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FOREWORD

The present publication is the latest in a series of volumes that have been issued annually since 1960. It contains basic documents on arms control and disarmament developments during the year. The work of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is described in the 11th annual report, which is printed at the end of the documentary material.

The papers are printed chronologically. They are preceded by a topical list of documents and followed by a chronological list. Other reference aids include a bibliography, an index, and lists of abbreviations, international organizations and conferences, and persons. The papers were compiled and annotated by Robert W. Lambert, Chief, Historical Division, with the assistance of Ruth Ihara, Jean Mayer, and Douglas Kline. Useful suggestions were also received from other officers of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

- A/—General Assembly¹
 ABM—antiballistic missile
 ABRES—advanced ballistic re-entry systems
 /AC—Ad Hoc Committee¹
 ACDA—U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
 AD—alliance defense
 ADB—Asian Development Bank
 Add.—addendum¹
 AEC—Atomic Energy Commission
 AECB—Atomic Energy Control Board
 AFB—Air Force Base
 AID—U.S. Agency for International Development
 ALPA—Alaskan Long Period Seismic Array
 AMSA—advanced manned strategic aircraft
 ARPA—Advanced Research Projects Agency
 ASM—air-to-surface missile
 ASW—antisubmarine warfare
 AWACS—airborne warning and control system
 B—(1) bacteriological,
 (2) biological
 Bevans—*Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, compiled under the direction of Charles I. Bevans.
 BG—Board of Governors¹
 BMD—ballistic missile defense
 BMEWS—ballistic missile early warning system
 BUIC—back-up interceptor control
 BW—biological warfare or weapon(s)
 C—(1) chemical, (2) committee¹
 C.1—First Committee¹
 CB—chemical and biological or bacteriological
 CBW—chemical and biological warfare or weapons
 CCC—Commodity Credit Corporation
 CCD—Conference of the Committee on Disarmament¹
 CCMS—Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society
 CIA—Central Intelligence Agency
 CIRC—circular¹
 CN—negotiating committee¹
 CNNWS—Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States
 Com.—Committee
 /Conf.—conference¹
 Cong.—Congress
 CONUS—continental United States
 COPREDAL—Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America¹
 Corr.—correction¹
 C.P.R.—Chinese People's Republic (People's Republic of China)
 CPSU—Communist Party of the Soviet Union
 CTB—comprehensive test ban
 CW—chemical warfare or weapon(s)
 CY—calendar year
 DC—(1) Disarmament Commission,¹
 (2) District of Columbia
 DOD—Department of Defense
 E/—Economic and Social Council¹
 ECM—electronic countermeasure(s)
 ENDC—Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee^{1, 2}
 EPR—electron paramagnetic resonance
 ESSA—Environmental Science Services Administration
 EURATOM—European Atomic Energy Community
 Ex.—Executive
 FFRDC—federally funded research and development centers
 F.R.G.—Federal Republic of Germany
 FTE—full-time equivalent
 FY—fiscal year
 G.A.—General Assembly
 GC—General Conference¹
 G.D.R.—German Democratic Republic³
 GNP—gross national product
 H.R.—House of Representatives
 HSD—hardsite defense
 IAEA—International Atomic Energy Agency
 IBRD—International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

- ICBM—intercontinental ballistic missile
 IDA—(1) International Development Association, (2) Institute for Defense Analyses
 IDB—International Development Bank
 IMI—improved manned interceptor
 INF—Information document¹
 IOC—initial operating capability
 IR—infrared
 IRBM—intermediate-range ballistic missile
 JCS—Joint Chiefs of Staff
 kt—kiloton
 kton—kiloton
 /L.—document¹
 LASA—Large Aperture Seismic Array
 LD—lethal dose
 LPZ—long-period vertical seismometer
 LTBT—limited test-ban treaty
 MBFR—mutual and balanced force reductions
 MIRV—multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle
 MIST—minor isotope safeguard techniques
 MLF—multilateral force
 MRBM—medium-range ballistic missile
 MR/IRBM—medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missile
 MRV—multiple reentry vehicle
 MSR—missile site radar
 MT—megaton
 MW—milliwatt
 n.a.—not available
 NAC—North Atlantic Council
 NASA—National Aeronautics and Space Administration
 NATO—North Atlantic Treaty Organization
 NCA—national command authority
 NMR—nuclear magnetic resonance
 NOAA—National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
 NORSAR—Norwegian Seismic Array
 NPT—non-proliferation treaty
 NSC—National Security Council
 OECD—Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
 OPANAL—Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America
 OTH—over-the-horizon radar
 P—preliminary
 P.L.—Public Law
 P-waves—elastic body waves
 PNE—peaceful nuclear explosion/explosive
 PPBS—Planning-Programming-Budgeting System
 PRC—People's Republic of China³
 prov.—provisional¹
 pt.—part
 pub.—publication, publisher
 /PV.—*proces verbal* (verbatim record)¹
 R-waves—Rayleigh surface waves
 R and D—research and development
 Rept.—report
 RES—resolution¹
 Rev.—revision, revised¹
 RIND—Research Institute of National Defense (Sweden)
 RV—reentry vehicle
 S.—Senate
 SALT—strategic arms limitation talks
 SAM—surface-to-air missile
 SC—Security Council¹
 SCAD—subsonic cruise armed decoy
 sec.—section
 sess.—session
 SG/SM—Secretary-General/summary¹
 SIPRI—Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
 SLBM—submarine-launched ballistic missile
 SPASUR—space surveillance system
 SR—summary record¹
 SRAM—short-range attack missile
 S.Res.—Senate resolution
 SS—surface-to-surface missile
 SSAB—Social Science Advisory Board
 SSBN—fleet ballistic missile submarine
 SSR—Soviet Socialist Republics
 TIAS—Treaties and Other International Acts Series
 TLC—thin-layer chromatography
 U.A.R.—United Arab Republic
 U.K.—United Kingdom
 ULMS—undersea long-range missile system
 U.N.—United Nations
 UNDP—United Nations Development Program
 UNESCO—United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
 U.N.G.A.—United Nations General Assembly
 UNITAR—United Nations Institute for Training and Research
 UNTS—United Nations Treaty Series
 U.S.—United States

USA—(1) United States of America, (2) U.S. Army	VRBM—variable-range ballistic missile
USAEC—U.S. Atomic Energy Commission	WDC—world disarmament conference
USAF—U.S. Air Force	/WG—working group ¹
U.S.C.—United States Code	WHA—World Health Assembly
USN—United States Navy	WHO—World Health Organization
U.S.S.R.—Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	WWSSN—World-Wide Standard Seismograph Network
UST—United States Treaties and Other International Agreements	

¹ Abbreviation used in documents of United Nations organs or international conferences served by the United Nations Secretariat.

² Title changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969.

³ Communist regime not recognized by the United States.

LIST OF PRINCIPAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

Established by the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.¹ Second session of General Conference, Sept. 7-9, 1971, in Mexico City. *Membership*: Barbados,² Bolivia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), 1969- (formerly Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament).

Announced at the United Nations, Dec. 13, 1961, and endorsed by General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), Dec. 20, 1961. Name changed to Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, Aug. 26, 1969. 19th session, Feb. 23-May 13, 1971; 20th session, June 29-Sept. 30, 1971, *Membership*: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, France,³ Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, the Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, U.A.R., U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia.⁴ *Permanent Co-Chairmen*: U.S. and Soviet representatives. *Committee of the Whole*: All members.⁵ *Subcommittee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests*: U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R.⁵

Disarmament Commission, 1952- .

Established by General Assembly resolution 502 (VI), Jan. 11, 1952. Since 1959 the Commission has comprised all U.N. members. It did not meet in 1970.

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 1956- .

Established by Statute of Oct. 26, 1956. *Membership*: 102 in 1971. 15th session of General Conference, Sept. 21-27, 1971, in Vienna. *Group of Experts on the Question of International Observation of Peaceful Nuclear Explosions*: Established by IAEA in response to General Assembly resolution 2605 B (XXIV) of Dec. 19, 1969, to advise the Director-General regarding international observation of peaceful nuclear explosions in accordance with art. V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Second international technical meeting, Jan. 18-22, 1971, in Vienna, on contained (underground) peaceful nuclear explosions. *Participants*: Experts from more than 20 countries, including Argentina, Austria, France, India, Mexico, U.S.S.R., U.K. *IAEA Safeguards Committee* (1970-1971): Established by IAEA Board of Governors, Apr. 6, 1970, to draw up guidelines for safeguards agreements with parties to the nonproliferation treaty. Announced completion of its work, Mar. 11, 1971.⁶ *Membership*: Open to all IAEA members.

¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69-83.

² Barbados did not attend the General Conference.

³ France has not participated.

⁴ For the original membership prior to the 1969 enlargement, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, p. xvii.

⁵ Has not met since 1962.

⁶ For the guidelines, see *post*, pp. 218-244.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Announced July 1, 1968. Fourth session, Mar. 15-May 28, 1971, in Vienna. Fifth session, July 8-Sept. 24, 1971, Helsinki. Sixth session, Nov. 15, 1971-Feb. 4, 1972, Vienna.

United Nations General Assembly.

Twenty-sixth session, Sept. 21-Dec. 22, 1971.

Letter From the Supreme Soviet to the Mexican Senate: Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty, January 4, 1971¹

To the President of the Senate of Mexico
Mr. Enrique Olivarez Santana
Mexico City

Sir,

The appeal of the Senate of the United Mexican States dated 14 September 1970 on the question of the establishment of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone² has been carefully considered.

In connexion with this appeal we deem it necessary to state the following.

As the Senate of Mexico probably knows, there has been an exchange of views between the Governments of the Soviet Union and Mexico on the question of a Latin American nuclear-weapon-free zone and during the course of their exchange the Soviet Government stated its position on this question in detail.

The Soviet Union took note of the fact that, on the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, the Government of Mexico stated that it intended to seek a solution which would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It subsequently found such a solution in the signature and ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.³

The Soviet Union also took note of the fact that the Government of Mexico does not intend to allow the transport (transit) of nuclear weapons through its territory and that it extends the statute of denuclearization to the whole territory of Mexico, including its land, air space and territorial waters the limit of which has been established in accordance with international law at twelve nautical miles.

In view of this position of the Government of Mexico, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, on instructions from the Soviet Government, informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mexico that the Soviet Union was ready to undertake a commitment to respect the status of Mexico as a completely nuclear-weapon-free zone provided that the other nuclear Powers, too, undertook a commitment to respect that status.

If other Latin American States, following Mexico's example, also genuinely turn their territories into completely nuclear-

¹ A/8336/Rev. 1, July 8, 1971. Ambassador Malik sent the letter to Secretary-General Thant on June 23, 1971. For the protocol, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 83.

² Not printed here.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

weapon-free zones, they too can count on the same respect from the Soviet Union for the status of their territories as completely nuclear-weapon-free zones; this will be possible only if other nuclear Powers, too, undertake the same commitments.

In undertaking such commitments, the Soviet Union would at the same time reserve its right to reconsider them in the event of any State in respect of which the Soviet Union undertakes such a commitment perpetrating aggression or being an accomplice to aggression.

This is the position of the Soviet Union on the question raised in the appeal of the Senate of Mexico.

*Chairman of the Soviet of the Union
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*

A. Shitikov

*Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities
of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR*

Y. Nasriddinova

Moscow

4 January 1971

News Conference Remarks by President Nixon [Extract], January 4, 1971¹

Mrs. Dickerson. Mr. President, I'd like to ask you an overall question about our relations with the Communists. When you took office, you said this was going to be an era of negotiation, not confrontation. But in reality, haven't we returned to something of a cold war situation in regard to our relations with the Soviets? And how were our relations affected by their duplicity during the Middle East crisis when they helped rebuild the missile sites?

The President. Well, Mrs. Dickerson, when we talk about an era of negotiation rather than confrontation, we must remember that negotiation means exactly that. It means that you have two parties that have very great differences with regard to their vital interests, and the negotiation process will sometimes be very, very extended. It doesn't mean that we're going to have—negotiation does not necessarily mean agreement.

Now, let's be quite specific. Mr. Kosygin in his statement just a couple of days ago to the Japanese newspaperman, as you know, complained about our policy in Vietnam as he has previously, he complained about our policy in the Mideast.

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 11, 1971, pp. 38-40.

We, of course, have been concerned about their movements in the Caribbean. We have been concerned by what you mentioned, their own activities in the Mideast, and, of course, we have been concerned about their continuing harassment from time to time of the Berlin access routes.

Nevertheless, on the plus side, let's see what has happened. Over the past 2 years the United States and the Soviet Union have been negotiating. We have been negotiating, for example, on arms control. Those negotiations will begin again in Helsinki in March. I am optimistic that we will reach an agreement eventually. I do not suggest now that we are going to have a comprehensive agreement, because there is a basic disagreement with regard to what strategic weapons—what that definition is.

But we are now willing to move to a non-comprehensive agreement. We are going to be able to discuss that with the Soviet in the next round at Helsinki.

I am not predicting that we are going to have an agreement next month or 2 months from now or 3 months from now. But in terms of arms control, we have some overwhelming forces that are going to bring about an agreement eventually, and it is simply this: The Soviet Union and the United States have a common interest in avoiding the escalating burden of arms—you know that they have even cut down on their SS-9 and big missile deployment lately and development—and, second, the Soviet Union and the United States have an overwhelming common interest in avoiding nuclear competition which could lead to nuclear destruction.

So, in this field, I think we are going to make some progress. In the Mideast it is true we are far apart, but we are having discussions. On Berlin we are far apart, but we are negotiating. And finally, with regard to the rhetoric—and the rhetoric in international affairs does make a difference—the rhetoric, while it has been firm, has generally been non-inflammatory on our part and on theirs.

So, I am not without the confidence that I had at the beginning. I always realized that our differences were very great, that it was going to take time. But the United States and the Soviet Union owe it to their own people and the people of the world, as the super-powers, to negotiate rather than to confront.

POSSIBILITY OF SUMMIT TALKS

Mrs. Dickerson. Mr. President, you always have put a certain value on personal diplomacy. Do you think this would be a good time for you personally to talk with some of the Russian leaders? Do you think it's a good time to have a summit, of sorts?

The President. Mrs. Dickerson, as you know, I have had conversations with the Russian leaders through the years, and, of course, with Ambassador Dobrynin, a very skilled diplomat here in Washington, and with Mr. Gromyko when he was here.

Now, as far as another meeting is concerned, a meeting at a

higher level, that is a matter that has been speculated about. If it appears at some time that a meeting of that type would be what is needed to bring about the final consummation in one of these areas, for example, the SALT talks, or the Mideast, or the rest, we will certainly have such a meeting.

But unless there is the chance for progress, a summit talk is not in their interest and it is not in our interest, and not in the interest of world peace. It creates a false sense of security.

THE MIDDLE EAST

Mr. Severeid. Mr. President, we have no formal alliance with the State of Israel. But isn't it really a fact that we are now so deeply committed morally to the Israelis that if they were in unmistakable danger of defeat wouldn't we have to intervene?

The President. Mr. Severeid, to speculate on that question would not really be in the interests of peace in that area, as I see them at this point. Let's look how far we have come. We have had a cease-fire for 5 months, no killing, and for 3 or 4 years before that there were killings every day in that part of the world.

Second, as you know, the Israelis have gone back to the Jarring talks and also the other side will be there. That doesn't mean that the prospect for an early agreement is very great. It does mean, however, that there is some chance that there will be discussion.

And, third, it seems to me that we must take into account the fact that the people in that part of the world, the people of Israel, the people in the countries that are Israel's neighbors, that they are overwhelmingly on the side of peace—they want peace. Their leaders are going to have to reflect it.

I think that we are at a critical time in the Mideast, a critical time over the next few months when we may get these talks off dead center, make some progress toward a live-and-let-live attitude. Not progress that is going to bring a situation where the Israelis and their neighbors are going to like each other. That isn't ever going to happen, perhaps. But where they will live with each other, where they won't be fighting each other.

Now, to speculate about what is going to happen in the event that Israel is going to go down the tube would only tend to inflame the situation with Israel's neighbors. And I won't do it.

Mr. Severeid. Would it, Mr. President, calm the situation and help the prospects for peace if we did have some formal alliance with the State of Israel?

The President. No, I don't believe so, because I think that what we are doing for Israel is so well known to them, and also incidentally it is quite well known to their neighbors, that it provides the balance that is needed.

We just provided a \$500 million aid program for Israel. I say "aid"—they are going to be able to purchase weapons to that extent. We have made it clear time and again that we would help to maintain the balance of power in the area, so that Israel would

not be in a position that its neighbors could overwhelm them with their superior manpower or with the forces that they got from the Soviet Union. But I do not believe that a formal alliance would be—is either necessary or would be in the interest of peace in the area.

Mr. Smith. The kind of thing that bothers me is the tendency towards adventurism in that part of the world by the Russians. They are manning the SAM sites, and last summer—it wasn't widely publicized, but eight Israeli jets were on patrol, they ran into eight Egyptian MIG's, there was a fight and over the radio they heard they weren't Egyptians, they were Russian-piloted MIG's. The score was four Russians shot down.

But how frightfully dangerous that is. If the Russians had been tempted to retaliate, then it could have become terribly complicated.

The President. Mr. Smith, you will remember in the last 5 minutes of our conversation a year ago²—we didn't get to the Mideast till the last 5 minutes—but I mentioned this very point, that the key to peace in the Mideast is held by several people: first, the parties involved, the Israelis and their neighbors, primarily the U.A.R. and Jordan. But second, the key to peace is in the hands of the Soviet Union, the United States, Great Britain, France—the four major powers.

If the Soviet Union does not play a conciliatory peace-making role, there is no chance for peace in the Mideast, because if the Soviet Union continues to fuel the war arsenals of Israel's neighbors, Israel will have no choice but to come to the United States for us to maintain the balance to which Mr. Severeid referred. And we will maintain that balance.

That is why it is important at this time that the Soviet Union and the United States as well as Britain and France all join together in a process of not having additional arms and additional activities go into that area, because that will only mean that it produces the possibility of a future confrontation.

This is the time to talk. Let me say one other thing with regard to the talk. I would hesitate to give advice to other nations as they enter such delicate talks, but I am sure of this: These talks will have no chance for success if they are done in a public forum. It is very important that it be done quietly, because every time an offer is made or a suggestion is made, it is talked about in the parliaments of one country or another, on the radio—you can forget it. So if these talks can be quietly conducted, there is a chance for success, and in the end we want to remember that the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and France must all be, and I think will be, in a position to guarantee whatever settlement is made through the United Nations.

² See *ibid.*, July 6, 1970, p. 869.

CUBA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Mr. Chancellor. Sir, can I take you to Cuba?

Last October, just before we all left with you on your European trip, one of your aides here spoke about the potential of a grave threat in Cuba if the Russians introduced what apparently was a submarine missile base, a tender to serve nuclear submarines. Can you tell us what's going on there? Apparently there is a tender there. Will we react if the tender services a submarine in the harbor, or what happens? Can you tell us about that?

The President. Well, I can tell you everything that our intelligence tells us, and we think it is very good in that area, because, as you know, we have surveillance from the air, which in this case is foolproof, we believe.

First, let's look at what the understanding is. President Kennedy worked out an understanding in 1962 that the Russians would not put any offensive missiles into Cuba. That understanding was expanded on October the 11th [13th] of this year by the Russians when they said that it would include a military base in Cuba, and a military naval base. They, in effect, said that they would not put a military naval base into Cuba, on October the 11th [13th].

Now, in the event that nuclear submarines were serviced either in Cuba or from Cuba, that would be a violation of the understanding. That has not happened yet. We are watching the situation closely.

The Soviet Union is aware of the fact that we are watching it closely. We expect them to abide by the understanding. I believe they will.

Mr. Chancellor. Could we be close to a crisis, sir, if they begin doing that?

The President. I don't believe that they want a crisis in the Caribbean, and I don't believe that one is going to occur, particularly since the understanding has been so clearly laid out and has been so clearly relied on by us and as I stated here today.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rogers on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extracts], January 29, 1971¹

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to disarmament: Shortly before the SALT talks began, the administration proposed an ABM on the grounds that it was needed to defend against possible Chinese attack, to protect the Minutemen, and to guard against accidental

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Feb. 15, 1971, pp. 196-197.

attack. Earlier this week, the Pentagon indicated that there might be a slowdown in the ABM program, and that SALT was one consideration.

Could you say, sir, whether it will be acceptable to the United States to have an agreement with the Soviet Union on ABM's alone around Washington and Moscow? And, if so, what would happen to the rationale, the reasons for needing to defend against China, the Minutemen, and against accidental attack?

A. Yes. The position of the United States in the SALT talks has been, from the beginning, that we favored agreement including both offensive and defensive missiles. We also have made an attempt to—in fact, we have not discussed the negotiations themselves.

As far as the decisions about the budgetary requirements of ABM, those decisions have not been finalized.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think it is possible to have a Soviet-American agreement curbing or in any way limiting multiple warheads on missiles without having on-site inspection?

A. I don't want to go into the negotiating process itself. We think it is possible, if the Soviet Union wants a SALT agreement, that we can achieve an agreement. It is quite clear that the efforts to do this are very complex. They are very difficult both for the Russians and for us.

We are quite satisfied that the recent talks were somewhat unproductive because we think possibly the Soviet Union is waiting for the party congress. We don't know. But I think this: I think any agreement is possible if both the Soviet Union and the United States want it. Whether it is a practical matter that can be worked out or not, we don't know yet.

The press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, February 11, 1971¹

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the common interest of mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of the seabed and the ocean floor for peaceful purposes,

Considering that the prevention of a nuclear-arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining

¹ S. Ex. H, 92d Cong., 1st sess. The treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow on Feb. 11, 1971. It was approved by the U.S. Senate on Feb. 15, 1972, by a vote of 83 to 0, and ratified by the President on Apr. 26, 1972. It entered into force on May 18, 1972, when the U.K., the U.S., and the USSR deposited their instruments of ratification at Washington, London, and Moscow.

world peace, reduces international tensions and strengthens friendly relations among States,

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards the exclusion of the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof from the arms race,

Convinced that this Treaty constitutes a step towards a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Convinced that this Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, in a manner consistent with the principles of international law and without infringing the freedoms of the high seas,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to emplant or emplace on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a seabed zone, as defined in article II, any nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction as well as structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons.

2. The undertakings of paragraph 1 of this article shall also apply to the seabed zone referred to in the same paragraph, except that within such seabed zone, they shall not apply either to the coastal State or to the seabed beneath its territorial waters.

3. The States Parties to this Treaty undertake not to assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and not to participate in any other way in such actions.

Article II

For the purpose of this Treaty, the outer limit of the seabed zone referred to in article I shall be coterminous with the twelve-mile outer limit of the zone referred to in part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, signed at Geneva on April 29, 1958,² and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of part I, section II, of that Convention and in accordance with international law.

Article III

1. In order to promote the objectives of and insure compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each State Party to the Treaty shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other States Parties to the Treaty on the seabed and the ocean

² 15 UST 1606.

floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the zone referred to in article I, provided that observation does not interfere with such activities.

2. If after such observation reasonable doubts remain concerning the fulfillment of the obligations assumed under the Treaty, the State Party having such doubts and the State Party that is responsible for the activities giving rise to the doubts shall consult with a view to removing the doubts. If the doubts persist, the State Party having such doubts shall notify the other States Parties, and the Parties concerned shall cooperate on such further procedures for verification as may be agreed, including appropriate inspection of objects, structures, installations or other facilities that reasonably may be expected to be of a kind described in article I. The Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and any other Party so requesting, shall be entitled to participate in such consultation and cooperation. After completion of the further procedures for verification, an appropriate report shall be circulated to other Parties by the Party that initiated such procedures.

3. If the State responsible for the activities giving rise to the reasonable doubts is not identifiable by observation of the object, structure, installation or other facility, the State Party having such doubts shall notify and make appropriate inquiries of States Parties in the region of the activities and of any other State Party. If it is ascertained through these inquiries that a particular State Party is responsible for the activities, that State Party shall consult and cooperate with other Parties as provided in paragraph 2 of this article. If the identity of the State responsible for the activities cannot be ascertained through these inquiries, then further verification procedures, including inspection, may be undertaken by the inquiring State Party, which shall invite the participation of the Parties in the region of the activities, including any coastal State, and of any other Party desiring to cooperate.

4. If consultation and cooperation pursuant to paragraphs 2 and 3 of this article have not removed the doubts concerning fulfillment of the obligations assumed under this Treaty, a State Party may, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refer the matter to the Security Council, which may take action in accordance with the Charter.

5. Verification pursuant to this article may be undertaken by any State Party using its own means, or with the full or partial assistance of any other State Party, or through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

6. Verification activities pursuant to this Treaty shall not interfere with activities of other States Parties and shall be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedoms of the high seas and the rights

of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.

Article IV

Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any State Party with respect to existing international conventions, including the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, or with respect to rights or claims which such State Party may assert, or with respect to recognition or nonrecognition of rights or claims asserted by any other State, related to waters off its coasts, including, *inter alia*, territorial seas and contiguous zones, or to the seabed and the ocean floor, including continental shelves.

Article V

The Parties to this Treaty undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.

Article VI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and, thereafter, for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article VII

Five years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. Such review shall take into account any relevant technological developments. The review conference shall determine, in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending, whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

Article VIII

Each State Party to this Treaty shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it considers to have jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article IX

The provisions of this Treaty shall in no way affect the obligations assumed by States Parties to the Treaty under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

Article X

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, of the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, of the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and of the receipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XI

This Treaty, the English, Russian, French, Spanish and Chinese texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.

Done in triplicate, at the cities of Washington, London and Moscow, this eleventh day of February, one thousand nine hundred seventy-one.

Remarks by President Nixon on the Signature of the Sea-Bed Treaty, February 11, 1971³

Mr. Secretary, your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen:

It has been very properly pointed out that the seabed is man's last frontier on earth, and that frontier can either be a source of peril or promise.

By the signing of this treaty, we have pledged to seek its promise and to remove its peril. And as has been pointed out by the Ambassador from the United Kingdom and the Ambassador from the U.S.S.R., while this is a modest step among many in the field of control of armaments, it is an indication of progress that has been made and continues to be made toward the goal that we all seek: the control of instruments of mass destruction, so that we can reduce the danger of war.

Certainly, speaking for the United States of America, I pledge that as we sign this treaty in an era of negotiation, that we consider it only one step toward a greater goal: the control of nuclear weapons on earth and the reduction of that danger that hangs over all the nations of the world as long as those weapons are not controlled.

And as our representatives go back to Vienna in just a few weeks, we certainly hope that they will make progress. I can assure all of those gathered here that we seek, as does the Soviet Union and other nations, we seek an agreement there which will reduce the danger of nuclear war which hangs over the world and reduce it by controlling the nuclear arms, both as far as the Soviet Union is concerned and the United States.

And so on this occasion I reiterate that while the Ambassador from Great Britain quite properly said this was a modest step, it is an important step when we consider it in all of the aspects of the progress that has been made beginning in the sixties, now continuing in this decade.

We hope that we will be meeting perhaps in the future, perhaps in this room, perhaps in some other room in some other capital, for the final great step in the control of nuclear arms, the control of nuclear arms on earth.

Statement by Premier Kosygin on the Signing of the Sea-Bed Treaty, February 11, 1971¹

Comrades, gentlemen--allow me, on behalf of the Soviet government, to express satisfaction that the signing of the Treaty

³ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 15, 1971, pp. 211-212. The treaty appears *supra*.

¹ *Pravda*, Feb. 12, 1971, p. 1; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 6 (Mar. 9, 1971), p. 13.

on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof² is beginning today. This important international document was approved by the 25th session of the United Nations General Assembly.³ The conclusion of the treaty on the seabed is without doubt a positive act in international life.

Scientific and technical progress has made it possible to begin the development by man of a new part of the planet, one that until recently was closed to him—the seabed and the ocean floor. But at the same time, possibilities have been created for the emplacement there of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. Obviously, such a utilization of the seabed would expand the scope of the arms race. It is necessary to prevent this development in good time. After all, as experience shows, it is far more difficult to halt the arms race where it is already under way than to ban its development in new environments.

The treaty we are signing today is called upon to prevent the emplacement of the most dangerous types of weapons on the seabed. At the same time, the treaty provides for continued negotiations on further steps aimed at preventing a race in other types of arms on the seabed and the ocean floor. The Soviet government proceeds from the premise that this treaty is the first important step on the path to the complete demilitarization of the seabed and, on its part, is ready to exert efforts for the accomplishment of this task.

The treaty on the seabed, which imposes restrictions primarily on the nuclear powers, proceeds from the interests of safeguarding the security of all countries and peoples. Therefore, it will promote an easing of international tension and an improvement in relations between states. The treaty will also facilitate the creation of better preconditions for the peaceful utilization of the seabed and for the development of its riches.

The treaty on the seabed is another partial measure dealing with the problem of disarmament. The Soviet Union, together with the other socialist countries, is waging a persistent struggle against the arms race and for a ban on nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons, for the dismantling of foreign military bases and for the resolution of other disarmament questions. As we have repeatedly stated, we would welcome an agreement in the field of strategic arms limitation.

The conclusion of the treaty on the seabed, like that of other international agreements aimed at limiting the arms race, such as, for example, the treaty on a partial ban on nuclear tests⁴ and the treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons,⁵ was not an easy thing. In the drafting of these treaties, naturally, there were

² *Ibid.*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 680-681.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

difficulties and differences in the positions taken by the participants in the negotiations. But, as experience shows, a path to the achievement of an understanding can be found. As far as the Soviet government is concerned, it will continue to spare no efforts to find solutions to urgent problems connected with ending the arms race and achieving disarmament.

Needless to say, such acts as this treaty can serve peace in full measure if the practical activity of states in the field of foreign policy is determined by the goals of maintaining and consolidating peace, not of intensifying international tension and aggression.

In conclusion, allow me to express the hope that the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof will be signed and ratified by a very wide range of states and that it will enter into force in the immediate future.

The Soviet Union is signing this treaty because it corresponds to the unchanging goal of the Leninist foreign policy of our state—the strengthening of peace and the safeguarding of the people's security.

Bucharest Communique of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers [Extracts], February 19, 1971¹

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Pact states—the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—took place in Bucharest Feb. 18 and 19.

Guided by the Statement on Questions of the Strengthening of Security and the Development of Peaceful Cooperation in Europe that the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Pact states adopted at its conference of Dec. 2, 1970, in Berlin,² the Ministers exchanged information and opinions on the progress of preparations for convening an all-European conference. . . .

In the present conditions, the Foreign Ministers have found it both possible and necessary to approach specific questions practically and constructively, with an eye to accelerating the holding of a conference on security and cooperation in Europe.

The efforts recently undertaken by states supporting the convocation of an all-European conference, it was noted, have facilitated progress in preparing the conference. During bilateral

¹ *Pravda*, Feb. 20, 1971, p. 4; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 8 (Mar. 23, 1971), p. 19.

² *Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1970, p. 1; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXII, no. 49 (Jan. 5, 1971), pp. 2-3.

contacts, conditions have been created for the transition to preparatory work on a multilateral basis. The present task is not to delay the transition to this new and more active phase of preparation of the all-European conference.

The socialist countries represented at the conference reaffirmed their support of the Finnish government's proposal for all interested states to hold preparatory meetings in Helsinki, as well as that government's readiness to participate in such meetings at any time and to delegate its appropriate representatives for these purposes. The Foreign Ministers stressed that the prompt holding of such preparatory meetings is called for by the necessity of turning to the practical preparation of the all-European conference and would make it possible to discuss and agree on questions connected with convening the conference.

At the same time, attention was drawn to the fact that those circles which are not interested in the deepening of the detente in Europe are intensifying the opposition to convocation of the all-European conference. This opposition manifests itself in the setting of various preliminary conditions in order to complicate the preparatory work and to link the question of convening the conference with other problems, thus creating a serious obstacle to convening the conference. The decisions of the recent NATO Council session in Brussels³ are directed toward the pursuit of this line and the intensification of the arms race in Europe. All this retards the development of favorable processes in Europe which accord with the interests of the peoples of the European continent and with the interest of peace.

In this situation the need arises for adopting additional measures for the elimination of artificial obstacles to the convening of the all-European conference. On the instructions of their governments, the Foreign Ministers reassert the firm resolve of the states participating in the present conference to push for the earliest possible completion of the preparatory work for the convening of the all-European conference. The governments of these countries call on the governments of all interested states to exert further efforts in this direction.

The socialist countries represented at the conference will go on exerting constructive efforts in the direction of developing normal and mutually advantageous relations among all the states of the continent: they will continue to advocate the establishment and consolidation of an atmosphere of peace, an end to the arms race, and detente and cooperation in Europe and the whole world.

The Warsaw Pact states consider it important to reemphasize that the establishment of equal relations between the German Democratic Republic and other states which have not yet established such relations is of great significance for the cause of

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 667-676.

European and international security. Relations based on generally accepted norms of international law should be established between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. The ending of opposition to the G.D.R.'s admission to the U.N. and other international organizations would also serve the interests of detente. The participants in the conference consider it their fraternal duty to give the G.D.R. every assistance in these matters and will take appropriate steps in this respect.

Testimony of Admiral Moorer Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Additional Protocol II to the Tlatelolco Treaty [Extracts], February 23, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, I welcome the opportunity of appearing before this committee to discuss the military implications of the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.²

The Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to acknowledge the unique and special relationship which has historically existed between our country and the nations of Latin America. Our common interests and understanding contribute meaningfully to our mutual security.

We have followed with interest the development of the nuclear free zone of Latin America, as set forth in this treaty. We have participated in various considerations relevant to Protocol II and the formulation of the accompanying interpretative statement.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff understand that the interpretative statement which was an integral part of the U.S. signature of Protocol II on April 1, 1968,³ has received international acceptance. Further, we understand that the Additional Protocol II, with its accompanying interpretative statement which is currently being considered for ratification, would be accorded the same international acceptance.

With these understandings in mind, we would be assured of the continuance of the right of the United States to historic transit and transport privileges throughout the Latin American area, including military overflights and naval ship visits, without regard to the question of the presence of nuclear weapons aboard our aircraft or naval vessels.

In view of these considerations, the Joint Chiefs of Staff interpose no objection to the ratification of Additional Protocol II

¹ *Additional Protocol II to the Latin American Nuclear Free Zone Treaty: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, Second Session, and Ninety-second Congress, First Session, on Executive H, 91st Congress, 2d Session*, pp. 36, 38-40.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 83.

³ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 204-205.

to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

As you noted, I gave you three points that we were interested in. First, the definition of the territorial seas; second, the transit privileges for U.S. ships and aircraft; and third, the limitation on our nonuse of nuclear weapon undertakings.

First, let me discuss the definition of the territorial seas. Article 3 of the treaty provides that the term "territory" should include the territorial seas as defined by the national legislation.⁴ I emphasize the word "national."

As you are aware, it is our view that the limits of the territorial sea can only be set by the international community and its limits cannot be set by national legislation. Therefore, our first interpretative statement made the point that this treaty and its protocols would have no effect upon territorial sea claims.

Secondly, with respect to the problem of transit during the drafting sessions of the treaty, Mr. Chairman, Argentina advised that it wished a prohibition against the transit and deployment of nuclear weapons to be included in the treaty. Although the commission refused to adopt the Argentine position, nevertheless, the language of the treaty did not make it plain whether or not ships or aircraft with nuclear weapons which were in transit were prohibited in the Latin American area.

As you are aware, it is U.S. policy to neither confirm nor deny whether or not there are nuclear weapons within our ships or aircraft. If there were a treaty prohibition concerning transit, it is clear that this would adversely affect the movement of our military forces in the Latin American area. Therefore, the Joint Chiefs of Staff wished to leave no doubt as to the meaning of the Treaty.

The interpretative statement on transit made it plain that each of the Latin American countries would continue to have the exclusive right to decide for themselves whether or not a U.S. military ship or aircraft could enter their country in a transit status, keeping in mind the U.S. policy of neither confirming nor denying the presence of nuclear weapons.

Perhaps stated differently, we wanted to be sure that no one believed the treaty took away from the Latin American states their sovereign right to let our ships or aircraft enter their ports or fields in a transit status.

With respect to the third point, Mr. Chairman, the nonuse provision, the JCS do not generally favor a nonuse nuclear weapon provision in any agreement. This is so since such an undertaking could have an adverse effect upon the credibility of our nuclear deterrence. We were willing, however, to apply such a nonuse

⁴*Ibid.*, 1967, p. 71.

provision to Latin America because of the historic and special relationship that Latin America has to the United States and because of the traditional solidarity and mutual security interests between ourselves and our good neighbors to the south.

It should be understood our understanding of nonuse applies only to those who undertake the obligation of the treaty and forego the presence of nuclear weapons in their territory. The United States has no obligation to countries such as Cuba, which do not become parties to the treaty. Also nonuse is contingent upon parties abiding by their promise. If nuclear weapons were brought into a contracting country or the party made an armed attack and was assisted by a nuclear weapons state, we believe both would violate the treaty obligations and we wanted to make this point clear, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Thank you very much for that statement.

DEPLOYMENT IN TERRITORIAL SEA OR AIRSPACE

With reference to articles 1 and 3 of the treaty, how would you define deployment? What would constitute deployment in the territorial sea or airspace of the Latin American nations? Would it be correct, for example, to say that the presence of a nuclear equipped naval vessel in the territorial seas of a given nation would not constitute deployment in the sense of article 1 of the treaty?

Admiral Moorer. If it is in a transit or visit status, sir, that is correct. It does not constitute deployment.

Senator Sparkman. Would the United States object to visits by Soviet naval units with nuclear capability to Latin American ports? Would this be considered by the United States to be a violation of either the letter or spirit of the treaty? Would the establishment of a nuclear submarine base in a Latin American country constitute a violation of the treaty?

Admiral Moorer. Well, sir, you have asked me two questions. With respect to the visits, that would not be prohibited under the terms of the treaty.

With respect to establishment of a base, that would constitute a deployment or a presence. In that case it would constitute a violation of the treaty.

BRINGING TREATY INTO FORCE IN ENTIRE ZONE

Senator Sparkman. Very well. Admiral Moorer, why would it not be to the advantage of the United States to seek to bring the treaty into force throughout the entire treaty zone? I may say parenthetically if this were possible it would preclude, for example, the deployment of nuclear weapons in Cuba. Would the exclusion of Soviet weapons from the area not be worth our giving up the option of placing such weapons in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands?

Admiral Moorer. Well, sir, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not

considered this aspect because it deals with Protocol I.⁵ However, I would be very happy to discuss with the Committee in closed session the security problems involved with respect to the question you have asked, sir.

Senator Sparkman. Fine, thank you.

STATUS OF PANAMA CANAL ZONE

What is the status of the Panama Canal Zone with regard to the treaty? Would ratification of the treaty by Panama and waiver under paragraph 2, article 28, bring the treaty into force for the Canal Zone?

Admiral Moorer. Well, sir, it would have no legal effect, although Panama, which has signed but not yet ratified the treaty, can be expected to assert that the Canal Zone comes under the terms of the treaty because it is part of the territory of Panama.

As you know, Panama is the titular sovereign of the Canal Zone. However, under existing treaties the United States exercises all rights and powers as if it were sovereign, to the entire exclusion of the exercise by the Republic of Panama of any such sovereign rights.

Thus, U.S. consent is necessary to the extension of any legal obligations to the Canal Zone.

However, sir, I would like to emphasize that the U.S. Government has indicated that we would be agreeable to including the Panama Canal Zone and we expect that ultimately it will be included.

In the meantime, we are prepared to act consistent with the spirit of the treaty. We have not deployed nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone and have no intention of doing so. We would, of course, maintain well-established transit rights for our naval ships in the Canal.

Message From President Nixon to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, February 23, 1971¹

Today the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament begins a new session of work in the vital fields of Arms Control and Disarmament.

On this occasion, once again I want to convey my thoughts to you directly because of my conviction that few areas of endeavour go so deeply to the heart of the concerns and the aspirations of all nations as the search for restraints on armaments. Sound limitations on armaments can enhance international stability and increase the security of all countries; they can reduce the

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

¹ CCD/319, Feb. 23, 1971.

economic burden of armaments; and they can lay the ground-work for productive international cooperation in other areas.

The achievements of this Committee during the past decade have been significant, including, notably, the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty,² and most recently a Seabed Arms Control Treaty³ which was overwhelmingly commended by the UN General Assembly⁴ and signed earlier this month by a substantial number of States.

The tasks before the Committee are very important to world security. As in the past, genuine progress can best be made through patient and careful work toward mutually beneficial measures. Opportunities for such progress can and must be realized.

I believe that an opportunity for progress exists in the field of chemical and biological weapons. Despite differences of approach, there appears to be a fundamental area of agreement and common interest in the CCD regarding this problem. All members desire the greatest possible advance in achieving effective restraints on these weapons. All members are aware that such progress will enhance their own security and international security in general.

An agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons should serve these objectives. Because of the rapid transmission of contagious diseases, particularly with modern means of communications, any use of biological weapons—by any State in any conflict anywhere in the world—could endanger the people of every country. Additional restraints on biological weapons would thus contribute to the security of all peoples. A prohibition against the possession of biological weapons could also have far-reaching benefits of another character. It could encourage international cooperation in the peaceful application of biological research, a field which may lead to immeasurable advances in the health and well-being of peoples everywhere.

With respect to chemical weapons the objective situation is different. Unless countries can have assurance that other parties to an agreement will no longer possess chemical weapons, there will not be a basis for a sound and reliable arms control measure. It is this basic fact that determines the approach of the United States.

The common task with respect to chemical weapons now is to find solutions to the difficult problems of verification. We are determined to pursue this task. And, in any biological weapons convention, we will support an unambiguous commitment engaging all parties to undertake further negotiations regarding limitations on chemical weapons.

Important efforts are being made to move ahead in other areas

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

³ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 680-681.

of arms limitation. The need for restraints on nuclear arms is universally recognized. Negotiations to achieve limitations are continuing through the bilateral strategic arms talks. It is our earnest hope that these crucial talks will result in positive and substantial arms limitations.

The General Assembly has requested this Committee to continue as a matter of urgency its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. It also called attention to the need to improve worldwide seismological capabilities in order to facilitate such a ban.⁵ The United States will continue to support these efforts, particularly those designed to achieve a greater understanding of the verification issue.

At the same time, I hope that increasing attention will be given to the question of arms limitation with respect to conventional weapons. When such a vast proportion of all expenditures on armaments is being devoted to these weapons, all States, in all stages of development, share a common interest in exploring the possible paths toward sound agreements consistent with their security interests. The Seabed Treaty demonstrated, as have other arms control agreements negotiated during the past decade, that steadfastness in the pursuit of common goals can lead to tangible results. When we have worked toward measures in the interests of all, we have succeeded in resolving differences and overcoming obstacles that seemed great. Let us continue to do so.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, February 23, 1971¹

The Committee on Disarmament is resuming its work after thorough consideration of disarmament problems at the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly last autumn. In the course of the debate on disarmament issues the General Assembly dealt with a wide range of problems regarding both individual partial measures in this field and general and complete disarmament. In this connexion the greatest attention was given to the draft treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof² and the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, as well as to problems of general and complete disarmament.

15. Many delegations to the Assembly expressed their concern and their dissatisfaction over the slow progress in reaching agreement on and accomplishing partial disarmament measures,

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 685-687.

¹ CCD/PV.495, pp. 10-19.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 475-479.

and the lack of any forward movement towards the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet side fully shares that concern, and believes that the most important task is to invigorate the negotiations so as to speed up the accomplishment of both general and partial disarmament measures. The development of the present international situation is characterized by a headlong arms race, which absorbs enormous manpower and material resources and at the same time leads to an aggravation of international tension. At meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and at sessions of the General Assembly figures were cited regarding the tremendous growth in military expenditures which, over the last two decades, increased fourfold from \$51,000 million in 1949 to \$200,000 million in 1969.

16. Those figures show most convincingly that the arms race is continuing at an ever-increasing rate. Moreover, there is a real danger that the arms race will be driven by imperialist forces into a new, higher spiral. The continuing arms race is fraught with enormous danger. Its impact upon international relations is in present conditions more harmful than ever before. It can easily be imagined what the development of modern means of warfare, the build-up of the most sophisticated strategic weapons, may lead to. All this could be a stimulus to the fostering of aggressive designs and wild illusions regarding the possibility of using means of warfare to achieve political aims. In present conditions one must also take into consideration the increased danger of an accidental outbreak of war as a result of error, faulty equipment and so on.

17. In the light of these factors, all the efforts that are being made towards a limitation of the arms race, the reduction of armaments and disarmament assume particularly great importance. These efforts should be intensified to the maximum. Taking into account the General Assembly debates in the course of which delegations expounded their positions on disarmament problems, and also taking into account the events that have occurred in the international sphere, the main direction of the work of the Committee, in the opinion of the Soviet side, should be concentrated on continuing the negotiations to reach agreement on individual partial disarmament measures on the one hand and on solving the problem of general and complete disarmament on the other. In doing so the Committee should give due attention to the implementation of those partial measures which have already been agreed upon.

18. As far as individual disarmament measures are concerned, it can be noted with satisfaction that some progress has been achieved over the last few years. In the past decade, 1960 to 1970, a number of treaties have been concluded on the implementation of certain measures to curb the arms race, dealing mainly with nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction. I refer in this connexion to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the

atmosphere, in outer space and under water of 1963,³ The Treaty on principles governing the activities of States in outer space of 1967,⁴ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968.⁵

19. On 11 February the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof was signed in Moscow, Washington and London.⁶ A reference to that fact was made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pastinen. In signing the aforesaid Treaty the Soviet side pointed out that this agreement stemmed from the interests of ensuring the security of all countries and peoples and that it would facilitate the easing of international tension and the improvement of relations among States. The Soviet delegation expresses the hope that this Treaty will be signed by the largest possible number of States and that it will soon enter into force.

20. The task of the current session of the Committee on Disarmament is to explore all possibilities for the conclusion of new agreements in the field of disarmament and to move in that direction at a faster pace than heretofore.

21. It seems to us that one of the most topical problems to which the Committee should give attention is the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. There is plenty of evidence that the development of new and increasingly dangerous types of such weapons is still going on in a number of countries. Armed forces are being equipped with them. Some types of chemical toxic agents are being used by the United States against human beings and vegetation in the course of military operations in Viet-Nam. The complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological types of weapons and their destruction is a step that is long overdue. This was stated by many delegates at the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly. The resolution which was adopted by the General Assembly takes note of—

... the increasing concern of the international community over developments in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,

and expresses the deep conviction that—

... the prospects for international peace and security, as well as the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, would be enhanced if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war were to end and if those agents were eliminated from all military arsenals.⁷

³ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

22. In 1969 nine socialist countries submitted to the General Assembly a draft convention providing for the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons,⁸ and last year they submitted a revised draft convention containing substantial additions to the original draft as regards the scope of the prohibition, control and revision of the convention.⁹ The socialist countries urge the necessity of prohibiting both types of weapons. At a time when chemical weapons are already being widely used, the task before us is to ban both those types of weapons. The prohibition and elimination of those means of mass destruction would be a logical step towards the extension of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use in war of chemical and bacteriological agents.¹⁰

23. The task of the Committee on Disarmament is to ensure the fullest possible solution of the problem of banning chemical and bacteriological weapons. The revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of such weapons, submitted by the socialist countries, provides the necessary basis for the solution of that problem. It appears necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to consider that draft convention with due attention. Since, when submitting the revised draft convention to the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, the delegations of Poland, Hungary and the Mongolian People's Republic dwelt on it at length, we intend in our statement today to deal with only some aspects of the draft convention of the nine socialist countries.

24. In the General Assembly many delegations pointed out that an important part of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons was that of ensuring the fulfilment of the obligation assumed under an agreement prohibiting such weapons. It was also pointed out that the ensuring of the fulfilment of the obligations pertaining to the prohibition of these weapons should be based on a combination of national and international means and procedures of verification which would furnish confidence that the obligations laid down by the convention were being fulfilled by all the parties thereto. The draft convention of the nine socialist countries provides for precisely such a combination of national and international means and procedures of verification. The convention contains a provision that each State party to the convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with the provisions of the convention by the nationals and enterprises of its country. In accordance with this provision the government of each State party to the convention would ensure that the enterprises and nationals of that country did not engage in the development and production of

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 455-457.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and that such weapons were not being stockpiled in its military arsenals.

25. The draft convention of the socialist countries also provides for the use of international verification procedures. The convention contains a provision concerning the obligation of States parties to the convention to consult one another and to co-operate in the solution of any problems that may arise in connexion with the implementation of the provisions of the convention. Such consultations would enable States to remove doubts as to the fulfilment of the obligations under the convention. In the event of a well-founded suspicion of the violation of the obligations laid down by the convention, a State party to the convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council, which will consider that complaint. The Security Council will then inform the States parties to the convention of the results of its investigation.

26. The revised draft convention of the nine socialist countries has been prepared with due regard for the considerations and suggestions put forward by members of the Committee on Disarmament during its summer session. This draft contains the provisions necessary for achieving a practical solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. What is necessary is the desire and the willingness of States to exclude these types of weapons from military arsenals for ever.

27. The prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons would constitute a major disarmament measure. One of the most dangerous weapons of mass destruction would be removed from the equipment of armies, eliminated from military arsenals and destroyed. This would be of tremendous importance from the viewpoint of protecting mankind from the danger of a war involving the use of chemical and bacteriological agents and of restraining the development of the arms race in general. In that case, undoubtedly, the prospects for further negotiations on other disarmament problems would also be improved.

28. An important task which is linked directly to the solution of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons is the reinforcement of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of those types of weapons. It is necessary first of all to strive for the accession of all States to that important international agreement. We note with satisfaction the resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations calling for strict observance of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol by all States parties thereto, condemning all acts contrary to the objectives of the Protocol, and urging all States which have not yet done so to accede to the Protocol.

29. The accession by a considerable number of States to the Geneva Protocol during the past few years certainly shows the growing importance of this international instrument. The number of States parties to the Protocol now exceeds eighty. It is to be

regretted that the United States is not among them, although the United States Government has declared its intention to accede to the Protocol. In that connexion, however, as is evident from President Nixon's message to Congress on 19 August 1970¹¹ and Secretary of State Rogers' report on this problem dated 11 August 1970,¹² the United States is trying to exempt some chemical gases and herbicides from the operation of the Geneva Protocol—that is, to have their use in war regarded as permissible. Such a position is contrary to resolution 2603 A (XXIV), which—

Declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol . . . , the use in international armed conflict of: (a) Any chemical agents of warfare . . . [and] (b) Any biological agents of warfare . . .¹³

30. Among measures designed to curb the arms race which are awaiting agreement and implementation, the problem of prohibiting all types of nuclear tests, including underground tests, occupies an important position. This problem has been discussed for a long time now by various international bodies and still awaits a practical solution. Like many other States, the Soviet Union supported General Assembly resolution 2663 B (XXV), which calls upon "all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments", and requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. . .".¹⁴ The Soviet Union is entirely in favour of a positive solution of this major and urgent problem.

31. The Soviet side believes that control of the observance by States of their obligations regarding the prohibition of underground tests should be carried out on the basis of the use of national means of detection. The demand by certain Western Powers for on-site inspection for the purpose of such control stops, as a matter of fact, the achievement of agreement on this problem. The Soviet side reaffirms its readiness to seek the earliest possible achievement of an agreement to prohibit all types of nuclear weapon tests. At the same time, we consider it inexpedient to substitute all kinds of investigations and studies in the field of seismology for the solution of this problem. If agreement is reached on the cessation of tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection, the Soviet Union will be ready to participate in the widest possible international exchange of seismological data. Indeed, it is already participating actively in such an exchange. In order to achieve agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear tests, it is necessary first of all to take the appropriate political decision.

32. Among individual disarmament measures awaiting solution and agreement in the Committee there are a number of other

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 445-446.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 400-402.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 716-717.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 687.

measures on which the Soviet delegation will state its views at a later stage. One such measure is the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This might serve as a first step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons from the arsenals of States, and the destruction of such weapons. On this question, as is well known, there is a very important resolution of the General Assembly,¹⁵ as well as a specific proposal by the Soviet side, namely a draft convention under which States parties thereto undertake not to use nuclear weapons, not to threaten their use and not to induce other States to use such weapons.¹⁶ That proposal is still valid.

33. The elimination of military bases on foreign territories is an important and serious problem. Its solution would have a very positive influence on the progress of many other disarmament measures and on the strengthening of international security. The Committee's agenda includes an item on further steps to prevent the arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. Further efforts are needed for the accomplishment of the great and important task of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.

34. There are also other measures for curbing the arms race and strengthening international security which are on the Committee's agenda and which it will have to consider in the course of its session. In speaking of measures to curb the arms race, we should like to stress the need to keep in sight the question of implementing the decisions already agreed upon in this field. We refer to the effective implementation of international agreements on disarmament already concluded and their strict observance. Efforts should be made to ensure, for instance, that the maximum number of States accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force on 5 March 1970, and that the States which have signed that Treaty but not yet ratified it do so without delay. This very important international Treaty in the field of disarmament should play that role in reducing the threat of a nuclear war which is assigned to it by the large number of States parties to that international instrument.

35. As before, general and complete disarmament occupies the most important place among the disarmament problems to be considered by the Committee. Attaching great importance to this question, the Soviet Union as far back as 1962 put forward a broad and concrete programme of general and complete disarmament.¹⁷ We note with satisfaction that the problem of such disarmament was again vigorously discussed at the last session of the General Assembly.

36. Considerable progress has been made of late in the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 626-627.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 420-421.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 913-938.

development of military technology. New types of powerful weapons of mass destruction have appeared in the armaments of States. This has made even more urgent the need to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union has been making considerable efforts towards the solution of the basic disarmament problems. Nevertheless, we are compelled to note that no positive progress has yet been achieved in this field and that the problem of general and complete disarmament still awaits solution. There is a need for considerable joint efforts and the willingness of States to accomplish major disarmament measures. The fact that there has been some forward movement in the accomplishment of individual disarmament measures has convincingly shown the possibility of reaching agreement on problems of that kind. This is an encouragement to make more extensive efforts to reach agreement on broader aspects of disarmament.

37. We note with satisfaction the great interest which the General Assembly showed in the autumn of 1970 in the problems of general and complete disarmament. One cannot fail to be aware of the fact that many complex problems are encountered in considering the solution of this question. At a time when the danger of a nuclear war constitutes the major threat to all mankind, it is natural that the question of the priority of nuclear disarmament should be brought to the fore. In this connexion it is necessary to proceed from the premise that the basic questions of nuclear and complete disarmament can and should be solved with the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, and that the obligations assumed in regard to disarmament questions should cover the maximum number of States.

38. Speaking on general and complete disarmament at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, said:

The Soviet Union is in favour of invigorating the talks on general and complete disarmament, with due account taken of the progress achieved in the field of military technology, of the conclusion of several agreements on the limitation of the nuclear arms race . . . , as well as the entire range of the experience of talks which have taken place so far. It stands to reason that the obligations assumed on disarmament problems should cover a maximum number of States and, with regard to nuclear disarmament, the participation of all nuclear Powers—as we have already repeatedly stressed—is an indispensable condition.^{1 8}

The Soviet side will do its utmost to achieve progress towards a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament. The desire of the Soviet Union to ensure the solution of major disarmament problems and thus to curb the arms race is reflected in its willingness to seek success in the bilateral Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the United States. As members of the Committee know, those talks will be resumed on 15 March in Vienna.

^{1 8} *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 528.

39. Guided by the same objective, to exercise a restraining influence on the arms race, the Soviet Union supported at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly the resolution urging all nuclear-weapon Powers to put an end immediately to the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing and the deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems.¹⁹

40. In striving for the solution of the crucial problems in the field of disarmament, including general and complete disarmament, the Soviet side bases itself on the premise that the negotiations on this problem ought not to give rise to any difficulties or delay in reaching agreements on individual disarmament measures and on curbing the arms race. We realize that the solution of individual disarmament problems facilitates the solution of more general and important problems in that field.

41. Those are the views of the Soviet side concerning the problems with which this session of the Committee on Disarmament should deal. The tasks of the Committee, in our opinion, are extremely wide-ranging and important. We express the hope that the work of the Committee this year will be successful and that we shall succeed in making progress in curbing the arms race and proceeding along the road to disarmament as well as in reducing the threat of a new war.

42. I should like to avail myself of the opportunity while I am speaking of joining you, Sir, in welcoming new representatives to this Committee: the representative of Argentina, Mr. Guyer; the First Deputy Foreign Minister of Bulgaria, Mr. Tarabanov; the representative of Burma, U Win Pe; and the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Imru. I should like to say that we are very glad to greet Ambassador Krishnan, an old colleague, who is now the leader of the Indian delegation. We greet Mr. Sokoya of Nigeria; the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Naik; and the representative of the United Kingdom, Ambassador Hainworth.

43. We are also very glad to see here among us Ambassador Christov of Bulgaria; Ambassador Dugersuren of Mongolia; Ambassador García Robles and Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico. We also welcome the return to the Committee of the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Lothian, and Ambassador Gerard Smith of the United States. We should also like to welcome Ambassador Pastinen as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to wish him every success in his new task. We also greet his Deputy, our friend Mr. Epstein. We should like to assure our new colleagues that the Soviet delegation will be ready to co-operate with them in a spirit of goodwill in solving the problems facing the Committee on Disarmament.

44. I should like also before concluding, to greet the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations, Ambassador Kutakov,

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 681-683.

who has invariably shown profound interest in the work of our Committee on Disarmament.

Statement by the British Representative (Lothian) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, February 25, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, before I turn to the substance of my remarks today I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to say how glad we are to see you here presiding over this meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We have the happiest memories of Ambassador Sule Kolo, who is now representing Nigeria with much distinction in London; and we look forward to equally close and cordial relations with you and your delegation.

4. I should like also to congratulate Mr. Pastinen on his appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary-General and to say how much we look forward to working with him here in Geneva. May I welcome too those representatives who are back in the Committee after an absence of some years?—the representative of Bulgaria, Deputy Foreign Minister Tarabanov, and the representative of Ethiopia, Ambassador Imru; and those who are representing their countries for the first time in our deliberations the representative of Argentina, Ambassador Guyer; the representative of Burma, Ambassador U Win Pe—I understand he is not with us today but I hope we shall see him back here very soon—; the representative of India, Ambassador Krishnan; and the representative of Pakistan, Ambassador Naik. It is also a great pleasure to have among us again Mr. Epstein, the Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General.

5. I should like to take this opportunity to introduce the alternate leader of my own delegation, Ambassador Hainworth, who was British Ambassador in Djakarta until late last year and who has wide experience of arms control and disarmament matters, having earlier in his career been head of the Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department of the Foreign Office. Mr. Hainworth is well qualified to take part in the deliberations of the Committee, and I know that he will contribute as much in constructive thinking and energy as did his predecessor Mr. Porter.

6. The quality and experience of the representatives appointed to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament are, I think, both a measure of the great importance which member Governments attach to our deliberations and, at the same time, a key contributory factor to the success of those deliberations—for successful they have been. The test-ban Treaty of 1963,² the non-proliferation Treaty³ and now the sea-bed Treaty⁴ are all

¹ CCD/PV.496, pp. 5-12.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

³ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

achievements of which we can justifiably be proud and which can encourage our future work by reminding us that, even when negotiations seem to be making little headway, we can in the end achieve something positive and worthwhile.

7. It can be argued that the arms-control measures which we have so far achieved have made little impact on the global problem of armaments. Nevertheless, in my view the effect and value of the measures we have so far agreed should not be underrated. Such agreements can be welcomed as confidence-building measures; but they are more than that. The partial test-ban Treaty has ensured that the major nuclear Powers do not any longer carry out the numerous and large atmospheric nuclear tests that we can all remember so clearly. The difficulty of the negotiations leading up to the non-proliferation Treaty is a good indication that this is a substantial and meaningful measure. The sea-bed Treaty, if only a first step, has at least removed a potential threat and lifted a possible cause of fear from men's minds; this is surely not a negligible achievement. Moreover, our Committee has shown itself fully alive to the need to keep pace with or even anticipate the achievement of scientific discovery in this environment—the sea-bed—as in others. I look forward to the Disarmament Decade being marked by the negotiation of further agreements within this highly-qualified and competent Committee.

8. The opening of the sea-bed arms-control Treaty for signature on 11 February was marked by ceremonies in the capitals of the three depositary Powers. I was particularly glad to be present at the ceremony in London, which was also attended by my Prime Minister. In concluding the statement he made then, the Prime Minister said:

We can draw some encouragement from the start which has now been made to this Disarmament Decade. But much remains to be done and none of us can afford to relax our efforts. For our part, I can say on behalf of Her Majesty's Government that we will continue to play an active and constructive role in the work on the Committee in Geneva, and we will contribute in every way we can to further progress in the field of arms control and disarmament, which is of such vital concern to all of us here today and to all our countries.

I should like also to quote to you from the statement made on the same occasion by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary. He said:

This Treaty is in the best sense a product of compromise and co-operation. And that is how disarmament negotiations should be concluded. We all have different points of view. But we can, and over the sea-bed Treaty negotiations we did, listen to each other.

For myself I have been particularly encouraged by the number of States that have already signed the Treaty, and I look forward to more signatures in the near future. I hope too that it will not be long before we have the necessary number of ratifications, so that this important arms-control agreement can come into force.

9. Another field where there is a continuing need for follow-up action to ensure the effectiveness of our earlier deliberations

concerns the non-proliferation Treaty. In my speech of 4 November 1970 to the United Nations⁵ I appealed for further accessions to the Treaty, and I have pleasure in informing the Committee that the Vatican is today depositing instruments of accession in London, Moscow and Washington. I need hardly stress the importance Her Majesty's Government attaches to the full and effective implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty on the widest possible basis. Of course we all recognize that a number of important States, though well disposed to the Treaty, are holding back until they are satisfied as to the precise nature of the safeguards régime they will be required to accept.

10. In this connexion I should like to place on record the profound satisfaction of Her Majesty's Government at the remarkable progress which has been made over the past nine months in the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) Safeguards Committee. Earlier this month the Committee submitted to the IAEA Board of Governors recommendations on the content of agreements required under article III of the Treaty. I have now heard that the Board of Governors has authorized the Director-General to use this material as a basis for negotiations, and has urged the Committee to press on with its work on the financial provisions, which have not yet been settled. This means that the Agency is now in a position to undertake detailed negotiations, not only with non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty but also with those States whose final adherence to the Treaty may be conditional on the conclusion of satisfactory safeguard arrangements.

11. It is, I think, remarkable that some fifty countries, with the able assistance of the Agency's Secretariat, have been able in such a relatively short time to agree on such a highly complex document setting up what is in effect a new international safeguards system: a system especially designed to meet the requirements of the non-proliferation Treaty. They could not have done it without a great deal of good will and above all a willingness to compromise. The achievement is a heartening one and demonstrates the real value to the international community of specialist organizations like the IAEA.

12. The IAEA also has a key role to play in the implementation of article V of the non-proliferation Treaty. This was designed to ensure that the future benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions are made widely available. We fully endorse United Nations General Assembly resolution 2665 (XXV) of December 1970 expressing appreciation of the work already done on this subject by the IAEA and requesting it to continue its efforts.⁶ We are contributing fully to the basic studies in Vienna which are an essential prerequisite for progress under article V of the Treaty, and are

⁵ A/C.1/PV. 1750, p.22.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 689.

encouraged by our delegation's reports of the progress which has been made so far.

13. Turning now from agreements already negotiated to those which we must look to achieve in the near future: a comprehensive test ban in all countries remains a major aim of British policy. Of course, we must all recognize that agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is to a large extent bound up with progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. These talks will be resumed in Vienna next month; and I hope that it will not be long before the promise and importance of these talks is translated into concrete results. I noted with interest that President Nixon said on 4 January that he was optimistic that the United States and the Soviet Union would reach an agreement eventually.⁷ It is accordingly my hope that the early conclusion and publication of an agreement in the field covered by the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks will give a stimulus to the work we have undertaken in this Committee over the years towards a comprehensive test ban.

14. During those years, I should like to remind the Committee, the United Kingdom delegation has consistently put forward proposals and scientific papers to assist consideration of the verification problems which have been such an obstacle to progress on a comprehensive test ban. We played our full part in the original Conference of Experts in 1958 and in the experts' subsequent discussions in the context of the Conference on the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests. To provide ourselves with a firm technical base on seismology, the chief problem area, we initiated and are still continuing a programme of seismic research and development whose primary aim is to attack the problem of verification.

15. In 1965 the United Kingdom delegation tabled a paper on experiments with seismic arrays⁸ which showed that the dependence on close-in stations could be reduced in that in certain circumstances detection of nuclear explosions was possible from some thousands of kilometres as compared with the 1,000 kilometre range postulated by the 1958 Geneva Conference of Experts.⁹ Such an array system would, however, still leave unidentified a residue of seismic events at lower magnitudes which would need on-site inspection. In 1968 in a working paper the United Kingdom delegation suggested that verification of a comprehensive test ban might be facilitated by the establishment of a special committee of seven members to consider complaints and to decide by a majority of 5 to 2 whether an on-site inspection was required. The paper also suggested that, as a means of hastening agreement, a treaty might provide for an agreed quota

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 3-4.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 408-411.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1098-1099.

of permissible underground tests descending to nil over a period of four to five years.¹⁰ Finally, in my first statement to the Committee, made in July 1970,¹¹ I tabled a paper giving the further results of British work on verification of a comprehensive test ban aimed at determining what detection and identification capability could be achieved by a system of stations with the most modern of equipment and data-handling techniques.¹²

16. I believe this to have been a full and positive contribution to the discussion of verification problems; and I can assure members of the Committee that we shall continue to make available to the Committee any relevant scientific development or other idea that might make our task easier. I also look forward to the fullest and most free exchange of views and expert information about the seismic techniques available to States now and in the very near future, to enable us to see more clearly what verification techniques are available to us. I should like to note the already close collaboration that exists between nations in exchanging seismic data. I hope too that States will consider carefully the passage in resolution 2663 A (XXV) inviting "those Governments that are in a position to do so to consider lending their assistance in the improvement of world-wide seismological capabilities. . . ." ¹³

17. This year, following a Romanian initiative in New York, experts appointed by the Secretary-General are engaged on a study of the economic and social consequences of the arms race. The experts had their first meeting from 16-19 February, and I hear that they have made a good start in their deliberations. The United Kingdom Government was pleased that Sir Solly Zuckerman was available to take part in this study. We shall be able in due course to discuss here the experts' report; and it is my hope that the report itself and the wide publicity it will doubtless receive will assist us in our task of making people in all countries fully aware of the economic consequences to them and to all of us of escalation in military expenditure. It is, I am sure, the hope of all of us here that the talks on strategic arms limitation between the two super-Powers will result in agreement which will have the effect of limiting expenditures on strategic nuclear weaponry.

18. In considering the economic and social consequences of the arms race the experts will undoubtedly consider the question of conventional arms as well as expenditure on nuclear weapons. I hope that this may make it possible for us to feel our way forward towards common ground from which we can approach the very difficult but very pressing problems raised by the continuously-accelerating world expenditure on conventional arms.

¹⁰ ENDC/232.

¹¹ CCD/PV.482, p. 9.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 342-349.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 685-686.

19. In my speech on 4 November 1970 to the General Assembly I spoke at some length on the subject of chemical and biological warfare. I pointed out that the United Kingdom delegation had kept its promise to consider biological weapons and chemical weapons together.¹⁴ I must, however, repeat my view that last year's deliberations, which centred very largely on the problems of chemical weapons, have shown that we are still a long way from finding a solution to the generally-acknowledged difficulty of the problem of verifying a total ban on chemical weapons and agents of warfare. We shall all, I am sure, and the United Kingdom delegation not least, continue the search; but in the meantime it seems to me most illogical as well as most dangerous to hold up agreement on the complete prohibition of biological weapons and toxins. Delegations here seem very largely agreed that the way we have proposed that this should be done in our convention¹⁵ is suitable and likely to be effective. Why then should we make difficulties for ourselves by insisting that agreement on biological weapons should be made conditional on achieving a simultaneous ban in the much more difficult area of chemical weapons?

20. A number of delegations have asked the British delegation if we shall be putting forward new proposals. This is not my intention. For the reasons I put forward in New York I still believe that the United Kingdom approach to this problem is well founded, and I regret the delay there has been in reaching agreement on the urgent problem of biological weapons since the United Kingdom delegation first broached this subject. But if nothing has occurred in recent scientific or political developments that has made it possible for us to change our basic approach to the subject, I believe that there has been a change in the circumstances in which we find ourselves discussing this problem this year which might make 1971 an especially propitious year for resolving the problem.

21. In the first place, all delegations have now had a full opportunity to consider the subject in depth. All delegations are now well acquainted with the facts and difficulties as well as with each other's views. Secondly, with the successful completion of the detailed negotiations on the sea-bed that have occupied the Committee in recent years it may be easier for the Committee now to concentrate its full resources on the search for agreement in the field of chemical and biological warfare.

22. Then too there are, I believe, important changes in the international climate. I believe that delegations now accept that

¹⁴ A/C.1/PV.1750, pp. 27-32.

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp.428-431.

the aim of the United Kingdom Government is to strengthen the Geneva Protocol.¹⁶ Since our initiative the Protocol has gained considerably by the accession of a substantial number of countries; and I confidently look forward to more accessions in the near future. Recently we have seen one of the super-Powers put in hand the destruction of its stockpiles of biological weapons, and I am sure that we all welcome this far-sighted decision. However, I fully agree with the view expressed by the representative of the Soviet Union on 2 September 1970 that unilateral renunciations are no substitute for being a party to international agreements.¹⁷ Undoubtedly renunciation of biological weapons on any wider scale would be most effectively achieved through a carefully-negotiated multilateral agreement.

23. Against this background, I see no reason to be pessimistic about the prospects for our negotiations this year. But we must recognize that, if we do not succeed in finding another subject of agreement to follow up last year's sea-bed arms-control achievement, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will run the risk of failing to carry out its mandate as a negotiating body for arms limitation and disarmament matters and of disappointing the expectations of our peoples and governments, not least at the General Assembly of the United Nations.

24. However, I am sure this need not be the case. The Committee now knows enough about chemical and biological warfare to be able to embark upon the first round of truly productive negotiations in this field. I would therefore hope that we might adopt a realistic and practical approach. With determination on all sides I believe that a worthwhile agreement comprehensively prohibiting biological weapons—weapons with the most appalling potential for mass destruction—is available to us. I hope that those who are now pessimistic about the prospects for the year will seize the opportunity of an early agreement on the basis of the United Kingdom draft convention and will ensure that our negotiations will once again be fruitful.

25. It was, I think, Martin Luther King who said that final victory is the result of many short-term advances. I feel that this is very applicable to our work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. While we may sometimes feel a sense of frustration and impatience, we must not forget that each new achievement is a step towards the final aim of a peaceful and secure world. This, I believe, is what makes our work so important and worth while.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 495.

Statement by the Canadian Representative (Ignatieff) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Underground Test Ban [Extract], February 25, 1971¹

33. In our opinion the problem of underground nuclear-weapon testing is the most urgent matter before us. It is obvious that, in order to comply with resolution 2663 A and B of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly,² this Committee should assign the highest priority to confronting the problems that have for too long stood in the way of measures to prohibit or to curtail underground nuclear-weapon testing. We all recognise the value of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,³ an important step forward which helped to reduce the threat that radioactive clouds might engulf our planet. We must also recognise, however, that that Treaty did not significantly curtail the nuclear arms race or nuclear testing; on the contrary, since 1963 the number of tests has actually been increasing each year. Even the problem of radio-active fallout—resulting from accidental ventings of underground tests, as well as from atmospheric testing by non-adherents to the 1963 convention—is still with us.

34. Faced with this problem, our Committee in 1971, I suggest, does not consist of players in search of a role; rather, this Committee has an obligation to take up in earnest and in detail its work towards an underground nuclear test agreement. This task has been called to the attention of this Committee repeatedly by resolutions of the General Assembly. I think it should be clear to us all that the General Assembly and the nations there represented expect a great deal more of this Committee on this issue in 1971 than the single, albeit valuable, informal meeting plus the several useful scientific contributions which were all that the record showed from this Committee last year.

35. Of course, the ultimate results of our efforts to achieve an agreement on underground testing are closely linked to the fruitfulness of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, as Lord Lothian reminded us.⁴ Nevertheless, pending an agreement between the major nuclear Powers on some form of curtailment of the present nuclear confrontation, this Committee has much work to do to clear away as many as possible of the entanglements in the way of a solution of the long-standing verification problem.

36. Consequently, the Canadian delegation contends that throughout 1971 this Committee should allocate a major portion of its time to an intensive examination of what appear to us to be the three salient aspects of the problem:

37. First, the need for international co-operation in the

¹ CCD/PV.496, pp. 14-18.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-687.

³ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 33.

development and improvement of facilities for the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear tests by seismological means, as called for in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of resolution 2663 A of the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.

38. Second, the need for an examination of ways of devising a verification system that will be adequate to ensure compliance with a complete underground test ban; and

39. Third, the need for an examination of ways to devise—if a comprehensive agreement is not attainable soon—underground test limitations, possibly including quotas, which conform to the existing capabilities for seismological verification and which might expand *par passu* with improvements in verification technique.

40. International as well as national seismological identification capabilities should play a fundamental role, as the Canadian delegation has been suggesting and attempting to demonstrate through study of its possibilities, in facilitating the monitoring of a complete underground test ban. Alternatively, if a complete test ban cannot be negotiated in the near future, international seismic data exchange should facilitate lower thresholds of prohibition and of seismological detection than would otherwise be possible. As I stated at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in New York on 2 November 1970:

There appears to be a growing recognition of the potential role of seismological data exchange, on a . . . guaranteed basis, in facilitating the verification of any underground test ban, and thus promoting the long-sought agreement on this question. Alternatively, the international exchange of seismic data on an assured availability basis might contribute to a threshold treaty which would at least impose a limit on the size of the tests carried out, in the event that agreement on the broader basis appeared to be negotiable to the nuclear Powers directly concerned.⁵

41. Canadian scientists have devoted considerable effort to the study of the existing multilateral capability for monitoring an underground test agreement by seismological means as well as of the potentialities. As a result of these studies, which are continuing, we have made a number of general suggestions (CCD/305) concerning ways to provide, with very little financial commitment, more of the basic data enabling a better definition not only of existing capabilities but also of significant improvements in these capabilities. The Canadian study, based on the information submitted in response to the questionnaire circulated by the Secretary-General concerning the quantity and quality of the seismic data which national seismological stations could produce and which governments would be prepared to make available on an assured basis,⁶ was circulated in preliminary form to all members of this Committee⁷ and in final form to all

⁵ A/C.1/PV.1749, pp. 8-10.

⁶ A/1967 and Add. 1-5.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 390-393.

Members of the General Assembly.⁸ I hope that the Committee will wish to give more detailed consideration to this matter. In due course I hope to table, for the convenience of delegations, another working paper summarizing in briefest form the conclusions and recommendations of the study which has been made in Canada.

42. Our study suggested, as the Committee will recall, that the seismic stations investigated should have a combined capability for the identification of underground nuclear explosions in the northern hemisphere down to about 60 kilotons in hard rock—that is, let us say, magnitude 5.6 to 6.0 in hard rock—using only the “positive identifier” method. To achieve an identification threshold below magnitude 5.0 all available identification criteria must be brought to bear in a multivariate analysis. We hope that our basic attempt at an assessment of the existing state of the art of seismological verification and of the capabilities and potentialities of international seismic exchange, which was for the first time based on real data and figures as a result of the Secretary-General’s questionnaire, will be useful to the Committee in discussing what measures may be appropriate and feasible to improve that capability.

43. We believe that such an examination would also lead logically into the second item of business I have suggested regarding a test ban: namely a discussion of the suggestions for verification procedures which could supplement seismological monitoring in a complete test ban. But, unless those discussions prove fruitful, the Canadian delegation believes that the Committee should turn its attention to what is perhaps the most promising of all prospects: negotiations to cut the garment of an agreement on underground test limitations to the cloth of existing and potential seismological verification capabilities. The delegation of Japan has already contributed extremely interesting suggestions in this respect.⁹

44. An in-depth examination such as I have suggested: first, of the improved availability of seismic information; second, of various verification procedures in addition to or based on seismological monitoring; and third, of the options and risks associated with various levels of test prohibition, would in our view provide a firmer foundation so that, when the international political situation permits a decision on a further ban on nuclear testing, this essential work will be well in hand in this Committee.

45. I realize that these very complex questions cannot be treated adequately in the course of an opening statement such as this. Indeed, the subject is of such complexity and importance that it merits a major share of our attention at this session. And, precisely because of the complicated nature of this matter, I

⁸ *Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions* (Dec. 1970).

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 399-400.

venture to hope that the two major nuclear Powers, whose representatives have in this Committee expressed support for the objective of ending nuclear tests, will plan to make a positive contribution to this discussion, and in so doing will let us have the benefit of their expertise and technical knowledge on these critical problems, in order that we may explore the possibilities of a consensus on the various ways and means of achieving the objective of putting a stop or a limit to nuclear tests. In this way the negotiation of an underground nuclear test-ban may begin to move from the present phase of incompatible initial *prises de position* to a concrete examination of what in fact may be negotiable.

Radio Address by President Nixon [Extracts], February 25, 1971¹

To understand the nature of the new American role we must consider the great historical changes that have taken place.

For 25 years after World War II, the United States was not only the leader of the non-Communist world, it was the primary supporter and defender of this free world as well.

—But today our allies and friends have gained new strength and self-confidence. They are now able to participate much more fully not only in their own defense, but in adding their moral and spiritual strength to the creation of a stable world order.

—Today our adversaries no longer present a solidly united front; we can now differentiate in our dealings with them.

—Today neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has a clear-cut nuclear advantage; the time is therefore ripe to come to an agreement on the control of arms.

The world has changed. Our foreign policy must change with it.

We have learned in recent years the dangers of overinvolvement. The other danger—a grave risk we are equally determined to avoid—is underinvolvement. After a long and unpopular war, there is temptation to turn inward—to withdraw from the world, to back away from our commitments. That deceptively smooth road of the new isolationism is surely the road to war.

Our foreign policy today steers a steady course between the past danger of overinvolvement and the new temptation of underinvolvement.

That policy, which I first enunciated in Guam 19 months ago, represents our basic approach to the world:

—We will maintain our commitments, but we will make sure our

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 15, 1971, pp. 306-310.

own troop levels or any financial support to other nations is appropriate to current threats and needs.

—We shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the freedom of a nation allied with us or of a nation whose survival we consider vital to our security.

—But we will look to threatened countries and their neighbors to assume primary responsibility for their own defense and we will provide support where our interests call for that support and where it can make a difference.

These principles are not limited to security matters.

We shall pursue economic policies at home and abroad that encourage trade wherever possible and that strengthen political ties between nations. As we actively seek to help other nations expand their economies, we can legitimately expect them to work with us in averting economic problems of our own.

As we continue to send economic aid to developing nations, we will expect countries on the receiving end to mobilize their resources, we will look to other developed nations to do more in furnishing assistance, and we will channel our aid increasingly through groups of nations banded together for mutual support.

This new sharing of responsibility requires not less American leadership than in the past, but rather a new, more subtle form of leadership. No single nation can build a peace alone; peace can only be built by the willing hands—and minds—of all. In the modern world, leadership cannot be “do it yourself”; the path of leadership is in providing the help, the motive, the inspiration, to do it together.

In carrying out what is referred to as the Nixon doctrine, we recognize that we cannot transfer burdens too swiftly. We must strike a balance between doing too much and preventing self-reliance, and suddenly doing too little and undermining self-confidence. We intend to give our friends the time and the means to adjust, materially and psychologically, to a new form of American participation in the world.

The Future Agenda

How have we applied our new foreign policy during the past year? And what is our future agenda as we work with others to build a stable world order?

In Western Europe, we have shifted from predominance to partnership with our allies. Our ties with Western Europe are central to the structure of peace because its nations are rich in tradition and experience, strong economically, vigorous in diplomacy and culture; they are in a position to take a major part in building a world of peace.

Our ties were strengthened on my second trip to Europe this summer and reflected in our close consultation on arms control negotiations. At our suggestion, the NATO alliance made a

thorough review of its military strategy and posture. As a result, we have reached new agreement on a strong defense and the need to share the burden more fairly.

In Eastern Europe, our exchange of state visits with Romania and my meeting last fall with Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia are examples of our search for wider reconciliation with the nations that used to be considered behind an Iron Curtain.

Looking ahead in Europe:

—We shall cooperate in our political and economic relations across the Atlantic as the Common Market grows.

—We and our allies will make the improvements necessary to carry out our common defense strategy.

—Together we stand ready to reduce our forces in Western Europe in exchange for mutual reductions in Eastern Europe.

We now come to a matter that affects every nation: the relations between the world's two great superpowers.

Over the past 2 years in some fields the Soviet Union and the United States have moved ahead together. We have taken the first step toward cooperation in outer space. We have both ratified the treaty limiting the spread of nuclear weapons.² Just 2 weeks ago we signed a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds.³

These are hopeful signs, but certain other Soviet actions are reason for concern. There is need for much more cooperation in reducing tensions in the Middle East and in ending harassment of Berlin. We must also discourage the temptation to raise new challenges in sensitive areas such as the Caribbean.

In the long run, the most significant result of negotiations between the superpowers in the past year could be in the field of arms control.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union have produced the most searching examination of the nature of strategic competition ever conducted between our two nations. Each side has had the chance to explain at length the concerns caused by the posture of the other side. The talks have been conducted in a serious way without the old lapses into propaganda.

If both sides continue in this way, there is reason to hope that specific agreements will be reached to curb the arms race.

Taking a first step in limiting the capacity of mankind to destroy itself would mark a turning point in the history of the postwar world; it would add to the security of both the Soviet Union and the United States, and it would add to the world's peace of mind.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

³ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

In all our relations with the Soviets, we shall make the most progress by recognizing that in many cases our national interests are not the same. It serves no purpose to pretend they are; our differences are not matters of mood, they are matters of substance. But in many other cases, our separate national interests can best be pursued by a sober consideration of the world interest.

The United States will deal, as it must, from strength: We will not reduce our defenses below the level I consider essential to our national security.

A strong America is essential to the cause of peace today. Until we have the kind of agreements we can rely on, we shall remain strong.

But America's power will always be used for building a peace, never for breaking it—only for defending freedom, never for destroying it.

America's strength will be, as it must be, second to none; but the strength that this nation is proudest of is the strength of our determination to create a peaceful world.

We all know how every town or city develops a sense of community when its citizens come together to meet a common need.

The common needs of the world today, about which there can be no disagreement or conflict of national interest, are plain to see.

We know that we must act as one world in restoring the world's environment before pollution of the seas and skies overwhelms every nation. We know we must stop the flow of narcotics; we must counter the outbreaks of hijacking and kidnaping; we must share the great discoveries about the oceans and outer space.

The United States is justly proud of the lead it has taken in working within the United Nations, and within the NATO alliance, to come to grips with these problems and with these opportunities.

Our work here is a beginning, not only in coping with the new challenges of technology and modern life but of developing a worldwide "sense of community" that will ease tension, reduce suspicion, and thereby promote the process of peace.

That process can only flourish in a climate of mutual respect.

We can have that mutual respect with our friends without dominating them or without letting them down.

We can have that mutual respect with our adversaries without compromising our principles or weakening our resolve.

And we can have that mutual respect among ourselves without stifling dissent or losing our capacity for action.

Our goal is something Americans have not enjoyed in this century: a full generation of peace. A full generation of peace depends not only on the policy of one party or of one nation or one alliance or one bloc of nations.

Peace for the next generation depends on our ability to make

certain that each nation has a share in its shaping and that every nation has a stake in its lasting.

This is the hard way, requiring patience, restraint, understanding, and—when necessary—bold, decisive action. But history has taught us that the old diplomacy of imposing a peace by the fiat of great powers simply does not work.

I believe that the new diplomacy of partnership, of mutual respect, of dealing with strength and determination will work.

I believe that the right degree of American involvement—not too much and not too little—will evoke the right response from our other partners on this globe in building for our children the kind of world they deserve: a world of opportunity in a world without war.

Foreign Policy Report by President Nixon to the Congress [Extracts], February 25, 1971¹

PART II: RELATING NATIONAL INTERESTS

Alliance Defense

In last year's annual report, I noted the variety of views on some central questions of defense policy that had to be faced candidly among the allies:

—What is a realistic assessment of the military threats to Western Europe?

—How long could NATO sustain a conventional forward defense against a determined Warsaw Pact attack?

—How should our tactical nuclear posture in Europe be planned to counter specific military threats?

—How should our tactical nuclear capabilities be related to our conventional posture?

—What relative burdens should be borne by the U.S. and its partners in providing the forces and other resources required by our common strategy?

—Are all NATO's capabilities in Europe sufficient to meet the needs of our strategy?

To answer these questions, I proposed that the Alliance conduct a thorough review of its strategy and defense posture in Europe for the coming decade.²

The United States launched such a review in the National Security Council system, covering all the issues of European security: NATO strategy and forces, mutual force reductions, and

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 1, 1971, pp. 315-318, 354-361, 363-367.

² *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1970, p. 205.

our broader effort to enhance security through negotiation. In response to my proposal in last year's report, and at the initiative of Secretary General Brosio, our NATO allies then joined us in a major collective study of the full range of Allied defense problems in the 1970's.

The basic problem was not technical or esoteric. It was an absolute necessity to devise a sensible posture of defense we can plausibly ask our peoples to support. Many voters, legislators and officials in Western countries have raised questions about the continuing burden of defense budgets—not because they did not see the need for security, but because they did not see a clear rationale for the forces proposed. Our armies are not ends in themselves, or merely tokens of a commitment. They have a function to perform: to aid in deterrence and to defend if deterrence fails. Therefore, the Alliance needed to work through the analysis of what realistic deterrence and defense required in Europe over the longer term. We needed to give substance to our strategy, to make it credible to ourselves as well as to our adversaries.

The result of our studies in the National Security Council and in NATO was a major achievement. The North Atlantic Council ministerial meeting in December, 1970, which completed the Alliance study, was indeed, as Secretary Rogers called it, "one of the most important in the history of the Alliance."³ We now have the blueprint and substance of a rational defense posture, which provides the framework for resolving the policy questions I raised last year.

The Threat and NATO Strategy. We and our NATO allies do not believe that war is imminent in Europe, but we must face the possibility that it could occur. The military power of the Warsaw Pact has grown over the decade and continues to increase. Postwar Europe has seen more than its share of crises, and new crises are possible. As the annex to the December communique pointed out: "In addition to a capability to deter and counter major deliberate aggression, Allied forces should be so structured and organized as to be capable of dealing also with aggressions and incursions with more limited objectives associated with intimidation or the creation of faits accomplis, or with those aggressions which might be the result of accident or miscalculation."⁴

Our review examined three alternative strategies for dealing with these contingencies:

- reliance on conventional forces alone.
- early response with nuclear weapons.
- a flexible strategy that does not preclude or force either kind of response.

³ *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 4, 1971, p. 7.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 675.

America's will to employ nuclear retaliation in defense of NATO, our analysis indicated, remains central and necessary to Allied security. But in the conditions of today's new strategic equation, it can no longer be the sole basis for Allied deterrence. Today, nuclear destruction would be mutual. No NATO leader should be left with only the choice between capitulation and immediate resort to general nuclear war.

Sole reliance on conventional forces might lead an aggressor to conclude that we might accept the loss of vital territory without taking further action. Sole reliance on nuclear forces, on the other hand, might lead inevitably and unnecessarily to the very widespread devastation that we should be trying to prevent. Neither of these prospects enhances our security.

We and our allies therefore reaffirmed our consensus that we must have forces able to deter and defend below the threshold of general nuclear war, to give us full flexibility in responding to any outbreak of hostilities. This means a strong and credible deployment of modernized NATO conventional forces. These forces must be capable of rapid mobilization and reinforcement and of sustaining a successful initial forward defense against conventional attack.

The Military Situation in Europe. We next had to assess the military balance in Europe in terms of the goals of our strategy.

The economic strength of the NATO nations, we found, makes us considerably stronger in military potential than the Warsaw Pact. We and our allies collectively enjoy a three-fold advantage in Gross National Product and a two-fold advantage in population.

The actual balance of conventional military forces in Europe is much closer, however. NATO's active forces in peacetime are roughly comparable to those of the Warsaw Pact. Following mobilization, NATO is capable of maintaining forces larger than the Warsaw Pact. But geographic proximity and differences in domestic systems give the Warsaw Pact the significant advantage of being able to mobilize its reserves and reinforce more rapidly than NATO.

It follows as a practical matter that:

—NATO must be alert for warning of an impending attack, so that we can act as promptly as possible to mobilize and reinforce.

—We must improve NATO's conventional deterrent, especially correcting qualitative deficiencies in present Allied forces.

—We must maintain a sufficient tactical and strategic nuclear deterrent as a complement to our conventional forces.

—We must continue our consultation—as I urged in last year's report—on defining the precise role of tactical nuclear weapons.

Our strategic review illuminated the need for specific qualitative improvements. Several components of our posture require additional attention: the sheltering of our tactical aircraft, our logistical stocks and transport, the peacetime disposition of Allied

ground forces; the protection of NATO's flanks; the standardization of Allied equipment; our armored and anti-armor forces; our overall maritime capabilities, particularly for anti-submarine defense; our machinery for mobilization and reinforcement; and NATO communications for crisis management purposes. Our studies have shown that many improvements in these areas can be made at acceptable cost.

Sharing Alliance Burdens Equitably. The conception of burden sharing in previous administrations was that our allies should share our burden; the thrust of the Nixon Doctrine is that their primary task is to shoulder their own. The emphasis is no longer on their sharing the cost of America's military commitment to Europe—although financial arrangements may play a part—but on their providing the national forces needed in conjunction with ours in support of an effective common strategy.

Our allies have responded to this shift in emphasis. We were gratified when at the December NATO Council meeting our European allies joined in a pledge to strengthen their national forces and to inaugurate a new joint program of modernizing NATO's common infrastructure.⁵

The program announced in December will accelerate construction of aircraft shelters and an integrated communication system. It represents a landmark in the history of NATO—an effort undertaken, organized and financed entirely by our European allies. As Secretary Laird has pointed out, this common infrastructure—the integrated network of permanent facilities supporting NATO forces in Europe—is a particularly appropriate focus of collective European effort. It is a collective asset, badly in need of improvement; our allies' effort here is of direct and permanent benefit to their own defense.

U.S. Forces in Europe. The United States faced pressures to withdraw our forces from Western Europe for budgetary reasons, and pressures to keep them there for purely symbolic reasons. All these arguments evaded the crucial question: What defense function do and should our forces in Europe perform?

I decided, despite these pressures, that given a similar approach by our allies, the United States would maintain and improve its forces in Europe and not reduce them without reciprocal action by our adversaries. This decision, which I announced at the December NATO meeting, flowed directly from the analysis we had conducted in the NSC system and reinforced in NATO consultation. It had become clear to me that without undiminished American participation in European defense, neither the Alliance's strategy, nor America's commitment, nor Western cohesion would be credible.

No token presence could serve our purpose. Our substantial contribution of United States forces—about 25 percent of NATO's

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 667 ff.

peacetime capabilities in Central Europe—insures the viability of the strategy of flexible response. It enables us to found Alliance defense on something other than reliance on the threat of strategic nuclear war. It is the basis of our allies' confidence in us. It links European defense to a common strategy and to the nuclear power of the United States.

America's presence in substantial force is psychologically crucial as well. It provides the sense of security which encourages our partners' efforts to unite and to do more for themselves. Our direct and large-scale involvement in Europe is the essential ingredient of the cohesion of the West which has set the stage for the effort to negotiate a reduction of tension.

Accurately or inaccurately, our allies would interpret a substantial withdrawal of American forces as a substantial withdrawal of America's commitment. Were they to conclude this was happening, they would not necessarily do more on their own to compensate; they would more likely lose confidence in the very possibility of Western defense, and reduce their reliance on Western solidarity.

In maintaining and improving our forces in Europe—and in the seas on Europe's flanks—we are doing what is necessary to encourage our European allies to take up a greater share of the collective responsibility. They are doing so, and the Alliance is stronger for it.

East-West Relations in Europe

Security in Europe depends on more than NATO's military strength. The close ties of friendship in the West and the stability of the military balance set the stage for renewed effort at a broader reconciliation.

East-West conflict in Europe springs from historical and objective causes, not transient moods or personal misunderstandings. For 25 years Europe has been divided by opposing national interests and contrary philosophies, which clash over specific issues: the military confrontation of opposing coalitions, the division of Germany, the situation in and around Berlin, the nature of relations between Western and Eastern countries and institutions, and the barriers to travel and cultural and intellectual intercourse.

These issues will not be quickly resolved. To relax tensions means a patient and persistent effort to deal with specific sources and not only with their manifestations. The West will be conciliatory on substance, but we are determined to deal with substance and not simply with atmosphere.

We in the West are convinced by the history of the postwar period that a detente that does not apply equally to Eastern and Western Europe will be inherently unstable. In our view, detente means negotiating the concrete conditions of mutual security that will allow for expanded intra-European contact and cooperation

without jeopardizing the security of any country. Soviet policies and doctrine, however, too often interpret detente in terms of Western ratification of the status quo and acknowledgement of continuing Soviet hegemony over Eastern Europe. Beyond this, Soviet policy has been tempted to offer a relaxation of tension selectively to some allies but not to others, and only on limited issues of primary interest to the USSR. In view of this fundamental difference, a major question for the Alliance to face is whether we can overcome the East-West stalemate while maintaining unity among ourselves and avoiding internal divisions in our countries.

A Western Consensus. In the postwar period, East-West relations were almost an exclusive preserve of Soviet and American policies and negotiations, just as the major European crises of this period were predominantly Soviet-American confrontations.

Today, our Western European allies are properly anxious to make their own contribution to East-West negotiations. They will increasingly assert their own judgment and interests in doing so. A wide variety of contacts and negotiations are proceeding today, involving different participants in different forums on several issues:

—The United States is negotiating with the USSR in SALT.

—The United States, the Soviet Union, the UK and France are holding Four Power talks at the UN on the Middle East.

—The same four powers are negotiating in Europe on Berlin.

—The Federal Republic of Germany has negotiated new treaties with the USSR and Poland,⁶ and may soon open talks with Czechoslovakia. For the first time the Chancellor of the Federal Republic has met with the East German Premier.

—France reached agreement with the USSR in 1970 for periodic consultation on major world issues.

—NATO allies have conversed bilaterally with Warsaw Pact countries on a Conference on European Security, as well as on the question of mutual reduction of forces in Europe.

At issue are major national questions (such as the relationship between East and West Germany), basic regional problems (such as mutual force reductions), and the overall US-Soviet strategic relationship. Whatever the issue, however, its resolution will engage the interests of NATO and Europe as a whole.

Obviously, the Western countries do not have identical national concerns and cannot be expected to agree automatically on priorities or solutions. Each ally is the best judge of its own national interest. But our principal objective should be to harmonize our policies and insure that our efforts for detente are complementary. A differentiated detente, limited to the USSR

⁶The German-Soviet treaty appears *ibid.*, pp. 403-404. For the German-Polish treaty, see 10 *International Legal Materials* 127.

and certain Western allies but not others, would be illusory. It would cause strains among allies. It would turn the desire for detente into an instrument of political warfare. Far from contributing to reconciliation in Europe, it would postpone it indefinitely.

Today's pursuit of detente is taking place simultaneously with efforts to strengthen the economic and political solidarity of Western Europe. The West cannot afford to allow the momentum of individual approaches to the East to put allies inadvertently in the painful position of having to choose between their national concerns and their European responsibilities.

East-West detente and Western cohesion can be mutually supporting, if the Alliance consults thoughtfully to strike a balance between individual and common interests. The United States applies such a code of consultation to itself; we have been scrupulous to maintain a dialogue with our allies on the issues and developments in SALT; in turn, our allies have worked in consultation with us on major East-West issues. It is crucial that this continue.

Our urgent task in the coming year is to achieve an understanding within the Alliance on our analysis of the sources of East-West tensions, on our respective roles in dealing with them through individual and collective diplomacy, and on our evaluation of future trends. I pledge the United States to an intensive effort of Allied consultation on these questions in 1971, at the highest level and in bilateral channels and multilateral forums.

The Major Issues: We must translate our consensus on objectives into specific policies.

Allied efforts toward *mutual force reductions* in Europe will continue in the coming year. Reducing the military confrontation in Europe is in the common interest of East and West. Our mutual objective should be to create a more stable military balance at lower levels and lower costs.

The problem of defining a fair agreement in precise terms is extremely complex. As in the preparations for SALT, I instructed our Government to develop the analytical building blocks of an agreement and evaluate them in differing combinations, as our contribution to the Alliance's collective deliberations. Our technical analysis is described in the Arms Control chapter of this report.

The USSR has frequently proposed a general *Conference on European Security*. But such a conference, in the Soviet formulation, would not address the main security issues—the German question, Berlin, mutual force reductions—but only very general themes. We and our allies are prepared to negotiate with the East in any forum. But we see little value in a conference whose agenda would be unlikely to yield progress on concrete issues, but would only deflect our energies to drafting statements

and declarations the interpretation of which would inevitably be a continuing source of disagreements. Once a political basis for improving relations is created through specific negotiations already in process, a general conference might build on it to discuss other intra-European issues and forms of cooperation.

Any lasting relaxation of tension in Europe must include progress in resolving the issues related to the division of *Germany*.

The German national question is basically one for the German people. It is only natural that the government of the Federal Republic should assign it high priority. But as Chancellor Brandt has emphasized, it is the strength of the Western coalition and West Germany's secure place in it that have enabled his government to take initiatives which mark a new stage in the evolution of the German question. The reshaping of German relations with the East inevitably affects the interests of all European states, as well as the relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

Therefore, there has been full consultation within the Alliance during the evolution of the Federal Republic's new policies and the negotiation of its new treaties with the USSR and Poland. It is clearly established that Allied responsibilities and rights are not affected by the terms of these treaties. I emphasized in my talks with Chancellor Brandt in Washington and in intensive Allied consultation in 1970 that we support West Germany's objective of normalizing relations with its eastern neighbors, and that we view its anguish at the unnatural division of the German nation with profound compassion.

New policies and their effects in Central Europe will create new conditions and raise new issues—but none that cannot be dealt with in continuing close consultation with the Federal Republic and within the Alliance.

With the encouragement of the Federal Republic, the US, UK and France in August 1969 invited the USSR to discuss *Berlin*. Four Power ambassadorial discussions started in March 1970. The history of the postwar period demonstrates the complexity and importance of this issue.

The Western objectives are the assurance of unhindered traffic to and from Berlin, Soviet acknowledgement of the existing and entirely legitimate ties between Berlin and Bonn, and improved communications and travel in and around Berlin. An effective Four Power agreement on Berlin will have to encompass arrangements worked out between East and West Germany on technical details. We recognize that new access procedures to Berlin will not necessarily prevent administrative harassment; this will depend as much on Communist willingness to remove Berlin as a cause of friction as on the specific terms of agreement.

Thus what began essentially as a discussion of practical improvements to assure Berlin's viability has assumed greater significance in East-West relations. To the West German

Government, the eastern treaties and a Berlin settlement are parts of the whole complex of Germany's future, and therefore it has conditioned the ratification of the treaties upon a satisfactory conclusion of the Berlin talks. To the Western allies, progress on Berlin will be an indicator of the possibilities of moving toward fruitful talks on broader issues of European security.

Eastern and Central Europe. The breakdown of the postwar monolithic Stalinist bloc in Europe is a fact of life. This creates new conditions, aspirations, and expectations in both Western and Eastern Europe. Just as peace and its fruits are indivisible for the West, so they must be for Eastern Europe.

While the countries of that region are in close proximity to the USSR, they also have historic ties to Western Europe and to the United States. We will not exploit these ties to undermine the security of the Soviet Union. We would not pretend that the facts of history and geography do not create special circumstances in Eastern Europe. We recognize a divergence in social, political, and economic systems between East and West.

But, in our view, every nation in Europe has the sovereign right to conduct independent policies, and to be our friend without being anyone else's enemy or being treated as such.

There are difficulties, which we recognize, attending close political relations between Eastern European nations and the United States. But within these limits there are opportunities for economic, scientific and technological contact which we are prepared to broaden on the basis of mutual benefit.

PART III: THE SOVIET UNION

... The great central issue of our time—the question of whether the world as a whole is to live at peace—has not been resolved.

This central issue turns in large part on the relations among the great nuclear powers. Their strength imposes on them special responsibilities of restraint and wisdom. The issue of war and peace cannot be solved unless we in the United States and the Soviet Union demonstrate both the will and the capacity to put our relationship on a basis consistent with the aspirations of mankind.⁷

Address to the United Nations
General Assembly
October 23, 1970

In my Inaugural Address,⁸ and again at the United Nations last October, I urged the Soviet leaders to join with us in building a new and constructive relationship.

I emphasized four factors that provide a basis for such a development:

—Neither of us wants a nuclear exchange.

—We both should welcome the opportunity to reduce the burden of armaments.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 530.

⁸ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Jan. 27, 1969, pp. 150-154.

—We are both major industrial powers, and yet have very little trade or commercial contact with one another. Both would clearly benefit if our relationship permitted an increase in trade.

—Both are deeply involved, at home and abroad, with the need for creative economic and social change. Both our interests—and the broader world interest—would be served if our competition could be channeled more into our performances in that field.

Thus, our two nations have substantial mutual incentives to find ways of working together. We are realistic enough to recognize, however, that we also have very real differences that can continue to divide us:

We view the world and approach international affairs differently. Ideology continues to shape many aspects of Soviet policy. It dictates an attitude of constant pressure toward the external world. The Soviet Government too frequently claims that the rationale for its internal and external policies is based on universalist doctrines. In certain fundamental aspects the Soviet outlook on world affairs is incompatible with a stable international system.

The internal order of the USSR, as such, is not an object of our policy, although we do not hide our rejection of many of its features. Our relations with the USSR, as with other countries, are determined by its international behavior. Consequently, the fruitfulness of the relationship depends significantly upon the degree to which its international behavior does not reflect militant doctrinal considerations.

As the two most powerful nations in the world, we conduct global policies that bring our interests into contention across a broad range of issues. Historically, international adversaries have demonstrated a compulsion to seek every gain, however marginal, at the expense of their competitors. In this classical conception, the accumulation of gains over a period of time could alter the balance of power. This may have been realistic in the past; at least it was the essence of international affairs.

But it is folly for the great nuclear powers to conduct their policies in this manner. For if they succeed, it can only result in confrontation and potential catastrophe.

The nature of nuclear power requires that both the Soviet Union and we be willing to practice self-restraint in the pursuit of national interests. We have acted on this principle in our conduct of the SALT negotiations, in our diplomatic initiatives in the Middle East, and in our proposals to improve the situation in Berlin. We are prepared to apply it to all legitimate Soviet interests.

Such a policy of restraint, however, requires reciprocity—concretely expressed in actions.

By virtue of its size and geography, the USSR has traditionally had important security interests in Europe and East Asia. Her

undoubted status as a global power obviously creates interests in other areas where Russia has not traditionally been a factor. But the natural expansion of Soviet influence in the world must not distort itself into ambitions for exclusive or predominant positions. For such a course ignores the interests of others, including ourselves. It must and will be resisted. It can, therefore, lead only to confrontation.

We often approach negotiations with differing premises. We do not suggest that the starting point—or, indeed, the culmination—of our negotiations with the USSR be the acceptance of our views and positions. Nor do we expect to resolve issues by cajoling the Soviet leaders into solutions damaging to their national interests. We cannot be expected, however, to accept the Soviet definition of every issue, to agree automatically to the Soviet order of priorities, or to accept every aggrandizement of Soviet positions abroad as a “new reality” no longer open to challenge. The principle of mutual accommodation, if it is to have any meaning, must be that both of us seek compromises, mutual concessions, and new solutions to old problems.

The relationship between the two great nuclear powers in this decade must rise above tactical considerations. We must be prepared to face issues seriously, concretely, and in a spirit of mutual respect. Durable solutions will be those which both sides have an interest in maintaining.

We are engaged in a strategic and military competition. We both possess the capability to develop our military power and project it massively into distant areas. The last two decades witnessed the transformation of the Soviet Union from a Eurasian power to an intercontinental one. The USSR now possesses military capabilities far beyond those at the command of previous Soviet leaders.

In earlier periods our strategic superiority gave us a margin of safety. Now, however, the enormous increase in Soviet capabilities has added a new and critical dimension to our relationship. The growth of Soviet power in the last several years could tempt Soviet leaders into bolder challenges. It could lead them to underestimate the risks of certain policies. We, of course, continue to weigh carefully Soviet statements of intentions. But the existing military balance does not permit us to judge the significance of Soviet actions only by what they say—or even what we believe—are their intentions. We must measure their actions, at least in part, against their capabilities.

It is of the utmost importance that the new strategic balance of the 1970's and our interest in strategic stability not be misunderstood. Confrontation may arise from a mistaken perception of the posture of an adversary. Such a mistake can lead to a failure to appreciate the risks and consequences of probing for advantages or testing the limits of toleration. We believe that this

was involved to some degree in the events which led up to the Middle East crisis last year.

It may also have been a factor in Soviet naval actions in the Caribbean in the fall of 1970. There the Soviet Union took new steps which could have afforded it the ability to again operate offensive weapons systems from this Hemisphere. That would have been contrary to the understanding between us. Only after a period of discussion did we reaffirm our understanding and amplify it to make clear that the agreement included activities related to sea-based systems.

In our relations with the USSR there should be no misconceptions of the role we will play in international affairs. This country is not withdrawing into isolation. With the Soviet Union, we want a relationship in which the interests of both are respected. When interests conflict, we prefer negotiation and restraint as the methods to adjust differences: But, when challenged, the United States will defend its interests and those of its allies. And, together with our allies, we will maintain the power to do so effectively.

A New American-Soviet Relationship

Mutual restraint, accommodation of interests, and the changed strategic situation open broad opportunities to the Soviet Union and the United States. It is our hope that the Soviet Union will recognize, as we do, that our futures are best served by serious negotiation of the issues which divide us. We have taken the initiative in establishing an agenda on which agreement could profoundly alter the substance of our relationship:

—*SALT*. Given the available resources, neither of us will concede a significant strategic advantage to the other. Yet the temptation to attempt to achieve such advantage is ever present, and modern technology makes such an attempt feasible. With our current strategic capabilities, we have a unique opportunity to design a stable and mutually acceptable strategic relationship.

We did not expect agreements to emerge quickly, for the most vital of interests are engaged. A resolution will not be achieved by agreement on generalities. We have put forward precise and serious proposals that would create no unilateral advantages and would cope with the major concerns of both sides.

We do not yet know what conclusions the Soviet Union will draw from the facts of the situation. If its leaders share our assessment, we can unquestionably bring competition in strategic weapons under control.

—*Europe*. With our allies, we have entered into negotiations with the USSR to improve the Berlin situation. Arrangements which, in fact, bring an end to the twenty-four years of tension over Berlin, would enable us to move beyond the vestiges of the

postwar period that have dominated our relationship for so long. A broader era of negotiations in Europe then becomes possible.

Progress toward this goal also could be obtained through a successful agreement on mutual reduction of military forces, especially in Central Europe where confrontation could be most dangerous.

—*The Middle East* is heavy with the danger that local and regional conflict may engulf the Great Powers in confrontation.

We recognize that the USSR has acquired important interests and influence in the area, and that a lasting settlement cannot be achieved unless the Soviet Union sees it to be in its interest.

We continue to believe that it is in the Soviet interest to support a reasonable settlement. The USSR is not, however, contributing to that end by providing increasingly large and dangerous numbers of weapons to the Arab states, or by building military positions for its own purposes. We are prepared to seek agreement with the USSR and the other major powers to limit arms shipments to the Middle East.

We have not tried to lay down a rigid order of priorities within this agenda. It is a fact of international politics, however, that major issues are related. The successful resolution of one such issue cannot help but improve the prospects for solving other problems. Similarly, aggressive action in one area is bound to exert a disturbing influence in other areas.

An assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations at this point in my Administration has to be mixed. There have been some encouraging developments and we welcome them. We are engaged in a serious dialogue in SALT. We have both signed the treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons from the seabeds.⁹ We have both ratified the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ We have entered negotiations on the issue of Berlin. We have taken the first step toward practical cooperation in outer space.

On the other hand, certain Soviet actions in the Middle East, Berlin, and Cuba are not encouraging. Taken against a background of intensive and unrestrained anti-American propaganda, these actions inevitably suggest that intransigence remains a cardinal feature of the Soviet system.

Yet these events may have provided a basis for future progress in our relations. Properly understood, they illustrate the altogether incommensurate risks inherent in a policy of confrontation, and the marginal benefits achievable by it.

Against this background it is an appropriate moment to take stock of our relations, and to weigh the decisions necessary for further progress.

The Soviet leaders will be reviewing their own policies and

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

programs in connection with the 24th Congress of their Party. This report sets forth my own assessment of our relations with the USSR, and the principles by which we propose to govern our relations in the future. I have outlined the factors that make for common interests and suggested an agenda of outstanding opportunities:

- a more stable military relationship for the next decade.
- a peaceful settlement of the Middle East conflict.
- an agreed framework for security in Europe.

We are under no illusion that these are easy tasks. But, as I said in my address to the United Nations:

In the world today we are at a crossroads. We can follow the old way, playing the traditional game of international relations, but at ever-increasing risk. Everyone will lose. No one will gain. Or we can take a new road.

I invite the leaders of the Soviet Union to join us in taking that new road¹¹

PART IV: SECURING NATIONAL INTERESTS

STRATEGIC POLICY AND FORCES

Strategic forces, both offensive and defensive, are the backbone of our security.

—They are the primary deterrent to strategic attacks against us or our allies.

—They face an aggressor contemplating less than all-out attacks, with an unacceptable risk of escalation.

—They are essential to the maintenance of a stable political environment within which the threat of aggression or coercion against the U.S. and its allies is minimized.

Our strategic forces must be numerous enough, efficient enough, and deployed in such a way that an aggressor will always know that the sure result of a nuclear attack against us is unacceptable damage from our retaliation. That makes it imperative that our strategic power not be inferior to that of any other state. Thus I am committed to my pledge to keep our strategic forces strong. I am equally committed to seeking a stable strategic relationship with the Soviet Union through negotiations. There is no inconsistency between those goals; they are in fact complementary.

The Strategic Balance

Last year I reported on a new strategic policy for the 1970's. In assessing the changed strategic relationship, we faced the following realities:

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 533.

—Until the late 1960's, we possessed strategic forces that provided a clear margin of superiority.

—In the late 1960's, however, the balance of strategic forces changed. While our forces were held at existing levels, the Soviet Union moved forward vigorously to develop powerful and sophisticated strategic forces which approached, and in some categories exceeded, ours in numbers and capability.

By any standard, we believe the number of Soviet strategic forces now exceeds the level needed for deterrence. Even more important than the growth in numbers has been the change in the nature of the forces the USSR chose to develop and deploy. These forces include systems—particularly the SS-9 ICBM with large multiple warheads—which, if further improved and deployed in sufficient numbers, could be uniquely suitable for a first strike against our land-based deterrent forces. The design and growth of these forces leads inescapably to profound questions concerning the threats we will face in the future, and the adequacy of our current strategic forces to meet the requirements of our security. Specifically:

—Does the Soviet Union simply seek a retaliatory capability, thus permitting the pursuit of meaningful limitations on strategic arms?

—Or does the Soviet Union seek forces which could attack and destroy vital elements of our retaliatory capability, thus requiring us to respond with additional programs of our own involving another round of arms competition?

The past year has not provided definitive answers. Clearly, however, the USSR, over the past year, has continued to add significantly to its capabilities.

OPERATIONAL UNITED STATES AND SOVIET MISSILES

	1965	End 1969	End 1970
Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles:			
United States	934	1054	1054
U.S.S.R.	224	1109	1440
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles:			
United States	464	656	656
U.S.S.R.	107	240	350

By the mid-1970's we expect the Soviets to have a force of ballistic missile submarines equal in size to our own. Furthermore, the Soviet Union has continued to make significant qualitative improvements in its strategic forces. These include new and improved versions of their Minuteman-size SS - 11 missile, continued testing of multiple warheads, research and testing of ABM components, and improved air defense systems.

An additional source of uncertainty is China's possession of

nuclear weapons. China continues to work on strategic ballistic missiles and, by the late 1970's, can be expected to have operational ICBM's, capable of reaching the U.S.

On the other hand, the Soviet Union in the past few months appears to have slowed the deployment of land-based strategic missile launchers. The significance of this development is not clear. The USSR could be exercising self-restraint. Its leaders may have concluded, as we have, that the number of ICBM's now deployed is sufficient for their needs. Or, the slowdown could be temporary and could be followed, in due course, by a resumption of new missile deployments. The delay could mean that the Soviet Union is preparing to introduce major qualitative improvements, such as a new warhead or guidance system. Finally, the slowdown could presage the deployment of an altogether new missile system.

We will continue to watch Soviet deployments carefully. If the USSR is in fact exercising restraint, we welcome this action and will take it into account in our planning. If it turns out to be preparatory to a new intensification of the strategic arms race, it will be necessary for us to react appropriately.

The Doctrine of Strategic Sufficiency

Our policy remains, as I explained last year, to maintain strategic sufficiency. The concept of sufficiency is not based solely on debatable calculations and assumptions regarding possible scenarios of how a war might occur and be conducted. It is in part a political concept, and it involves judgments whether the existing and foreseeable military environment endangers our legitimate interests and aspirations.

Specifically, sufficiency has two meanings. In its narrow military sense, it means enough force to inflict a level of damage on a potential aggressor sufficient to deter him from attacking. Sole reliance on a "launch-on-warning" strategy, sometimes suggested by those who would give less weight to the protection of our forces, would force us to live at the edge of a precipice and deny us the flexibility we wish to preserve.

In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning solely on some finite—and theoretical—capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.

But sufficiency also means numbers, characteristics, and

deployments of our forces which the Soviet Union cannot reasonably interpret as being intended to threaten a disarming attack. Our purpose, reflected both in our strategic programs and in our SALT proposals, is to maintain a balance, and thereby reduce the likelihood of nuclear war. Insofar as we can do so by unilateral decisions, we seek to obviate the need for costly, wasteful, and dangerous cycles of strategic arms deployment.

Defensive in its essence, the decision to pursue a policy of strategic sufficiency rather than strategic superiority does not represent any lessening of our resolve not to permit our interests to be infringed. The doctrine of sufficiency represents, rather, an explicit recognition of the changed circumstances we face with regard to strategic forces. The United States and the Soviet Union have now reached a point where small numerical advantages in strategic forces have little military relevance. The attempt to obtain large advantages would spark an arms race which would, in the end, prove pointless. For, both sides would almost surely commit the necessary resources to maintain a balance. We have deliberately chosen to tailor our policy to fit these realities. But we are also taking measures in other categories of military power to prevent a gap from developing in our military posture.

We hope that the Soviet Union will likewise recognize these realities, and that its force buildups are ending. It should be under no illusion that we will not respond to major quantitative and qualitative improvements which threaten to upset the strategic balance.

In pursuing our policy we have started a number of studies within the NSC framework to refine further our understanding of the strategic relationship and the number and type of forces required to maintain sufficiency. These continuing studies are important because even with numbers held constant, the relative strategic position can change through modernization and technological advances and through differing concepts for employment. In the past year, we have therefore, examined with particular care three aspects of our strategic force which are central to the concept of sufficiency—the survivability, the flexibility, and the mix of our existing forces.

The survivability of our forces. Our strategic forces must be such that the Soviet Union knows that even an all-out surprise attack will involve unacceptable costs. The survivability of our retaliatory forces is therefore essential. Without it, the Soviet Union, in some future crisis, might be tempted to strike first, or to use military or political pressure in the belief that we were effectively deterred.

Survivability of our retaliatory forces can be assured in a number of different ways:

—By increasing the number of offensive forces to insure that a sufficient number will survive a surprise attack.

—By defending ICBM's and bombers with air and missile defenses.

—By hardening our existing missile silos.

—By increasing the mobile portion of our strategic forces.

—By adding multiple independently targetable warheads to missiles to allow each surviving missile to attack more targets and hence not be defeated by a single ABM interceptor.

In seeking to improve the survivability of our forces, we have deliberately adopted measures designed to demonstrate our defensive intent. For example, because proliferating our offensive forces risks an increase in Soviet forces and a new phase in the arms race, we have not increased the number of our missiles and bombers. Instead, we have relied on alternatives such as hardening missile silos and deploying missile defenses. Our deployment of MIRV's serves the same purpose. They do not have the combination of numbers, accuracy and warhead yield to pose a threat to the Soviet land-based ICBM force.

With the programs we have undertaken, the bulk of our retaliatory forces are currently secure from attack and should remain so in the near future. However, continuing Soviet deployments and improvements—in particular, the large SS-9 missile with accurate independently targetable multiple warheads—could threaten the survivability of the land-based portion of our forces. That would not, of course, be an acceptable situation. We will, therefore, keep this matter under close review. We will, as a matter of the highest priority, take whatever steps become necessary to maintain the assured survivability of our retaliatory capabilities.

Flexibility—The responses available to us. We have reviewed our concepts for responses to various possible contingencies. We must insure that we have the forces and procedures that provide us with alternatives appropriate to the nature and level of the provocation. This means having the plans and command and control capabilities necessary to enable us to select and carry out the appropriate response without necessarily having to resort to mass destruction.

The mix of forces. For several years we have maintained three types of strategic forces—land-based ICBMs, bombers, and submarine-launched missiles. Each is capable of inflicting a high level of damage in response to a nuclear first strike. Taken together they have an unquestioned capability of inflicting an unacceptable level of damage. This concept takes advantage of the unique characteristics of each delivery system. It provides insurance against surprise enemy technological breakthroughs or unforeseen operational failures and complicates the task of planning attacks on us. It complicates even more the longer range planning of the levels and composition of the opposing forces. If the effectiveness and survivability of one element were eroded, the

Soviet Union could choose to concentrate its resources on eroding the effectiveness and survivability of the others. This would confront us with serious new decisions and we will therefore continue to review our forces in the light of changing threats and technology to ensure that we have the best possible mix to meet the requirements of sufficiency.

While this review of the sufficiency of our strategic posture has taken place, we have also continued to seek agreement on a strategic balance with the USSR at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). I will discuss in greater detail elsewhere in this report the progress of those talks.

The Forces for Sufficiency

Last year, I announced my commitment to maintain our existing strategic forces with relatively little change. The grounds for this decision were that:

—Sharp cutbacks would not permit us to satisfy our sufficiency criteria and were unwarranted in view of the continuing growth of Soviet forces. Unilateral reductions could—paradoxically—eliminate any Soviet incentives for an agreement to limit strategic arms. They would also raise serious concerns among our allies, particularly in NATO.

—On the other hand, sharp increases in our forces, unless spurred by new Soviet deployments, might lead the Soviets to misunderstand our intentions, and might force them into new strategic investments they would otherwise eschew. The prospects for reaching agreement to limit strategic arms might be irreparably damaged.

During the past year, I have continued this policy of deliberate restraint. Our programs have been as follows:

—We started to improve the survivability of our Minuteman force by increasing the hardness of Minuteman silos, thereby making them less vulnerable to nuclear attack. We also are continuing the deployment of Safeguard defensive sites to protect our Minuteman.

—We are adding multiple independently targetable warheads to some of our strategic missiles. This action also contributes to stability since it helps ensure a credible retaliatory capability. Without such a system in our future arsenal, the possibility of a Soviet preemptive strike against our strategic forces, combined with strong Soviet defensive forces, would make questionable the assured penetration of a sufficient number of weapons from our retaliatory capability. With multiple independently targetable warheads, each of our surviving missiles will have the capability to attack a number of targets, thereby enhancing our ability to penetrate enemy defenses.

We consider these measures to be essential to maintain the sufficiency of our strategic posture in the light of increases and improvements in the Soviet strategic forces.

To insure that our forces will remain sufficient in the future we will continue research and development on appropriate measures and systems to enhance the survivability and effectiveness of our strategic offensive and defensive forces.

In light of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations, we are acting with great restraint in introducing changes in our strategic posture. We will avoid steps which make it more difficult for the Soviet Union and ourselves to reach an agreed structure of strategic stability. At the same time, we must be prepared to take necessary steps to maintain the sufficiency of our strategic forces should an agreement not be reached within the near future.

Ballistic Missile Defense

When I announced the Safeguard ABM program, I promised that "each phase of the deployment will be reviewed to insure that we are doing as much as necessary but no more than that required by the threat existing at that time."¹² The Defense Program Review Committee has just completed a thorough review of Safeguard against the background of SALT, our strategic policy, changes in the Soviet capability, and the Chinese development of strategic forces.

—While it appears that the Soviets have slowed the increase of their missile systems, the evidence is far from unambiguous. Nor is it clear that even at present levels of Soviet forces, future qualitative improvements would not endanger our ICBM forces.

—The potential for qualitative improvements and numerical increases in Soviet forces poses a serious threat to our land-based strategic forces in the absence of agreed arms limitations on both defensive and offensive forces.

—Attacks might also be directed against our national command authorities and gravely endanger our capability to respond appropriately to the nature, scale and source of the attack.

—We still face the disturbing possibility of accidents.

—Finally, before this decade is over, the Chinese will have the capability to threaten some of our major population centers.

These developments persuade me of the wisdom of our initial decisions to take the necessary preliminary steps for Safeguard ABM deployments. I am convinced that we must plan to continue our Safeguard program for the present.

At the same time, we have actively discussed with the Soviet Union, limitations on defensive as well as offensive strategic weapons. Some limits on ABM systems are essential to any SALT agreement. We have taken this into account in our planning.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 105.

Last year Congress approved varying levels of work on the four Safeguard sites designed primarily to protect our Minuteman missiles.

I will continue a Safeguard program designed to provide maximum flexibility in the conduct of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. We are doing nothing which precludes any possible agreement on SALT. Our specific plans for the coming year will be announced by the Secretary of Defense.

At the same time, we have no explicit statement from the USSR as to the reasons for the leveling-off of the ICBM deployments, nor any guarantee that the apparent slow-down will continue. Moreover, the Soviet Union has been pursuing qualitative improvements which could threaten our retaliatory forces. With all the will in the world, we may be unable to secure limitations in the SALT discussions. In view of that possibility, I deem it essential that we continue with the minimum program of work on ABM.

Our strategic forces constitute the foundation of our nation's security. We maintain these forces, in sufficient size and character, to achieve our objective of deterrence. While we intend to maintain whatever forces are necessary to insure our deterrent, we also intend to pursue every reasonable avenue of negotiation that might end the strategic arms race—a race that contributes nothing to the real security of either side.

GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

The change in the strategic situation in recent years profoundly enhances the importance of our general purpose forces. The Soviet Union's build-up alters the character of the strategic threat. China also is developing strategic forces, though her current capabilities are still quite limited.

With this shift in strategic realities, our potential adversaries may be tempted by the use or the threat of force below what they consider the level of general nuclear war. General purpose forces, therefore, now play a larger role in deterring attacks than at any time since the nuclear era began.

In last year's report, I pointed out that after intensive review I had decided to maintain general purpose forces adequate to deter or, if necessary defend against, a major threat to the interests of the U.S. and its allies in Europe or Asia; and simultaneously to cope with a minor contingency elsewhere. This decision reflected our assessment of certain new factors that I outlined in last year's report:

- the nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies.

- the prospects for a coordinated two-front attack on our allies by Russia and China are low both because of the risks of nuclear war and the improbability of Sino-Soviet cooperation. In any event, we do not believe that such a coordinated attack should be met primarily by U.S. conventional forces.

—the desirability of insuring against greater than expected threats by maintaining more than the forces required to meet conventional threats in one theater—such as NATO Europe.

—weakness on our part would be more provocative than continued U.S. strength, for it might encourage others to take dangerous risks, to resort to the illusion that military adventurism could succeed.¹³

Guidelines for General Purpose Forces

In this past year, we have continued to shape our general purpose forces to those concepts. Our guidelines were the following:

—Both the USSR and the Chinese have substantial forces that can be rapidly reinforced. Our capabilities thus must rest on our allies' strength, strong U.S. overseas forces and the availability of credible reinforcements. We could not hide deficiencies from a potential enemy; weakness in conventional forces invites conventional attack.

—To serve as a realistic deterrent, our general purpose forces together with those of our allies, must be such as to convince potential enemies that they have nothing to gain by launching conventional attacks.

—To deter conventional aggression we and our allies together must be capable of posing unacceptable risks to potential enemies. We must not be in a position of being able to employ only strategic weapons to meet challenges to our interests. On the other hand, having a full range of options does not mean that we will necessarily limit our response to the level or intensity chosen by an enemy. Potential enemies must know that we will respond to whatever degree is required to protect our interests. They must also know that they will only worsen their situation by escalating the level of violence.

—It is our policy that future guerrilla and subversive threats should be dealt with primarily by the indigenous forces of our allies. Consistent with the Nixon Doctrine, we can and will provide economic and military assistance to supplement local efforts where our interests are involved.

—Our forces will be developed and deployed to the extent possible on the basis of a common strategy with our allies and a common sharing of the defense burden.

Since these factors are crucial to our support for regional defense organizations, they are discussed more fully elsewhere in this report, particularly in the sections on Europe and Indochina. In addition, the Secretary of Defense, in his Defense Report to the Congress, will describe in detail specific measures we have taken and the progress we have made.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 26.

Designing Our General Purpose Forces

Our major effort over the past year has been to develop a military posture consistent with these strategic guidelines and adequate to protect our overseas interests.

Europe. During 1970, the NATO Alliance concentrated on a thorough review of its defense posture. The central question was what strategy and mix of conventional and theater nuclear forces was best suited to the defense of the Alliance when both the U.S. and the USSR have the capabilities for mutual nuclear devastation. The review reflected the fact that Europe is moving through a time of change, and that the relationship of NATO and Warsaw Pact military forces can have a significant effect on the outcome of political negotiations.

Thus, we had to consider carefully not only the forces already deployed in Europe, but the capabilities the NATO Alliance maintains for rapid mobilization and reinforcement, and the probabilities of receiving early warning. The commitment of our own strategic forces to the Alliance deterrent, of course, was not in question.

For our part, we reviewed the contribution of United States ground, air, and naval forces. Together with our allies we concluded that:

—We should not decrease our present forces, nor should any other ally.

—The basic Alliance strategy would require maximum flexibility to deal with the full range of possible attacks.

—A realistic deterrent against conventional attacks required a substantial conventional forward defense capability.

—Important qualitative improvements would have to be made by all allies to offset the continuing improvements by the Warsaw Pact.

Asia. The situation in Asia differs significantly from that in Europe. The People's Republic of China has substantial military forces. But those forces pose a more limited and less immediate threat in Asia than do the forces of the Soviet Union in Europe. Chinese nuclear capabilities are still in an early stage of development. At the same time, our allies in Asia have not yet fully developed their own defense capabilities.

Taking account of these facts, we have reviewed general purpose force requirements in Asia. Our review indicates that we can meet our collective security objectives while placing greater reliance on our allies for their own defense. The growing strength of our allies has already resulted in a reduction of the level of our general purpose forces stationed in the region.

In all Areas. The primary role of our general purpose forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression. If aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined by our interests,

the needs of our allies, and their defense capabilities, which we are seeking to improve. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union's strong and balanced conventional capability enables it to project its military power to areas heretofore beyond its reach. This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests.

This may impose new requirements and new burdens in the coming decade. We would prefer that rivalry with the USSR be contained through self-restraint, mutual respect for interests, and specific agreements. But I am determined that our general military posture will remain as strong as the international situation dictates.

ARMS CONTROL

... through negotiation we can move toward the control of armaments in a manner that will bring a greater measure of security than we can obtain from arms alone.¹⁴

The President's Message to the Congress
Transmitting the Ninth Report of the
U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, February 26, 1970

The World has no more urgent interest than reducing the danger of war, and above all, nuclear war. This creates responsibilities for all nations, but particularly for the nuclear superpowers.

The control of armaments is not a new issue in this decade or the postwar period. Man has long sought to create the mutual trust and techniques to limit and reduce arms. The historical record has been tragic. Arms control has generally foundered because it failed the test of international crises—nations could not resolve the very issues that stimulated weapons competition. At the same time, political settlements were threatened by arms rivalry—nations could not define levels that did not stimulate ever new competition and thus new antagonisms and insecurity.

Progress to Date

In an age of great technological change and enormous nuclear power, we face even larger challenges. This Administration is dedicated to the limitation and reduction of arms. We are proud of our accomplishments.

Preventing the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. The worldwide reach of scientific knowledge enables virtually any nation in time to acquire nuclear weapons. Last year, the United States ratified the treaty to halt further proliferation of nuclear weapons. More than 100 nations have either signed or ratified this treaty, and negotiations to implement its verification procedures are in progress. If all nations act on its principles and abide by its obligations, the incentive for any additional nation to acquire nuclear arms will recede.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 733-734.

Preserving Peace in New Frontiers. Modern technology has opened up the vistas of outer space and the ocean depths for mankind's benefit. But it has created as well the temptation to exploit these new environments for military gain. We and other nations have acted to prohibit nuclear weapons in outer space. This Administration took the initiative to negotiate a treaty banning weapons of mass destruction from the seabeds. The United Nations overwhelmingly approved the treaty this fall, and I will soon submit it to the Senate.¹⁵

Curbing Biological and Chemical Threats. Modern science has spawned the most deadly means of biological and chemical warfare. This Administration has moved on several fronts to reduce this threat:

—The United States renounced all use of biological and toxin weapons and first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons. Our biological and toxin research will be confined to small programs solely for defensive purposes. I have approved a plan to destroy stockpiles of these agents and associated munitions. We announced the conversion of one major biological facility to the investigation of the health effects of certain chemicals.

—On August 19, 1970, I submitted to the Senate the 1925 Geneva Protocol banning the use in warfare of chemical and biological weapons.¹⁶ If ratified, the United States would join 95 other nations, including all the major powers, in supporting this treaty.

—In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, we will urge further international control over the biological and chemical means of war.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)

The most important area in which progress is yet to be made is the limitation of strategic arms. Perhaps for the first time, the evolving strategic balance allows a Soviet-American agreement which yields no unilateral advantages. The fact we have begun to discuss strategic arms with the USSR is in itself important. Agreement in such a vital area could create a new commitment to stability and influence attitudes toward other issues.

A New Method of Preparation. In previous arms control negotiations our usual practice was to develop a single proposal, based on what would command a consensus among diverse views in the bureaucracy. This frequently led to rigidity in the negotiations; unless the other side adopted an almost identical stance, the talks deadlocked. Time and energies were then consumed in re-negotiating a position within our Government.

¹⁵ See *post*, pp. 430-431.

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 445-446. The protocol appears *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

I concluded that we needed a new approach—to give us a firmer grasp of the issues, to provide maximum flexibility in negotiations, and to speed up the overall negotiating process. Because flexibility is a virtue only within a framework of clear purpose, I ordered the most comprehensive study of weapons systems bearing on the negotiations.

We assigned the analytical tasks to a special NSC group, the Verification Panel. It first examined the various weapons systems to determine the effect of conceivable limitations on our current and projected military programs, their effect on Soviet programs, and—on the basis of this analysis—the strategic situation ensuing from particular weapons limitations.

The Panel looked as well at verification. Confidence that obligations are being adhered to is a basic requirement for stable arms control agreements and should be of equal concern to both sides. We made a detailed analysis of our ability, and the measures needed, to verify compliance with each agreement. We also studied counteractions if we detected a violation, and whether we could take them in time to protect our security.

The result was the development of individual “building blocks” for all offensive and defensive weapons. We can combine these blocks in various clusters of limitations and reductions to produce alternative proposals for the negotiations.

This enables us to respond quickly and meaningfully to any Soviet counterproposals; at home we are not the prisoner of bureaucratic jockeying to come up with an agreed response. The focus in our dialogue, either with the USSR or within our own government, can be on substantive issues.

Differing Perspectives. We made major efforts to understand the position of the Soviet Union. Of all possible areas for negotiation, limitation of strategic weapons requires the greatest such efforts, for no nation will maintain an accord which it believes jeopardizes its survival.

This task of developing an equitable agreement is greatly complicated by our differing strategic positions and perspectives.

Even within the United States, and no doubt in the USSR, there are widely divergent views over the key elements of an effective and credible strategic posture. The technical issues are highly complex and the political and strategic considerations engage our vital interests. It would be surprising, therefore, if there were not also large initial differences between the U.S. and the USSR.

The composition and level of our respective strategic forces reflected different geographical factors and historical development. This posed a major problem of establishing an equivalence between weapons systems with dissimilar characteristics and capabilities:

—Our deployments of offensive missile launchers were completed by 1967; the USSR continued to build different types

of land-based ICBM's and a nuclear-powered missile submarine force that will equal ours within three years at current rates. The USSR has constructed a large ICBM, the SS-9, for which the U.S. has no counterpart. Deployed in sufficient numbers and armed with the multiple independently targetable warheads (MIRV's) of sufficient accuracy, this missile could threaten our land-based ICBM forces. Our MIRV systems, by contrast, do not have the combination of numbers, accuracy and warhead yield to pose a threat to the Soviet land-based ICBM force.

—The USSR has a large force of intermediate and medium range ballistic missiles. We do not. On the other hand, our alliance commitments and their regional military programs caused us to base our tactical aircraft abroad; we also retain air power on carriers.

—The USSR has deployed an Anti-Ballistic Missile defense system, thus far in the Moscow area. We have initiated an ABM program based on different strategic principles and missile systems.

Our analysis indicated critical areas of prospective strategic instability:

—Offensive systems have clearly developed to a point where certain further improvements as well as increased launcher deployments could pose a threat to land-based missile retaliatory forces and thus threaten stability.

—Instability also could develop through the unchecked extension of defensive capabilities. One side might believe that its defenses could clearly limit the damage it might suffer from retaliation, and therefore that it was in a position to strike first.

We took these factors into account in shaping negotiating positions for SALT. There have been three phases so far, alternating between Helsinki and Vienna: Helsinki I (November 17–December 22, 1969); Vienna I (April 16–August 14, 1970); Helsinki II (November 2–December 18, 1970). The negotiators are now slated to reassemble in Vienna on March 15.

The Course of SALT Negotiations

There has been speculation both here and abroad concerning the talks. Progress has been facilitated by our agreed policy of privacy with respect to the negotiating exchanges. I will, of course, respect that agreement. I am, therefore, free to discuss only the general character of the talks and underlying issues which have emerged.

We believed that progress could best be made if the initial exchanges encouraged agreement on the definition of the subject matter and the nature of the issues. Thus, we did not launch discussions in the traditional manner of hard, detailed proposals that might lead to early deadlock, each side supporting its opening position. Instead, we explored some general concepts of strategic

stability and related them to the issues posed by limiting individual weapons systems. Our negotiating team, ably led by Ambassador Gerard Smith, reviewed our analysis, explaining how we thought agreements might evolve and their verification requirements.

This essentially exploratory approach, which included a general treatment of verification, enabled each side to gain greater understanding of the other's thinking. There was broad consensus on certain general strategic concepts. At the same time there were clear differences on whether certain systems should be included in discussions of an initial agreement.

Both sides proceeded in a thoughtful, non-polemical manner. Calm, reasoned dialogue produced a common work program for future sessions.

In the later phases of the talks, we moved from an analysis of issues to a discussion of concrete measures. Initially, the U.S. suggested possible approaches involving both numerical and qualitative limitations on strategic offensive and defensive systems, including MIRV's. We also put forward an alternative comprehensive approach which would not constrain MIRV's, but would involve reductions in offensive forces in order to maintain stability even in the face of qualitative improvements.

The Soviet Union, for its part, submitted a general proposal which diverged from ours in many respects, including a major difference on the definition of strategic systems.

When it proved difficult to make progress on the basis of the initial approaches and proposals, our preparatory work enabled us to move rapidly to a modified approach taking account of Soviet objections. Our approach incorporated alternative provisions for either limitation or a total ban of ABM. Modified proposals were put forward by the Soviet Union as well. On some issues, our views coincided or were quite close; on others there remained important differences. In many respects, Soviet suggestions on various aspects of offensive and defensive limitations lacked the specificity and detail to permit firm conclusions about their overall impact.

SALT Issues For the Future. We have been able to move from preliminary exploration of substantive issues to concrete negotiations in a fairly short period. The dialogue has been serious and businesslike. The rate of progress, however, has been influenced by differing perspectives.

This Administration has established and enunciated a concept of strategic sufficiency. We have reflected this concept in the nature and number of our strategic forces and the doctrines for their employment. All these aspects of our posture are fully aired in each year's budgetary process. As I have pointed out in the section on Strategic Forces, Soviet deployments make us uncertain whether the USSR has made a similar national commitment to strategic equilibrium.

There also remain specific differences that have gradually emerged in our exchange of proposals. These involve what an agreement should cover and how it should be verified.

—We have approached the question on what armaments to include in an initial agreement with different definitions. While recognizing that a variety of offensive systems could be construed as strategic, we believe that priority should go to those that form the core of offensive threats, ICBM's, SLBM's and heavy strategic bombers.

—The USSR has broadly defined "strategic" offensive weapons as those that can reach the other side's territory. These terms include our theater nuclear delivery systems including those on aircraft carriers. But our carrier and land-based air forces abroad are essential components of integrated theater defenses created under alliance commitments in response to common threats. On the other hand, the Soviet approach would not include limitations on its own theater nuclear forces, including their own medium or intermediate range missiles. During the course of the negotiations we have been making efforts in consultation with our allies to take account of this difference in perspective.

—There has also been a difference over whether a separate agreement limiting ABM's alone would be in our mutual interest. The U.S. believes that to be stable and satisfactory, an agreement should include limitations on both offensive and defensive systems.

—As I said last year, the requirement for adequate verification of any agreement is essential to both sides. We have not yet found a way to overcome certain differences. They are particularly difficult in connection with our attempts to limit or ban MIRV's or ABM's. We will continue working on solutions to these problems in future negotiations.

In light of these complex issues and our differing approaches, we are neither surprised nor discouraged that progress has not been more rapid. The discussions have produced the most searching examination of strategic relationships ever conducted between the United States and the USSR. Each side has had the opportunity to explain at length the particular strategic concerns caused by the present and prospective posture of the other. Both sides know better how an agreement could deal with these concerns.

The Soviet position has not been presented in the detail that ours has, but the negotiations have reached a point where views are better understood and the basis of an agreement may be emerging. Further progress is therefore possible when negotiations resume.

We need to determine how comprehensive an agreement is feasible. On the one hand, even a relatively modest accord would create a stake for both sides to preserve progress and build upon it

with further agreements. Moreover, it could influence attitudes towards issues outside SALT. On the other hand, if all the effort that has gone into SALT were to produce only a token agreement, it could be counterproductive. There would be no reason to be confident that this could serve as a bridge to a more significant agreement. Therefore, we shall strive for an initial agreement which is as broad and comprehensive as possible. It must deal with the interrelationship between offensive and defensive limitations.

Two principles should be recognized. The strategic balance would be endangered if we limited defensive forces alone and left the offensive threat to our strategic forces unconstrained. It would also be dangerous, however, if only offensive forces were restrained, while defenses were allowed to become so strong that one side might no longer be deterred from striking first. To limit only one side of the offense-defense equation could rechannel the arms competition rather than effectively curtail it.

We also have to clarify the relationship between the process of negotiations—which may be protracted and involve several stages—and actions taken during the talks and even after an initial agreement. It is clear that restraint is essential. If the Soviet leaders extend their strategic capabilities, especially in ways that increase the threat to our forces, we would face new decisions in the strategic field.

Last summer, in a press conference on July 30, 1970, I stated what appeared to me to be the only alternatives:

We can either continue this race in which they continue their offensive missiles and we go forward with our defensive missiles, or we can reach an agreement. That is why at this point we have hopes of attempting to find, either on a comprehensive basis, and lacking a comprehensive basis, a selective basis, the first steps toward which the superpowers will limit the development of and particularly the deployment of more instruments of destruction when both have enough to destroy each other many times over.¹⁷

I retain that hope and in this report reaffirm my commitment to its fulfillment. At this stage what is needed are political decisions to move towards an agreement on the basis of an equitable strategic relationship. We have taken this decision.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe

Last year I indicated that we needed to study carefully mutual force reductions in Europe as one of the most fruitful areas for East-West dialogue. Accordingly, I directed that our government reinforce the preliminary work done in NATO with an intensive analysis of the issues in an agreement to reduce NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

Problems. In many respects this subject poses even more complex problems than strategic arms limitation:

The principal objective should be a more stable military balance at lower levels of forces and costs. Therefore, reductions should

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 350.

have the effect of enhancing defensive capabilities, so as to diminish the incentives for attacking forces. Even if defensive capabilities were not actually improved, force reductions, as a minimum, should not create offensive advantages greater than those already existing. Yet, reductions would tend to favor offensive capabilities, since attacking forces could concentrate while reduced defensive forces were compelled to spread along a given line.

Achieving reductions that leave the balance unaffected or, preferably, improve stability, raises a number of intricate technical problems. For example, how do we establish equivalency between opposing forces? This is already difficult enough with respect to strategic arms limitations which involve relatively few weapons systems. In reducing conventional ground and air or tactical nuclear forces a great variety of national forces and materiel would have to be considered. Furthermore, there are marked differences in the equipment, organization, and strength both within and between the opposing NATO and Warsaw Pact forces.

Preparations. Following the pattern developed for SALT, we first assembled detailed data on manpower, conventional weapons, tactical nuclear weapons and aircraft for both sides. We compared them in areas ranging from a narrow zone in Central Europe to ones extending up to the Western USSR. We had to determine:

—The current balance of forces for each category. We could then evaluate the new military equation if various forces were reduced in different degree[s], and gauge when one side might gain a unilateral advantage.

—Our ability to verify levels of all forces so that we can confirm reductions.

—The measures needed to detect increases in the manpower or equipment of reduced forces.

Our preliminary analysis pointed up a central problem. The Warsaw Pact can mobilize and reinforce more rapidly than NATO, primarily with divisions from the USSR. Thus, in judging force reductions we must consider not only the balance of standing forces but what each side could do following various periods of mobilization and reinforcement. There are two broad approaches to reductions:

—proportionately equal ones applying the same percentage of reductions to both sides.

—asymmetrical ones in which reductions by the two sides would be made in differing amounts in different categories so that one side would make larger cuts in one category in return for larger cuts by the other side in another category to create a stable military equation at lower force levels.

The first has the advantage of simplicity but would tend to magnify the effects [of] any imbalances which exist at the outset. The

second, because of its complexity, would pose difficult analytical and negotiating problems, but would have the advantage of providing a firmer basis for a stable relationship between the two sides. We are studying these questions with our allies.

Our preliminary conclusions suggest that the pattern of the SALT negotiations might be valid as an approach to discussions of mutual force reductions in Europe. Rather than exchanging concrete proposals at the outset we could first explore major substantive issues and their relation to specific problems. Within this common framework we could move to more detailed discussion of individual issues. This building block approach could resolve the complex technical issues and lead to an agreement.

CONCLUSION

It is essential that the United States maintain a military force sufficient to protect our interests and meet our commitments. Were we to do less, there would be no chance of creating a stable world structure.

But it is an illusion to think that the ideal guarantee of security—for ourselves or for the world—rests on our efforts alone. While maintaining our strength, therefore, we are also making a sustained effort to achieve with the Soviet Union agreement on arms limitations. Only a designed balance of armaments can ensure security that is shared and equitable, and therefore durable.

It is for that reason that we have defined our security requirements in terms that facilitate arms control agreements. The doctrine of strategic sufficiency is fully compatible with arms limitations. So too are the role of our conventional forces and the purpose of our security assistance.

Our goal is security—and if others share that goal, it can be assured through mutual design, rather than mutual exertion. It will, in any event, be maintained.

Note Verbale From Secretary-General Thant to U.N. Members: Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race, March 1, 1971¹

The Secretary-General of the United Nations presents his compliments to . . . and has the honour to refer to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970 requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures, to be transmitted to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-sixth session.²

¹ A/8469/Add. 1, Nov. 12, 1971, pp. 3-5. For the U.S. reply, see *post* pp. 316-342. The Secretary-General's report appears *post*, pp. 644-686.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

In accordance with the terms of this resolution, the Secretary-General appointed a group of 14 consultant experts to assist him in the preparation of the report.

The Group of Consultant Experts, which held its first session at United Nations Headquarters from 16 to 19 February 1971, to organize its work, considered that it would be greatly assisted in its task if Governments could supply information, both quantitative and qualitative, on the matters listed below:

1. The level and trend of military expenditure over the past decade, and the near-term and long-term prospects for such expenditure. Data on expenditure should be broken down, if possible, in terms of procurement (commodities), personnel, research and development, capital investment.

2. The effect, if any, of military expenditure on the rate of growth of the economy.

3. The effect of military expenditure on the use of resources.

(a) The level and trend of employment of manpower in (i) the armed forces; (ii) defence-related activities

(b) The level and trend of manpower and financial resources devoted to all research and development activities, and the proportion of these totals allocated to (i) military purposes; and (ii) defence-related industry

(c) The level and trend of public and private social expenditure (education, health, cultural activities, social security, housing, etc.)

4. The effects, if any, on the volume and structure of imports and exports resulting from (a) domestic and (b) foreign military expenditure. The proportion of imports and exports that is defence-related.

5. The effects, if any, on the balance of payments resulting from (a) domestic and (b) foreign military expenditure.

6. The level and trend of economic aid, provided or received, and the relationship, if any, of defence considerations.

7. The influence of military expenditure on the level of economic activity and on foreign trade.

8. Possibilities of environmental damage. Tendencies towards the premature exhaustion of raw material resources or the over-exploitation of such resources.

9. Effects on social stability and on social attitudes, tensions, frictions.

10. The effects, if any, of defence considerations on over-all production and foreign trade policies.

11. The effects, if any, of defence considerations at home or abroad on the transfer of technology (a) internally (b) to foreign countries.

12. Other information or observations which may be relevant to the work of the expert group, particularly in connexion with paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) which

calls upon all States to take effective steps for the cessation and reversal of the arms race and for the achievement of steady progress in the field of disarmament.

Having regard to paragraph 4 of resolution 2667 (XXV) which "calls upon all Governments to extend their full co-operation to the Secretary-General to ensure that the study is carried out in the most effective way". Governments are invited to supply any data, information or studies that would throw light on the items listed.

It should be emphasized that all data supplied by Governments to the United Nations or specialized agencies under existing standard reporting procedures will be made available by the Statistical Office of the United Nations to the Group, and there is, therefore, no need for Governments to furnish such data in connexion with the present request, except in so far as it may be possible to bring previously supplied information up to date or to provide additional detail. Since the Group wishes to examine trends over the past decade, as well as the current situation and outlook, it is requested that, wherever possible, data should be supplied for the years 1961 to 1970. Value data should be reported in national currencies in current prices, and wherever possible, in constant prices. If estimates are also available in terms of current and constant dollars, these too should be reported.

Since the report called for by resolution 2667 (XXV) is required to be transmitted to the General Assembly in time for consideration at the next session, it is requested that Governments forward their replies to the Secretary-General not later than 1 May 1971.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 2, 1971¹

It has become customary for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to initiate its yearly session by a round of debate in which delegations offer their comments in more general terms on the workload ahead, the priorities they think should be set, and the manner by which results may be obtained. We must avoid, however, this period of finding our way becoming too long. The time allotted to us is, as always, limited. Detailed, concrete negotiations on the priority subjects must therefore start as soon as possible. Also, in order to achieve valuable guidance as to where the main efforts should be made by the Committee, it is necessary that the evaluation made by representatives of the general situation should be a quite frank one.

3. As I am today entering upon the tenth year of work in this Committee, I feel particularly urged to express with strong

¹ CCD/PV.497, pp. 5-13.

emphasis my most general comment: that it is about time that these negotiations produced something substantial. Everywhere in the world newspaper readers look with a wry smile on our returning here, to talk—again—about disarmament, when the news is full of the reality of a dangerously escalating armaments race.

4. It is about time that our negotiations resulted in a major measure of disarmament, markedly cutting down on armaments. So far any comparison between achievements on the debit and credit sides of the armaments ledger does not give us ground for much satisfaction. This goes also for our latest accomplishment, the limited sea-bed Treaty, which has just been opened for signature.² Sweden is one of the over sixty States which signed on the first day. My Government intends to submit the text to Parliament for its approval shortly, and we expect to be able to ratify the Treaty in the reasonably near future. But we all realize that the sea-bed Treaty, because it is a limited, partial one, does not in any significant way hamper the arms race.

5. A promising feature of the Treaty is, of course, contained in its article V, by which the Parties undertake to continue negotiations “concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed . . .”. The Swedish delegation, which sets great store by this clause, does not, however, intend to propose that demilitarization of the sea-bed be selected immediately as one of the major topics on our agenda for this year. The time-table is such that this Committee can now rather take the time to await the results of the present phase of work in the enlarged United Nations sea-bed Committee. We expect soon to get an authoritative formulation of the overriding rule that in the interest of the pursuit of peaceful activities there should be no encroachments in or on the international sea-bed, no objects or activities that are unauthorized, including, of course, any serving national military purposes. The reference in para. 5 of article III, on verification, of the sea-bed Treaty to “appropriate international procedures” for verification purposes is an encouraging sign of greater understanding of the need for an international régime which would have the power to cover and control all activities on the sea-bed under international waters.

6. Before taking up the two disarmament measures on which the Swedish delegation holds that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should concentrate its efforts during the present session, I wish to dwell briefly on the concurrent and by far most important endeavour in the disarmament field at this juncture. I refer, of course, to the bilateral negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapon systems (SALT). In this connexion I wish to draw attention to General Assembly

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

resolution 2661 A (XXV) on the necessity of bringing the nuclear arms race to an immediate halt.³ In this resolution, which was adopted without one negative vote and with only a handful of abstentions, the Assembly urges the Governments of the nuclear-weapon Powers to bring about an immediate halt—I repeat, immediate—in the nuclear arms race and to cease forthwith all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems. This resolution touches on the most crucial event to be expected in the disarmament field—the limitation and gradual elimination of nuclear arms.

7. In its latest *Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament* issued in November 1970 and concerned with developments in 1969/70, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) gives a frightening picture of the expanding nuclear arms race. Broadly speaking, the *Yearbook* indicates that the United States is rapidly introducing multiple warheads (MIRVs) and, although less rapidly, anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs). There is also important research and development work on new weapon systems which may be procured unless the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks produce results soon. In the Soviet Union, according to SIPRI, there is a sharp continued increase in total missile strength involving both numbers and qualities of its nuclear missiles. It is generally believed that Soviet policy on future development will also be influenced largely by the outcome of SALT. The other nuclear-weapon Powers, including China, seem to be very far behind the two super-Powers as far as both nuclear strength and the development of delivery systems are concerned, a situation which should be considered opportune for a decisive stopping of the upward spiral now.

8. A factor which should preoccupy us all is the limited character of the agreements discussed at the SALT meetings. It seems that what the negotiators have in mind as far as offensive weapons are concerned is a ceiling on the total number of nuclear delivery systems. However, such a ceiling, unless it were placed quite low, would have little or no effect on the arms race. In fact, the race might even be accelerated by turning competition completely to qualitative changes. Therefore a freeze on the deployment as well as on the testing of all offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems, as called for in the United Nations resolution to which I have just referred, would be highly desirable.

9. Ever since the bilateral talks, now currently named SALT, were first mentioned as a possibility in 1964, the world community has been hailing them as perhaps the most important opportunity that the two countries primarily involved, but also the world at large, has had to come to grips in an effective way with the nuclear arms race. One can reflect for a moment on the

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 681-682.

effects that would have been obtained had past opportunities not been lost. For instance, already in 1964 the arms race could have been frozen, reductions being introduced later of the level then prevailing. The total amount of intercontinental ballistic missiles on both sides was then, for instance, less than half the number of those available today. No development of MIRVs had started and only on the Soviet side was there some limited deployment of ABMs. But, alas, those opportunities were lost.

10. The Soviet Union voted in favour of the United Nations resolution which I mentioned earlier; the United States abstained. I should like to express the hope that this favourable position by at least one of the parties might be reflected in concrete suggestions during the further negotiations, involving a freeze on testing as well as deployment of all offensive and defensive nuclear weapon systems. To make it immediately effective, a moratorium should be part of such a plan for the period during which the bilateral talks are taking place, as was also recommended in General Assembly resolution 2602 A (XXIV) adopted in December 1969.⁴

11. This Committee cannot let this issue be neglected in our negotiations simply because part of the problem is treated elsewhere. I should like to associate myself with the remarks made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, when he said on 23 February, during one of the first statements made at this session, that—

... this Committee, which by definition is the competent organ for negotiations on disarmament, cannot continue indefinitely to refrain from considering [these] matters ...⁵

about which we only hear through sporadic articles in the press. The work of this Committee would undoubtedly be greatly affected if SALT were crowned with rapid success. It would be a signal that the political attitudes had matured into a readiness to take disarmament plans seriously. The road to successful negotiations on further matters on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would be illuminated in a most promising way.

12. But a vexing question for this Committee is: should we allow ourselves also to be affected if there is a continued stalemate in SALT? This question touches most directly upon what must be one of our central preoccupations during this session: namely, to achieve finally a comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear explosives. Actual developments in regard to nuclear-weapon testing demonstrate that the situation is not a stationary one which would allow us to sit quietly in a static position hoping for some propitious moment to occur. The situation is, on the

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 710-711.

⁵ CCD/PV.495, p. 28.

contrary, a dangerously dynamic one. Nuclear testing is instrumental in the qualitative build-up of nuclear arms, and available evidence shows that testing has been stepped up recently. Again I wish to refer members of the Committee to the figures given by SIPRI in its new Yearbook (pp. 384-385). It lists a total of seventy-three nuclear tests conducted during the eighteen months from January 1969 to June 1970. Of these, fifty-one were American underground weapon tests and sixteen Soviet such tests.

13. Later information indicates that the trend towards increased testing continues. Several large underground explosions have thus been reported recently by Swedish scientific institutions. Leakages of radioactivity have again occurred from underground tests, further underlining the importance of bringing to an end, once and for ever, all weapon testing. I trust that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will devote considerable attention during this year's session to the achievement of this goal. Two excellent resolutions of the General Assembly, 2663 A and B (XXV), provide a formal basis for these efforts.⁶ Neither SALT nor the recently-completed partial sea-bed Treaty, with their limited scope and uncertain outcome, can be considered as adequate commitments by the main nuclear-weapon Powers to fulfil the pledges contained in earlier treaties, such as the non-proliferation Treaty, to arrive at effective measures to halt the nuclear arms race.⁷

14. A vast majority of the non-nuclear-weapon States are fulfilling their part of mutual restraint in the nuclear arms field by their adherence to that and other treaties. In this connexion it is heartening to be able to state that the talks held within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna, concerned with detailed safeguard arrangements for the non-nuclear-weapon States under the non-proliferation Treaty, seem to be advancing well. There could be no more effective commitment by the nuclear-weapon Powers concerning limitation of their proliferation of nuclear weapons than a comprehensive test ban which would effectively limit the possibilities of any further sophistication of these terror arms. My delegation intends to revert to the test-ban issue a little later in this session and will then make some concrete proposals for action by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

15. In this context I want to stress the importance of the international aspect of this issue in regard to control also. We all want to feel safe. The question of verification and control cannot concern only the main nuclear-weapon Powers, which are by tradition apt to regard themselves as "adversaries". I beg to submit that this is an out-moded way of looking at the problem.

16. Related to this topic is the question of nuclear explosions

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-687.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

for peaceful purposes. The General Assembly touched upon it in resolution 2665 (XXV)—which is, however, largely of a procedural character—requesting the IAEA to continue and intensify its technical programmes in this field.⁸ The resolution does not deal with the over-all political aspects, involving, *inter alia*, the elaboration of rules for the establishment of an international regime for peaceful nuclear explosions. My country will continue to take an active part in the technical discussions—a member of this delegation is serving as chairman of the main study group, in Vienna—but we will also continue to press simultaneously for the construction of a set of legal rules to govern the activities in question, as foreseen in the non-proliferation Treaty. These problems will necessarily become the subject of our attention as soon as the Committee tackles the comprehensive test ban. These considerations lead, in our view, to the conclusion that a thorough treatment of the truly international political and legal aspects of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions should be undertaken without undue delay.

17. I wish to turn now to the second main subject on which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must focus its attention during this year's session: the effective elimination of chemical and biological weapons from the arsenals of the world. I intend to revert shortly to this matter also, probably next week, in order to offer some detailed considerations and proposals. At this stage I will therefore limit myself to some general remarks.

18. In the case of chemical and biological means of warfare we are clamouring for urgency not because of pending threats of dangerous developments, as is the case in regard both to SALT and to the comprehensive test ban, but rather the opposite: the moment is auspicious because of the obviously-growing hesitancy in all quarters about possessing and using these weapons. One can say quite generally that, through the onslaught of compact, condemnatory public opinion, the proponents of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare are beginning to beat a retreat. An illustration among several is that the number of States adhering to the Geneva Protocol⁹ is increasing after a lull of many years.

19. The resolution on this subject, adopted with a virtually unanimous vote by the General Assembly at its last session, is a testimony to that same feeling of urgency calling on this Committee to continue its consideration of the problem of chemical and biological weapons—

... with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and to their elimination from the arsenals of all States.¹⁰

20. The text of the General Assembly resolution also helps to

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 689.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

solve some of the quandaries which last year tended to divide and thereby unduly delay the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on such a prohibition. It brought forth quite concrete ideas about how an agreement or agreements should be constituted. One of the principles would be that chemical and biological weapons should continue to be dealt with together. Another just as important principle was underlined: namely, that verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which could complement and supplement each other. In expressing so clearly these two principles the resolution must be considered as an important step forward and a valuable basis for continued work in this Committee.

21. We must now prove ourselves worthy of the confidence that we shall be able speedily to arrive at a ban on chemical and biological weapons, horror weapons as they are. For this purpose we should cease arguing in "either-or" terms and take time to reason constructively about various practical proposals. We should keep the options open and not commit ourselves prematurely to one position or another. We should certainly not be satisfied with a comfortable minimum solution, such as banning only biological means of warfare. If we followed that path of codifying a partial and militarily rather insignificant prohibition, we should once more risk landing in a dead-end alley. We should rather try to strive for a maximum solution—a comprehensive ban on the development, testing and production of chemical and biological weapons and decisions on their effective elimination.

22. This is no plea for a simplistic way of solving the whole vexing problem by one stroke of the pen: just accepting one or the other of the draft treaties before us.¹¹ The Swedish delegation is quite convinced that we must advance to a more complex system. It might perhaps be placed under a general caption, in line with the interesting suggestion last year by the Moroccan delegation amounting to a kind of multilateral declaration of intent of renouncing chemical and biological weapons, a decision already taken by my country as well as several others. But the propensities of the weapons and also the parameters of their verification are very complex and accordingly should be given detailed and varied treatment.

23. One assumption is, however, already firmly established: namely, that the problems pertaining to these means of mass warfare do not fall neatly into two categories labelled chemical and biological respectively. Our urge to eliminate all these weapons is one and the same; but the detailed aspects of entering into decisions as to verification, destruction and so on are manifold. Let us sit down to work on this problem without the advocacy of one wholesale solution or another.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431, 533-537.

24. In this intervention I have not touched upon several disarmament measures or General Assembly resolutions which nevertheless should not be neglected during this session. To these belong the important ones on the expert study on the costs of the armaments race¹² and on the comprehensive programme of disarmament.¹³ I only wish to point out in passing that in the resolution dealing with the latter subject attention is drawn to the issue of conventional armaments. A natural approach to that problem is the regional one, for instance the convening of regional conferences on the initiative of the States of a certain region to discuss the prevention and limitation of armaments on a regional basis. Encouraging developments may be at hand in this regard in Europe. We might possibly discuss here ways and means by which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might encourage further such regional efforts, involving perhaps parts of the world other than Europe.

25. On the two subjects which my delegation considers should be given earnest and detailed treatment during this year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament I have in this intervention touched in only a summary fashion. The two items which stand out as particularly urgent, as I have said, are the comprehensive test ban and the total elimination of chemical and biological means of warfare. The opening statements by the co-Chairmen¹⁴ did not contain any hopeful signs of new approaches to either of those two subjects, approaches which might have indicated a movement towards workable compromises.

26. In the face of such apparent lack of constructive leadership on the part of the main Powers, a heavier responsibility falls of necessity on the other members of the Committee. This year's session may well prove to be a crucial one. I fully agree with the statement made by the representative of Mexico a week ago that the Committee ought—

... to bear very closely in mind the impatience of the United Nations General Assembly with the meagre results obtained thus far in the matters entrusted to us.¹⁵

This impatience may well turn to rebellion if we are not able to demonstrate at the end of this session that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is in effective working order as a negotiating body.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Tanaka) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 2, 1971¹

Before going into the substance of my statement today I should like, on behalf of my delegation, to say how pleased we are to see

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 691-693.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 682-683.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 19-21, 21-30.

¹⁵ CCD/PV.495, p. 23.

¹ CCD/PV. 497, pp. 14-22.

you, Mr. Chairman, presiding over this meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I should like also to congratulate Mr. Pastinen on his appointment as Special Representative of the Secretary-General in this Committee. We are very much looking forward to working with him. At the same time I should like to associate myself with members of the Committee who have spoken before me in welcoming those representatives who are now back with us in the Committee after an absence of a few years, as well as the new representatives in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Ambassador Guyer of Argentina, Deputy Foreign Minister Tarabanov of Bulgaria, Ambassador U Win Pe of Burma, Ambassador Imru of Ethiopia, Ambassador Krishnan of India, Mr. Sokoya of Nigeria and Ambassador Hainworth of the United Kingdom. It is also a great pleasure to have with us again Mr. Epstein, the Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General.

32. At the outset of this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament I should like first of all to express my sincere congratulations to all my colleagues on the signing of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof which took place on 11 February in Washington, Moscow and London respectively with the participation of an encouragingly large number of countries.² It is my conviction that the prompt entry into force of the Treaty, which is the fruit of great efforts made in the past two years by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will prevent a nuclear arms race on the sea-bed and contribute to the reduction of international tensions. I should like to take this opportunity to express my earnest desire that as many States as possible, including all militarily-important States, will sign and ratify the Treaty without delay.

33. Since participating for the first time in this Committee in the summer of 1969 the Japanese delegation has always stressed the fact that the task to which the Committee should give its most urgent attention and most unremitting efforts at present is the achievement of nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. It is also our belief that, should there be any concept that nuclear weapons constitute a status symbol for a State, becoming a criterion by which the right to a voice in international affairs is judged, such a concept would have to be rejected.

34. Of course, my delegation cannot but admit frankly that there still exist numerous obstacles to the early achievement of nuclear disarmament. The greatest of such obstacles is the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China, which is a nuclear Power, has yet to participate in disarmament negotiations; that the Government of the Republic of France continues to

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

maintain its own special position with regard to such negotiations; and that both Governments, ignoring the protests voiced by the overwhelming majority of the peoples of the world, are going ahead with their testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere. My colleagues may recall in this connexion that at a meeting of this Committee in 1970 I expressed the hope that those two Governments would take an active part in international disarmament negotiations.³ Today I wish to call again upon those Governments to heed the earnest appeal of the world for the achievement of disarmament and to adopt more positive attitudes towards nuclear disarmament.

35. As has already been pointed out by many delegations, it is the success or failure of the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic armaments that is the key to the question of whether the nuclear arms race, by which the human community is at present threatened, will come to an end in the near future and whether it will become possible to bring about nuclear disarmament. Accordingly, although it is true that those negotiations are being conducted only between the United States and the Soviet Union, those talks are of great significance in the annals of disarmament and it is beyond doubt that their success or failure will not only affect the national interests of the two super-Powers but also have an immeasurable influence upon the international community as a whole.

36. I should like to emphasize at this juncture that the two negotiating Powers should fully realize their grave responsibilities to the entire international community. We have already witnessed three rounds of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks since the first preliminary round took place in 1969 at Helsinki, and the talks will be entering their fourth phase from 15 March next. We should, however, be frank enough to admit that the future prospects for the talks are far from clear; and this is not encouraging to us even if we take into account the delicate nature of the negotiations.

37. Furthermore, my delegation is deeply concerned about the present situation: namely that the United States and the Soviet Union, while on the one hand engaging in negotiations, seem at the same time to be rapidly improving the quality of their strategic nuclear arms. If they are going to confine the scope of their talks principally to the quantitative limitation on strategic nuclear missiles and virtually exclude the possibility of any qualitative limitation, such as the limitation of the development, testing and deployment of new strategic nuclear missiles, it is rather doubtful to what extent those talks will be able to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security; and the significance of the talks, which I have emphasized, will be considerably

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 241.

diminished. In the light of the above considerations I should like on this occasion to urge the United States and the Soviet Union to consider also without delay the possibility of qualitative limitation, such as the regulation of strategic nuclear missile testing, as far as such limitation can be reliably verified at the present stage of scientific and technological development.

38. The next question with which I should like to deal in my statement today is that of the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, one of the nuclear disarmament measures to which this Committee should urgently address itself. With a view to facilitating the solution of this problem, I feel it necessary to draw the attention of all members of this Committee to the following points.

39. First, seismological methods of detecting and identifying underground events would be the principal means of verifying compliance with the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests; although it is by no means my intention to deny the importance of on-site inspection. We know that underground nuclear explosions above a certain level of magnitude can be detected and identified by seismological methods; and this is substantiated by the results of the meeting of experts which was held on the initiative of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).

40. Secondly, therefore, it would be important for us to study fully the merits and demerits of prohibiting, first of all, underground nuclear-weapon tests above a certain level of magnitude. I am inclined to advocate that the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests above such a level of magnitude detectable and identifiable using the seismological methods at present available would have positive advantages in the field of arms control and disarmament. This opinion is based upon the fact that as early as 1960 we witnessed the exploratory attempts made by the nuclear Powers concerned to achieve such partial banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests; that not a small number of underground nuclear-weapon tests being carried out at present are actually of a scale large enough to be detectable and identifiable with great certainty by seismological means; and that there seems to be enough evidence for us to assume that such large-scale nuclear weapon tests will continue to be conducted with the aim of increasing the sophistication of strategic nuclear weapons.

41. Thirdly, I believe it necessary for members of this Committee to reach agreement as soon as possible on what is the level of magnitude above which underground nuclear explosions can be detected and identified at present with great certainty by seismological methods, namely on the question of determining the threshold. For its part, the Japanese delegation once referred to the level suggested in the SIPRI report as an appropriate level of threshold.⁴ Although we still believe that that level is adequate for

⁴*Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 381 ff.

our purpose, we have no intention of insisting on that position. We are convinced, however, that what is urgently required is the determination to achieve the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests above a certain threshold, once such a threshold is decided on, pending the prohibition of the smaller-scale underground nuclear explosions below the level of that agreed threshold which cannot at present be detected and identified by seismological methods.

42. While recognizing the difficulty of the problems involved in any ban on those small-scale underground nuclear-weapon tests which cannot be detected and identified by seismological methods, since there is no other way effectively to verify compliance with the prohibition, it will surely be unnecessary for us to emphasize that we should make unremitting efforts to improve our detection and identification capability so that the prohibition of such tests may be achieved at the earliest possible date. In this connexion I wish to pay a high tribute to the initiative taken and continuous efforts made by the Canadian delegation towards this goal.

43. I might add that, in order to improve our detection and identification capability, we should intensify our efforts to promote international exchange of seismic data and improve the existing world-wide network of seismological observatories. We should also consider the possibility of improving the present systems of international data exchange existing for purely scientific purposes, such as the Bureau Central International de Seismologie in Strasbourg and the Tsunami Warning System in the Pacific, the members of both of which already include socialist countries, in view of the potential contribution of such systems to the organization of an international system of verification of a ban on underground nuclear-weapon tests.

44. Furthermore, I believe that it is worth while for us to consider again at this juncture the usefulness, as a means of improving our verification capability, of the installation of "black boxes", which was proposed in 1962 by the Soviet Union.⁵

45. It has been stated by many members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, including Japan, that the cessation of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons is another important measure that could lead to nuclear disarmament. On 8 April 1969 the representative of the United States suggested that in order to ensure compliance with a cut-off agreement the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should be asked to safeguard the nuclear material used in each nuclear-weapon State's peaceful nuclear activities and to verify the continued shutdown of facilities for the production of fissionable material that are closed.⁶

⁵ See *ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1047-1055.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 158 ff.

46. In the belief that it is reasonable in the present circumstances to entrust such control to the IAEA, and that this measure would constitute a step towards the correction of the imbalance of obligations as between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁷ the Japanese Government has supported the approach suggested by the United States. We recall that many other members of this Committee, including *inter alia* Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom, have also supported the United States proposal; and we should like to express our hope that a cut-off agreement will be concluded as soon as possible along the lines to which I have just referred. At the same time permit me to reiterate our continued support for the transfer of fissionable material for use in weapons to peaceful purposes as a measure either connected with or supplementing a cut-off agreement.

47. While hoping for the achievement of agreement on this matter on the basis of the principles to which I have referred, the Japanese delegation ventures to suggest that, even before agreement is reached on the points I have just mentioned, both the United States and the Soviet Union agree to make available at an appropriate price part of their stockpiles of weapon-grade enriched uranium for peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States. As the world's nuclear activities expand by leaps and bounds in future, the demand for enriched uranium will also increase tremendously. In anticipation of such a situation many countries are increasing their efforts to develop uranium enrichment techniques or improve efficiency in the use of nuclear fuel. If the transfer of enriched uranium now intended for weapon purposes to use for peaceful purposes were to be put into practice, it would certainly contribute greatly to the stabilization of the supply and demand situation in the world with regard to enriched uranium. Furthermore, it seems to us that the blending process by which enriched uranium for use in weapons would be made suitable for peaceful use does not involve any great technical difficulties.

48. It is essential, of course, that such transfer should be carried out under an adequate safeguard system. We for our part consider that it might be possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to transport, under their own control, agreed amounts of weapon-grade enriched uranium in their stockpiles to non-nuclear-weapon States, where the uranium would be blended in the presence of the representatives of an appropriate international organization, such as the IAEA, the United States, the Soviet Union and possibly other States. We should like to emphasize that such a procedure would provide us with effective international control without necessitating access to facilities in the United States and the Soviet Union. My delegation also

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

believes that our present suggestion, if put into practice, not only would contribute to increasing the nuclear fuel supply but also could become an embryo version of the open destruction of nuclear weapons under international control.

49. Having completed our work on the elaboration of the sea-bed Treaty, we have before us another measure of great urgency: that is the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The Japanese Government has always been of the opinion that, with regard to the scope of weapons to be prohibited, we should consider both chemical and biological weapons at the same time, and has suggested all along that it is necessary in order to facilitate our work on this question to proceed first with the consideration of and to reach basic agreement on matters of substance, especially with regard to the verification problem. On the basis of that position the Japanese delegation notes with pleasure that many techniques for solving the verification problem were suggested and subsequently considered during last year's sessions.

50. In disarmament negotiations in our times the solution of numerous problems of a scientific nature is required before any political decision can be taken; and I believe that the question of verification relating to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons is one of those important problems for the solution of which scientific and technological co-operation among all countries is essential.

51. With regard to the question of verification, we have stressed the usefulness of holding international meetings with the full participation of experts. We recall in this connexion that informal meetings of this Committee have made a substantial contribution to deliberations on the verification problem. As we consider such meetings invaluable, we should like to suggest that they be held as often as possible and that, with a view to achieving substantial progress on how to verify compliance with the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, we have, during an appropriate period of time at the next session of this Committee, an intensive series of informal meetings, with experts from the socialist countries also participating, on subjects which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would select in advance. For that purpose it might be useful for us to decide during the course of the present session on concrete items for deliberation in such meetings.

52. As many delegations, including my own have already stated, one of the prerequisites for the achievement of general and complete disarmament is the participation of all militarily-important States in disarmament negotiations. In this connexion the Japanese delegation notes the statement of the representative of France on 9 November 1970 in the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, that—

... my delegation would gladly associate itself with any draft which would ask the Secretary-General to convene a group of experts under his high authority ...⁸

We welcome the positive attitude on the part of France as expressed in that statement. We look forward to France making an active contribution in the matter of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. As a first step it might make such a contribution by submitting working papers or sending experts to the discussions in informal meetings.

53. I also note the fact that the Government of the People's Republic of China decided in 1952 to undertake to implement strictly the provisions of the Geneva Protocol,⁹ provided that all the other contracting and acceding Powers observe them reciprocally; and I should like further to express our hope that the day will come when that Government will make a contribution with regard to the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons.

54. In the course of the debate at the General Assembly last year many representatives referred to the increase in the world's military expenditure. This delegation greatly appreciates General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV), which was adopted on the initiative of the Romanian delegation and which called for the preparation by the Secretary-General, assisted by consultant experts, of a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race; since we believe that such a report will show clearly the harmful effects of the arms race from the economic and social points of view.¹⁰ Accordingly the Japanese Government has already taken steps to co-operate in this undertaking and, in response to the request made by the Secretary-General in implementing the General Assembly resolution, has sent a prominent figure to the United Nations. In this connexion we feel that in preparing the report the unique case of Japan, whose defence expenditure has always been below one per cent of its national income since the Second World War, might perhaps provide valuable data with regard to the economic and social consequences of the arms race.

55. We are now in the second year of the Disarmament Decade. Recalling that many countries at the General Assembly last year requested that this Committee play a more active part in disarmament negotiations, I believe that we must never let the Disarmament Decade degenerate into a mere slogan. As we all know, what makes it difficult for us to achieve disarmament is the fact that a military balance of power now plays an important part in maintaining world order, and if that balance is not to be impaired, any attempt to reduce the world's armaments must be

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 568.

⁹ For the protocol, see *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 691-693.

made in a very cautious manner and on a step-by-step basis. At the same time disarmament negotiations should never, under the guise of furthering mankind's ideal of disarmament, be misused by any State as a means of manoeuvring the existing military balance to its own advantage or as an instrument of propaganda.

56. With regard to the question of verification, which is a key factor in achieving disarmament, I believe that we should overcome the difficulties arising from differences in the domestic situations of the different States, make more strenuous efforts to study that question, and co-operate internationally in order to solve it. I believe further that it is by implementing without delay such individual disarmament measures as are susceptible of effective international verification that we can achieve part of what world opinion is demanding.

57. I must point out further that one of the basic obstacles to the achievement of disarmament is the reality of the existence of power politics in the pursuit of national objectives. As far as Japan is concerned, I should like to refer to the statement made by Prime Minister Sato at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, when we commemorated the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization's foundation. Referring to the relationship between the economic and military strength of a country, he said that the Japanese people, bearing in mind their historical experience, have no intention of using any major portion of their national resources for military purposes but are determined to contribute to the maintenance of world peace, using their industrial capacity for peaceful economic co-operation with the developing countries and thereby contributing to the economic and social development of the developing countries. Furthermore, the Prime Minister emphasized that our people are convinced that it is in such a way that the security of Japan can best be assured.¹¹

58. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is a forum where countries of various regions of the world, including the two super-Powers, meet every year and work together for a period of nearly half a year. We must not let the disarmament negotiations in this Committee become a superficial exchange of views, but must avail ourselves to the excellent opportunity offered by this forum to increase our mutual understanding, through formal and informal channels, with regard to the basic problems underlying our disarmament efforts. I believe sincerely that that is the way to make our work on the question of disarmament more fruitful.

¹¹ A/PV.1877 (prov.), p. 62.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, March 2, 1971¹

60. In its statement today the Soviet delegation would like to add to what it said in its statement in the Committee on 23 February on the question of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons.² The solution of the problem of prohibiting those weapons, as representatives of many countries pointed out at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, should become the top priority task of the Committee on Disarmament. Resolution 2662 (XXV) adopted by the General Assembly requests the Committee—

... to continue its consideration of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and to their elimination from the arsenals of all States.³

61. The Soviet side considers that the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare has now become a key question in our work. This is due to the necessity of prohibiting those means of warfare, as one of the important and urgent tasks in regard to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. In saying that, we are aware of the fact that the problem of such a prohibition has already been discussed at length and in detail, and there is in fact a definite basis for its solution. Speaking at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, said:

It is the opinion of the Soviet Government that agreement should be achieved in the immediate future on the termination of the manufacture and on the destruction of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare, that most dangerous type of weapons of mass destruction. One hardly needs to be wordy about the significance of solving this task for all mankind.

The military use of toxins, gases, bacteria and similar chemicobacteriological means has long since been condemned and stigmatized by peoples and States. It has been prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which has become a universally recognized rule of international law. Why then should we reconcile ourselves to the fact that these monstrous means of warfare are retained in the arsenals of States, while their stockpiles are growing and laboratories are conducting, under the cover of secrecy, experiments on still more lethal types of chemical and bacteriological weapons?⁴

62. However, despite a long discussion of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons, both at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and at sessions of the General Assembly, and despite the existence of a definite basis for its solution, the situation today regarding this question appears to be very unsatisfactory. Although the need to prohibit chemical and bacteriological means of warfare and to eliminate them from

¹ CCD/PV.497, pp. 22-30.

² *Ante*, pp. 23 ff.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 529.

all military arsenals has been recognized by the overwhelming majority of the countries of the world, nevertheless so far there has not been observed any substantial forward movement in the search for the necessary agreement.

63. The basic obstacle to progress towards the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare and their elimination from the arsenals of States is the position of certain Powers which would like to avoid the prohibition of chemical toxic substances. Although, taking into account the general atmosphere that has come about in the world condemning the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, those Powers officially speak of the need to prohibit those weapons, they are at the same time leading up to having some chemical agents left outside the prohibition for use in war. In opposing the prohibition of the production of chemical weapons, they put forward the argument that it is very difficult to organize control over such a prohibition. To us that argument seems to be far-fetched and, rather, a pretext for preventing the complete elimination of all chemical and bacteriological agents from military arsenals.

64. In this connexion it will be appropriate to recall the conclusion reached by the scientists who prepared the report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) on chemical and bacteriological weapons:

As the years have gone by, it has probably become increasingly true to say that the real obstacles to disarmament are the momentum of the arms race and the political problems of stopping it, not the technical problems of verification.⁵

The SIPRI report thus indicates that it is political considerations rather than the problems of verification that prevent the solution of this problem of disarmament.

65. In the meantime a further delay in the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons entails serious dangers. In the absence of a ban on their production and stockpiling, it is relatively easy for them to spread throughout the world and become part of the military arsenals of a great many countries. In his report on chemical and bacteriological weapons the Secretary-General of the United Nations also refers to this danger when he states:

A particular danger also derives from the fact that any country could develop or acquire, in one way or another, a capability in this type of warfare, despite the fact that this could prove costly. The danger of the proliferation of this class of weapons applies as much to the developing as it does to developed countries.⁶

66. The result of the absence of an agreement banning the production of chemical and bacteriological agents for military purposes is that the development, production and stockpiling of increasingly dangerous types of such agents will further expand. The longer this process continues, the more difficult it will be to

⁵ SIPRI, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, pt. IV, p. 1.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 298.

come to an agreement. It is no accident that scientists—specialists in the fields of chemistry and biology—are warning against the growing danger of chemical and bacteriological weapons with ever greater insistence.

67. The twenty-third World Health Assembly held in May 1970 drew the attention of the world to—

... the danger hanging over mankind as a result of the ever-continuing work to develop new forms of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and also as a result of their stockpiling,

expressed—

... its profound anxiety in regard to the recurring cases of the use of chemical means of waging warfare,

and emphasized—

... the need for the rapid prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the destruction of stocks of such weapons as a necessary measure in the fight for human health.⁷

68. The Tenth International Congress on Microbiology held in Mexico in August 1970 also pointed to the great potential dangers of human, animal and plant infections to the welfare of mankind, and urged the governments of the world to eliminate completely both chemical and bacteriological weapons. Similar statements were made in 1970 by scientists of Bulgaria, Finland, the Democratic Republic of Germany, the United States, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union.

69. The existence of stockpiles of chemical and bacteriological agents in military arsenals and as part of army equipment enables the proponents of their use to resort to them although their use is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We see an example of this in Viet-Nam, where the United States armed forces are waging war with the use of chemical agents, increasing at the same time the quantity and toxicity of the agents used. In this regard concrete facts were cited at the Congress of the American Association for the Advancement of Science held recently in Chicago. According to estimates made by an American biologist, Professor Matthew S. Meselson, as a result of the spraying by the United States air force of poisonous chemicals over the fields of Viet-Nam, about 600,000 Vietnamese have lost their means of nutrition. According to a statement made by the Federation of American Scientists on 20 May 1970 the United States armed forces in Viet-Nam used 2,776 tons of CS gas in 1969 as compared with 114 tons in 1965.

70. The peoples and governments of the world have repeatedly and unequivocally denounced the use of chemical weapons and condemned those using them. The twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly declared that—

... the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of all analogous liquids,

⁷ World Health Assembly res. WHA 23.53.

materials and devices, as well as bacteriological (biological) weapons, constitutes a flagrant violation of the Hague Convention of 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949.⁸

71. The general situation in regard to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons should induce us to redouble our efforts to ensure the solution of this problem. The Soviet side sees two directions in which it believes we should proceed.

72. On the one hand, it is necessary to continue the efforts to strengthen further the Geneva Protocol of 1925,⁹ above all through the accession to it of those countries which have not yet done so, and through the strict compliance of all States with its provisions. In this regard the Soviet side considers dangerous the attempts to weaken the Geneva Protocol through an arbitrary interpretation of its content and the scope of the prohibition. The Protocol unambiguously prohibits the use in war of all chemical and bacteriological agents, without exception. As is known, the Secretary-General of the United Nations has suggested that an end should be put to attempts to give a different interpretation to that agreement, having, in his report on chemical and bacteriological weapons, strongly urged States—

To make a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents), which now exist or which may be developed in the future.¹⁰

In its turn the General Assembly adopted resolution 2603 A (XXIV), in which it—

Declares as contrary to the generally recognized rules of international law, as embodied in the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June, 1925, the use in international armed conflict of: (a) any chemical agents of warfare . . . ; (b) any biological agents of warfare . . .¹¹

73. In this connexion it is noteworthy that the United States has not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Almost one and a half years have passed since the statement made on 25 November 1969 by the President of the United States of his intention to ratify the Geneva Protocol.¹² Nevertheless, this question is still unsettled.

74. The second direction in which, in our opinion, every possible effort should be made is the achievement of agreement on measures for the purpose of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. The discussion on such measures has been going on for several years both within our Committee on Disarmament and at sessions of the

⁸ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 75-76.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 267.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 716-717.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 592-593.

General Assembly. Basically, all members of this Committee have expressed their views on this score, and it can be noted that on a number of important aspects the views of many States coincide. This should facilitate progress towards the solution of this problem.

75. The socialist countries have proposed the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons through the conclusion of a convention the draft of which was submitted by nine socialist States at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969.¹³ Taking into account the discussions which have taken place since that time and the views expressed by a number of delegations, the sponsors of the draft convention have introduced amendments and additions to it. The revised draft convention was, as is known, submitted to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly.¹⁴ An important addition to the original draft of the convention is that this now provides for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling not only of chemical and bacteriological weapons themselves but also of their means of delivery. Thus the complete exclusion of the possibility of chemical and bacteriological agents being used for military purposes is still further guaranteed.

76. Substantial amendments have been made in the provisions of the convention concerning guarantees of its observance by the States parties thereto. We should like to dwell on this point especially. During the debates in the Committee on Disarmament, including those at its informal meetings attended by technical experts, many delegations have recognized that, taking into account the specific peculiarities of chemical agents whose production for military and peaceful purposes is closely intertwined, it is impossible to establish any international forms of verification of the prohibition of the production of chemical weapons in the usual sense of the word "verification". This conclusion coincides with the views of experts of the League of Nations who studied this question for a long time and concluded that, in the event of the functions of verification of the prohibition of the production of chemical agents being transferred to an international body, "the difficulties would be considerable". They considered doubtful "the effectiveness of . . . international inspection". Such inspection, in their view, "would be a source of numerous disputes and suspicions".¹⁵

77. In this connexion the practical conclusion shared by many States would be that it is necessary to make active use of national means of control in combination with possible international methods of guaranteeing the observance of an agreement by the

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 455-457.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

¹⁵ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Disarmament, *Disarmament and Security: A Collection of Documents, 1919-55* (Com. print, 84th Cong., 1st sess.), p. 185.

parties thereto. The Committee's attention was drawn to this point by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, in her statement today.¹⁶ Taking this into consideration, the sponsors of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons made a number of significant additions in a new, revised draft. It seems to us that the provisions concerning guarantees of the fulfilment of an agreement which are contained in the revised draft convention submitted by the socialist countries at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations represent the approach which should constitute the basis for the solution of the problem. This approach met with wide approval at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly and was confirmed in its resolution, which states that—

... verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition.¹⁷

78. Under article V of the draft convention each State party is bound to take the necessary legislative and administrative measures for the implementation of its provisions. This is the basis of national verification measures. At the same time the draft convention contains articles providing for the international aspects of the guarantees of compliance with the agreement. Thus, for instance, article IV of the draft convention provides that the States parties shall be internationally responsible for taking within their national boundaries and their jurisdiction all possible measures to ensure compliance with the provisions of the convention. By assuming such an international responsibility each State party to the convention stands before the world community as a guarantor that neither its government nor its juridical or physical persons will engage in the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

79. Moreover, the draft convention of the socialist countries provides also for such an international procedure as the examination of complaints. As practice in respect of other agreements has shown, the most effective procedure can be the combination of an article providing for consultations among States parties to an agreement if doubts arise about the fulfilment of the provisions of an agreement by any of the parties thereto, and an article stipulating the right of States parties to lodge a complaint, if necessary, with the Security Council of the United Nations together with a request for investigation. The entrusting of the Security Council with the examination of complaints connected with the fulfilment of the provisions of the convention enhances the responsibility of the States parties to the convention and strengthens the guarantee of their compliance with its provisions.

¹⁶ *Ante*, p. 83.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

The very fact of the establishment of such a procedure for considering complaints, apart from its direct purpose, is also significant from the point of view that it would have a restraining effect with regard to possible violations of the agreement.

80. In this connexion it is also important that under articles VI and VII the States parties to the convention undertake to co-operate with one another in settling questions which may arise in regard to fulfilment of the provisions of this international instrument, as well as in carrying out any investigations that may be undertaken by the Security Council.

81. It is natural that this highly important and comprehensive international instrument covering the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological types of weapons of mass destruction should contain a clause providing for the possibility of further elaboration of the convention, taking into account the subsequent scientific and technological achievements in this field. It is also necessary to review from time to time the operation of the present convention in order to have the assurance that the purposes set forth in the preamble and the provisions of the convention are really being carried out. That is precisely the reason why article X provides for a review conference to be held five years after the convention has entered into force.

82. Thus in its present form the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries proposes a carefully worked out system of guarantees of the fulfilment of the agreement. We should like to stress once again that the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of this draft would provide an opportunity of solving in a positive manner the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. At the same time that prohibition would not affect in a negative way the peaceful activities of States in the fields of chemistry and biology.

83. The delegation of the Soviet Union intends to continue in a constructive spirit the negotiations regarding the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the basis of the draft convention of the socialist countries. It would be in the interest of all States and peoples to overcome the existing difficulties and break the deadlock in which the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons now finds itself.

84. Those are the views of the Soviet side on one of the major problems now before the Committee on Disarmament.

Netherlands Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Prohibition of Chemical Warfare Agents, March 2, 1971¹

One of the problems in the field of a prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical warfare

¹ CCD/320, Mar. 2, 1971.

in which

$Y = O$ or S

$Z = O$ or S

$X = F, CN, N_3, SR'', S(CH_2)_n SR'', S(CH_2)_n S + (R'')_2,$
 $S(CH_2)_n N(R'')_2, S(CH_2)_n N + (R'')_3$

$R =$ (Substituted) alkyl, cycloalkyl or hydrogen

$R' =$ Alkyl, dialkylamino

$R'' =$ alkyl

The formula should be handled in connexion with a toxicity level (LD_{50}) of 0.5 mg/kg determined subcutaneously (e.g. on rats), in such a way that compounds which are covered by the general formula should be subject to unconditional prohibition if they show a toxicity level of 0.5 milligram or less per kilogram of body weight.

It seems to be unlikely that compounds covered by the proposed criterion will be used for civilian purposes (e.g. as insecticides), at least for the time being. However, in order to take account of future developments in the field of organophosphorus compounds, it is suggested that the criterion be reviewed periodically.

The Netherlands delegation is aware of the fact that the suggestion worked out in this paper shows some imperfections. In the first place it includes only one type of chemical warfare agents. If proven promising, the same approach might perhaps be extended to other types of chemical warfare agents in the near future. It is, however, recommended to consider organophosphorus compounds first because of the very serious threat originating from nerve agents.

Secondly the proposal does not incorporate chemical compounds which may be used for so-called "binary" nerve gas weapons, in which the nerve gas is formed by mixing two components during the delivery of the weapon to its target.

Nevertheless the Netherlands delegation hopes that the proposal may serve as a contribution to the formulation of a prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical warfare agents.

News Conference Remarks by President Nixon on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], March 4, 1971¹

Q. Mr. President, a few months back, you were quite optimistic about the successful conclusion of SALT talks. Are you less optimistic now?

The President. I am just as optimistic now as I was then about

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 8, 1971, pp. 428-429.

the eventual success. As you will note from our world policy report, the two great super-powers now have nuclear parity. Neither can gain an advantage over the other if the other desires to see to it that that does not occur. Now, under these circumstances, therefore, it is in the interest of both powers to negotiate some kind of limitation, limitation on offensive and defensive weapons. We will be stating a position on that on March 15 when the new talks begin in Vienna. As far as when an agreement is reached, I will not indicate optimism or pessimism. As far as the eventuality of an agreement, my belief is that the seriousness of the talks, the fact that there are great forces, the danger of war, the escalating costs, and the fact that neither power can gain an advantage over the other, I think that this means that there will be an agreement eventually between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Yes, sir?

Q. On both offensive and defensive weapons?

The President. I should add that I know that the suggestion has been made that we might negotiate a separate agreement on defensive weapons alone. We reject that proposal. We will negotiate an agreement that is not comprehensive but it must include offensive as well as defensive weapons, some mix.

Statement by Secretary of State Rogers to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gases and Bacteriological Warfare, March 5, 1971¹

I am pleased to appear before the committee today to begin the testimony in support of the President's request that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.²

This administration has made the problems of chemical and biological warfare one of its special concerns. Shortly after taking office in early 1969, President Nixon ordered an intensive interagency review of our policy in the field of chemical and biological warfare. Annual reviews of our programs and policies in the area of chemical warfare and the biological research programs are a continuing aspect of this administration's activities on the subject. On November 25, 1969, the President announced the first of a series of major policy decisions.³ Our decision to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate was one of those key decisions.

The President also announced that the United States would reaffirm its often repeated renunciation of the first use of lethal

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 29, 1971, pp. 455-459.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 592-593.

chemical weapons, and he extended this renunciation to the first use of incapacitating chemicals.

Further, the President stated that the United States was renouncing the use of lethal biological agents and weapons and all other methods of biological warfare. He indicated that the United States will confine its biological research to defensive measures, such as immunization and protective measures.

In February of 1970, the President announced that the above decisions on the nonuse of biological agents and weapons would also apply to toxins; that is, biologically produced chemical substances.⁴ As you know, on December 18, 1970, the Department of Defense announced its detailed disposal plans for existing stocks of biological agents and toxins not required for defensive research purposes.⁵ On January 27 this year, the President announced that following destruction of the stocks the biological facilities at Pine Bluff Arsenal would be taken over by the Food and Drug Administration for a major new health project to investigate the effects of a variety of chemical substances such as pesticides and food additives.⁶

These decisions, together with the President's decision to resubmit the protocol to the Senate, are truly significant steps of reason and restraint.

Also as a result of the review of chemical warfare and the biological research program in 1970, the administration made a number of decisions in this area which bear on your deliberations on the protocol. They include the following:

—To continue support for the United Kingdom draft arms control convention banning the development, production, and stockpiling of biological agents and toxins.⁷

—To continue our own efforts to achieve effective control of development, production, and stockpiling of chemical weapons and means of warfare through international agreement.

—To initiate a new review of the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides in the Viet-Nam conflict so that the additional data obtained from the field can be used for an examination of the implications and consequences for U.S. policy of their future use in war.

—To continue provision of riot control agents to military forces to a level to be determined by relevant military and economic considerations, with the agents carefully controlled.

With respect to chemical herbicides, the administration's decisions included:

—The immediate termination of all use of chemical herbicides in

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 5-6.

⁵ *The New York Times*, Dec. 19, 1970, p. 1

⁶ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 1, 1971, p. 123.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

Viet-Nam for crop destruction purposes and a phaseout of the use of chemical herbicides for purposes of defoliation. During the phaseout, our herbicide operations will be limited to defoliation operations in remote, unpopulated areas or to the perimeter defense of fire bases and installations in a manner currently authorized in the United States and which does not involve the use of fixed-wing aircraft.

—The preparation of disposition plans for the stocks of agent “Orange” presently in Viet-Nam.

As a result of these decisions we are now considering the question of advice and consent to ratification of the protocol in a situation vastly changed from what it was several years ago. We believe U.S. ratification of the protocol would be an important step in advancing the President’s new policy in this area. Ratification would also:

—Strengthen the legal prohibitions against the use in war of chemical weapons and of biological weapons and toxins;

—Constitute a positive and constructive movement toward arms control and a direct response to United Nations General Assembly resolutions urging all members to become parties to the protocol;

—Reinforce past U.S. policy statements on no first use of these agents and confirm past U.S. votes in the General Assembly in favor of strict adherence to the principles and objectives of the protocol; and

—Enhance the U.S. position in developing initiatives for future arms control measures in the chemical and biological warfare area.

Prohibition on First Use

Let me now turn to the protocol itself, its scope and its importance. The United States and 29 of the other states which participated in the Geneva Conference of 1925 were original signers of the protocol. There are now 96 parties to the protocol. Since January 1970, 12 countries, including Japan and Brazil, have become parties. All our NATO allies are parties. The Soviet Union and all but one of its Warsaw Pact allies are parties, as is Communist China.

France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Communist China, and 30 other countries which have become parties have entered similar but not identical reservations which made clear that the effect of the protocol was to prohibit only the *first use* of the weapons covered, leaving unaffected the right of retaliatory use of such weapons. Accordingly, the protocol is considered for those parties, and more generally, as a prohibition on the first use of chemical and biological weapons. As you know the Geneva Protocol does not prohibit research, development, testing, manufacture, and stockpiling of chemical or biological agents.

When President Nixon formally resubmitted the protocol to the Senate on August 19 of last year, he recommended that the

United States ratification be subject to a reservation making clear our right to retaliate with *chemical* weapons should any enemy state or its allies use either *chemical* or *biological* weapons against us.⁸

Our proposal to ratify without assertion of a right of retaliation in the area of biological weapons and toxins even in the event of a first strike against us with biological weapons or toxins offers a constructive United States initiative in accord with the President's policy decisions.

Interpretation of the Protocol

The protocol is not free from ambiguity, with some differences in viewpoint still unresolved after 45 years.

As I indicated in my report to the President on the protocol, the United States considers the term "bacteriological methods of warfare" as used in the protocol to embrace all biological methods of warfare and the use in warfare of toxins however produced.⁹ This broad interpretation, though not clear from the language of the protocol, is generally accepted by the international community.

I also noted in my report that it is the United States understanding of the protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of chemical herbicides and riot control agents. This interpretation, as you know, is one upon which there are differences of opinion in the international community.

On December 16, 1969, the General Assembly of the United Nations passed a resolution to the effect that the use in war of all chemicals is contrary to the protocol.¹⁰ Although not specifically stated, the intent was to include riot control agents and chemical herbicides. We took the position that the General Assembly was not the proper forum for resolving this question of treaty interpretation and, in addition, made clear we disagreed with this interpretation.¹¹

The resolution was adopted by a vote of 80 to 3, with 36 abstentions. Participating in the General Assembly vote were 80 of the 84 states at that time parties to the protocol. Twenty-nine of them were among the 36 who abstained on the resolution; and two of them, Australia and Portugal, joined the United States in voting against it. This split vote among the parties to the protocol reflected not only the divergency of views on whether or not the protocol covers the use of riot control agents and herbicides but also whether the General Assembly is an appropriate or competent body to interpret international law as embodied in a treaty.

Since then Japan, which like the United States was one of the original signatories in 1925, has ratified the protocol. In the

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 445-446.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 400-402.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 716-717.

¹¹ See *ibid.*, pp. 689 ff.

debates in the Diet, the Japanese Government made clear its view that the use in war of riot control agents was *not* prohibited. Japan did not formally transmit its view to other parties. We propose to follow the same procedure.

We have chosen to handle our understanding in this way because we believe this to be a question of setting forth our views on a disputed issue. We do not believe that a formal reservation would be appropriate. A reservation is used by a country ratifying or acceding to a treaty when that country does not wish to undertake all of the obligations set forth in that treaty. Because we do not believe that the protocol imposes any obligations concerning the use of riot control agents and chemical herbicides, it would be both unnecessary and inappropriate for the United States to enter a reservation on this point.

Occasionally a country transmits to the depositary government, along with its instrument of ratification or accession, a formal statement explaining its interpretation. It does this to insure that all states party to a treaty will be aware of its interpretation of the obligations it is undertaking. We are not proposing that this procedure be followed in this case for two reasons: First, as a result of our public statements at the United Nations and elsewhere, as well as the position set out in the documents transmitted to the Senate along with the protocol, the international community is already well aware of our interpretation. Second, if we did enter a formal interpretation, other states parties might feel obliged to take exception to our statement in order to preserve their own understanding of the protocol. We believe it is well understood that a difference of opinion exists among the parties on this point. We do not believe an exchange of conflicting formal positions at this time would contribute to a resolution of this issue.

I would also note that *no* party to the protocol thus far has made a formal interpretation or formal reservation with respect to riot control agents or herbicides. For these reasons I hope this committee, and the Senate as a whole, will also accept this approach.

I would like to emphasize in connection with riot control agents that the key words of the protocol—the phrase “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases”—are far from clear in resolving whether the protocol was intended to apply to “all other” or “similar other” gases. The equally authentic French language text uses the words *gaz similaires*.

It is our view that the protocol was not intended to cover the use in war of riot control agents. The United States Representative to the Preparatory Commission for the Geneva Disarmament Conference in 1930 stated that:

I think there would be considerable hesitation on the part of many governments to bind themselves to refrain from the use in war, against any enemy, of agencies which they have adopted for peacetime use against their own population, agencies adopted on

the ground that, while causing temporary inconvenience, they cause no real suffering or permanent disability, and are thereby more clearly humane than the use of weapons to which they were formerly obliged to resort in time of emergency.¹²

The preparatory commission report itself noted it was "unable to express a definite opinion of the question of interpretation" on whether the protocol should cover tear gas.¹³ This issue remains unresolved today among the parties.

It is difficult to see how it can be argued, however, that the words "other gases" plus the phrase "all analogous liquids, materials or devices"—all of which were taken from the Treaty of Versailles of 1919¹⁴—were intended to cover the use in war of chemical herbicides. Chemical herbicides were, of course, not in general use until the late 1940's. And most significantly, the negotiating history does not suggest any intention to cover the general class of antiplant, as opposed to antipersonnel, chemicals.

Our position on both riot control agents and chemical herbicides is, of course, without prejudice to the position the United States might take in any future international agreements dealing with chemical agents. Such agreements would have to be negotiated on the basis of all considerations which the parties might consider relevant at the time.

Importance of U.S. Ratification

The failure of the United States to ratify the protocol has obscured the leading role this country has played since World War I in urging the international community not to resort to chemical or biological warfare.

Widespread acceptance of the obligations of the protocol through formal ratification or adherence has been accepted as an important goal by all members of the United Nations. Our ratification would also constitute an important step in our efforts to seek further disarmament measures relating to development, production, and stockpiling of biological warfare and chemical warfare agents.

We would hope to achieve at the Geneva Disarmament Conference, first, acceptance of the draft U.K. convention banning all biological means of warfare and, second, development of more effective controls over production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. However, until we have become a party to the protocol, our ability to guide and influence the development of these further measures—measures which we consider important to our own security and to further progress in the arms control field—will be seriously undermined.

The ratification of the Geneva Protocol will have no adverse

¹² *Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference*, series X, pp. 311-314.

¹³ *Report of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference and Draft Convention* (Dept. of State pub. 192, 1931), p. 45.

¹⁴ *Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference, 1919*, vol. XIII, p. 329.

effect on our national security. The security of the United States and its allies is dependent not on our use of biological agents or our first use of lethal or incapacitating chemical agents but rather on our ability to deter the use of these weapons against us. Therefore, ratification is very much in the interests of the United States. As I have indicated, the protocol is a vital part of existing restraints on the use of chemical and biological weapons and a key step in the effort to develop more effective international arms control measures in this area.

I believe it is of critical importance to our efforts in this area that the United States now become a party to the protocol. Accordingly, I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification with the reservation proposed by the President.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Biological Weapons, March 9, 1971¹

My statement today will be concerned with chemical and biological weapons. This topic should take top priority in our negotiations just now. It has been so recommended by the United Nations General Assembly.² It seems to hold out also the best chances of rapid success, as we should proceed on the assumption that the political will on all sides is to a rather unusual degree in favour of this disarmament measure. We have now to solve predominantly logical-legal problems of a systematic approach to a convention and technical-practical problems of control. We are fortunate in having from last year's deliberations an important storehouse of ideas as to the content of an international treaty or set of treaties dealing with the complete elimination of these weapons. These ideas, however, need to be combined in a coherent way. Those delegations which have done considerable homework on analysing component parts of a future agreement on chemical and biological weapons may have different conceptions of how the elements should be combined; but let us at least start by exchanging our models.

3. Exactly a year ago this very week, on 12 March 1970,³ I began what I called "a mapping expedition", trying to find a way out of the agonizing stalemate to which we had been brought by endless argumentation about the merits of the British draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare⁴ and the socialist draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteri-

¹ CCD/PV.499, pp. 5-14.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 84 ff.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 324-326.

ological (biological) weapons⁵ respectively. The first suggestion I made was that in order to be constructive we should stop categorizing chemical and biological means of warfare as just "chemical" versus "biological". Instead, we should choose as categories relevant for international law-making on the one hand such chemical and biological means of warfare as could and should be totally and unconditionally prohibited, and on the other hand those which must be dealt with in a more discriminating, "conditional" way because the components constituting them also had legitimate, peaceful uses.

4. Also, eleven months ago to the day, on 9 April 1970, I continued that mapping expedition, at that time in search of tenable guidelines for verification.⁶ A continuum of verification methods was scrutinized, comprising both international and national means.

5. Today I intend to make an attempt to bring together as a more constructive and coherent whole the considerations flowing from these two main preoccupations. My colleagues will notice that they correspond to the two main principles laid down in General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV): namely that of dealing with chemical and biological weapons together and that of utilizing both international and national means of verification.

6. If we look at the two proposals, couched in treaty language, which are before us, in the light of the principles just mentioned we must conclude, in the opinion of my delegation, that none of them is as yet at the stage where a more general consensus on its contents can be expected.

7. The revised text of the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare has many noteworthy features, but it fails to meet the first of the guiding principles in that it covers only biological means of warfare and toxins.⁷ The nine Powers' revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons⁸ shows some valuable improvements as compared with their earlier draft, but still seems to us to fail to set out satisfactory international methods of verification. The system of complaint to the Security Council in case of an allegation of breach contained in its article VII is in itself a precious and even indispensable part of any verification system; but we consider that, before such a far-reaching step as recourse to the Security Council were taken by a party, other measures should have been undertaken to reassure the international community in a more general and permanent way that no production of those horror weapons was under way.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 455-457.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 132-140.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 533-537.

8. The conclusion I wish to draw at this stage as a result of these short comments on the treaty texts before us is that further work is necessary before we can say with any confidence that a solution based on the principles commended by the General Assembly in its resolution 2662 (XXV) is in sight.

9. It should go without saying that the Swedish delegation has benefited greatly from analyses made and policies suggested by other delegations in the course of last year. I apologize in advance for not being able to include many references lest my presentation gets bogged down in words.

10. Prior to discussing the substance of the prohibitions to be included in the treaty, we should circumscribe the problem by stating explicitly what they should not try to encompass. The Swedish delegation recommends that we should now decide definitely to abandon any references to the use of chemical and biological weapons in the treaty we are about to draft. This would require a surgical change in the United Kingdom draft convention. Without my making a long-winded plea on this score, I hope all delegations will agree that—

11. First, prohibition of use is already covered by the Geneva Protocol,⁹ and—

12. Second, even if that legislation were to be amended in any way, it would belong to the laws of war and not in a text concerned with arms limitation and disarmament.

13. For the sake of the parallel it may be observed that in neither the non-proliferation Treaty,¹⁰ the Moscow Treaty¹¹ nor the limited sea-bed Treaty¹² was any prohibition of use included. Such a regulation should be *sui generis*.

14. When we then proceed to construct an anti-system for chemical and biological weapons, the first step in our decision-making, I submit, should be to clarify the relationship between chemical and biological weapons and agents. One of the uncertainties which has caused some difficulties is that the socialist draft convention focuses on weapons and thus logically places the responsibility for their elimination squarely on the parties, the governments. But the prohibitions seem to be concerned only with the terminal product, a military weapon. The United Kingdom draft, on the other hand, concentrates on the agents. But if we follow that line and include also all the chemical means of warfare, we face an enormous mass of compounds, dispersed all over our modern societies, and so immediately become entangled in an intricate discussion as to the permissibility of production for non-military use.

15. Logically the solution should be quite simple: the treaty should open with a principal overriding regulation of the type

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

indicated in the socialist draft convention. The scope of such an undertaking would be "not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and biological weapons". A further improvement would be the inclusion of the prohibition of transfers. This, as a primordial clause, would in reality amount to a solemn, multilateral declaration of the total renunciation of chemical and biological weapons.

16. In connexion with this pinpointing of what is requested as a direct responsibility on the part of governments parties to a future treaty, there would follow two corollary obligations for which governments would also take direct responsibility, as they referred to their own activities. The first is concerned with destruction or disposal otherwise of existing stocks of chemical and biological means of warfare (cf. the Soviet article II and the British article II, para. (c)), and the second with the training of troops, instructions in army manuals in the handling of such weapons, and so on. These latter are, however, preoccupations that I will leave aside for the moment since they are secondary to my main reasoning today.

17. In the second place there would follow a subsidiary set of prohibitions concerned with the agents which constitute such weapons or are integral components of such weapons. These prohibitions would have to refer to production, testing and stockpiling as well as to transfers (export) of these agents and be coupled with an undertaking by the parties not to allow any such activities within their countries, subject to specifications in the text.

18. For the sake of such specification of the prohibitions, the point of departure should be the definitions formulated in the United Nations experts' report on chemical and biological weapons and referred to in the preface to that document by the United Nations Secretary-General. There he called upon—

... all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenal of weapons.¹³

Chemical agents of warfare are chemicals, whether gaseous, liquid or solid, which might be employed because of their direct toxic effect on man, animals and plants. Bacteriological (biological) agents of warfare are living organisms, whatever their nature, or infective material derived from them, intended to cause disease or death in man, animals or plants and depending for their effects on their ability to multiply in the person, animal or plant attacked.

19. To proceed further in selecting certain chemical and biological agents for specified prohibition, on their production and so on, I submit that we should establish three different types, which perforce must be given different treatment, depending on how far the agents are in themselves weapons, have no use other

¹³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 267.

than military use, and can therefore be singled out for straightforward, unconditional, total elimination. To those belong the chemical agents which can be used as nerve gases and mustards, which are super-toxic and have an almost exclusive use as potential chemical means of warfare. To this first category belong also the toxins. These would constitute category (a). Other chemicals may be toxic and may be used as chemical means of warfare but they also have peaceful uses, for instance as drugs, insecticides and herbicides and as raw material for industrial products. Compounds such as hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, tear gases and defoliants belong to this category.

20. From the point of view, here used as a demarcation line, that the second category also have alternative uses, these latter of the chemicals are in the same category as the biological agents. Although there are great variations in so far as, for instance, quantities are concerned—some entering in thousands of tons into industrial production, others in minute doses into the production of protective devices—, they could all be lodged under the same rules as to “conditional” production for legitimate peaceful purposes and proscription of other production. There are also widely-differing degrees of hazards attached to them. Many of them are already controlled by national legislation; probably more and more of them will become so covered as the concern over possible injuries to human beings and environment expands. This category (b) would thus embrace biological agents and chemical agents where the prohibition of their production and so on would refer to their special application for warfare.

21. In category (c) would be placed ancillary equipment or vectors specifically designed for using biological and chemical agents as means of warfare. Again, some of those are the same as or similar to such equipment having a recognized application for peaceful purposes also.

22. As to more detailed technical characterizations, these might probably best be specified later in the treaty text under the heading “verification”. It is our considered view that rules about verification, which should pertain to specified items under prohibition, require that those items be made as clearly recognizable as possible. This is reminiscent of what the representative of Canada suggested in his very constructive statement of 25 February: namely that we should try in the Committee to develop verification procedures and that these procedures might then determine, by their very nature, the scope of the prohibitions that could be verified effectively, thus circumscribing the types or groups of agents involved.¹⁴

23. I wish now to turn to this very question of verification, which constitutes the second major problem, the first having been that of the scope of the prohibitions we want to incorporate in an

¹⁴ CCD/PV.496, pp. 19-20.

international instrument. As I have just said, the Swedish delegation holds that the specification of the prohibitory rules is to a considerable extent dependent on what is verifiable, and to what degree. As a matter of fact our Committee followed a similar course in regard to the non-proliferation Treaty, as the prohibitory articles I and II of that Treaty are couched in quite general terms, banning the production of nuclear weapons, while article III on control contains the specific rules about the substances the production of which is to be controlled.

24. In a field as complex as that of chemical and biological means of warfare, rules as to verification would have to be more varied. Their elaboration must be so careful that all necessary safeguards are introduced without unduly interfering with the production for other than military uses of items which are of high value—for instance, in the biological field pharmaceuticals for immunization and other protective measures, and in the chemical field a long series of important industrial products. For these reasons we have, as it were, to go back again on the mapping expedition, examining the verification needs in relation to all those categories of weapons and agents I have just indicated.

25. As to the first and general obligation of governments not to produce weapons, the solution might have to be that no specific verification procedures would be prescribed, but reference would be made to the more detailed, but varying, procedures coupled with respective subsidiary prohibitions in relation to agents. A complaints procedure, such as is now contained in both the British and the socialist draft conventions, ought most probably to be instituted in order to allay suspicions of violation of this general article as well as the corollary ones on training, manuals, and so on. The Swedish delegation has in some parallel cases advocated that recourse to lodging complaints with the United Nations should not be had abruptly but should be preceded by a series of attempts to clarify the situation through an exchange of views between the parties involved—challenge, we have called it. It is interesting to note that in their draft the socialist States seem to be motivated by the same intention, as article VI of that draft speaks of an undertaking “to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.”

26. Next, in regard to destruction and other forms of disposal we must express regret that these matters seem to have fallen largely outside this Committee's attention so far. In order that the international community as a whole should be satisfied that the definite elimination of chemical and biological weapons and agents from national arsenals is taking place in accordance with the treaty provisions, we ought to consider the possibility of activities aimed at destruction or diversion being conducted under the surveillance of an international agency. Some of the substances in question might even be transferred to an appropriate agency for laboratory

uses in countries in need of such supplies for research or for health protection. The Swedish delegation intends shortly to submit a technical working paper in order to facilitate debate on this intricate aspect of verification.¹⁵

27. When we proceed to the chemical and biological agents whose production etc. is to be regulated, as I have underlined today and also in earlier statements, we must proceed with great circumspection, with open minds, and be ready to choose different avenues of control in regard to different substances. The main outline of a control system, however, has emerged from our previous debate and documentation, and not least from General Assembly resolution (2662 (XXV)). I have underscored how necessary it is to have a combination of national and international control measures to rely on. We are fortunate to have already—I believe in all countries—a basis laid down in domestic regulations for the production and handling of poisons. More extended schemes and more rigorous methods of control are following rapidly in the wake of the new concern about the environment; and international harmonization of such national legislation is being discussed, starting with the narcotics field. Undoubtedly international co-operation will be expanded. Probably a scheme for international statistical reporting, at least in regard to some agents, will come to seem more and more feasible. Scientific and technological information will also become increasingly available internationally. Openness in this regard is to be recommended.

28. The task of monitoring production of chemical and biological agents will thus, we believe, be facilitated gradually; but in such a situation of flux it is obviously difficult to lay down rigid formulae for verification over the whole field and once and for all. We must rely on getting more contributions from experts. The Swedish delegation supports the suggestions made by several delegations that experts should be called in to help to clarify the modalities of verification. Such work by experts is required in order to find appropriate verification methods. But what we in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament must confine ourselves to at this point is a discussion on what verification procedures are open to us at this stage, and the general structure of a verification system.

29. The model which the Swedish delegation favours for international checking on all prohibited activities is that of a chain of step-by-step exchanges of information and consultation (challenge). In addition a complaints procedure must be outlined, the selection of the international agency to which complaints should be addressed being, as far as we can see, the only problem as yet unresolved in relation to this final chapter of a systematic process of verification.

30. However, I would venture to go one step further towards

¹⁵ See *post*, pp. 151-154

international verification in regard to category (a), comprising those chemical agents the production of which should be unconditionally prohibited—that is, those chemicals and toxins which have no use other than military use. They also constitute the most deadly weapons and consequently the ones we should be most anxious to eliminate.

31. The suggestion of drawing such a demarcation line has so far only been checked with our own experts; but it has, I find, a reassuring resemblance to technical suggestions put forward by Japanese and Dutch experts as set out in working papers CCD/301¹⁶ and CCD/320.¹⁷ The expert advice is that, if a line were drawn confining those chemical agents which have a toxicity of more than one mg per kg body weight, it would circumscribe those which have no practical peaceful uses, which chemical compounds with a toxicity below this limit often have.

32. Consequently our suggestion is that, in case of production of those supertoxic compounds, as we might call them, the national authority charged with control and inspection duties would be obliged to report for transmission to an international agency the reasons for such production. One should then weigh carefully the rights and obligations of the international agency in cases of suspected production for weapon purposes. If the reports showed that production of such items was becoming important—in quantities above one kg, say—the need could not be ruled out at this stage for some form of on-site inspection, either on the invitation of the suspected party or obligatorily. In this connexion we have noted with interest the Polish suggestion that on-site inspection might be used if the Security Council so requested.¹⁸ Our question is whether recourse to such inspection should not be possible somewhat earlier in the challenge and complaints procedure.

33. Besides those two problems—that concerning the scope of the prohibitory treaty, which we submit must be all-inclusive in regard to chemical and biological weapons and their constituent parts, and the verification procedure, which we submit must be diversified according to specific characteristics—there remains the problem of timing. Shall we content ourselves, as suggested by the delegation of Morocco in its working paper submitted in 1970,¹⁹ with an agreement on joint prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, with verification procedures defined, however, in the main instrument for biological weapons only and with provision for a supplementary document later on verification procedures for chemical weapons? That would involve timing in stages for the total elimination of all types of weapons.

34. But this way of distinguishing between biological and

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 379-382.

¹⁷ *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

¹⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 147.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.

chemical weapons is one which I rejected earlier. If any category were to be singled out for special attention, it is rather the most toxic gases and chemical compounds that should qualify. And if some biological agents were produced as exclusively for military purposes as those that group would stand in line to be included in the "unconditional" prohibition.

35. Admitting that the verification methods which are ready for immediate application are found wanting, the Swedish delegation submits that we should proceed in a somewhat different manner. First, we should accept the idea of a total, comprehensive agreement but we should include an article setting a deadline—one deadline or several different ones—for a more detailed elaboration of verification procedures. A precedent for such a course of action is found in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which entered into force a year ago while safeguards agreements are still being negotiated in Vienna.

36. This of course presupposes a considerable degree of self-discipline on the part of States entering into the agreement; but why should we not have confidence in such a self-controlled observance of international law? The Geneva Protocol relies on it, the United Kingdom draft convention relies on it for the prohibition of biological weapons; and of the members of this Committee a unilateral renunciation has been made by my country and Yugoslavia at least of both chemical and biological weapons, and by Canada, the Netherlands and the United States in regard to biological weapons, without waiting for international control measures.

37. At the beginning of this statement I advanced the suggestion that we should start to exchange what we each conceive as practicable models for a treaty on chemical and biological means of warfare. What I have attempted to sketch today is one such model. It has taken as points of departure quite concrete and technical facts about the various agents within this area. But it has also been framed, or at least thought out tentatively, in terms which could be fitted into a prospective legal instrument. In elaborating it we have endeavoured to incorporate only such elements as would, we believe, meet with general approval. The Swedish delegation will eagerly await suggestions for alterations to, elaborations of or substitutions for this attempt at a compromise formula.

38. In order to facilitate our process of mutual comprehension—yes, even in order to press forward with our work in this Committee—we would like to invite other delegations to reply to certain basic questions more or less immediately. These are:

1. Do you agree that we decide to exclude from the ambit of this new treaty the question of the use of chemical and biological weapons, and to confine it to prohibiting production, testing, stockpiling and transfers of such means of warfare and prescribing the elimination of existing stocks?

2. Do you agree that we attempt to include in a first, principal clause an undertaking by States not to produce etc. such weapons?

3. Do you agree that, for the purpose of specification of agents whose production etc. is forbidden, as well as for verification requirements, we place the supertoxic chemicals in a category under particularly severe restrictions and control?

4. Do you agree that, for biological agents and such chemical agents as will have to be produced in sometimes large quantities for non-military purposes, we rely for control first on national systems of bookkeeping, inspection and verification, possibly coupled with statistical reporting to some international agency, subject, if suspicion is aroused, to subsequent processes of verification by consultation and challenge and, in the final instance, by lodging complaints with the United Nations?

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 9, 1971¹

I do not intend to set forth in detail this morning the position of the United States Government regarding control of biological and chemical weapons. In its general lines that position is familiar to the Committee, and no purpose would be served by taking up the Committee's time to review it now. The position has not changed, based as it is on technological realities and national security concerns. From time to time during the course of the present session, however, the United States delegation intends to address itself to various aspects of this complex issue. My comments today will be devoted to the control of biological weapons.

62. A great deal has been said in the opening speeches of this session about the desire of the international community that negotiations should proceed from measures of arms control to measures of actual disarmament. The Secretary-General, in his message conveyed by his Special Representative, Mr. Pastinen,² reminded us of the General Assembly's Declaration of last autumn expressing the hope that negotiations would move forward "from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and disarmament everywhere . . ."³ Mr. Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, spoke of the "impatience" of the General Assembly with the results obtained thus far in the matters entrusted to us.⁴ The representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff, pointed out that there has

¹ CCD/PV.499, pp. 20-23.

² CCD/PV.495, pp. 6-9.

³ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 3-5.

⁴ CCD/PV.495, p. 23.

been "little if any progress toward actual disarmament" and that this is indeed "a gloomy trend".⁵

63. My delegation can appreciate this concern; the United States also wants progress towards effective disarmament. I should like to remind the Committee, however, that there is before it a draft convention that would constitute a genuine and significant disarmament measure, the first true measure of disarmament this body would have negotiated. I have in mind, of course, the draft convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling and use of biological weapons.⁶ Indeed, the United States, with its unilateral step in this field—President Nixon's decision to renounce the use of all methods of biological warfare and to dispose of existing United States stocks of biological weapons—has already taken a serious measure of disarmament. The United States action, however, has clearly not disposed of the problem. As the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, pointed out at our last session, such unilateral renunciations, while helpful, can be neither so legally binding nor so homogeneous as a multilateral accord, and therefore cannot take the place of such an agreement.⁷

64. In the discussions on chemical and biological weapons in this Committee thus far it has been too often and too easily assumed that chemical weapons pose a much larger threat to mankind than do biological weapons and that the latter are in fact a negligible problem. This is far from being the case, and I think much of the confusion arises from the difficulty of assessing the dangers inherent in a given weapon. When we evaluate the danger of a weapon, in connexion with considering the desirability of totally prohibiting it, there are two criteria which must be given particular weight. The first criterion is the likelihood that the weapon will be used; the second is the consequences for mankind if it is used (or even released accidentally through leakage). By the first criterion, chemical weapons appear to pose the greater danger. They have been used in past military actions. In their present stage of development they are more predictable than biological weapons. Unlike biological weapons, they are inherently unlikely to spread in an uncontrollable manner. For these reasons the possibility of the use of chemical weapons would seem to be greater now.

65. However, by the other criterion—the consequences of use—it is biological weapons which pose by far the greater threat. They are weapons of mass destruction on a much larger scale than chemical weapons, truly deserving Mrs. Myrdal's term "horror weapons".⁸ It would be extremely difficult to restrict their effects to enemy forces or to "the battlefield", however broadly that

⁵ CCD/PV.496, p. 13.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁷ CCD/PV.490, p. 15.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 109.

term might be defined. Experts in the field of microbiology have emphasized that the release of biological weapons could threaten vast populations. In a statement made before this Committee meeting in informal session on 5 August 1970, Professor Joshua Lederberg, the Nobel Prize winner in medicine, warned that—

BW stands apart from all other devices in the actual threat that it poses to the health and life-expectancy of every human being, whether or not he is politically involved in belligerent actions.⁹

Recalling Professor Khorana's synthetic assembly of a small gene, Professor Lederberg predicted the technical capability to synthesize small viruses by the end of this decade. He noted that such advances in molecular biology—

... might be exploited for military purposes and eventuate in a biological weapons race whose aim could well become the most efficient means for removing man from the planet.¹⁰

66. In the draft convention proposed by the United Kingdom our Committee has at hand an instrument which is at once negotiable and effective, an instrument which would remove the threat of development, production and stockpiling as well as of the use of biological weapons. It has been widely accepted in this forum that the way to make progress in arms control and disarmament is to take action as soon as possible whenever a measure or group of measures is ripe for agreement. Using this standard, even if effective control of chemical weapons were more clearly discernible on the horizon than it appears at present it would still be desirable to reach agreement on a biological weapons convention now. The United States delegation will be making further statements on the subject of chemical weapons during the course of this session; but we see no practical prospect for early progress on the basis of a comprehensive approach to chemical and biological weapons.

67. My Government has considered in detail the complex problems involved in verifying effective restraints on chemical weapons, and will continue its efforts in this field. We have listened with attention to the statements made so far during this session on the subject of chemical and biological weapons, including particularly those made by the Soviet representative.¹¹ However, we do not understand today, any more than we understood in the past, the argument for an iron linkage between further prohibitions on chemical weapons and biological weapons, the argument that we must delay prohibiting the possession of biological weapons until we can simultaneously prohibit the development, testing, production and stockpiling of all the various forms of chemical weapons. In our view the negotiation of a convention on biological weapons along the lines of the United

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 357.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

¹¹ See *ante*, pp. 93-98.

Kingdom draft would help to demonstrate to the world that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is not allowing itself to become bogged down in futile political debate but instead is moving ahead on disarmament measures wherever practicable.

Statement by Secretary of Defense Laird to the House Armed Services Committee [Extracts], March 9, 1971¹

I. STRATEGY OVERVIEW

In his first report to Congress on foreign policy, on February 18, 1970, President Nixon enunciated a policy of peace and what is needed to achieve it.² Based on the principles of partnership, strength, and a willingness to negotiate, this positive policy is designed to move our country and the rest of the world toward a generation of peace. This basic policy, reaffirmed in the President's second report on foreign policy, on February 25, 1971,³ underlies and guides our new national security strategy of realistic deterrence.

The goal of peace and the need to maintain adequate combat capabilities are fully consistent. The President recognized this when he declared adequate strength to be one of the three pillars of his foreign policy; without adequate military power our Nation could not attain or maintain peace.

From the President's strategy for peace, we derive this guideline for Defense planning:

Our goal is to prevent wars, to maintain a realistic and ready military force aimed at deterring aggression—adequate to handle aggression should deterrence fail. As Secretary of Defense, I believe that in terms of force levels and expenditures, we can make the transition from war to lasting peace and expanding freedom with an efficient and modernized U.S. military force that, in peacetime, would require no more than 7 percent of gross national product or less and be made up of no more than 2.5 million men and women who are volunteers. Combined with adequate strength, true partnership and constructive negotiations, such a force is designed to deter war.

The Department of Defense 5-year program for fiscal year 1972-fiscal year 1976 is keyed to the goal of preventing war and securing peace.

¹ *Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 3818 and H.R. 8687 To Authorize Appropriations During the Fiscal Year 1972 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, Tracked Combat Vehicles, Torpedoes, and Other Weapons, and Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation for the Armed Forces and To Prescribe the Authorized Personnel Strength for Each Active Duty Component and of the Selected Reserve of Each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes, Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, Ninety-second Congress, First Session*, pt. 1, pp. 2325-2334, 2347-2351, 2355-2368.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 20-33.

³ *Ante*, pp. 44-75.

A. Security Policy and Strategy in Perspective

The security a nation enjoys at any given time is, in great part, the result of past efforts, particularly in the area of technology. The United States and other free world nations clearly enjoy greater security today than they would if the tremendous efforts of the past 20 years had not been made.

In the past two decades we achieved first place in nuclear capability, became preeminent in space, and substantially strengthened our conventional capabilities. Our military power was an important factor in preventing aggression and safeguarding peace in many parts of the world, notably Europe. However, it did not prevent aggression in Indochina.

One problem was that national security policies during the past decade did not focus sufficiently on lowering the probability of all forms of war through deterrence of aggressors. The effect of these policies on military planning was to create forces that lowered the probability of nuclear war while stressing a growing U.S. military capability to engage and to fight in other types of conflict.

That this military capability proved not to be an effective deterrent was due to a second major problem in national security planning. This was the failure to correlate closely and fully military strategy, national security strategy, and foreign policy, which embrace all elements of effective deterrence—nonmilitary as well as military.

This administration believes—and this is the foundation of President Nixon's strategy for peace—that our central national security objective is the prevention of war, and the movement toward a generation of peace. A realistic military strategy for the decade of the seventies cannot be permitted to become an end in itself. It must be an inseparable part of a broader national strategy of deterrence, and meaningfully related to our pressing requirements in the domestic field.

In conceptual terms, U.S. national security strategy went through two distinct phases during the past two decades. Figures 1 and 2 in the appendix illustratively summarize the basic strategy concepts, budget levels (in constant 1964 dollars), and major forces associated with the Eisenhower years and the Kennedy-Johnson years. These two phases were characterized by different emphases with regard to planning for military forces and military assistance. They can be summarized as follows:

EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION

Strategy Concepts: Strategic superiority; limited general purpose forces deployed well forward with a potential tripwire function for possible nuclear response; strong regional and bilateral alliances with a dominant U.S. air, sea and ground role; allied ability to handle low intensity conflicts; and substantial economic and military aid. Eisenhower strat-

KENNEDY-JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

Strategy Concepts: Emphasis on "assured destruction" by strategic forces; "flexible response" for NATO strategy; a planning goal (never attained) to gain capability for fighting large Asian and European conflicts simultaneously; pursuit of a capability for fighting and training others to fight limited wars and insurgen-

egy and forces were deterrence-oriented with emphasis on nuclear umbrella.

Forces: Emphasis on development of new systems. Many nuclear systems deployed today were initially developed including IRBMs and ATLAS, TITAN, POLARIS and MINUTEMAN ICBM/SLBM systems. Work on ABM was also initiated. A notable decline in General Purpose Forces was evident from Korean War levels. Military manpower dropped by more than one million men. The number of Army divisions and Navy warships declined. Tactical air squadrons increased.

Budgets: In constant FY 1964 dollars, the budget came down sharply from the Korean peak in the first two years and remained relatively stable thereafter. The post-Korean mean average was about \$46 billion.

Foreign and Military Assistance: The trend was down from post-World War II peaks but a rough balance was struck between military and economic assistance and the dollar levels remained relatively high.

Manpower: Emphasis was placed on Reserve call-ups for augmentation requirements.

cies; and large but declining foreign and military assistance programs. Significant change in strategy was the shift in emphasis to greater orientation for U.S. toward bearing the principal Free World burden in non-nuclear conflict.

Forces: Strategic force buildup in early years until leveling off in the mid-1960's. Research and Development effort primarily emphasized refinements rather than conceptually new systems; notable exceptions: MIRV, battlefield sensors, F-111, C-5A. In General Purpose Forces, divisions, warships and tactical air squadrons, except fighter-interceptors, increased substantially. Manpower increased by over one million men, due largely to Vietnam. Special Forces were expanded.

Budgets: Trend up, with pre-Vietnam (1962-64) mean average \$50.7 billion in constant FY 1964 dollars. Significant planning innovation: initiation of the Planning - Programming - Budgeting System (PPBS).

Foreign and Military Assistance: Trend toward roughly stable and large economic aid with military assistance down significantly. With general aid levels going down, there was shift from military to economic aid.

Manpower: Heavy reliance on use of the draft for conflict, rather than available Reserve forces. When Reserves were called up, it was largely for crisis-management requirements.

B. The changing environment—Prelude to the 1970's

When the Nixon administration assumed office in January 1969, it was clear that our complex national security problems demanded a basic rethinking of the existing policies in the light of changing world and domestic conditions. It was clear that new directions were needed. In my defense report to the Congress last February, I discussed the problems we found and the initial steps we instituted to cope with them.⁴

At least seven factors, taken together, indicate that the economic, political, military, and manpower realities existing now are significantly different from the situation just 5 years ago. These factors are as follows:

A growing Soviet military capability and technological momentum.

An expanding Soviet influence around the world, as evidenced by worldwide deployment of its growing naval forces.

An emerging Chinese Communist nuclear threat.

The reordering of national priorities, with a reduced percentage of gross national product for defense spending.

⁴ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 40 ff.

Sharply rising U.S. personnel costs and a start toward zero-draft and an all-volunteer military force.

A changing world economic environment because of vigorous growth, particularly among free world nations.

An increasing awareness among NATO members of the need for burden sharing and among many of our Asian friends of the need for regional support.

Confronted with this changing environment, we concluded after careful analysis in the National Security Council that we must, whatever else, assure the following criteria in national security planning for the decade of the 1970's:

1. Preservation by the United States of a sufficient strategic nuclear capability as the cornerstone of the free world's nuclear deterrent.

2. Development and/or continued maintenance of free world forces that are effective, and minimize the likelihood of requiring the employment of strategic nuclear forces should deterrence fail.

3. An international security assistance program that will enhance effective self-defense capabilities throughout the free world, and, when coupled with diplomatic and other actions, will encourage regional security agreements among our friends and allies.

C. Transition to a new national security strategy

In my defense report last year, I characterized 1969 as largely a transition year in which we reviewed strategy, current capabilities, and possible major future programs. But I also stated that 1969 was a year of decision and that as a result of the reviews and decisions in 1969, the President had established the main directions of our foreign policy and national security strategy for the 1970's.

The changing international security environment was recognized and discussed by President Nixon in his first foreign policy report to Congress in February 1970. The President's 1971 Foreign Policy Report amplifies these changes, and discusses some of the other major initiatives taken by this administration; including the Middle East and Indochina peace initiatives, and a revised policy for chemical warfare and biological research.

The two major initiatives undertaken in 1969 which have a strong impact on our future defense planning were, of course, the Nixon doctrine and the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). The first emphasized our determination to instill a new basis for cooperation between us and our allies which takes into account their growing capabilities. The other demonstrated our commitment to serious and meaningful negotiations as the preferred path toward peace.

SALT is a crucial effort by the United States, in the field of negotiations, to seek agreement with the Soviet Union on strategic

arms limitation. SALT represents an attempt (a) to reduce the likelihood of strategic nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union; and (b) to preserve U.S. strategic sufficiency through negotiations, rather than through competition in an arms race. SALT represents, among other things, an effort to avoid major increases in strategic force expenditures which will be necessary in the absence of an early successful agreement.

The application of the Nixon doctrine can provide free world strength and security as a realistic way to support peace initiatives through meaningful negotiations.

The institution of the Vietnamization program occurred almost simultaneously with the first public articulation of the Nixon doctrine by the President in 1969 at Guam. Vietnamization, the first significant application of the Nixon doctrine, was accorded top priority in our first 2 years of responsibility for national security affairs.

Both 1969 and 1970 were years of transition, during which new directions were set and major elements of our new strategy were structured.

We chose in 1970 to break the cycle of submitting a 5-year defense plan to Congress in order to permit time for a safe and orderly transition from the national security policies of the past decade to those more appropriate for the decade of the 1970's and beyond.

The fiscal year 1971 transitional program and budget was designed essentially to preserve the basic capabilities the Nixon administration inherited as final decisions were being made on the major elements of our new national security strategy.

Although both fiscal year 1970 and 1971 were transitional with respect to program and budget levels, the fiscal year 1971 plan contained many of the key elements of the President's strategy for peace. Among the elements distinguishing the fiscal year 1971 plan from the previous strategy were the following:

A concept of strategic sufficiency which is based on specific criteria for the design of our strategic capabilities.

A strong conventional capability buttressed by increased burden sharing and improved defense capabilities of other free world nations.

Adequate peacetime general purposes forces for simultaneously meeting a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a contingency elsewhere.

Smaller U.S. Active Forces, with great emphasis to be given to their readiness and effectiveness, including modernization.

A reemphasis on maintaining and using our technological superiority.

Increased international security assistance for the defense needs and roles of other free world nations.

A new approach to U.S. military manpower, based on a goal of

zero draft and an all-volunteer active force, with increased reliance on National Guard and Reserve Forces.

What has emerged from the review and decisions of the 1969-70 transition years is a new approach to national security planning concepts and a reformulation of older concepts. The new strategy is one of "realistic deterrence."

D. A strategy of realistic deterrence

As Secretary of Defense, my primary responsibility is to address those aspects of the President's foreign policy which bear directly on the defense programs and defense strategy of this Nation.

Figure 3 in the appendix⁵ schematically illustrates the essential components of the President's foreign policy and the interrelated nature of the three pillars of peace—strength, partnership, and negotiation.

It demonstrates in their broadest aspects the close relationship between the President's policy objectives on the one hand, and the close correlation of foreign policy activities guided by the State Department and those aspects of national security strategy which are the primary responsibility of the Department of Defense.

The President's foreign policy objectives concentrate on long-term objectives and long-term policies. He noted in describing the Nixon doctrine that it is neither practical, nor the most effective way to build a lasting structure of peace, to rely solely upon the material and manpower resources of the United States to provide this capability. We have said, and I would repeat, that we do not intend to be the policeman of the world. Many of our allies are already prosperous; others are rapidly becoming so. Therefore, it is realistic and more effective that the burden of protecting peace and freedom should be shared more fully by our allies and friends.

We seek a structure of peace, in which free nations support each other against common threats according to their proportionate strengths and resources, while each bears the major responsibility for its own defense. The security of all is enhanced if each nation increasingly is able to rely upon itself for its own defense, particularly its own defense manpower.

The Nixon doctrine, by fostering and encouraging the capabilities of our allies, will enhance world stability. It is designed to foster development of a more effective deterrent—and through it a more stable world—thereby increasing the prospects for meaningful negotiation from a posture of strength around the world.

This approach in defense planning to national and international security—through the pillars of strength and partnership, each nation in a significant role and bearing its appropriate portion of the burden, each committed to working for peace from a strong internal security base—is a strategy of realistic deterrence. It forms the foundation for the third pillar—meaningful negotiation.

⁵ Not printed here.

Turning to the defense posture and force aspects of this strategy for which I as Secretary of Defense am primarily responsible, I would point out that whatever the outcome of SALT our strategic forces will remain the cornerstone of the free world's deterrent against nuclear attack and must always be sufficient for this crucial role. While assuring an adequate deterrent at the strategic and tactical nuclear level, we and our allies also need to maintain strong conventional capabilities. Hence, for those levels in the deterrent spectrum below general nuclear war, the forces to deter Soviet and Chinese adventures clearly must have an adequate war-fighting capability, both in limited nuclear and conventional options. This has been reaffirmed during the past 2 years by a comprehensive reexamination, together with our allies, of our national and our multilateral deterrent capabilities, most especially NATO's historic review of Alliance Defense for the 1970's (AD-70).

As we move toward the President's goal of peace in the decade of the 1970's, the deterrent to localized conflict apart from large-scale Soviet or Chinese attack, increasingly will be provided by allies and friends who themselves have a capability and national will to defend themselves. Local security would be further enhanced by regional defense arrangements which provide and take advantage of shared capabilities.

1. Regional variations

Obviously, no single strategy can be applied in the same exact terms to situations which are sharply different. Therefore, we must fashion the elements of our strategy of realistic deterrence to match the various conditions we find in different regions. Let me cite several factors briefly, which I will discuss in later sections of this report:

In NATO/Europe, U.S. national security strategy for the 1970's must include the objective of maintaining a strong NATO deterrent in Western Europe, including its northern and southern flanks, against a wide range of possible Soviet and pact initiatives, short of strategic nuclear exchanges. Such initiatives could span a continuum, from border incursions and military backed political threats to a full-scale conventional or tactical nuclear attack, including conflict at sea.

In Asia, our continuing nuclear superiority vis-a-vis the Chinese can contribute significantly to deterrence of Chinese nuclear attacks, or conventional attacks on our Asian allies, and would be strengthened further with an area ballistic missile defense effective against small attacks. However, there is a need for our Asian friends and allies to strengthen their conventional forces, both to defend themselves against non-Chinese attacks and, in regional conjunction, to build a defensive capability which would give Communist China increased pause before initiating hostilities. At

the same time, we will maintain adequate forces to meet our commitments in Asia.

It is not realistic or efficient to expect each country to develop an independent self-defense capability against all levels of non-Chinese and non-Soviet attack. The drain on allied manpower and on their economies would inhibit the achievement of economic growth, and therefore, the political stability which is essential to military security. At the same time, deep historical, social and political inhibitions to immediate and effective regional mutual security arrangements in some areas must be recognized. Thus, a careful balance must be achieved between independent capabilities and collective arrangements. One of the most important means available to the United States to stimulate and to help aid in the development of these capabilities and arrangements is the provision of appropriate security assistance to our allies.

In summary, as shown on figure 4,⁶ the strategy of realistic deterrence, emphasizing free world strength and partnership, offers the most feasible approach toward our goal of achieving basic national and international security objectives. This strategy involves a shift in the direction U.S. foreign and security policy has taken over the past 10 years. Successful application of the President's strategy for peace requires a coordinated application of all foreign policy resources—military power, diplomacy, military and economic assistance, and foreign trade—and most importantly, the understanding and strong support of Congress and the American people.

As the President said in his foreign policy report last month:

Gone for Americans is a foreign policy with the psychological simplicity of worrying primarily about what we want for others. In its place is a role that demands a new type of sustained effort with others.⁷

II. CONCEPTS FOR DEFENSE PLANNING

Planning in the revised and revitalized National Security Council context now takes into account all assets available for achieving foreign policy objectives. The goals we seek for the enhancement of American and world interests—peace, freedom, social, economic and political development, broadening opportunities—obviously cannot be achieved by means of direct military power alone.

The basic objective of our strategy of realistic deterrence is to prevent armed conflict and ultimately to eliminate its use as a means by which one nation tries to impose its will upon another. But so long as the threat persists that other nations may use force, adequate military power must remain an essential element of Free World strategy.

In defense planning, the strategy of realistic deterrence empha-

⁶ Not printed here.

⁷ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 1, 1971, p. 312.

sizes our need to plan for optimum use of all military and related resources available to meet the requirements of free world security. These free world military and related resources—which we call “total force”—include both active and reserve components of the United States, those of our allies, and the additional military capabilities of our allies and friends that will be made available through local efforts, or through provision of appropriate security assistance programs.

A. The total force approach

It needs to be understood with total clarity . . . that defense programs are not infinitely adjustable . . . there is an absolute point below which our security forces must never be allowed to go. That is the level of sufficiency. Above or at that level, our defense forces protect national security adequately. Below that level is one vast undifferentiated area of no security at all. For it serves no purpose in conflicts between nations to have been almost strong enough.⁸

Elsewhere in this defense report, I present a summary of the several existing threats to free world security. In planning to meet these threats, we intend to use the total force approach. We will plan to use all appropriate resources for deterrence—United States and free world—to capitalize on the potential of available assets.

In considering the spectrum of potential conflict, we will be guided by the following principles in our defense planning:

In deterring strategic nuclear war, primary reliance will continue to be placed on U.S. strategic deterrent forces.

In deterring theater nuclear war, the United States also has primary responsibility, but certain of our allies are able to share this responsibility by virtue of their own nuclear capabilities.

In deterring theater conventional warfare—for example, a major war in Europe—United States and Allied forces share the responsibility.

In deterring subtheater or localized warfare, the country or ally which is threatened bears the primary burden, particularly for providing manpower; but when U.S. interests or obligations are at stake, we must be prepared to provide help as appropriate through military and economic assistance to those nations willing to assume their share of responsibility for their own defense. When required and appropriate, this help would consist essentially of backup logistical support and sea and air combat support. In some special cases, it could include ground combat support as well.

Moreover, U.S. involvement in world affairs is not based exclusively on our alliances, but rather, our formal and informal obligations derive from and are shaped by our own national interests. To protect our interests, we must insure free use of international airspace and free access to the world's oceans. Thus, our future defense planning must also insure a U.S. capability to prevent an effective challenge to free use of international airspace and the oceans of the world.

⁸*Ibid.*, p. 357.

The significance of total force planning perhaps is best illustrated by examining its military application to NATO.

As has been stated, the United States bears primary responsibility in the field of strategic and theater nuclear weapons, although in the latter case certain of our allies also contribute significant forces. Our strategic forces must be sufficient now and in the future, since they are a cornerstone of the free world's deterrent. By providing strong, effective and survivable strategic forces, reliable and effective intelligence and command and control, and other necessary capabilities in our strategic posture, we seek to convince potential opponents that recourse to the holocaust of general nuclear war will continue to be an irrational and unsuccessful option.

U.S. strategic forces relate primarily to the deterrence of a strategic nuclear attack. They also serve an important role, together with theater and tactical nuclear capabilities, in deterring conflict below the level of general nuclear war.

However, as the last two decades have demonstrated, reliance on a nuclear capability alone is by no means sufficient to inhibit or deter aggression. A sufficient nuclear capability must be coupled with a sufficient conventional capability in both our own forces and in those of our allies. This conventional capability must be adequate to meet aggression in the sophisticated environment which would be expected in a conflict with the Warsaw Pact. If these NATO forces are to deter this type of aggression, they must be capable of confronting it with such capabilities as strong armor and antitank forces, appropriate airpower for air superiority and ground combat support, strong naval forces to support NATO's flanks, and other combat and support forces.

In addition, such a conflict would require reinforcement and augmentation from the United States and would undoubtedly involve conflict at sea. Therefore, we and our allies must be able to control wherever necessary the air- and sea-lanes needed to support United States and allied forces abroad.

Finally, because some of our NATO allies—for example, Greece and Turkey—do not have and cannot afford needed modern equipment, it is in our interest to help them modernize their forces, and to rely on them to man and operate those forces. Conversely, we must and do expect that those NATO allies who are able to do so will improve their contributions to the common defense through appropriate programs, financial participation, and force modernization.

In summary, through application of all resources across (1) the full spectrum of possible conflict and (2) the full spectrum of capabilities, we intend to maintain sufficient U.S. strength and to mesh this strength with that of other nations in a new order of partnership. If we are to achieve a lasting peace, we must work together to deter aggression, to prevent war.

We will apply the total force concept in non-NATO areas as

well. The President stated in his foreign policy report to Congress last year, in a passage with particular application to Asia, that our friends and allies must bear an increasing responsibility for their own defense.⁹

In his second annual foreign policy report to Congress last month, he said:

We will continue to provide elements of military strength and economic resources appropriate to our size and our interests. But it is no longer natural or possible in this age to argue that security or development around the globe is primarily America's concern. The defense and progress of other countries must be first their responsibility and second, a regional responsibility. Without the foundations of self-help and regional help, American help will not succeed. The United States can and will participate, where our interests dictate, but as a weight—not the weight—in the scale.¹⁰

When the Nixon administration assumed office in January, 1969, just the opposite was the case in Southeast Asia. U.S. forces were carrying the major part of the burden. Our first challenge under President Nixon's strategy for peace was to reverse the trend toward greater and greater involvement of Americans in ground combat. We set out to end American military involvement in the Indochina fighting.

A key element for the success of our new strategy is the need for total force planning and an even wider context than defense planning alone. This wider context embraces all free world assets—military and nonmilitary—which can help prevent the outbreak or continuation of conflict, while fostering freedom, peace, self-determination and cooperation among nations.

A. The strategic nuclear threat

The primary strategic threat to the United States—the capability of the Soviet Union to deliver long-range, nuclear weapons against targets in the United States—has been a matter of grave concern to us. Shown on table¹¹ are our estimates of Soviet strategic offensive and defensive weapon systems in the near term. U.S. strategic forces are shown for comparison on table 2.¹¹ Although projections beyond those shown become progressively less certain, especially where they extend beyond the production and deployment leadtimes of the weapon systems involved, we must make such projections for future defense planning.

The Soviets have built up their ICBM forces at a rapid rate during the past 5 years, and as of the end of 1970, had some 1,440 operational launchers. There are indications, however, that construction on new silo starts has slowed during the past year.

The SS-11 deployment of launchers appears to have leveled off at the present time, with over 900 missiles, part of which are associated with the MR/IRBM fields. The deployment rate of the SS-9's decreased during 1970, even though deployment continued.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Feb. 23, 1970, pp. 211-212.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1971, p. 310.

¹¹ Not printed here.

Work on some sites may have been suspended and work has slowed on several others. The deployment rate of the SS-13 continues as it has for the past 4 years, with some indication that it may be slowing.

The implications of these trends are still not clear. The Soviets may have completed new starts for a programmed force of SS-9 and SS-11 missiles, or they may have slowed silo construction in order to proceed with retrofit of some existing silos with improved, modified or MIRV'ed missiles. Alternatively, the explanation may be that the Soviets are preparing to deploy new ICBM systems. We will, of course, be examining the situation carefully in order to get more precise indications of where they are headed.

However, we expect the Soviets by mid-1972, if they elect to continue work on those sites where construction has slowed or stopped, and to maintain the older systems at the current level, to have over 1,500 operational ICBM launchers, part of which are associated with the MR/IRBM fields.

Beyond 1972 our projections of Soviet ICBM launchers and reentry vehicles (RV's) become less firm. As was the case last year, there is still no agreed estimate on what the size and characteristics of the Soviet force will actually be in the period after 1972, or on where it may level off.

It should be kept in mind that although the Soviets probably have no MIRV'ed missiles operational at the present time, MRV's have been tested many times on the SS-9 since August 1968.

It is evident that the Soviets could have over the next few years, several distinctly different forces depending on their objectives and force decisions. Regardless of the direction in which they proceed, a key question would remain about the accuracy of the RV's in their ICBM force. It is estimated that the accuracy of the SS-9 could be substantially improved by 1975/76. With this improved RV accuracy, the projected Soviet SS-9 missile force could pose a serious threat to the future survivability of undefended Minuteman silos.

The Soviet ICBM threat is augmented by a substantial nuclear-powered, ballistic-missile submarine fleet, that is presently the fastest growing element of the threat. The most capable component of this fleet is the Y-class, which, like the U.S. Polaris, has 16 tubes for launching missiles. There are now at least 17 such subs operational—capable of launching at least 272 missiles with a range of 1,300 nautical miles. The additional ballistic missile capability in older Soviet submarines gives them a total of more than 350 launchers in the operational inventory. Another 15 or more Y-class submarines are in various stages of assembly and fitting out. At the current production rate of 7-8 SSBN's per year, the U.S.S.R. could develop an operational force of Y-class submarines by 1974, comparable in size to the current Polaris force. A longer range submarine-launched ballistic missile is under active development. We cannot estimate deployment at this time.

The Soviet intercontinental heavy bomber force, which now numbers around 200 aircraft (including about 50 tankers) continues its slow downward trend of the past few years. Although we believe the Soviet medium bomber force of several hundred aircraft is targeted primarily against the Eurasian area, we cannot ignore the fact that these aircraft do have a one-way mission capability against the United States. The Soviets also have a new swing-wing bomber under development. Its future role has not been determined, but it is estimated to have intercontinental range capability.

With regard to the strategic defensive forces of the Soviet Union, there is extensive deployment of aircraft defenses, as well as an ABM system deployed around Moscow. The Soviets have a large inventory of radars numbering in the thousands and a force of over 3,000 interceptor aircraft. There is a slight trend toward a reduction in the number of these interceptors, but the quality of the force has improved. Four new interceptors have been added since 1964, and these newer models make up a substantial part of the force. In addition, four different SAM systems, with about 10,000 launchers, are presently deployed for air defense. There is concern by some of my technical experts that the SA-5 SAM might be capable of adaptation for certain ABM roles.

The Soviets now have four Moscow ABM complexes (ABM-1) operational. They are continuing construction of surveillance radars which could be a part of an ABM system, and are actively working on R. & D. related to development of new ABM system components, including a new missile. Further details are shown on table 3.¹²

As for the strategic nuclear threat of the People's Republic of China their progress toward achieving an ICBM capability is continuing. The sophistication of Chinese missile programs was clearly indicated by the launching of China's first satellite in April 1970, probably using stages of an IRBM now under development. We believe that the Chinese could attain an initial operational capability (IOC) with ICBM's within 3 years after flight testing commenced. The start of testing has not yet been confirmed, but a reduced range test of an ICBM may have occurred in late 1970. Thus the earliest possible date for deployment would be 1973, but it is more likely that the Chinese ICBM will not attain IOC until a year or two later, and they probably could not have significant numbers of ICBM's deployed until late in the decade.

Further details on Chinese strategic systems are provided in table 4.¹²

B. The theater nuclear threat

The theater nuclear forces of the Soviet Union include large numbers of ballistic missile launchers (including short, medium,

¹² Not printed here.

intermediate, as well as variable range missiles) and tactical surface-to-surface missile launchers assigned to their ground forces. In addition, their large medium bomber force of about 700 aircraft in long range and 400 aircraft in naval aviation is capable of carrying nuclear weapons, as are a substantial number of light bombers, fighter bombers, and fighters in the tactical air forces. Soviet naval forces, both surface and subsurface, also carry nuclear-capable missiles.

Theater nuclear capabilities of the People's Republic of China probably are limited currently to medium bombers, but limited deployment of the Chinese medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) may have occurred. The emphasis in Chinese R. & D. appears to have shifted in 1970 from the MRBM to development of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM). The Chinese MR/IRBM development efforts have also provided important experience for their ICBM program.

By mid-1971, the Chinese are expected to have a small number of MRBM's deployed. Their IRBM could attain IOC within the next year or two, and by mid-1972 the Chinese are expected to have operational a modest number of missiles, with a mix of MRBM's and IRBM's. This will, of course, provide an additional nuclear threat to the free nations of Asia.

China's primary aircraft for nuclear weapon delivery is the Badger, now in series production. They now have a few of these aircraft operational and are expected to have a significant force by mid-1972.

C. The Soviet and Warsaw Pact theater conventional threat

Over the past year, we have seen the Soviet and other Warsaw Pact forces continue their growth both in quality and in quantity. The Soviets now have at least 160 divisions including motorized rifle, tank, and airborne. This total includes divisions deployed along the U.S.S.R.-Chinese border.

It should be borne in mind that Soviet divisions are appreciably smaller than their U.S. counterparts, and that the Soviets allocate a considerably smaller proportion of their manpower to combat and service support functions than we do.

Admiral Moorer will discuss Soviet ground forces in greater detail in his presentation to the committee.

Ground combat.—The Soviets probably will continue for the next few years production of the T-62 medium tank, with modifications.

In other categories of equipment we believe that the Soviets will gradually equip infantry units in at least some of the divisions with a new amphibious armored infantry combat vehicle. Furthermore, the Soviets are almost certainly experimenting with improved conventional weapons, and within several years the Soviets could have sizable operational inventories of improved conventional artillery shells, bombs, and missile warheads in theater force units.

We believe the Soviets will retain their current family of tactical missiles and that the number of tactical launchers will continue to grow.

Tactical air.—In tactical aviation, a gradual buildup probably will continue for the next few years. Over the longer term, the total aircraft inventory probably will decline as newer aircraft models reduce the requirement for large numbers of older fighters and light bombers. As of January 1, 1971, we believe that the force consisted of over 4,500 aircraft, including reconnaissance and support types. Almost half are capable of delivering nuclear weapons, though some of these aircraft at the present time are assigned to units that do not have a primary ground attack mission.

The Soviets have developed several new aircraft which could satisfy their requirement to replace obsolescent ground attack and light bombers and improve their air defense capability. One of these aircraft became operational in 1970, and another may be operational now in Soviet tactical aviation. A third, Foxbat, recently was deployed with strategic defense forces as an interceptor, and may enter the tactical aviation inventory in 1971. If employed in tactical aviation, it is believed that the Foxbat will retain its primary role as an interceptor and fulfill a specialized secondary reconnaissance role.

Air defense.—We expect the Soviets to continue to expand and improve their theater air defense systems, including the command and control systems and the tactical missile systems. The SA-4 Ganef missile system which has been in service with Soviet forces in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe since 1967, is now entering service with several of the subordinate armies, and the SA-6 Gainful is currently being deployed to upgrade Soviet capability in this category.

Naval forces.—It is obvious that an open-ocean navy has been developed by the Soviet Union. Already having the largest submarine force in the world, the Soviets have introduced several new, advanced classes of submarines since 1968. The Y-class SSBN already has been discussed. The introduction of nuclear-powered, cruise missile attack classes has added a new dimension to submarine warfare.

By the mid-1970's, the replacement of older diesel-powered, cruise missile and attack submarines with new nuclear-powered vessels could result in a quantitatively smaller but qualitatively improved submarine force.

Concurrent with this massive submarine construction and development program, the Soviets have introduced new and advanced naval missile systems.

Over the next 5 years, we expect the composition of the Soviet's major surface combatant fleet to change significantly as new missile-equipped combatants replace older ships armed with guns. Whereas in 1970, missile-equipped surface combatants

accounted for 23 percent of the major surface combatant fleet, by 1975, we project that some 40 to 50 percent of the fleet will be missile armed.

Lift capability.—With regard to lift forces, the Soviets have increased their military air transport capability to include the AN-22/Cock heavy logistic transport, a number of which are operational with transport units. The new AN-22 can carry nearly 100,000 pounds of cargo to a radius of 2,800 nautical miles or 175 troops to a radius of some 5,000 nautical miles.

General—Warsaw Pact.—With regard to future developments in forces of other Warsaw Pact nations, we believe that there will be qualitative improvements in general purpose forces over the next decade, but we see no trends which indicate substantial changes in their contribution to Warsaw Pact capabilities. Barring disruptive political developments, we believe the Soviets will continue to place heavy emphasis on East European forces opposing NATO.

IV. FORCE PLANNING UNDER THE NEW STRATEGY

The traditional discussion of both the threat and our own force planning in specific mission categories has certain limitations. While it is convenient for budgetary purposes and superficially clearer to analyze threats and forces in neat categories, such categorization can be both misleading and hazardous for force planning. The military strategist necessarily deals with the complete spectrum of conflict, just as the national security strategist must take account of both military and nonmilitary resources.

In planning forces for the complete spectrum of conflict, we must recognize all the capabilities that can be provided by our existing forces. Many of these forces are versatile enough to perform more than one mission or function and to serve purposes different from the one for which they have been specifically designed and procured. Many examples are available: the B-52, although designed as a strategic bomber, has played a large role in tactical operations in the conflict in Southeast Asia; most tactical aircraft and tactical missile systems have both conventional and nuclear delivery capabilities and several aircraft have multi-mission roles, such as interdiction, close support, and air superiority; some tactical fighters can be used as interceptors for strategic air defense of the continental United States; and aircraft carriers, depending on aircraft complement, are capable of being used in defending the fleet, attacking hostile ships or submarines, providing close air support or interdiction overland, or other missions.

Thus, the use to which any system can be put derives more from inherent capability and the nature of the conflict than from primary mission design. At the same time, it should be recognized that any given force element cannot always be used in a time-critical environment for more than one mission, a major reason for prudent levels of force redundancy.

A. The 5-year program

Last year, when presenting the fiscal year 1971 defense budget and program I advised you that we had broken the cycle of 5-year planning, and that the fiscal year 1971 budget was transitional. This year, as I promised, we are presenting the first 5-year defense program of this administration. The summary forces, shown in classified tables provided to the committee, represent the basic minimum capabilities which we deem necessary and appropriate to provide for the immediate years ahead. In effect, we have completed our transition to baseline planning, and are now building for the future. Table 9¹³ includes a summary of the active forces we plan to maintain through fiscal year 1972.

In the following sections, I will discuss many of the specific programs which we are recommending in the fiscal year 1972 budget to preserve baseline capabilities and to provide for readiness, modernization, and improvement in existing forces, while at the same time creating additional options for new forces should future events require them. Before turning to a more detailed discussion, however, I believe it is important to note certain trends.

As you know, major reductions have occurred over the past 2 years in the size of our Armed Forces—in numbers of Army divisions, in the number of aircraft in the total tactical and strategic aircraft inventory, in active naval ships, and, of course, in the manpower associated with these forces. In fiscal year 1972, continuing reductions in certain areas are planned, although of a much smaller scope than in the immediate past.

As examination of table 1¹³ reveals a change in emphasis in the fiscal year 1972 defense budget, in that both research and development and procurement reflect considerable increases from fiscal year 1971. The procurement increases will provide us with some badly needed modernization of existing forces, while the R. & D. increases represent a needed investment for the future.

Several other points are worthy of note. First, the fiscal year 1972 defense budget, in terms of constant dollars, is about equal to what might be termed the last peacetime budget, that of fiscal year 1964.

Second, the cost of manpower required to maintain our Active Forces is increasing. As we proceed toward an all-volunteer force, we can expect manpower costs to continue increasing substantially as we seek to make military service more attractive and more rewarding. It will not be easy to strike a balance between our equipment needs and our manpower needs.

In addition, you will note that there is no appreciable change in our strategic force funding compared with last year. We continue to believe that hard decisions may have to be made in this area in the coming months, and I will not hesitate to recommend

¹³ Not printed here.

additional effort should the threat or developments in SALT warrant. But pending favorable development in SALT, we continue to believe that an orderly phased program, to preserve essential capabilities, maintain available options and create new ones as appropriate, is both prudent and necessary.

Let me turn now to a discussion of major forces and modernization programs we are proposing for fiscal year 1972. Of course, many of the details associated with these programs will be amplified by other Department of Defense witnesses when they appear before the committee.

B. Strategic nuclear forces for deterrence

Our strategic forces are the cornerstone of the Free World's deterrent against nuclear attack and must always be sufficient for this crucial role. We seek a negotiated limit or reduction of strategic nuclear forces in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). But in the absence of an agreement, we must proceed with planned improvements to assure the effectiveness of our strategic forces in the face of a formidable Soviet threat.—President's Message to Congress on Fiscal Year 1972 Budget, January 29, 1971.¹⁴

Since the Soviet Union was approaching the strategic strength of the United States in the past 2 years, reexamination of the basis for strategic force planning was required. As a result of the reexamination, the Nixon administration established sufficiency criteria, insofar as a nuclear attack upon the United States is concerned, which are more comprehensive than the retaliatory, or "assured destruction" objective followed in the past.

These criteria for strategic sufficiency are not rigid and unchanging, but rather are developed as broad guidance for planning. They are kept under review in the light of changing technology and other factors, such as intelligence estimates of Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities in strategic weaponry.

Furthermore, as the President noted in his Foreign Policy Report, the concept of sufficiency in what I like to call the broader context of total force planning includes more than just military considerations. In the President's words:

In its broader political sense, sufficiency means the maintenance of forces adequate to prevent us and our allies from being coerced. Thus the relationship between our strategic forces and those of the Soviet Union must be such that our ability and resolve to protect our vital security interests will not be underestimated. I must not be—and my successors must not be—limited to the indiscriminate mass destruction of enemy civilians as the sole possible response to challenges. This is especially so when that response involves the likelihood of triggering nuclear attacks on our own population. It would be inconsistent with the political meaning of sufficiency to base our force planning solely on some finite—and theoretical—capacity to inflict casualties presumed to be unacceptable to the other side.¹⁵

We are continually examining ways to diversify our strategic systems to reduce the possibility that an unforeseen technological development or early deployment of projected threats could neutralize a substantial part of our strategic capability.

In planning strategic forces to meet the military criteria for

¹⁴ Office of Management and Budget, *U.S. Budget in Brief*, p. 30.

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 57.

deterrence, our principal objectives, derived from the sufficiency criteria, currently include maintaining an adequate second-strike capability to deter an all-out surprise attack on our strategic forces; providing no incentive for the Soviet Union to strike the United States first in a crisis; preventing the Soviet Union from gaining the ability to cause considerably greater urban/industrial destruction than the United States could inflict on the Soviets in a nuclear war; and defending against damage from small attacks or accidental launches.

While these general planning objectives provide overall guidance, there are a number of more specific issues which must be considered when planning our strategic forces.

Among them is the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT). Because we cannot predict their outcome, we must insure the maintenance of our present capabilities, while at the same time preserving or creating options to adjust those capabilities upward or downward if that is required at some time in the future. In the absence of an appropriate SALT agreement that provides for mutual security, an approach that preserves needed capabilities while we continue to seek an effective agreement is, in my view, essential.

To fulfill our objectives in strategic force planning, we strive to maintain a reliable retaliatory force, placing primary emphasis on measures that both reduce vulnerability to attack and assure defense penetration. In addition, we seek to provide reliable reconnaissance and early warning capabilities to minimize the likelihood and consequences of surprise, appropriate defensive forces to protect against both air and ballistic missile attack, and effective and reliable command and control of these forces.

At the same time, recognizing the uncertainty inherent in strategic force planning, it is essential to pursue a vigorous research and development program to preserve our options to augment or modify both our offensive and defensive capabilities.

Both the Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist strategic nuclear threats, as presently projected through the mid-1970's, have important implications for our strategic force planning.

Even if the Soviet Union levels off at roughly the present number of ICBM's operational and under construction, it could still have more than 1,900 reentry vehicles in its ICBM force by the mid-1970's. This force, alone, would be more than enough to destroy all U.S. cities of any substantial size. Practically all of the U.S. population also lies within range of the growing Soviet SLBM force. We must also continue to take into account the Soviet bomber force, which is expected to decline only gradually in the near term.

We continue to believe that an effective defense of our population against a major Soviet attack is not now feasible. Thus, we must continue to rely on our strategic offensive forces to deter a Soviet nuclear attack on our cities.

Since we rely on these forces for deterrence, we must insure that they are adequate to convince all potential aggressors that acts which could lead to nuclear attack or nuclear blackmail pose unacceptable risks to them.

Recent analyses of strategic force effectiveness indicate that planned strategic forces should continue to provide an adequate deterrent for the near term. We do have reliable and survivable strategic retaliatory forces, and their capabilities for retaliation today cannot be denied by nuclear attack.

1. The planned fiscal year 1972 strategic forces

For fiscal year 1972, in the absence of a SALT agreement, the major numerical change that will take place in these forces is the inactivation of three B-52 squadrons. We currently plan to keep the aircraft from one of these inactivated squadrons, plus those of the two B-52D squadrons in Southeast Asia, as rotational aircraft to support our mission requirements in that area.

Our strategic offensive forces at the end of fiscal year 1972 will consist of 1,000 Minuteman missiles, 54 Titan missiles, 450 B-52 aircraft (26 squadrons), 71 FB-111 aircraft (four squadrons), and 656 Polaris and Poseidon missiles carried in 41 nuclear submarines.

Our strategic defensive forces at the end of fiscal year 1972 will include about 600 manned interceptors and about 900 surface-to-air missiles on site, together with the required warning and command control systems.

With planned modernization, and with a phased Safeguard deployment as appropriate, these strategic force strengths represent our baseline planning forces for the future.

2. Modernization of U.S. strategic forces in fiscal year 1972

The major programs for improvement and modernization discussed in the following sections are designed to preserve the sufficiency of these forces to fulfill the basic planning objectives I noted earlier, while at the same time preserving our flexibility. A summary of these programs, and the comparable fiscal year 1971 effort, is shown on the following table (see p. 140).

(a) *A reliable and survivable retaliatory force.*—In the strategic offensive forces area, we are concerned both about the potential vulnerability and the penetration capability of our bombers and missiles as we approach the mid-seventies.

As I noted last year, to enhance the prelaunch survivability of our strategic bomber force against the Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile threat, alert aircraft are being dispersed over a greater number of bases, generally further inland than in the past. Fourteen satellite bases, each with minimum facilities to support aircraft, will be in operation by the end of fiscal year 1972. We are currently examining options for more extensive interior basing of this force, and other means to further improve prelaunch survivability against a broad range of potential submarine-launched

SELECTED STRATEGIC FORCES PROGRAMS

[In millions]

	Fiscal year 1971 actual funding	Fiscal year 1972 proposed funding
Reliable, survivable retaliatory forces:		
Development and continued procurement of short range attack missile (SRAM) and modification of aircraft	\$266	\$359
Continued development of subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD)		10
Continued procurement of Minuteman III and Minuteman force modernization	589	839
Conversion of SSBNs to Poseidon configuration, continued procurement of Poseidon missiles, and associated effort	1,022	803
Development of new undersea long range missile system (ULMS)	45	110
Continued development of new strategic bomber, B-1	75	370
Development of advanced ballistic re-entry systems and technology	100	87
Reconnaissance, early warning, and air defense:		
Continued development of airborne warning and control system (AWACS), and over the horizon radar (OTH)	92	149
Continued deployment of new satellite strategic surveillance system and development of follow-on systems	213	187
Ballistic missile defense:		
Continued deployment of Safeguard	1,331	1,278
Identification and development of advanced ballistic missile defense technology by the Army's Ballistic Missile Defense Agency	105	100
Prototype development of hard-site defense	25	65
Civil defense	73	78

ballistic missile threats. For example, one specific initiative undertaken by the Air Force is the provision of a rapid start capability for the B-52's and associated tankers assigned to the Strategic Air Command to reduce engine start time.

We will also need to provide improved penetration capability for the B-52 force as well as the FB-111 bomber force which will be operational through the mid-to-late seventies. For this purpose, we are requesting \$359 million in fiscal year 1972 to: (1) complete development of the short-range attack missile (SRAM), (2) procure a quantity of missiles, and (3) modify B-52 and FB-111 aircraft to carry SRAM's. In addition, we are requesting \$10 million to continue development of the subsonic cruise armed decoy (SCAD) to counter possible Soviet air defenses of the late seventies.

The SRAM will carry a nuclear warhead and travel at supersonic speed. It will give the attacking plane a capability to "stand off" from a target and avoid anti-aircraft defenses. Based on favorable static and flight test results of the SRAM motor, the Air Force has recently ordered the start of full production of the missile.

We are continuing the program to deploy MIRV's in our Minuteman and Poseidon missiles. We consider this program

essential to preserve the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces when faced with the growing Soviet strategic threat. The MIRV program will provide a number of small, independently-targetable warheads on a single missile. Should part of our missile force be unexpectedly and severely degraded by Soviet preemptive actions, the increased number of warheads provided by the remaining MIRV missiles will insure that we have enough warheads to attack the essential soft urban/industrial targets in the Soviet Union. At the same time, the MIRV program gives us increased confidence in our ability to penetrate Soviet ABM defenses, even if part of our missile force were destroyed.

Including MIRV, several major programs for the improvement and modernization of our land-based missile force are now underway, with a total funding requested of \$839 million. The budget includes \$591 million to procure Minuteman IIIs toward a total planning objective of 550 missiles. The force modernization program includes upgrading Minuteman silos against nuclear blast and radiation effects, in order to reduce their vulnerability. This program will be coordinated with the replacement of Minuteman I by Minuteman III missiles to complete both the silo upgrading and Minuteman III deployment programs efficiently. The budget also includes funds to continue the program of reducing the vulnerability of the Minuteman II missiles to nuclear radiation effects while in flight. The Minuteman III missiles currently being produced are already designed to withstand these effects. In addition, we will continue the command data buffer program, which will permit more rapid and remote retargeting of Minuteman III missiles.

In addition, we are planning steps to preserve this portion of our strategic offensive forces through the deployment of active ballistic missile defense. I will discuss this program and its relation to our overall planning in a later section.

We are continuing to convert Polaris submarines to carry the Poseidon MIRV missile. The Poseidon development test program was completed in June 1970 with 14 successes in 20 firings. In addition, through February 1971, there have been eight production missiles fired from submerged submarines. The first Poseidon-equipped submarine will deploy this spring. The budget includes \$803 million to convert more submarines, procure more missiles, and provide long-lead items for conversions planned next year. Funding for the Poseidon submarine conversion program should be completed in fiscal year 1974.

In addition to these programs now in progress, we must also make preparations to carry out long-range modernization programs to provide adequate strategic offensive forces in the 1980's. We believe that the best near-term approach is to do design studies and preliminary engineering development of a number of systems without committing ourselves to produce any of them. In this way, we will preserve the flexibility to capitalize on opportunities as they appear, counter threats which may emerge in the future,

and respond to changes emerging from SALT.

The two most significant of our ongoing long-range developments are the Undersea Long-Range Missile System (ULMS) and the B-1 intercontinental bomber. The ULMS program now underway will provide the option to augment or eventually modernize the seabased portion of our missile forces. Work is proceeding deliberately so as to preserve options on performance characteristics and to shorten the leadtime for deployment should this become necessary in the future. Although our continuing investigations have resulted in no immediate concern about the survivability of our Polaris and Poseidon submarines at sea, we are continuing our active program for SSBN defense. Of course, no system can be guaranteed to remain invulnerable indefinitely and we are aware that the Soviets are working on new ASW techniques. However, our investigations have also persuaded us that the expanded operating area permitted by the long range of an ULMS missile could offset possible antisubmarine threats which might develop during the late 1970's or beyond. Since continued development work on ULMS preserves our flexibility to respond to a possible future degradation in the effectiveness of any of our strategic systems, it is an important factor in our future strategic force planning. The budget contains \$110 million, primarily for continued technical trade-off studies, preliminary submarine and facilities design, and design work on the powerplant and navigation, guidance, fire control, and launcher system.

The budget also includes \$370 million to continue engineering development of the B-1 intercontinental bomber. This aircraft is designed to modernize the aging B-52 fleet. The B-1 is being designed to enhance survivability in all modes of operation through faster reaction, increased resistance to overpressure, faster flyout times, higher speeds and lower altitudes during penetration, reduced IR and radar cross sections, and greatly increased ECM capabilities; it is being designed for increased conventional capabilities as well. The B-1 is being developed in such a manner as to minimize the concurrence of development and production. This will permit a B-1 operational capability by the early 1980's if we choose at a later date to proceed into production.

The B-1 engineering development contract with North American Rockwell is a cost-plus-incentive-fee contract with no provision for a buy option. I want to emphasize that we will not commit the B-1 to production before development is completed. The program provides for seven basic milestones. At the present time, the only fixed date is a September 1974 first-flight time, but a contract change proposal is being prepared to move the first-flight time ahead to April 1974 and to eliminate two test aircraft. The preliminary design review and the system and engine design validations are scheduled for fiscal year 1972.

We plan to continue our investigations of Advanced Ballistic Re-entry systems (ABRES) and technology, and are requesting \$87 million in fiscal year 1972 for this effort.

(b) *Air Defense.*—During fiscal year 1972, we will make certain additional reductions in the current air defense forces, primarily with reductions in surface-to-air missiles, but we will maintain our aircraft early warning capability and will continue research and development to provide effective bomber defenses. The major change planned for these forces in fiscal year 1972 is a reduction in the number of Nike-Hercules missile batteries.

Even if we successfully conclude a strategic arms limitation agreement, we may need to modernize our air defenses in the late 1970's. Therefore, the budget includes research and development funds for two key systems: \$3.6 million for the CONUS Over-the-Horizon radar (OTH-B) and \$145 million for the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).

The CONUS OTH-B radar system will provide distant, all-altitude detection of approaching aircraft. Tests now being conducted should provide by mid-1972 performance data needed to decide whether to construct an operational system.

AWACS will provide the capability to detect and track low- or high-flying aircraft against the surface clutter over land or sea. It is now in engineering development, and two prototype radars are being prepared for flight testing in military versions of the Boeing 707 commercial jet aircraft. We expect the tests to be completed in late 1972. We can then select the better system, and decide in light of circumstances at that time whether to proceed with the final stages of system development.

A future air defense system will require an improved interceptor that possesses a look-down/shoot-down capability, greater time on station at AWACS operating ranges, and improved firepower. Both the Navy F-14 and Air Force F-15 now under development are capable of being adapted to fulfill the mission of a new air defense manned interceptor, and we expect to examine closely the feasibility of using one of them for this mission. The Army surface-to-air missile system (SAM-D) currently under development could also play a significant role in CONUS air defense.

(c) *Missile warning and space systems.*—Early warning of ICBM attack will continue to be provided by the ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) radars and the "forward scatter" OTH radar system. The seven radars of the 474N system will give limited early warning of SLBM attack. Development of the satellite early warning system is continuing. The fiscal year 1972 budget includes \$187 million to deploy this new advanced system, which will complement our radars in providing early warning of ICBM, SLBM and fractional orbit bombardment system (FOBS) launches, and continue development work on follow-on systems. The system will greatly improve the overall capability of our warning network, especially against both ICBM and SLBM launchers.

We will continue to maintain an active antisatellite defense capability. Satellite tracking and identification will continue to be provided by the existing USAF spacetrack system and the Navy's

SPA-SUR system; both tied into the North American Air Defense Command and supported by the Space Defense Center for continuous space cataloging.

(d) *Ballistic missile defense.*—The Safeguard antiballistic missile defense system has been and continues to be designed to achieve several objectives against a combination of Soviet and Chinese threats. They include: protection of our land-based retaliatory forces against a direct attack by the Soviet Union; defense of the American people against the kind of nuclear attack which Communist China is likely to be able to mount within the decade; and, protection against the possibility of accidental attacks from any source.

Last year I told the Congress that—

... without the Safeguard increment provided by this (fiscal year 1971) budget, we would be faced now with the hard decisions about adding immediately to our offensive systems rather than being able to await hoped-for progress in SALT.¹⁶

I further noted in discussing Safeguard several other important points:

That the impact of technological surprise—for example, Sputnik—can lead to expensive crash responses unless we face and make important national security decisions in a timely manner.

That Safeguard may not be sufficient to cope with all possible threats, but that it can serve as a core for growth options to defend Minuteman as well as providing the basic four-site coverage.

That we were pursuing other concepts, including Mobile Minuteman (on land or afloat), further hardening of Minuteman silos, and shelter based Minuteman, through fiscal year 1971 R. & D. programs to provide other approaches to the Minuteman survivability problem.

And that if the threat development warranted, I would not hesitate to recommend accelerated development of ULMS.

Before turning to a discussion of this year's proposed Safeguard program, let me note that we have moved forward in this budget on both the ULMS and the B-1 development programs, and we are continuing to examine other options as well. With regard to deployment options, we are requesting funds to exercise only one in fiscal year 1972, to start the increased hardness program for Minuteman silos. Our philosophy has not changed: we are pursuing moderate programs, preserving our flexibility with regard to both SALT and the threat, and keeping our options open for the future.

This year a complete and comprehensive review was conducted in accordance with the President's commitment of March 14, 1969.¹⁷ The review of Safeguard included:

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 50.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 102-105.

Technical progress: The technical and deployment progress of Safeguard has been satisfactory. The Spartan and Sprint missiles under control of the missile site radar deployed at Meck Island have successfully intercepted ICBM targets. Of 10 systems tests to date, eight have been successful, one partially successful, and one unsuccessful.

Threat: The threat is discussed in detail in chapter III and the tables. In summary:

(a) There has been an unexplained slowdown in deployment of current Soviet ICBM models, but tests of modifications of the SS-9, SS-11, and SS-13 have continued. Even at current ICBM levels, qualitative force improvements, to include MIRV's, could pose a threat to the survivability of U.S. land-based ICBM's unless defensive measures are taken.

(b) The continued deployment of Soviet Y-class submarines, and a new long-range submarine launched ballistic missile (SLBM) which is being tested, could threaten the survivability of our strategic bomber force; and

(c) The Chinese have continued to make progress toward the development of an ICBM system. Estimated earliest possible initial ICBM capability is 1973 with the more likely time being the mid-1970's.

Diplomatic context: The President has discussed developments in SALT in his foreign policy report to Congress on February 25.¹⁸ Although there has been progress in SALT, we have not obtained the necessary results from the negotiations to allow us confidently to change our basic plans for Safeguard.

As the President said 2 years ago, the deployment of Safeguard depends on the evolution of the Soviet and Chinese threats, and the outcome of SALT. As we found in the review, the threat developments indicate that we should continue to move ahead toward the full Safeguard deployment; however, we cannot predict the outcome of SALT.

The President has decided to request authorization to implement the following Safeguard program through fiscal year 1972:

Continue construction at the sites at Grand Forks AFB, N. Dak. and Malmstrom AFB, Mont.

In 1971, start construction at the site at Whiteman AFB, Mo., authorized in the fiscal year 1971 budget.

Take steps toward deployment of a fourth site at either Warren AFB or in the Washington, D.C. area.

This decision reflects the following considerations:

To be responsive to the threat, orderly progress on the presently authorized Minuteman defense and those research and development activities for improving future Minuteman survivability should continue. A fourth Safeguard site at Warren would allow

¹⁸ See *ante*, pp. 52 ff.

timely deployment of additional Minuteman defense and light defense of some inland strategic bomber bases and command and control centers at Omaha and Colorado Springs. However, an acceptable arms control agreement could affect the planned Safeguard defense of Minuteman.

The National Command Authorities are vulnerable to attack by Soviet ICBM's and SLBM's and the defense of our NCA would add to the credibility of our deterrent. At the same time, NCA defense is part of one option of a U.S. SALT proposal and is of interest to the Soviet negotiators.

The initiation of a full light area defense deployment of the entire United States continues to be a desirable objective because of the continuing efforts of the Chinese to produce an ICBM. Therefore, we should retain the option for proceeding with full Safeguard area defense deployment.

In summary, the Soviet and Chinese threats to the United States call for moving ahead toward the full Safeguard deployment. However, we wish to exercise those restraints which we believe may enhance the chances for reaching an acceptable agreement. In short:

The President's program will continue progress toward satisfying our strategic objectives. It continues progress toward defense of Minuteman pending a satisfactory agreement in SALT. It maintains an option to provide for defense of the NCA as outlined as part of one option in a U.S. SALT proposal, and it maintains the option for the deployment of area defense against small attacks at a later time.

The President's program will continue progress in SALT. The proposed program does not request authorization for additional area defense sites beyond those which also protect Minuteman and the NCA. The United States has indicated a willingness to modify the long-range plans for full Safeguard area defense of Conus if an acceptable arms control agreement with the Soviet Union can be reached.

Our fiscal year 1972 request for funds and authorization includes both Warren AFB and Washington, D.C. We believe that the Congress should authorize work on both sites this year, to provide the President maximum flexibility both with regard to SALT developments and the threat. I would emphasize that under this request, the fiscal year 1972 deployment program would be limited to only one of the two locations.

The Safeguard program is designed to achieve several strategic objectives. In addition, the present program provides flexibility for several SALT contingencies and possible outcomes. It does not prejudge either the decisions to be made in SALT or the possible results of SALT. Until it becomes clear that an agreement adequately constraining the Soviet threat to our retaliatory forces is attainable, the program will proceed in an orderly and timely manner. To do more could reduce the chances for success in

SALT: to do less could erode our security and reduce Soviet incentives to negotiate seriously in SALT.

In summary, Mr. Chairman, the proposed fiscal year 1972 Safeguard program and other related actions which we are recommending reflect the basic philosophy which President Nixon announced in making his first decision on Safeguard—a measured, orderly, and sufficient pace, subject to review and modifications as developments dictate. While we proceed at a measured pace with Safeguard, we intend to keep our other options open. We are continuing to examine those which I mentioned last year, and are examining other concepts as well: for providing light area defense against small or accidental attacks through other means than the current full Safeguard to enhance our ability to counter the Chinese threat even if a desirable SALT agreement precludes full deployment of the current Safeguard program; through prototype development of a hard site defense to augment the Safeguard defense of Minuteman if necessary; and other potential programs that may become available in the decade ahead in both offensive and defensive areas. Our objective is to insure that under any foreseeable circumstances we can continue to provide for the safety and security of the American people.

A summary of the deployment schedule through fiscal year 1972 for the proposed Safeguard program is shown below. The \$1,278 million we are requesting for fiscal year 1972 will accommodate the funding level required for either site, excluding personnel and operation and maintenance costs. The details of the Safeguard program and related ballistic missile defense activities will be discussed in detail by Department of Defense witnesses.

Deployment schedule (equipment readiness date)

October 1974: Grand Forks.

May 1975: Malmstrom.

Early 1976: Whiteman.

Mid-1977: Warren.

Late 1977: Initial¹⁹ Washington Capability.

(e) *Civil defense.*—A complete review of the U.S. civil defense program has been conducted by the Office of Emergency Preparedness at the direction of the National Security Council (NSC). Pending consideration of the review by the NSC, we do not propose any major changes in the civil defense funding for fiscal year 1972. The budget includes \$78 million for this program. We will maintain current programs to identify shelters, equipment, and train civil defense volunteers. Deployment of the prototype low frequency warning transmitter will continue in fiscal year 1972. As in previous years, a large portion of the civil defense funds will be used to assist State and local civil defense activities and finance Federal emergency operations.

¹⁹The initial defense of Washington is the same as would be provided in the full Safeguard deployment and includes a single Missile Site Radar (MSR). (Footnote in original.)

C. Theater nuclear forces for deterrence

The nuclear capability of our strategic and theater nuclear forces serves as a deterrent to full-scale Soviet attack on NATO Europe or Chinese attack on our Asian allies.—President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress 1970 and 1971.²⁰

In considering theater nuclear war, i.e., enemy use of nuclear weapons overseas without a direct attack on the United States, we must recognize both the utility of all weapons systems in contributing to deterrence including the capabilities of our allies, and the limitations that influence the use of systems designed for one level of warfare in another level.

Considering first the utility of strategic nuclear weapons in deterring theater nuclear war, it is clear that the existence of these forces can create uncertainty in the minds of nuclear-armed potential enemies, about how we would respond to their use of theater nuclear weapons; e.g., whether we would confine ourselves to a response in kind or would escalate further. Thus, for example, uncertainty about U.S. use of strategic nuclear weapons in retaliation if the Soviets use nuclear weapons against NATO can contribute to the deterrence of theater nuclear warfare in Europe. But, with the rough equality of United States and Soviet strategic capabilities, reliance on strategic weapons alone is not sufficient.

By the same token, but even more so, our theater and tactical nuclear weapons add to the realism of deterrence of theater conventional wars in Europe and Asia; the Soviets and Chinese Communists cannot be sure that major conventional aggression would not be met with the tactical use of nuclear weapons.

On the other hand, a realistic free world strategy calls for the planning of forces which are sufficient to cope with each level of potential conflict at that level. Therefore, we must plan our theater nuclear weapon posture and relate it to our conventional posture in such a way that we have a realistic option in the theater without having to rely solely on strategic nuclear weapons. In other words, we plan to maintain tactical nuclear capabilities that contribute to realistic deterrence while allowing for maximum flexibility of response in every major contingency we plan for should deterrence fail.

We are currently evaluating the long-term structure of our theater and tactical nuclear programs. In the near term, we will continue to rely on current capabilities, including theater assets, tactical aircraft, missiles, rockets, field artillery, and atomic demolition munitions. However, research and development and weapon improvement programs are planned in this area, to insure that our weapons and the associated command and control systems have both adequate capability and continue to emphasize minimum chance of accident. With such programs, we believe that we can retain or improve the essential contribution our theater nuclear forces make to our deterrent posture.

²⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 26.

D. Theater conventional forces for deterrence

The primary role of our general purpose forces is to deter and, if necessary, cope with external aggression. If aggression occurs, the use of our forces will be determined by our interests, the needs of our allies, and their defense capabilities, which we are seeking to improve. It is clear, however, that the Soviet Union's strong and balanced conventional capability enables it to project its military power to areas heretofore beyond its reach. This requires us to maintain balanced and mobile ground, sea and air forces capable of meeting challenges to our worldwide interests.—President's Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 25, 1971.²¹

A basic planning approach used to determine the approximate size of our theater general purpose forces involves estimating the capabilities of various alternative forces in several situations that could arise in the future.

We plan our general purpose forces in peacetime to be adequate for simultaneously meeting together with our allies a major Communist attack in either Europe or Asia, assisting allies against non-Chinese threats in Asia, and contending with a minor contingency elsewhere. In planning our capabilities, we maintain the full range of air, sea, and ground forces needed to meet our planning goals.

The situation which is most demanding, of course, is in NATO. Our general purpose theater force requirements are largely determined by planning for United States and allied conventional forces, which, after a period of warning and of mobilization will be able to defend NATO Europe against a conventional Warsaw Pact attack. We and our allies also must insure our ability to sustain our deployed forces and those of our allies through control of the air and sea lanes.

With regard to U.S. force capabilities in Asia, we do not plan for the long term to maintain separate large U.S. ground combat forces especially oriented just to this theater, but we do intend to maintain strong air, naval, and support capabilities. If a large land war involving the United States should occur in Asia, we would, of course, be prepared to mobilize, and would initially use our non-NATO-committed forces as well as portions of those forces based in the United States and earmarked for NATO, if required and feasible, and with emphasis on our air and naval capabilities. In the future, we expect the emphasis in Asia more and more to be placed on U.S. support to our allies who themselves provide the required manpower.

Television Remarks by Secretary of State Rogers on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], March 11, 1971¹

Miss Drew: In general, how would you size up U.S.-Soviet

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 66-67.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Mar. 29, 1971, pp. 444-445.

relations right now? Are they getting better? Getting worse? What are the major problems that you see?

Secretary Rogers: I think that one of the major difficulties when this question is asked is, people—they're either "very good" or "very bad" or "cold" or "warm." I think they're quite realistic now. I think the Soviet Union realizes that we're not going to be cajoled into thinking that there's a spirit of détente if nothing has happened. On the other hand, I think they realize that we're prepared to work out agreements with them that are sensible and practical. And I think that's reflected in the SALT talks we're having.

Miss Drew: Are you optimistic that there will be an agreement?

Secretary Rogers: Yes, I think that there will be, eventually, an agreement. I'm not sure about the timing of it.

Miss Drew: On offensive and defensive weapons?

Secretary Rogers: Yes.

Miss Drew: You think that there will be. If we can't get one on offensive, do you think we might settle for one on defensive?

Secretary Rogers: No, I don't think so. I think an agreement on defensive weapons alone would be illusory and might be even harmful.

Statement by ACDA Director Smith on Arrival at Vienna, March 12, 1971¹

The Delegation of the United States of America returns to Vienna to resume on March 15 our talks with the USSR Delegation on limiting nuclear strategic armaments.

This will be the fourth phase of the negotiations on strategic arms limitations. In this connection, I would like to refer you to past statements by the United States Delegation regarding the strategic arms limitation talks, which pointed to the constructive and useful nature of our discussions to date.

The rate of progress in the discussions during the first three phases of the talks has been influenced by the differing perspectives of the two sides and the inherently complex issues involved. We have already in these discussions engaged in the most searching examination of strategic relationships ever conducted by the United States and the USSR, and this in itself is of considerable significance; we anticipate that this examination will continue. Moreover, we have, in spite of the differing perspectives and the

¹ ACDA files.

complexities of the issues, been able during the first three phases to move in a fairly short period from the preliminary exploration of issues to concrete negotiations. Because of the past discussions, both sides are in a better position today to understand how an agreement could deal with concerns that each has about the present and prospective posture of the other.

While significant differences remain to be overcome, it is the view of the United States Government, as recently stated by President Nixon on February 25 in his second annual Presidential review of U.S. foreign policy, that the basis of an agreement may be emerging.² Thus, the fourth phase of our talks may reach a significant stage.

I am here to carry out President Nixon's instructions to negotiate a strategic arms limitation agreement, and I will bend every effort towards this end.

Statement by Deputy Foreign Minister Semenov on Arrival at Vienna, March 14, 1971³

The U.S.S.R. delegation has come to continue the strategic arms limitation talks with United States delegation.

As is known, the Soviet Union has consistently advocated the adoption of effective measures in the field of disarmament and the limitation of the arms race. The Soviet government has instructed the U.S.S.R. delegation to conduct the strategic arms limitation talks in a businesslike and constructive spirit and to strive for positive results. A mutually acceptable agreement on strategic arms limitation would undoubtedly promote a reduction in international tension. This is in accord with the interests not only of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but of other states as well.

The U.S.S.R. delegation highly appreciates the gracious hospitality of the Austrian government and people. We are pleased to be back once again in the capital of neutral Austria and send our best wishes to the inhabitants of Vienna and to all the Austrian people.

Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Model for a Comprehensive Agreement Concerning the Prohibition of Chemical and Biological Means of Warfare, March 16, 1971¹

In the intervention by the Swedish delegation on 9 March, 1971 a model for a comprehensive convention prohibiting the develop-

² See *ante*, pp. 70-73.

³ *Pravda* Mar. 15, 1971, p. 5; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 11 (Apr. 13, 1971), p. 19.

¹ CCD/322, Mar. 16, 1971.

ment, testing, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological means of warfare was tentatively described in general terms.² In order to make the suggestions contained therein more easily comprehensible, they are outlined in the following in an abbreviated form. A "skeleton" of our ideas is thus presented. It should be underlined that the presented model is not complete—it deals primarily with the thorny issues of the scope of the prohibitions and procedures for verification—and that some of the suggestions are still very tentative. As a matter of fact both the intervention itself and this abbreviated presentation should primarily be regarded as stages in the "mapping expedition", covering the whole field of CBW, in which the CCD has been engaged for more than a year.

II. *Scope of the prohibition*

1. No prohibitory rules should be included in the presently discussed treaty against *use* of CBW which is dealt with in a comprehensive way in the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

2. The treaty should contain a principal overriding regulation, indicating the undertaking by the Parties "not to develop, test, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire chemical and biological weapons".

3. This general undertaking ought to be complemented with a prohibitory rule against all *transfers* of weapons between Parties.

4. Two corollary obligations to the general prohibition concerning weapons would follow:

(a) the first concerned with *destruction* or other disposal of *existing stocks* of chemical and biological means of warfare;

(b) the second concerned with the *training of troops* in offensive combat with CBW, *instructions* on such methods in *military manuals* etc.

5. There would follow a *subsidiary set of prohibitions*, concerned with the *agents* which constitute C and B weapons or are integral components of such weapons. These prohibitions would refer to *production, testing and stockpiling*, as well as *transfer* (export) of the agents.

6. The agents would be separated into two categories according to two technical criteria:

(a) Category (a) would comprise those agents, whether chemical, toxins or biological which have a *practically exclusive use* as potential means of warfare. They would, at the same time, be those agents which are *super-toxic*. In the chemical field this category would include *all substances more toxic than 1 mg per kg body weight*. It would thus i.a. [*sic*] comprise the chemical components of nerve gases and mustards, as well as all toxins;

(b) Category (b) would comprise *all remaining chemical*

² See *ante*, pp. 108-117.

agents, less toxic than indicated by the above mentioned formula and which can be used as means of warfare but also have recognized peaceful uses. This would be the main category comprising such chemicals as hydrogen cyanide, phosgene, tear gases and defoliants. Also *most biological agents* would belong to this category in so far as they are produced for non-military purposes, e.g. for immunization.

7. There would, finally, be a third category, category (c), comprising *ancillary equipment or vectors*, specifically designed for using chemical and biological agents as means of warfare.

III. *Verification*

1. The verification procedures would probably have to be largely concentrated to the area of the *agents*. Suspicions of violations of the overall prohibition against *CB weapons* would have to be taken care of within the framework of a *detailed complaints procedure*. The same procedure would cover suspicions of violations against the corollary prohibitions against military training, army manuals etc.

2. The details of the *complaints procedure* will have to be worked out carefully. It should take the form of a system of successive steps, including consultations between the parties and other *fact-finding* measurers. The final step would consist of a possibility of lodging a complaint with the UN *Security Council*.

3. *Destruction and disposal* of existing stocks of CBW would also have to be verified, preferably through an *international procedure*.

4. The *more specific verification procedures* would be concentrated on the *agents*. They would comprise a combination of *national and international control measures*.

The most rigorous methods of control would be those dealing with category (a) above, i.e. chemicals more toxic than 1 mg per kg body weight, toxins and biological agents without any recognized peaceful use.

The production of these compounds *would in principle be prohibited*. Any deviation from this general rule would have to be reported to an *international agency*, the report giving the reasons for the production (scientific use, protective measures etc). In case of any large-scale production (i.e. over one kg) or in case of suspected undeclared production, the international agency might be entitled to conduct an *on-site inspection*, either on the invitation of the producing or suspected party, or obligatory.

5. The *compounds comprising category (b)* as well as the *ancillary equipment* and vectors in *category (c)* would be controlled by *national means only*, such national control possibly in some cases complemented by *statistical reporting* by the parties to an *international agency*; they would further be subject, if suspicion was aroused, to the sequence of processes foreseen in the

complaints procedure, i.e. through consultation and challenge and, in the final instance, by a reference of the dispute to the Security Council of the United Nations.

6. If and when new technical developments would allow more stringent verification procedures on the categories (b) and (c), agreement should be sought to shift them to category (a).

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons, March 18, 1971¹

At our meeting on 9 March I reaffirmed the importance the United States attaches to proceeding without delay to negotiate a convention to prohibit biological weapons.² Today I should like to turn to chemical weapons. As the Committee is aware, the United States shares the generally-accepted view that consideration of the two categories of weapons should go forward in parallel. Without attempting to review the entire question of chemical-weapon verification on this occasion, I should like to cover some points that seem to us of significance.

56. Mr. Garcia Robles, the representative of Mexico, described in his statement of 23 February the considerations under which a proper and reasonable verification system should function. He pointed out that a perfect system was not possible but that, if the system were effective, then a State violating a treaty would be acting in full knowledge of the fact that such a violation "must inevitably, and probably very soon, be discovered".³ The United States certainly does not expect a perfect verification system. The rule of reason must apply here as elsewhere. What we do require is just what Mr. Garcia Robles described—a sufficiently high probability of detection that a State which might contemplate violating a ban would be deterred from doing so.

57. If this were not the case, States which abided by the prohibition would be at a serious disadvantage vis-à-vis those which might not. But the consequences of an inadequately-verified agreement go even beyond the matter of military advantage and disadvantage. For if under a treaty a possibility existed for clandestine acquisition of a chemical-warfare capability, then the likelihood that such weapons would one day actually be used could be enhanced. That would be an outcome of our efforts here which none of us would wish. The point is important, and it is not self-evident, so perhaps I can elaborate on it briefly.

58. One of the most effective deterrents today against the use of chemical weapons is the widespread assumption that chemical

¹ CCD/PV.502, pp. 21-26.

² See *ante*, pp. 117-120.

³ CCD/PV.495, p. 26.

weapons would be employed in retaliation. Many parties to the Geneva Protocol⁴ have made formal reservations specifically preserving this right. The Soviet Union has attached particular importance to this right and has referred to it in a number of statements in this Committee. If we are to give up the effective capability to retaliate, then effective verification is the psychological deterrent which we believe must take its place. Only under such conditions can further serious constraints be placed on chemical warfare in the form of a prohibition of production and possession of chemical weapons.

59. In saying this we do not wish to understate the importance of the Geneva Protocol. As the Committee knows, my Government hopes shortly to ratify it. I wish, however, to make the obvious point that the Protocol needs all the help it can get in preventing the use of these weapons, whether that be by a fully credible system of verifications applied to appropriate forms of controls or by maintenance of deterrent capabilities.

60. These are, in essence, the reasons why the United States is so insistent on adequate verification. I should now like to look a bit more closely at that very important word "adequate".

61. One of the first questions to be asked in devising an adequate verification system concerns the amounts of chemical agents or of weapons that would have to be detected if significant violations were to be deterred. A few kilograms of even the most potent chemical agent could not generally be considered a significant capability from the military point of view. We would not, therefore, need a system so refined that it could detect such small amounts. At what level of production would we become concerned? Presumably different countries would give different answers, depending in part on the extent of the potential threat they perceived and the size and sophistication of their armed forces. The amount would also be different for different agents.

62. We do not intend to go into the question at all thoroughly today; but, keeping the general principle in mind, we would like to discuss a hypothetical example of what might be a "significant violation". For purposes of the calculations set forth in the following remarks, we will suggest that such a development would be the production, contrary to a treaty obligation, of, say, 10,000 tons of organophosphorus nerve agent over a period of a year. That would not be an unduly high figure for a major country to produce; yet it would represent in itself a capability of substantial military significance. Such production would provide enough agent to fill about three million artillery rounds.

63. In the interim since last summer's session, the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has devoted considerable time and effort to a study of the possibilities for detecting violations of a prohibition on the production of organophosphorus

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

nerve agents. We consider this form of prohibition to be central to any further meaningful controls on chemical weapons. In order to gain a better understanding of the problem we would face in verification, we prepared an analytical model of a hypothetical production operation. We asked ourselves, how visible would an operation be that was capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of organophosphorus nerve agent in a year? What steps would be involved? What quantities of constituent materials would be required? How big an operation would it be? Finally, how would such an operation compare with the totality of the commercial chemical production employing the same materials?

64. In describing to the Committee some of the results of this study we will be addressing, in part to the problems raised in certain working papers presented last year, particularly those of Canada⁵ and Italy,⁶ which posed a series of important questions bearing on the role which economic data monitoring might play in a system of chemical-weapon control.

65. The phosphorus that would be used to produce agents of this type would come from phosphate rock, the raw material itself. The great bulk of phosphate rock is used for fertilizer manufacture, but a small proportion is used to produce elemental phosphorus. Approximately 80 per cent of United States elemental phosphorus production is, in turn, converted to phosphoric acid for the manufacture of detergents, medicines, water conditioners and food. Another 19 per cent is used to make such things as alloys, matches, gasoline additives and munitions. The remaining one per cent of elemental phosphorus production is converted into phosphorus trichloride. Most of this phosphorus trichloride is used for pesticide production and other commercial products; but this is also the substance from which the nerve agents are produced.

66. The amount of materials required to produce a given amount of nerve agent would differ for various specific agents. For purposes of the study we selected one type of agent, and we found that 10,000 tons of that agent could be produced in a year in the United States by the diversion of about one per cent of our annual production of elemental phosphorus. We can assume that a government that had decided to disregard a prohibition would tap the production chain at the level of elemental phosphorus, where the diversion would be as nearly invisible as possible, rather than, for example, drawing from phosphorus trichloride production, where the diversion would be proportionately greater.

67. The difficulty of detecting such a diversion becomes even clearer when we note that elemental phosphorus production in the United States increased, with wide fluctuations, at an average of 4.4 per cent annually from 1964 to 1969. During the same period

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 375-379.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 388-390.

phosphorus trichloride production increased, also with wide fluctuations, on an average of 13 per cent each year. As more and more civilian products are developed using these substances, the growth of their production can be expected to continue. However, we find that in 1970 production of elemental phosphorus in the United States declined by 4.5 per cent and the production of phosphorus trichloride declined by 8.7 per cent.

68. Thus we see that an increase, a decrease, or even a considerable fluctuation in the reported production either of elemental phosphorus or of phosphorus trichloride would not in itself provide grounds for suspecting a violation of a ban on nerve-agent production. As we pointed out earlier, diversion of one per cent of annual production of elemental phosphorus in the United States could serve to produce 10,000 tons of nerve agent—that is, enough agent to fill three million artillery rounds.

69. The quite visible decline in United States production of elemental phosphorus and phosphorus trichloride in 1970 appears to have been related to general economic factors; it had nothing to do with the production or the non-production of nerve agents. None of our current production of these chemicals goes into the production of nerve agents. As we have told the Committee, the United States is not now producing nerve agents and, in fact, has not done so since mid-1968.

70. If I may, I will turn now to another approach to the problem of verifying a prohibition of nerve-agent production. We asked ourselves what physical, visual evidence of production might be available. Might there not be something characteristic and detectable by national means? I use the term "national means" here in the sense most commonly applied to verification problems: that is, using national resources to detect possible violations by others. We studied the supply of materials to the final, agent-processing plant, the external characteristics of the plant itself, and the shipment of the finished product from the plant.

71. To produce 10,000 tons of nerve agent over the course of one year would require a fairly substantial input of raw materials, taken all at once. If these materials were delivered to the processing plant on a continuing basis, however, an average of one railway carload daily would probably be sufficient. These materials could be transported in ordinary commercial containers.

72. As for the plant itself, there is no doubt that at least the final production stages would contain a hazardous operation, requiring very special precautions. All tell-tale equipment and other signs of agent manufacture, however, could easily be under cover. To give some idea of how much cover would be required, a facility capable of manufacturing 10,000 tons of agent a year could probably be housed entirely out of sight within a structure about the size of a football field. This would be only a small fraction of the floor space now employed in the United States for

the manufacture of products utilizing substantial proportions of elemental phosphorus.

73. If the finished agent were shipped from the plant in bulk containers, this might require two railway cars a day on an average. The containers could easily be of a commercial type widely used in transporting various kinds of highly toxic chemicals. If filling of munitions—that is, the shells and so forth—were done within the plant, perhaps one-third more plant area would be necessary. There would then also be additional rail traffic depending on the kinds of munitions, which could range from artillery shells to large bombs. Given the differences in bulk, transportation of munition casings to the plant might average anywhere from two to ten carloads daily. Approximately the same number of railroad cars would be required to remove the filled munitions from the plant. These cars for shipment in and out could be of a closed type which would be indistinguishable, at least from any distance, from railroad stock used in civilian transport.

74. I have taken the liberty of exposing my colleagues to this rather technical exposition this morning in the belief, which we have often reaffirmed, that the nature of the problem of chemical weapons is heavily technical in character. We are often told, and have been told again this morning, that what is needed is simply a political decision; but political decisions, at least in my country, must be solidly based on the relevant technological facts. We feel very strongly that in putting forward these facts, as we see them, we are not throwing up any “technical smoke-screen” but are contributing in a serious, meaningful way to the task which has been entrusted to this Committee.

75. The example I have been using this morning is not intended as a prediction of what might occur but only as a convenient way of demonstrating the inherent difficulty of assuring compliance with a chemical-warfare treaty. I believe it is evident that a failure to comply would offer few chances of detection by any currently-developed national means. The illustration which we have used in this discussion is based for purposes of simplicity on the manufacture of a quite substantial amount of nerve agent at a single facility. Obviously if it were desired to produce a fraction of that amount of agent, for example one-half, which would still be a large amount, or if it were desired to produce the same amount over a period of several years, or at several different plants, then there would be a much smaller extent of activity visible at any one time. Similarly, if it were not desired to fill the munitions immediately but to hold the agent in bulk in readiness for use in munitions, there would again be less activity observable at the site.

76. The illustration also demonstrates another point. If we relied, for the international component of a verification system, on a complaints procedure based on the monitoring of economic

data, would we be sufficiently aware of unusual or suspicious activity to take the step of invoking the complaints procedure?

77. I have given this brief concrete example to illustrate the problem that we still must overcome if we are to devise a verification system responsive to the principle that a violator must expect to be detected. My delegation welcomes the thinking of others in this common task. For our part, we are continuing to work on this problem with particular attention to the methods and the adequacy of inspection. We hope to continue to present the results of our work in appropriate detail to the Committee as it continues to deal with this question.

Netherlands Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Seismic Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions, March 18, 1971¹

1. Introduction

The Netherlands Delegation to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has considered the materials presented to this Body on the question of the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear explosions, together with the relevant data from open literature. The delegation thought it worthwhile to summarize the data most pertinent to this question in order to facilitate discussions. It has summarized a substantial part of these data in two figures reproduced in this paper.

The excellent Canadian report of November 1970 on Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions by P. W. Basham and K. Whitham has been the main source of the information presented in the figures, including the magnitude-yield relation.

2. Existing capabilities

A summary of the existing seismic capabilities for identification of underground nuclear explosions, especially in the Northern Hemisphere, is given in the upper part of Figure 1. More detailed information for the different test sites is given in Figure 2.

In both figures a *detection* and *location* capability for earthquakes (Q) and explosions (E) is indicated where there is a 90 per cent probability that each of at least four seismic monitoring stations can detect and locate the earthquake or explosion by measuring the body (P) wave. In the Northern Hemisphere the lower limit of this *detection* and *location* capability (indicated by 4P90) for earthquakes and explosions is between magnitude m_B -values of 4.2 and 4.4. This corresponds to an explosion yield

¹ CCD/323, Mar. 18, 1971.

of about 3 kiloton in hard rock. The P-wave detection capability is given by thin lines in Figure 1.

The capability to *identify* earthquakes and explosions is presented in the form of bars in the figures. This discrimination between earthquakes and explosions is based on the surface (*R*) wave/body (*P*) wave ratio, which is quite different for the two kinds of events. Positive identification of earthquakes is possible for m_B -values of 4.8-5.1, while for explosions this is 5.8-6.1. The possibility of positive identification is interpreted here as a 90 per cent probability that each of at least four seismic monitoring stations can identify at this threshold value the earthquake or explosion as such by measuring the amplitudes of the *R*-wave and *P*-wave. This capability is indicated by 4R90 in the figures.

In connexion with a comprehensive test ban, lower identification probabilities for explosions are also considered. In Figure 1 these are presented in the form of bars for a 50 per cent and a 20 per cent probability of identification by four stations each. For example, the identification threshold is lowered to m_B 5.1-5.4 at the 20 per cent probability level for each of four stations (4R20). In Figure 2 other identification probabilities are also given.

Another possibility to identify an explosion can be found by using a "negative" criterion, that is the absence of *R*-waves when one would expect these in the case of an earthquake. An estimate of this identification capability is indicated in Figure 1.

From the upper part of Figure 1 it can be concluded that the present seismic monitoring system in the Northern Hemisphere can identify with a reasonable probability *explosions* with a magnitude m_B 5.5 or a yield of about 50 kton in hard rock. *Earthquakes* can be identified above m_B 4.8-5.1 with a high degree of confidence.

3. Potential capabilities

Several methods to increase the identification capabilities for underground nuclear explosions have been proposed and/or are investigated at present (see the lower part of Figure 1).

a. Specific studies of events at the Nevada Test Site have made clear that, by a study of R_g -waves, an identification threshold of m_B 5.0 may actually be reached. R_g is the surface wave, guided within the continental part of the earth crust only, and consequently restricted to purely continental source-receiver path ways. It seems likely that with the existing station network this type of wave could effectively be used for other continental test site-station combinations.

b. In theory the ratio of the body (*P*) wave frequencies can be used down to the level of its detection, which should mean to magnitude m_B -values of 4.2-4.4. In practice this method, which makes use of the (spectral) characteristics of the measured body (*P*) wave itself (thus not using a combination of body (*P*) and

surface (R) waves), has at least been realized down to m_B 4.9 for certain test site-station combinations. It seems likely that the highly successful work on this P-wave spectral ratio discriminant, as developed by the United Kingdom research group, by additional studies could be extended to magnitude values nearer to the threshold of P-wave detection. In any case the method can be used without undue extension of the present seismic monitoring system.

c. An important capability increase could be achieved by the use of the new high-gain long-period vertical seismometer (LPZ), as developed by research groups in the United States of America. Using these instruments the surface (R) wave spectral ratio criterion can be extended down to a magnitude of 5.3 and the R -wave/P-wave ratio method down to m_B 4.9. Moreover, the absence of surface (R) waves in the records of this instrument may constitute an important indication for the explosion character of an event down to m_B -values of 4.4, which corresponds with a hard-rock yield of about 4 kton. The installation of a limited number of high quality high gain LPZ recorders could thus become of major significance in improving the identification system.

d. The last mentioned threshold values are of the same order as envisaged to be reached by the 26 extended seismic array system as described by the United Kingdom Delegation in document CCD/296.² It can be expected however that the 26 array system will be much more expensive than the installation of a limited number of LPZ instruments.

In Figure 1 (lower part) estimates of the potential capabilities of the different systems are indicated. At present no exact identification probabilities can be given.

4. Additional identification improvements

a. A better and more detailed structural analysis of the crust and upper mantle of the earth should help in lowering the existing threshold values by a more effective use of the "matched filtering" process. A gain of 0.2 magnitude units has been obtained for some of the test site-station combinations. Eventually this same gain could be reached for any other place in the Northern Hemisphere, which would mean a lowering of the threshold yield value by a factor of 2/3.

b. Knowledge of the predominant type of radiation of seismic waves in the seismic zones of the earth could be of great importance in the interpretation of the records of an event of unknown type. The identification of earthquakes will be made more effective and herewith the discrimination against underground nuclear explosions.

c. For the understanding of the processes of energy transfer in earthquakes and explosions additional studies on the magnitude-yield relation of explosions in different types of media are needed.

²Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 342-349.

The question has already been raised if the use of surface wave magnitudes is not to be preferred to the body wave magnitude-scale m_B which is normally used in this work. It seems likely that a more consistent explanation of the data, and therewith of the identification of suspected events, might be reached.

d. Other, non-seismic, methods of detection of underground nuclear explosions, have been envisaged. Cratering occurs for explosions of about 20 kton and more in thick layers of dry soil, as mentioned in the SIPRI report³ (see also Figure 1). Extensive mining works are necessary for the seismic decoupling of underground explosions in hard rock, although it is unclear whether such decoupling is possible for interesting yields. Both cratering and mining can probably be detected by satellites.

A multi-variate analysis of the whole scale of possibilities mentioned above inevitably will lead to an increase of the weight of the conclusions based on the individual methods.

5. *Suggestions*

The work on the *P*-wave spectral ratio, as developed by the United Kingdom, should be elaborated and extended to lower magnitude events.

The installation of an appropriate limited network of high gain LPZ instruments, as developed by the United States of America, could be particularly helpful.

Additional study of crust and upper mantle structure, and of the radiation characteristics of shallow earthquakes in regions that in future could be used as test-sites, should be encouraged.

Support should be given to studies directed to the solution of the magnitude-yield relation in different types of media, and to the question of seismic efficiency.

6. *Conclusions*

It has been shown that the existing, more or less routine-based, facilities can identify 50 kton events in hard rock. By the inclusion of other types of discriminants this identification in principle could be extended to hard-rock yields of 10-20 kton, using the present monitoring system. With an additional installation at selected places of high gain LPZ seismometers another threshold reduction of a factor of two might be realized.

Also in that case, however, a supposed test-ban treaty could be evaded by a test programme of yields of 10 kton and less in dry soil that, in the case of sufficient thickness of the layer, will remain undetected and unidentified by seismological means or by observations of cratering.

With the most optimistic views in mind on the future development of seismic identification techniques, it can still be

³ *Seismic Methods for Monitoring Underground Explosions.*




FIGURE 1




FIGURE 2

said that this 10 kton threshold will not be lowered within the next five years.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, March 25, 1971¹

In my statement last month at the inaugural meeting of the present session of the Committee I had occasion to point out that, in my delegation's view, there were three questions to which priority should be given in our deliberations in the current year: general and complete disarmament, the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests and chemical and microbiological weapons.²

47. The first is obviously the question of greatest importance. However, in order to study it constructively the Committee needs three basic documents, and for the time being it has only one—the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations of September 1961, which still has full validity.³ But we lack the other two which would enable us to clarify the respective positions of the two nuclear super-Powers in this field. For this purpose the Comprehensive Programme of Disarmament, which according to the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2661 C (XXV) this Committee must “take into account” in its work and its negotiations, suggests “the revision and updating of the existing draft treaties submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America respectively, or the submission of new proposals”.⁴

48. While we wait, then, for the representatives of the two Powers to provide us with those essential tools, much to our regret we shall have to concentrate for the present on the two other questions, to the former of which this statement will be entirely devoted. Next week I hope to be able to make a similar statement on chemical and microbiological weapons.

49. When dealing with the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, we believe that we should remember at all times that the General Assembly, advisedly using (in its resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962)⁵ an expression rarely found in its resolutions, *condemned* all nuclear-weapon tests, and that that total condemnation has never been modified; on the contrary, the General Assembly itself, in five

¹ CCD/PV.504, pp. 19-28.

² CCD/PV.495, pp. 23-31.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 439-442.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 682-683. For the Soviet draft treaty and the U.S. treaty outline, see *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 77-102, 111-140.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1029-1032.

consecutive resolutions adopted between 1966 and 1970—and adopted, it is well to remember, with the affirmative vote of all the nuclear Powers participating in the Committee's work—has invariably urged “all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments”.⁶

50. It might also be worth while to emphasize that in the third preambular paragraph of the Moscow Treaty the three original Parties expressed their determination to “achieve the permanent suspension of all explosions of nuclear weapons” and to “continue negotiations to that end”.⁷ Notwithstanding this, and despite the abundance of constructive proposals submitted periodically by many members of the Committee, the statements of the two super-Powers on this subject often bring to mind a dialogue of the deaf. That is why as far back as 1968 the eight States then comprising the group of non-aligned countries, in their memorandum of 26 August of that year, expressed their profound concern “that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals . . . [which] should be studied further without delay”.⁸

51. In the following year the Swedish delegation submitted, with the modest title of a working paper, what amounts to a complete draft treaty on the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests.⁹ This is still before the Committee and, in the view of my delegation, offers the advantage, among others, of embodying provisions relating to nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes and making special reference to the international agreements which, by article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,¹⁰ should be in course of active negotiation. This is a subject in which, I would remind the Committee in passing, the Mexican delegation has from the very outset expressed its special interest, as I have already had occasion to point out in my statement of 13 August 1970¹¹ quoting the main documents illustrating our position.

52. However, the impasse in which we find ourselves is still the same as that which existed when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament established, shortly after it began its work, a sub-committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, to which the question of the suspension of nuclear-weapon tests was specifically entrusted. The prolonged stagnation which we so much deplore is due essentially to the fact that neither the position of the United States, that on-site inspections are necessary, nor that of the Soviet Union, which maintains that the use of national means of detection is sufficient, has undergone any appreciable change.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803; *ibid.*, 1967, p. 731; *ibid.*, 1968, pp. 796-797; *ibid.*, 1969, p. 722; *ibid.*, 1970, p. 687.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 589-591.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 140-142.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

¹¹ CCD/PV.487, pp. 22-24.

53. My delegation—and I believe that our attitude is probably shared by many other delegations—would have no objection to provision in the treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests for a reasonable minimum number of on-site inspections. We believe that, if the procedure were surrounded by sufficient safeguards to prevent its objective from being distorted, there would be no risk of its abuse for purposes other than those of strengthening confidence and making verification more effective.

54. On the other hand we must say with the same frankness—and, as in the previous case, we believe that a considerable number of delegations think as we do—that, taking into account the astonishing progress achieved both in the detection and identification of underground nuclear-weapon tests and in satellite photography, it does not appear that the conclusion of a treaty based exclusively on national means of detection would entail the danger that any of the nuclear Powers could carry out clandestine tests on a scale capable of affecting the strategic balance. Our opinion is founded partly on the recent declaration, to which several representatives have already referred in their statements, of Mr. William C. Foster, whom we have met here and whose experience, objectivity and considered judgement enable us to appreciate his declarations at their full worth.

55. From a purely pragmatic point of view, however, we must acknowledge that that eclecticism of our delegation, even if shared by the majority of the members of the Committee, would certainly not prevail on either of the two super-Powers to accept the point of view of the other, regardless of the reasons for their respective attitudes, although these sometimes seem to us as unfathomable as, according to the poet, are the ways of the Lord. A realistic analysis of the situation consequently compels us to conclude that, if we wish to break the vicious circle in which we have remained for so many years, we must endeavour to devise a true compromise formula which will enable each super-Power to move forward over half the ground that must be covered in order to reach the goal which the General Assembly sets for us year after year.

56. With this idea in mind my delegation has been examining during the last few weeks the many volumes containing the verbatim records and other documents of the Committee. As a result of that study we have arrived at the conclusion that, from among all the proposals presented formally or informally during the 503 meetings already held by this negotiating body, the one which it would perhaps be most worth while to consider anew with particular attention is that generally known as the proposal of the “black boxes”, the name customarily given from the very beginning to automatic seismic stations.

57. To illustrate the reasons for our conclusion I will venture to go back somewhat into history. Although at the meeting of the Committee held on 3 December 1962 the representative of the

Soviet Union, then Mr. Tsarapkin, made a brief reference to this question,¹² the quite comprehensive description of it was given by him one week later at the meeting held on 10 December. At that meeting the Soviet representative stated, among other things:

... We believe that the existing differences can be overcome if we seek for a compromise on a mutually acceptable basis.

We have already pointed out that, in this respect, the conclusions reached by the Soviet, United States and United Kingdom scientists at the Pugwash Conference in London last September¹³ are of definite interest; they proposed the use of unmanned automatic seismic stations, in order to facilitate agreement on the question of control over underground explosions.

The Soviet delegation has already pointed out that we are prepared to agree that in a treaty on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, provision should be made for the setting up of automatic seismic stations both on the territory of the nuclear Powers themselves and near the frontiers of the nuclear Powers, with the agreement, of course, of the States on whose territory it is proposed to locate such stations.

The Soviet Union is prepared to agree that two or three such stations should be set up on the territory of States possessing nuclear weapons, including the territory of the Soviet Union. These stations could be located in the zones that are most subject to earthquakes. ... Further, we base ourselves on the assumption that delivery of the appropriate sealed apparatus for periodic replacement in the automatic seismic stations in the USSR from the international centre and its return to the international centre should be carried out by Soviet personnel in Soviet aircraft.

The Soviet Union is sincerely striving to reach agreement on a mutually acceptable basis. If the participation of foreign personnel is required for the delivery of this apparatus to automatic seismic stations from the international centre and for its return from the stations to the international centre, the Soviet Union would be prepared to agree to this ...

We believe that this proposal by the Soviet Union introduces a new element into the negotiations on the cessation of tests and that it will be duly appreciated by the neutral States and the Western Powers ...¹⁴

58. On the following day, 11 December, that same representative emphasized in the Sub-Committee on a Treaty for the Discontinuance of Nuclear Weapon Tests that—

The Soviet Union is opposed to on-site inspection. There is no need for inspection to ensure effective control over the observance of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests by all parties to it. The Soviet Union considers that national detection networks are adequate and we see no need for additional measures. It was only in going forward to meet the Western Powers that we suggested making use of the idea of automatic seismic stations, an idea put forward at the Pugwash Conference of scientists in London three months ago. It was for precisely this reason that we proposed that the existing manned national means of detection should be supplemented by setting up unmanned automatic seismic stations.¹⁵

59. Lastly, Mr. Tsarapkin, at the meeting of the Committee held on 19 December 1962, again insisted on this matter and specified the scope and meaning of his country's proposals in the terms that I shall read next, as I have just done, from the verbatim record:

The main issue that now divides the Soviet Union and the United States in regard to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests is inspection. The Western Powers continue to insist on compulsory inspection, while the Soviet Union, basing itself on the practical experience of States and on a strictly objective assessment of the scientific data, believes

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1144-1153.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 863-865.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 1184-1185.

¹⁵ ENDC/SC.1/PV.48, p. 12.

that inspection is not necessary in order to reach agreement on the banning of all types of nuclear weapon tests.

The Soviet Union stands firmly on that ground. It is precisely this difference on the question of inspection, and on the question of international control posts, that prevents us from reaching agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments.

We put forward our compromise proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations because we desired to provide the Western Powers with further guarantees in relation to control over the prohibition of nuclear tests.

We are trying thus to circumvent the serious obstacle to agreement constituted by the Western Powers' demand for on-site inspection and the establishment of an international control system.

Those are the aims we are pursuing in putting forward the proposal for automatic seismic stations.

We accepted the idea of using automatic seismic stations because it would enable the latest scientific achievements to be used for the purpose for which we are taking part in the present negotiations—the purpose of banning all nuclear weapon tests for all time.

During the previous meetings of our Committee [the Soviet representative went on to say] and especially in the recent meetings of the Sub-Committee, we have been asked by the Western Powers what these automatic stations would be like and what their technical equipment would be. In other words, they have asked us for technical details. They considered that a great drawback to our proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations was that it did not reveal the technical details. However, any objective person would say that precisely the absence of technical regulations in the Soviet proposal for the use of automatic seismic stations is not its drawback but its great merit. It is precisely this absence of technical regulations in our proposal that shows the desire on our part for joint—and I emphasize “joint”—elaboration of the technical aspects of the proposal for automatic seismic stations; and this should be bound to satisfy both sides.

The question of what is to be put into the automatic stations we wish to solve in collaboration with the Western Powers. By this proposal we offer the United States and the United Kingdom a wide field for collaboration, so that they also can contribute to the work. But these details can and should be agreed after we have reached agreement in principle with the United States on the use of automatic stations as an adjunct to national detection systems without the demand for inspection.¹⁶

60. An objective and dispassionate analysis of the declarations I have just recalled, especially since it is made with so many years' hindsight, leads to the conclusion that the Soviet proposal thus defined undoubtedly introduced a new factor and constituted a not negligible compromise formula. Unfortunately there were still at that time embers of the cold war—to use that contradiction in terms—the effects of which were no doubt felt in the deliberations of the Committee and its Sub-Committee. Perusal of the records of those years—and I have had the experience of re-reading several hundreds of pages covering the five sessions of the Committee and the three of the Sub-Committee at which that matter was discussed—may be enthralling. The speeches made lively dialogues, with full and rapid replies and rejoinders. But we must admit that very often a spirit of exaggerated polemics and unnecessary and aggressive irony, which at times became sarcasm, predominated. Thus the proposal on the “black boxes”—which quite obviously was suggested by the Soviet Union not apart from, as some chose to interpret it, but rather instead of on-site inspection—did not in 1962 yield the constructive results that might perhaps have followed from serious negotiations taking that proposal as a starting-point.

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1249-1250.

61. Today, however, the situation is totally different. The debates in the Committee take place in a climate of complete serenity, which, although we must be careful to prevent it from becoming a sign of decrepitude, offers for the moment the advantage that we can analyse and assess all proposals conscientiously and objectively. The relations between the representatives of the two States exercising the co-Chairmanship of the Committee and the tone of their respective statements could not be more propitious for the initiation of formal or informal talks which would avoid misunderstandings and situations like those that unfortunately arose over eight years ago. For that reason my delegation believes that it would be especially valuable if the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States could agree to inform us on the following points.

62. From the delegation of the Soviet Union we should like to hear whether its Government would now be prepared to make a proposal similar—and I use that qualifying adjective advisedly because I fully realize the evolution and the progress in electronics that have taken place between 1962 and 1971—to the “black boxes” proposal, dealing with the use, instead of on-site inspections, of automatic seismic stations as a supplement to national detection networks.

63. From the delegation of the United States we should like to hear whether its Government would be ready today to accept in principle, as a basis for negotiations to solve the problem of inspection relating to underground nuclear tests, a proposal similar—and here I repeat the adjective I used earlier for the reasons I have explained—to that of the “black boxes” or automatic seismic stations submitted by the Soviet Union in 1962, taking advantage to some extent of the conclusions of the Tenth Pugwash Conference held in the United Kingdom in that same year.

64. If, as I hope, both replies are in the affirmative, we shall have embarked on the right course to comply at long last with the repeated exhortations of the General Assembly. If, however, the Governments of the two super-Powers do not feel they can make a final statement on the subject immediately but view with sympathy the idea that, for instance, the Group of twelve non-aligned countries should carefully explore the possibility of preparing an up-to-date proposal acceptable to the two parties for the purposes outlined earlier, we are convinced that for this it would be enough, after an informal exchange of views, for the co-Chairmen so to notify, also informally, any member of the Group. It must not be forgotten in fact that one of the Group's main functions—the other being that of highlighting the legitimate interest of all the peoples of the world in disarmament and consequently their right to have their views taken into account—is that of contributing to the drafting of formulas that may command general acceptance.

65. We trust that if, through one of the procedures I have just outlined, the inspection problem can be solved, the result will be the immediate conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of all underground nuclear-weapon tests. However, if this did not happen and if it were necessary to proceed by stages, the inspection system agreed jointly would be equally useful in allowing the adoption of any of the provisional partial measures that have been suggested for quite some time: such as, for instance, the prohibition of tests beyond a given threshold of magnitude, the adoption of a moratorium covering all those below that magnitude or the establishment of a descending scale of quotas for the execution of such explosions, and so on.

66. I should, however, like to emphasize that we are convinced that if, unfortunately, we were compelled to resort to provisional solutions, it would be essential to take the necessary measures to prevent them from confirming once again the soundness of the French proverb which so frequently reminds us that only the provisional lasts—in other words, they must not mean the indefinite postponement of total prohibition.

67. We believe that this year, the second year of the Disarmament Decade, the Committee will have to submit, in accordance with the special request of the General Assembly, a special report on the results of its work concerning the “urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests”, to quote the title of General Assembly resolution 2663 (XXV).¹⁷ It is imperative for us to make every possible effort to break the deadlock which, during the seven years that have elapsed since the Moscow Treaty was concluded, we have all so greatly deplored.

Report by Secretary of State Rogers on Foreign Policy [Extract], March 26, 1971¹

Although the nations of the world continue to arm, there is a growing awareness that their security is not necessarily thereby guaranteed. Indeed the accumulation of both strategic and conventional arms increases the potential for destruction throughout the world, while large military expenditures divert resources which might otherwise be used for the economic and social development of nations. Annual worldwide military expenditures have risen from \$139 billion in 1964 to an estimated \$200 billion in 1969.

To check this trend and strengthen the foundations of world peace, the President established as a goal of the Administration

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685 ff.

¹ *United States Foreign Policy, 1969-1970: A Report of the Secretary of State* (Department of State pub. 8575), pp. 171-180. The report was sent to the Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee on Mar. 26.

not merely limitations on the growth or spread of armaments, nuclear and conventional, but their reduction as well. The Administration is aware of the difficulty of achieving arms control, in particular over strategic arms. However, we have given it a policy priority comparable to the Vietnamization program and the effort to achieve a settlement in the Middle East.

At arms control meetings in 1969 and 1970, U.S. negotiators were instructed to:

(1) work out an agreement with the Soviet Union and others prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed;

(2) seek greater clarification on matters of verification in order to facilitate the conclusion of an adequately verified comprehensive nuclear weapons test ban;

(3) press for an agreement to cutoff production of fissionable material for weapons purposes;

(4) support a British proposal for a comprehensive ban on the production and stockpiling of biological weapons; and

(5) seek agreement with the U.S.S.R. in strategic arms talks that would limit both offensive and defensive systems.

In 1969 and 1970 there was an acceleration of the pace of developments in the arms control field, given impetus by the earlier accomplishments of the Antarctic Treaty,² the "Hot-line" agreement,³ the Limited Test Ban Treaty,⁴ the Outer Space Treaty,⁵ and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁶ The scope of common ground between the United States and the Soviet Union broadened.

Arms control discussions proceeded during the past two years in a variety of forums—the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and the U.N. General Assembly. A number of complementary efforts are involved. Most important is the effort of the two nuclear superpowers to establish agreed limitations on their own strategic armaments.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

In 1968 agreement had been reached between the United States and the U.S.S.R. to hold talks on the limitation of strategic arms. However, the convening of the talks had been postponed because of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Soon after taking office the President ordered the most comprehensive study ever undertaken of the strategic and general purpose force requirements of the

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

³ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 236-238.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

United States and the examination of the advantages and possible scope of strategic arms agreements with the U.S.S.R. After consideration of these studies, which included detailed study of our ability to verify such agreements, the President decided that the United States should seek discussions with the Soviet Union at an early date.

In June 1969 the Secretary of State proposed to the Soviet Ambassador that preliminary talks on strategic arms limitations should begin by the end of July. In October the U.S.S.R. responded favorably and the first round of talks was held in Helsinki from November 17 to December 22, 1969. This round was largely devoted to a general, but thorough, exploration of the approach by both sides to the problem. This dialogue resulted in a common, agreed work program for future sessions.

On April 16, 1970, the second phase of SALT began in Vienna. In his message to Ambassador Smith on opening this phase of the talks, the President expressed his firm commitment to the search for an early, equitable, and verifiable agreement.⁷

Early in this phase both sides set forth their approaches to a comprehensive strategic arms agreement to limit offensive and defensive forces. The United States suggested an approach involving numerical as well as qualitative limitations on offensive and defensive systems, including a ban on multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRV's) as well as an approach omitting MIRV's but including a reduction of offensive forces.

Taking account of Soviet reactions in Vienna to the various U.S. approaches, the U.S. delegation in early August presented a concrete proposal less comprehensive than the approaches suggested earlier in the session. This proposal also dealt with both offensive and defensive weapons and incorporated alternative provisions for a total ban or limitation on antiballistic missiles (ABM's). The U.S. delegation made clear that should initial agreement be reached, we would continue to seek wider, more comprehensive limitations. The Vienna phase recessed on August 14.

Negotiations resumed in Helsinki November 2 and ended on December 18, 1970. This third phase was primarily devoted to presentation of Soviet views on matters we had dealt with in our proposal, as well as to a Soviet modified proposal for an initial agreement. As in previous discussions, talks were serious and nonpolemical. The Helsinki talks revealed that on some questions the two sides hold similar views; on others, wide differences remain. The U.S.S.R. has argued that "strategic" weapons should be defined as those which can reach the other side's territory, a definition that would include our tactical nuclear delivery systems in the European theater. They have, on the other hand, resisted limitations on their own theater nuclear delivery forces. There

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 162.

have also been differences over whether an initial agreement on defensive systems (ABM's) alone would serve the goal of the talks. We have stated our belief that an agreement should include limitations on both offensive and defensive systems.

As a result of the talks to date each side has achieved an increasingly better understanding of the other's position. We believe that both sides continue to recognize a common interest in reaching an agreement to avoid the costly and dangerous consequences of a continuing strategic arms race. Although serious and difficult negotiations remain, we are hopeful that agreement will be reached. We are committed to seek the achievement of that goal. The fourth phase of the talks begins in Vienna in March 1971.

In all these discussions our prime objectives remain those set forth by the Secretary of State in his speech of November 13, 1969:

—To enhance international security by maintaining a stable strategic relationship through limitations on the deployment of strategic armaments.

—To halt the upward spiral of strategic arms and avoid the tensions, uncertainties, and costs of an unrestrained continuation of the strategic arms race.

—To reduce the risk of an outbreak of nuclear war through a dialogue about issues arising from the strategic situation.⁸

NONPROLIFERATION

Effective control of nuclear weapons requires not only limitation of the strategic arms of superpowers, but also a halt to the proliferation of nuclear powers. Recognition of this led to the negotiation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its endorsement by the U.N. General Assembly in 1968.

In February 1969, after a reexamination of the treaty in the National Security Council, President Nixon requested Senate consent to ratification.⁹ The Senate gave its approval on March 13, 1969. On March 5, 1970, the United States and the Soviet Union deposited their instruments of ratification during ceremonies in Washington, London, and Moscow, thus joining the United Kingdom and more than 40 other nations who had previously done so. This brought the treaty into force. By the end of 1970 a total of 64 countries were parties to the treaty, and an additional 34 had signed but not yet ratified.

We are continuing our efforts to facilitate the conclusion of satisfactory agreements to implement the safeguards requirements of the treaty. Effective safeguards against the diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices provide an important contribution in preventing

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 534.

⁹ *See ibid.*, p. 33.

proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are encouraged by the great progress already achieved in solving many complex problems preparatory to implementation of the safeguard provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We have voluntarily offered to permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to apply its safeguards to nuclear facilities in the United States—excluding only those with direct national security significance—when safeguards are instituted under the Treaty.

COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

An adequately verified comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons would limit further development of strategic arms and could also impose an additional constraint on proliferation. President Nixon, in his messages in March and July 1969 regarding the work of the Geneva CCD,¹⁰ stated his support for the conclusion of such a comprehensive test ban and urged efforts to achieve greater understanding of how compliance could be verified.

To this end we have taken steps to implement the seismic investigation proposal which the United States had presented to the United Nations in 1968. In September 1969 seismic recordings of our peaceful nuclear explosion, Project Rulison, were taken by the United States and 16 other cooperating countries. Discussion of this data should contribute to our understanding of seismology and its potential for identifying underground nuclear explosions. For this reason, we also supported resolutions proposed by Canada at the United Nations in 1969 and 1970 to promote worldwide exchange of seismic data.¹¹ We have accordingly submitted to the United Nations a list of U.S. seismic stations from which records would be available to other interested countries to contribute to verification of a comprehensive test ban. We anticipate there will be further discussion of a test ban in the CCD during 1971.

Seismic Stations From Which the United States Has Offered To Supply Data That Would Contribute to Verification of a Comprehensive Test Ban

WITHIN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

<i>Location</i>	<i>Operating Organization</i>
Alabama (Spring Hill)	Spring Hill College
Arizona (Tucson)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
California	
(Berkeley)	University of California
(Goldstone)	California Institute of Technology
Colorado (Golden)	Colorado School of Mines
District of Columbia	Georgetown University
Georgia (Atlanta)	Georgia Institute of Technology
Massachusetts (Weston)	Weston College
Michigan (Ann Arbor)	University of Michigan
Mississippi (Oxford)	University of Mississippi
Missouri (Florissant)	St. Louis University

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-110, 300-301.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 719-722; *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685-686.

*Seismic Stations From Which the United States Has Offered To
Supply Data That Would Contribute to Verification
of a Comprehensive Test Ban—Continued*

WITHIN CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

<i>Location</i>	<i>Operating Organization</i>
Montana	
(Bozeman)	Montana State University
(Large Aperture Seismic Array—LASA)	Philco-Ford Corp., Contractor for U.S. Air Force Systems Command
New Jersey (Ogdensburg)	Columbia University
New Mexico (Albuquerque)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
Oregon (Corvallis)	Oregon State University
Pennsylvania (State College)	Pennsylvania State University
South Dakota (Rapid City)	South Dakota School of Mines and Technology
Texas	
(Dallas)	Southern Methodist University
(Junction)	Texas A&M University
(Lubbock)	Texas Technological College
Utah (Dugway)	University of Utah
Virginia (Blacksburg)	Virginia Polytechnic Institute
Washington (Longmire)	University of Washington

OUTSIDE CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

<i>Location</i>	<i>Operating Organizations</i>
Alaska	
(College Outpost)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
(Alaskan Long Period Ar- ray—ALPA)	U.S. Air Force Technical Applications Center
Antarctica (South Pole)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
Canal Zone (Balboa Heights)	Panama Canal Co.
Guam (Mariana Islands)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
Hawaii (Kipapa)	U.S. National Ocean Survey
Puerto Rico (San Juan)	U.S. National Ocean Survey

NUCLEAR CUTOFF

In 1969, in the CCD, the United States again urged that progress be made on the negotiation of an agreement to halt the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes—often referred to as the “cutoff” proposal. We sought to improve the prospects of negotiating such an agreement by proposing that verification should be accomplished by the IAEA on the same basis that will apply to the nonnuclear weapon states parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, a basis already concurred in by the U.S.S.R. in that Treaty. With the concentration on the Seabed Treaty¹² and the chemical and biological weapons (CBW) question, however, there was little further discussion of the proposal.

SEABEDS

The latest effort to put areas for deployment of nuclear weapons out of bounds has been the negotiation of a treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed. The treaty provides that the

¹² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

parties undertake not to emplant or emplace nuclear weapons or any other types of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond the outer limit of a 12-mile-wide coastal seabed zone. The prohibitions also apply within the seabed zone but with certain qualifications.

In his first message to the CCD after assuming office, President Nixon urged that an international agreement be worked out "in order to assure that the seabed, man's latest frontier, remains free from the nuclear arms race."¹³ At the time in the CCD there was considerable sentiment that there should be a broad prohibition on all military uses of the seabed. The United States, however, made clear that such a prohibition would be unverifiable and would seriously compromise the security of countries with exposed coast lines. The United States proposed instead a ban on the emplacement of nuclear weapons since this would eliminate the only real threat of an arms race on the seabed while greatly reducing the difficulties of verification. Ultimately, in October 1969, the United States and the Soviet Union tabled a joint draft generally embodying the approach we had advocated for the scope of the prohibition.¹⁴

As work on the seabed treaty continued during 1970, many countries expressed the view that a way should be found to give all parties (particularly coastal states), regardless of their technological capabilities, a chance to take part in verifying the treaty prohibitions. Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to meet these concerns. After detailed consultations and negotiations, the two sponsors of the treaty developed provisions for practical verification procedures that enable all parties to assure themselves that the prohibitions of the treaty are being observed. Particular care was taken to insure that the provisions of the treaty would not prejudice unresolved law-of-the-sea issues.

The final U.S.-U.S.S.R. draft, tabled in the Geneva Disarmament Committee on September 1, 1970,¹⁵ was commended at the 25th U.N. General Assembly by a resolution that expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty.¹⁶ This resolution was adopted by an overwhelming vote of 104 to 2 with 2 abstentions. The seabed treaty was subsequently opened for signature in February 1971, when the three depositary governments—the United States, U.S.S.R., and the United Kingdom—signed the document, together with some 60 other countries, in parallel ceremonies in the three capitals.

CHEMICAL WARFARE AND BIOLOGICAL RESEARCH

Soon after taking office the Administration undertook a comprehensive study of our chemical and biological policies and

¹³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 109-110.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 507-509.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 475-479.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 680-681.

programs. On November 25, 1969, the President reaffirmed U.S. renunciation of the first-use of lethal chemical weapons and extended the renunciation to incapacitating chemicals.¹⁷ At the same time he announced his decision to submit the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.¹⁸ It was subsequently transmitted on August 19, 1970,¹⁹ and was pending before the Senate at the end of 1970. The Protocol prohibits the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous, or other gases, all analogous liquids, materials or devices and bacteriological methods of warfare. As the Secretary stated in his report to the President for submission to the Senate, it is our understanding of the Protocol that it does not prohibit the use in war of riot control agents and chemical herbicides.²⁰

The President also renounced all use of biological and toxin warfare by the United States, and directed the Defense Department to start planning the disposal of existing stocks. These plans were completed by the end of 1970 with a view to destruction proceeding in 1971. The President also announced that the United States would in the future confine its biological and toxin programs to research and development for defensive purposes such as immunization and safety.²¹

In the spirit of these decisions, we supported a U.K. draft convention prohibiting the use, production, development, and stockpiling of biological agents of warfare. The draft was presented to the Committee on Disarmament on August 26, 1969,²² and subsequently amended at our suggestion to include a ban on toxins.²³

The issues involved in control of chemical and biological weapons were a principal topic in the Committee in 1969 and 1970, and were discussed at the U.N. General Assembly during the past two sessions. Multilateral discussion of the U.K. draft convention and efforts to develop effective international controls regarding chemical weapons are again expected to be one of the principal subjects considered by the Committee in 1971.

We are hopeful that early progress will be possible in negotiating this convention inasmuch as prohibitions on the production, storage, and use of biological weapons and toxins do not require the kind of verification needed in many other areas of arms restraint. Biological weapons have uncertain military value and have never been used in warfare.

OTHER DEVELOPMENTS

On August 13, 1970, the United States made a presentation on conventional arms control at the CCD.²⁴ Noting the important

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 592-593.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 764-765.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 445-446.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 400-402.

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

²² *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 431-432.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

²⁴ *Ibid.* pp. 420 ff.

steps that had been taken toward nuclear arms control, we pointed out that it was important to begin serious study of conventional arms control. We stressed our continuing interest in achieving regional arms limitations.

We pointed out that time was not on our side. The rapid advances of technology and the diffusion of military production know-how are bound to increase the problems of establishing restraints on conventional arms as time goes on. Limitation on such armaments could release funds for nonmilitary purposes. We stressed that both arms producers and arms recipients have a responsibility and an interest in participating in the search for viable approaches to controlling conventional armaments. We reaffirmed the President's suggestion in his foreign policy statement of 1970 that the great powers should show restraint in their arms sales to regions in conflict.²⁵ We expressed the hope that a concerted attack would be made by all interested countries on this problem, thereby complementing the work going forward to control nuclear arms.

No specific action was taken on conventional armaments by the CCD in 1970, but we hope the Committee will give increased attention to this question in the future.

Also on August 13, 1970, the President submitted Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.²⁶ The Treaty itself is restricted to Latin American states, but nuclear states ratifying this Protocol would undertake: (1) to respect the aims and provisions of the Treaty, (2) not to contribute to its violation in the territory to which it applies, and (3) not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against parties to the Treaty. In announcing our decision to request such ratification to a meeting of the Organization of American States General Assembly in June 1970, the Secretary of State said that "the progress each of us wants should be the result to an effort that reflects, as our Charter puts it, 'the desire of the American peoples to live together in peace.'"²⁷ This desire, taken as a result of a Latin American initiative, led to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

PROSPECTS FOR 1971

As a result of three extensive rounds of talks with the Soviet Union in SALT, both sides have gained a greater understanding of each other's position and concerns. Although significant problems remain to be resolved, such as differences over the definition of what should be limited, we have also established important areas of common ground. Both sides have an overriding interest in

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 408-409. The treaty appears *ibid.*, 1967, p. 69 ff. Additional Protocol II may be found *ibid.*, p. 83.

²⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, July 27, 1970, p. 118.

limiting the strategic arms race and the costly competition which would continue in the absence of agreement. While the timing of such an agreement cannot be predicted, we are hopeful that substantial progress can be made toward this goal in the next phase of talks in Vienna. For our part, we will continue to make every effort in the coming year to achieve an early agreement.

In the Committee on Disarmament, we will seek also to obtain broad agreement on the U.K. draft convention banning biological weapons and toxins.

Topics considered in 1970—a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a cutoff on production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, and controls over chemical weapons—will remain under negotiation in Geneva. We anticipate the entry into force of the Seabeds Arms Control Treaty with the ratification of 22 countries, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. Following receipt of advice and consent of the Senate we would also expect to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

We shall take every reasonable step to see that these hopes are fulfilled. At the same time, overly optimistic expectations of quick results on a number of major issues would be unwarranted. There undoubtedly will be many honest differences regarding the complex subjects to be resolved. Their resolution cannot be accomplished overnight. We intend, however, to make every effort to make the pace of negotiation as rapid as possible, keenly aware that in the past the advance of military science and technology has often outdistanced the work of arms control negotiators.

Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Destruction of Chemical and Biological Means of Warfare, March 30, 1971¹

The Secretary-General of the United Nations has called upon all states to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons.² One aspect of this elimination is destruction of already existing chemical and biological means of warfare as foreseen both in the nine countries' revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons³ and in the revised text of the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare.⁴

¹ CCD/324, Mar. 30, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 267.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431.

Different attempts have been made to solve the problem of *disposing* of chemical and biological means of warfare. Recently, an operation whereby chemical munitions (rockets) containing nerve gas were sunk in the Atlantic became widely known and was extensively reported on (see "Hearings before the Sub-committee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; House of Representatives Aug. 3, 4, 6 and 7, 1970, Washington, D.C.").⁵ This report dealt thoroughly with several means of disposal and destruction and also provided the information that some types of equipment for destruction was under construction.

In the present working paper the principles of *destruction* of both chemical and biological means of warfare are outlined. An element of importance that has been taken into account is that the effectiveness of the destruction should be easily observed and verified.

CHEMICAL AGENTS

The following is applicable to nerve and mustard gases which are considered to be representative of the most dangerous compounds and, furthermore, are stockpiled in various parts of the world in great quantities. Such agents may be stockpiled in various ways which cause different technical problems when it comes to destruction. They may, e.g., be stockpiled in

- (a) containers in which the agents are easily accessible;
- (b) munitions, containing explosives and perhaps propellants, from which the agents are accessible without prior defusing;
- (c) munitions, the explosive part of which has to be defused before it can be emptied of the agent.

In the cases (b) and (c) the explosive part of the munitions causes special problems, particularly in the latter case where simultaneous destruction of the explosive part and the agents seems unavoidable. Thus, from the point of view of destruction, two alternatives can be anticipated:

- (1) pure agents
- (2) agents which are inseparable from munitions.

In the case of a *pure agent* two principally different methods for the destruction are conceivable.

One is by means of reactive chemicals (in a water solution) which detoxify the agent and the second, which is also more likely

⁵ *Ocean Disposal of Unserviceable Chemical Munitions: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries, House of Representatives, Ninety-first Congress, on the Planned Dumping of Obsolete Poisonous Substances (Particularly Nerve Gas) Into the Atlantic Ocean; To Insure All Precautions Are Taken To Guarantee the Safety of Life and Property, and To Prevent Possible Pollution of the Ocean, August 3, 4, 6, 7, 1970.*

to be generally applicable, by thermal destruction (i.e. decomposition by heating/pyrolysis/or combustion).

The chemical method may involve use of alkali or oxidants (e.g., bleach). Chemical destruction generally gives nontoxic end-products, but the character of the products makes them an environmental hazard if introduced directly into the open, the ground, sea, lakes or rivers. The question of how to dispose of large quantities of the end-products, derived from the different chemical destruction methods, will have to be investigated further. Special facilities may have to be constructed.

Heating the agents themselves in autoclaves is technically feasible but may lead to some complex end-products about which relatively little is known.

Combustion, in combination with absorption of potential pollutants from the exhaust gases, appears to be the most promising method—technically and from the point of view of environmental pollution. A suitable combustion process would require specially constructed facilities.

The advantage of the thermal destruction methods would be that smaller destruction units might be used for a given amount of the agents and that the end-products are more easily handled. Actual experiments would have to be performed to evaluate the order of the most feasible technical steps.

In the case of *munitions* from which the agent cannot be separated easily, much more drastic procedures seem to be necessary. Use of underground nuclear explosions has been discussed and found technically feasible but were discarded in the earlier mentioned case for several reasons, among them the risks involved in handling the defective munitions (Hearings before the Sub-Committee on Oceanography of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries; House of Representatives Aug. 3, 4, 5 and 7, Washington, D.C. 1970). Instead, the formerly widely used method of disposal by sinking the munitions in the sea was applied. The agents, when released from their containers, will be destroyed by chemical reactions with the sea water in due time. However, this method will be less attractive with regard to some of the nerve gases and the mustard gases, which need a considerably longer period to react with water. In addition, attention should be paid to the provisions of the recent Seabed Treaty which prohibit, i.e., the storing of chemical and biological weapons on the seabed.

Another less attractive alternative is treatment of the munitions with lime or bleach in old mines or underground in places chosen with great care.

Underwater detonation in closed-off water-filled pools together with facilities to take care of the toxic gases that may escape from the water surface might be feasible. Any of the mentioned methods are cumbersome. However, the greatest part of the existing chemical warfare agents can apparently be destroyed as such and according to the procedures suggested for pure agents.

BIOLOGICAL AGENTS

Biological agents may be destroyed by combustion, in autoclave or by means of disinfectants. Also, destruction of biological agents has its hazards, but offers in general smaller problems than chemical agents, especially since the quantities to be destroyed, and accordingly also the quantities of end-products, should be much smaller than is the case with the chemical warfare agents. Various destruction facilities intended for ordinary peaceful purposes already exist.

CONCLUSION

The destruction of munitions and agents intended for chemical and biological warfare is technically feasible. Because of the high toxicity and infectiousness of the agents, hazards may in certain cases cause considerable destruction costs due to the need for special technical facilities. The destruction methods recommended above may be subject to verification without major technical difficulties, but apparently only with inspectors present at the site of destruction.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, March 30, 1971¹

The Soviet delegation intends to devote its statement today to the problem of the prohibition and elimination of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which occupies the chief place in the work of the current session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

20. In their approach to the solution of this problem the Soviet Union and other socialist countries base themselves on the need to take immediately urgent practical steps to eliminate chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. The socialist countries have repeatedly pointed out to States that the continuing process of the further development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons is creating a serious threat to mankind, and that the adoption of urgent measures to stop that process would help to strengthen peace and the security of the peoples. At the same time, broad international agreement on that pressing problem would create a favourable atmosphere for progress in other areas of disarmament as well.

21. After taking the initiative in the United Nations on the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the socialist countries, with the support of other

¹ CCD/PV.505, pp. 11-19.

peace-loving States, succeeded in ensuring that this problem—which for a long time had not been considered in disarmament negotiations—became the subject of intensive and businesslike discussions in the past few years. States have shown an increased interest in strengthening the Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.² The number of parties to that important international agreement has grown in recent years. Useful decisions have been taken by the United Nations General Assembly stressing the importance of the Geneva Protocol and the need to prepare measures aimed at the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. In view of the general condemnation of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare, a number of States which had previously rejected any proposal to prohibit those types of weapons have now stated their readiness to agree to prohibition of the production of bacteriological weapons and toxins and to their elimination from their military arsenals.

22. The position of the socialist countries on this question is based on the assumption that at present there is every possibility of prohibiting simultaneously and jointly the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical and bacteriological weapons and of eliminating completely the stockpiles of those weapons of mass destruction. The nine socialist countries were guided by precisely that consideration when they submitted for consideration at the twenty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.³ We regarded that draft as a good basis for a future agreement and as acceptable to the majority of States.

23. Desiring to direct the discussion of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological means of warfare into the channel of practical and constructive negotiations, the socialist States which had co-sponsored that draft convention submitted at the subsequent twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly a revised draft.⁴ That draft took into account the views expressed by a number of delegations here in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and at the United Nations General Assembly on various aspects of an agreement, particularly on such important questions as the scope of the agreement and control over its implementation.

24. We are gratified to note that the basic position of the socialist countries: namely, the recognition of the possibility of prohibiting both chemical and bacteriological weapons together—is shared by many States. That is shown, for instance, by the

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 455-457.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

Memorandum submitted by twelve non-aligned States members of the Committee on Disarmament last year, which states that it is essential that both types of weapons should be dealt with together with a view to their prohibition.⁵ The specific proposal concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare put forward by Sweden,⁶ Morocco⁷ and other countries are also based on that approach. As has been stated repeatedly here, the appropriateness of such an approach has also been recognized by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2662 (XXV).⁸

25. Basing themselves on their position of principle, and guided by that resolution of the General Assembly, the delegations of the socialist countries have again stressed, during the current session of the Committee, the need for the prohibition and elimination of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. After carefully considering the statements made by delegations in this Committee concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, we have arrived at the following conclusions regarding the situation which has come about as a result of the discussion of this problem.

26. The characteristic feature of that situation is the fact that the difference in the approach to the solution of the problem by the socialist and non-aligned countries on the one hand and by the Western Powers on the other has been quite definitely brought to light. Unlike the socialist and non-aligned countries, which urge the simultaneous and complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western countries refuse to agree to such a prohibition. This has been fully shown during the current session of the Committee. The United States and the United Kingdom state that they are willing to agree to prohibit only bacteriological means of warfare. They explain their unwillingness to agree to outlaw chemical weapons and to put an end once and for all to the production and stockpiling of those weapons by the alleged difficulties of control over the implementation of such an agreement.

27. We can in no way agree with such assertions. Together with other socialist countries, we believe that it is possible to reach agreement on a system of guarantees of the fulfilment of an agreement combining both national and international control measures which would secure the consistent implementation of the agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. In our opinion, all the arguments advanced by the Western Powers about the difficulties of control over the prohibition of chemical weapons are merely an attempt

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.453-455.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 151-154.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970* pp. 341-342.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.683-685.

to justify their reluctance to renounce chemical means of warfare. The long experience of disarmament negotiations has shown that questions of control have often been used as a pretext for refusing to reach an agreement.

28. In analysing the present situation we cannot but conclude that because of the negative attitude of the Western Powers the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons are in fact in a state of deadlock, and that at present the achievement of agreement on the problem in its entirety does not appear possible. The absence of agreement in this field at the present juncture will result in delaying indefinitely the discussion of this problem and will cast doubt on the possibility of elaborating, in the foreseeable future, an agreement which would meet with wide support in the world and in which the militarily-important States capable of producing and stockpiling chemical and bacteriological means of warfare would participate. Delay in making progress in the question of prohibiting those types of weapons hinders the constructive consideration and solution of other disarmament problems, gives rise to pessimism and, as a matter of fact, undermines the efforts aimed at achieving positive results in disarmament negotiations.

29. In the situation that has come about, the socialist States co-authors of the draft convention on chemical and bacteriological weapons have considered all possible alternatives for the solution of this problem. They have arrived at the conclusion that, in view of the reluctance of the United States and other Western Powers to renounce chemical means of warfare, there is unfortunately at present no prospect of a more or less speedy achievement of a comprehensive agreement in this field. Desiring to extricate the solution of the problem from the deadlock, the socialist countries declare their readiness and propose now, as a first step towards solving this problem, to reach agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare and toxins only; and to this end they are submitting for the consideration of the Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction.⁹

30. In submitting this draft convention on behalf of the socialist countries participating in the work of the Committee—namely, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union—the Soviet delegation wishes to state that the Governments of the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, as co-authors of the draft convention on the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, have also joined us as co-authors of the document we have submitted today. We have likewise been authorized to inform members of the Committee

⁹ *Infra.*

that the draft convention is fully supported by the Government of the Democratic Republic of Germany.

31. Permit me now to describe briefly the content of the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries. The basic aim of the agreement is to preclude completely the possibility of the use in war of bacteriological weapons and toxins. The achievement of that aim is ensured by the provisions of articles I and II of the draft convention under which each State party to the convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not designed for peaceful purposes. The States parties also undertake to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the convention all types of such weapons in their possession. At the same time provision is made for a corresponding ban on auxiliary equipment and means of delivery of bacteriological agents and toxins.

32. In preparing the draft convention its authors based themselves on the premise that the prohibition of the production of bacteriological weapons and toxins must not adversely affect the development of biological industry for peaceful purposes. To this end the draft convention includes article X, which provides that the convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States parties or international co-operation in the field of bacteriological activities for peaceful purposes. Under this article States parties to the convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information concerning the use of bacteriological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

33. The draft convention contains provisions designed to ensure its implementation by States parties. Articles IV, V, VI and VII of the draft provide for a system of guarantees in order to make the agreement a viable and effective instrument. For guarantee purposes both national and international verification procedures are used. That is a combination which, as many delegations have recognized, is practically the most appropriate in the case of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Thus articles IV and V define national forms of verification. They make States parties to the convention internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions and bind them to take the necessary legislative and administrative measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and toxins as well as their means of delivery.

34. On the other hand, articles VI and VII provide for forms of guarantees based on international procedures. Thus, under article VI States parties undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the

application of the provisions of the convention. Under article VII any State party which finds that actions of any other State party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of the convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations, and undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake in virtue of the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

35. The system of guarantees provided for in the draft convention is reinforced by the provisions of article XII, which stipulate that five years after the entry into force of the convention a conference of States parties shall be held in order to review the operation of the convention and to ensure that its provisions are being implemented.

36. The provisions of the draft convention concerning chemical weapons are of great importance, and we should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to this. There is a special article in the draft convention, article IX, under which each State party to the convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective means for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for carrying out any use of chemical weapons as means of warfare. Accordingly, article XII concerning the convening of a conference of States parties to the convention provides that the conference shall consider how the provision regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons is being implemented. In the preamble to the convention the States parties express their conviction that an agreement on bacteriological weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

37. All those provisions of the convention are designed to ensure and facilitate progress towards the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States. They reflect the position of the socialist countries, which advocate the complete prohibition of both bacteriological and chemical means of warfare.

38. We should also like to stress the importance of article VIII of the draft convention. That article stipulates that nothing in the convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which contains generally-recognized rules of international law. By concluding the proposed convention the parties to it would thereby confirm their adherence to the purposes and principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and stress the importance of that document and its prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Moreover, as the content of article VIII shows, the authors of the draft convention base themselves on the understanding that the Protocol contains

generally-recognized rules of international law concerning the inadmissibility of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons—that is to say, the understanding which, as we know, was confirmed by the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in resolution 2603 A (XXIV).¹⁰

39. The co-authors of the draft convention submitted today intend in their subsequent statements to dwell in greater detail on the provisions of this draft. In addition to what has been said we should like to emphasize the significance and the consequences of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons on the basis of the draft submitted by the socialist countries.

40. The entry into force of a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins and providing for their destruction would preclude the possibility of the unleashing of a war using these means of warfare, and this would be in the interest of all nations. By making it a binding obligation of States to prohibit and eliminate this category of weapons of mass destruction, the convention would become an agreement concerning the implementation of a disarmament measure as such, which would facilitate progress in reaching agreement on other measures in the field of disarmament and in achieving general and complete disarmament. Its conclusion would serve to improve the international situation and to strengthen international peace and security.

41. In submitting a draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins for the consideration of other States the socialist countries base themselves on the assumption that the conclusion of such a convention will enable the participants in disarmament negotiations to concentrate their efforts on elaborating an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. Whereas at present, behind the talk about biological weapons, some countries are trying to conceal their reluctance to agree to the prohibition of chemical weapons, once the proposed convention on the prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare has been concluded they will no longer be able to evade answering the question whether they are prepared to enter into an agreement on the destruction of the chemical agents which are in the equipment of the armies of many States.

42. The socialist States consider that negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons should not be delayed until the entry into force of the convention on bacteriological weapons. The efforts of States in this direction should not be interrupted. The complete prohibition of chemical weapons is an urgent problem which can and must be solved. The arguments put forward by the delegations of the socialist and many other States in support of the need for the urgent prohibition of chemical weapons remain

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 716-717.

valid. The threat of chemical war still exists. We constantly meet with facts which show that the process of developing and stockpiling dangerous chemical means of warfare is still going on and that toxic chemical agents are being used by the armed forces of the United States, thus giving rise to resolute condemnation by all the peoples of the world.

43. Bearing all this in mind, we believe that consideration of the proposed convention on bacteriological weapons and toxins should be carried on at the same time as the examination of the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons is continued. The Soviet delegation, as in the past, continues to insist on the need to conduct in a constructive spirit the negotiations for the immediate prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their complete elimination from the arsenals of States.

44. In conclusion we beg, on behalf of the socialist countries co-authors of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction, to express the hope that this document will be most carefully studied by all the participants in the negotiations, that it will meet with wide support, and that it will become the basis for an agreement on the complete prohibition of one type of weapon of mass destruction.

45. Permit me to avail myself of this opportunity to express our deep sentiments of respect and regret to the representative of Sweden, Ambassador Edelstam, who has informed us today that he is leaving his post. His participation over a long period in the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and in our enlarged Conference has been extremely useful, effective and, I would say, very instructive, because it has constantly given us rich food for thought and discussion and has helped us to make progress. At the same time we should like to welcome the new representative of Sweden, who has been introduced to us by Ambassador Edelstam: Mr. Lennart Eckerberg, who will represent Sweden in our negotiations. We also desire to wish him every success in fulfilling his very important mission as representative of Sweden in our Committee.

Communist Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on Their Destruction, March 30, 1971¹

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament and, above all, with a

¹ CCD/325/Rev. 1, Apr. 15, 1971. The draft Convention was submitted to the CCD by the Soviet representative on behalf of Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian SSR, and the USSR. The Apr. 15 edition incorporated several minor changes described below.

view to prohibiting and eliminating nuclear, chemical, bacteriological (biological) and all other types of weapons of mass destruction,

Convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament,²

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of States such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,³ and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Guided by the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 as well as the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and any biological means of warfare,⁴

Noting the conclusions contained in the report submitted to the United Nations General Assembly and the Disarmament Committee on the grave consequences for mankind that might result from the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,⁵

Convinced that an agreement on bacteriological (biological) weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for the complete prohibition of

²In the original version (CCD/325, Mar. 30, 1971), there were commas after the words "toxins" and "elimination."

³*Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁴*Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 793-795; *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 716-717.

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 297-298.

chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued,

Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire:

(1) microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in such quantities as are not designed for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes;

(2) auxiliary equipment or means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents or toxins for hostile purposes.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the Convention—observing all the necessary precautions—or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated weapons in its possession as well as the equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention.

Article III

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes not to assist, encourage or induce any particular State, group of States or international organizations to take action contrary to the provisions of this Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal or physical persons of that State.

Article V

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to take as soon as possible, in accordance with its constitutional procedures, the necessary legislative and administrative measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of the weapons, equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention, and for destroying them.

Article VI

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

Article VII

1. Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its

validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.⁶

2. Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.⁷

Article X

1. The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

2. This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States

⁶ In the original version the last sentence of this par. began, "The Security Council shall inform. . ."

⁷ In the original version this article read as follows: "Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for carrying out any use of chemical weapons as means of warfare."

Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

1. This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, so as to be sure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

Article XIII

1. This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and shall transmit other notices to them.

6. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XIV

This Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

Done in copies at, this day of,

Statement by the Department of State: Communist Draft Convention on Biological Weapons, March 30, 1971¹

This morning at the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament the Soviets and their allies tabled a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins.² We welcome this move by the Soviet Government. The United States has supported at Geneva a ban on biological and toxin weapons such as was embodied in the draft convention proposed by the United Kingdom in August of 1969.³ We believe a convention banning biological weapons is possible and should be negotiated now. We will also continue our work in the more difficult area of prohibitions regarding chemical weapons. We have just received in Washington the text of the new draft convention. We note with satisfaction that many of the ideas in the convention proposed by the United Kingdom are treated in a similar way in the Soviet draft, including the idea of a commitment to further negotiations on chemical weapons and prohibitions regarding toxins that were originally proposed by the United States.

We will, of course, have to study the draft carefully, but on first reading it appears to be a serious document which should facilitate negotiations toward a mutually acceptable agreement on biological weapons.

Address by General Secretary Brezhnev to the 24th Congress of the CPSU [Extract], March 30, 1971⁴

The Soviet Union counters the aggressive policy of imperialism with its policy of the active defense of peace and the strengthening of international security. The main lines of this policy are well known. Our party and our Soviet state, in cooperation with the fraternal socialist countries and with other peace-loving states and with the warm support of many millions of people throughout the world, have for many years now been waging a struggle along these lines, upholding the cause of peace and friendship among the peoples. The C.P.S.U. sees the following as the main concrete tasks of this struggle in the present situation.

First.

—To eliminate the hotbeds of war in Southeast Asia and in the Near East and to promote political settlements in these areas on the basis of respect for the legitimate rights of the states and peoples that have been subjected to aggression.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Apr. 26, 1971, p. 549. The statement was issued by Charles W. Bray III, Director of the Office of Press Relations.

² *Supra*.

³ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

⁴ *Pravda*, Mar. 31, 1971; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 12 (Apr. 20, 1971), p. 13.

—To administer an immediate and firm rebuff to any act of aggression or international highhandedness. To this end, full use must be made of the possibilities of the United Nations.

—Renunciation of the use of force or the threat of its use in resolving disputed questions must become a law of international life. For its part, the Soviet Union invites the countries that share this approach to conclude appropriate bilateral or regional treaties.

Second.

—To proceed from the definitive recognition of the territorial changes that took place in Europe as a result of the Second World War, to carry out a fundamental shift toward a detente and peace on this continent, and to ensure the convocation and success of an all-European conference.

—To do everything to ensure collective security in Europe. We reaffirm our readiness, which has been jointly expressed by the member-countries of the defensive Warsaw Treaty, for the simultaneous abrogation of this treaty and of the North Atlantic Alliance, or—as a first step—for the dismantling of their military organizations.

Third.

—To conclude treaties imposing a ban on nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons.

—To work for the cessation of all testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, everywhere.

—To promote the creation of non-nuclear zones in various parts of the world.

—We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all states possessing nuclear weapons and for the convocation to this end of a conference of the five nuclear powers—the U.S.S.R., the U.S.A., the C.P.R., France and Britain.

Fourth.

—To step up the struggle for the cessation of the arms race in all types of weapons. We favor the convocation of a worldwide conference to consider the full range of disarmament questions.

—We are for the dismantling of foreign military bases. We stand for the reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where military confrontation is especially dangerous, above all in Central Europe.

—We consider it advisable to work out measures reducing the probability of the accidental outbreak or deliberate fabrication of military incidents and their development into international crises or into war.

The Soviet Union is prepared to negotiate an agreement on the reduction of military expenditures, above all by the major states.

Fifth.

—The U.N. decisions on the elimination of the remaining colonial regimes must be fully implemented. Manifestations of

racism and apartheid are subject to universal condemnation and boycott.

Sixth.

—The Soviet Union is prepared to deepen relations of mutually advantageous cooperation in all fields with states that seek to do so. Our country is ready to participate, together with other interested states, in the solution of such problems as the conservation of the natural environment, the development of power-engineering and other natural resources, the development of transportation and communications, the prevention and elimination of the most dangerous and most widespread diseases, and the exploration and development of outer space and the oceans.

Such are the basic features of the program of struggle for peace and international cooperation and for the freedom and independence of the peoples that our party has put forward. (Stormy, prolonged applause.)

Report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, April 5, 1971¹

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Mexico City on April 1, 1968,² having considered the same, reports favorably thereon with understandings and declarations and recommends that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification thereof with the understandings and declarations in the resolution of ratification which is printed at the conclusion of this report.

BACKGROUND

This protocol and the treaty to which it pertains, the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (described briefly in the last paragraph of this section), are the result of the work of the "Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America" which met in Mexico City between March, 1965 and February, 1967. The United States was not a member of the Commission but sent observers to all but one of its sessions. On February 14, 1967 the treaty and its two protocols were opened for signature. The United States signed Additional Protocol II with an accompanying statement on April 1, 1968, at Mexico City. (The United States has not signed and does not presently plan to sign Protocol I.) More than two years later, on August 13, 1970, it was submitted to the Senate for advice and consent to ratification.

According to the executive branch, the delay in signature and submission of the protocol to the Senate was occasioned by a

¹ S. Ex. Rept. 92-5, 92d Cong., 1st sess.

² For the treaty and the protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69-83.

desire to see whether the treaty would be "widely accepted by the parties" and by a desire to test the United States interpretation of the treaty and the protocol in actual practice with the parties over an extended period. An initial hearing on the protocol was held by the Committee on September 22, 1970, and a second, and final, hearing on February 23, 1971.

PURPOSE

Protocol II was designed expressly for signature by states possessing nuclear weapons and wishing to associate themselves with the objectives of the treaty. By adhering to this protocol the United States commits itself, subject to its clarifying interpretations, to respect the aims and provisions of the treaty, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American states for which the treaty is in force.

The treaty itself, which only Latin American nations may sign, commits the contracting parties to use nuclear materials and facilities under their jurisdiction only for peaceful purposes. It prohibits contracting parties from producing, testing, or possessing nuclear weapons in their territories. In addition it forbids the receipt, deployment or installation of any nuclear weapons in the territories of the parties. Compliance with the treaty is to be assured through the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system and by special inspections conducted by the "Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America," an international body established under the provisions of the treaty.

MAIN PROVISIONS OF PROTOCOL

Articles 1 and 2 of Additional Protocol II obligate the United States to respect the express aims and provisions of the treaty, and not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of Article 1 of the treaty in the territories to which the treaty applies in accordance with Article 4 thereof.

Article 3 contains an undertaking "not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty." The treaty defines contracting parties as "those for whom the Treaty is in force" and thus the term does not include parties to either of the protocols.

Article 4 of the protocol incorporates a number of the provisions of the treaty by reference. It provides that the duration of the protocol shall be the same as that of the treaty, and that the provisions of Article 30 on denunciation shall be applicable to the protocol. Article 30 of the treaty provides that it may be denounced "if, in the opinion of the denouncing state, there have arisen or may arise circumstances connected with the content of this Treaty or of the annexed Additional Protocols I and II which affect its supreme interests or the peace and security of one or

more Contracting Parties," and goes on to provide that denunciation shall take effect 3 months after notification. Article 4 of the protocol also provides that the definitions of "territory" and "nuclear weapons" as set forth in Articles 3 and 5 of the treaty shall be applicable to this protocol. In addition, Article 4 of the protocol states that the "provisions regarding ratification, reservations, * * * authentic texts and registration contained in * * * the treaty" should be applicable to the protocol.

Article 5 of Protocol II provides that the protocol shall enter into force for each adherent on the date it deposits its instrument of ratification.

UNDERSTANDINGS AND DECLARATIONS

In his letter of transmittal the President requested that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification, subject to certain understanding set forth in a statement accompanying the report of the Secretary of State.³ This statement was similar to that which accompanied the United States signature of the protocol⁴ but contained revised language reflecting the entry in force of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty⁵ which occurred subsequent to U.S. signature of the protocol. In the course of the Committee's hearings executive branch witnesses proposed another modification of the statement to present a more explicit formulation of the U.S. understanding of the basis for territorial claims. The principal provisions of the revised statement, which is incorporated in the form of a declaration in the resolution of advice and consent, are as follows:

(1) U.S. ratification cannot be construed as an acceptance by the United States of the unilaterally asserted territorial boundary claims of the parties to the treaty (e.g., territorial seas).

(2) U.S. military transit and transport privileges will not be affected by ratification.

(3) The pledge not to use nuclear weapons against a contracting party would not prohibit a U.S. nuclear response in the event of an armed attack by a party with the assistance of a nuclear weapon state.

(4) Contracting parties are prohibited from acquiring nuclear explosives for peaceful purposes, but the United States could carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on their behalf and reaffirms its willingness to do so on the same terms as under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(5) The United States will act with respect to Latin American territories of Protocol I adherents just as Protocol II would require us to act with regard to contracting parties.

COMMITTEE ACTION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Committee on Foreign Relations held public hearings on the protocol on September 22, 1970. At that time testimony was

³ See *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 317-322, 408-409.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 204-205.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 461-465.

heard from Mr. Charles A. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Mr. James F. Leonard, Assistant Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Mr. Charles Van Doren, Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and Rear Admiral William E. Lemos, Director, Policy Plans, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Completion of the hearings was then delayed pending the appearance before the Committee of Admiral Thomas E. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. On February 23, 1971, Admiral Moorer testified in support of the protocol. The record of these two hearings has been published as a separate document for the information of the Senate. On March 30, 1971, the Committee, by a vote of 13-0, ordered the protocol reported favorably to the Senate subject to the understandings discussed above. Those members voting in the affirmative were Senators Fulbright, Sparkman, Church, Symington, Pell, McGee, Muskie, Spong, Aiken, Cooper, Javits, Scott and Pearson.

The Committee is not aware of any opposition to the protocol.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION OF RATIFICATION

Resolved, (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to the ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, signed at Mexico City on April 1, 1968 (Ex.H, 91-2), with the following understandings and declarations:

I

That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purpose of this treaty and its protocols, or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the contracting parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-contracting parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon state, would be incompatible with the

Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article 1 of the treaty.

II

That the United States Government considers that the technology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is undistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the contracting parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with contracting parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty, and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device.

III

That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of contracting parties.

Statement by the Canadian Representative (Ignatieff) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, April 6, 1971¹

Before proceeding with the substance of my remarks this morning, may I associate the Canadian delegation with the tributes paid by other delegations to Ambassador Edelstam of Sweden? His

¹ CCD/PV.507, pp. 5-12.

outstanding contributions to the work of this Committee have won him well-deserved recognition both from this Committee as well as from his Government. We wish him continued success and happiness in the future. At the same time, we extend very warm greetings to Ambassador Eckerberg—may I just add that I am extremely happy to see the head of the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Myrdal, in her place?—and we look forward to the same close co-operation between the Canadian and Swedish delegations in the future as we have enjoyed in the past.

3. This Committee has generally accepted that we should address ourselves at this session most particularly to comprehensive test-ban and chemical and biological weapons issues. My statement today will deal with the efforts to end all nuclear tests. Before doing so, however, I should like to note the welcome development of 30 March, when the socialist delegations presented a new draft on measures to prohibit biological weapons.² This Committee now has the prospect of moving forward in this area, and the draft is being given by the Canadian Government the careful study which it obviously deserves.

4. In my statement of 25 February, when discussing what the objective of this Committee should be in regard to the banning of nuclear tests, I urged that we should—

... explore the possibilities of a consensus on the various ways and means of achieving the objective of putting a stop or a limit to nuclear tests.³

Since then a number of delegations, notably those of Ethiopia,⁴ Japan,⁵ Mexico,⁶ Nigeria,⁷ the Netherlands⁸ and Pakistan,⁹ have contributed to this process of exploration.

5. I scarcely need emphasize that the preference of the Canadian Government is clearly for the stopping of all nuclear tests, including those conducted underground, without further delay. Nor do I need to emphasize that we entirely agree that a complete underground test ban is the objective of this Committee, no less than of the United Nations General Assembly, and that the need for such a ban is urgent. That objective was repeated most recently in the important statement of Mr. Brezhnev on 30 March, when he called on nuclear Powers to work together for “an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, by everyone and everywhere”.¹⁰ The question which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has to answer is this: what are we here in this Committee going to do in fulfilling our responsibilities in implementing this objective? A comprehensive test ban would have an important arms-control impact on the

² *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

³ *Ante*, p. 40.

⁴ CCD/PV. 498, pp. 6-7.

⁵ *Ante* pp. 87 ff.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 165 ff.

⁷ CCD/PV.504, pp. 8 ff.

⁸ CCD/PV.502, pp. 7 ff.

⁹ CCD/PV.503, pp. 10 ff.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 196.

impending development of ever more sophisticated weapons. In addition to serving as one of the means of curtailing the strategic arms race between the major nuclear Powers, it would have an important and beneficial effect in buttressing the non-proliferation Treaty.¹¹

6. For these reasons the Canadian delegation intends to continue to press for the earliest possible fulfilment of the obligation accepted by the original parties to the partial test-ban Treaty to continue negotiations to end underground weapon-test explosions.¹² We have also urged further exploration by this Committee of the evident utility of international seismological data exchange as one possible means of facilitating the solution of the long-standing problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban, if co-operation is forthcoming on an assured basis and current identification capability is improved.

7. To that end we have suggested the consideration of specific economical ways to improve facilities and performance so that, as the representative of Nigeria suggested in his statement of 25 March, international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data may provide the basis for developing a reliable and widely-acceptable system of verification.¹³ In pursuit of this objective, we believe it would be useful to convene during the summer session an informal meeting with seismological experts present—including, we hope, experts from the two major testing Powers—to consider further ways of implementing United Nations General Assembly resolution 2663 A (XXV).¹⁴

8. I agree also with the comment by the representative of Ethiopia in his statement on 4 March, that delay in concluding an agreement which would end all testing in all environments is having the effect of undermining the full impact of the original Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.¹⁵ Several representatives have referred to the fact that since the entry into force of the Moscow partial test ban the average rate of testing, in terms of the annual number of tests underground as well as the magnitude of individual explosions, has increased substantially, including an increase in unrestrained testing by the nuclear Powers which have not acceded to the partial test-ban Treaty—the People's Republic of China and France.

9. As we know, nuclear testing is the outward and visible sign of the continued nuclear arms race and is a clear symptom of the continuing proliferation and refinement of nuclear weapons among the principal nuclear Powers. Continuance of this trend is even capable of undermining support among non-nuclear States for the most important single achievement of this Committee to

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹³ CCD/PV.504, p. 9.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-686.

¹⁵ CCD/PV.498, pp. 6-7.

date—the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Unless the nuclear Powers are willing to demonstrate their readiness to pursue seriously the objective stated in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963: “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”, the future prospects of non-proliferation will be seriously jeopardized.

10. Moreover, at a time when there is growing public concern with the dangers of pollution as a threat to our environment, it is essential also that the undertaking contained in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963: “to put an end to the contamination of man’s environment by radioactive substances”, be implemented with a greater sense of urgency. I have in mind the dangers of venting either into the atmosphere or, by seepage, into the seas, as well as other conceivable environmental risks, which may be particularly acute in cases of very high-yield tests.

11. If the solution obviously lies in putting an end to the armaments race and eliminating the incentive to the production and testing of all kinds of weapons, including nuclear weapons, as the preamble to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 recognizes, why is it necessary to consider partial measures at all eight years after the conclusion of that Treaty?

12. The reasons are obvious. Despite efforts by several delegations, including our own, to bridge the differences of opinion on the question of verification, divergence persists between the principal nuclear Powers on the necessity or otherwise of on-site inspection. Indeed, as the representative of Mexico reminded us in his well-researched statement of 25 March, the positions of the major testing Powers on this issue seem today much farther apart than in those far-off half-forgotten days early in the 1960s when a comprehensive test ban was under active negotiation.¹⁶ At that time a compromise appeared at least to be in sight on the basis of the installation of “black boxes” and the acceptance of a limited number of on-site inspections. As we contemplate the present apparently insuperable deadlock, an interesting “chicken-and-egg” question arises: have serious discussions between the major testing Powers been suspended for so long because of the intractability of this problem; or has the problem appeared as intractable because serious discussion has been so long suspended, despite all our attempts in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to cut through this Gordian knot?

13. Moreover, although more governments have acceded to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty than to any other arms-control agreement, two important nuclear Powers have not acceded and have continued unrestrained testing. The relevance of this fact to the prospects of an early agreement to end all testing is clear. The representative of the Soviet Union, in his statement on 23 February, drew particular attention to the statement of the Foreign Minister

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 167 ff.

of the USSR at the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, when he said:

... It stands to reason that the obligations assumed on disarmament problems should cover a maximum number of States and, with regard to nuclear disarmament, the participation of all nuclear Powers—as we have already repeatedly stressed—is an indispensable condition.¹⁷

14. Since then we have also had the statement by Mr. Brezhnev on 30 March in Moscow, that—

... we support nuclear disarmament of all States possessing nuclear weapons and the convening for this purpose of a conference of the five nuclear Powers: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France and Britain.¹⁸

Does this statement mean that nothing is to be done by the original parties to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 to stop or limit their nuclear testing except on the basis of participation by all five nuclear-weapon Powers? The Canadian delegation is, of course, on record along with many other delegations as being in favour of the participation by the remaining two important nuclear-weapon States, the People's Republic of China and France, in these arms-control and disarmament negotiations, in the interest of making international agreements as comprehensive as possible.

15. In these circumstances, how long are we to wait for the achievement of the objective so clearly set out in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, the "discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time"? How long, O Lord, how long is this Committee to be virtually immobilized by problems of this nature? If it were politically feasible to remove the obstacles to a comprehensive test ban without further delay, the Canadian delegation would be the first to welcome such a development. What, in essence, we have been saying is that, since we have waited for eight years already and so long as there appears to be no immediate prospect of the removal of the remaining obstacles to an agreement, it is surely not good enough for this Committee to accept the present situation, in which the significance of those restraints which were established by the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 is being eroded year by year.

16. In what ways could we move forward? I made some suggestions in summary form in my statement of 25 February.¹⁹ I should like to elaborate on this occasion on the kind of transitional restraints—and I emphasize the word "transitional"—which we believe could and should be examined thoroughly by this Committee with a view to augmenting and strengthening the partial test ban, pending the achievement of our goal—a comprehensive test ban. Those transitional measures are illustrative and clearly do not begin to exhaust all possible restraints and their combinations and variations.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 528.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 37-40.

17. First, the nuclear-weapon Powers signatories to the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty could report in advance their annual testing programmes to be conducted underground. That public information might include details regarding the timing, location and magnitude of all underground tests. This could offer a basis for testing the efficacy of the various techniques for detection and identification of underground nuclear tests as they now exist or as they may be improved upon in the future. An additional advantage of such a procedure might be that, for the first time, all countries could be provided with a basis for judging whether or not in fact the signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty were indeed adhering to agreed restraints to protect the ecological environment.

18. Second, these annual testing programmes, in addition to being reported, could be planned on a diminishing scale. Thus the nuclear Powers signatories to the partial test-ban Treaty could undertake to phase out progressively tests above an agreed seismological verification capability level, starting with high-yield tests and working down the magnitude/yield scale.

19. Third, such restrictions on the size of tests could also descend, as I suggested in my statement of 25 February, *pari passu* with improvements in seismological verification capabilities.

20. Fourth, in line with the growing public concern about the protection of our ecological environment, precautions required by the partial test-ban Treaty against radiological hazards through venting into the atmosphere or into the seas could be strengthened; and provision might be made to guard as well against other conceivable environmental hazards, such as earth disturbances or tsunamis, that is, seismic sea waves.

21. Fifth, there could be a commitment, particularly on the part of the major testing Powers, to work together in promoting international co-operation and in the development and improvement of facilities for the detection, location and identification of underground nuclear tests by seismological means, as called for in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2663 A (XXV). Such co-operation could be facilitated if there were advance information regarding annual test programmes, and if the reporting were supplemented by an undertaking to make available immediately, or with the minimum of delay, seismological information requested by other countries.

22. If, as I have suggested, a consensus could be sought on further measures to place agreed restraints on nuclear testing, pending an agreement "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times", several procedures would suggest themselves.

23. For instance, the nuclear Powers might implement any or all of those proposals, placing further transitional restraints on their nuclear testing through unilateral declarations. Indeed, one of the nuclear Powers recently announced some limitations on its

testing programme, although, regrettably, they seem to apply only to peaceful nuclear test explosions. Commendable as that kind of unilateral action might be, the members of the international community, especially those concerned about the future of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, might possibly prefer a more binding international agreement, in the form of a new treaty or treaties negotiated in this Committee.

24. A third alternative, and one which would appear to us as perhaps the most suitable, considering the transitional nature of any engagement to reinforce the restraints on underground nuclear tests pending a comprehensive test ban, and considering also the fact that in any case a new agreement would have to refer back to the Treaty of 1963 banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, would be the negotiation of a protocol to that partial test-ban Treaty.

25. As I have indicated, such options concerning measures to help bridge the gap between a partial and a comprehensive test ban exist in great variety and could be implemented in a variety of ways; and, if properly designed, they need not delay or reduce the impetus towards a comprehensive test ban. Rather, they could constitute a significant further step towards a comprehensive test ban; for in so far as they are partial they would clearly not reduce the continuing need for a comprehensive test ban, and in so far as they could be progressively extended they would propel us, in our view, closer to that goal. They could, in effect, serve to narrow that widening gap between the aim and objective proclaimed in the partial test-ban Treaty, to which I have referred, and the facts of contemporary testing, which are contradictory to that aim.

26. The Canadian delegation believes that this consideration should be weighed very carefully by those who insist that this Committee should take up an all-or-nothing attitude towards a comprehensive test ban. In that connexion I cannot but recall that in the past this Committee has been counselled more than once to avoid allowing the best to become the enemy of the good. Indeed, in our view the suggestion that all useful, urgently-needed measures to regulate and progressively curtail underground testing must be rejected because such measures are, of course, less desirable than something more complete, is not unlike the riposte to the hungry masses which apocryphal history attributes to Marie Antoinette: "Let them eat cake". We can all agree that the cake of a comprehensive test ban is preferable to the modest bread of further partial limitations; but the question is, when is it to be expected?

27. In conclusion, as I have suggested in outline, the direction in which consensus might be sought is on measures which would strengthen and reinforce the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. There are various possibilities which should be examined if there is a will to achieve agreement. It has been said that the opportunity for doing mischief is found a hundred times a day and of doing good

once in a year. Let us determine that on this important subject of a comprehensive test ban some good is accomplished this year.

28. In short, the Canadian delegation joins most of the other delegations which have spoken so far on the question of the comprehensive test ban in suggesting that we leaven our consideration of this matter with an appropriate sense of urgency. In particular, the co-Chairmen, whose Governments are responsible for by far the largest part of the nuclear testing which is going on, should consult and consider adopting, at the very least, one or more of the several transitional measures which we have proposed to limit testing pending the cessation of all testing to which they are committed, so that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will have something positive to say in the special report which this body is required to submit to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly in accordance with resolution 2663 B (XXV).²⁰

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, April 6, 1971¹

Today the Soviet delegation intends to put forward some considerations concerning measures to restrict the nuclear arms race and also with regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Union attaches paramount importance to these questions and is pursuing a consistent and firm policy aimed at curbing the arms race and at disarmament, in the interest of strengthening peace and the security of peoples. A convincing manifestation of this policy was the programme of measures in the field of disarmament which was expounded in the report of Leonid I. Brezhnev to the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a programme which attracted great attention in the world. The report defines the policy of the Soviet Union in regard to disarmament and contains important specific proposals. The report states:

One of the most important international problems of today is disarmament. We have sought to achieve concrete results that would reduce the threat of war, to prevent the peoples from growing used to the arms race as an inevitable evil.

In the period covered by the report, the Treaty on the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons² has been elaborated and has entered into force. Although not all States and not all nuclear Powers have become parties to that Treaty, it has to some extent reduced the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war. The important thing now is that the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Italy and other countries should corroborate their signature by ratifying the Treaty.

Treaties have been concluded which prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons in outer space,³ as well as on the sea-bed and the ocean floor.⁴ What has been achieved, however, is only initial steps. Our aim is to ensure that nuclear power serves exclusively peaceful purposes.

²⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 687.

¹ CCD/PV.507, pp. 16-24.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

³ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

We are having talks with the United States on the limitation of strategic arms. Their favourable outcome would make it possible to avoid a new round in the nuclear-missile arms race and to release considerable resources for constructive purposes. We are seeking to ensure that they produce positive results.

We should like to stress, however, that disarmament negotiations in general, and for all the more reason those in which very delicate military and technological aspects are discussed, can be productive only if the security interests of the parties are taken into consideration to an equal extent and if no one seeks to obtain unilateral advantages.

The struggle to halt the nuclear and conventional armaments race, to achieve disarmament—right up to general and complete disarmament—will continue to be one of the major directions of the foreign-policy activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet State.

44. In defining the basic specific aims of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union in the field of disarmament in the present situation, Leonid I. Brezhnev said that these were—

To conclude treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons;

To secure an end to the testing of nuclear weapons, including underground tests, by anyone, anywhere;

To promote the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world.

We stand for the nuclear disarmament of all States possessing nuclear weapons, and for the convening for this purpose of a conference of the five nuclear Powers: the USSR, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom.

To intensify the struggle to halt the race in all types of weapons. We favour the convening of a world conference to consider disarmament questions to the fullest extent.

We stand for the dismantling of foreign military bases; for a reduction of armed forces and armaments in areas where military confrontation is especially dangerous and, above all, in Central Europe.

We consider it expedient to work out measures to reduce the probability of the accidental outbreak or deliberate fabrication of bellicose incidents and their development into international crises, into war.

The Soviet Union is prepared to reach agreement on the reduction of military expenditures, in the first place those of the great Powers.⁵

45. That is the position of the Soviet Government on the problem of disarmament. It is dictated by concern for the maintenance of international peace and security, by the desire to prevent a world nuclear conflict fraught with disastrous consequences for all mankind. The most important way to achieve that aim is disarmament. For this reason the struggle for disarmament is an integral part of the policy of the Soviet Union. That is our invariable position.

46. The Soviet delegation would also like to put forward some considerations concerning the problems of restricting the nuclear arms race and of general and complete disarmament, which are now being considered by the participants in our negotiations.

47. An important task of the Committee on Disarmament is to ensure progress in solving the problem of general and complete disarmament. That is the ultimate goal of our efforts and should be given the attention it deserves. The Soviet delegation, in determining its attitude to the problems discussed in this Committee, takes as its starting-point the extent to which the solution of this or that problem may help us to achieve that ultimate goal. It is this criterion, we believe, that should determine the priorities in considering measures to restrict the nuclear arms race.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 196.

48. The Soviet delegation, during the current session of the Committee, has already spoken at length on the importance of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons for progress towards general and complete disarmament. The delegations of the socialist countries have undertaken a further important initiative on that problem.⁶ There are a number of other problems before the Committee the solution of which would help to pave the way to the achievement of general and complete disarmament. Of paramount importance among them, we believe, are the proposals concerning nuclear disarmament.

49. In this connexion we should like to stress the importance of adopting measures which would outlaw the most dangerous types of weapons: namely, nuclear weapons. Mankind experienced the destructive power of those weapons as far back as 1945 when, literally within a few seconds, the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were reduced to ruins and tens of thousands of their inhabitants perished. Since that time the arsenals of States have been filled with even more powerful types of weapons, whose destructive power is a hundred and even a thousand times greater than that of the weapons used in 1945.

50. Realizing how great is the threat hanging over mankind as a result of the arms race, the Soviet Union is doing all it can to prevent the possible use of those horrible weapons of mass destruction and to secure their elimination from the military arsenals of States. One initial step which, in our view, could create a favourable atmosphere for the negotiations on nuclear disarmament and would not be linked to complex control procedures would be to reach agreement on the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons. The achievement of that important measure would reduce the threat of a nuclear war. The assumption by States of an obligation to renounce the use of nuclear weapons before more radical measures to ban and eliminate them were agreed on and carried out would serve as a clear demonstration of their readiness to mobilize efforts with a view to taking concrete steps towards the elimination from military arsenals of the most powerful and deadly weapons of mass destruction.

51. The sixteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly most definitely rejected the use of nuclear weapons by stating that—

The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations;

The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons would exceed even the scope of war and cause indiscriminate suffering and destruction to mankind and civilization and, as such, is contrary to the rules of international law and to the laws of humanity.⁷

The Soviet Union took an active part in elaborating that international document condemning the use of nuclear weapons.

52. Desiring to find a practical solution of this problem in a

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 23 ff., 93-99, 183-190.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 648-650.

legally-binding international instrument, the Soviet Union submitted to the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.⁸ That draft convention gained the support of a large number of States and, by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII), was transmitted for the consideration of this Committee.⁹ Now that the stockpiles of nuclear weapons have grown immeasurably, the need for a positive solution to the problem of prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons has become all the more urgent.

53. In General Assembly resolutions and in statements made by representatives in this Committee stress has been laid on the great political and practical importance of the Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use in war of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare,¹⁰ to which more and more States accede with every passing year. An agreement similar to the Geneva Protocol in its singleness of purpose on renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons would play a still more important role in strengthening international security and confidence among States.

54. I should now like to dwell on another question relating to restriction of the nuclear arms race: namely, that of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests—a question to which the representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff, devoted his statement this morning.

55. Almost eight years have passed since the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water was signed in 1963.¹¹ The conclusion of that international instrument, as is generally acknowledged, had a positive impact on the political situation in the world, helped to slow the nuclear arms race, considerably reduced the danger of the contamination of outer space, the atmosphere and the waters of the seas and oceans of our planet by radioactive substances, and created at the same time favourable prerequisites for subsequent steps in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. And in that regard we cannot in any way minimize the importance of that international instrument even in the form in which it was concluded in 1963.

56. One cannot, however, ignore the fact that the Treaty is a partial agreement, since it does not cover underground nuclear explosions. The question of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests is constantly in our minds. The preamble to the Moscow Treaty stipulates the determination of the States parties to continue negotiations “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time”. The Soviet side believes it to be extremely important to secure the cessation of all

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 420-421.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 626-627

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

testing of nuclear weapons, including underground testing, by anyone, anywhere.

57. This problem has now acquired a considerable degree of urgency and the need for its solution is becoming ever more vital every year. The solution of the problem would be of great international significance, since it would facilitate the achievement of further measures of nuclear disarmament. The Soviet side believes that agreement in this regard can be reached on the basis of recognizing the adequacy of national means of detection for control over such a prohibition, and that there is no need to carry out on-site inspections. We are compelled to note, however, that for a number of years the representatives of the Western countries have been putting forward as an argument against the conclusion of a treaty banning underground nuclear explosions the difficulties of a technical nature connected with the implementation of control.

58. In our opinion that is not the real reason. We agree with those representatives who point out that the stumbling-block lies in the political field. Long experience of negotiations on disarmament questions shows that, when there is willingness to adopt the appropriate political decision, problems of a technical nature become of secondary importance and do not create insurmountable obstacles to the achievement of mutually-acceptable agreements. In advocating the cessation of underground nuclear tests the Soviet Union, like many other countries, is interested in reach[ing] an agreement which will be strictly observed by all the participating States. Being prepared to rely upon the means of detection and identification of seismic events that are available to States today, the Soviet side would like to stress that in present conditions the probability of detecting any attempts to violate an agreement on the prohibition of tests is so great that no government would be able to carry out underground nuclear-weapon tests secretly, in evasion of an existing agreement.

59. During this session of the Committee a number of delegations have expressed views regarding different approaches to the solution of the problem of the discontinuance of underground nuclear tests. In particular the representative of the United Kingdom, Lord Lothian, speaking at the meeting of the Committee on 25 February, once again advocated the halting of test explosions above a certain threshold of magnitude, with control ensured by means of seismic stations and without on-site inspections.¹² That idea was supported by the representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff¹³ and the representative of Japan, Mr. Tanaka.¹⁴

60. In this connexion the Soviet delegation deems it necessary to state its views on the matter. The idea of establishing a certain

¹² *Ante*, pp. 33-34.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 37 ff.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 87 ff.

threshold of magnitude for the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, while leaving States free to continue test explosions below that threshold, is based on the assumption that a proportion of such tests could not be identified with the help of national means of detection. The Soviet delegation cannot agree with that view. As we have already pointed out, the Soviet Union believes that in solving the problem of the prohibition of underground tests one should base oneself on recognition of the fact that the existing national means of detection are adequate for verifying the fulfilment of a corresponding agreement.

61. The prohibition of nuclear tests above a certain threshold would mean that all underground explosions below the established threshold would be outside the prohibition. That would in fact legalize a certain proportion of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Such an approach would hardly facilitate the solution of the problem of a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Thus the proposal for a partial cessation of underground nuclear tests—that is, only those above a certain threshold of magnitude—has a number of shortcomings that are bound to give rise to serious doubts about its suitability. We are inclined to share the view expressed in this connexion by the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Imru, who stated that—

We must be careful that the threshold approach does not lead us to the intractable situation that tests for the perfection of smaller tactical nuclear weapons could continue for a long time to come.¹⁵

62. Much has been said here on the need to expand the international exchange of seismic data. In that connexion we should like to point out once again that the Soviet Union is already carrying out such co-operation on a large scale. If a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear tests on the basis of control over its fulfilment through national means of detection is concluded, the Soviet side will be prepared to participate in the fullest possible exchange of seismological data.

63. In the course of the current session of the Committee some delegations have again raised the question of the cessation of production of fissionable materials for military purposes. The Soviet delegation has already expressed its views in that regard. In evaluating that proposal one must bear in mind that by now the nuclear Powers have already produced enormous quantities of fissionable materials, from which it will be possible to continue the production of nuclear weapons for many years to come. The stockpiles of fissionable materials already accumulated are sufficient for the further intensive production of nuclear weapons. As for available nuclear weapons, the existing stockpiles of such weapons will not be reduced by a single bomb or warhead even after the production of fissionable materials for military purposes has ceased. Thus the implementation of the proposal to halt the production of fissionable materials for military purposes would

¹⁵ CCD/PV.498, p. 7.

have no practical significance, either from the point of view of nuclear disarmament or from that of the removal or reduction of the threat of a nuclear-missile war. By adopting it we might merely create the illusion that something practical had been done in the field of nuclear disarmament, whereas in fact nothing practical would have been achieved.

64. In response to the proposal that the Soviet Union and the United States should make available to non-nuclear countries an agreed quantity of enriched uranium from their stockpiles, we should like to point out that the Soviet Union is actively co-operating in providing fissionable materials for other countries. In particular the Soviet side is making a considerable contribution to the fund of fissionable materials of the International Atomic Energy Agency in order to render assistance to the developing countries, and is also extensively co-operating in this field on a bilateral basis.

65. Those are our views concerning some of the measures to curb the nuclear arms race which have been discussed in the Committee.

66. As to partial disarmament measures, the accomplishment of which would undoubtedly pave the way to the main objective—general and complete disarmament—, we are far from thinking that a detailed and specific discussion of the problem of general and complete disarmament should be relegated to a secondary place. We believe that the consideration of partial disarmament measures and that of the problem of general and complete disarmament should be carried on in a parallel manner.

67. The debate on the problem of general and complete disarmament occupied a prominent place in the work of the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly and of last year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. In the course of the current session of the Committee many delegations have stressed the need to achieve progress on that problem. A number of documents adopted at the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly have also drawn attention to that aspect of the matter. All this shows the great concern of States at the situation that has come about. We understand and share this concern. Linked to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament is the task of averting the danger which looms over mankind and of ensuring peaceful conditions for mankind's existence and the elimination of the harmful consequences with which the arms race is fraught for all the peoples of the world.

68. At present the Committee has the necessary basis for a thorough consideration of general and complete disarmament. It is constituted by the Soviet draft treaty of 1962 on general and complete disarmament¹⁶ and a number of other documents submitted for the consideration of the Committee. The Soviet draft treaty on general and complete disarmament contains a

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 77-102.

whole range of measures in the field of disarmament, as well as measures designed to ensure the security of States and the maintenance of peace after complete disarmament is accomplished. We very much appreciate the statements made by many delegations expressing readiness to undertake negotiations on general and complete disarmament. At the same time we must stress that the solution of such a complex problem requires the efforts of all States which are members of this Committee and certainly of all nuclear Powers. Our Committee could prepare a draft treaty on this subject which could then be submitted for the consideration of all States.

69. The Soviet delegation has repeatedly stated that the preparation of agreements on partial disarmament measures exerts a favourable influence on the search for an adoption of positive solutions in regard to the problem of general and complete disarmament. In its turn, the consideration of general and complete disarmament also helps the search for positive solutions in the field of partial measures. Those two fields are inseparably linked to one another, and this is confirmed by the experience of our negotiations.

Letter From Senator Fulbright to President Nixon on the Geneva Protocol, April 15, 1971¹

Dear Mr. President:

The Committee on Foreign Relations has recently completed hearings on the Geneva Protocol of 1925² which you submitted to the Senate on August 19, 1970.³ At its last business meeting the Committee discussed the testimony which had been heard and reviewed the possible courses of action open to it. The Members decided that before the Committee gave further consideration to the Protocol I should privately communicate to you certain views which many of us now hold concerning United States adherence to the Protocol.

At the outset let me express the Committee's strong approval of the initiatives which you have already taken in revising U.S. policy with regard to chemical and biological weapons. Your decisions to renounce altogether biological and toxin warfare, as well as the first use of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons,⁴ were a major contribution toward a more secure future for mankind. All of us appreciate the difficulties which confronted you in taking these steps and in deciding to resubmit the Geneva Protocol to the Senate.

There is no question of the Committee's strong support for the objectives of the Geneva Protocol. Indeed it is because we attach such great importance to the Protocol that many of us are reluctant to proceed further toward its ratification on the basis of

¹ ACDA files.

² *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 445-446.

⁴ See *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 522-523.

the understandings and interpretations which have been attached to it by the Secretary of State.⁵

I believe it accurate to say that when our hearing began few of the Members had firm views on the question of tear gas and herbicides. Having heard a number of expert witnesses on all aspects of the Protocol many Members now consider that it would be in the interest of the United States to ratify the Protocol without restrictive understandings, or, if that is not possible at this time, to postpone further action on the Protocol until it is.

The Secretary of State's position on tear gas and herbicides appears to rest primarily on the grounds that the Protocol was not intended to prohibit their use. Having heard the legal testimony on both sides of this issue, many Committee Members conclude that an adequate legal argument can be made either for or against that interpretation. Given the Protocol's acknowledged ambiguity, we tend to agree with the view expressed in testimony by Mr. George Bunn, former General Counsel of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, who said that "any future interpretation of the Protocol should depend less on the negotiating history than on a realistic appraisal of the pros and cons—military, diplomatic and arms control—of the use of these agents in the future."

In this connection, we note that the use of herbicides in Vietnam is now being discontinued. It would appear that their actual utility in Vietnam has been marginal and that the crop destruction program may well have been counter-productive. Furthermore, the more we learn about the impact of the herbicide warfare on the ecology of Vietnam, the more disturbing are its implications for the future. As Dr. Arthur W. Galston, an eminent biologist from Yale, reminded the Committee, "If man makes conditions unsuitable for vegetation on this earth, he thereby makes conditions unsuitable for his own existence."

Testimony on the question of tear gas also raised considerable doubt in the minds of many Members as to the desirability of its future use in war by the United States. Dr. Matthew Meselson of Harvard, who testified before the Committee and who has made a careful study of the military use of tear gas, presented the following conclusions:

1. The military value of riot gas is very low.
2. Our overriding security interest in the area of chemical and biological weapons is to prevent the proliferation and use of biological and lethal chemical weapons.
3. Our use of riot gas in war runs directly counter to this fundamental interest.

Dr. Meselson's view coincides closely with that expressed by another highly qualified witness, Dr. Donald G. Brennan of the Hudson Institute, a military strategist who last testified before the Committee in support of the Safeguard Anti-Ballistic Missile

⁵ See *ibid.*, pp. 400-402.

System. After a skeptical critique of many of the familiar arguments against tear gas and herbicides, Dr. Brennan concluded that the military cost of giving up tear gas and herbicides appeared relatively low and that the United States position could therefore properly "be dominated by 'decent respect for the opinions of mankind' and accept the interpretation that the Protocol embraces harrassing agents and herbicides."

The latter point leads to another consideration which troubles many Members of the Committee. This is the fact that the overwhelming majority of the nations of the world already agree, as evidenced by an 80-3 vote in the U.N. General Assembly, that tear gas and herbicides should be prohibited under the Geneva Protocol.⁶ If, at this late date the United States adheres to the Protocol but in so doing places its weight behind a restrictive interpretation, this cannot help but weaken the effect of the Protocol. The Committee finds it difficult to believe there would be any positive moral force to our becoming a party to the Protocol only on condition that we reserve the right to keep on doing as we wish despite the fact that most other nations believe it undesirable. Furthermore, I sense a reluctance on the part of Committee members to give advice and consent to an international agreement in the face of a virtual certainty that our interpretation will be challenged or rejected. It will not suffice, as the Secretary of State suggested, to ratify now, and work out the problems later.

We believe that these arguments are, of themselves, sufficiently compelling to warrant the Committee's request that you give further consideration to the tear gas and herbicide question. In addition, as you know, there are now several studies in progress on the use of tear gas and herbicides in Vietnam, including one requested by you as a basis for examining the implications and consequences for U.S. policy of their future use in war. It seems to us that all of these studies, but in particular the latter, should be available before any final action is taken with regard to ratification of the Protocol.

Although we would agree that the Protocol should long ago have been ratified by the United States, it is perhaps unfortunate that it comes before the Senate at a time when the United States is at war and actively employing chemical weapons which most nations consider to be prohibited by the Protocol. Possibly by the time the results of these additional studies are available the war in Indochina will be ended, or at least the level of conflict there will have been reduced to a point where our further use of either tear gas or herbicides will be unnecessary. This alone would make it easier for all concerned to make a dispassionate assessment of the issues involved.

As a practical matter I have considerable doubt that the Protocol could now receive the advice and consent of the Senate

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 716-717.

on the terms laid down by the Secretary of State, i.e., that you might not ratify the Protocol if the proposed understandings are modified by action of the Senate. At present the prospects for the Protocol are clouded by strongly held views on both sides and I personally would not wish to see it risked a second time under such circumstances. The Committee asks therefore that the question of the interpretation of the Protocol be reexamined considering whether the need to hold open the option to use tear gas and herbicides is indeed so great that it outweighs the long-term advantages to the United States of strengthening existing barriers against chemical warfare by means of ratification of the Protocol without restrictive interpretations. If the Administration were to take the longer and broader view of our own interests, I cannot imagine any serious opposition to that decision, either here at home or abroad. On the contrary, I personally believe that were you to take this initiative your action would be regarded as truly courageous and possessed of real moral force.

Sincerely yours,

J. W. FULBRIGHT
Chairman

Structure and Contents of IAEA Safeguards Agreements Under the Nonproliferation Treaty, April 20, 1971¹

PART I

BASIC UNDERTAKING

1. The Agreement should contain, in accordance with Article III.1 of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons², an undertaking by the State to accept safeguards, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS

2. The Agreement should provide for the Agency's right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied, in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within the territory of the State, under its jurisdiction or carried out under its control anywhere, for the exclusive purpose of verifying that such

¹ *The Structure and Content of Agreements Between the Agency and States Required in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (INFCIRC/153). This document was adopted by the IAEA Board of Governors on Apr. 20, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

material is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

CO-OPERATION BETWEEN THE AGENCY AND THE STATE

3. The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall co-operate to facilitate the implementation of the safeguards provided for therein.

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

4. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner designed:

(a) To avoid hampering the economic and technological development of the State or international co-operation in the field of peaceful nuclear activities, including international exchange of *nuclear material*³;

(b) To avoid undue interference in the State's peaceful nuclear activities, and in particular in the operation of *facilities*; and

(c) To be consistent with prudent management practices required for the economic and safe conduct of nuclear activities.

5. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall take every precaution to protect commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information coming to its knowledge in the implementation of the Agreement. The Agency shall not publish or communicate to any State, organization or person any information obtained by it in connection with the implementation of the Agreement, except that specific information relating to such implementation in the State may be given to the Board of Governors and to such Agency staff members as require such knowledge by reason of their official duties in connection with safeguards, but only to the extent necessary for the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities in implementing the Agreement. Summarized information on *nuclear material* being safeguarded by the Agency under the Agreement may be published upon decision of the Board if the States directly concerned agree.

6. The Agreement should provide that in implementing safeguards pursuant thereto the Agency shall take full account of technological developments in the field of safeguards, and shall make every effort to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness and the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement by use of instruments and other techniques at certain *strategic points* to the extent that present or future technology permits. In order to ensure optimum cost-effectiveness, use should be made, for example, of such means as:

(a) Containment as a means of defining *material balance areas* for accounting purposes;

(b) Statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of *nuclear material*; and

³ The italicized terms are defined at the end of the paper.

(c) Concentration of verification procedures on those stages in the nuclear fuel cycle involving the production, processing, use or storage of *nuclear material* from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made, and minimization of verification procedures in respect of other *nuclear material*, on condition that this does not hamper the Agency in applying safeguards under the Agreement.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

7. The Agreement should provide that the State shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and that such safeguards shall be applied in such a manner as to enable the Agency to verify, in ascertaining that there has been no diversion of *nuclear material* from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, findings of the State's system. The Agency's verification shall include, inter alia, independent measurements and observations conducted by the Agency in accordance with the procedures specified in Part II below. The Agency, in its verification, shall take due account of the technical effectiveness of the State's system.

PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE AGENCY

8. The Agreement should provide that to ensure the effective implementation of safeguards thereunder the Agency shall be provided, in accordance with the provisions set out in Part II below, with information concerning *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement and the features of *facilities* relevant to safeguarding such material. The Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities under the Agreement. Information pertaining to *facilities* shall be the minimum necessary for safeguarding *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement. In examining design information, the Agency shall, at the request of the State, be prepared to examine on premises of the State design information which the State regards as being of particular sensitivity. Such information would not have to be physically transmitted to the Agency provided that it remained available for ready further examination by the Agency on premises of the State.

AGENCY INSPECTORS

9. The Agreement should provide that the State shall take the necessary steps to ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively discharge their functions under the Agreement. The Agency shall secure the consent of the State to the designation of Agency inspectors to that State. If the State, either upon proposal of a designation or at any other time after a designation has been made, objects to the designation, the Agency shall propose to the State an alternative designation or designations. The repeated

refusal of a State to accept the designation of Agency inspectors which would impede the inspections conducted under the Agreement would be considered by the Board upon referral by the Director General with a view to appropriate action. The visits and activities of Agency inspectors shall be so arranged as to reduce to a minimum the possible inconvenience and disturbance to the State and to the peaceful nuclear activities inspected, as well as to ensure protection of industrial secrets or any other confidential information coming to the inspectors' knowledge.

PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES

10. The Agreement should specify the privileges and immunities which shall be granted to the Agency and its staff in respect of their functions under the Agreement. In the case of a State party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency⁴, the provisions thereof, as in force for such State, shall apply. In the case of other States, the privileges and immunities granted should be such as to ensure that:

(a) The Agency and its staff will be in a position to discharge their functions under the Agreement effectively; and

(b) No such State will be placed thereby in a more favourable position than States party to the Agreement on the Privileges and Immunities of the Agency.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

Consumption or dilution of nuclear material

11. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on *nuclear material* subject to safeguards thereunder upon determination by the Agency that it has been consumed, or has been diluted in such a way that it is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards, or has become practicably irrecoverable.

Transfer of nuclear material out of the State

12. The Agreement should provide, with respect to *nuclear material* subject to safeguards thereunder, for notification of transfers of such material out of the State, in accordance with the provisions set out in paragraphs 92-94 below. The Agency shall terminate safeguards under the Agreement on *nuclear material* when the recipient State has assumed responsibility therefor, as provided for in paragraph 91. The Agency shall maintain records indicating each transfer and, where applicable, the re-application of safeguards to the transferred *nuclear material*.

Provisions relating to nuclear material to be used in non-nuclear activities

13. The Agreement should provide that if the State wishes to use *nuclear material* subject to safeguards thereunder in non-nuclear activities, such as the production of alloys or ceramics, it shall

⁴ INFCIRC/9/Rev. 2.

agree with the Agency on the circumstances under which the safeguards on such *nuclear material* may be terminated

NON-APPLICATION OF SAFEGUARDS TO NUCLEAR MATERIAL TO BE USED IN NON-PEACEFUL ACTIVITIES

14. The Agreement should provide that if the State intends to exercise its discretion to use *nuclear material* which is required to be safeguarded thereunder in a nuclear activity which does not require the application of safeguards under the Agreement, the following procedures will apply:

(a) The State shall inform the Agency of the activity, making it clear:

(i) That the use of the *nuclear material* in a non-proscribed military activity will not be in conflict with an undertaking the State may have given and in respect of which Agency safeguards apply, that the *nuclear material* will be used only in a peaceful nuclear activity; and

(ii) That during the period of non-application of safeguards the *nuclear material* will not be used for the production of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;

(b) The State and the Agency shall make an arrangement so that, only while the *nuclear material* is in such an activity, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement will not be applied. The arrangement shall identify, to the extent possible, the period or circumstances during which safeguards will not be applied. In any event, the safeguards provided for in the Agreement shall again apply as soon as the *nuclear material* is reintroduced into a peaceful nuclear activity. The Agency shall be kept informed of the total quantity and composition of such unsafeguarded *nuclear material* in the State and of any exports of such material; and

(c) Each arrangement shall be made in agreement with the Agency. The Agency's agreement shall be given as promptly as possible; it shall only relate to the temporal and procedural provisions, reporting arrangements, etc., but shall not involve any approval or classified knowledge of the military activity or relate to the use of the *nuclear material* therein.

FINANCE

15. The Agreement should contain one of the following sets of provisions:

(a) An agreement with a Member of the Agency should provide that each party thereto shall bear the expenses it incurs in implementing its responsibilities thereunder. However, if the State or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so. In any case the Agency shall bear the cost of any additional measuring or sampling which inspectors may request; or

(b) An agreement with a party not a Member of the Agency

should in application of the provisions of Article XIV.C of the Statute⁵ provide that the party shall reimburse fully to the Agency the safeguards expenses the Agency incurs thereunder. However, if the party or persons under its jurisdiction incur extraordinary expenses as a result of a specific request by the Agency, the Agency shall reimburse such expenses provided that it has agreed in advance to do so.

THIRD PARTY LIABILITY FOR NUCLEAR DAMAGE

16. The Agreement should provide that the State shall ensure that any protection against third party liability in respect of nuclear damage, including any insurance or other financial security, which may be available under its laws or regulations shall apply to the Agency and its officials for the purpose of the implementation of the Agreement, in the same way as that protection applies to nationals of the State.

INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

17. The Agreement should provide that any claim by one party thereto against the other in respect of any damage, other than damage arising out of a nuclear incident, resulting from the implementation of safeguards under the Agreement, shall be settled in accordance with international law.

MEASURES IN RELATION TO VERIFICATION OF NON-DIVERSION

18. The Agreement should provide that if the Board, upon report of the Director General, decides that an action by the State is essential and urgent in order to ensure verification that *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement is not diverted to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices the Board shall be able to call upon the State to take the required action without delay, irrespective of whether procedures for the settlement of a dispute have been invoked.

19. The Agreement should provide that if the Board upon examination of relevant information reported to it by the Director General finds that the Agency is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of *nuclear material* required to be safeguarded under the Agreement to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, it may make the reports provided for in paragraph C of Article XII of the Statute and may also take, where applicable, the other measures provided for in that paragraph. In taking such action the Board shall take account of the degree of assurance provided by the safeguards measures that have been applied and shall afford the State every reasonable opportunity to furnish the Board with any necessary reassurance.

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE AGREEMENT AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES

20. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto

⁵ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 915 ff.

shall, at the request of either, consult about any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof.

21. The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to request that any question arising out of the interpretation or application thereof be considered by the Board; and that the State shall be invited by the Board to participate in the discussion of any such question by the Board.

22. The Agreement should provide that any dispute arising out of the interpretation or application thereof except a dispute with regard to a finding by the Board under paragraph 19 above or an action taken by the Board pursuant to such a finding which is not settled by negotiation or another procedure agreed to by the parties should, on the request of either party, be submitted to an arbitral tribunal composed as follows: each party would designate one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators so designated would elect a third, who would be the Chairman. If, within 30 days of the request for arbitration, either party has not designated an arbitrator, either party to the dispute may request the President of the International Court of Justice to appoint an arbitrator. The same procedure would apply if, within 30 days of the designation or appointment of the second arbitrator, the third arbitrator had not been elected. A majority of the members of the arbitral tribunal would constitute a quorum, and all decisions would require the concurrence of two arbitrators. The arbitral procedure would be fixed by the tribunal. The decisions of the tribunal would be binding on both parties.

FINAL CLAUSES

Amendment of the Agreement

23. The Agreement should provide that the parties thereto shall, at the request of either of them, consult each other on amendment of the Agreement. All amendments shall require the agreement of both parties. It might additionally be provided, if convenient to the State, that the agreement of the parties on amendments to Part II of the Agreement could be achieved by recourse to a simplified procedure. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of any amendment to the Agreement.

Suspension of application of Agency safeguards under other agreements

24. Where applicable and where the State desires such a provision to appear, the Agreement should provide that the application of Agency safeguards in the State under other safeguards agreements with the Agency shall be suspended while the Agreement is in force. If the State has received assistance from the Agency for a project, the State's undertaking in the Project Agreement not to use items subject thereto in such a way as to further any military purpose shall continue to apply.

Entry into force and duration

25. The Agreement should provide that it shall enter into force

on the date on which the Agency receives from the State written notification that the statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force have been met. The Director General shall promptly inform all Member States of the entry into force.

26. The Agreement should provide for it to remain in force as long as the State is party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

PART II

INTRODUCTION

27. The Agreement should provide that the purpose of Part II thereof is to specify the procedures to be applied for the implementation of the safeguards provisions of Part I.

OBJECTIVE OF SAFEGUARDS

28. The Agreement should provide that the objective of safeguards is the timely detection of diversion of significant quantities of *nuclear material* from peaceful nuclear activities to the manufacture of nuclear weapons or of other nuclear explosive devices or for purposes unknown, and deterrence of such diversion by the risk of early detection.

29. To this end the Agreement should provide for the use of material accountancy as a safeguards measure of fundamental importance, with containment and surveillance as important complementary measures.

30. The Agreement should provide that the technical conclusion of the Agency's verification activities shall be a statement, in respect of each *material balance area*, of the amount of *material unaccounted for* over a specific period, giving the limits of accuracy of the amounts stated.

NATIONAL SYSTEM OF ACCOUNTING FOR AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL

31. The Agreement should provide that pursuant to paragraph 7 above the Agency, in carrying out its verification activities, shall make full use of the State's system of accounting for and control of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement, and shall avoid unnecessary duplication of the State's accounting and control activities.

32. The Agreement should provide that the State's system of accounting for and control of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement shall be based on a structure of material balance areas, and shall make provision as appropriate and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements for the establishment of such measures as:

(a) A measurement system for the determination of the quantities of *nuclear material* received, produced, shipped, lost or otherwise removed from inventory, and the quantities on inventory;

(b) The evaluation of precision and accuracy of measurements

and the estimation of measurement uncertainty;

(c) Procedures for identifying, reviewing and evaluating differences in shipper/receiver measurements;

(d) Procedures for taking a *physical inventory*;

(e) Procedures for the evaluation of accumulations of unmeasured inventory and unmeasured losses;

(f) A system of records and reports showing, for each *material balance area*, the inventory of *nuclear material* and the changes in that inventory including receipts into and transfers out of the *material balance area*;

(g) Provisions to ensure that the accounting procedures and arrangements are being operated correctly; and

(h) Procedures for the submission of reports to the Agency in accordance with paragraphs 59-69 below.

STARTING POINT OF SAFEGUARDS

33. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall not apply thereunder to material in mining or ore processing activities.

34. The Agreement should provide that:

(a) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in subparagraph (c) below is directly or indirectly exported to a non-nuclear-weapon State, the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity, composition and destination, unless the material is exported for specifically non-nuclear purposes;

(b) When any material containing uranium or thorium which has not reached the stage of the nuclear fuel cycle described in sub-paragraph (c) below is imported, the State shall inform the Agency of its quantity and composition, unless the material is imported for specifically non-nuclear purposes; and

(c) When any *nuclear material* of a composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched leaves the plant or the process stage in which it has been produced, or when such *nuclear material*, or any other *nuclear material* produced at a later stage in the nuclear fuel cycle, is imported into the State, the *nuclear material* shall become subject to the other safeguards procedures specified in the Agreement.

TERMINATION OF SAFEGUARDS

35. The Agreement should provide that safeguards shall terminate on *nuclear material* subject to safeguards thereunder under the conditions set forth in paragraph 11 above. Where the conditions of that paragraph are not met, but the State considers that the recovery of safeguarded *nuclear material* from residues is not for the time being practicable or desirable, the Agency and the State shall consult on the appropriate safeguards measures to be applied. It should further be provided that safeguards shall terminate on *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement under the conditions set forth in paragraph 13 above, provided that the

State and the Agency agree that such *nuclear material* is practicably irrecoverable.

EXEMPTIONS FROM SAFEGUARDS

36. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall, at the request of the State, exempt *nuclear material* from safeguards, as follows:

(a) Special fissionable material, when it is used in gram quantities or less as a sensing component in instruments;

(b) *Nuclear material*, when it is used in non-nuclear activities in accordance with paragraph 13 above, if such *nuclear material* is recoverable; and

(c) Plutonium with an isotopic concentration of plutonium-238 exceeding 80%.

37. The Agreement should provide that *nuclear material* that would otherwise be subject to safeguards shall be exempted from safeguards at the request of the State, provided that *nuclear material* so exempted in the State may not at any time exceed:

(a) One kilogram in total of special fissionable material, which may consist of one or more of the following:

(i) Plutonium;

(ii) Uranium with an *enrichment* of 0.2 (20%) and above, taken account of by multiplying its weight by its *enrichment*; and

(iii) Uranium with an *enrichment* below 0.2 (20%) and above that of natural uranium, taken account of by multiplying its weight by five times the square of its *enrichment*;

(b) Ten metric tons in total of natural uranium and depleted uranium with an *enrichment* above 0.005 (0.5%);

(c) Twenty metric tons of depleted uranium with an *enrichment* of 0.005 (0.5%) or below; and

(d) Twenty metric tons of thorium;

or such greater amounts as may be specified by the Board of Governors for uniform application.

38. The Agreement should provide that if exempted *nuclear material* is to be processed or stored together with safeguarded *nuclear material*, provision should be made for the re-application of safeguards thereto.

SUBSIDIARY ARRANGEMENTS

39. The Agreement should provide that the Agency and the State shall make Subsidiary Arrangements which shall specify in detail, to the extent necessary to permit the Agency to fulfil its responsibilities under the Agreement in an effective and efficient manner, how the procedures laid down in the Agreement are to be applied. Provision should be made for the possibility of an extension or change of the Subsidiary Arrangements by agreement

between the Agency and the State without amendment of the Agreement.

40. It should be provided that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall enter into force at the same time as, or as soon as possible after, the entry into force of the Agreement. The State and the Agency shall make every effort to achieve their entry into force within 90 days of the entry into force of the Agreement, a later date being acceptable only with the agreement of both parties. The State shall provide the Agency promptly with the information required for completing the Subsidiary Arrangements. The Agreement should also provide that, upon its entry into force, the Agency shall be entitled to apply the procedures laid down therein in respect of the *nuclear material* listed in the inventory provided for in paragraph 41 below.

INVENTORY

41. The Agreement should provide that, on the basis of the initial report referred to in paragraph 62 below, the Agency shall establish a unified inventory of all *nuclear material* in the State subject to safeguards under the Agreement, irrespective of its origin, and maintain this inventory on the basis of subsequent reports and of the results of its verification activities. Copies of the inventory shall be made available to the State at agreed intervals.

DESIGN INFORMATION

General

42. Pursuant to paragraph 8 above, the Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of existing *facilities* shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary Arrangements, and that the time limits for the provision of such information in respect of new *facilities* shall be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements. It should further be stipulated that such information shall be provided as early as possible before *nuclear material* is introduced into a new *facility*.

43. The Agreement should specify that the design information in respect of each *facility* to be made available to the Agency shall include, when applicable:

(a) Identification of the *facility*, stating its general character, purpose, nominal capacity and geographic location, and the name and address to be used for routine business purposes;

(b) Description of the general arrangement of the *facility* with reference, to the extent feasible, to the form, location and flow of *nuclear material* and to the general layout of important items of equipment which use, produce or process *nuclear material*;

(c) Description of features of the *facility* relating to material accountancy, containment and surveillance; and

(d) Description of the existing and proposed procedures at the *facility* for *nuclear material* accountancy and control, with special reference to *material balance areas* established by the operator,

measurements of flow and procedures for *physical inventory* taking.

44. The Agreement should further provide that other information relevant to the application of safeguards shall be made available to the Agency in respect of each *facility*, in particular on organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control. It should also be provided that the State shall make available to the Agency supplementary information on the health and safety procedures which the Agency shall observe and with which the inspectors shall comply at the *facility*.

45. The Agreement should stipulate that design information in respect of a modification relevant for safeguards purposes shall be provided for examination sufficiently in advance for the safeguards procedures to be adjusted when necessary.

Purposes of examination of design information

46. The Agreement should provide that the design information made available to the Agency shall be used for the following purposes:

(a) To identify the features of *facilities* and *nuclear material* relevant to the application of safeguards to *nuclear material* in sufficient detail to facilitate verification;

(b) To determine *material balance areas* to be used for Agency accounting purposes and to select those *strategic points* which are *key measurement points* and which will be used to determine the *nuclear material* flows and inventories; in determining such *material balance areas* the Agency shall, inter alia, use the following criteria:

(i) The size of the *material balance area* should be related to the accuracy with which the material balance can be established;

(ii) In determining the *material balance area* advantage should be taken of any opportunity to use containment and surveillance to help ensure the completeness of flow measurements and thereby simplify the application of safeguards and concentrate measurement efforts at *key measurement points*;

(iii) A number of *material balance areas* in use at a *facility* or at distinct sites may be combined in one *material balance area* to be used for Agency accounting purposes when the Agency determines that this is consistent with its verification requirements; and

(iv) If the State so requests, a special *material balance area* around a process step involving commercially sensitive information may be established;

(c) To establish the nominal timing and procedures for taking of *physical inventory* for Agency accounting purposes;

(d) To establish the records and reports requirements and records evaluation procedures;

(e) To establish requirements and procedures for verification of the quantity and location of *nuclear material*; and

(f) To select appropriate combinations of containment and surveillance methods and techniques and the *strategic points* at which they are to be applied.

It should further be provided that the results of the examination of the design information shall be included in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

Re-examination of design information

47. The Agreement should provide that design information shall be reexamined in the light of changes in operating conditions, of developments in safeguards technology or of experience in the application of verification procedures, with a view to modifying the action the Agency has taken pursuant to paragraph 46 above.

Verification of design information

48. The Agreement should provide that the Agency, in co-operation with the State, may send inspectors to *facilities* to verify the design information provided to the Agency pursuant to paragraphs 42-45 above for the purposes stated in paragraph 46.

INFORMATION IN RESPECT OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL OUTSIDE FACILITIES

49. The Agreement should provide that the following information concerning *nuclear material* customarily used outside *facilities* shall be provided as applicable to the Agency:

(a) General description of the use of the *nuclear material*, its geographic location, and the user's name and address for routine business purposes; and

(b) General description of the existing and proposed procedures for *nuclear material* accountancy and control, including organizational responsibility for material accountancy and control.

The Agreement should further provide that the Agency shall be informed on a timely basis of any change in the information provided to it under this paragraph.

50. The Agreement should provide that the information made available to the Agency in respect of *nuclear material* customarily used outside *facilities* may be used, to the extent relevant, for the purposes set out in subparagraphs 46(b)-(f) above.

RECORDS SYSTEM

General

51. The Agreement should provide that in establishing a national system of accounting for and control of *nuclear material* as referred to in paragraph 7 above, the State shall arrange that records are kept in respect of each *material balance area*. Provision should also be made that the Subsidiary Arrangements shall describe the records to be kept in respect of each *material balance area*.

52. The Agreement should provide that the State shall make arrangements to facilitate the examination of records by inspectors, particularly if the records are not kept in English, French, Russian or Spanish.

53. The Agreement should provide that the records shall be retained for at least five years.

54. The Agreement should provide that the records shall consist, as appropriate, of:

(a) Accounting records of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement; and

(b) Operating records for *facilities* containing such *nuclear material*.

55. The Agreement should provide that the system of measurements on which the records used for the preparation of reports are based shall either conform to the latest international standards or be equivalent in quality to such standards.

Accounting records

56. The Agreement should provide that the accounting records shall set forth the following in respect of each *material balance area*:

(a) All *inventory changes*, so as to permit a determination of the *book inventory* at any time;

(b) All measurement results that are used for determination of the *physical inventory*; and

(c) All *adjustments* and *corrections* that have been made in respect of *inventory changes*, *book inventories* and *physical inventories*.

57. The Agreement should provide that for all *inventory changes* and *physical inventories* the records shall show, in respect of each *batch* of *nuclear material*: material identification, *batch data* and *source data*. Provision should further be included that records shall account for uranium, thorium and plutonium separately in each *batch* of *nuclear material*. Furthermore, the date of the *inventory change* and, when appropriate, the originating *material balance area* and the receiving *material balance area* or the recipient, shall be indicated for each *inventory change*.

Operating records

58. The Agreement should provide that the operating records shall set forth as appropriate in respect of each *material balance area*:

(a) Those operating data which are used to establish changes in the quantities and composition of *nuclear material*;

(b) The data obtained from the calibration of tanks and instruments and from sampling and analyses, the procedures to control the quality of measurements and the derived estimates of random and systematic error;

(c) The description of the sequence of the actions taken in preparing for, and in taking, a *physical inventory*, in order to ensure that it is correct and complete; and

(d) The description of the actions taken in order to ascertain the cause and magnitude of any accidental or unmeasured loss that might occur.

REPORTS SYSTEM

General

59. The Agreement should specify that the State shall provide the Agency with reports as detailed in paragraphs 60-69 below in respect of *nuclear material* subject to safeguards thereunder.

60. The Agreement should provide that reports shall be made in English, French, Russian or Spanish, except as otherwise specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements.

61. The Agreement should provide that reports shall be based on the records kept in accordance with paragraphs 51-58 above and shall consist, as appropriate, of accounting reports and special reports.

Accounting reports

62. The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall be provided with an initial report on all *nuclear material* which is to be subject to safeguards thereunder. It should also be provided that the initial report shall be dispatched by the State to the Agency within 30 days of the last day of the calendar month in which the Agreement enters into force, and shall reflect the situation as of the last day of that month.

63. The Agreement should stipulate that for each *material balance area* the State shall provide the Agency with the following accounting reports:

(a) *Inventory change* reports showing changes in the inventory of *nuclear material*. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the end of the month in which the *inventory changes* occurred or were established; and

(b) Material balance reports showing the material balance based on a *physical inventory* of *nuclear material* actually present in the *material balance area*. The reports shall be dispatched as soon as possible and in any event within 30 days after the *physical inventory* has been taken.

The reports shall be based on data available as of the date of reporting and may be corrected at a later date as required.

64. The Agreement should provide that *inventory change* reports shall specify identification and *batch data* for each *batch* of *nuclear material*, the date of the *inventory change* and, as appropriate, the originating *material balance area* and the receiving *material balance area* or the recipient. These reports shall be accompanied by concise notes:

(a) Explaining the *inventory changes*, on the basis of the operating data contained in the operating records provided for under subparagraph 58(a) above; and

(b) Describing, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the anticipated operational programme, particularly the taking of a *physical inventory*.

65. The Agreement should provide that the State shall report each *inventory change*, *adjustment* and *correction* either periodically in a consolidated list or individually. The *inventory changes* shall be reported in terms of *batches*; small amounts, such as analytical samples, as specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, may be combined and reported as one *inventory change*.

66. The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall provide the State with semi-annual statements of *book inventory* of *nuclear material* subject to safeguards, for each *material balance area*, as based on the *inventory change* reports for the period covered by each such statement.

67. The Agreement should specify that the material balance reports shall include the following entries, unless otherwise agreed by the Agency and the State:

- (a) Beginning *physical inventory*;
- (b) *Inventory changes* (first increases, then decreases);
- (c) Ending *book inventory*;
- (d) *Shipper/receiver differences*;
- (e) Adjusted ending *book inventory*;
- (f) Ending *physical inventory*; and
- (g) *Material unaccounted for*.

A statement of the *physical inventory*, listing all *batches* separately and specifying material identification and *batch data* for each *batch*, shall be attached to each material balance report.

Special reports

68. The Agreement should provide that the State shall make special reports without delay:

(a) If any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of *nuclear material* that exceeds the limits to be specified for this purpose in the Subsidiary Arrangements; or

(b) If the containment has unexpectedly changed from that specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements to the extent that unauthorized removal of *nuclear material* has become possible.

Amplification and clarification of reports

69. The Agreement should provide that at the Agency's request the State shall supply amplifications or clarifications of any report, in so far as relevant for the purpose of safeguards.

INSPECTIONS

General

70. The Agreement should stipulate that the Agency shall have

the right to make inspections as provided for in paragraphs 71-82 below.

Purposes of inspections

71. The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make ad hoc inspections in order to:

- (a) Verify the information contained in the initial report on the *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement;
- (b) Identify and verify changes in the situation which have occurred since the date of the initial report; and
- (c) Identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, *nuclear material* in accordance with paragraphs 93 and 96 below, before its transfer out of or upon its transfer into the State.

72. The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make routine inspections in order to:

- (a) Verify that reports are consistent with records;
- (b) Verify the location, identity, quantity and composition of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement; and
- (c) Verify information on the possible causes of *material unaccounted for, shipper/receiver differences* and uncertainties in the *book inventory*.

73. The Agreement should provide that the Agency may make special inspections subject to the procedures laid down in paragraph 77 below:

- (a) In order to verify the information contained in special reports; or
- (b) If the Agency considers that information made available by the State, including explanations from the State and information obtained from routine inspections, is not adequate for the Agency to fulfill its responsibilities under the Agreement.

An inspection shall be deemed to be special when it is either additional to the routine inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78-82 below, or involves access to information or locations in addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 for ad hoc and routine inspections, or both.

Scope of inspections

74. The Agreement should provide that for the purposes stated in paragraphs 71-73 above the Agency may:

- (a) Examine the records kept pursuant to paragraphs 51-58;
- (b) Make independent measurements of all *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement;
- (c) Verify the functioning and calibration of instruments and other measuring and control equipment;
- (d) Apply and make use of surveillance and containment measures; and

(e) Use other objective methods which have been demonstrated to be technically feasible.

75. It should further be provided that within the scope of paragraph 74 above the Agency shall be enabled:

(a) To observe that samples at *key measurement points* for material balance accounting are taken in accordance with procedures which produce representative samples, to observe the treatment and analysis of the samples and to obtain duplicates of such samples;

(b) To observe that the measurements of *nuclear material* at *key measurement points* for material balance accounting are representative, and to observe the calibration of the instruments and equipment involved;

(c) To make arrangements with the State that, if necessary:

(i) Additional measurements are made and additional samples taken for the Agency's use;

(ii) The Agency's standard analytical samples are analysed;

(iii) Appropriate absolute standards are used in calibrating instruments and other equipment; and

(iv) Other calibrations are carried out;

(d) To arrange to use its own equipment for independent measurement and surveillance, and if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, to arrange to install such equipment;

(e) To apply its seals and other identifying and tamper-indicating devices to containments, if so agreed and specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

(f) To make arrangements with the State for the shipping of samples taken for the Agency's use.

Access for inspections

76. The Agreement should provide that:

(a) For the purposes specified in sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b) above and until such time as the *strategic points* have been specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements, the Agency's inspectors shall have access to any location where the initial report or any inspections carried out in connection with it indicate that *nuclear material* is present;

(b) For the purposes specified in sub-paragraph 71(c) above the inspectors shall have access to any location of which the Agency has been notified in accordance with sub-paragraphs 92(c) or 95(c) below;

(c) For the purposes specified in paragraph 72 above the Agency's inspectors shall have access only to the *strategic points* specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements and to the records maintained pursuant to paragraphs 51-58; and

(d) In the event of the State concluding that any unusual circumstances require extended limitations on access by the

Agency, the State and the Agency shall promptly make arrangements with a view to enabling the Agency to discharge its safeguards responsibilities in the light of these limitations. The Director General shall report each such arrangement to the Board.

77. The Agreement should provide that in circumstances which may lead to special inspections for the purposes specified in paragraph 73 above the State and the Agency shall consult forthwith. As a result of such consultations the Agency may make inspections in addition to the routine inspection effort provided for in paragraphs 78-82 below, and may obtain access in agreement with the State to information or locations in addition to the access specified in paragraph 76 above for ad hoc and routine inspections. Any disagreement concerning the need for additional access shall be resolved in accordance with paragraphs 21 and 22; in case action by the State is essential and urgent, paragraph 18 above shall apply.

Frequency and intensity of routine inspections

78. The Agreement should provide that the number, intensity, duration and timing of routine inspections shall be kept to the minimum consistent with the effective implementation of the safeguards procedures set forth therein, and that the Agency shall make the optimum and most economical use of available inspection resources.

79. The Agreement should provide that in the case of *facilities and material balance areas* outside *facilities* with a content or *annual throughput*, whichever is greater, of *nuclear material* not exceeding five *effective kilograms*, routine inspections shall not exceed one per year. For other *facilities* the number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of inspections shall be determined on the basis that in the maximum or limiting case the inspection regime shall be no more intensive than is necessary and sufficient to maintain continuity of knowledge of the flow and inventory of *nuclear material*.

80. The Agreement should provide that the maximum routine inspection effort in respect of *facilities* with a content or *annual throughput* of *nuclear material* exceeding five *effective kilograms* shall be determined as follows:

(a) For reactors and sealed stores, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing one sixth of a *man-year of inspection* for each such *facility* in the State;

(b) For other *facilities* involving plutonium or uranium enriched to more than 5%, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such *facility* $30 \times \sqrt{E}$ man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or *annual throughput* of *nuclear material*, whichever is greater,

expressed in *effective kilograms*. The maximum established for any such *facility* shall not, however, be less than 1.5 *man-years of inspection*; and

(c) For all other *facilities*, the maximum total of routine inspection per year shall be determined by allowing for each such *facility* one third of a *man-year of inspection* plus $0.4 \times E$ man-days of inspection per year, where E is the inventory or *annual throughput of nuclear material*, whichever is greater, expressed in *effective kilograms*.

The Agreement should further provide that the Agency and the State may agree to amend the maximum figures specified in this paragraph upon determination by the Board that such amendment is reasonable.

81. Subject to paragraphs 78-80 above the criteria to be used for determining the actual number, intensity, duration, timing and mode of routine inspections of any *facility* shall include:

(a) The form of *nuclear material*, in particular, whether the material is in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items; its chemical composition and, in the case of uranium, whether it is of low or high *enrichment*; and its accessibility;

(b) The effectiveness of the State's accounting and control system, including the extent to which the operators of *facilities* are functionally independent of the State's accounting and control system; the extent to which the measures specified in paragraph 32 above have been implemented by the State; the promptness of reports submitted to the Agency; their consistency with the Agency's independent verification; and the amount and accuracy of the *material unaccounted for*, as verified by the Agency;

(c) Characteristics of the State's nuclear fuel cycle, in particular, the number and types of *facilities* containing *nuclear material* subject to safeguards, the characteristics of such *facilities* relevant to safeguards, notably the degree of containment; the extent to which the design of such *facilities* facilitates verification of the flow and inventory of *nuclear material*; and the extent to which information from different *material balance areas* can be correlated;

(d) International interdependence, in particular, the extent to which *nuclear material* is received from or sent to other States for use or processing; any verification activity by the Agency in connection therewith; and the extent to which the State's nuclear activities are interrelated with those of other States; and

(e) Technical developments in the field of safeguards, including the use of statistical techniques and random sampling in evaluating the flow of *nuclear material*.

82. The Agreement should provide for consultation between the Agency and the State if the latter considers that the inspection

effort is being deployed with undue concentration on particular *facilities*.

Notice of inspections

83. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall give advance notice to the State before arrival of inspectors at *facilities* or *material balance areas* outside *facilities*, as follows:

(a) For ad hoc inspections pursuant to sub-paragraph 71(c) above, at least 24 hours, for those pursuant to sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b), as well as the activities provided for in paragraph 48, at least one week;

(b) For special inspections pursuant to paragraph 73 above, as promptly as possible after the Agency and the State have consulted as provided for in paragraph 77, it being understood that notification of arrival normally will constitute part of the consultations; and

(c) For routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 72 above, at least 24 hours in respect of the *facilities* referred to in sub-paragraph 80(b) and sealed stores containing plutonium or uranium enriched more than 5%, and one week in all other cases.

Such notice of inspections shall include the names of the inspectors and shall indicate the *facilities* and the *material balance areas* outside *facilities* to be visited and the periods during which they will be visited. If the inspectors are to arrive from outside the State the Agency shall also give advance notice of the place and time of their arrival in the State.

84. However, the Agreement should also provide that, as a supplementary measure, the Agency may carry out without advance notification a portion of the routine inspections pursuant to paragraph 80 above in accordance with the principle of random sampling. In performing any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall fully take into account any operational programme provided by the State pursuant to paragraph 64(b). Moreover, whenever practicable, and on the basis of the operational programme, it shall advise the State periodically of its general programme of announced and unannounced inspections, specifying the general periods when inspections are foreseen. In carrying out any unannounced inspections, the Agency shall make every effort to minimize any practical difficulties for *facility* operators and the State, bearing in mind the relevant provisions of paragraphs 44 above and 89 below. Similarly the State shall make every effort to facilitate the task of the inspectors.

Designation of inspectors

85. The Agreement should provide that:

(a) The Director General shall inform the State in writing of the name, qualifications, nationality, grade and such other

particulars as may be relevant, of each Agency official he proposes for designation as an inspector for the State;

(b) The State shall inform the Director General within 30 days of the receipt of such a proposal whether it accepts the proposal;

(c) The Director General may designate each official who has been accepted by the State as one of the inspectors for the State, and shall inform the State of such designations; and

(d) The Director General, acting in response to a request by the State or on his own initiative, shall immediately inform the State of the withdrawal of the designation of any official as an inspector for the State.

The Agreement should also provide, however, that in respect of inspectors needed for the purposes stated in paragraph 48 above and to carry out ad hoc inspections pursuant to sub-paragraphs 71(a) and (b) the designation procedures shall be completed if possible within 30 days after the entry into force of the Agreement. If such designation appears impossible within this time limit, inspectors for such purposes shall be designated on a temporary basis.

86. The Agreement should provide that the State shall grant or renew as quickly as possible appropriate visas, where required, for each inspector designated for the State.

Conduct and visits of inspectors

87. The Agreement should provide that inspectors, in exercising their functions under paragraphs 48 and 71-75 above, shall carry out their activities in a manner designed to avoid hampering or delaying the construction, commissioning or operation of *facilities*, or affecting their safety. In particular inspectors shall not operate any *facility* themselves or direct the staff of a *facility* to carry out any operation. If inspectors consider that in pursuance of paragraphs 74 and 75, particular operations in a *facility* should be carried out by the operator, they shall make a request therefor.

88. When inspectors require services available in the State, including the use of equipment, in connection with the performance of inspections, the State shall facilitate the procurement of such services and the use of such equipment by inspectors.

89. The Agreement should provide that the State shall have the right to have inspectors accompanied during their inspections by representatives of the State, provided that inspectors shall not thereby be delayed or otherwise impeded in the exercise of their functions.

STATEMENTS ON THE AGENCY'S VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES

90. The Agreement should provide that the Agency shall inform the State of:

(a) The results of inspections, at intervals to be specified in the Subsidiary Arrangements; and

(b) The conclusions it has drawn from its verification activities

in the State, in particular by means of statements in respect of each *material balance area*, which shall be made as soon as possible after a *physical inventory* has been taken and verified by the Agency and a material balance has been struck.

INTERNATIONAL TRANSFERS

General

91. The Agreement should provide that *nuclear material* subject or required to be subject to safeguards thereunder which is transferred internationally shall, for purposes of the Agreement, be regarded as being the responsibility of the State:

(a) In the case of import, from the time that such responsibility ceases to lie with the exporting State, and no later than the time at which the *nuclear material* reaches its destination; and

(b) In the case of export, up to the time at which the recipient State assumes such responsibility, and no later than the time at which the *nuclear material* reaches its destination.

The Agreement should provide that the States concerned shall make suitable arrangements to determine the point at which the transfer of responsibility will take place. No State shall be deemed to have such responsibility for *nuclear material* merely by reason of the fact that the *nuclear material* is in transit on or over its territory or territorial waters, or that it is being transported under its flag or in its aircraft.

Transfers out of the State

92. The Agreement should provide that any intended transfer out of the State of safeguarded *nuclear material* in an amount exceeding one *effective kilogram*, or by successive shipments to the same State within a period of three months each of less than one *effective kilogram* but exceeding in total one *effective kilogram*, shall be notified to the Agency after the conclusion of the contractual arrangements leading to the transfer and normally at least two weeks before the *nuclear material* is to be prepared for shipping. The Agency and the State may agree on different procedures for advance notification. The notification shall specify:

(a) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the *nuclear material* to be transferred, and the *material balance area* from which it will come;

(b) The State for which the *nuclear material* is destined;

(c) The dates on and locations at which the *nuclear material* is to be prepared for shipping;

(d) The approximate dates of dispatch and arrival of the *nuclear material*; and

(e) At what point of the transfer the recipient State will assume responsibility for the *nuclear material*, and the probable date on which this point will be reached.

93. The Agreement should further provide that the purpose of this notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to

identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, *nuclear material* subject to safeguards under the Agreement before it is transferred out of the State and, if the Agency so wishes or the State so requests, to affix seals to the *nuclear material* when it has been prepared for shipping. However, the transfer of the *nuclear material* shall not be delayed in any way by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to this notification.

94. The Agreement should provide that, if the *nuclear material* will not be subject to Agency safeguards in the recipient State, the exporting State shall make arrangements for the Agency to receive, within three months of the time when the recipient State accepts responsibility for the *nuclear material* from the exporting State, confirmation by the recipient State of the transfer.

Transfers into the State

95. The Agreement should provide that the expected transfer into the State of *nuclear material* required to be subject to safeguards in an amount greater than one *effective kilogram*, or by successive shipments from the same State within a period of three months each of less than one *effective kilogram* but exceeding in total one *effective kilogram*, shall be notified to the Agency as much in advance as possible of the expected arrival of the *nuclear material*, and in any case not later than the date on which the recipient State assumes responsibility therefor. The Agency and the State may agree on different procedures for advance notification. The notification shall specify:

(a) The identification and, if possible, the expected quantity and composition of the *nuclear material*;

(b) At what point of the transfer responsibility for the *nuclear material* will be assumed by the State for the purposes of the Agreement, and the probable date on which this point will be reached; and

(c) The expected date of arrival, the location to which the *nuclear material* is to be delivered and the date on which it is intended that the *nuclear material* should be unpacked.

96. The Agreement should provide that the purpose of this notification shall be to enable the Agency if necessary to identify, and if possible verify the quantity and composition of, *nuclear material* subject to safeguards which has been transferred into the State, by means of inspection of the consignment at the time it is unpacked. However, unpacking shall not be delayed by any action taken or contemplated by the Agency pursuant to this notification.

Special reports

97. The Agreement should provide that in the case of international transfers a special report as envisaged in paragraph 68 above shall be made if any unusual incident or circumstances lead the State to believe that there is or may have been loss of *nuclear*

material, including the occurrence of significant delay during the transfer.

DEFINITIONS

98. "Adjustment" means an entry into an accounting record or a report showing a *shipper/receiver difference* or *material unaccounted for*.

99. "Annual throughput" means, for the purposes of paragraphs 79 and 80 above, the amount of *nuclear material* transferred annually out of a *facility* working at nominal capacity.

100. "Batch" means a portion of *nuclear material* handled as a unit for accounting purposes at a *key measurement point* and for which the composition and quantity are defined by a single set of specifications or measurements. The *nuclear material* may be in bulk form or contained in a number of separate items.

101. "Batch data" means the total weight of each element of *nuclear material* and, in the case of plutonium and uranium, the isotopic composition when appropriate. The units of account shall be as follows:

- (a) Grams of contained plutonium;
- (b) Grams of total uranium and grams of contained uranium-235 plus uranium-233 for uranium enriched in these isotopes; and
- (c) Kilograms of contained thorium, natural uranium or depleted uranium.

For reporting purposes the weights of individual items in the *batch* shall be added together before rounding to the nearest unit.

102. "Book inventory" of a *material balance area* means the algebraic sum of the most recent *physical inventory* of that *material balance area* and of all *inventory changes* that have occurred since that *physical inventory* was taken.

103. "Correction" means an entry into an accounting record or a report to rectify an identified mistake or to reflect an improved measurement of a quantity previously entered into the record or report. Each correction must identify the entry to which it pertains.

104. "Effective kilogram" means a special unit used in safeguarding *nuclear material*. The quantity in "effective kilograms" is obtained by taking:

- (a) For plutonium, its weight in kilograms;
- (b) For uranium with an *enrichment* of 0.01 (1%) and above, its weight in kilograms multiplied by the square of its *enrichment*;
- (c) For uranium with an *enrichment* below 0.01 (1%) and above 0.005 (0.5%), its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.0001; and
- (d) For depleted uranium with an *enrichment* of 0.005 (0.5%) or below, and for thorium, its weight in kilograms multiplied by 0.00005.

105. "Enrichment" means the ratio of the combined weight of

the isotopes uranium-233 and uranium-235 to that of the total uranium in question.

106. "Facility" means:

(a) A reactor, a critical facility, a conversion plant, a fabrication plant, a reprocessing plant, an isotope separation plant or a separate storage installation; or

(b) Any location where *nuclear material* in amounts greater than one *effective kilogram* is customarily used.

107. "Inventory change" means an increase or decrease, in terms of *batches*, of *nuclear material* in a *material balance area*; such a change shall involve one of the following:

(a) Increases:

(i) Import;

(ii) Domestic receipt: receipts from other *material balance areas*, receipts from a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity or receipts at the starting point of safeguards;

(iii) Nuclear production: production of special fissionable material in a reactor; and

(iv) De-exemption: reapplication of safeguards on *nuclear material* previously exempted therefrom on account of its use or quantity.

(b) Decreases:

(i) Export;

(ii) Domestic shipment: shipments to other *material balance areas* or shipments for a non-safeguarded (non-peaceful) activity;

(iii) Nuclear loss: loss of *nuclear material* due to its transformation into other element(s) or isotope(s) as a result of nuclear reactions;

(iv) Measured discard: *nuclear material* which has been measured, or estimated on the basis of measurements, and disposed of in such a way that it is not suitable for further nuclear use;

(v) Retained waste: *nuclear material* generated from processing or from an operational accident, which is deemed to be unrecoverable for the time being but which is stored;

(vi) Exemption: exemption of *nuclear material* from safeguards on account of its use or quantity; and

(vii) Other loss: for example, accidental loss (that is, irretrievable and inadvertent loss of *nuclear material* as the result of an operational accident) or theft.

108. "Key measurement point" means a location where *nuclear material* appears in such a form that it may be measured to determine material flow or inventory. "Key measurement points" thus include, but are not limited to, the inputs and outputs (including measured discards) and storages in *material balance areas*.

109. "Man-year of inspection" means, for the purposes of paragraph 80 above, 300 man-days of inspection, a man-day being a day during which a single inspector has access to a *facility* at any time for a total of not more than eight hours.

110. "Material balance area" means an area in or outside of a *facility* such that:

(a) The quantity of *nuclear material* in each transfer into or out of each "material balance area" can be determined; and

(b) The *physical inventory* of *nuclear material* in each "material balance area" can be determined when necessary, in accordance with specified procedures,

in order that the material balance for Agency safeguards purposes can be established.

111. "Material unaccounted for" means the difference between *book inventory* and *physical inventory*.

112. "Nuclear material" means any source or any special fissionable material as defined in Article XX of the Statute. The term source material shall not be interpreted as applying to ore or ore residue. Any determination by the Board under Article XX of the Statute after the entry into force of this Agreement which adds to the materials considered to be source material or special fissionable material shall have effect under this Agreement only upon acceptance by the State.

113. "Physical inventory" means the sum of all the measured or derived estimates of *batch* quantities of *nuclear material* on hand at a given time within a *material balance area*, obtained in accordance with specified procedures.

114. "Shipper/receiver difference" means the difference between the quantity of *nuclear material* in a *batch* as stated by the shipping *material balance area* and as measured at the receiving *material balance area*.

115. "Source data" means those data, recorded during measurement or calibration or used to derive empirical relationships, which identify *nuclear material* and provide *batch data*. "Source data" may include, for example, weight of compounds, conversion factors to determine weight of element, specific gravity, element concentration, isotopic ratios, relationship between volume and manometer readings and relationship between plutonium produced and power generated.

116. "Strategic point" means a location selected during examination of design information where, under normal conditions and when combined with the information from all "strategic points" taken together, the information necessary and sufficient for the implementation of safeguards measures is obtained and verified; a "strategic point" may include any location where key measurements related to material balance accountancy are made and where containment and surveillance measures are executed.

Statement by the Polish Deputy Foreign Minister (Winiewicz) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, April 22, 1971¹

May I first thank you, Mr. Chairman, very sincerely for the kind words you directed to me? I sense a feeling almost of reproach that I am not able to come here more often; but I hope that with progress being made by our Conference of the Committee on Disarmament my presence will be needed, and I promise to improve. I thank Lord Lothian also for the kind words which he directed to me and which I, of course, reciprocate very warmly.

16. In addressing this distinguished gathering I am fully aware of the responsibility resting on us and of the great hopes placed in our work by the international community. We know the destructive political, economic and social consequences of the arms race; and we know that it entails expenditure amounting to billions of dollars a year—as someone said, the equivalent of the national income of all the developing countries taken together.² It is understandable, therefore, that world public opinion has been following the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with some impatience. We cannot deny that the process of disarmament discussions and agreement is too slow and that the results fall short of expectations; although we have no intention of underestimating what has already been achieved.

17. The results have been inadequate in spite of the good will shown by the delegations of many countries—I mention particularly, of course, the socialist countries, including Poland—and in spite of the many disarmament initiatives that have been taken. If, contrary to expectations, good will and numerous initiatives have not brought more concrete results, this is due sometimes to the lack of response and only too often to the lack of adequate attempts by certain parties to understand each other. Permit me to emphasize my thought by quoting an opinion uttered by the American Senator Edmund Muskie. Speaking at a meeting of the Philadelphia Council for International Affairs and referring to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) now in progress, Senator Muskie criticized his Government's approach. According to a Reuter report of 7 April, Senator Muskie stated:

It [the United States Government] has called for Soviet restraint in deploying weapons; yet it is not willing to exercise comparable restraint. It fears the development of the Soviet MIRV, which the Soviets have not even tested adequately, if they have tested it at all; yet it refuses to admit that the Soviets have cause for concern about our [the American] MIRV, which is already being deployed.³

18. Senator Muskie's opinion of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks may be applied to the American attitude to all disarmament negotiations, including those of our Committee. A change in such attitude, particularly more trust in the good will of others—

¹ CCD/PV.510, pp. 8-18.

² See *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, p. 754.

³ *Washington Post*, April 8, 1971, p. 19.

especially those who suffered the greatest losses in the last war—and a more constructive approach to disarmament negotiations, remain essential conditions for their success. As far as we in Poland are concerned, therefore, we can only answer positively Lord Lothian's appeal for increased trust and co-operation.

19. While underlining the fully-justified desire that our work be more effective and more fruitful, we are neither forgetting nor underrating for a moment what has already been done by the United Nations in the field of disarmament, despite the fact that the first United Nations disarmament resolution was presented and accepted in 1946 (General Assembly resolution 41 (I)).⁴

20. Let us recall that the first post-war disarmament agreement, the Antarctic Treaty,⁵ came into force on 23 June 1961, that is, less than ten years ago, and that we have since prepared and concluded another four agreements, the significance of which should not be passed over in silence and which should encourage and stimulate us to make further efforts. I have in mind the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963,⁶ the outer space Treaty of 1967,⁷ the non-proliferation Treaty signed in 1968 and binding since 1970⁸; and of course the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof signed on 11 February this year.⁹ We want to believe, and what is more we expect, that the immediate future will bring new achievements in this field.

21. Assessing the situation realistically we cannot, of course, close our eyes to the difficulties confronting us in our deliberations here. One of them is the increasingly complex technology of armaments. The more technologically complex the armaments process becomes, the more difficult it is to reverse it and to eliminate its results, and the more involved disarmament negotiations become. Such difficulties have become apparent also during the discussion on our draft convention on the prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction.¹⁰

22. I should like to emphasize that the Polish delegation fully maintains its opinion that both those kinds of weapons should be eliminated as soon as possible. The correctness of such an attitude has been proved many times. However, motivated by a spirit of compromise and wishing to create possibilities for the achievement of further results in our work so as to ensure that the next session of the United Nations General Assembly may mark a further step in disarmament, we have agreed to a separate convention being drawn up for bacteriological weapons and toxins.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 6-7.

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 533-537.

23. Motivated by that spirit Poland, together with other socialist countries, presented on 30 March a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction.¹¹ But our attitude of compromise should in no way be construed as renunciation of our firm conviction that all chemical weapons, without reservation, should also be eliminated as quickly as possible. Thus I can only thank those delegations which, sharing that opinion, supported our original proposal to ban both bacteriological and chemical weapons.¹² We deeply appreciate that support, since it reflects our common concern for the best possible ultimate solution of the problem. May I appeal for further trust in and support of our present initiative?

24. There is no doubt that the common struggle for the achievement of the aims of our original draft convention has not been in vain; and we are also taking that into account. Even though the main goal has not yet been reached, the efforts undertaken have brought some positive results; and that should not be overlooked. Among those results is undoubtedly the fact that steps have been taken in the United States to ratify the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹³ action for which we have so far been waiting in vain. Let us hope that the ratification will soon become a fact and that the well-known reservations emphasized by the United States Administration as to certain kinds of chemical weapons will not prevail. When that moment comes, we may then thank the United States Administration and the United States delegation in this Committee.

25. Being deeply convinced of the rightfulness of and justification for demanding an early elimination of chemical weapons, we have now included in our new proposal for a draft convention on biological weapons article IX, which reads as follows:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons as means of warfare.

In our opinion this is still an important and urgent problem, and one that brooks no delay. The provisions of article IX proposed by us are not based on any theoretical hypothesis. They meet the urgent needs of our day, their aim being to eliminate once and for all from war arsenals all weapons of chemical warfare which, in spite of the clear and unequivocal prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol, are still in use on battlefields.

26. Almost every day brings information on the sufferings and losses inflicted on the people and on the natural environment of heroic Viet-Nam by the chemical war waged against that country. This example of barbaric warfare has been followed by others,

¹¹ *Ante*, pp.190-194.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 455-457.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 764-765.

waged by those who deny the hitherto dependent nations their right to self-determination and independence. I have in mind particularly Angola. Can we remain indifferent when toxic chemical agents have been proved to have been used in large quantities by the Portuguese in that country? Have we the right not to draw the logical conclusions from the fact that hundreds of thousands of the inhabitants of Angola have been doomed to hunger, their soil having been made arid by chemical substances?

27. Nor can we be certain that the example of chemical warfare in Viet-Nam will not be followed by the Israeli aggressors in their war of conquest against the Arab nations. Eventualities of that kind should be prevented quickly and effectively. That is what world public opinion expects us to do; and it is dictated by the existing facts and lingering dangers. The procedure we have proposed in article IX of our draft convention is fully in line with the reality of the world situation.

28. In view of the importance and urgency of the problem we might consider establishing a time limit for the conclusion of negotiations on chemical weapons provided for in article IX of our draft convention. In any case we hold the view that the convention on the elimination of chemical weapons should be drafted and concluded, at the latest, before the first review of the convention concerning the elimination of bacteriological weapons. There are also reasons why we should carefully consider the suggestion made by the representative of Japan that the Committee should hold informal meetings on chemical weapons when the time is opportune.¹⁴

29. We have heard voices expressing surprise that our new draft convention does not provide for a ban on the use of bacteriological weapons. I think that in this respect we are facing a simple misunderstanding. Reference to this point was also made by the speaker who preceded me. The authors of the draft convention on biological weapons have logically assumed that the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons was clearly and unequivocally settled by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which constitutes a binding norm of international law. The fact that this norm exists seems to make pointless any repetition of the ban in a convention which is to deal with the elimination of one kind of those weapons. It seems superfluous because, in our opinion, the adoption of such a concept would in practice weaken the full validity of the Geneva Protocol.

30. We would also draw attention to the fact that article II of our new draft convention provides that—

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy within a period of three months after the entry into force of the Convention—observing all the necessary precautions—or to divert to peaceful uses all previously accumulated weapons in its possession as well as the equipment and means of delivery mentioned in article I of the Convention.

¹⁴ CCD/PV.509, pp. 8-9.

One cannot use something which is destroyed. This is an additional, convincing argument explaining why a ban on the use of bacteriological weapons has been considered by the authors of the new draft as unnecessary or superfluous. Since those weapons are to be eliminated, there will be no practical possibility of their being used.

31. I should like to draw attention to yet another problem which must be explained and agreed upon if the final text of the convention in question is to be drawn up. I have in mind the problem of control. The United Kingdom draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons presented some time ago proposed that the United Nations Secretary-General should take part in control operations.¹⁵ Wishing to guarantee really effective action in this field, and bearing in mind the existing and binding principles, it is difficult for us to accept such an approach.

32. In accordance with the letter and spirit of the United Nations Charter it is the Security Council that is the main instrument for preserving peace. Article 24 states unequivocally:

In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf.¹⁶

We remain persuaded of the validity of that regulation, since it is in accord with world reality. This is why article VII of our draft convention, in line with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, provides for the possibility of lodging complaints with the Security Council, which in turn would conduct the necessary investigations.

33. This seems to us to be the only logical, correct and adequate solution which would guarantee the proper functioning of the convention. Besides, in proposing this solution we are just expressing our wish to maintain the attitude we have successfully represented so far. As I said here on 14 April last year:

... the Security Council, in accordance with its statutory functions deriving from the United Nations Charter, would be in a position to take all appropriate steps resulting from the process of the investigation so that any would-be violator would have no chance of escaping sanctions.¹⁷

In any case we are convinced that, by submitting a new draft convention on the elimination of bacteriological weapons, the socialist countries are offering real possibilities for an early, full understanding on this matter. The Polish delegation is ready to take all necessary steps to achieve this aim without delay.

34. We would like the progress made in this matter to be an effective catalyst in the process of further disarmament, which, though difficult and complicated, is more necessary than ever before. We welcomed with great satisfaction the recent statement made by Mr. Roshchin, head of the Soviet delegation, and his

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

¹⁶ *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, p. 141.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 148.

proposal that the Committee should start drafting an agreement on general and complete disarmament.¹⁸ We welcomed this all the more since two years ago the Polish delegation, on the basis of the same premises, put forward a suggestion on similar lines at a meeting of our Committee.¹⁹ This direction still seems to us to be the right one.

35. At the same time we are happy to be able to state that the partial disarmament solutions already worked out pave the way to our main goal, general and complete disarmament. One of these important partial measures is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which came into force on 5 March 1970; and I should like to say a few words regarding our attitude in this respect. The Treaty, as is clearly shown by the number of its signatories, can undoubtedly contribute to the strengthening of peace and international security by preventing the spread of one of the most dangerous means of mass destruction, nuclear weapons. The Treaty, as we know, also provides for the development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This co-operation will help to spread knowledge of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes, thus contributing to a gradual growth of its effectiveness, indispensable as it is for the economic development of many countries.

36. However, the benefits of the non-proliferation Treaty will only be fully apparent when all its provisions are implemented, especially the system of safeguards. What is necessary in order to achieve this is (a) the earliest possible ratification of the Treaty by the maximum number of States, especially those which have a large nuclear potential at their disposal; and (b) the conclusion and coming into force of agreements on safeguards between the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the States parties to the Treaty. Poland, like many other countries, welcomed the conclusion of the IAEA Safeguards Committee's work on the principles on which the agreements between the parties to the Treaty and the Agency provided for in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty should be based. We are also pleased that the IAEA Board of Governors has approved those principles.²⁰

37. It is worth stressing the atmosphere of the debates held by the Safeguards Committee, which succeeded in reaching an agreement on such difficult problems as the general principles and methods of IAEA control over the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes by parties to the Treaty not having nuclear weapons at their disposal. That atmosphere is certainly worthy of imitation. It is not without reason that the term "Viennese spirit of compromise" has come to be used in the United Nations to denote a broad basis of compromise among the nearly fifty States taking part in the Safeguards Committee, a compromise which

¹⁸ *Supra*.

¹⁹ ENDC/PV.406, p. 6.

²⁰ See *ante*, pp. 218-244.

made it possible to agree upon and adopt principles of a by no means simple nature. It would be desirable for this spirit to be maintained in future at international meetings, and not only those held in Vienna.

38. Thus the principles of the IAEA safeguards have been fixed. Some countries, including certain signatories to the Treaty, and especially the Euratom countries, had previously pointed to the lack of such principles when giving the motives for their decision to put off the ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty and/or the commencement of negotiations with the Agency on the conclusion of the agreements on safeguards envisaged by the Treaty. The contents of such agreements are now known, and therefore the functions of IAEA also are now clear, together with the duties of States as regards control as envisaged by the non-proliferation Treaty. This should undoubtedly serve to facilitate further negotiations with the IAEA.

39. Poland, like a number of other countries, as is well known, has ratified the non-proliferation Treaty and in September 1970 initiated negotiations in Vienna with IAEA which are still in progress. We have also made appropriate preparations in our own country to create a national system of registration and control of nuclear materials. And here permit me to remind the Committee that a good and constructive example in this field has been set by Finland, which was the first European country completely to conclude negotiations with IAEA and which in March this year initialled an agreement with the Agency.²¹ I am quoting that as tangible proof that the agreement in question is not as difficult and complex as some representatives of the Euratom countries assert—I have the impression, evasively assert.

40. In our concern for the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty we appeal to all countries, especially the European signatories to the non-proliferation Treaty, to ratify it in accordance with the recommendations of the United Nations, in the interest of international *détente* and, of course, for the sake of facilitating further steps in disarmament. We hope that the signatories to the Treaty which have not so far declared their readiness to start negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency will do so in the near future on the basis of the already-accepted principles of the safeguards agreements.

41. We fully realize that the non-proliferation Treaty can be implemented and meet the expectations placed in it only if its obligations are accepted by the largest possible number of countries, especially those in which nuclear science is well developed. This applies particularly to the European continent, where by far the greatest modern weaponry potential is still accumulated. We have a special interest also in the non-prolifera-

²¹ *The Text of the Agreement Between Finland and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection With the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*, INFCIRC/155, October 27, 1971.

tion Treaty entering fully into force within Europe; because we might then proceed with some ideas which were expressed years ago in our suggestion concerning an atom-free zone in central Europe²² and which we might follow up when once the non-proliferation Treaty had entered fully into force, particularly in Europe.

42. We believe that an early introduction of a concerted system of safeguards as regards peaceful uses of nuclear energy, a system aimed at preventing any possible attempt to divert it to purposes conflicting with those of the Treaty, would be in the interest of Europe and the entire world. There is no doubt that the implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty would also contribute to the discussions and agreements on further steps towards general and complete disarmament.

43. Bold new vistas of the possibilities of large-scale action in this direction were outlined in the speech made by the Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, at the recent historical twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.²³ We submit that the wide range of disarmament proposals put forward in that speech is yet another proof of the spirit of initiative in working for international *détente* and disarmament which is characteristic of the policy pursued by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries co-operating closely with it. Allow me to express the conviction that these proposals will meet with a favourable response in the Western countries; and in particular they should be studied and re-studied, for in the opinion of Poland they offer much food for thought also as regards the endeavours of our Committee.

44. While giving unqualified support to all those proposals, to which we hope there will be time to return in more detail in the future, the Polish delegation is particularly pleased to note that they include proposals for regional solutions which are of special interest to central Europe; namely, support for the convening of a European conference on security and co-operation, a conference which should also take up the problems of regional disarmament; a proposal for the conclusion of regional agreements renouncing the use or threat of use of force in controversial issues; the concept of setting up atom-free zones in various parts of the world; the concept of reducing the danger of military confrontation in the heart of Europe; and the working out of a system to eliminate the dangers of military incidents.

45. I should like to recall that it was Poland which first put forward in the United Nations General Assembly, in 1957, a plan for creating an atom-free zone in central Europe²⁴; that it was Poland which suggested the freezing of atomic weapons in

²² *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 201-205.

²³ *Ante*, pp. 195-197.

²⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 889-892.

Europe;²⁵ and that the Polish delegation was the delegation which proposed in the forum of the United Nations, in 1964, the convening of a conference of all European countries, with the participation of the Soviet Union and the United States, to examine the problems of European security.²⁶

46. I would emphasize once again that the creation of conditions of lasting peace and the mutually-advantageous co-operation of nations on our continent remains one of the fundamental aims of the foreign policy of my country, and that we are ready to discuss any proposal to this end which might become the subject of debate at a European conference on security and co-operation. In our opinion the aim of such a conference, or rather such a chain of conferences, would be the establishment of a European system of security. European security, once fortified, must have a salutary effect on world security when we remember that it was Europe which precipitated the last two wars which engulfed the whole globe. This is the reason why I so often mention here, in the face and in the presence of representatives of other continents, the problems of Europe.

47. As far as we are concerned, it is very difficult to realize at the present moment the dangers of a policy which might not pursue the aims of security and peaceful co-operation. For our part we can only regret that the opportunities for creating a collective security system in Europe are being put off by some States until the future. The lack of a collective-security system during the inter-war period was taken advantage of by Hitler. In our opinion the postponement of work, be it even preparatory work, on creating such a system at a number of conferences on European security and co-operation could lead to our losing the opportunity of turning the European continent into the backbone of peace, a bastion of peace, which is so necessary at a time when other continents are plunged into serious conflicts and the economically-developing continents so greatly need European assistance.

48. Taking into account the achievements of disarmament negotiations to date, which though modest are nevertheless essential, and realizing the threat and danger to mankind of an unbridled arms race, the Polish delegation sees only one proper way out: namely, sincere negotiations in a spirit of good will and good faith in order to find proper disarmament solutions. So we can only say, let us continue the quest for a basis of common understanding.

49. I have been instructed by my Government to pledge Poland's full support for the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and to declare that Poland will do its

²⁵ *Ibid.*, 1964, pp. 53-55.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 527.

level best to work out practical decisions, which, although sometimes only partial, are yet important for the eventual goal to which we all aspire.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rogers on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], April 23, 1971²⁷

Q. Mr. Secretary, to turn to the Russian issue, what effect do you think there is on SALT of the new missile construction in the Soviet Union that Secretary Laird has been talking about?

A. Well, Secretary Laird, of course, pointed out correctly the situation as it has developed. The Soviet Union is constructing many new large missile sites. We are not sure at the moment whether they are improved SS-9's or a new variation of missiles.

I think what it does, it points up the importance of the President's policy to include both offensive as well as defensive missiles in our discussions in the SALT talks, because if the Soviets have no limitation to the deployment of these large missiles—and they have much larger missiles than we have—then it is to our disadvantage. So we would hope that we could work out a settlement, an agreement, with the Soviet Union which would include both offensive and defensive weapons.

Q. To follow up on that, does it raise the question in your mind, or in the Government's mind, at all, this new construction, that perhaps the Soviet Union is not satisfied with parity and may want superiority in nuclear weaponry?

A. I think it is too early to tell, Mr. Roberts, because, as I say, we are not sure exactly the magnitude of the final program or exactly the type of missile system that they are deploying. But it certainly does emphasize the importance of including offensive weapons as well as defensive weapons in any agreement we have with them.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Bacteriological Weapons, April 27, 1971¹

Today the Soviet delegation intends to put forward some considerations regarding the draft convention of the socialist countries on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction,² as an addition to what we said on this subject on 30 March when we submitted the aforesaid draft for the consideration of the Conference of the

²⁷ *Department of State Bulletin*, May 10, 1971, pp. 596-597.

¹ CCD/PV. 511, pp. 5-12.

² *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

Committee on Disarmament.³ We note that some delegations have already expressed their views on the proposal of the socialist countries, and we regard this as the beginning of the work of considering and reaching agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and toxins.

3. One of the questions now being asked by many members of the Committee is how the conclusion of a separate convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins will affect the prospects of the prohibition of chemical weapons. It is also asked whether this might not delay the solution of the problem of chemical weapons and worsen the prospects of their prohibition. Apprehensions on this score were expressed in particular by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, at the meeting of our Committee on 6 April.⁴

4. The socialist countries firmly base themselves on the invariable position of principle that it is necessary to secure the prohibition and elimination from the arsenals of States of both chemical and bacteriological weapons: that is, both those categories of means of mass destruction. In this connexion we should like to stress that it is precisely the socialist countries which have submitted to the General Assembly on two occasions draft conventions prohibiting those types of weapons.⁵ The representatives of Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria, Mongolia, Poland and Romania, who have spoken at recent meetings of this Committee, have cogently demonstrated the readiness of the socialist countries to agree to such a prohibition. We do not wish to repeat the important statements and arguments expounded by those delegations. The position of principle of the socialist countries to which I have referred has been set forth in those statements. We have no differences with those who call for the destruction of both bacteriological and chemical means of warfare. That is precisely the aim which the socialist countries seek to achieve.

5. The socialist countries, in taking in the Committee on Disarmament on 30 March a new initiative on the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, based themselves on an objective appraisal of the existing situation. A realistic assessment of the state of affairs in discussing the question of the comprehensive prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons unfortunately points to the fact that, because of the negative attitude of some Western Powers, the chances of reaching agreement on the simultaneous prohibition of those two means of warfare are at present very slight. This has been shown by the experience of two years of discussion and negotiation within the Committee on Disarmament regarding the problem of the comprehensive prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. It has also been shown by the whole course of the

³ *Arite*, pp. 183-190.

⁴ CCD/PV.507, pp. 26-27.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 455-457; *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

discussions on this problem at the present session of the Committee. Moreover, in our opinion, lack of progress in this field would have a negative effect on the discussion of the disarmament problem as a whole.

6. Taking into account the existing state of affairs and seeking at the same time to extricate from the deadlock the solution of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons, the socialist countries took a new initiative in proposing to prohibit at this stage bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins only. In so doing we based ourselves on the premise that the conditions for a positive solution of this problem have now come about. In our opinion, progress in regard to the prohibition of bacteriological weapons will make it possible to ensure progress also in regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. The new initiative of the socialist countries was thus dictated by political realism and a desire to take a first concrete step towards the elimination of both those types of weapons.

7. What, then, are the positive aspects of the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction?

8. First, the basic aim envisaged by the draft convention of the socialist States: namely, the prohibition and the elimination from the armaments of States of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction—bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins—would be achieved. The significance of this factor alone is considerable. Many delegations, including our own, have dealt at length with this aspect of the matter.

9. Secondly, the assumption by States of definite obligations in regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons would be ensured. The draft convention of the socialist countries contains provisions regarding the obligation of the States parties to conduct negotiations in good faith on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (article IX). The draft also states that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons will facilitate the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare (twelfth preambular paragraph). The article on the holding of a conference to review the operation of the Convention (article XII) contains a special provision stipulating that the conference should consider how the obligation concerning the prohibition of chemical means of warfare was being fulfilled.

10. The combination in the draft convention of the socialist countries of these obligations regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons creates important prerequisites under international law for progress in solving this problem. It can hardly be denied that as a result of the assumption of these obligations the situation in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons would not only not be worsened in comparison with the situation we have today, but, on the contrary, should become more favourable.

11. Thirdly, the conclusion of a convention on bacteriological

weapons would achieve a reinforcement of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.⁶ The draft convention condemns in its tenth preambular paragraph—

... all actions contrary to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 as well as the use in international armed conflicts of any chemical and any biological means of warfare.

Furthermore, it emphasizes in article VIII that—

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 ... an instrument which embodies generally recognized rules of international law.

Finally, as a result of the elimination of bacteriological weapons the possibility of their use, which is prohibited by the Geneva Protocol, would be precluded.

12. Some delegations tend to regard the convention on bacteriological weapons as an agreement on a partial solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. In this connexion we should like to say that, as the whole experience of disarmament negotiations has shown, partial solutions in the field of measures concerning disarmament and the curbing of the arms race are of considerable political and practical value. Thus, for all our desire to reach agreement on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, we do not consider a treaty such as the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty,⁷ for instance, to be of little use or even "dangerously" partial. We regard it as an extremely important international agreement which, apart from its great political significance, has serious practical positive aspects. It has prevented the contamination of the atmosphere and of man's environment by radioactive substances which endanger the health of human beings as a result of nuclear explosions carried out in the three environments covered by the Moscow Treaty. That agreement is playing a very positive role in international life, and we are exerting every possible effort to make it a universal international instrument to which all States without exception would become parties.

13. The proposal to destroy all bacteriological weapons provides, in fact, not for a partial, but for a complete solution of the problem of the prohibition and destruction of those means of warfare: that is, an entire category of weapons of mass destruction.

14. Thus the Soviet side believes that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons and toxins as proposed by the socialist States would be of great positive significance. This would in no way relegate to a secondary place the solution of the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons but would be a definite step in that direction.

15. We wish to stress that the conclusion of an agreement on

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

bacteriological weapons will make it possible to concentrate our negotiations entirely on the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons, which we propose should be discussed side by side with the question of bacteriological weapons. The readiness of States to conduct negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons side by side with the drafting of an agreed text of a convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons would be a concrete expression of their desire to do away as soon as possible with that type of weapons of mass destruction as well. We fully share the view of the Deputy Foreign Minister of Poland, Mr. Winiewicz, who said on 22 April:

We would like the progress made in this matter to be an effective catalyst in the process of further disarmament, which, though difficult and complicated, is more necessary than ever before.⁸

16. May I now dwell on another aspect of the draft convention of the socialist countries? The United Kingdom delegation has asked why the draft does not contain a provision prohibiting the use of bacteriological methods of warfare and toxins.⁹ In deciding that matter we based ourselves on the premise that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 clearly and unequivocally prohibited the use of all types of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. That prohibition is a generally-recognized rule of international law.

17. In our opinion any attempt, even on the pretext of strengthening the Geneva Protocol, to settle the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in another document under international law could only weaken and detract from the significance of the Protocol. If a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons were to include a provision prohibiting their use, that might give rise to the interpretation on the one hand that there was still no such prohibition in existence, and on the other that the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons was also still open. The convention on bacteriological weapons should be a further step along the road which was opened by the conclusion of the Geneva Protocol.

18. We have noted with satisfaction that our position is shared by other delegations. The representative of India, Mr. Krishnan, has said in this connexion:

Since the issue of the use of both chemical and biological weapons has been comprehensively and definitely solved by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, that issue need not and should not be dealt with in any other international instrument that might now be concluded concerning the other aspects of such weapons: namely their development, production, stockpiling and elimination. Any other course would only create complications and harm the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which the international community wishes to observe and strengthen further.¹⁰

Likewise the representative of Brazil, Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro, has said:

Brazil cannot but share the view that the question of the use of biological weapons has

⁸ *Ante*, p. 249.

⁹ CCD/PV.510, p. 6.

¹⁰ CCD/PV.504, p. 40.

already been fully settled . . . we do not think its place is to be found necessarily in the draft convention we are now considering.¹¹

19. We should also like to explain the provision in the socialist countries' draft convention concerning the undertaking by each State party to be internationally responsible for compliance with the convention by its legal or physical persons (article IV). This undertaking is one of the important component parts of the system of guarantees to ensure the implementation of the convention. Any potential violator of the agreement would thus know in advance that in the event of his not complying with the terms of the convention he would be held responsible before the whole world community. That would have a restraining effect on potential violators and thus help to ensure the effectiveness and viability of the convention.

20. As to how the governments of the States parties would technically exercise control to ensure that no legal or physical persons of the States concerned were engaged in activities incompatible with the provisions of the convention, the solution of that question lies entirely within the competence of the aforesaid governments. Taking into account the constitutional procedures existing in their countries, they would themselves choose appropriate forms of control, as provided in article V of the draft convention.

21. Provision for that kind of control, to be exercised by States parties to an agreement over the observance of its provisions by legal and physical persons of the countries concerned, is to be found in other international agreements. Thus, for instance, article III of the non-proliferation Treaty¹² in regard to its meaning and purpose is based on the premise that the governments of the States parties to the Treaty are entirely responsible for the activities of their legal and physical persons. The inclusion in the convention on bacteriological weapons of a clause on the international responsibility of the States parties for ensuring strict observance of its provisions by all their legal and physical persons would enhance the reliability of the agreement and thus complement in a natural way the other provisions of the agreement concerning the guarantees of its fulfilment.

22. In the opinion of our delegation, articles IV and V of the draft convention should be regarded as interrelated. The international responsibility resting upon the States parties to the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons should be reflected in national legislative and administrative measures prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and of their means of delivery. Those measures should ensure the fulfilment by States parties of the obligations assumed under the convention.

¹¹ CCD/PV.510, pp. 19-20.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

23. The provision contained in article VII of the draft convention of the socialist countries concerning the complaints procedure in case of possible violations of the convention is one of the important international guarantees of the implementation of the terms of the agreement. A similar provision defining the complaints procedure is also to be found in article III of the sea-bed Treaty.¹³

24. The draft convention on biological weapons submitted by the United Kingdom provides not only for the procedure of lodging a complaint with the Security Council but also for the procedure of lodging a complaint with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in the event of a violation of the convention.¹⁴ The question of such a procedure—that is, resort to the good offices of the Secretary-General—was raised when the Treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed was being elaborated. We stated our position on this question at that time.¹⁵ The complaints procedure proposed in the draft convention of the socialist countries, which provides that a complaint may be lodged directly with the Security Council of the United Nations, is most appropriate and practicable. Under the United Nations Charter, the Security Council is the body responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. In accordance with its terms of reference, the Council itself will determine how decisions adopted under article VII of the proposed convention are to be implemented.

25. A number of delegations, in particular the United Kingdom delegation, have raised the question of the terms used in the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins submitted by the socialist countries.¹⁶ Reference has been made to the terms “agents”, “weapons” and “means of warfare”. A clarification on the subject was given by the representative of Mongolia in his statement at the meeting on 15 April.¹⁷ We should like to point out once again that the terms “weapons” or “means of warfare” in the draft convention of the socialist countries cover all bacteriological agents and toxins which can be used for purposes of war. The convention is designed to eliminate completely all bacteriological agents and toxins as weapons. Thus the term “weapons” completely covers the term “agents”.

26. Those are some of our comments and explanations in connexion with the remarks made in this Committee on the draft convention of the socialist countries. We hope that these explanations will help towards a better understanding of the proposal of the socialist countries in regard to the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and will facilitate

¹³ *Ante*, p. 8.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 294-296.

¹⁶ CCD/PV.507, p. 14.

¹⁷ CCD/PV.508, p. 9.

all-round consideration and the elaboration of an agreed text of the convention which has been submitted for the consideration of the Committee.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, May 4, 1971¹

We are approaching the end of yet another session of our Committee, and I am grateful to have today an opportunity to take up the question of the comprehensive test ban. It is an issue to which my delegation has devoted considerable attention during what will soon be ten years of our work in Geneva.

3. When the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament opened in March 1962, the participating Foreign Ministers decided to organize the Conference so as to permit simultaneous work on general and complete disarmament, on so-called confidence-building or collateral measures, and on the discontinuance of nuclear-weapon tests.² We were kindled with optimism and enthusiasm, and the two major proposals that came before the Conference that first year—on general and complete disarmament³—were grandiose enough to increase further our optimism.

4. The non-aligned members, then eight in number, took as their first task the attempt to make a strategic break-through on a partial measure, choosing the very one which had then already been the object of many years' work—a comprehensive agreement on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments. Their Joint Memorandum of 16 April 1962⁴ was accepted as one of the bases for the further negotiations; and in a way it has remained such until this very day. It outlined a simple but effective system for control on a purely technical and non-political basis, relying mainly on national means of observation and control but referring also to the possibility of setting up an international scientific commission for effectuating verification in contested cases.

5. In the spring of 1963 the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament made a spurt to achieve the comprehensive test ban. The political climate in that period following the Cuba crisis was unusually favourable. Agreement was also secured on a number of fundamental points. The margin of remaining differences seemed small enough, stretching at times only between the numbers of two to three and seven for on-site inspections. Then, suddenly, the negotiating process in Geneva was cut off. The Moscow Treaty banning tests in the three non-controversial environments only was

¹ CCD/PV.513, pp. 5-15.

² See *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. 1, pp. 176-177.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 103-127, 351-382.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-336.

agreed upon by the nuclear-weapon Powers.⁵ Here in Geneva we have only recently started, in terms of active and detailed negotiations, to move beyond the point we had reached in 1963.

6. Despite the fact that the treaty concluded represented only a partial solution, it was hailed as a sign of success. We were told, and we believed, that it was the first step towards the discontinuance of all tests. Although the Moscow Treaty excluded underground tests from the provisionally partial prohibition, we read the intention to be that it should serve as a disarmament measure by curtailing further qualitative development of nuclear weapons. The representative of the United Arab Republic confirmed this view when he said recently that the Moscow Treaty "was expected to have a considerable restraining effect on the super-Powers".⁶

7. We now know that the partial test-ban Treaty has not functioned according to these expectations. Figures on numbers and yields of the underground tests in the United States of America and the Soviet Union provide evidence that the further development of nuclear weapons—which we also learn about in their constantly new and ever more frightening finished shapes—has not been stalled, perhaps not even been at all retarded, by the partial ban. I am afraid the conclusion is unavoidable: the Moscow Treaty has not functioned as a disarmament measure, at least as far as the nuclear-weapon Powers are concerned.

8. This is not to say that the Moscow Treaty has been without value. I can subscribe to two-thirds of the judgement giving credit to it by the Soviet representative, Mr. Roshchin, in his statement on 27 April: first, that its emergence had great political significance: it stimulated hopes and spurred on our efforts to bring more ambitious disarmament measures into existence; second, that it "has prevented the contamination of the atmosphere and of man's environment by [hazardous] radioactive substances".⁷ This is true and it is to the point. The Moscow Treaty might rather, in fact, be characterized as a preventive health measure, although modest as such. That it has not served as a disarmament measure was brought into sharp focus by the representative of Ethiopia, who gave vent to the view, *inter alia*, that it "is gathering around it an air of unreality".⁸

9. The purpose of my compressed historic sketch has been to contribute to the searching analysis we now need of the actual situation. Several delegations have felt the same urge to resume the detailed negotiations which we left off in 1963. This new phase of negotiations has been marked by a number of concrete, even if tentative, suggestions. It would seem best to concentrate, from now on, on the same specific points in order to get a clear chart of

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁶ CCD/PV.509, p. 11.

⁷ *Ante*, p.257.

⁸ ENDC/PV.498, p. 7.

the 1971 positions of all delegations as to the structure and content of the desired test-ban treaty.

10. In order to explain the Swedish position in relation to these suggestions, may I be permitted to recall that two years ago my delegation presented a working paper containing suggestions for a treaty to ban underground nuclear-weapon tests?⁹ We had given it the tentative form of a treaty text in order to illustrate our thoughts as clearly as possible, hoping that other delegations might clarify their own positions so that by joint efforts we could improve the text to make it commonly acceptable.

11. By the substantive part of our proposed draft all underground nuclear explosions were placed under prohibition. Reference was made, however, to the possibility of one specific exemption from the total ban: peaceful explosions were to be allowed, if carried out in accordance with a special international agreement. The draft also contained a scheme for control, based on an effective exchange of information, including seismological data, and a gradual procedure, usually referred to as verification by challenge. The possibility was provided to turn to the Security Council in the final instance if a definite accusation were to be lodged against another party. The scheme was reinforced by a withdrawal clause.

12. In analysing the many interesting statements made this year we recognize some changes in attitude as to (a) the scope and (b) the nature and form of a possible agreement; and we notice further (c) some specific, new or reiterated suggestions as to verification. I should like to start with the question of the scope.

13. The representatives of the United Kingdom,¹⁰ Canada,¹¹ Japan¹² and the Netherlands¹³ have indicated various ways in which the present highly unsatisfactory situation as to a comprehensive solution could be somewhat improved by further partial or transitional agreements. Tests above a certain threshold could be banned, or there could be a phasing-out period or a restricted quota of permissible underground explosions. Responding to these moves, the Soviet co-Chairman stated that prohibiting nuclear tests above a certain threshold while leaving tests below the threshold outside the prohibition "would hardly facilitate the solution of the problem of a comprehensive nuclear test ban".¹⁴ We note that the representative of the United Arab Republic,¹⁵ as well as the representatives of Ethiopia¹⁶ and the Netherlands¹⁷ share these doubts.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 33-34.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 37 ff.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 87 ff.

¹³ CCD/PV.502, pp. 7 ff.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 213.

¹⁵ CCD/PV.509, p. 6.

¹⁶ CCD/PV.498, p. 7.

¹⁷ CCD/PV.512, p. 11.

14. There are two sets of reasons, of which one may be called political and one technical, why the Swedish Government has all along hesitated to support the threshold proposal. It would, in our view, be another half-measure, perhaps limiting arms development in some directions but leaving other directions open for so-called improvements of nuclear weapons. Also, if the threshold chosen were not rather low it would not even have the desired non-proliferation effect on non-nuclear-weapon States. The margin thus left open might be exploited by them to use plutonium from their own reactors to "go nuclear" in the weapons field also. These are the reasons why on political grounds we have not felt able to support the threshold solution.

15. When it has been suggested that it might be easier to reach agreement if the prohibition applied only to explosions above a certain strength or effect, the technical idea has been that this so-called threshold could be chosen so that identification techniques at present known would make confusions with earthquakes sufficiently rare to be negligible. It has also been suggested that the threshold could be lowered *pari passu* with future improvements in identification capabilities.

16. A minimum requirement, however, is that one should be able to determine beyond dispute whether an event lies below the threshold or not. As long as the nuclear explosions claimed to be below the threshold are not open to international observers—a procedure foreseen for peaceful nuclear explosions under the non-proliferation Treaty¹⁸—, so long non-violation of the threshold will most probably have to be monitored by observations from a distance, by measuring the seismic magnitudes of the explosions. I have been warned, however, that the proper comparison between magnitudes obtained by seismographs in different locations is a general problem within seismology which appears to be far from a satisfactory solution.

17. A ban on tests above a certain threshold, therefore, would require agreement on a reference station or a network of reference stations, sensitive and reliable enough. Such a station or stations would have to be well calibrated in relation to relevant test areas. This would amount practically to a requirement for an undertaking by the nuclear-weapon Powers to conduct the explosions permitted below a given threshold only in certain well-calibrated test areas. They would themselves need to be very accurately informed as to the expected seismic magnitudes, in order not to risk laying themselves open to accusation.

18. Such would be the situation if the agreed threshold were to be defined in terms of seismic magnitudes. If the threshold were instead defined in terms of nuclear explosion energy or yield, and no on-site observers were allowed, the additional problem of relating yield to magnitude would complicate matters consider-

¹⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

ably. Other problems, for instance in connexion with testing in alluvium or by means of decoupling, have been pointed out in the excellent analysis by the delegation of the Netherlands. The threshold concept would thus introduce serious technical problems which an all-out ban wholly avoids. Even if we could agree on a treaty text solving these problems, much controversy could still be foreseen in the subsequent operation of a threshold treaty.

19. Consequently, both on political and on technical grounds the Swedish delegation continues to doubt that a threshold concept could be of any help towards reaching a test-ban treaty. We shall be glad, however, to continue to discuss these and other technical problems in more detail. We strongly support the Canadian proposal to hold technical discussions this summer.¹⁹ We are prepared to take part in these on an expert level, and look forward to learning about the latest scientific efforts in other countries, including all the nuclear-weapon members of the Committee. They are, after all, the most knowledgeable.

20. I turn now to the second idea related to the scope of an agreement: that is, the idea of a phasing-out period for underground testing based on the quota proposal of the United Kingdom,²⁰ resuscitated this year,²¹ and discussed in considerable detail by the representative of Canada in his interesting proposal on transitional measures.

21. As I have indicated earlier, the Swedish delegation sees some indisputable merits in this suggestion. One is, of course, that such an arrangement would soften the "shock" for the nuclear-weapon Powers of an immediately-total test ban. Further, the Swedish working paper foresees exemptions from the total ban in respect of peaceful explosions. We could conceive of a combination of these two purposes during a transitional period, provided that the date for the entry into force of a comprehensive treaty were firmly settled and not too far off. Finally, the scheme could provide opportunities for testing seismic detection, location and identification capabilities, particularly if agreed calibration explosions were part of the quota. Thus, for political as well as for technical reasons, we look forward to a closer discussion of the phasing-out proposal.

22. In regard to the nature and form of an agreement, we have noticed some interesting statements from different sides, sometimes coinciding. The representative of Poland, in recommending partial disarmament agreements, used the expression "to enlarge the scope of the Moscow Treaty of 1963 by including in its provisions a ban on underground nuclear tests also".²² In a statement by the Netherlands we find the phrase "a complete ban on nuclear testing for weapon purposes or, failing this, a possible

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 203.

²⁰ ENDC/232.

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 33-34.

²² CCD/PV.501, p. 25.

extension of the existing ban".²³ And by Canada it was recently suggested, with special reference to transitional measures, that as an "alternative . . . perhaps the most suitable . . . would be the negotiation of a protocol to that partial test-ban Treaty".²⁴

23. The Swedish delegation ardently desires to see a comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. As the question presents itself in practice, it would be unwise, in our opinion, to try to achieve this by any renegotiation and reopening of the Moscow Treaty. Such an approach would risk opening matters which are now settled by rules which are legally binding on over one hundred parties. The Moscow test-ban Treaty has achieved an identity of its own and a special standing—in the same manner as for instance the 1925 Geneva Protocol.²⁵ We should add to such treaties, not tamper with them. Accordingly, our preferred approach is to work out an independent treaty which takes up where the Moscow Treaty leaves off, or possibly a protocol adding to but not affecting the provisions of the Moscow Treaty. In its attempt to draft an instrument the Swedish delegation chose the former of these two methods, as it appeared to be the most susceptible of resulting in a succinct and solid legal undertaking. In conclusion, it would seem urgent that the Committee collectively consider and decide the question of legal format before it works out a detailed text.

24. Concerning the wider complex of problems as to the nature of the agreement to establish, the representative of Canada some weeks ago offered as a variant a whole series of suggestions for purely transitional measures to be undertaken unilaterally or bilaterally before the full treaty was agreed upon. Among those interesting proposals was launched an idea which the Swedish delegation wishes to support most warmly: namely, that all nuclear tests be announced in advance, with publication of place, time, yield and even magnitude of the explosion.

25. Turning now to the verification issue, as distinct from threshold and other problems of scope, I want to say first that the Canadian proposal which I have just mentioned on notification of explosions, along with their essential parameters, would be of great assistance for the solving of remaining identification problems, especially if extended also to past explosions. Here the nuclear-weapon States have an opportunity to make a large contribution to the further improvement of identification methods, and at no extra cost.

26. In the same statement the Canadian representative again asked for international co-operation in the development and improvement of facilities for detection, location and identification of underground nuclear tests by seismological means. Similar recommendations were made in earlier statements by the represen-

²³ CCD/PV.502, p. 10.

²⁴ *Ante*, p. 207.

²⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

tatives of the United Kingdom²⁶ and of Japan.²⁷ The Netherlands delegation has advocated such improvements as worth while in a working paper which provides us with a valuable technical discussion of the detection and identification issue.²⁸ The Swedish delegation certainly supports these recommendations, so close to what we have been suggesting since that time back in 1965 when we urged the formation of a "detection club" as an alternative to an official international scientific commission.²⁹

27. The representative of Mexico has reminded us—and the reminder is very timely, I think—that it was once considered politically acceptable to use so-called "black boxes" to assist in seismological verification.³⁰ The Japanese delegation has also underlined the usefulness of such means. The idea of "black boxes" was originally introduced in this Committee back in 1962.³¹ In our context, a "black box" is an unmanned and automatic seismic station for supplying close-in seismic data about seismic events in the host country. Such an arrangement could be instrumental in solving the practical problem of identification of weak events. The method of identification by comparison between so-called body and surface waves has been shown to be very effective with not-too-weak events at long distances. With data from suitably equipped and located "black boxes" the aforementioned method should make it possible to deal effectively also with weak events and thus eliminate some remaining apprehensions in regard to the control issue. We therefore join the representative of Mexico in his question to the Soviet Union and the United States about their attitude today towards the use of "black boxes".

28. Such "black boxes" might perhaps give rise to questions about territorial intrusion. My delegation proposed earlier a different arrangement, using standardized seismograph stations in national networks, with agreed norms for operational performance and data accessibility. Such a network of national stations would constitute a particularly efficient basis for seismic data exchange, delivering the same kind of but more extensive measurements than a few "black boxes". The credibility of such data would rest, of course, on the professional integrity and reputation of the scientific institutes managing the stations.

29. We have—together with the non-aligned members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—for a long time advocated as useful an international seismic data exchange, and are content to have found renewed support during this session from

²⁶ *Ante*, pp. 33-34.

²⁷ *Ante*, pp. 87 ff.

²⁸ *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

²⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 390-393.

³⁰ *Ante*, pp. 167 ff.

³¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1183-1185.

the United Kingdom,³² the Japanese,³³ the Nigerian,³⁴ the Canadian³⁵ and the Netherlands³⁶ delegations. The Soviet Union recently pronounced its support for this measure on the condition that a ban on underground tests was achieved.³⁷ The representative of the United Arab Republic stressed the importance of guaranteeing to all countries—including those with limited, if any, seismological resources of their own—access to an open exchange of seismic data through co-operation. He also recommended that the procedure in case of suspicious events should include some form of verification by challenge, recourse to the Security Council, a review conference and a withdrawal clause.³⁸ Our working paper contains this same sequence except for the review conference, which suggestion we endorse as a very valuable addition.

30. In facing the problem of the apparently still existing demand from some delegations for obligatory on-site inspection, the representative of Ethiopia suggested that at least one on-site inspection per year might be accepted as a confidence-building undertaking.³⁹ The Swedish delegation is quite convinced that, with the present state of the art, sufficient deterrence against cheating can be obtained without obligatory on-site inspections. We feel that, as suggested in our working paper, inspection by invitation “to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting Party” is sufficient.⁴⁰

31. Naturally we would have nothing against an agreement on some rate of obligatory on-site inspections if that turned out to be politically acceptable to the nuclear-weapon Powers. But progress in several domains is certainly moving in such a direction that the importance once attached to on-site inspections is diminishing. The effectiveness of other means of surveillance, not least the satellites, has been greatly increased. We find a clear signal that the wind of change is going against the claim for obligatory on-site inspection in statements made recently by our highly-respected former co-Chairman, Mr. William Foster.

32. To conclude, it has now become evident that the technical aspects of the verification issue should not be the same obstacle as they were in 1963. The decisive considerations are military and political, and the controversy on control will be dissipated the day the nuclear-weapon Powers become politically ready to accede to

³² *Ante*, p. 34.

³³ *Ante*, pp. 89-90.

³⁴ CCD/PV.504, p. 9.

³⁵ *Ante*, p.206.

³⁶ CCD/PV.512, p. 9.

³⁷ See *ante*, p. 213.

³⁸ CCD/PV.509, pp. 14-15.

³⁹ CCD/PV. 498, p. 7.

⁴⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.

the ardent appeal from the rest of the world that nuclear testing should stop.

33. In connexion with the verification issue I could touch upon the possibility of sometimes ascertaining whether nuclear explosions have occurred by measuring increases in the radioactivity of the atmosphere. I raise this point, however, more in order to demonstrate an imperfection in the present fulfilment of obligations under the Moscow Treaty. As our Canadian colleague pointed out in his very thought-provoking statement on 6 April, there is today growing public concern over the increasing frequency of radioactive leakages from underground tests, also beyond and across national borders; and concern also over other potential environmental risks connected with high-yield tests.⁴¹

34. My country has on several occasions observed and measured radioactive debris within our borders. Investigations clearly show their origin to be in nuclear-weapon tests, sometimes in the east and sometimes in the west. Although Sweden has experienced at times a threefold increase in the degree of radioactivity, the levels have not constituted a health hazard. I take it for granted that those technical violations of the Moscow Treaty were the result of miscalculation. Nevertheless, they weaken the integrity of the Treaty. It is therefore our duty to react and to notify the Governments concerned, and this we have done.

35. There now remains just one other point that I want to mention before concluding this statement, which I know has already become regrettably long; but we do now have to deal with details. My last point relates to the desire to construct non-discriminatory rules for the peaceful application of nuclear explosives. We have recently heard some interesting remarks on this question: for instance, by the representative of Pakistan, who in his statement on 23 March recommended that this Committee should devote attention to the political and legal aspects of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions.⁴² The representative of the Netherlands, speaking at our last meeting, also held that "it is part of the task of this Committee to give thought to the arms-control aspects of the subject".⁴³

36. I would prefer, however, to revert at some later time to this highly interesting question of regulating peaceful nuclear explosions. Important as it is, it constitutes an issue bordering upon several other agreements—for instance, the Moscow Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁴⁴ and the non-proliferation Treaty—and also upon the technical tasks of the International Atomic Energy Agency. It could be discussed to some extent apart from our most urgent task, which is that of arriving at an agreement in principle on the complete banning of all nuclear-weapon tests.

⁴¹ *Ante*, p. 204.

⁴² CCD/PV.503, p. 8.

⁴³ CCD/PV.512, pp. 15-16.

⁴⁴ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1967, pp. 69 ff.

37. If we are to make real progress in working out a comprehensive test ban, we cannot continue just to make speeches at one another. We must isolate certain basic elements and reach decisions on how they are to be tackled. To facilitate such "an agreement as to what we have to agree upon", I venture to conclude my statement today by raising six specific questions.

38. First, could any delegation state specific political reasons, contingent upon the present situation—for instance, in connexion with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—why we should make efforts to elaborate a threshold treaty despite the general political and the technical objections to such a solution?

39. Second, are there any corresponding reasons for another partial agreement, such as a phasing-out of underground tests?

40. Third, would delegations prefer an independent treaty banning underground tests; or an addition, in the form of a protocol, to the Moscow Treaty; or, despite the risks involved, the renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty to include underground tests also?

41. Fourth, do delegations wish, for the moment, to work simultaneously on a treaty and on a series of transitional measures facilitating and leading up to a comprehensive solution?

42. Fifth, could the delegations of the nuclear-weapon Powers state their positions as to co-operating in a seismic data exchange when established as a transitional measure?

43. Sixth, could the delegations of the nuclear-weapon Powers state their present positions as to on-site inspection, obligatory on the one hand and by challenge or by invitation on the other?

Statement by the Mexican Representative (Castañeda) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Biological Weapons, May 4, 1971¹

I should like on this occasion to refer to the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. However, it is not my intention to consider the draft convention on the banning of biological weapons only, submitted by nine socialist States on 30 March,² but rather to reiterate our position concerning the serious shortcomings inherent in this partial approach to the problem. This is not the first time that we have done so. When dealing with this topic in the past in commenting on the United Kingdom draft,³ which in our view suffers from the same failing, we have already expressed our views.⁴

45. We are in an awkward position. It is neither pleasant nor easy to express reservations and doubts regarding an agreement on

¹ CCD/PV.513, pp. 15-21.

² *Ahte*, pp. 533-537.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁴ CCD/PV.481, pp. 8 ff.

disarmament reached by the great Powers—that is to say, the States more directly concerned, since those States are affected to a greater degree than the others. Nevertheless we venture to do this, for two reasons. The first is that in our view the specific function of the non-aligned countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament is not to provide systematic political support for the proposals submitted by one or other of the great Powers, but to examine their proposals and agreements critically in the light of the broader interests of the international community as a whole. The second reason is that we consider that the disarmament measure proposed to us is more apparent than real.

46. We have heard and stated in this Conference on numerous occasions the reasons for which a large majority of its members have preferred—and still prefer—a comprehensive approach: in other words, why it is essential that we should consider and settle jointly the prohibition of chemical and of biological weapons. It is unnecessary to repeat those reasons, which are only too well known. However, we are now told that, since it is not possible at present to arrive at an agreement on the whole question, we must be resigned and content ourselves with solving one part of the problem, the prohibition of biological weapons only; and that an attempt will be made later to reach an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

47. If this were the true situation, we should support unreservedly the socialist proposal and should have adopted in the past the United Kingdom proposal. When dealing with disarmament we must be very realistic. At times it is desirable to content oneself with partial measures. It has been said countless times that the best is the enemy of the good; and of course we agree with the judgement.

48. However, we believe that that is not the prevailing situation. What is suggested to us is not a limited but possible agreement instead of a broader but impossible one. What is proposed to us is that we should split, divide, a single entity that must not be divided because that would have very serious unfavourable consequences. The isolated and separate treatment of the exclusive prohibition of biological weapons affects the present prohibition of the use in war of chemical weapons. In other words, it affects the 1925 Geneva Protocol,⁵ and would also prejudice the possibility of prohibiting in the future the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

49. In this connexion I should like to quote the opinion of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), whose authority and prestige are recognized by all. After demonstrating that the adoption of a treaty relating to biological weapons only would be a militarily less significant measure, the report adds:

... because it would split the category of CB weapons in respect of which there has been a single taboo and a single body of law hitherto, and because it would single out

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

biological weapons for abolition while permitting the continued production and possession of chemical weapons, it might come to be understood or construed as an act which in some degree condoned chemical weapons . . .

To the risk of appearing to condone chemical weapons must be added the risk of confusing the public as to what is forbidden by splitting up the traditional unity of CB weapons in law and policy.⁶

50. The Soviet Union itself never considered that the prohibition in isolation of biological weapons alone was merely a second best, a less satisfactory solution than total prohibition, though acceptable in the last analysis. On the contrary, that country regarded it as an intrinsically undesirable and unacceptable solution. In that connexion, in order to prove what I have said, I should like to quote a few short, clear and categorical passages from the working paper submitted by the Soviet Union on 6 August 1970, as follows:

The proposal by the United Kingdom to conclude a convention solely for the prohibition of biological weapons not only fails to solve the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, but in essence means the expansion and legalization of chemical means of warfare. . . .

Chemical and bacteriological weapons have consistently been considered together in view of the common characteristics of these types of weapons of mass destruction. The prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is provided for in a single international instrument—the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Attempts to adopt a different approach to the prohibition of chemical weapons and biological weapons and proposals to provide for their prohibition in separate agreements will mean undermining the existing generally recognized rules of international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol, which adopts a unified approach to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons alike.

51. I venture to repeat the view that in the opinion of the Soviet Union separate, isolated treatment of biological weapons would undermine the existing generally-recognized rules of international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol. The quotation continues:

In these conditions, the implementation of the United Kingdom proposal, which is based on a separate approach to chemical and bacteriological weapons and provides for the prohibition of the latter alone, constitutes a direct danger in that it will promote the build-up by States of arsenals of chemical weapons and increase the risk of the use of such weapons in international conflicts.⁷

52. In the light of these unequivocal and categorical statements, which appear unassailable to us, how can we be convinced a few months later that this draft treaty, which splits the subject in identically the same way and prohibits biological weapons only, is a step forward, a positive contribution which would facilitate future agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons? What new element or event in these past few months could possibly lead us to believe that the very serious consequences anticipated by the Soviet Union could suddenly have become beneficial?

53. What, then, is the meaning of this new proposal? How should it be interpreted by members of this Conference, who were told not long ago that a partial treaty covering biological weapons

⁶ Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*, vol. V: *The Prevention of CBW*, p. 120. Almquist & Wiksell (Stockholm, 1971).

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 387.

only was in itself prejudicial, undesirable and unacceptable? Perhaps the reply should be looked for in the field of chemical and not in that of biological weapons. Perhaps the great Powers which possess chemical weapons have reached the conclusion that they are not ready today to ban the manufacture of such weapons, because they believe it to be very difficult to verify and control that prohibition or for any other reason, and have resigned themselves to the continuance of the existing situation.

54. Thus the draft treaty of the nine socialist countries and the earlier United Kingdom draft may be regarded, not as agreements prohibiting the manufacture of biological weapons, but rather as agreements which do not prohibit the manufacture of chemical weapons. I believe that this is their essential character. They are more important for what they do not contain than for what they do. And in truth they do not contain much. To prohibit biological weapons only is of minor practical importance. As has been reiterated many times in the debate, biological weapons are practically unusable weapons because they represent as great a danger for the user as for the adversary. Moreover, as is well known, there have been several important unilateral declarations renouncing their manufacture and use.

55. But now the argument has been adduced that some unexpected technological advance could emerge, a break-through which would make possible the use of these weapons without danger to the launcher, and that this could happen before the ending of the negotiation of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting simultaneously the two categories of weapons. In order to protect ourselves against this hypothetical situation there are in any case means which do not have the serious disadvantages of the partial treaty. President Nixon, in his declarations of 25 November 1969⁸ and 15 February 1970,⁹ announced the decision of his country to renounce all biological weapons and lethal toxins of an offensive character and pledged the elimination of existing stocks of those weapons. Several other countries have made similar announcements.

56. If the Soviet Union made a similar declaration, that would be sufficient for the formation of a network of unilateral undertakings, not differing in their political effectiveness and practical results from the proposed treaty, which in the final analysis does not establish true international control and leaves to each party the responsibility of complying with its obligations. This would suffice temporarily while a comprehensive treaty for the two types of weapons was being negotiated. Mexico has already proposed this solution in its statement of 23 July 1970.¹⁰

57. The authors of the socialist draft assert that attempts to arrive in the future at an agreement banning chemical weapons

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 592-593.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 5-6.

¹⁰ CCD/PV.481, pp. 12-13.

would not be abandoned, and to this effect they invoke article IX of their draft, according to which—

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction . . .¹¹

We are not insensitive to this argument. Although article IX lays down an imperfect obligation, without sanctions, we recognize the value of such undertakings. Furthermore, this now famous clause was included in a treaty for the first time precisely at the suggestion of Mexico. I refer to article VIII of the non-proliferation Treaty.¹² But those circumstances were very different. The great Powers undertook to negotiate in the future no less than complete disarmament: that is, something so ambitious and distant that it was wise not to postpone the acceptance of a specific and immediate obligation—that of non-proliferation—in the hope of attaining the distant ideal. This same clause, in our view, had less meaning when applied to the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor,¹³ and in the case now before us quite frankly we do not see the need to assume a partial obligation now and to postpone until the future negotiations and agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. On the contrary, we see many reasons for joint negotiations on two questions which are really one, and that here and now.

58. The idea of separating the two questions would be justified only by proof that there were better prospects of reaching agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons in the future than today. But there are not. Historical experience shows rather that, when partial measures of disarmament have been agreed upon in the hope of more comprehensive agreements in the future, the positions tend to crystallize and separate and the difficulties and obstacles to increase with the passage of time. What occurred with the Treaty of Moscow¹⁴ probably proves that disarmament agreements are less difficult to attain before than after.

59. The fact that the memorandum of the twelve non-aligned countries of 25 August 1970¹⁵ and General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV)¹⁶ approved and adopted the idea of treating the two prohibitions jointly is for us one more reason demonstrating that this idea is well founded. The artificial division of the subject and the isolated treatment of biological weapons, the essential feature of the draft of the nine socialist countries, are clearly and directly contrary to an important declaration of the General Assembly of the United Nations.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 193.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, p. 464.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 453-455.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

60. Those are our general points of view, and I believe they coincide with those of other countries in the group of non-aligned States. We realize that the great military Powers have their own reasons and interests, which do not necessarily coincide with the interests and reasons of the international community in general, for preferring another solution. Until they agree on the problem of verification and control—and that is said to be extremely difficult—chemical weapons will continue to be produced and improved. But we believe that the role of the non-aligned countries in the Committee consists not in accepting and resigning themselves to this situation, but in redoubling their efforts for serious negotiation, not in the future but now, of a prohibition of chemical weapons. The non-aligned countries may fail in their attempt, but they are bound to persevere.

61. This goal can be reached if the problems raised by a treaty prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are examined thoroughly and then, if possible, a text proposed for a comprehensive treaty prohibiting both types of weapons. It appears to me that the representative of Yugoslavia, Mr. Božinović, in his statement of 27 April,¹⁷ set the example of what should be done. We invite the representatives of the non-aligned States in the Committee who hold similar aims and ideas to join us in this common task, either during the recess or immediately after the resumption of our work in the summer.

62. Another regrettable consequence of the draft relating to biological weapons only might be that we should devote all our time and effort to considering it in detail, to the detriment of another more urgent and important task. I am referring, of course, to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. The enormous activity on this question which has developed in our Committee lately, the considerable number of new or revived proposals concerning the problem of control and recent technological progress, appear to have opened new prospects for an agreement. This question deserves and requires the highest priority.

63. Here too the non-aligned countries have an important function to perform. At our meetings the possibility has been considered that our group—or some of its members—might on this occasion do something more than merely stress the urgent need for the nuclear Powers to arrive at an agreement. Perhaps—as we believe—the circumstances are propitious for the non-aligned countries to work out and suggest a draft treaty prohibiting underground tests. We appeal again to our colleagues who think as we do to join with us in the collective task of drafting that treaty during the recess or at the summer session.

¹⁷CCD/PV.511, pp. 14 ff.

Statement by the Moroccan Representative (Khattabi) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Bacteriological Weapons, May 6, 1971¹

We have had before us since 30 March a new draft convention on prohibition of the development, manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction.² This draft, submitted by nine socialist countries of which seven are members of the Committee on Disarmament, differs very considerably in the scope of its prohibitions from the original text submitted in a revised form by the same co-sponsors to the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations.³ It approximates within certain limits, however, to the revised draft convention submitted last year by the United Kingdom.⁴ The common aim of both draft conventions is apparently the attempt to find agreement on the elimination of bacterial agents and toxins; but a detailed and objective analysis of the two texts shows that the difference between them remains too large to be ignored.

6. The provisions of the socialist text are based on the principle that prohibition of the use in war of bacteriological means is covered by the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which lays down a generally-recognized rule of international law.⁵ They are aimed essentially at the elimination of bacteriological agents and toxins designed for military purposes. The draft convention of the United Kingdom, by contrast, gives a large place to the use for hostile purposes of microbial agents or other biological agents or of toxins, though it likewise seeks to eliminate them.

7. Article I of the United Kingdom text endorses the prohibition of the use for hostile purposes of microbial agents or other biological agents or of toxins formulated in the Protocol of 1925. Their use is also dealt with in articles III and IV, dealing with the procedure for complaint of non-observance of the provisions of the agreement. In our opinion this method of procedure is likely not only to create confusion about the true objective of the agreement which we have to prepare, but also somewhat to extend the effect of the reservations made by a certain number of States to the Geneva Protocol.

8. The sixth and eighth paragraphs of the preamble and articles I, III and IV of the United Kingdom text give the clear impression that its principal object is to amplify the Geneva Protocol of 1925 by adopting a complaints system applicable essentially to the use of bacteriological agents or of toxins. We all know that the Geneva Protocol does not provide for a complaints procedure in

¹ CCD/PV.514, pp. 6-11.

² *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 533-537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

the event of violation of its provisions by a State party; it only appeals to "the conscience and the practice of nations", so that a certain number of States parties to the Protocol have believed it to be in their interest to formulate reservations. Moreover, in explaining why the United Kingdom introduced into its draft convention provisions applying to "use", its delegation said that many States parties to the Geneva Protocol "entered reservations which had the effect of making this instrument a 'no first use' agreement only."⁶

9. That observation made by Mr. Porter for the United Kingdom delegation was confirmed by that country's present representative, Mr. Hainworth, during his statement of 25 March,⁷ and very recently by Lord Lothian in his statement of 22 April.⁸ There is ground, then, for supposing that the States parties to the Protocol which have not formulated any reservations—for example, my own country—would be induced in some way to accept, through the agreement that we are required to draft, the reservations to the Protocol formulated by other States. This reasoning is all the more correct if we bear in mind that the agreement proposed to us would not apply to chemical weapons. Obviously—and this is truly lamentable—the Geneva Protocol, as was once stated by the representative of the United Kingdom, "means different things to different people."⁹ Thus it is difficult, if only with clarity in view, to conceive of an agreement containing provisions which could lead to confusion or to restrictive or even arbitrary interpretations concerning the meaning which each party would wish to give either to the Protocol or to the new convention.

10. Furthermore, it should be said that article VI of the United Kingdom text, which largely corresponds to article VIII of the socialist text, would apparently suffice to dispel any doubts about the attitude of the different States towards the Geneva Protocol.

11. In his statement of 29 April the representative of Italy, Mr. Caracciolo, pointed out that, whereas the prohibition of use in the Protocol was limited by the reservations, "The United Kingdom draft, on the contrary, provides for a complete prohibition of the use of biological weapons."¹⁰ This observation seems to us pertinent; but who could guarantee that the new convention would not also be whittled down by reservations? In any case, the existence of an agreement prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and of toxins and providing for their destruction would render purposeless the reservations made to the Geneva Protocol concerning the use of bacteriological weapons. It is thus to be hoped that the Powers

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 437-438.

⁷ CCD/PV.504, pp. 32-33.

⁸ CCD/PV.510, p. 6.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 438.

¹⁰ CCD/PV.512, pp. 6-7.

directly interested will give us their opinion on this precise question.

12. I pass now to article II of the revised draft convention of the United Kingdom, which corresponds in general to articles I, II and III of the draft convention of the socialist countries, to point out first of all the difference in form between the two texts.

13. The United Kingdom draft covers "the production or acquisition of . . . microbial or other biological agents or toxins"; whereas the socialist draft refers to the commitment "not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire . . . microbiological or other biological agents or toxins" (*article I, (1)*). It will be noted that this draft contains certain terms embodied in United Nations decisions; and this appears to us entirely pertinent.

14. It is beyond dispute that the provisions of an international agreement to execute effective measures of disarmament must be devised and formulated in clear and exact terms. Let us consider, for instance, article II (a, i) of the United Kingdom text and article I (1) of the socialist text, which prohibit bacteriological agents and toxins "of such types and in such quantities as are not designed [or are not justified] for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes." I must confess that this expression is hardly reassuring, for it awakens a doubt concerning the "products" which we are trying to prohibit.

15. In my opinion it would be more effective and practical to specify that the prohibition would apply to weapons produced from bacteriological agents or toxins. That precision would in no way affect the production of biological agents for peaceful purposes. As a matter of fact, the socialist draft convention contains a clause dealing with this point: article X (2), which stipulates that the convention—

. . . shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development . . . or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities . . .

16. Still on article II of the United Kingdom draft convention, I must say that I have not fully understood the wording of sub-paragraph (c) concerning the destruction or conversion to peaceful purposes of all stocks of agents or toxins or ancillary equipment "within three months after the Convention comes into force for that Party." I stress the words "for that Party". Does this mean that the entry into force of the convention would depend upon the deposit by all signatory States of their instruments of ratification? In any event, the expression "for that Party" appears to us superfluous, because in our opinion it will be necessary to establish a clear distinction between the coming into force of an instrument and the attitude towards it of particular signatory States.

17. I come now to the question of the complaints procedure provided in each of the two texts. In my speech of 25 March I stated that we shared the view of those delegations which did not

want the new convention to deal with the use of bacteriological and chemical weapons, since this was banned by the Protocol of 1925.¹¹ Similarly, as I explained a moment ago, a new agreement largely applicable to the use of bacteriological weapons would only cause difficulties. It is unnecessary, therefore, to emphasize this and to point out that article III of the United Kingdom text provides a complaints procedure applicable in part to the use of bacteriological means of warfare.

18. In this connexion we cannot help doubting whether a complaints procedure, however effective, could have any practical value if bacteriological means of warfare were used against an adversary, because their use would inevitably lead to quite unpredictable catastrophe and disaster. The need is therefore to prevent the use of these weapons by banning their development, manufacture and stockpiling and eliminating them effectively.

19. The provision of article IV of the United Kingdom draft that each party declares its intention to furnish "appropriate assistance" is highly important. However, we should like that clause to be tied, not particularly to use, but generally to any violation of the convention.

20. After that comment I should like to point out that articles IV, V, VI and VII of the socialist draft meet to a reasonable extent the frequently-expressed need for a combination of appropriate national and international measures capable of ensuring compliance with the convention and laying down a suitable system of control and complaint. These provisions are appropriately supplemented and strengthened by article X, which provides a means of exchange and co-operation between States parties to the convention in scientific activities related to the use of bacteriological (biological) substances for peaceful purposes.

21. The observations made by the representative of Argentina on 29 April on article IV of the socialist draft, which stipulates that "Each State Party to the Convention shall be internationally responsible for compliance with its provisions by legal or physical persons of that State", deserve our close attention. Mr. de La Guardia made a concrete suggestion for delimiting more precisely the responsibility of States parties.¹²

22. On the question whether a complaint of violation should be made first to the Secretary-General of the United Nations or directly to the Security Council, my delegation will speak later. We feel, however, that it would probably be better to have regard to the special nature of the agreement and also to past experience.

23. Let me say again that we attach growing importance to the search for an agreement on the total and final elimination of all means of warfare, chemical as well as bacteriological, in accord-

¹¹ CCD/PV.504, p. 16.

¹² CCD/PV.512, pp. 18 ff.

ance with resolution 2662 (XXV) by which the General Assembly of the United Nations has requested us to continue consideration—

... of the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons and to their elimination from the arsenals of all States.¹³

24. Though we acknowledge the efforts various delegations have made to achieve a concerted and widely-acceptable agreement, we cannot help noting with some bitterness that the two draft conventions now before us offer only a faint glimmer of hope of the elimination of chemical weapons. Article V of the United Kingdom text alludes only vaguely to the achievement of later measures to strengthen—to use the language of the article—“the existing constraints on chemical methods of warfare”, the reference being to what other States regard as a categorical prohibition of the use of these methods by the Protocol of 17 June 1925. Article IX of the socialist draft seems too weak to be reassuring.

25. Nevertheless, without wishing to over-emphasize the proposals contained in our working paper¹⁴ and in my statement of 25 March, I should like to suggest that the article dealing with chemical means of warfare should be so worded as to contain the following provisions:

First, all States parties to the convention accept the principle of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their means of delivery.

Second, all States parties undertake to contribute to continued negotiations on effective measures, including the adoption of an appropriate system of verification, with a view to reaching as soon as possible an agreement on the prohibition and destruction of those weapons and their means of delivery.

Third, it should be possible to declare a moratorium on chemical weapons pending the conclusion of an agreement on their elimination.

26. It would indeed be deplorable if chemical weapons, which are unceasingly condemned by the international community, continued to be regarded as means of warfare, deterrence and reprisal. It is therefore our duty to continue to work unremittingly at the question of chemical weapons, because their elimination would constitute, more than that of bacteriological weapons, a genuine measure of disarmament. That is why the principle of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons should be restated in the provisions of the convention, which would prohibit bacteriological weapons as a first step and embody an express undertaking to continue serious and uninterrupted consideration of the problem of chemical weapons.

¹³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 341-342.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Bacteriological Weapons, May 6, 1971¹

27. In connexion with the statement made at our meeting on 4 May by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Castañeda, we should like to give some explanations and put forward some considerations. In referring to the working document presented by the Soviet Union on 6 August 1970,² which contains a criticism of the United Kingdom proposal to conclude a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons,³ the representative of Mexico raised the following question:

"What new element or event in these past few months could possibly lead us to believe that the very serious consequences anticipated by the Soviet Union could suddenly have become beneficial?"⁴

28. Before replying to that question we should like once again to emphasize, as on previous occasions, that the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, in their position of principle, base themselves on the need for the total prohibition and liquidation of both chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. We did not believe previously, nor do we believe now, that it would be expedient to prohibit only bacteriological weapons and to leave chemical means of warfare outside the prohibition. Therefore attempts to interpret the position of the socialist States in any other way cannot be considered as well-founded. It was precisely the socialist countries that put forward draft conventions on the complete cessation of the production of both chemical and bacteriological weapons and on their destruction.⁵ We adhere as before to the positions contained in those drafts, and we should be very well satisfied if governments were to reach agreement on the total prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons on the basis of those drafts.

29. On many occasions during the present session of the Committee the delegations of the socialist countries have declared their readiness to continue negotiations on the prohibition of both those types of weapons of mass destruction. In the light of this we should like to point out that the most important points of our criticism of the United Kingdom draft are that its adoption would lead to the undermining of the existing generally-recognized rule of international law contained in the Geneva Protocol,⁶ and that the draft could not ensure the necessary basis for making progress towards the solution of the problem of eliminating the arsenals of chemical weapons. That criticism remains valid.

¹ CCD/PV.514, pp. 12-16.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 385-388.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 272.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 455-457; *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

30. It was precisely on the basis of that critical appraisal of the United Kingdom draft that the socialist countries introduced their own draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins,⁷ which differs essentially from the United Kingdom draft in that the draft of the socialist countries is intended to obviate those phenomena which would occur if the United Kingdom proposal were adopted. Thus, in order to prevent the undermining of the existing rule of international law contained in the Geneva Protocol, which provides for the prohibition of the use of all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the draft convention of the socialist countries, first of all, does not contain a provision similar to that in the United Kingdom draft prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons.

31. In our statement on 27 April we said:

... We based ourselves on the premise that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 clearly and unequivocally prohibited the use of all types of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. That prohibition is a generally-recognized rule of international law.

We pointed out that—

... any attempt, even on the pretext of strengthening the Geneva Protocol, to settle the question of the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons in another document under international law could only weaken and detract from the significance of the Protocol.⁸

32. Secondly, the inclusion in the draft of the socialist countries of a number of provisions which do not appear in the United Kingdom draft reinforces, as we have already indicated, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

33. Thus our criticisms of the United Kingdom draft convention in connexion with the danger of weakening the Geneva Protocol remain completely valid. It is precisely for the purpose of obviating that danger that the socialist draft convention contains very important provisions aimed at further strengthening the Protocol.

34. In order to achieve the total prohibition of chemical weapons, the draft convention of the socialist countries, in contrast to that of the United Kingdom, provides, as we have already indicated, for the assumption by States of clearly-defined obligations in regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons. The draft convention of the socialist countries contains provisions concerning the obligation of the parties to the convention to conduct negotiations in good faith on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons (article IX). In the twelfth paragraph of the preamble to the draft convention it is also stated that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons will facilitate the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare. Article XII on the convening of a conference to review the operation of the convention states that the conference should

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 258.

examine the question of how the obligation concerning the prohibition of chemical means of warfare is being implemented.

35. The aforesaid provisions of the draft convention of the socialist countries concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons establish important prerequisites of an international legal character for making progress in solving this problem. As a result of their adoption the situation in the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons will be considerably improved in comparison with that existing at the present time.

36. All this shows quite clearly that in regard to the most important aspects of the problem of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons the socialist countries adhere to the positions which were previously held by them in discussing this problem.

37. What has happened since the submission of the working paper referred to by the representative of Mexico which contained a criticism of the United Kingdom draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons? In those months during which the delegations of the socialist countries endeavoured to secure the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, it became quite clear that the conclusion of an agreement on that basis was not feasible at the present time. As is well known, the United States and the countries which support it declared themselves against working on the draft convention proposed by the socialist countries.

38. In analysing the situation thus created, we realized that it was impossible not to come to the conclusion that owing to the negative attitude of the Western Powers the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons were virtually in a deadlock and that the achievement of agreement on the problem as a whole was not possible at the present time. The absence of agreement in this area at the present stage casts doubt on the possibility of working out an agreement in the foreseeable future which would receive wide support throughout the world and to which the militarily-important States capable of producing and stockpiling chemical and bacteriological weapons would be parties. Delay in making progress in the question of prohibiting these types of weapons is an obstacle to the constructive consideration and solution of other disarmament problems, gives rise to an attitude of pessimism and, in fact, undermines efforts aimed at achieving positive results in disarmament negotiations.

39. Together with our colleagues representing the other socialist countries, we have emphasized that we propose the conclusion of an agreement on the basis of the draft convention submitted by our delegations in order to extricate the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons from the deadlock created by the Western Powers and thereby take the first step towards the elimination of these types of weapons from the arsenals of all States.

40. In taking the decision to put forward a new draft convention, namely one concerning the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins, the socialist countries have taken fully into account the views and considerations expressed by other members of the Committee, including the Mexican delegation. We refer to the statement made by Mr. Garcia Robles, who said that the Mexican delegation, although it is in favour of a more comprehensive approach, nevertheless "is prepared to do all it can to achieve a solution satisfactory to all".⁹ We refer also to the statement made by Mr. Castañeda that—

While the possibility of an agreement encompassing both chemical and bacteriological weapons recedes, the danger grows that untimely advances in technology will permit the use of biological weapons without risk to the users. Apparently today these weapons can hardly be used because of that risk; but the situation could change radically in a short time. Thus, it is asserted, the Committee ought to agree forthwith on the prohibition of biological weapons without awaiting the conclusion of a more difficult and thus more remote agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. That is the weightiest argument adduced in favour of a separate and immediate treaty on biological weapons. I must confess that it has not failed to impress me.¹⁰

41. In this connexion we would point out that it seems to us that the statement made by Mr. Castañeda at our last meeting that—

... quite frankly we do not see the need to assume a partial obligation now and to postpone until the future negotiations and agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons—

does not correspond with what he had stated previously in this regard. In his statement on 4 May Mr. Castañeda expressed the opinion that, failing the conclusion of an international convention prohibiting biological weapons, the Soviet Union might make a unilateral declaration of renunciation of such weapons.¹¹

42. In this connexion we should like to emphasize above all that the solution of such a question is a matter of choice for each individual State. On numerous occasions the Soviet delegation has stated that unilateral declarations cannot achieve the same purpose as international agreements. In this respect we fully support the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, to the effect that—

... unilateral decisions can be no substitute for internationally-binding agreements ... And it is, of course, preferable to arrive at a state of affairs in which we shall have an international treaty so that all renunciations will have the same and, we hold, maximum coverage.¹²

A similar statement was made by the representative of the United Arab Republic.¹³

43. In conclusion we should like to point out that, as our delegation has been able to gather from the statements made by various members in the Committee and from their conversations

⁹ CCD/PV.449, p. 27.

¹⁰ CCD/PV.481, p. 12.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 273.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 338.

¹³ CCD/PV.490, p. 15.

with delegations of the socialist countries co-sponsors of the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, the majority of the delegations in the Committee have displayed an understanding attitude towards the new initiative of the socialist countries and have set about the consideration of that draft in a business-like manner. We hope that the discussion of this and the Committee's work on the subject will contribute to the speedy conclusion of an agreement which will put an end for all time to one of the three types of weapons of mass destruction, namely bacteriological (biological) means of warfare.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, May 13, 1971¹

26. It is useful, as we come to the end of the spring session, to review briefly the status of our efforts and the prospects for the summer; and I should like to take a few minutes this morning to do that.

27. In President Nixon's statement to the opening meeting of this Committee on 23 February he expressed the belief that an opportunity for progress existed in the field of chemical and biological and toxin weapons; and he stressed particularly the desirability of achieving a convention on biological weapons.² The United States has for some time maintained that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should begin without delay to work on a convention on biological weapons, since the Committee has been in substantial agreement on the problems of prohibiting biological weapons and since these weapons are particularly dangerous instruments of mass destruction. This is the course which was originally charted by the Government of the United Kingdom almost two years ago with the tabling of its first convention on biological warfare.³ My Government is pleased that, with the submission of a convention on biological weapons by the Soviet Union and its allies⁴ which in many respects is closely modelled on the United Kingdom draft,⁵ the negotiation of a convention prohibiting the acquisition and possession of biological weapons has become an imminent prospect.

28. Much work remains to be done in the Committee before the convention becomes a reality. The Committee is now, however, an experienced negotiating body. It should be able by the end of the summer session, without sacrificing the attention which should be given to other subjects, to develop a draft which in all essential respects meets the requirements of the task. President Nixon, in his message of 23 February to this Committee, made it clear that the United States is also determined to pursue the task of finding

¹ CCD/PV.516, pp. 11-15.

² *Ante*, p. 20.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 324-326.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 432-436.

solutions to the difficult problems of verifying controls on chemical weapons. We believe that the negotiation of a convention on biological warfare should not detract from or delay our efforts in this regard.

29. We have put before the Committee during the current session the findings of some recent research on verification.⁶ While these findings were not encouraging in themselves, it is a necessary part of our work to study all possible approaches to the problem and face up to the results even when they reveal serious difficulties. We look forward to participating in the meeting of experts on chemical weapon verification which your delegation, Mr. Chairman, together with some other delegations, has requested for this summer; and we look forward to hearing the contributions of various delegations on this subject.

30. The question of a ban on underground nuclear tests has received a good deal of attention during the present session. Many delegations have presented thoughtful comments and specific suggestions, including the delegations of Canada, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, Sweden, and others. There will be much to discuss when the Committee reconvenes, and the United States delegation will participate fully in these discussions in our summer session.

31. With regard to the question of verification of a comprehensive test ban, the United States position has not changed. The United States continues to believe that adequate verification requires on-site inspection. The field of seismology deserves continued study and development. The United States, for its part, is engaged in a large-scale and costly programme of research in this area.

32. Recently Dr. Eric Willis, the Director of the Nuclear Monitoring Research Office of our Advanced Research Projects Agency, described this programme in a briefing here in Geneva, which many of you heard. As Dr. Willis made clear, two of the most promising developments—the installation of two new large seismic arrays and the research made possible by new and more sensitive instruments for the study of long-period seismic waves—are still at an early stage. Dr. Willis also reviewed while here the status of the current technology, and indicated that under current circumstances the differentiation between naturally-occurring seismic events and nuclear explosions remains an unsolved problem in some cases. It is not possible to say how much future developments in the field of seismic research will improve our present capabilities; but we are hopeful that our common understanding of the verification issues can be substantially advanced. We intend, meanwhile, to participate actively in the Committee's examination of the current state of the art.

33. Other nuclear arms-control measures which have been given

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 154 ff.

some attention in the Committee this session are a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the creation of nuclear-free zones. The United States has been particularly gratified by the expressions of support for its cut-off proposal.⁷ It has been argued in the past that the cut-off would be an illusory measure given the quantities of fissionable material already accumulated. It seems to me quite plain, however, that the more fissionable material produced, the greater will be the difficulty of establishing controls over it. Implementation of the United States suggestion, which would involve placing a limit on the size of stocks of nuclear-weapons material, could become truly significant over the long run, if not immediately, as a brake on the nuclear arms race. The adoption of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection for the cut-off would also be a step towards establishing a more universal system of safeguards on fissionable-material production.

34. During the period covered by the session the United States gave further evidence of its support for the establishment of nuclear-free zones in appropriate areas and under appropriate circumstances. I am pleased to inform the Committee that the President of the United States has ratified Additional Protocol II to the Treaty of Tlatelolco,⁸ pursuant to the advice and consent of the United States Senate, and that our instruments of ratification were deposited in Mexico City yesterday. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a major regional initiative; and it is an encouraging example of the progress in arms control that can be made on a regional basis.

35. While I am reviewing developments in the field of nuclear-arms control, I would like to pay tribute to the extraordinarily successful conclusion during last month of the work in the IAEA on safeguard guidelines.⁹ This step is a milestone on the road to full implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty.¹⁰ Safeguards agreements have already been negotiated by Finland and Austria,¹¹ and negotiations are currently under way with about thirty additional countries. I hope, and believe, that we can now look forward to the early conclusion of many more safeguard agreements with the IAEA and to further ratifications of the Treaty.

36. If progress is to be made toward general and complete disarmament—as all of us believe it should—the problems of limiting conventional arms need to be addressed by this Committee just as surely as the problems of nuclear arms need to be attacked and answered. However, in my view, not enough attention has been paid to the issue this year.

37. In his message to this Committee at the beginning of this

⁷ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 158 ff.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69-83.

⁹ *Ahte*, pp. 218-244.

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹¹ INFIRC/155 and 156.

session President Nixon stressed that—

When such a vast proportion of all expenditures on armaments is being devoted to these weapons, all States, in all stages of development, share a common interest in exploring the possible paths toward sound agreements consistent with their security interests.¹²

As the President's statement indicates, it is not the intention of the United States that conventional arms restraints would apply only to the developing countries. They should apply as well to the major military States. In this connexion the United States has supported and continues to support efforts towards mutual force reductions in Europe. As President Nixon noted in his Report to Congress on 25 February, the United States Government has undertaken an intensive analysis of the issues to be considered in an agreement to reduce the force of NATO and the Warsaw Pact.¹³ The United States study is designed to achieve better understanding of this complex subject, and is intended to contribute to NATO work on the subject.

38. Having expressed my Government's continuing interest in achieving this and other regional arms-limitation agreements, I must repeat what I said in a statement before this Committee last August:

... time is not on our side. The rapid advances of technology and the diffusion of production know-how in the military armaments field are bound to increase the problems of establishing restraints on conventional armaments.¹⁴

It is frankly a disappointment, therefore, that so little interest has been shown in this subject within the Committee.

39. A number of speakers at this session have commented on the spiralling figures for world military expenditures. Limitations on conventional as well as nuclear weapons could release much-needed resources for non-military purposes. The United States Government welcomes the study currently being carried out by a body of experts under the supervision of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race. The United Nations Secretariat has sent a questionnaire to Member States as a preliminary to compiling the necessary statistical data for the study.¹⁵ My Government will be co-operating fully in answering that questionnaire.¹⁶ We hope that other governments will co-operate similarly. We look forward to the publication of the results of the United Nations study,¹⁷ which should help our Committee in its work.

40. Finally, as our spring session concludes, I should like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Pastinen, the Alternate Representative, Mr. Epstein, and the members of the United Nations staff here in the Palais des Nations

¹² *Ante*, p. 21.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 44 ff.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 421.

¹⁵ See *ante*, pp. 75-77.

¹⁶ The U.S. reply appears *post*, pp. 316-342.

¹⁷ For the U.N. report, see *post*, pp. 644-686.

for the excellent support which they have continued to provide for our operation in Geneva.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, May 13, 1971¹

41. Today the Committee on Disarmament is ending its spring session. The discussions at this session have raised a wide range of disarmament problems both of a general character and concerning partial measures in this field. It seems desirable to analyse, at least in a very general way, the course of the negotiations that have taken place and to sum up the results of the session's work. This would help us to use the forthcoming recess of the negotiations in order to be better prepared for the summer session of the Committee, at which it will be necessary to carry out important and intensive work so as to enable us to submit to the General Assembly of the United Nations a report on the positive results of our talks.

42. Recently—and this has been reflected in the resolutions of the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly, to which reference has been made by many delegations during the present session—an important place in our discussions has been occupied by the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. We regard as a positive factor in the Committee's work the fact that it devoted its main attention to this question.

43. The delegation of the USSR stated at the beginning of the past session and reaffirms today that, in our opinion, the most appropriate basis for a radical solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on their destruction, submitted by nine socialist countries.² If the negotiations had developed around this document, the Soviet side would have been ready to conduct them in the most constructive spirit in order to achieve positive results.

44. Unfortunately this did not happen. The consideration in the Committee of the question of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological means of warfare showed quite clearly that a solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of these agents on the basis that had been proposed by the socialist countries proved at the present time unfeasible. The negative attitude of the United States of America and some other Western Powers, which are unwilling to agree to the renunciation of chemical weapons, in fact blocked a comprehensive solution of the problem of prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons.

¹ CCD/PV.516, pp. 15-20.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 533-537.

45. Desiring to extricate the matter from the deadlock and to direct the negotiations into the channel of practical work, the socialist countries co-sponsors of the draft convention on chemical and bacteriological weapons, as is known, proposed as a first step to agree to the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins, and submitted a corresponding draft convention.³ On the significance of this step our delegation and the delegations of the other socialist countries co-sponsors of the new draft convention have already spoken in sufficient detail. Today we should merely like to stress that the draft convention of the socialist countries is based on the need for the States parties to this convention to assume firm obligations regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons. This has been reflected in the fact that the convention confirms the importance of the rule of international law prohibiting the use of all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons which is contained in the Geneva Protocol of 1925,⁴ and the convention also has a provision concerning the obligation of the parties to conduct negotiations on the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare (article IX).

46. During the discussion of this problem many delegations expressed their views and made specific comments on the draft convention that had been submitted. We evaluate as positive the fact that many delegations proceeded to the practical discussion of the text of the draft convention of the socialist countries and of other proposals on this problem. The Soviet side will give every attention to the comments expressed in regard to this draft and will study them carefully. We are ready to make every effort in order that the work of the Committee during the summer session on an agreement to prohibit bacteriological weapons and toxins may be as productive as possible.

47. The Soviet side will not slacken its efforts to achieve the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare. Success in the negotiations on this problem depends, of course, in the first place on the readiness of States to adopt the appropriate political decision. Until there is such readiness, until agreement is reached on questions of principle in regard to the prohibition of chemical means of warfare, the discussion of particular questions connected with this prohibition—for example, the technical aspects of control—will merely sidetrack the discussion and divert attention from the substance of the problem. This could be used as a convenient screen by those who are unwilling to give up chemical weapons. As for the Soviet side, it is ready to continue negotiations on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical means of warfare on the basis of the draft of the nine socialist countries submitted at the United Nations General Assembly on 23 October 1970, in which, as is well known, questions of control are also dealt with in detail.

³ *Akte*, pp. 190-194.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

48. Great attention has been given in the statements of many representatives during the past session of the Committee to questions of nuclear disarmament. This is quite understandable: whatever aspects of disarmament are concerned, the core of this problem is the question of prohibiting nuclear weapons and eliminating them from the arsenals of States as the most devastating means of mass annihilation.

49. At the centre of our discussions there were also such questions as the curbing of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests, a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, and so on. Unfortunately, in the field of nuclear disarmament—and this must be quite frankly acknowledged—we still have not succeeded in proceeding to practical negotiations and to the discussion of specific draft agreements, their individual formulations, articles and so forth. On most of these problems radical divergencies of view still stand in the way of their solution.

50. A significant example in this respect is the question of putting an end to underground nuclear weapon tests. The Soviet Union considers that the solution of this problem is vital and urgent. It would be of great international significance and would have a favourable influence on the prospects of solving the problem of nuclear disarmament as a whole. During the present session the Soviet delegation has again explained the position of the USSR on this subject.⁵

51. We have pointed out that the Soviet side, as in previous years, holds the view that all experiments with nuclear weapons in this environment can be ended by all States under an agreement the fulfilment of which would be guaranteed by national means of detection. We believe that in present-day conditions it is impossible to carry out underground nuclear explosions secretly. On the other hand, the United States continues to insist on the requirement of international on-site inspection, for which in view of the present-day level of development of science and technology there is no need at all. Such a requirement is an obstacle to the achievement of an agreement.

52. At past meetings of the Committee various views have been expressed on the problem of curbing the nuclear arms race. During the recess our delegation will study and analyse with all earnestness the considerations which have been put forward here, as will also, it is to be supposed, the other members of the Committee. In making such an analysis, of course, it will be necessary to bear in mind that the problem of disarmament is directly linked with exceedingly complicated military and technical aspects, and negotiations on this problem can be effective only when the security interests of all States are taken into account to

⁵ *Ante*, p. 26; pp. 211 ff.

an equal degree and no one seeks unilateral advantages. In the field of nuclear disarmament all States can be duly guaranteed the same security, if all the nuclear Powers are parties to the agreements on such disarmament.

53. As has been repeatedly pointed out in resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly and in the statements of delegations in the Committee, the ultimate result of our negotiations should be the achievement of agreement on general and complete disarmament. In the course of the present session the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have declared their readiness to exert efforts aimed at a positive solution of this fundamental problem. We note with satisfaction that many non-aligned States are showing great interest in the question of general and complete disarmament. At the same time one cannot but note that in the discussion on general and complete disarmament no positive changes for the better have been achieved and that, as a matter of fact, genuine negotiations on this problem are not being conducted. The reason for this situation is that the United States of America and some other Western Powers are not showing any interest in this question, as is quite evident from the course of the work of the session of the Committee which is ending today.

54. The Soviet delegation has already pointed out that the negotiations in the Committee on specific problems of disarmament can be carried on in a businesslike, constructive manner only if all sides take an active part in discussing them; the assumption of obligations in regard to measures of disarmament or the limitation of the arms race should affect the maximum number of States. All this applies in even greater measure to the problem of general and complete disarmament.

55. The Soviet delegation would like to confirm that it will make persistent efforts also in the future to achieve real results in the negotiations on general and complete disarmament. In this connexion we should like to recall once more the statement made by Leonid Brezhnev at the twenty-fourth congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to the effect that—

The struggle to halt the nuclear and conventional arms races, to achieve disarmament—right up to general and complete disarmament—will continue to be one of the major directions of the foreign-policy activities of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet State.⁶

56. In conclusion we should like to express the hope that the members of the Committee will take advantage of the forthcoming recess to study further and work out all the problems under consideration by the Committee, with a view to achieving positive results in the field of disarmament which the Committee could report to the forthcoming twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 196.

57. We should also like to take this opportunity to express our satisfaction and gratitude to the Representatives of the Secretary-General, the Secretariat and all its members who have facilitated our work, for having so well organized and provided for the activities of the Committee on Disarmament.

**Address by CPSU General Secretary Brezhnev at Tbilisi [Extract],
May 14, 1971⁷**

In connection with the West's reaction to the proposals advanced at the Congress, I should like to note the following detail. Some NATO countries are displaying an appreciable interest, and in part some nervousness as well, on the question of the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Their representatives ask: Whose armed forces—foreign or national—and what armaments—nuclear or conventional—are to be reduced? Perhaps, they ask, the Soviet proposals embrace all this taken together? In this connection, we too have a question to ask: Do not such curious people resemble a person who tries to judge the taste of a wine by its appearance alone, without touching it? If there is any vagueness, this can certainly be eliminated. All that is necessary is to muster the resolve to “taste” the proposals that interest you, which, translated into diplomatic language, means to enter into negotiations. (*Applause.*)

**Statement by President Nixon on Military Forces in Europe, May
15, 1971¹**

At this point in time, it would be an error of historic dimensions for any of the North Atlantic Treaty allies to reduce unilaterally the military forces maintained in Europe for the common defense.

As the most powerful member of the Alliance, the United States bears a responsibility for leadership.

Let us persevere to carry forward the policy of this Nation under five successive Presidents representing both political parties, confident that our united strength will promote the enduring peace we seek.

⁷*Pravda*, May 15, 1971, p. 3; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 20 (June 15, 1971), p. 5.

¹*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 24, 1971, p. 772. Former Presidents Johnson and Truman publicly supported the statement (*ibid.*, p. 773).

Television-Radio Interview With Secretary of State Rogers: Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe [Extract], May 16, 1971¹

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, the Soviet Union this week called on the Western Powers to start negotiating on a reduction of military forces and armaments in Central Europe, and the administration said it welcomed the proposal. What does the administration reaction mean in a practical way? How are you following up the proposal?

Secretary Rogers: Well, in the first place, we are asking our Ambassador in Moscow to talk to the Soviet officials for certain clarifications that are necessary to understand fully what Mr. Brezhnev had in mind.² Secondly, I will be going to the NATO meeting in the next couple of weeks, and we will discuss with our allies there how we could proceed to negotiate with the Soviet Union, if that seems to be practical.

Mr. Valeriani: What clarification are you seeking from the Russians?

Secretary Rogers: Well, it was a little vague what he had in mind. He talked about tasting wine and so forth, and we want to be sure that we understand that. He said we shouldn't ask about the wine, we should drink it first; and we would like to know first: Is it wine, and is it sweet wine or is it sour? We want to be sure, in other words, that this has some potential for success. We don't have any desire for a conference unless it could be meaningful. On the other hand, we are very anxious to negotiate with the Soviet Union on a mutual reduction of our force levels in Europe, and we have indicated that to the Soviet Union for some time now.

Mr. Valeriani: Senator Mansfield says a definite date should now be set for the start of negotiations, perhaps as early as next month. Are you willing to begin negotiations that soon?

Secretary Rogers: We are willing to begin negotiations with the Soviet Union on mutual and balanced force reductions. We have been willing for some time. In fact, in the last NATO meeting we made it clear in our communique we were prepared to negotiate with them.³ Up to this time they have never indicated a willingness to do that. They have said we have to have a European security conference and after that we will discuss mutual and balanced force reductions. Now, if the Soviet position is changed, it is a very worthwhile, I think, move. We would be glad to

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 7, 1971, pp. 734-736.

² The Brezhnev statement appears *ante*, p. 293.

³ See *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 667 ff.

consider it, and if it is significant, if there has been a significant change in their position, we welcome it.

Mr. Valeriani: Mr. Secretary, even if no agreement can be negotiated on a mutual reduction, why is the administration so rigid about the present force levels? The implication seems to be that our European allies do not trust the American commitment to NATO unless that commitment is backed up by a large number of American forces on the ground.

Secretary Rogers: President Nixon has had a very careful study made of the requirements of our force levels in Europe, and at the last NATO meeting we decided, together with our allies, that the present force levels were just right, that if we reduced our force levels by any such number or, in fact, any reduction at this time, it would be very destabilizing. We have about enough strength there to be a deterrent to the Soviet Union to prevent any conventional attack, we believe.

Now, if we reduce our force levels in Europe at this time, we think it would be a very dangerous situation. We would want to do it in the context of a mutual and balanced force reduction. Why should we in the United States reduce unilaterally and thereby kiss goodbye to any chance that we might have to negotiate successfully to reduce the Soviet presence? And the tensions in Europe could be reduced if we could have a mutual and balanced force reduction, and that is our objective.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, President Eisenhower said many years ago that we could do with far fewer troops in Europe. I think he talked about one or two divisions, as contrasted with the present four-plus divisions, and more recently Defense Secretary Laird said that the level of the troops would be decided after the fiscal '71 budget.⁴ Now, what makes the present level so sacrosanct in view of both President Eisenhower's remarks many years ago and Defense Secretary Laird's judgment about a year and a half ago?

Secretary Rogers: I don't think President Eisenhower would have the same view today if he were here, and if you will notice, yesterday most of the previous officials in Government who know very much about the NATO structure support President Nixon's position completely.

We need those troops there for the reasons that I just mentioned. We have had a very careful study made of the present

⁴Authorization for Military Procurement, Research and Development, Fiscal Year 1971 and Reserve Strength: Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Ninety-first Congress, Second Session, on S. 3367 and H.R. 17123, To Authorize Appropriations During the Fiscal Year 1971 for Procurement of Aircraft, Missiles, Naval Vessels, and Tracked Combat Vehicles, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation for the Armed Forces and To Prescribe the Authorized Personnel Strength of the Selected Reserve of Each Reserve Component of the Armed Forces, and for Other Purposes, pt. 1, p. 40.

situation, and I am fully convinced that we need those troops there.

Now, that is not to say that we must never reduce the troops, but we want to have in Europe sufficient conventional strength so that we do not have to rely on a nuclear deterrent, and the point is that the present troop force level in Europe is about the same as the Warsaw Pact strength, and we do not want to provide any incentive to the Russians to make any move in the conventional sense.

Now, we have told our allies that this is our position. They have agreed to beef up their contribution. They are going to provide a billion dollars more in the next 5 years, and we have also told them that if any change is to be made, we will do it after careful consultation with them.

Now, any such move, as suggested by Senator Mansfield, I believe, would be disastrous to our foreign policy. Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the troops that we have in Europe are not to protect Europe solely; they are to protect us. This is an alliance that has worked well since World War II. It has provided peace in that area of the world, and the idea somehow that we have our troops in Europe just to protect Europe is fallacious.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, I would like to ask you a question about the Nixon doctrine in connection with this crisis that has blown up rather suddenly.

Secretary Rogers: Well, it really isn't a crisis; it is just an argument in Congress.

Mr. Lisagor: Well, Senator Mansfield says you are engaged in overkill, in any case, with this array of formidable people you have called up.

Secretary Rogers: We would like to get a good substantial vote in favor of President Nixon.

Mr. Lisagor: Back to the Nixon doctrine. Doesn't that say that we will merely help those areas to help themselves, and isn't Europe in a better position really to defend itself today than any other area in the world? So why do we then continue to have a 300,000-man force in Europe?

Secretary Rogers: Well, I don't agree with your premise. The Soviet Union has a large military force in the Warsaw Pact area, and they are phased off against the NATO forces, and if we withdraw 150,000 Americans from that area of the world, it would be very destabilizing and present a very dangerous picture in my opinion. So I think we need them there.

Furthermore, Mr. Lisagor, I think you have to keep in mind that under President Nixon's doctrine of reducing our troop levels throughout the world, we have made very substantial reductions. People seem to forget that.

Since this administration has been in office, we have cut down the overall strength of our military capacity in terms of men about 650,000, and we are going to cut down some more, but we can't do it in this way. This is obviously the wrong way to do it, and it would be a very dangerous situation, and I have been very pleased that most editorial comments and comments from people who are thoughtful about it realize it would be very irresponsible for the Senate to pass Senator Mansfield's amendment.⁵

Mr. Trewhitt: You mentioned that you are ready for mutual balanced force reductions. What kind of forum do you have in mind? Are you talking about alliance negotiations or these negotiations within the context of European security?

Secretary Rogers: We don't much care about the exact forum as long as it is a forum that looks as though it might result in some progress. We have, up to this point, favored a European security conference which would include all of the European nations and the United States and Canada, provided that it deals with the subjects of security, provided that it deals with mutual and balanced force reductions.

Now, if the Soviet Union has come around to our position and is prepared to have that discussion in a European security conference, we would very much favor it, but we would be prepared to discuss it in some other forum, but we are not going to do it alone, because we have indicated to our allies steadily since World War II that this is an alliance and we are all in it together and it is a collective security arrangement, so that any discussion about mutual and balanced force reductions would have to include our allies.

Effect on Balance of Payments

Mr. Trewhitt: To look into the future just from that point of departure, are you suggesting that we will simply have to maintain these force levels off into the indefinite future unless the Soviet Union is prepared to renegotiate?

Secretary Rogers: No, I am not. As a matter of fact, it also is forgotten that in the last 2 years we have reduced the forces there by about 20,000, and in an orderly way, after we have full consultations with our allies, we might be prepared to reduce them further, but I think it is important, Mr. Trewhitt, to keep in mind that what we are talking about now is relocation of our forces. In other words, it is just a question of bringing them back to the United States. There is no money that would be saved. It wouldn't save any money for the American taxpayer. Costs would be just as great to bring the troops back to the United States as to keep them in Europe, and why do that?

⁵ *Congressional Record* (daily), May 11, 1971, p. 56682.

Mr. Trewhitt: It does have a bearing on the balance of payments though.

Secretary Rogers: It has a bearing on the balance of payments but not as much as the people are inclined to think, because there is an offset that the Germans provide and, furthermore, some of the other allies buy military equipment in this country. So the total effect on the balance of payments is a lot less than people think.

Statement by President Nixon on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 20, 1971⁶

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen:

As you know, the Soviet-American talks on limiting nuclear arms have been deadlocked for over a year. As a result of negotiations involving the highest level of both governments, I am announcing today a significant development in breaking the deadlock.

The statement that I shall now read is being issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington; Washington, 12 o'clock; Moscow, 7 p.m.

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

This statement that I have just read expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American Governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal. If we succeed, this joint statement that has been issued today may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war but to the works of peace.

Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General Thant: Preparation of an International Treaty Concerning the Moon, May 27, 1971¹

On instructions from the Government of the Union of Soviet

⁶ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, May 24, 1971, pp. 783-784.

¹ A/8391, June 4, 1971, and Corr. 1, June 10, 1971. The draft treaty is printed *infra*.

Socialist Republics I would request the inclusion of an item in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations entitled "Preparation of a treaty concerning the Moon".

In recent years major new advances have been made in space research. On the basis of modern science and technology, extensive research programmes relating to the Moon are being undertaken. The missions of United States astronauts and the experiments conducted by the USSR with the help of Lunokhod-1 and other automatic devices have opened up new prospects for mankind in the exploration of the Moon. These achievements will promote the further expansion of activities by States on the Moon.

At all stages of space exploration, the Soviet Union has invariably advocated the progressive development of international law on outer space in the interests of all peoples. Establishing a solid international legal basis for the activities of States in outer space serves the cause of peace and helps to strengthen mutual understanding and co-operation among States. It will be recalled that it was the initiative of the Soviet Union which led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,² and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.³

The Soviet Government is of the opinion that steps should be taken now towards the further elaboration and formulation of rules of international law to govern the activities of States on the Moon. As the Earth's only natural satellite, the Moon has an important role to play in the conquest of outer space and it should be used exclusively in the interests of peace and for the benefit of all mankind. It is essential that the activities of States on the Moon should not be allowed to become a source of international conflict and that a legal basis should be established for potential uses of the Moon. The conclusion of an appropriate international treaty would serve this purpose.

I am transmitting to you a draft Treaty concerning the Moon, which is based on generally accepted rules of international law, including the Charter of the United Nations and agreements relating to outer space concluded earlier. It contains the following basic provisions:

(1) The exploration and use of the Moon are to be carried out with due regard to the interests of present and future generations.

(2) In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the threat or use of force or any other hostile

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38-43.

³ 19 UST 7570.

activities on the Moon as well as the use of the Moon to carry out such activities in relation to the Earth are prohibited.

(3) The prohibition against the installation on the Moon of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and against any other activities involving the use of the Moon for military purposes is reaffirmed.

(4) The Moon is to be explored and used by means which ensure that any adverse changes or contamination of the lunar environment are avoided.

(5) The surface and subsoil of the Moon cannot become the property of States, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations, national organizations or juridical or natural persons.

(6) States Parties are to take all possible steps to safeguard the life and health of any man on the Moon.

A treaty based on the above principles would be an important contribution to the formation and development of international space law. The conclusion of such a treaty would promote the further elaboration of rules of international law relating to the activities of States in the exploration of celestial bodies.

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics trusts that at its twenty-sixth session the General Assembly will give due attention to the item "Preparation of a treaty concerning the Moon".

Since the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee are to hold sessions before the opening of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, I would ask you to bring the Soviet draft Treaty concerning the Moon to the attention of those bodies.

I would request you, Sir, to regard this letter as an explanatory memorandum under rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and to circulate it, together with the text of the draft Treaty, as an official document of the United Nations.

(Signed) A. GROMYKO

Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics

Soviet Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon, May 27, 1971¹

The States Parties to this Treaty,

Noting the gains made by States in the exploration of the Moon,

Recognizing that the Moon as the only natural satellite of the Earth, has an important role to play in the conquest of outer space,

¹ A/8391, June 4, 1971. The draft treaty was transmitted to Secretary-General Thant on June 4 (*supra*).

Desiring to prevent the Moon from becoming a scene of international conflict,

Determined to promote the further development of co-operation among States in the exploration and use of the Moon and its subsoil and of circumlunar space,

Recalling the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,² and the provisions of the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space,³

Taking into account the need to define and develop the provisions of these international instruments in relation to the Moon with a view to further progress in the conquest of outer space,

Have agreed on the following:

Article I

1. States Parties shall pursue their activities on the Moon and in circumlunar space in accordance with international law, including the Charter of the United Nations.

2. In accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the use of force in any form or the threat of force, as well as any other hostile actions or threat of such actions, shall be prohibited on the Moon. The use of the Moon to commit any of the aforementioned actions in relation to the Earth or space objects shall also be prohibited.

Article II

1. The Moon shall be used by all States Parties exclusively for peaceful purposes.

2. States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Moon any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or to install such weapons on the surface of the Moon or in its subsoil.

3. The establishment of military bases, installations and fortifications, the testing of any type of weapons and the conduct of military manoeuvres on the Moon shall be prohibited.

Article III

1. States Parties shall strive to co-operate in matters relating to activities on the Moon. Such co-operation may be on either a multilateral or a bilateral basis.

2. Each State Party shall engage in the exploration and use of the Moon with due regard to the interests of present and future generations and with respect for the rights of other States Parties as specified in this Treaty.

² Documents on Disarmament, 1967, pp. 38-43.

³ 19 UST 7570.

3. A State Party which has reason to believe that another State Party is violating its obligations under this Treaty may request consultations between the States Parties concerned.

Article IV

1. States Parties shall explore and use the Moon by reasonable means avoiding the disruption of the existing balance of the lunar environment.

2. States Parties shall explore and use the Moon in such a way as to prevent adverse changes in the lunar environment and its contamination through the introduction of extralunar matter. Where necessary, consultations shall be held between the States Parties concerned.

Article V

1. States Parties may pursue their activities in the exploration and use of the Moon anywhere on the surface of the Moon, in its subsoil or in circumlunar space.

2. For these purposes States Parties may, in particular:

- land their space objects on the Moon, launch them from the Moon and place them in circumlunar orbit;
- dispose their vehicles, equipment and personnel anywhere on the surface of the Moon, in its subsoil or in circumlunar space.

Vehicles and personnel of States Parties may move freely over the surface of the Moon, through its subsoil and in circumlunar space.

3. Actions of States Parties in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article should not interfere with the activities of other States Parties on the Moon. Where such interference may occur, the States Parties concerned shall undertake consultations.

Article VI

1. States Parties may establish both manned and unmanned stations on the Moon.

2. Stations shall be installed in such a manner that they do not impede the free access of vehicles and personnel of other States Parties pursuing activities on the Moon to all areas of the Moon, as provided for in article I of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies.

Article VII

1. States Parties undertake to adopt all practicable measures to safeguard the life and health of men on the Moon. For this purpose they shall regard any person on the Moon as an astronaut within the meaning of the article V of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, and as part of the personnel of a spacecraft within the meaning of the

Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, irrespective of the duration of the stay of such person on the Moon, the place where he is situated on the Moon, his formal membership of the crew of a spacecraft and other similar circumstances.

2. It shall be the duty of States Parties to offer shelter in their stations, vehicles, installations or other facilities to persons in distress on the Moon who are part of the personnel of other States Parties.

3. In pursuing activities on the Moon, States Parties shall take the necessary steps to exchange information on any phenomena they discover in outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, which could endanger the life or health of men on the Moon, as well as information on any signs of organic life.

Article VIII

1. Neither States, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organizations and national organizations having the status of juridical persons or not, nor natural persons, may claim the surface or subsoil of the Moon as their property. The emplacement of vehicles or equipment on the surface of the Moon or in the subsoil thereof, including the construction of installations integrally connected with the surface or subsoil of the Moon, shall not create a right of ownership over portions of the surface or subsoil of the Moon.

2. Portions of the surface or subsoil of the Moon may not be the object of concession, exchange, transfer, sale or purchase, lease, hire, gift or any other arrangements or transactions with or without compensation between States, international intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations or national organizations having the status of juridical persons or not, or of arrangements or transactions between natural persons.

Article IX

In accordance with article VIII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, States Parties shall retain ownership of articles of their property delivered to the surface of the Moon or to circumlunar space, including structures, vehicles and equipment.

Article X

A State Party which learns of the crash landing, forced landing or other unintended landing on the Moon of a space object that does not belong to it, or the crash of component parts of such an object shall inform the State Party to which the space object or component parts belong, and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Article XI

In addition to the provisions of article VII of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, a State Party shall be liable for damage resulting from its act or omission or from an act or omission of its personnel on the Moon to the property or personnel of other States Parties on the Moon, unless it is established that the damage occurred through no fault of the said State or of its personnel on the Moon.

Article XII

1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of . . . , which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by five Governments including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments under this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification of and accession to this Treaty, the date of its entry into force and other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XIII

Any State Party to the Treaty may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party to the Treaty accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party to the Treaty on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XIV

Any State Party to the Treaty may give notice of its withdrawal from the Treaty one year after its entry into force by written notification to the Depositary Governments. Such withdrawal shall take effect one year from the date of receipt of this notification.

Article XV

This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Treaty.

Done in . . . , at the cities of . . . , the . . . day of . . . one thousand nine hundred and seventy— . . .

American-Soviet Communiqué on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, May 28, 1971¹

The US-USSR negotiations on limiting strategic armaments continued in Vienna from March 15 to May 28, 1971.

The US delegation was headed by the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. Members of the delegation J. Graham Parsons, Paul Nitze, Harold Brown, and Royal Allison participated in the negotiations.

The USSR delegation was headed by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. S. Semenov. Members of the delegation N. N. Alekseev, P. S. Pleshakov, A. N. Shchukin, K. A. Trusov, O. A. Grinevsky, and R. M. Timerbaev participated in the negotiations.

The delegations were accompanied by advisors and experts.

In the course of the Vienna phase of the negotiations, the delegations continued consideration of questions dealing with the limitation of strategic armaments. At the final stage, there was an exchange of views on matters stemming from the announcement on May 20 on the understanding between the Governments of the US and the USSR regarding further development of the negotiations.² It has been agreed to proceed after a brief recess with the negotiations in accordance with the above understanding.

The negotiations between the US and the USSR delegations will be resumed on July 8, 1971, in Helsinki, Finland.

The US and the USSR delegations express their sincere appreciation to the Government of Austria for the hospitality accorded and for assistance in creating favorable conditions for holding the negotiations in Vienna.

¹ ACDA files.

² *Ante*, p. 298.

News Conference Remarks by President Nixon [Extracts], June 1, 1971¹

TROOP WITHDRAWALS FROM EUROPE

Q. Mr. President, Chairman Brezhnev recently indicated a willingness to negotiate troop withdrawals from Europe. Do you plan to take him up on this?

The President. We have completed within our own Government our study of the question of balanced mutual force reductions. Secretary Laird has had some consultations last week on this matter with the NATO defense chiefs and Secretary Rogers is conducting consultations at the present time with the Foreign Ministers of the various NATO countries. When those consultations have been completed, then the United States and our allies will move forward to discuss, negotiate, with the Soviet Union and other countries involved with regard to mutual, balanced force reductions.

POSSIBILITY OF EUROPEAN MEETINGS

Q. Mr. President, we not only have the prospect—maybe distant in the future—of the mutual reduction of force, but we have the Berlin question, the SALT talks, the dollar problem in Europe. Do you foresee meeting with the leaders of Europe on their own soil within the foreseeable future?

The President. Mr. Cormier, I plan no trip to Europe and no meetings with European leaders in the near future. If such plans do develop, of course, I will announce them. And if it becomes necessary, as a result of developments in the question of mutual force reductions or arms limitation that such meetings occur, I will, of course, go any place that I think would serve the interests of our goal of reducing the dangers to peace in the world, and, of course, reducing the burden of armaments.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION

Q. Mr. President, if there should be agreements on both defensive and offensive weapons with the Soviet Union, do you plan to submit both of those agreements to the Senate in a treaty form, or only the agreement on defensive weapons, leaving the other to an understanding?

The President. Well, Mr. Lisagor, this is a matter which you have raised, along with other reporters that cover the White House, in some of the background briefings, and I'm sure that all of you know that it is not possible for me and it would not be appropriate for me, to discuss this matter in any way that would jeopardize the agreement itself.

We cannot tell at this time what form the agreement will take. With regard to defensive weapons, the ABM, it is a simpler matter,

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, June 7, 1971, pp. 845-846.

because we are talking about only one weapon system. Therefore, it might be subject to a treaty.

With regard to the offensive limitations that we're talking about, it is not as simple a matter, because here we have several weapons systems. We have missiles. We have bombers. We have nuclear submarines. And the understanding, the commitment that has been made at the highest level, deals with only some of those systems. Consequently, what would come out with regard to offensive weapons may or may not be at the treaty level. It might be at an understanding level at this point, and be at a treaty level at a later point.

I would like to be more precise than that, but that is an accurate statement of what we expect.

Communique of the North Atlantic Council, June 4, 1971¹

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Lisbon on 3rd and 4th June, 1971.

2. The continuing political aim of the Atlantic Alliance is to seek peace through initiatives designed to relax tensions and to establish a just and durable peaceful order in Europe, accompanied by effective security guarantees. The Alliance remains indispensable to peace and stability in Europe and to the security of all its members.

3. Ministers reviewed the international situation, concentrating their attention on Europe and the Mediterranean.

4. They assessed the state of progress of the several initiatives which allied countries had undertaken within the framework of the established policy of the Alliance to intensify contacts, explorations and negotiations with members of the Warsaw Pact and other European states. The purpose of all these initiatives is to seek just solutions to the fundamental problems of European security and thus to achieve a genuine improvement of East-West relations. They noted with satisfaction the results obtained and expressed the hope that the continuation of these efforts would lead to further progress helping the development of détente. The allies have consulted and will continue to consult closely on these diplomatic activities.

5. Ministers welcomed the continued negotiations between the US and the USSR with the aim of placing limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. They noted the useful discussions held in the North Atlantic Council on this subject. Ministers also welcomed the agreement between the US and the USSR announced on 20th May, regarding the framework for further negotiations,² and expressed the sincere hope that it would

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, June 28, 1971, pp. 819-821.

² *Ante*, p. 298.

facilitate discussions leading to the early achievement of concrete results enhancing the common security interests of the North Atlantic Alliance and stability in the world.

6. In reviewing the Berlin question, Ministers underlined the necessity of alleviating the causes of insecurity in and around the city. During the past quarter of a century, much of the tension which has characterized East-West relations in Europe has stemmed from the situation in and around Berlin. Thus, the Ministers would regard the successful outcome of the Berlin talks as an encouraging indication of the willingness of the Soviet Union to join in the efforts of the Alliance to achieve a meaningful and lasting improvement of East-West relations in Europe.

7. Ministers therefore reaffirmed their full support for the efforts of the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States to reach an agreement on Berlin. They shared the view of the three Governments that the aim of the negotiations should be to achieve specific improvements based on firm commitments without prejudice to the status of Berlin. In this context, they emphasized the importance of reaching agreement on unhindered movement of persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and Western sectors of Berlin, on improved opportunities for movement by residents of the Western sectors, and on respect for the relationship between the Western sectors and the Federal Republic as it has developed with the approval of the three Governments.

8. Ministers were of the view that progress in the talks between German Authorities on a modus vivendi, taking into account the special situation in Germany, would be an important contribution to a relaxation of tension in Europe.

9. Ministers, having reviewed the prospects for the establishment of multilateral contacts relating to the essential problems of security and co-operation in Europe, again emphasized the importance they attach to the successful conclusion of the negotiations on Berlin. They noted with satisfaction that these negotiations have entered into a more active phase and have enabled progress to be registered in recent weeks. They hope that before their next meeting the negotiations on Berlin will have reached a successful conclusion and that multilateral conversations intended to lead to a conference on security and co-operation in Europe may then be undertaken. In this spirit they invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue, in the framework of its normal consultations on the international situation, its periodic review of the results achieved in all contacts and talks relative to security and co-operation in Europe so that it could without delay take a position on the opening of multilateral talks.

10. In anticipation of these multilateral contacts, the Council in Permanent Session actively pursued preparations for discussions on the substance and procedures of possible East-West negotiations, and submitted a report to this effect to Ministers. The

report stressed that the successful outcome of such negotiations would have to be founded on universal respect for the principles governing relations between states as cited by Ministers in previous Communiqués and Declarations. The various prospects for developing co-operation between East and West in the economic, technical, scientific, cultural and environmental fields were closely examined. The report also reviewed in detail the essential elements on which agreement would be desirable in order to promote the freer movement of people, ideas and information so necessary to the development of international co-operation in all fields.

11. Ministers noted these studies and instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue them pending the initiation of multilateral contacts between East and West. Ministers stressed that they would press on with their bilateral exploratory conversations with all interested states.

12. Ministers took note of the report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared by the Council in Permanent Session. While welcoming the efforts currently undertaken to re-establish peace in the Eastern Mediterranean, they observed that developments in the area as a whole continue to give cause for concern. In the light of the conclusions of this report, they instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue consultations on this situation and to report thereon at their next meeting.

13. The allied Governments which issued the declarations at Reykjavik in 1968³ and Rome in 1970⁴ and which subscribed to paragraphs 15 and 16 of the Brussels Communique of 1970⁵ have consistently urged the Soviet Union and other European countries to discuss mutual and balanced force reductions. They reaffirmed that the reduction of the military confrontation in Europe—at which MBFR is aiming—is essential for increased security and stability.

14. Against this background, Ministers representing these Governments welcomed the response of Soviet leaders indicating possible readiness to consider reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. These Soviet reactions, which require further clarification, are, together with those states, receiving the closest attention of the Alliance.

15. In an effort to determine whether common ground exists on which to base negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, these Ministers expressed the agreement of their Governments to continue and intensify explorations with the Soviet Union and also with other interested Governments on the basis of the considerations outlined in paragraph 3 of the Rome Declaration. They expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations. To this end these Ministers agreed that Deputy Foreign Ministers or High Officials should

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 447-450.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 225 ff.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 667 ff.

meet at Brussels at an early date to review the results of the exploratory contacts and to consult on substantive and procedural approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions.

16. These Ministers further announced their willingness to appoint, at the appropriate time, a representative or representatives, who would be responsible to the Council for conducting further exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and the other interested Governments and eventually to work out the time, place, arrangements and agenda for negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions.

17. Reviewing other developments in the field of arms control and disarmament, these Ministers noted as a significant step forward the conclusion of a treaty banning the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and ocean floor. Allied Ministers noted with satisfaction the work done by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a view to reaching an agreement eliminating bacteriological weapons and toxins. They reaffirmed the importance they attach to effective and adequately verified arms limitation and disarmament measures consistent with the security of all states and invited the Council in Permanent Session to continue to pursue the Alliance efforts and studies in all fields related to arms control and disarmament.

18. Ministers expressed satisfaction at the impressive progress achieved by the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society as reported by the Secretary General. They noted particularly the important contribution made by the Allies to combat the pollution of the seas by oil and to the development of road safety. They welcomed the fact that intensive work was underway on problems relating to coastal and inland water pollution and disaster assistance. They further welcomed the contribution the Committee had made to alerting Governments and public opinion to the problems of modern technology, as well as to the dangers for modern society arising from the deterioration of the environment. They observed that many countries of the Alliance have equipped themselves with new Government structures to cope with such problems. Ministers took special note of the fact that the benefits of allied efforts had not been confined to the countries of the Alliance but were being felt in other countries as well as in broader-based international organizations.

19. Ministers expressed their regret at the impending departure of Mr. Manlio Brosio who had informed them of his intention to resign as Secretary General of the Organization. In their tributes to Mr. Brosio, Ministers dwelt on his outstanding stewardship in often difficult circumstances and stressed the patience and perseverance which have marked his untiring work for both defence and detente. They expressed to him their deep appreciation for the distinguished service he has rendered to the Alliance and to peace in the past seven years.

20. The Council invited Mr. Joseph Luns, Foreign Minister of

the Netherlands, to become Secretary General of the Organization as from 1st October, 1971. Mr. Luns informed the Council of his acceptance of this invitation.

21. The next Ministerial Session of the North Atlantic Council will be held in Brussels in December 1971.

22. Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of Italy, as President of Council, to transmit this Communiqué on their behalf through diplomatic channels to all other interested parties including neutral and non-aligned Governments.

Proclamation by President Nixon on Ratification of Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, June 11, 1971¹

The Senate of the United States of America by its resolution of 19 April 1971, two thirds of the Senators present concurring, gave its advice and consent to the ratification of Additional Protocol II, with the following understandings and declarations:

I

That the United States Government understands the reference in Article 3 of the treaty to "its own legislation" to relate only to such legislation as is compatible with the rules of international law and as involves an exercise of sovereignty consistent with those rules, and accordingly that ratification of Additional Protocol II by the United States Government could not be regarded as implying recognition, for the purposes of this treaty and its protocols or for any other purpose, of any legislation which did not, in the view of the United States, comply with the relevant rules of international law.

That the United States Government takes note of the Preparatory Commission's interpretation of the treaty, as set forth in the Final Act, that, governed by the principles and rules of international law, each of the Contracting Parties retains exclusive power and legal competence, unaffected by the terms of the treaty, to grant or deny non-Contracting Parties transit and transport privileges.

That as regards the undertaking in Article 3 of Protocol II not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties, the United States Government would have to consider that an armed attack by a Contracting Party, in which it was assisted by a nuclear-weapon State, would be incompatible with the Contracting Party's corresponding obligations under Article I of the treaty.

II

That the United States Government considers that the tech-

¹A/8560, Dec. 8, 1971. The treaty appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69 ff. For Additional Protocol II, see *ibid.*, p. 83.

nology of making nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes is indistinguishable from the technology of making nuclear weapons, and that nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes are both capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner and have the common group of characteristics of large amounts of energy generated instantaneously from a compact source. Therefore the United States Government understands the definition contained in Article 5 of the treaty as necessarily encompassing all nuclear explosive devices. It is also understood that Articles 1 and 5 restrict accordingly the activities of the Contracting Parties under paragraph 1 of Article 18.

That the United States Government understands that paragraph 4 of Article 18 of the treaty permits, and that United States adherence to Protocol II will not prevent, collaboration by the United States with Contracting Parties for the purpose of carrying out explosions of nuclear devices for peaceful purposes in a manner consistent with a policy of not contributing to the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities. In this connection, the United States Government notes Article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons under which it joined in an undertaking to take appropriate measures to ensure that potential benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions would be made available to non-nuclear-weapon states party to that treaty and reaffirms its willingness to extend such undertaking, on the same basis, to states precluded by the present treaty from manufacturing or acquiring any nuclear explosive device.²

III

That the United States Government also declares that, although not required by Protocol II, it will act with respect to such territories of Protocol I adherents as are within the geographical area defined in paragraph 2 of Article 4 of the treaty in the same manner as Protocol II requires it to act with respect to the territories of Contracting Parties.

The President ratified Additional Protocol II on 8 May 1971, with the above-recited understandings and declarations, in pursuance of the advice and consent of the Senate.

It is provided in Article 5 of Additional Protocol II that the Protocol shall enter into force, for the States which have ratified it, on the date of the deposit of their respective instruments of ratification.

The instrument of ratification of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland was deposited on 11 December 1969, with understandings and a declaration, and the instrument of ratification of the United States of America was deposited on May 12, 1971 with the above-recited understandings and declarations.

²*Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

In accordance with Article 5 of Additional Protocol II, the Protocol entered into force for the United States of America on 12 May 1971, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations.

Now, *Therefore*, I, Richard Nixon, President of the United States of America, proclaim and make public Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America to the end that it shall be observed and fulfilled with good faith, subject to the above-recited understandings and declarations, on and after 12 May 1971, by the United States of America and by the citizens of the United States of America and all other persons subject to the jurisdiction thereof.

In testimony whereof, I have signed this proclamation and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

Done at the city of Washington this eleventh day of June in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred seventy-one and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred ninety-fifth.

RICHARD NIXON

By the President:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Secretary of State

Statement by the Soviet Government on Conference of Five Nuclear Powers, June 15, 1971¹

1. For over a quarter of a century now, mankind has been spared a world war. Yet peace remains precarious. In one part of the world after another armed conflicts arise and military tension builds up, while the danger of a military confrontation on a global scale persists.

2. The arms race is one of the factors having an especially negative effect on all aspects of international life. It is creating an increasingly serious threat to peace, apart from absorbing enormous material and intellectual resources which in other circumstances could be used to accelerate economic and social progress and further the well-being of peoples. It is clear that the greatest danger lies in the nuclear arms race. It is the primary reason for the peoples' anxiety and their worries about the future.

3. In addressing this statement to the Governments of nuclear-weapon Powers, the Government of the USSR does not consider it necessary to dwell on the great power of destruction that such weapons possess, on the devastating consequences of their use, or on the suffering and misfortune that a nuclear war, if one were to

¹S/10236, June 25, 1971. The statement was transmitted to the other nuclear powers on June 15.

break out, would cause to all the peoples of the world. However, the Soviet Government does wish to draw the attention of the Governments of all nuclear Powers to the fact that, although the efforts to limit the nuclear arms race have led to the adoption of some positive steps, it has not yet proved possible to reverse the process of stockpiling of increasingly powerful means of mass destruction in the arsenals of nuclear Powers. Consequently, there is a need to make even more determined efforts to adopt effective measures conducive to nuclear disarmament.

4. The Government of the USSR considers that all nuclear Powers have the duty and the responsibility to make such efforts. It is precisely those Powers that can and should work out and implement a practical programme for nuclear disarmament.

5. It goes without saying that such an objective cannot be attained if efforts in that direction are made by only one or a few of the nuclear Powers. It is essential that all nuclear-weapon States act in a concerted manner to arrive at the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

6. Of course, the nuclear Powers do not at present have a common approach to the resolution of questions involved in nuclear disarmament, and their views on such questions differ in many respects. But that should not prevent them from initiating concerted action aimed at bringing their views closer together and jointly paving the way to nuclear disarmament. Such action is demanded by the interests of all peoples and all States including the nuclear Powers themselves, since their security too will be more reliably guaranteed by the elimination of nuclear weapons than by a continuation of the nuclear arms race.

7. In view of the foregoing, the Soviet Government proposes the convening as early as possible of a conference of the five nuclear-weapon Powers: the Soviet Union, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom. Such a conference should consider questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole. The understanding that would result from the negotiations could cover both the entire range of measures relating to nuclear disarmament and the individual steps progressively leading to the achievement of that end.

8. There is no doubt that progress in the matter of nuclear disarmament would assist in settling the problem of general and complete disarmament, would have a salutary effect on the international situation generally, and would contribute to the strengthening of confidence in relations among States.

9. The Soviet Government proposes that there should be initiated, through the diplomatic channel, an exchange of views on questions relating to the date and place of the conference, the agenda and procedure.

10. So far as the Government of the USSR is concerned, it feels that the earlier a conference of the five nuclear Powers is convened, the better.

11. With regard to the site of the conference, its position remains open. It could accept any place convenient to all the participants. Should it be the general view, the Soviet Government would also not be opposed to the establishment of a preparatory committee to discuss the convening of the conference.

12. The Government of the USSR looks forward with interest to learning the views which each of the nuclear Powers may have with regard to these various matters. It hopes that this statement will be studied with all the attention that the problem of nuclear disarmament deserves and that as a result of concerted efforts by the nuclear Powers progress will be made in resolving this problem.

News Conference Remarks by Secretary of State Rogers: Force Reductions in Europe [Extract], June 15, 1971¹

Q. There is some criticism here and also abroad that NATO is now procrastinating on the MBFR, now that the Soviets after 3 years of thinking seem to be inclined to talk about it. What is your comment on that?

A. Well, it just isn't so, of course. As you know, NATO proposed this in 1968, and we have consistently held out the initiative as a possibility. Finally, the Soviet Union has responded and said they are willing to talk about it, and we are prepared to talk about it.

Now, our NATO communiqué, I think, provides the maximum flexibility to do exactly that.² I am going to talk to Ambassador Dobrynin in the next day or so to find out if they are prepared to have discussions on mutual and balanced force reductions and find out what they are prepared to talk about, what they are thinking about in terms of time and place, et cetera.

We are perfectly prepared to have negotiations. We want them. The suggestion on the part of Mr. Brezhnev that maybe we are not sincere³ is difficult to follow, because it is our proposal. We have a little question about their sincerity, because they seem to make all these pronouncements in political speeches. But I will find out, and the other nations are going to find out in their discussions, what the Soviet Union is prepared to do.

Now, we are going to have a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting in the fall, and at that time we will coordinate with our allies and determine our positions; and we are prepared to negotiate.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, July 5, 1971, pp. 5-6.

² *Ante*, pp. 307-311.

³ *See ante*, p. 293.

United States Report to Secretary-General Thant on Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race, June 18, 1971¹

INTRODUCTION

In the quarter century since the Second World War five Presidents and innumerable actions of the Congress have committed the United States to the goal of a peaceful and secure world which will be free from the economic and social burdens of arms races. Some progress has been made in this period; much more needs to be done. President Nixon said in March 1971, "I have set as my goal the attainment of a generation of peace. I believe that arms control presents both a necessary and a promising road towards a stable, secure world in which true peace can exist . . .

" . . . Progress is not always dramatic, but the direction is sure. My Administration is dedicated to finding better, safer and cheaper alternatives for insuring our security than the expedient of competition in weaponry".²

Twenty-five years ago, when it had a monopoly of nuclear weapons, the United States offered a proposal without precedent in the history of nations. It offered to give up its nuclear weapons if and when an effective international system might be created which would prevent any nation from acquiring nuclear weapons. The "Baruch Plan", as it was called,³ did not find acceptance, and it soon became apparent that the goal of nuclear disarmament, the supreme importance of which was widely recognized, would have to be approached by more modest steps.

President Eisenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal to the United Nations General Assembly in December 1953 was conceived as one such step.⁴ Out of it grew the International Atomic Energy Agency, which in due course came to have the important safeguards responsibility under the recent non-proliferation treaty.⁵

The "Atoms for Peace" proposal was followed by other initiatives in the 1950s, most of them specifically addressed to the nuclear problem. Among them were the "open skies" inspection proposal of 1955;⁶ proposals to end the production of nuclear materials for weapons and to transfer existing weapons materials to peaceful uses;⁷ and proposals for safeguards against surprise attack and for a nuclear test ban.

¹ A/8469/Add. 1, Nov. 12, 1971, pp. 143-169.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 703.

³ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 7-16.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 393-400.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. I, pp. 486-488.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 593-595.

The 1959 Antarctica Treaty,⁸ a United States initiative related to the International Geophysical Year, contained significant provisions banning any measures of a military nature or nuclear explosions on the continent of Antarctica and permitting mutual inspection by the signatories of their installations and equipment in the Antarctic. With the passage of time and the development of new weapons systems, the treaty has come to be seen as a valuable precedent for other agreements.

In 1961 the United States was the first nation to establish a separate government agency to deal with arms control and disarmament. This development came at a time when international disarmament discussions were about to enter a new and productive phase with the convening in 1962 of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, later to become the 26-nation Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). As one of the two co-chairmen of the Committee, the United States has felt a special responsibility for progress in this field, and its Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has been a valuable instrument for the development of pertinent United States policy and objectives.

The disarmament conference in Geneva has been in existence over ten years. Out of its deliberations have evolved the limited test ban treaty,⁹ the Washington-Moscow "hot line",¹⁰ the non-proliferation treaty, and the sea-bed arms control treaty.¹¹ The United States has been gratified to be closely identified with these important forward steps as well as with the treaty on outer space and celestial bodies,¹² which was negotiated within the framework of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

The national commitment to arms control and disarmament goes well beyond these past accomplishments of international negotiation. On a number of occasions the United States has urged that the CCD focus attention on the problem of conventional arms and has stressed continuing American interest in achieving regional arms limitations. The United States has supported the United Kingdom draft convention banning biological weapons and toxins¹³ and has welcomed the recently introduced Soviet draft convention on biological weapons.¹⁴ With these developments it should be feasible to reach early agreement in this area, thereby making another contribution to the control of weapons of mass destruction.

In the meantime the United States has independently renounced all use of biological weapons and toxins and the first use

⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 236-238.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38-43.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

of lethal and incapacitating chemical weapons, and initiated a programme to destroy stockpiles of biological agents and toxins.¹⁵ The President has also requested Senate advice and consent to ratification of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 banning the use in war of chemical and biological weapons.¹⁶

As evidence of United States support for constructive regional arms control agreements, the Senate this year gave its advice and consent to the ratification of Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (the Treaty of Tlatelolco).¹⁷

Particular importance attaches to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with the Soviet Union which have been under way since November 1969. The discussions in SALT have produced the most searching examination of strategic relationships ever conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union. Agreement in this vital area could create a new commitment to stability and influence attitudes towards other issues and could help curb rising defence expenditures.

In an announcement on 20 May 1971, President Nixon stated that:

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favourable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued. This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.

He concluded by saying that the statement he had just read "expresses the commitment of the Soviet and American Governments at the highest levels to achieve that goal".¹⁸

In the pages that follow, an effort is made to show something of the economic and social consequences of American defence programmes in the decade of the 1960s and to project some possible near-term trends. The United States has scaled down its military effort in the past two years. The share of GNP devoted to defence has declined from over 9 per cent to under 8 per cent, and the total military personnel and United States government employment in defence-related activities has dropped from 6.3 million to 5.9 million. During the decade defence-related research and development expenditures dropped from 49 per cent to 29 per cent of all research and development expenditures.

It is as true today as it was in 1962, when the United States forwarded to the United Nations its country study on the

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 592-593; *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 5-6.

¹⁶ The President's message appears *ibid.*, pp. 445-446. For the Geneva protocol, see *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 83; *ante*, pp. 311-313.

¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 298.

economic and social consequences of disarmament, that "the allocation of resources to purely military purposes is not an economically creative process, except in an incidental way".¹⁹ The object is to provide for the national security; the requirements of security change, of course, and the United States sincerely hopes for further progress in the reduction of international tensions and in the field of arms control and disarmament which will permit more resources to be devoted to enhancing the quality of life.

The following pages set forth the comments of the United States on the items listed in the Secretary-General's note of 1 March 1971.²⁰

ITEM 1

The level and trend of military expenditures over the past decade

Purchases of goods and services for the national defence of the United States in current dollars declined from \$52 billion in 1962 to \$50 billion in 1965, thereafter rising steeply to \$79 billion in 1969 as a result largely of the military operations in South-East Asia and inflation (table 1). In 1970 these expenditures were down by over \$2 billion, reflecting the policy of reducing the American military involvement in Viet-Nam.

In real terms (constant 1970 dollars) the increase in defence expenditures between 1965 and 1968 amounted to 42 per cent, and the decline from the peak in 1968 to 1970 was \$14 billion or 16 per cent.²¹

In the decade 1961-1970 gross national product increased steadily from \$520 billion to \$977 billion (current dollars) or by 88 per cent. Inflationary factors were moderate during the first half of the decade but intensified sharply thereafter coincidentally with the rapid increase in defence purchases and total federal expenditures between 1965 and 1969. As a result real GNP increased much more moderately than nominal GNP—by 46 per cent—and in fact experienced a slight decline from 1969 to 1970.

In relation to GNP, defence expenditures exceeded 9 per cent at the beginning of the decade, dropped to over 7 per cent in 1965, peaked in 1967 and 1968 at more than 9 per cent, and had declined to 8 per cent in 1970.

During this period federal purchases of goods and services for all purposes except defence showed a generally rising trend, increas-

¹⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, p. 218.

²⁰ *Ante*, pp. 75-77.

²¹ The Department of Commerce, which is responsible for United States GNP statistics, does not prepare an implicit price deflator for purchases of goods and services for national defence. In table 1 and in this portion of the discussion, the implicit price deflator for total federal purchases of goods and services was applied to defence purchases to arrive at constant dollar values [footnote in original].

ing by 140 per cent in current dollars and by 71 per cent in constant (1970) dollars.

One of the principal components of national defence purchases (table 2) is the compensation of military and civilian personnel. Over the decade the amount devoted to this category increased by almost 90 per cent, from \$18 billion to \$33 billion, reflecting substantial pay increases as well as increased manpower. At the beginning of the decade personnel expenditures constituted 37 per cent of total defence purchases. In 1969 this percentage had risen to 41 per cent, and in 1970 to over 43 per cent in spite of a decline in manpower from 1969 to 1970.

Procurement of military hardware is another principal component of national defence expenditures and reflects not only the ebb and flow of specific hardware requirements but also changes in the technological aspects of military programmes. Department of Defense procurement statistics suggest the main trends in hardware procurement in the decade of the 1960s (table 3).

President Nixon has said that, "In the 1971 budget, America's priorities were quietly but dramatically reordered: For the first time in 20 years, we spent more to meet human needs than we spent on defense".²² The budget proposed for fiscal year 1972 (1 July 1971-30 June 1972) calls for a modest increase in defence spending during the year which will, however, not prevent such spending from declining further as a percentage of total budgetary outlays (36 per cent in fiscal year 1971, 34 per cent in fiscal year 1972). The President's budget proposals are, of course, subject to review and appropriation by the Congress.

Defence programmes continue to be affected by strong inflationary pressures especially with respect to manpower costs. It is estimated that in dollars of constant buying power the defence budget proposed for fiscal year 1972 will decline by about 5 per cent from fiscal year 1971. It is also estimated that the fiscal year 1972 programme in constant dollars will be about 24 per cent below the wartime peak of fiscal year 1968 and will be about equal to the pre-war (fiscal year 1964) level. Defence manpower will be below the pre-war level as will total expenditures (in constant dollars) for procurement, research and development, construction, supplies and services.

In presenting the budget to the Congress in January 1971, President Nixon articulated the goal of the United States as "a full generation of peace in which all nations can focus their energies on improving the lives of their citizens.

"To achieve this, we must continue to work in close cooperation with our allies, move from confrontation to negotiation with those with whom we differ and—together with our allies—maintain enough military strength to deter aggression . . ."²³ This, then, is

²² *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 1, 1971, p. 130.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 135.

the broad policy framework within which United States military expenditures are planned for the foreseeable future.

ITEM 2

Military expenditures and the rate of growth of the economy

The relationship between military expenditures and economic growth is one on which definitive conclusions are difficult to reach. This difficulty arises in part from deficiencies in data available for measurement and in part also from differences in interpretation.

There are plausible arguments for and against the proposition that military expenditures reduce potential growth of the economy. Without further research and a more thorough review of the empirical data it is impossible to state with finality what the net effect on the capacity for further growth has been in an economy as large and complex as that of the United States. Yet it is almost certainly true that if fewer resources were devoted to defence and a single-minded effort were made to devote them to growth-generating activities, the rate of growth could be increased.

ITEM 3a

The level and trend of manpower in the armed forces and in other defence-related activities

The military manpower of the United States increased at the beginning of the decade to a peak of 2.8 million in 1962 and thereafter was stable for three years at approximately that level (table 4). With the escalation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, American military manpower rose rapidly to over 3.5 million in 1968 and 1969 and declined by over 300,000 from 1969 to 1970. By 30 June 1971 military personnel are expected to be down to 2.7 million. By 30 June 1972 a further reduction to 2.5 million is planned.

In fiscal year 1972 the military accession requirement will be about 528,000 enlisted personnel and nearly 40,000 officers for the active forces. This is equal to about one fourth of the total of young men reaching age 19 that year. Accession needs are expected to decline in fiscal year 1974 and beyond if proposed pay raises and other inducements are enacted. It is anticipated that these measures will bring about an increase in voluntary enlistment and an extension of existing enlistments. The target date for reaching zero draft calls is set as 1 July 1973.

Civilian defence-related employment in the United States Government remained under one million in the first half of the decade, peaked at 1.1 million-plus in the years 1966-1969, and declined to just over one million in 1970, thus undergoing significantly smaller change than military manpower in the same period.

There are no statistics for defence-related employment in the private sector for the calendar years 1961-1970, but the Depart-

ment of Labor had made some estimates of such employment for selected fiscal years (table 5).

As might be expected, there was a substantial increase (1.1 million or 53 per cent) in defence-related private employment between fiscal 1965 and 1968. This increase was larger than the increase in defence-related public employment, both absolutely and relatively. The private employment figure had shrunk to 2.6 million in 1970. It is estimated that it will decline further to about 2.1 million (approximately the 1965 level) in 1971—a drop of 1.1 million in three years.

Defence-related employment in private industry is diffused over a broad range of industries and occupations. Within manufacturing, such employment has been most heavily concentrated in ordnance and aircraft, with electronic and communications equipment, electronic components, and shipbuilding and other transportation equipment also showing substantial percentages of defence-related employment. Employment attributable to the increase in defence spending during the Viet-Nam build-up was generally concentrated in these industries, and, with the exception of shipbuilding, they have also been most affected by the recent cutback in defence spending.

Workers producing goods and services for defence are generally more skilled than the civilian labour force as a whole. Among white-collar workers, a higher percentage of professional and managerial workers were employed in defence-related jobs than in the entire economy. Among blue-collar workers, craftsmen and operatives were also more strongly represented in defence-related employment. Thus, at the peak year of such employment (fiscal year 1968), about 60 per cent of the aeronautical engineers, over 30 per cent of all physicists, and almost 60 per cent of airplane mechanics were employed in defence-related work.

Summing up, it may be said that in the fiscal year 1965, close to six million people were employed in some form of defence work, that by fiscal year 1968 this figure had risen to almost eight million. A substantial decline since fiscal year 1968, on the order of about two million, will bring the estimated total for fiscal year 1971 to about the level for fiscal year 1965.

ITEM 3b

Research and development, civilian and defence-related

Total United States research and development expenditures are expected to reach a level of \$28 billion during 1971, almost twice the 1961 level (table 6). Between 1968 and 1971 total research and development expenditures rose at an average annual rate of 3.5 per cent, compared to a growth rate nearly twice as high between 1964 and 1968 (table 7).

Although a special research and development price index is not currently available to convert research and development expenditures from current to constant dollars, some insight into the

extent of research and development growth attributable solely to price increases can be obtained by using the implicit price deflator for the gross national product. Using this technique, research and development spending, in constant prices, declined on the average of 1 per cent a year over the period 1968-1971, in contrast to an average annual increase of 8 per cent in 1961-1964 and 4 per cent in 1964-1968.

Industrial firms perform most of the nation's research and development. In 1971, industry is estimated to undertake 71 per cent (in dollar terms) of the total United States research and development effort. This will amount to nearly \$20 billion. The industry share has remained about the same since 1964, but is down from the 1961 level of 75 per cent. Federal government research and development laboratories spent 13 per cent of total research and development funds in 1971, while universities and colleges expended an additional 12 per cent. The remainder was performed by other non-profit institutions.

The Federal Government was the source of 53 per cent of total research and development funds in 1971, down from 63 per cent in 1966, and 64 per cent in 1961. Non-federal support of research and development rose by 11 per cent annually in 1964-1968 and by 9 per cent annually in 1968-1971. The relative decline of federal support is largely attributable to the completion of research and development projects associated with the space programme.

Defence-related research and development expenditures declined somewhat during the first half of the decade and increased in the second half, reaching a level in 1970 which was approximately 10 per cent above 1961. Such expenditures accounted for nearly one half of total research and development outlays in 1961. By 1971 the ratio is expected to fall below 28 per cent.

In 1969, the full-time equivalent of 555,000 scientists and engineers were engaged in research and development, up from 425,000 in 1961 (table 8). While the percentage of these scientists and engineers employed by industrial firms has been declining moderately, the percentage of those employed by the Federal Government, by universities and colleges, and by other non-profit institutions has shown some over-all increase.

No official estimates are available on the numbers of scientists and engineers employed on defence-related research and development. It is considered that, although defence-related research and development expenditures increased between 1961 and 1969, the numbers of scientists and engineers engaged in defence-related research and development remained approximately the same, the difference being accounted for by relatively higher per-man costs in defence-related research and development. Unofficial, informal estimates place defence-related research and development employment in this period in a range of 165,000-175,000. Since 1969 there have been substantial lay-offs of scientists and engineers, a

portion of whom were employed in defence-related research and development.

ITEM 3c

The level and trend of public and private social expenditure

Total expenditures for education, health and housing more than doubled over the decade, increasing from \$75.4 billion in 1961 to \$152.7 billion in 1969. The greatest relative increases occurred in education and health expenditures. Private and public expenditures on education rose from \$25.3 billion in 1961 to \$59.1 billion in 1969, or from 4.9 per cent of the GNP in 1961 and [to?] 6.3 per cent in 1969. Public and private expenditures on health services increased from \$26.8 billion to \$59.3 billion in 1969, rising from 5.2 per cent of the GNP to 6.4 per cent in 1969.

In the case of housing, there was a rise in actual expenditures over the decade, an increase from \$23.3 billion in 1961 to \$34.2 billion in 1969. This was relatively less than the rise in the GNP, and housing therefore reflected a slightly decreasing share of the GNP.

During the decade of the 1960s, United States expenditures on cultural activities also exhibited a substantial growth. In current dollars, expenditures on various forms of recreational and cultural activity rose from about \$22 billion to \$41 billion between 1961 and 1969. For example, personal consumption of books and maps, as well as radio and television receivers, records and musical instruments more than doubled during this time span. Expenditures by United States residents on foreign travel also doubled. Sales of magazines, newspapers and sheet music increased by 61 per cent; sales of tickets to motion pictures rose by 19 per cent; and sales of tickets to other theatrical events rose by 109 per cent.

Trends in constant prices for these various sectors are more difficult to estimate because of the varying effect of price inflation (table 9).

ITEMS 4, 5, 7

Military expenditures and the international transactions of the United States

The military expenditures of the United States affect the country's international transactions directly and identifiably (tables 10 and 11) when defence funds are spent abroad for the purchase of goods and services (imports) and when goods and services purchased with defence funds are transferred to foreign recipients (exports).

Military expenditures abroad (i.e., imports of goods and services) averaged about \$3 billion per year in the first half of the decade and increased to \$4.8 billion in 1969 and 1970. The increase in personnel and related expenditures, which in 1970 was the largest single category of military expenditures abroad, was particularly steep (136 per cent). Moreover, due largely to

recurring pay raises, these expenditures reached a new high in 1970 although military expenditures in general and, to a lesser extent, military expenditures abroad, had declined from 1969 to 1970.

Between 1961 and 1970 all other imports of goods and services increased much more substantially (170 per cent) than military expenditures abroad (61 per cent) so that by the end of the decade the military component constituted only 8 per cent of total imports, as against 13 per cent in 1961.

On the export side, transfers under military sales have increased very substantially, from \$402 million in 1961 to about \$1.5 billion in 1969 and 1970. On the other hand, transfers under military grants have experienced an almost equivalent reverse trend, from about \$1.5 billion in 1961 to \$759 million in 1969 and \$615 million in 1970.

Between 1961 and 1969 total exports of defence-related goods and services rose by 38 per cent. During the same period all other exports increased by about 90 per cent. Thus the share of all defence-related exports of total exports dropped between 1961 and 1969 from 7 per cent to 5 per cent.

The total balance on current account (total exports, minus total imports, minus total unilateral grants) rose between 1961 and 1965 from \$3.1 billion to \$5.9 billion. It deteriorated steadily thereafter to a deficit of \$885 million in 1969—a total decline of \$6.8 billion. This decline was characterized by a sizeable increase in imports (from \$32 billion to \$54 billion) and a considerably slower growth in exports (from \$41 billion to \$56 billion). Numerous factors account for this development, the principal ones being inflation and the relatively full employment in the country in those years. Both, in turn, are obviously associated with the sizeable growth in total federal expenditures from 1965 to 1969 and the inadequate use of fiscal and monetary measures to deal effectively with the economic pressures which these generated.

The current balance was again positive in 1970, at \$638 million, a recovery from 1969 of \$1.5 billion. This improvement can be attributed substantially to progress in stabilizing the economy and the price-cost level.

Since the defence-related balance has been consistently negative, it may be expected that a reduction or elimination of that item would benefit the over-all balance of payments of the United States. The extent of such beneficial effect is, however, by no means predictable. It will depend, among other factors, on the extent to which the countries which have benefited substantially from American military expenditures will tend to cut back purchases from the United States or rely more heavily on imports of American capital. Relative cost and price levels and growth rates in other economies are additional factors which will have an effect on the kind of adjustment which may flow from a reduction or elimination of negative balance in the defence-related sector.

ITEM 6

The level and trend of United States economic aid and the relationship to it of defence considerations

Net official development assistance provided by the United States has averaged approximately \$3.5 billion annually over the decade 1961-1970 (table 12). This has amounted to about half of all economic aid extended by all countries during the period. The level of United States aid has fluctuated only moderately during the decade. The number of other donors and the size of their contributions to development assistance have increased, and the United States is gratified that it is now one of many countries providing economic aid, in marked contrast to the situation existing immediately after the Second World War.

The United States continues to give strong support to multi-lateral development institutions. Thus, while net United States expenditures for multilateral institutions were only 7 per cent of total United States economic aid in 1968, they are likely to reach 15 per cent by 1971 and may well exceed that level.

Other favourable United States actions have increased the value of international aid and made possible greater export earnings by developing countries. These include the termination of the concept of "additionality";²⁴ the "untying" of United States aid credits within Latin America; agreement that United States aid dollars may be used for procurement in less developed countries; and the proposal placed before the OECD Development Assistance Committee in Paris that all donors agree to complete the "untying" of bilateral development loans on a fully reciprocal basis.

As to the future course of the United States foreign assistance programme, President Nixon on 21 April 1971 sent to the Congress proposed legislation designed to render more effective the administration of United States aid. Key elements in the proposals are the increased emphasis to be given to multilateral institutions and the central role of the private sector in the development process. Development, humanitarian and security purposes are to be clearly distinguished and separately administered within the United States Government.

According to the proposed legislation, development programmes will be based on the priorities and plans of the developing countries, with the initiatives coming from them. The United States will look to the international institutions for leadership in the world development process and to the maximum extent possible work within the framework they establish.

Separate legislation is now before the United States Congress providing for over \$5 billion in development assistance. Of this, \$2

²⁴ "Additionality measures" in effect prior to June 1969 had placed certain limits on the selection of United States products eligible for procurement with AID funds [foot-note in original].

billion would move through the multilateral organizations such as IBRD, IDA, IDB and ADB. Over \$3 billion would be handled over a three-year period by the two proposed new United States institutions: the International Development Corporation and the International Development Institute. New international security legislation would provide an additional \$778 million for economic supporting assistance, which is a category of official development assistance.

In its most recent formulation of the principles underlying foreign assistance, the Congress has specifically cited "our sense of freedom, justice and compassion" and has declared that "the freedom, security and prosperity of the United States are best sustained in a community of free, secure and prospering nations." This concept inheres in the Charter of the United Nations.

The post-war United States assistance programmes began with a purely economic and essentially European focus. The intensification of the cold war and aggression against South Korea then brought about the addition of substantial military assistance to friendly countries under the Mutual Security Program. By 1961 the improvement in world stability made possible a new emphasis on accelerated economic development.

In working out military assistance programmes with recipient countries, the United States seeks to assure that the recipient's capacity to maintain its defence establishment is not overtaxed and especially that its defence expenditures do not make undue claims on resources required for its economic and social purposes. The Foreign Assistance Act requires that these factors, along with any expenditures for sophisticated weapons systems, must be considered in approving any development loans and P.L. 480 sales of agriculture commodities. The proposed new security assistance legislation would also give new emphasis to arms control considerations by requiring that military assistance decisions take into account whether the assistance will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of arms control arrangements.

ITEM 8

Possibilities of environmental damage and of the premature exhaustion or over-exploitation of raw material resources

In the United States, as in other parts of the world, national defence, as well as its counterpart civilian requirements, involves a wide range of industrial activities, thus increasing the drain on natural resources and adding to pollution and other environmental problems.

At the present time, the United States is not experiencing any particular shortages of materials, but in the past defence efforts have limited the availability of some of these resources, such as copper, aluminium and nickel, for use in the civilian sector. In the United States both the public and the private sectors are actively

pursuing a wide variety of programmes to combat pollution. Similarly, the United States has supported a number of international efforts in this field, particularly the forthcoming Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment.

As the world's population increases and our presently known or available resources decrease, the latter will have to be carefully managed if life, as we know it, is to survive. The environmental reserves will be in short supply. The United States recognizes that the task of managing these resources and of limiting the pollutants will become increasingly formidable, consuming a growing proportion of man's productive activities.

ITEM 9

The effects of military expenditures on social stability and on social attitudes, tensions, frictions

The degree of social stability and the social attitudes, tensions or frictions that may prevail at any given time are the product of many complex factors. There are no valid means of measuring the effects of military expenditures on social stability. Any statements which might be made regarding the social unrest that may or may not be created by particular levels of military expenditures would be in the nature of hypotheses rather than firm conclusions derived from incontrovertible evidence.

ITEM 10

Effect of defence considerations on foreign trade policies

Like virtually all industrialized nations, the United States has long maintained controls over certain exports to protect the national security. These controls include arms, ammunition and implements of war, atomic energy materials, and certain other strategic commodities associated with the production or use of goods of a military character.

The selective strategic trade controls of the United States are consistent with the Security Exceptions (article XXI) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.²⁵ They have been significantly narrowed in scope over the past ten years, so that defence-related considerations today have at most a marginal impact on the foreign trade of the country.

ITEM 11

Effects of defence considerations on the transfer of technology internally and to foreign countries

Scientific and technological information on a large scale is widely available in the United States to anyone who wishes to obtain it. The United States Government itself provides a great volume of such information through official publications and services. Internationally, it is settled United States policy to

²⁵ 4 Bevans 639.

encourage co-operation in basic science, and closely allied to this policy is the national policy on technological exchange. As the President stated in his foreign policy report to the Congress in 1970, "science and technology must be marshalled and shared in the cause of peaceful progress, whatever the political differences among nations".²⁶ In his foreign policy report for 1971 he added, "It is only through the broadest possible exchange of information that the interests of mankind can be assured, and over the long run we stand to gain as much as any nation through such exchanges".²⁷

The United States has for years actively sought opportunities to give practical expression to the policy of sharing scientific and technological information, and there is now a long and significant record of such sharing with individual countries and through international organizations and programmes.

For example, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) has contributed extensively to such technology transfers. A great deal of information relating to the peaceful application of nuclear materials is widely available under the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act. For years the Commission has brought many scientists and engineers to the United States for graduate training in the field of atomic energy. Many American industrial firms have done the same. The AEC has also projected technology abroad through the libraries which it has donated to many countries and to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). It actively supports the IAEA Technical Assistance Programmes providing both funds and specialists, and it has long provided participants in the IAEA conferences, symposia, and panels. In these and numerous other ways the United States has played a leading role in the transfer of nuclear technology.

The Government's policy of sharing does not, of course, extend to infringement on proprietary rights in information which are protected by law. Furthermore, the United States, like other countries, has found it necessary to place restrictions on the transfer of scientific and technological information where national security interests or international obligations are involved. It is, however, national policy to keep these restrictions to a minimum.

The following are limitations arising from defence considerations:

Under the Mutual Security Act of 1954, the Department of State controls the export of technical data relating to the production, use or development of certain items listed as arms, ammunition and implements of war. Apart from technical data that is classified from the standpoint of military security and whose use is limited accordingly both in the United States and abroad, this control covers all other unpublished technical data

²⁶ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 23, 1970, p. 226.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, Mar. 1, 1971, p. 374.

TABLE 1. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND NATIONAL DEFENCE PURCHASES

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
	<i>Billions of current dollars</i>									
Gross national product	520.1	560.3	590.5	632.4	684.9	749.9	793.9	865.0	931.4	976.5
Federal purchases of goods and services for National Defence ²⁸	47.8	51.6	50.8	50.0	50.1	60.7	72.4	78.0	78.8	76.6
National Defence as percentage of GNP	9.2	9.2	8.6	7.9	7.3	8.1	9.1	9.0	8.5	7.8
	<i>Billions of 1970 dollars</i>									
Gross national product	670.4	714.3	743.0	783.5	833.2	887.5	910.5	953.8	980.5	976.5
Federal purchases of goods and services for National Defence ²⁸	66.9	72.0	69.3	65.6	63.9	75.2	87.8	90.9	86.7	76.6
National Defence as percentage of GNP	10.0	10.1	9.3	8.4	7.7	8.5	9.6	9.5	8.8	7.8

TABLE 2. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PURCHASES OF GOODS AND SERVICES FOR NATIONAL DEFENCE IN GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT

	<i>(Billions of dollars)</i>									
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970
National Defence ³⁰	47.8	51.6	50.8	50.0	50.1	60.7	72.4	78.0	78.8	76.6
	<i>By object classification³¹</i>									
Compensation of employees	17.7	18.6	19.0	20.4	21.2	24.8	27.4	30.1	32.1	33.4 ²⁹
Military	10.9	11.5	11.7	12.6	13.1	15.8	17.5	19.3	20.6	21.4 ²⁹
Civilian	6.8	7.1	7.4	7.7	8.1	9.0	9.9	10.8	11.5	12.0 ²⁹
Structures	2.2	2.0	1.7	1.3	1.1	1.1	1.0	1.2	1.5	1.2 ²⁹
Other	27.9	31.0	30.0	28.3	27.8	34.8	43.9	46.7	45.3	42.0 ²⁹
	<i>By type of function³¹</i>									
Military Services and foreign military assistance	45.3	48.8	48.3	47.6	48.5	59.2	70.5	75.8	76.6	74.5 ²⁹
Atomic energy development	2.5	2.6	2.5	2.5	2.1	2.1	2.0	2.2	2.1	2.0 ²⁹
Other ³²	.1	.2	-.1	-.1	-.5	-.6	-.2	.1	.1	.1 ²⁹

²⁸The national defence component of gross national product includes purchases of goods and services by: the Department of Defense for military functions and military assistance, the Atomic Energy Commission (civilian and military uses), and the Selective Service System; furthermore, purchases for civil defence programmes and net purchases of strategic and critical materials.

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics, and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

²⁹Preliminary data.

³⁰The national defence component of gross national product includes purchases of goods and services by: the Department of Defense for military functions and military assistance, the Atomic Energy Commission (civilian and military uses), and the Selective Service System; furthermore, purchases for civil defence programmes and net purchases of strategic and critical materials.

³¹Some of individual entries may not agree with total for national defence because of rounding.

³²Includes purchases for Selective Service and civil defence programmes and net purchases of strategic and critical materials.

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

TABLE 3. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE EXPENDITURES FOR PROCUREMENT, FOR MILITARY FUNCTIONS³³

	(Millions of dollars)										(est)
	Fiscal year 1962	Fiscal year 1963	Fiscal year 1964	Fiscal year 1965	Fiscal year 1966	Fiscal year 1967	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969	Fiscal year 1970	Fiscal year 1971	Fiscal year 1971
TOTAL	14,532	16,632	15,351	11,839	14,339	19,012	23,283	23,988	21,584	18,448	18,448
Aircraft	6,400	6,309	6,053	5,200	6,635	8,411	9,462	9,177	7,948	6,603	6,603
Missiles	3,442	3,817	3,577	2,096	2,069	1,930	2,219	2,509	2,912	3,036	3,036
Ships	1,906	2,522	2,078	1,713	1,479	1,398	1,356	1,949	2,066	1,993	1,993
Ordnance, vehicles and related equipment ³⁴	1,137	1,665	1,597	1,309	1,899	4,252	6,447	7,098	5,620	4,146	4,146
Electronics and communications	1,139	1,427	1,264	897	983	1,284	1,595	1,409	1,182	1,040	1,040
Other procurement	507	891	782	625	1,273	1,737	2,204	1,846	1,857	1,629	1,629

Note: The data shown in this table are not compatible with the data in table 2 because the basis is the fiscal rather than the calendar year and because they reflect time of payment rather than time of delivery (the basis for GNP accounting).

³³ Exclusive of military assistance.

³⁴ Includes tracked combat vehicles.

Source: United States Department of Defense, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller).

TABLE 4. DEFENCE-RELATED EMPLOYMENT IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT COMPARED WITH TOTAL FEDERAL EMPLOYMENT AND TOTAL UNITED STATES EMPLOYMENT³⁵ (Calendar years)

	(in thousands)										
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1970
Total United States employment	73,031	73,442	74,571	75,830	77,178	78,893	80,793	82,272	84,239	85,903	
including military personnel ³⁶	4,851	5,168	5,096	5,087	5,101	5,687	6,165	6,272	6,264	5,895	
Total Federal Government employment ³⁷	2,572	2,828	2,738	2,739	2,723	3,123	3,446	3,535	3,506	3,188	
Military personnel ³⁷	2,279	2,340	2,358	2,348	2,378	2,546	2,719	2,737	2,758	2,707	
Civilian personnel ³⁷											
In defence-related agencies ³⁷											
Department of Defense	943	961	946	923	933	1,022	1,108	1,107	1,125	1,039	
Other ³⁸	15	14	14	14	15	16	16	16	16	16	
Total Federal Government defence-related employment (military and civilian)	3,530	3,803	3,698	3,676	3,671	4,161	4,570	4,658	4,647	4,243	
As percent of:											
Total Federal Government employment	72.8	73.6	72.6	72.3	72.0	73.2	74.1	74.3	74.2	72.0	
Total United States employment, including military personnel	4.8	5.2	5.0	4.8	4.8	5.3	5.7	5.7	5.5	4.9	

³⁵ Employment figures are annual averages.

³⁶ Civilian employment is based upon household surveys in which persons holding more than one job are counted only once. Employment includes wage and salary employees, agricultural workers, domestic workers and self-employed persons.

³⁷ Excludes foreign nationals employed by the United States Government abroad. Figure for military personnel includes those engaged in civilian functions. Figure for Department of Defense civilian personnel includes only those employed in military function.

³⁸ Atomic Energy Commission, Selective Service System, Office of Emergency Preparedness.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Civil Service Commission.

TABLE 5. ESTIMATED TOTAL EMPLOYMENT AND PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT³⁹ IN MAJOR DEFENCE INDUSTRIES ATTRIBUTABLE TO DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARY EXPENDITURES (Selected fiscal years)

(in thousands)

	Fiscal year 1965	Fiscal year 1968	Fiscal year 1969 ⁴⁰	Fiscal year 1970 ⁴⁰
Total defence-related employment	5,764.6	7,772.4	7,643.0	7,062.7
Total defence-related public employment (military and civilian)	3,657.0	4,555.0	4,644.0	4,474.0
Total defence-related private employment ⁴¹	2,107.6	3,217.4	2,999.0	2,588.7
Ordnance and accessories:				
Amount	125.0	241.0	249.7	203.0
Per cent of industry	55.2	72.6	74.2	70.8
Electronic and communications equipment:				
Amount	185.0	276.0	261.0	243.0
Per cent of industry	34.7	40.8	38.6	36.7
Electronic components:				
Amount	80.0	116.4	106.0	93.0
Per cent of industry	28.6	30.6	27.8	24.2
Aircraft and parts:				
Amount	375.0	525.9	515.0	444.5
Per cent of industry	62.3	61.8	61.5	58.3
Shipbuilding and other transportation equipment: ⁴²				
Amount	51.0	63.0	67.0	70.0
Per cent of industry	19.6	20.8	20.3	21.0
All other industry	1,291.6	1,995.1	1,800.3	1,535.2

³⁹ Employment estimates cover wage and salary employees in the United States attributable to Department of Defense military functions. They do not include the employment attributable to the other three defence-related agencies (Atomic Energy Commission, Office of Emergency Preparedness, Selective Service System), and they do not include the self-employed, domestic workers, or United States citizens employed abroad. However, total private defence-generated employment does include self-employed and unpaid family workers on farms.

⁴⁰ Preliminary estimates.

⁴¹ Employment estimates were made using an inter-industry employment model. Estimates, therefore, include not only the directly affected defence employment, but also the employment in supporting industries as well. Estimates of defence-related employment may, therefore, appear high if compared to data which relate only to jobs in direct defence work.

⁴² Excludes motor vehicles.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

TABLE 6. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES—EXPENDITURES: TOTAL, FEDERAL, DEFENCE-RELATED AND NON-FEDERAL, 1961-1970

(Millions of dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969 prel.	1970 est.
Total research and development expenditures	14,552	15,665	17,371	19,214	20,439	22,266	23,642	25,083	26,175	26,850
As percentage of gross national product	2.8	2.8	2.9	3.0	3.0	3.0	3.0	2.9	2.8	2.7
Total federal research and development expenditures	9,264	9,926	11,219	12,553	13,033	13,992	14,449	14,972	14,979	14,650
Defence-related research and development expenditures ^{4 3}	7,161	6,988	6,978	6,917	6,556	6,884	7,499	7,815	8,029	7,998
As percentage of total federal research and development	77.3	70.4	62.2	55.1	50.3	49.2	51.9	52.2	53.6	54.6
As percentage of total research and development expenditures	49.2	44.6	40.2	36.0	32.1	30.9	31.7	31.2	30.7	28.7
Non-federal research and development expenditures	5,288	5,739	6,152	6,661	7,406	8,274	9,193	10,111	11,196	12,200
As percentage of total research and development expenditures	36.3	36.6	35.4	34.6	36.2	37.1	38.9	40.3	42.8	45.4

^{4 3} Defence-related research and development expenditures are: all research and development expenditures of the Department of Defense, and certain research and development expenditures of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Source: National Science Foundation, *National Patterns of Research and Development Resources, 1953-71*.

TABLE 7. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES—EXPENDITURES

*Average annual rates of growth, 1969-1971**Current prices*

Year	GNP	Total research and development	Federal research and development	Defence ⁴⁴ research and development	Non-federal research and development
1961-1964	6.7	9.7	10.7	-1.1	8.0
1964-1968	8.1	6.9	4.5	3.1	11.0
1968-1971 (est.)	6.5	3.5	-0.5	-0.1	9.1
			<i>Constant prices</i>		
1961-1964	5.3	8.3	9.2	-2.5	6.6
1964-1968	5.0	3.8	1.5	0.1	7.8
1968-1971 (est.)	1.8	-1.0	-4.9	-4.5	4.3

⁴⁴ Defence-related research and development expenditures are: all research and development expenditures of the Department of Defense, and certain research and development expenditures of the Atomic Energy Commission.

Source: National Science Foundation, *National Patterns of Research and Development Resources, 1953-71*.

TABLE 8. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES—
EMPLOYMENT OF FULL-TIME-EQUIVALENT (FTE) SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS⁴⁵
IN SELECTED YEARS (1961-1969), BY SECTORS
(in thousands)

	1961	1965	1968	1969 (est.)
Total	425.2	498.0	550.2	554.9
Federal Government ⁴⁶	50.6	64.2	68.3	70.3
As percentage of total	11.9	12.8	12.4	12.7
Industry ⁴⁷	312.0	348.4	380.7	380.9
As percentage of total	73.4	70.0	69.2	68.6
Universities and colleges ⁴⁸	51.5	66.0	78.0	80.3
As percentage of total	12.1	13.2	14.2	14.5
Other non-profit institutions	11.1	19.4	23.2	23.4
As percentage of total	2.6	3.9	4.2	4.2

⁴⁵ Number of full-time employees plus the FTE of part-time employees.

⁴⁶ Includes civilian and military personnel.

⁴⁷ Includes professional Research and Development personnel employed at Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) administered by industry and excludes social scientists.

⁴⁸ Includes FFRDCs administered by universities.

Source: National Science Foundation, *National Patterns of Research and Development Resources, 1953-71*.

TABLE 9. GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT AND EXPENDITURES FOR EDUCATION, HEALTH AND HOUSING
(1961-1969)

(Billions of current dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969
Gross national product	520.1	560.3	590.5	632.4	684.9	749.9	793.9	865.0	931.4
Total expenditures for education, ⁴ health ⁵ and housing ⁵¹	75.4	82.8	88.6	95.2	102.6	110.7	121.8	138.7	152.7
As percentage of gross national product	14.5	14.7	15.0	15.1	15.0	14.8	15.4	16.0	16.4
Total expenditures for:									
Education ⁴	25.3	27.1	29.6	32.7	36.9	42.6	48.0	53.7	59.1
As percentage of gross national product	4.9	4.8	5.0	5.2	5.4	5.7	6.0	6.2	6.3
Health ⁵	26.8	29.2	31.1	34.4	37.5	41.8	47.3	53.0	59.3
As percentage of gross national product	5.2	5.2	5.3	5.4	5.5	5.6	6.0	6.1	6.4
Housing ⁵¹	23.3	26.5	28.0	28.1	28.2	26.3	26.5	32.0	34.2
As percentage of gross national product	4.5	4.7	4.7	4.4	4.1	3.5	3.3	3.7	3.7

⁴ Includes private expenditures on education and research, and government (Federal, State and local) expenditures on education, on the education and training of veterans, and on labour.
⁵ Includes, from the national income accounts, federal, State and local purchases of goods and services for health care, and hospitals (including veteran's hospitals and medical care) and expenses of private medical care and private hospitals.
⁵¹ Includes private investment in new housing from the national income accounts and federal, State and local purchases of goods and services for housing (public housing, urban renewal and community development).
 Source: Council of Economic Advisors.

TABLE 10. BALANCE ON GOODS, SERVICES AND UNILATERAL TRANSFERS, AND DEFENCE-RELATED COMPONENT
(Millions of dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 ^P
I. Exports of goods and services										
TOTAL	30,235	32,045	34,163	38,611	41,027	44,362	47,108	51,426	56,273	63,578
Defence-related goods and services	2,017	2,448	2,468	2,316	2,704	2,185	2,543	2,616	2,750	n.a.
Transfers under military sales contracts	402	656	657	747	830	829	1,240	1,395	1,515	1,479
Transfers under military grants, net	1,465	1,539	1,562	1,340	1,628	1,002	905	804	759	615
Barter sales of agricultural products										
arranged to finance purchases of:										
Department of Defense	—	—	8	35	109	142	226	200	210	
Atomic Energy Commission	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	—	28	2	—	—	
Commercial sales under government-to-government agreements ²	150	253	241	194	137	184	170	217	266	61,484
All other exports of goods and services	28,218	29,597	31,695	36,295	38,323	42,177	44,565	48,810	53,523	
Defence-related as per cent of total exports	7	8	7	6	7	5	5	5	5	n.a.
II. Imports of goods and services										
TOTAL	-23,148	-25,357	-26,617	-28,691	-32,278	-38,060	-40,990	-48,129	-53,564	-59,291
Military expenditures ³	-2,998	-3,105	-2,961	-2,880	-2,952	-3,764	-4,378	-4,535	-4,850	-4,837
All other imports of goods and services	-20,150	-22,252	-23,656	-25,811	-29,326	-34,296	-36,612	-43,594	-48,714	-54,454
Defence-related as per cent of total imports	13	12	11	10	9	10	11			
III. Unilateral transfers, net										
TOTAL	-3,951	-4,152	-4,277	-4,037	-4,386	-3,810	-3,874	-3,632	-3,594	-3,650
Military grants of goods and services ⁴	-1,465	-1,539	-1,562	-1,340	-1,628	-1,002	-905	-804	-759	-615
All other unilateral transfers	-2,486	-2,613	-2,715	-2,697	-2,758	-2,808	-2,969	-2,828	-2,835	-3,035
IV. Balance on goods, services and unilateral transfers										
TOTAL	3,136	2,536	3,269	5,883	4,364	2,492	2,243	-336	-885	638
Balance on defence-related goods, services and unilateral transfers	-2,446	-2,196	-2,055	-1,904	-1,876	-2,582	-2,740	-2,731	-2,858	n.a.

n.a.—Not available.

P—Preliminary.

⁵² Includes commercial sales of military equipment under government-to-government agreements for which data are available.

⁵³ Includes: (i) The personal expenditures of American military and civilian personnel and their dependants abroad and the foreign purchases of the military exchanges and similar agencies which sell to personnel;
(ii) Foreign expenditures of American contractors employed to construct and operate American foreign installations and to furnish other services abroad;
(iii) Expenditures abroad for material, supplies and equipment (including, for example, petroleum and uranium) for the use of American forces at home or abroad;
(iv) Purchases of all other goods and services abroad, including the employ of foreign nationals, which are related to United States military activities abroad;
(v) And also dollar value of foreign goods and services procured in exchange for United States agricultural products under barter agreements.

⁵⁴ Counterbalanced by net transfers under military grants, above under "Exports".

Source: Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics.

TABLE 11. DEFENCE EXPENDITURES ABROAD FOR GOODS AND SERVICES, BY MAJOR CATEGORY ⁵⁵

	(Millions of dollars)										
	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 ^P	1970 ^P
TOTAL ⁵⁶	2,998	3,105	2,961	2,880	2,952	3,764	4,378	4,535	4,850	4,837	4,827
Department of Defense expenditures ⁵⁷	2,694	2,839	2,765	2,755	2,894	3,718	4,367	4,521	4,850	4,827	
Expenditures by United States personnel and by military exchanges, clubs, etc.	772	829	843	954	1,050	1,256	1,391	1,502	1,654	1,822	
A. United States military and civilian personnel and dependants	460	484	472	561	623	738	799	871	944	1,049	
B. Military exchanges and other non-appropriated fund agencies	312	345	371	393	427	518	592	631	710	773	
Construction, equipment materials and supplies	790	778	686	621	680	1,090	1,300	1,279	1,353	1,154	
Foreign citizens, other services, unallocated and NATO infrastructure	928	1,021	1,021	1,034	1,052	1,282	1,600	1,692	1,774	1,814	
Military assistance programme off-shore procurement and services	204	211	215	146	112	90	76	53	58	37	
Atomic Energy Commission defence expenditures	301	262	188	118	49	36	2	-	-	-	
Coast Guard expenditures	3	4	8	7	9	10	9	9	11	10	

⁵⁵ For quarterly data see line 16, table 1, of the quarterly United States balance of payments presentations in *The Survey of Current Business*.

⁵⁶ This series differs from the series maintained by the Department of Defense, which includes expenditures for retired pay, claims, grants of cash to foreign countries, and net changes in Department of Defense holdings of foreign currencies purchased with dollars. These transactions are included in other entries in the quarterly balance of payments presentation in *The Survey of Current Business*.

⁵⁷ Data by category differ from the series maintained by the Department of Defense in certain instances, e.g., (i) Department of Defense includes permanent change of station and *per diem* allowances in the category "Expenditures by United States Personnel" beginning with the last half of 1967, whereas they are included here in the category "Other Services and Unallocated"; and (ii) Department of Defense data do not include expenditures for equipment from operation and maintenance appropriations in the category "Equipment" beginning with 1965, whereas they are included here as "Equipment" through 1967 and "Materials and supplies" thereafter.

P—Preliminary.

Source: United States Department of Commerce, Office of Business Economics from information made available by operational agencies.

TABLE 12. OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, TOTAL OFFICIAL AND TOTAL NET FLOWS⁵⁸

(Millions of dollars)

	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970 ^P
(A) Net official development ⁵⁹ assistance flows	2,943	3,232	3,627	3,636	3,465	3,459	3,567	3,303	3,163	2,975
(B) Net Export Import Bank ⁶⁰ and CCC Commercial Sales Programme ⁶¹	504	304	72	- 191	82	65	155	304	165	229
(C) Net total official flows (A) + (B)	3,447	3,536	3,699	3,445	3,547	3,524	3,722	3,607	3,328	3,204
(D) (C) as percentage of GNP	0.65	0.62	0.62	0.54	0.51	0.46	0.46	0.41	0.35	0.33
(E) Net private flows ⁶²	1,102	819	880	1,326	1,898	1,360	1,922	2,116	1,459	2,395
(F) Total net flows (C) + (E)	4,549	4,355	4,579	4,771	5,445	4,884	5,644	5,723	4,787	5,599
(G) (F) as percentage of GNP	0.86	0.77	0.76	0.74	0.78	0.64	0.70	0.65	0.49	0.57

P—Preliminary.

⁵⁸ These categories and their constituent components are the product of international agreement on what is to be included in calculating the 1 per cent of GNP target for external flows for development. All figures are net of repayments.

⁵⁹ AID financed development loans; technical assistance; supporting assistance, etc.; Food for Peace; contributions to multilateral organizations; Peace Corps, etc.

⁶⁰ Medium-term credits on commercial terms.

⁶¹ Commodity Credit Corporation short-term credits for agricultural commodities.

⁶² Private investment and capital flows.

Source: AID Statistics and Reports.

relating to arms, but has only a specialized and limited impact. Even within the closely circumscribed category of trade involved, the great majority of transfer requests—well over 90 per cent—are approved.

Technical data relating to nuclear weapons, the publication of which would constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defence and security, are classified as Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act. These data may be made available only to authorized persons in the United States and may not be divulged to other countries or their nationals except in certain situations and under agreements of co-operation which provide for the safeguarding of such technical data. The purpose of these controls is to prevent the unauthorized use of atomic data for military purposes. These controls, as well as the controls over components of nuclear facilities, are also required to assure compliance by the United States Government with the provisions of the nuclear test ban treaty and the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Under the Export Administration Act of 1969, the Department of Commerce exercises control over unpublished technical data related to a limited range of technologically advanced and highly strategic goods. The purpose of these controls over technical data is to reinforce the controls over exports of equipment and materials having military significance. The practice of the Department of Commerce is to approve the great bulk of applications in this field, with conditions in some cases prescribing the limitations on use of the technology for production abroad.

Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions, June 29, 1971¹

1. INTRODUCTION

In December 1970 at the 25th UNGA the Canadian delegation distributed a technical report entitled, "Seismological detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions". This was a final assessment of world-wide seismological capabilities for this purpose based on information submitted by co-operating countries in accordance with the UNGA Resolution 2604 A (XXIV).² A preliminary analysis of the problem was distributed to CCD members in August 1970, and summarized in the Canadian Working Paper CCD/305 of August 10, 1970.³

¹ CCD/327, June 29, 1971, and Corr. 1, June 30, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 719-722.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 390-393.

These analyses of the problem were, of necessity, substantially theoretical, although empirical data on actual events were used whenever available. One of the most important conclusions and recommendations was that extensive practical studies of discrimination capability should be undertaken and published using the records from conventional seismograph stations on the same continental mass as earthquake and explosion sources, in order to determine whether the detection and identification thresholds achieved in North America from a limited deployed network (the Canadian network) might be achieved elsewhere using currently deployed equipment. In particular, the technical report noted that the demonstrated threshold of explosion identification in North America could not, without further definitive research, be extrapolated to continental regions in Eurasia.

In North America it was demonstrated that geological conditions along the propagation paths between the Nevada Test Site and a particular network of conventional seismograph stations produce sufficiently efficient propagation of Rayleigh surface waves that the underground explosion identification threshold was 10-20 kilotons in hardrock using the Canadian standard seismograph network alone. It should be lower if all available continental data were used, but such an extensive study on actual events has never been done or, at least, published. No comparable claim could be proved for Eurasian test sites using conventional seismograph stations operating in Eurasia and reported in the returns to Resolution 2604 A (XXIV).

The purpose of this working paper is to outline the results of a study of Eurasian earthquakes and underground explosions made using seismic records from the currently deployed Eurasian standard seismograph stations. The results are a clear demonstration that the identification threshold for these events which can be routinely achieved without the deployment of further equipment is about 20 kilotons yield in competent rock. Furthermore, the new results can be used in association with the material published in the 1970 Technical Report to predict with more certainty the significance of any proposals to deploy different instrumentation with different characteristics, or to merge currently available data in a more effective way. The scientific study has also suggested an improved way to take into account the influence of gross geological effects on surface wave propagation. When this is done, seismic data acquired on the same continent as an event can be usefully and simply compared with seismic data acquired at a station on a different continent from that of the event, for perhaps the first time and with considerable clarification. These data are referred to as continental and intercontinental data, respectively. Finally, in order to clarify the yield limits and to demonstrate the above-mentioned point, comparisons are made with available previously published North American data, although these are not optimum data in terms of the UN returns.

2. EVENTS, STATIONS AND DATA

The North American data consist of that collected for a series of Canadian research papers published in the past few years and will be presented in a modified unified form. The map of North America in Figure 1⁴ shows the locations of the pertinent conventional Canadian seismograph stations and the events that will be discussed. The USA explosions include twenty-four at the Nevada Test Site, two in the Aleutian Islands, one in New Mexico and one in Colorado. The earthquakes selected for comparison are twenty-eight shallow focus earthquakes in the regions of southwestern USA and northwestern Mexico.

The Eurasian data are collected specifically for this study: the data distribution services of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) of the USA, previously known as the Environmental Science Services Administration (ESSA), were used. This provides, at cost, microfilm copies of records from stations of the World Wide Standard Seismograph Network (WWSSN). The locations of the forty-two Eurasian stations employed are shown on the map of Eurasia in Figure 2.⁴ The events selected for analysis were ninety shallow focus Eurasian earthquakes of 1969, restricting the choice of earthquakes to those reported in the five arbitrary regions shown in Figure 2, and thirty-three underground explosions in 1968, 1969 and the first half of 1970. All events were located by the NOAA service, using abstracted seismic readings of *P* or body-wave seismic phases from co-operating observatories and institutions throughout much of the world, i.e., in general, the ensemble of stations studied in the 1970 Technical Report, but *without P*-wave data from most of the seven short-period arrays also considered in that report. The number of explosions in the data sample at each of the eight separate Eurasian test sites are shown adjacent to the site location in Figure 2.

It should be emphasized that all the discrimination results to be presented were achieved from analysis of recordings from standard conventional seismograph stations (Canadian and WWSSN), most of which have been in operation for more than five years. The improvements to be expected from the inclusion of seismic arrays and improved single stations are in some cases documented and predictable, and in other cases need urgent study. These points will be discussed further in later sections.

3. SURFACE WAVE MAGNITUDE (M_s) VERSUS BODY WAVE MAGNITUDE (m_b) DISCRIMINATION

Variations in the geological structure of the upper layers of the earth have two related but separate effects on surface wave magnitudes, M_s , relevant to discrimination: firstly, the propaga-

⁴Not printed here.

tion of Rayleigh surface waves is more efficient with more laterally homogeneous propagation paths, and, secondly, distinctly different propagation paths over different regions of the earth's surface often result in different absolute levels of M_s computed for the same or an equivalent seismic event. The first effect determines the "size" of the seismic surface wave observed after propagation over a particular path length and therefore the "size" of the event that produces the smallest signal that can be observed. The second effect becomes important when comparisons are to be made between different test sites and events (earthquakes and explosions) and data from a world-wide ensemble of stations are to be used in combination.

The scientific analysis, which will be published later in full in the scientific literature, quantitatively defined the relative effects of four general types of Rayleigh wave propagation paths. These were continental Eurasia, continental North America, mixed continental-oceanic (i.e., propagation from Eurasia to North America or vice versa) and purely oceanic (i.e., propagation from an oceanic source to a coastal station). These path propagation effects were reduced to path-dependent corrections which depend on the period of the surface wave and can be simply applied to the computed surface wave magnitude. Additional modifications to the Rayleigh surface wave computation formula include a revised distance correction term, combined with measurements of the maximum in the signal independent of its period, and a correction for focal depth, determined from the Rayleigh wave frequency content in the record. This latter correction produces a distinct improvement in M_s versus m_b discrimination when it can be applied.

The improvements achieved from the derivation and use of this revised M_s formula and the discrimination success of the revised M_s versus m_b method will be illustrated using the stations and events shown in Figures 1 and 2. Although much of the emphasis in this paper is placed on M_s (the Rayleigh wave magnitude), similar regional variations can be attributed to m_b (the P -wave magnitude). These variations are reduced as much as possible by averaging a large number of station values to determine a final m_b ; for those cases where only a small number of P -wave readings are available, corrections are applied to provide m_b values that are accurate relative to larger, more widely recorded events. The path propagation and distance effects are not as critical for m_b ; the most sensitive stations for P -wave detection are often at large distances from the source; for example, many of the stations used to define m_b values for Eurasian events are outside Eurasia.

Figure 3⁵ illustrates an M_s versus m_b plot for the North American events recorded at Canadian stations (see Figure 1) using both the previously established and the newly refined M_s

⁵ Not printed here.

formulae. Figure 3(a) shows earlier published results and Figure 3(b) the same data on the revised M_s scale. The dominant effect of the refined M_s formula is to shift all continental events to the left, i.e. to lower M_s values. This is the intended purpose of the refined formula in that it shifts M_s to values that would be observed over long, complex world-wide paths, whilst continuing to employ the optimum seismogram measurements of the efficiently propagating, shorter period Rayleigh waves that have propagated over the purely continental North American path. These events were not remeasured on the original seismograms and the M_s values, therefore, do not contain the newly established depth correction, which requires Rayleigh wave measurements at a range of frequencies.

Two other effects are apparent in Figure 3. The Aleutian explosions, Longshot and Milrow (L and M) which fall far to the left of the continental USA explosion trend on Figure 3 (a), because of their complex path to the Canadian stations, now agree much better on Figure 3(b) with the other explosions. Thus, although these two Aleutian explosions remain above the other explosions in m_b (a matter discussed later), the path correction has normalized the explosions to an equivalent M_s . Secondly, the refined M_s has the additional effect of reducing the scatter in the earthquake population so that, on Figure 3(b), there is a more distinct separation (i.e., discrimination) from the explosion population. These events will be compared to the Eurasian events later in this paper.

Figure 4 shows revised M_s versus m_b plots for events in the three regions of Eurasia containing explosion sites (see Figure 2). This illustrates the smallest scale regionalization that is feasible for Eurasia because of the isolated locations of the explosions and restricted natural occurrence of earthquakes in the active seismic zones. There are only five events available for Region V in the time periods covered. Although the two Novaya Zemlya explosions and three Laptev Sea earthquakes are widely separated in M_s versus m_b relationships, there is not sufficient data to define the trends over a wide magnitude range. The majority of the past USSR explosions have been detonated at the eastern Kazakh test site; these, plus the one Sinkiang explosion (denoted "C"), are compared with the earthquakes from the general area of Tadzhik-Kirgiz-Sinkiang in the Region III plot in Figure 4.⁶ The earthquakes and explosions are clearly separated over the entire range of available data, i.e. down to about M_s 3.0, explosion m_b 5.0 and earthquake m_b 4.2.

Region II of Figure 2 contains three explosions from three sites near the Caspian Sea and three explosions from two sites west of the Ural Mountains. These explosions are compared with earthquakes from the general region of Caucasia-Iran-Turkmen in the Region II plot in Figure 4. The three larger Caspian explosions are

⁶ Not printed here.

clearly separated from the earthquake population and have M_s versus m_b relationships very similar to the larger eastern Kazakh and Novaya Zemlya explosions. The three smaller Ural explosions tend to be much nearer the earthquake population and have m_b values significantly lower than the eastern Kazakh explosions of equivalent M_s . They do, however, retain a clear separation from the earthquakes, and are discussed further later in this report.

The data plotted for the three regions in Figure 4 represent the events collected specifically for this study of an analysis of M_s versus m_b discrimination using the WWSSN stations in Eurasia. In Figure 4, a correction to M_s for the focal depth of an event has been included wherever the correction could be determined by measurement of the spectral content of the Rayleigh waves in the seismogram. In order to apply an identical procedure to all events for discrimination purposes, the depth correction was retained in M_s calculations for explosions. This process is sufficiently accurate that a majority of the explosions were assigned depth corrections equivalent to surface or very shallow-focus events. However, the procedure which has been devised is not perfect. Subsequent to the explosion identification (by the M_s versus m_b criterion illustrated in Figure 4), the explosion M_s values can be adjusted to the surface focus equivalent. This was done where necessary for Eurasian explosions appearing on the following diagram (Figure 5).⁷

4. COMPARISON OF NORTH AMERICAN AND EURASIAN EVENTS

The refinements made to M_s were designed to standardize the M_s magnitude so that the Rayleigh waves of maximum amplitude at any period within the standard long-period seismograph passband would yield magnitudes that are independent of the large first order effects of the propagation path. The refined M_s scale has been shown to reduce scatter and improve separation for North American events, and to produce a reliable discriminant for Eurasian events. Next, the two sets of data are combined in an attempt to explain the major residual differences in M_s versus m_b relationships within each of the general earthquake and explosion populations.

Figure 5 shows the intercomparison with separate plots of M_s versus m_b for the total suites of earthquakes and explosions. It clearly demonstrates that access to seismological data recorded by world-wide stations is necessary to reduce the threshold of identification of events in Eurasia. Thus, the six large Eurasian explosions shown as solid triangles in Figure 5(a) are explosions in 1966-68 using data recorded only in Canada. The smallest of these six explosions for which Rayleigh wave measurements were possible on the Canadian standard network had M_s 4.1, m_b 5.8. The smallest explosion is reduced approximately one unit in M_s if data is examined using equivalent stations on the Eurasian continent.

⁷Not printed here.

For North American events, the argument is reversed and it is advantageous to have access to North American data.

The Aleutian explosions (L and M) which remained above the continental USA explosions in Figure 3(b) are shown in Figure 5(a) to conform very closely to the larger Eurasian explosions.

The trend of the majority of the Eurasian explosions is slightly above the trend of the continental USA explosions, i.e. to have a larger m_b for the same M_s . The exceptions are the three Ural explosions (noted in Figure 4) which lie at the lower edge of the continental USA explosion trend. It is considered that these differences are related to the influence of the detonation environment on the m_b values; the eastern Kazakh, Novaya Zemlya and Caspian explosions detonated in older, more competent rock are, on the average, more efficient in P -wave coupling and produce higher relative m_b values than are the continental USA explosions in generally younger, less competent rock.

The three Ural explosions (the lowest three Eurasian explosions shown closely grouped on Figure 5(a)) agree in M_s versus m_b trend with two special USA explosions, Gasbuggy and Rulison, detonated in sedimentary rock environments for purposes of natural gas stimulation. These Ural explosions are also located in a region of deep sedimentary rocks and it therefore appears that explosions of similar size in similar detonation environments on the two continents produce similar M_s versus m_b trends.

In contrast to the different average trends of explosions on the two continents, Figure 5(b) suggests that North American and Eurasian earthquakes have similar average M_s versus m_b trends and general scatter. This suggests similar average tectonic conditions (as they affect M_s versus m_b) for the seismic regions sampled on the two continents, and similar degrees of perturbation from these average tectonic conditions. The pertinent point with respect to discrimination is whether these small populations are truly representative of the numerous earthquakes in these seismic regions. Consideration of nearfield observations by United States seismologists of earthquakes in the same seismic regions of North America suggests that they are representative, so that it is not expected that the earthquake occurring, say, next week or next year in these regions will deviate significantly from the trends established by the earthquake sample studied. Of course, studies of more extensive earthquake samples should be encouraged as a matter of some urgency.

5. STANDARD SEISMOGRAPH STATION DETECTION AND DISCRIMINATION THRESHOLDS

(a) *Rayleigh wave thresholds:*

It is important to consider redefining the concept of a positive identification threshold directly in terms of M_s without converting later to an m_b value using some assumption concerning the appropriate M_s versus m_b trend. There are three logical reasons for

doing so: (1) there has been justifiable confusion in the minds of non-seismologists with calculated or claimed identification thresholds at an m_b value, say $m_b 5.0$, where the detection of P -waves is still comparatively straightforward; (2) the threshold for explosion identification has heretofore been controlled by the capability of detecting the surface Rayleigh waves, and therefore defining the threshold in terms of M_s naturally avoids the difficulty with conversion back to m_b values; (3) the refinements made to the M_s formula have, for the first time, normalized all Rayleigh wave observations to the same absolute scale. In terms of M_s versus m_b discrimination, an M_s detection threshold is equivalent to the identification threshold (assuming, of course, that earthquakes and explosions remain separated at the M_s threshold), whenever sufficient location or detection capability exists.

The M_s detection threshold for Eurasian Rayleigh waves by the Eurasian WWSSN stations employed in this analysis has been determined. It is $M_s 3.2$ and corresponds to that level at which there is greater than 90 per cent probability of having measurable Rayleigh waves at four or more of the stations of the network. The explosion identification threshold for these stations and explosions in Eurasia is therefore $M_s 3.2$.

This clearly defined $M_s 3.2$ threshold can now be viewed in terms of the regional plots in Figure 4. The threshold is slightly to the left (i.e. to smaller magnitudes) of the Sinkiang explosion in Region III and slightly to the left of the three Ural explosions in Region II. It is important to note that it is near this magnitude range that the actual explosion data, from the NOAA source and for the time periods employed, are becoming scarce. Only three of the available explosions during the time period (all in eastern Kazakh) do not appear on the plots in Figure 4; one, $m_b 5.0$, had Rayleigh waves totally obscured by an interfering earthquake and two, $m_b 4.3$ and $m_b 4.7$, had no observable Rayleigh waves on the available Eurasian seismograms. An extrapolation of the trend of the explosions in Region III in Figure 4 to lower magnitudes shows that the latter two explosions are significantly below the $M_s 3.2$ threshold.

The earlier published North American data, revised to the new scale and summarized here in Figure 3, did not make use of all the potentially available standard station and other recordings. All that can be said is that the threshold corresponding to the smallest explosion size for which there is a greater than 90 per cent probability of measuring the corresponding surface waves at four stations of the Canadian standard network is also $M_s 3.2$. However, technical considerations which follow from the path corrections, which have now been numerically defined, and the USA contribution to the UN returns make it highly probable that the North American threshold which would be obtained by a new similar analytical experiment should be about $M_s 2.6$.

In other words, it is considered that the present situation which

produces the same proven threshold, $M_s 3.2$, for Eurasian and North American events is artificial: because of the extensive continental USA contribution to the United Nations returns, it is highly probable that the intrinsic threshold for continental North American events is near $M_s 2.6$, using these techniques.

The refined version of the M_s scale is a more stable indicator of event "size" and a more useful scale for defining both threshold and yield than is the previously employed m_b scale. The concept of defining a surface wave magnitude-yield relationship has been developing over the past year or two. It was discussed in the working paper, CCD/306, of the Swedish delegation on 12 August 1970,⁸ and in the Canadian Technical Report. The matter has been considered at length in scientific papers (available to us in preprint form) by UK, USA and Swedish seismologists. Yields for 16 of the USA explosions in Figure 3 are available. An empirical fit of yield versus M_s for these 16 explosions results in the relationship $M_s = 1.2 \log Y + 1.6$. The mean error in yield that would result from the application of this equation to these 16 explosions, and thus the expected error when applied to other explosions, is about 33 per cent. Assuming the empirical stability of M_s with respect to the explosion detonation environment, and the success of the refined M_s scale in removing first order path propagation effects, the application of this equation to the Eurasian explosions will result in yields of similar accuracy. For example, the yields of the three Ural explosions would be 27 ± 9 kilotons; the USA explosions, Gasbuggy and Rulison, in similar environments had reported yields of 29 and 40 kilotons, respectively; these five explosions are juxtaposed in Figure 5(a).

Applying this M_s versus yield formula directly, the yield equivalent to the $M_s 3.2$ Eurasian explosion identification threshold is about 20 kilotons. The intrinsic threshold of $M_s 2.6$ discussed above for continental North America, and discussed below assuming improved capabilities in Eurasia, is about 7 kilotons.

(b) *P-wave thresholds and earthquake location:*

The problem of the general availability of explosion data has been noted briefly above; this, of course, is related to the scheduling, size and number of explosions in the various testing programmes. The availability of earthquake data, on the other hand, is, within rather broad limits, predictable on the basis of well-established earthquake recurrence relationships for any general seismic region. It is, for example, possible to predict within about a factor of two how many earthquakes within a certain magnitude range will occur within these regions of Eurasia in the period of one year. Statistical prediction of this kind has been employed to estimate that the Eurasian earthquakes in the critical magnitude range, $m_b 4.2 - m_b 4.7$, employed here represent

⁸Documents on Disarmament, 1970, pp. 404-406.

approximately 25 per cent of the total Eurasian earthquakes for the same regions within this range that actually occurred during the year 1969. This lack of availability of relatively complete earthquake occurrence data is due to the rapidly diminishing capability of locating earthquakes as m_b values fall below about $m_b 4.7$, using P -wave data routinely transmitted to the NOAA epicenter location centre, which, with the voluntary information supplied to it, is restricted to the documentation on a world-wide basis of the larger and more socially significant earthquakes.

The 1970 Technical Report demonstrated, however, that, using all data guaranteed within the context of UNGA 2604 A (XXIV), the capability exists, using the short period arrays in addition to the more sensitive standard stations, to locate a high percentage of all Eurasian (in general, northern hemisphere) earthquakes in the $m_b 4.2$ to 4.7 range. Until such time as this is achieved routinely, or a special study is made of the detection and location of small earthquakes for a period of, say, one year for critical regions such as these in Eurasia, it can only be assumed that the earthquake trends and scatter will persist to low magnitudes. The total earthquake M_s versus m_b data available in various technical and scientific publications suggests that the small Eurasian earthquakes in the $M_s 2.7$ - 3.5 range, employed in this study, are, because of P -wave detection limitations, earthquakes with relatively large m_b values for this M_s range. That is, few of the remaining unreported earthquakes that undoubtedly occurred in the same time period are expected to have m_b values nearer to the explosion populations. This limitation on earthquake reporting, although not completely absent, is less severe in the seismic regions near the continental USA test sites because of the dense network of nearby USA stations routinely reporting data to the NOAA earthquake location agency.

6. DISCUSSION

The principal purpose of this working paper has been to make CCD delegations aware of the Canadian interpretation of the value of existing conventional seismograph stations on the continents of Eurasia and North America for purposes of identifying underground explosions on these two continents. A comparison will now be made between the present capabilities demonstrated in the body of this paper and the practical potential capabilities that can be achieved with modest improvements. An attempt will be made to distinguish between what can be considered as practically achievable at present (by consolidating available data, redeploing improved seismograph systems where necessary, modifying existing systems with modest but proven techniques, etc.), and what might be theoretically achievable with massive additional investment in highly sophisticated integrated systems.

(a) *The detection and location problem:*

Using the documented capabilities of the short period array

stations reported in the United Nations returns, the capability at present exists, although not achieved routinely, of locating the additional small earthquakes in the critical magnitude range near the $M_s 3.2$ identification threshold. To the extent that the complete (M_s versus m_b) definition of the earthquake population above the $M_s 3.2$ threshold is at present limited by this lack of earthquake location capability, establishing procedures to routinely achieve detection and location of more of these earthquakes should be given first priority. At least two nations to our knowledge (USA and Sweden) routinely compute locations of additional small earthquakes for their own research purposes, the USA by integrating data from two large aperture, short-period arrays (LASA and NORSAR), and Sweden by supplementing their own array data with additional data from several high quality standard stations throughout the world. A means is required of completing the data co-ordination and making the results available to the broader international seismological community.

In any case, this problem of event location is solved in principle down to $m_b 4.2$ or so: to go lower may require the suitable development of more, well-sited, short-period, medium-aperture arrays, and even then a lower general limit much below $m_b 4.0$ will be very difficult to achieve at all locations in the northern hemisphere. In all cases, we are using 90 per cent interval probability figures.

(b) *The surface wave detection problem:*

There are a number of long period facilities in existence throughout the world whose capabilities for Rayleigh wave detection are considerably better than the standard stations employed in the analysis discussed in this paper. These stations have not been employed in the analysis presented because it is only now, having defined standard station capabilities, that an accurate assessment of the requirements for improved long period facilities can be made. The 1970 Technical Report discussed in detail the capabilities of the more sophisticated individual long period facilities. For purposes of direct extrapolation from the standard station capabilities discussed in this paper, the following, rather over-simplified, assumption will be made concerning improvements to be gained from such systems: a single station with facilities for microseismic noise rejection and modest signal enhancement processing is assumed to be a factor of 4 better in Rayleigh wave signal amplitude detection than the standard station; a large-aperture, long-period array is assumed to gain an additional factor of 4 from beam-forming, for a total factor of 16 better than the standard station. These factors represent potential M_s threshold reductions of 0.6 and 1.2 for the improved single station and the large aperture array, respectively.

An assumption required for direct comparison of these improvements with the standard stations employed is that, in order to take

advantage of the efficient continental propagation, similarly located improved systems will apply their signal enhancement techniques to the equivalent maximum amplitude signals, and will not restrict consideration to 20-second or some other fixed-period waves. Then the threshold reductions described above can be applied directly to the M_s 3.2 threshold of the standard stations; it is further assumed that the improved systems will be deployed in such numbers and locations that will yield the equivalent 4 or more station detections.

The advantages of observations at nearer distances over purely continental paths can be illustrated by making a similar threshold reduction calculation for inter-continental propagation. The standard station Rayleigh wave detection threshold for the intercontinental case is about M_s 4.3. This is estimated from the Canadian standard station capabilities for Rayleigh waves from Asian earthquakes and explosions, but will be roughly equivalent for other intercontinental paths. The threshold is considerably higher than the continental case because of the greater average distances and the geological restriction which corresponds to working with Rayleigh waves with periods of 20 seconds or greater. The threshold reductions achievable by the improved systems can again be applied directly to this standard station M_s 4.3 threshold. A summary of the M_s thresholds for the two cases and the three different types of systems is given in the following table.

*M_s Thresholds for Continental and Intercontinental Cases
Employing the Three Different Seismograph Systems*

LONG PERIOD STATION SYSTEM	CONTINENTAL (within North America or Eurasia; average distance 3000 km)	INTERCONTINENTAL (between North America and Eurasia; average distance 8000 km)
STANDARD (WSSWN or Canadian network equivalents)	M_s 3.2	M_s 4.3
IMPROVED SINGLE STATIONS	M_s 2.6	M_s 3.7
LARGE APERTURE ARRAYS	M_s 2.0	M_s 3.1

It is apparent from this table that large aperture arrays at intercontinental distances will only slightly improve on the performance of standard stations situated on the same continent as the seismic events of interest. Furthermore, intercontinental arrays cannot match the performance of the continental improved

single stations. The lowest threshold is, of course, attributed to the arrays for the continental case.

(c) *Detection, location and identification:*

At present, we have complete detection and location information from NOAA of events down to about $m_b 4.7$: although the data is not complete, numerous events are detected and located below this level (see Figures 4 and 5). At $m_b 4.2$ only a small percentage of events are routinely detected and located. All explosions at or above the $M_s 3.2$ identification threshold have m_b values above the NOAA detection and location threshold and no problems of locating explosions at the present $M_s 3.2$ threshold arise.

The next simplest step, in principle, might consist of the reduction of the M_s threshold from $M_s 3.2$ to $M_s 2.6$ by employing improved Rayleigh wave detection systems on the same continent, coupled with the data merging described above to bring the detection and location capability of events down to $m_b 4.2$ in the northern hemisphere. All the explosions at the $M_s 2.6$ threshold will remain above the $m_b 4.2$ lower limit and can be detected, located and assigned m_b values. A majority of the earthquakes at the $M_s 2.6$ threshold will be below the $m_b 4.2$ detection and location threshold, i.e., their P -waves will not be detected by sufficient stations to allow locations to be calculated and m_b values to be assigned. A poorer location capability would be obtained with the one or two most powerful short-period arrays only. Accordingly, near this potential $M_s 2.6$ threshold, the circle will have fully turned and we should be in the paradoxical situation of identifying an explosion on the basis of being able to locate it, and then placing its M_s versus m_b position in the correct region of an established trend. The situation with respect to negative criteria will have turned "full-circle", and small earthquakes could be identified and ignored in monitoring because of the absence of observable P -waves.

The reduction of the M_s threshold significantly below $M_s 2.6$, for example to $M_s 2.0$ by the use of large arrays on the same continent as the events of interest, will require a parallel improvement in the P -wave detection (event location) threshold to below $m_b 4.0$. This will be extremely difficult to achieve. Furthermore, at this limit it could be justifiably argued that it remains to be clearly demonstrated that the principle of identification still works adequately and populations of earthquakes and explosions remain separated.

7. CONCLUSIONS

(a) The threshold of identification of Eurasian underground explosions using standard seismograph stations reported in the returns to UNGA Resolution 2604 A (XXIV) has been demonstrated to be approximately 20 kilotons in most natural environ-

ments (dry alluvium excepted—the situation is worse). This is the result of an analytical experiment with actual data.

(b) The corresponding figure for continental North American underground explosions was previously reported at 10-20 kilotons in hard rock using Canadian standard seismograph station data. The derivation of a new, refined surface-wave magnitude scale allows more accurate extrapolation. Accordingly, it is highly probable that an analytical experiment with actual data from stations reported in the United Nations returns would reduce this continental North American threshold to between 5 and 10 kilotons in most natural environments (dry alluvium excepted).

(c) A corresponding reduction to 5-10 kilotons in Eurasia requires the deployment of a limited number of improved single stations only, together with the merging of currently available data to achieve the detection and location ability calculated in the Canadian Technical Report of December 1970.

(d) To achieve a capability at 1-2 kilotons in natural environments other than dry alluvium, massive investment in arrays sited on the same continent as the events is necessary. Re-thinking of the logical processes practiced today of detection, location and identification will probably be necessary. Arrays have advantages in addition to their signal enhancement capabilities: they can be used to pick out a signal obscured at an ordinary station by seismic waves generated elsewhere from the event of interest, and they give some approximate location capability independently.

(e) Attention to existing test sites simplifies the identification problem: the situation for universal coverage is always more pessimistic than the results which can be achieved for particular developed test sites.

(f) The practical potential 5 to 10 kiloton thresholds are possible because of the deployment of such modern standard seismograph networks as the World-Wide Standard Seismograph Network, the Canadian Standard Network and others, the deployment of arrays by the USA, the UK, Canada, Sweden and other countries, the work of the USA and other countries in the development and deployment of experimental improved single stations, and the ready or potential availability of the data from all these.

(g) The lack of information on precise locations and yields of underground explosions, and the deployment of seismograph stations and their capabilities in many Eurasian countries makes the situation in a comparison of North American and Eurasian capabilities somewhat asymmetric.

(h) Problems with respect to explosions in dry alluvium or in artificially modified environments, or with conceivable measures to confuse the seismic signals from underground nuclear explosions are not considered in this report.

APPENDIX

A Glossary of Technical Terms

<i>event</i>	An earthquake or an underground nuclear explosion.
<i>station</i>	An establishment which houses seismographs. A <i>standard seismograph station</i> usually operates both <i>long period</i> and <i>short period</i> seismographs at a single site. A <i>seismic array station</i> operates an array of long and/or short period seismographs distributed in some geometric pattern over an area. A <i>large aperture</i> array has a total breadth of a few hundreds of kilometers, a <i>medium aperture</i> array of a few tens of kilometers.
<i>long period</i>	Refers to seismic waves, or to recording of seismic waves, with oscillation periods from about 10 to 50 seconds, the period range of Rayleigh surface waves pertinent to this report.
<i>short period</i>	Refers to seismic waves, or to recording of seismic waves, with oscillation periods from about 0.3 to 2.0 seconds, the period range of <i>P body waves</i> pertinent to this report.
<i>Rayleigh surface waves</i>	A type of seismic wave which propagates along the free surface of the earth. Consideration here is primarily restricted to the vertical component of these waves.
<i>P body waves</i>	A type of seismic wave which propagates through the body of the earth, and which is the first arriving seismic wave at a <i>station</i> from a distant <i>event</i> . Consideration here is again restricted to the vertical component of these waves.
<i>detection</i>	Refers to the process of deciding that an event has occurred on the basis of having recorded <i>P</i> and/or <i>Rayleigh waves</i> .
<i>location</i>	Refers to the process of calculating the location of a seismic <i>event</i> using the observed arrival times of <i>detected P waves</i> at a suitable number of stations.
<i>identification discrimination</i>	Refers to the process of deciding that an <i>event</i> is either an earthquake or an explosion on the basis of an established criterion using the recorded seismic waves.
<i>threshold</i>	The lowest level in terms of the <i>event magnitude</i> or <i>yield</i> at which each of the above three processes can be achieved with the appropriate statistical reliability. The statistical reliability employed in this paper refers to that <i>magnitude</i> or <i>yield</i> at which there is a 90 percent probability of <i>detecting</i> the appropriate <i>P</i> or <i>Rayleigh waves</i> at 4 or more <i>stations</i> . The <i>event location threshold</i> is assumed equal to the <i>P wave detection threshold</i> ; the <i>identification threshold</i> is equated to the <i>explosion Rayleigh wave detection threshold</i> .
<i>focus</i>	The position of an <i>event</i> in three dimensions, i.e., in terms of its geographical co-ordinates and its depth below the earth's surface.
<i>epicenter</i>	The point of intersection on the earth's surface of a line projected vertically up from the <i>focus</i> , i.e., the geographical co-ordinates of the <i>focus</i> .
<i>focal depth</i>	The depth of the <i>focus</i> below the epicenter.
<i>shallow-focus</i>	Earthquakes can occur at <i>focal depths</i> as great as about 700 km. For purposes of comparison to explosions of <i>surface-</i> (or <i>very shallow</i>) <i>focus</i> we restrict consideration to earthquakes of <i>shallow-</i> (depth less than 50 km) <i>focus</i> .

- surface-focus* In terms of the accuracies of estimating *focal depths* using distant observations, *events* shallower than about 10 km (this includes all explosions) can be assumed to be or will be indistinguishable from *events* at the surface of the earth (i.e., have *surface-focus*).
- M_s (*Rayleigh wave magnitude*) A logarithmic scale used to define the "size" of *events* on the basis of their *Rayleigh wave* amplitudes observed at a distance.
- M_b (*P wave magnitude*) A logarithmic scale used to define the "size" of *events* on the basis of their *P wave* amplitudes observed at a distance.
- yield* The nuclear explosion size in terms of the equivalent amount of chemical explosive.
- kiloton* The nuclear explosive equivalent of one thousand tons of chemical explosive.
- seismic zone* Tectonically controlled quasi linear features along which earthquakes are expected to occur. A system of *seismic zones* encompassed by poorly defined geographic boundary can be considered a *seismic region*.
- earthquake recurrence relationship* An empirical linear relationship between the *magnitude* of earthquakes and the logarithm of the number of earthquakes that occur per unit time interval. Recurrence relationships for particular *seismic regions* have shown small variations from the average relationship established for global seismicity.
- continental* In the context of this paper, a situation whereby the seismograph *stations* and the *events* of interest are confined to the same broad continental mass.
- intercontinental* In the context of this paper, a situation whereby the seismograph *stations* and the *events* considered are on different broad continental masses.
- microseismic noise* Natural, continuous (but with varying intensity) earth vibrations which, in the *long period* band, are caused primarily by meteorological disturbances at sea which propagate to all points of the earth as seismic waves, and by coupling of local meteorological disturbances with the foundation rocks in the vicinity of the seismograph *station*. The peak in the spectrum of *microseismic noise* occurs in a band near 6 seconds.
- beam-forming* A process achieved using *seismic array* recordings whereby appropriate time delays are applied to individual array signal elements before their addition in order to improve the signal-to-noise ratio.
- signal enhancement* Any special computational process designed to increase signal amplitude relative to background noise.

Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Seismological Verification of Ban on Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests, June 29, 1971¹

1. The present Working Paper summarizes six scientific reports recently distributed by the Swedish delegation (see the footnote here below²) and also some hitherto unreported results of efforts at the Research Institute of National Defence in Sweden to contribute to the solution of remaining problems with seismological verification of a ban on underground test explosions of nuclear weapons.

2. Paper (1) describes a method to calculate, from the times of arrival of seismic waves at seismographic observatories, the relative positions of particular events in narrow source areas, such as earthquake zones and explosion tests sites.³ The method provides not only rather precise relative positions but also confidence areas on the ground, as measures of the precision of the calculated positions. The method steadily improves itself upon acquisition of data from new events in the same source area. Applications to some nuclear explosions on islands in the Pacific Ocean and in Kazakhstan gave 90% confidence areas mostly between 25 and 100 square kilometers. In the present context the method facilitates the understanding of differences between events by relating them to topographic, geologic and tectonic features of the earthquake and explosion source areas. The method facilitates decisions about the "nationality" of events near national borders and the selection of areas to be investigated by other means, such as inspections. In all three applications the usefulness of the method is greatly increased if the real position of some calibration events can be used to fix the relative positions accurately on the map.

3. Paper (2),⁴ earlier versions of which have been the basis of several Swedish statements on the test ban control problem (see e.g. ENDC/PV.309,⁵ ENDC/191,⁶ ENDC/PV.315,⁷ ENDC/PV.323,⁸ ENDC/PV.385,⁹ ENDC/PV.399,¹⁰ ENDC/PV.415,¹¹ CCD/PV.487)¹² describes a method to determine, in numerical

¹ CCD/329, June 29, 1971.

² Except for the second paper, these studies were issued as reports of the Swedish Research Institute of National Defence (RIND), as indicated below.

³ K. Kogeus, *Telesismic Relative Location of Closely Spaced Epicenters* (RIND rept. C 4370-26, 1968).

⁴ U. A. Ericsson, "Event Identification for Test Ban Control," *Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America*, vol. 60, no. 5 (Oct. 1970), pp. 1521-1546.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 272-278.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 305-309.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 310-312.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 333-338.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 544-551.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 143-150.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 219-231.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 409 ff.

terms, the usefulness of particular seismic discriminants to the political decision problems posed by test ban control with or without obligatory inspections. The problem involves, on the one hand, the probability of correctly identifying an explosion as such and, on the other hand, the probability of striking a false alarm about an earthquake. The political requirements on the verification procedure ask for a certain minimum probability for correct identification of explosions, to deter from treaty violations, but also for a not too high rate of false alarms. The latter is much dependent on the natural rate of earthquakes and, in the case of control with obligatory on-site inspections, also on the permitted rate of such inspections and on their effectiveness. The solution offered in paper (2) takes the statistical properties of earthquakes and explosions into account and compares the politically required combination of deterrence level and false alarm rate with those practically attainable. This method showed that certain identification measures could be considered as sufficiently effective for some test ban control purposes. However, several problems remained to be solved. Paper (2) did not take weak events into account, nor did the method offer ways to combine simultaneous but often greatly different measurements at several stations in a seismographic network. It also remained to establish more firmly the statistical properties of earthquake and explosion waves. The observations used in paper (2) were rather few and the conclusions drawn from them approximate with unknown confidence intervals. Another unsolved problem of great practical importance was therefore how to obtain numerical estimates of the reliability of results obtained according to the method described in paper (2). These problems have been taken up since then and have been at least partly solved in some of the investigations summarized here below.

4. In paper (3) the connexion between the yield or energy of an explosion and the body and surface wave magnitudes measured by a network of stations, is described by a set of linear equations between the magnitudes and the logarithm of the yield, with superimposed statistical disturbances.¹³ The relations between yield and mean surface wave magnitudes, reproduced here last year in document CCD/306 and obtained from Canadian observations,¹⁴ was then new and coincides nearly with a relation recently published by J. Evernden and J. Filson in the US (see the footnote below).¹⁵ Expressions for the maximum likelihood estimates of yields from network magnitudes and approximate confidence ranges for these were also obtained. Of particular importance in the present context were three findings. One was

¹³ U. Ericsson, *A Linear Model for the Yield Dependence of Magnitudes Measured by a Seismographic Network* (RIND rept. C 4455-26, 1971).

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 404-406.

¹⁵ Jack F. Evernden and John Filson, "Regional Dependence of Surface-Wave Versus Body-Wave Magnitudes," *Journal of Geophysical Research*, vol. 76, no. 14 (May 10, 1971), pp. 3303-3308.

that the statistical disturbances could be described by normal distributions. The other was that, after an increase of the explosion yield the magnitudes measured at some twenty Canadian stations increased in essentially the same way at all stations. The third finding was that, in spite of this, the relative magnitude levels vary greatly (by nearly two units) between stations. This last finding demonstrates the importance of avoiding global averages of magnitudes. Instead, one should try to keep apart the situations defined by individual source areas and individual stations. Evernden and Filson (*loc.cit.*) have found that differences between stations can be correlated with local seismic noise levels. The bearing of such level differences on the impracticability of global event magnitudes for control of an underground test ban above a certain threshold is discussed in paper (3) in some detail. Individually calibrated stations and restriction of explosions permitted under such a treaty to calibrated test areas seem desirable in the case of such a treaty. Finally, paper (3) also provided a basis for the construction of discriminants which use body and surface wave magnitudes and which are normally distributed and independent of the explosion yield.

5. In paper (4)¹⁶ the yield estimation method established in paper (3) or subsidiary methods derived from it, are applied to 20 different source-network or source-station situations, with 69 underground nuclear explosions in the USSR and 75 in the US. Estimates by one surface wave station are found to be about as precise as joint estimates by four body wave stations. Yield estimates from surface waves are therefore to be preferred, when available and calibrated. Seismometric networks provide yield estimates which can be as repeatable as the basic radio-chemical yield estimates, but without calibrated test sites and calibrated stations the average correctness of such seismometric estimates is rather low. In uncalibrated situations the seismometric estimates, as given in paper (4), are only equivalent yields, being the yield to be exploded in a reference area (in our case the Pahute Mesa in the Nevada Test Site) to reproduce the magnitude from the considered event. Of particular interest in the present context is the finding in paper (4) that the way described in paper (3) to obtain one earthquake-explosion discriminant from all the body wave and surface wave magnitudes recorded in a network, also combines the measurements in such a way that the sharpness of discrimination is increased as much as possible, thereby maximizing the advantage of using a network of stations instead of single stations.

6. Paper (5) describes the activities during 1970 at the Hagfors Observatory in Sweden, including its operational performance.¹⁷ Paper (5) also lists nuclear explosions recorded at Hagfors, including the body and surface wave magnitudes obtained there.

¹⁶U. Ericsson, *Seismometric Estimates of Underground Nuclear Explosion Yields* (RIND rept. C 4464-26, 1971).

¹⁷Hagfors Observatory annual rept. for 1970 (RIND rept. A 4501-26, 1971).

The spectral content of body waves was found to depend very considerably on the position of the source area, with high frequencies dominating in waves from the Aleutians and from Eurasia. The detection capability for Eurasian events was found to be much better than for North American. Of special interest in the present context is a summary given in paper (5) of studies of identification using discriminants constructed from Hagfors measurements of body and surface wave magnitudes, of short period spectral ratios and of complexities.

7. Paper (6)¹⁸ gives a more detailed account of the identification studies on Hagfors data summarized in paper (5). Identification by complexity is found to be somewhat better for USSR explosions and Eurasian earthquakes than for US explosions and North American earthquakes, but in neither case the identification can be considered as very effective. A yet unreported study of complexity data from other stations shows, however, that identification by complexity can be much improved when data from several stations are combined. Identification by short period spectral ratio is noticeably better than by complexity and again identification at Hagfors of Asian events is better than of North American events. The events studied so far with this method had equivalent yields down to about five kilotons. Identification by body and surface wave magnitudes appear, however, to be by far the most effective method with Hagfors data. Again, Asian events are much better identified than North American events. However, present equipment at Hagfors does not permit the required surface wave detection for explosions in Central Asia with equivalent yields below fifty kilotons. For North American events the present surface wave detection level at Hagfors is just below hundred kilotons.

8. Further, yet unreported, Swedish studies deal with the optimal use of single station discriminants, the combination of different kinds of discriminants, the use of station networks for identification and the dependance of the power of identification by body and surface wave magnitudes on the position of the source area and on the event strength. These studies include Canadian data on North American events which show that identification can be made yield-independent; the available data, however, did not cover yields below five kilotons. Using observations made in Montana, Scotland, Australia and several stations in South Asia, significant regional differences in identification effectiveness have been observed between Eurasian and between North American source areas, as well as some striking homogeneities in the extended arc of earthquake sources made up by the Kuriles, Kamchatka and the Aleutians. Finally, it should be mentioned that a method has been found to determine the

¹⁸ H. Israelson, *Identification of Earthquakes and Explosions With Seismic Data From Hagfors Observatory* (RIND rept. C 4468-26, 1971).

reliability of conclusions about identification capabilities. Applications in progress are intended to show how confident one can be, on the basis of present observations, that a discriminant can meet some specific political demand and also how many observations one needs for quite confident conclusions. The purpose of these investigations is to show how much further observations, if any, are needed to consolidate our understanding of identification possibilities.

9. *Conclusions:* This summary of Swedish research into seismic verification of a ban on underground tests of nuclear weapons has not given full consideration to the most recent contributions from other research groups. At a later stage it will be possible to obtain a more complete picture of the present state of understanding. Many of the results summarized here above are also rather technical and bear mostly on how to conduct further research about seismic identification. In a general way, however, it can be said that the results recently obtained support and elaborate the decision-theoretical approach described in paper (2) above. That approach has been advocated by the Swedish delegation since 1967 as a way to get an adequate test ban control. The method of identification by body and surface waves has been seen to work down to about five kilotons, provided that properly placed and equipped stations give the necessary data. Identification by this method can be highly efficient but differences in the susceptibility to that method of different source regions make it advisable to consider some source regions separately. Methods have been obtained for the efficient use of integrated data from station networks and they are expected to increase even further the efficiency of identification by body and surface wave magnitudes. It also appears that identification by short period spectral ratio might work at least down to five kilotons. This is of special interest, as it appears much easier to record signals from weak events for the application of this method than for the method using body and surface wave magnitudes. Our data basis is, however, far too narrow for final conclusions about identification by short period spectral ratio. Finally, work is under way to determine how much experimental data really are needed for confident conclusions about identification capabilities.

**Report by Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon on the
Sea-Bed Treaty, June 29, 1971¹**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, D.C., June 29, 1971.

The President,
The White House.

The President: I have the honor to submit to you, with the

¹S. Ex. H, 92d Cong., 1st sess.

recommendation that it be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification, a certified copy of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.²

The Treaty was opened for signature at Washington, London and Moscow on February 11, 1971. Sixty-two States, including the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed the Treaty in Washington on that date. A number of other States have also signed the Treaty in one or more of the three capitals.

This Treaty is the product of several years of discussion and negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva (CCD) and at the United Nations. It represents an outstanding example of how an important multilateral instrument can be developed with the participation and significant help of many countries.

In 1967 the United Nations decided to engage in a thorough examination of the question of reserving the seabed underlying the high seas for peaceful purposes.

The question of preventing an arms race on the seabed was included in the agenda adopted by the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva (now the CCD) in August 1968.³ Concrete negotiations on this issue got under way at Geneva the following year. Initial discussion focused on the scope of a possible prohibition, the seabed area to which the prohibition should apply, and procedures for verifying compliance with the prohibition.

After extensive discussion, the United States and the Soviet Union reached agreement on the text of a draft treaty, tabled at the CCD on October 7, 1969, to prohibit the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed.⁴

CCD members proposed various amendments to this text, some of which were incorporated in a revised US-Soviet draft dated October 30, 1969.⁵

This draft was reviewed by the twenty-fourth United Nations General Assembly in the autumn of 1969. A number of additional amendments were proposed at that time and the General Assembly called on the CCD to continue its work on the draft treaty.⁶

During the 1970 CCD session, the United States and the Soviet Union twice revised their joint draft treaty to incorporate

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 583-584.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 473-475.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 507-509.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 715.

amendments that had been developed at New York and also amendments reflecting further suggestions by CCD members. Many countries had expressed the view that a way should be found to give all parties to the Treaty (and in particular coastal states), regardless of their technological capabilities, a greater opportunity to take part in verifying the Treaty prohibitions. Through detailed consultations and negotiations, the United States and Soviet sponsors of the Treaty developed procedures that would assist all parties in assuring themselves that the prohibitions of the Treaty are being observed.

The progress achieved at Geneva was reflected in the third version of the joint United States-Soviet draft treaty tabled on April 23, 1970,⁷ and in the final draft tabled on September 1, 1970.⁸

On December 7, 1970, by a vote of 104 to 2 (with 2 abstentions) the General Assembly voted to commend this Treaty and request that it be opened for signature and ratification at an early date. This resolution reflected the conviction of the international community "that the prevention of a nuclear arms race on the seabed and the ocean floor serves the interests of maintaining world peace, reducing international tensions and strengthening friendly relations among States."⁹

The Treaty consists of a Preamble and 11 Articles.

The Preamble has five paragraphs expressing the consensus of the parties. The first recognizes the common interest of mankind in the use of the seabed for peaceful purposes; the second stresses the positive value of preventing a nuclear arms race on the seabed; the third states that the Treaty is a step toward the exclusion of the seabed from the arms race; the fourth expresses the conviction that the Treaty is a step toward general and complete disarmament; and the final preambular paragraph affirms that the Treaty will further the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter without infringing the freedom of the high seas.

The principal obligation of the Treaty is set forth in the first paragraph of Article I. It provides that the parties undertake not to emplant or emplace nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof beyond the outer limit of a "seabed zone" as defined in Article II.

The prohibition also extends to structures, launching installations or any other facilities specifically designed for storing, testing or using such weapons. The Treaty would therefore prohibit, *inter alia*, nuclear mines that were anchored to or emplaced on the seabed. The prohibition would not, however, apply to facilities for research or for commercial exploitation not specifically designed for storing, testing or using weapons of mass destruction. On the

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 185-188.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 475-479.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 680-681.

other hand, facilities specifically designed for using such weapons would not, because they could also use conventional weapons, be exempted from the prohibition.

The prohibitions of the Treaty are not intended in any way to affect the conduct of peaceful nuclear explosions or to affect applications of nuclear reactors, scientific research, or other non-weapon applications of nuclear energy, consistent with other treaty obligations.

For the purpose of this Treaty, submarines and other vehicles that can navigate in the water above the seabed are to be viewed in the same way as any other ships; submarines would therefore not be violating the Treaty if they were either anchored to, or resting on, the seabed.

The second paragraph of Article I provides that the prohibition shall also apply within the coastal "seabed zone" with two exceptions: first, it does not apply to the seabed beneath the territorial waters of the coastal State, thus leaving unaffected the sovereign authority and control of the coastal State over its territorial waters within the seabed zone; second, it does not apply to activities of the coastal State anywhere within the twelve-mile zone.

The third paragraph of Article I provides that the parties will not assist, encourage or induce any State to carry out activities referred to in paragraph one.

Article II defines the "seabed zone" mentioned above. It states that the outer limit of this zone shall be coterminous with the 12-mile outer limit of the zone described in Part II of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone signed in Geneva on 29 April 1958,¹⁰ and shall be measured in accordance with the provisions of Part I, Section II of that Convention and in accordance with international law. The words "and in accordance with international law" were added to establish that where the provisions of Section II of the 1958 Convention are expressly inapplicable, as in the case of so-called "historic" bays, the rules of customary international law will govern the location of the baseline from which the outer limit of the "seabed zone" is to be measured for the purposes of this Treaty.

The Treaty's verification procedures are set forth in Article III. Paragraph one provides that each Party shall have the right to verify through observation the activities of other parties on the seabed so long as observation does not interfere with such activities. This provision does not imply the right to enter a facility or to open up a piece of equipment on the seabed; it does however permit close observation of a facility or an object on the seabed.

¹⁰ 15 UST 1606.

Paragraphs two and three of Article III set forth procedures for consultation and cooperation among the parties to remove any doubts concerning fulfillment of the obligations of the Treaty.

Paragraph four provides for recourse to the United Nations Security Council should there remain a serious question about a possible breach of the Treaty's obligations.

As specified in paragraph five, parties may undertake verification pursuant to the Treaty with the full or partial assistance of any other party or through appropriate international procedures.

Paragraph six makes clear that verification activities must not interfere with the activities of other parties and are to be conducted with due regard for rights recognized under international law, including the freedom of the high seas and the rights of coastal States with respect to the exploration and exploitation of their continental shelves.

It should be noted that the verification provisions of this Treaty apply only to the area beyond the outer limit of the "seabed zone".

To avoid any possible implication of prejudice to any party's position on law-of-the-sea questions, the Treaty contains a broad disclaimer provision in its Article IV. This Article states that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as supporting or prejudicing the position of any party with respect to existing international conventions or with respect to rights or claims regarding coastal waters or the seabed including continental shelves.

In Article V of the Treaty, the parties undertake to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed.

Article VI sets forth the procedure for amending the Treaty. An amendment would enter into force for each party accepting it upon acceptance by a majority of the parties, and for any other party on the date it accepts the amendment. This Article is similar to one contained in the Outer Space Treaty.¹¹

Article VII of the Treaty provides for a review conference to be held five years after its entry into force. The provision for a review conference was included to assure that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty were being realized, taking into account any relevant technological developments. This provision is similar to one contained in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.¹²

Article VIII provides that a party may withdraw from the Treaty upon three months notice if it finds that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. This provision is similar to one found in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

Article IX states that the Treaty will not affect the obligations of parties under international instruments establishing zones free from nuclear weapons.

Article X designates the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union as Depositary Governments, and provides that the Treaty shall enter into force upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two signatory States including the Depositary Governments. It specifies how other States may become parties and contains provisions of a formal nature relating to ratification, accession, and registration with the United Nations.

The provisions for signature and accession have been designed to permit the widest possible application of the Treaty. At the same time adherence to the Treaty will in no way imply recognition or change in status of regimes the United States does not now recognize. Nor will it in any way result in according recognition or change in status to any regime not now recognized by any other party.

I believe that this Treaty represents a practical and timely step in the field of preventive arms limitation. I hope the United States, whose ratification is required to bring the Treaty into force, will become a party in the near future.

Respectfully submitted,

WILLIAM P. ROGERS.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, June 29, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, may I first associate myself with the welcome you have extended to new members of the Committee as well as welcoming the return of numerous old members. I should also like to associate myself with the hopes which you have very eloquently expressed for progress in the field of disarmament, and particularly in the work before this Committee during the session we are beginning today.

12. In his report this year on United States Foreign Policy for the 1970s President Nixon stated that

Around the globe, East and West, the rigid bipolar world of the 1940's and 1950's has given way to the fluidity of a new era of multilateral diplomacy . . . It is an increasingly heterogeneous and complex world, and the dangers of local conflict are magnified. But so, too are the opportunities for creative diplomacy.

Increasingly we see new issues that transcend geographic and ideological borders and confront the world community of nations. Many flow from the nature of modern technology. They reflect a shrinking globe and expanding interdependence. . . .²

13. In few areas has the impact of modern technology been greater than on the possible means for man's destruction. The application of natural science to the technology of war has

¹ CCD/PV.517, pp. 6-11.

² *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 1, 1971, p. 306.

changed the world in ways that are little short of revolutionary. The development of the power and range of weapons has multiplied the magnitude of possible destruction. At the same time, the development of restraints on weapons is seen increasingly as one of the key issues that transcend geographic and ideological borders. Increasingly, the decisions made by one country about armaments are regarded as a matter of concern not only to that country's neighbours but to nations everywhere. And these concerns are making clear to nations the interdependence of their security as well as the need for creative diplomacy to enhance the security of all.

14. Certainly the need for such diplomacy, the need for serious and purposeful negotiation, is particularly urgent in the field of arms control and disarmament. The search through arms control negotiations for a greater measure of security than can be obtained from armaments alone is one of the most pressing tasks of our time. I believe that the continuing work of this Committee and other recent developments in the arms control field illustrate the determination of many countries to seek sound, equitable, and durable progress in this field.

15. On 20 May, as you, Mr. Chairman, have noted, President Nixon read to the people of the United States the following joint US-USSR statement, issued simultaneously in Washington and Moscow, concerning the United States-Soviet talks on strategic nuclear weapons:

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favourable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.

President Nixon then stated that:

This agreement is a major step in breaking the stalemate on nuclear arms talks. Intensive negotiations, however, will be required to translate this understanding into a concrete agreement.³

16. The announcement of 20 May was welcomed by the people of the United States. Our Government is now preparing intensively for the resumption on 8 July in Helsinki of the bilateral negotiations with the Soviet Union.

17. Progress is also being sought in another area. On 4 June, the communique issued by the Foreign Ministers of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at their Lisbon meeting⁴ noted that allied governments which issued the declarations at Reykjavik in 1968⁵ and at Rome in 1970⁶ had consistently urged the Soviet Union and other European countries to discuss mutual and balanced

³ *Ante*, p. 298.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 308-311.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 449-450.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 229-230.

force reductions. These NATO governments reaffirmed in the communique that the reduction of the military confrontation in Europe—at which mutual and balanced force reduction is aiming—is essential for increased security and stability. Against this background, ministers representing these governments welcomed the response of Soviet leaders indicating possible readiness to consider reductions of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. In an effort to determine whether common ground exists on which to base negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions, these ministers expressed the agreement of their governments to continue and intensify explorations with the Soviet Union and other interested governments. They also expressed their intention to move as soon as may be practical to negotiations. Now that positive comment has been received on this initiative, work is going forward vigorously within NATO governments and in the NATO Council in Brussels, looking towards these negotiations.

18. Turning now to our own work, I would like to recall that this Committee has demonstrated during the past ten years that it can make a contribution to peace through the negotiation of concrete arms control measures. These negotiations have demonstrated that it is possible—for allies, for non-aligned, and for nations among which there are real and serious differences—to achieve arms control agreements reflecting the interests of all such nations.

19. Ten years ago, on 23 June 1961, the first major post-war arms control agreement, the Antarctic Treaty⁷, entered into force. In the perspective of [the] past decade, we can see tangible evidence of how the implementation of that agreement has engendered a small but important measure of international cooperation and how it has contributed to mutual confidence among States. The agreements worked out in this Committee will also, I believe, demonstrate—particularly in the perspective of time—that they have contributed to cooperation and confidence among States and that they have helped set the stage for still further progress toward disarmament.

20. At our forthcoming session we look forward to intensive discussions and negotiations regarding a treaty for the elimination of biological weapons. As President Nixon pointed out in his message of 23 February to this Committee, additional restraints on biological weapons would contribute to the security of all peoples because:

... any use of biological weapons—by any State in any conflict anywhere in the world—could endanger the people of every country.⁸

21. The initiatives of the United Kingdom during the past three years, supported by the United States and other delegations, and

⁷*Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁸*Ante*, p.20.

the draft convention on biological weapons submitted by the Soviet Union and its allies this spring,⁹ have prepared the way for achievement of an agreement on biological weapons. We hope that a draft treaty that will meet with broad support on the part of the international community can be fashioned by this Committee this summer.

22. Our delegation hopes that all members of the Committee will support the early achievement of an agreement prohibiting biological weapons and that all members of the Committee will participate actively in the elaboration of such an agreement. Our own research and studies have convinced us that such a measure would be an important contribution to the security of all States. We recognize that many members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had hoped it would be possible, when taking this step, also to place prohibitions on chemical weapons. Our readiness to support in a convention concerning biological weapons an unambiguous commitment engaging all parties to undertake further negotiations on chemical weapons is a matter of record. We look forward to working with other members of the Committee on the task of finding solutions to the difficult verification problems posed by chemical weapons.

23. Last fall, the General Assembly asked the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of urgency its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.¹⁰ This issue was actively discussed at our spring session. In pursuing this summer the task assigned to us by the General Assembly, members of the Committee will, we hope, be able to gain a better understanding of the relationship of the current status of seismic technology to verification of a comprehensive test ban. We look forward to participating in the informal meeting to be held tomorrow on this subject.

24. There are a number of other issues on which useful work can be done during this session. The United States delegation has proposed a cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes and the adoption of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection for this purpose. There is the question of nuclear-free zones in appropriate areas. More attention should also be devoted to the question of possible restraints on conventional weapons. There is a continuing need, as I mentioned last year, to look at the problem of arms races as a whole and to determine which areas are already the subject of arms control efforts and which are not.¹¹

25. The Committee is resuming its work this summer somewhat later than in past years. We have a full agenda. If we are to work effectively on the issues before us, if we are to achieve a

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 687.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 250 ff.

productive session and at the same time complete our tasks in time for the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, we shall have to proceed at a vigorous pace during the coming months.

26. There is one final matter I would like to discuss briefly today. Last year our attention was drawn in this Committee to the statement by the Secretary-General of the United Nations about "the desirability of finding ways and means of associating all nuclear Powers, including France and the People's Republic of China, with arms control and disarmament negotiations".¹² Several delegations expressed the view that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control talks would be not only desirable but perhaps even prerequisite to progress on the most serious disarmament issues we face.

27. For our part, we recognize that a stable and enduring peace must ultimately be based on broadly accepted limitations on armaments rather than on the unconstrained, competitive development of armaments. We recognize as well that an enduring structure of peace must reflect the contributions and reconcile the aspirations of all nations.

28. As President Nixon stated in his first report on United States foreign policy for the 1970s:

Peace requires a *willingness to negotiate*. . . We are working toward the day when all nations will have a stake in peace, and will therefore be partners in its maintenance.¹³

29. There are, of course, a variety of ways in which progress could be made towards that goal. A number of possible approaches have been raised, including the recent proposal of the Soviet Government. In considering this question in the future we will bear in mind that there are certain issues that are particularly appropriate for discussion among the nuclear-weapon States themselves. At the same time there are also issues that are appropriate for discussion among nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

30. Accordingly we would welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory to all those States and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns as well of non-nuclear-weapon States.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, June 29, 1971¹

Today the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament resumes its work. The task of the present session is to continue the consideration of questions on the Committee's agenda with a view to reaching agreements on further steps towards limiting the arms race and towards disarmament. The great importance of this task

¹² See *ibid.*, p. 261.

¹³ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Feb. 23, 1970, p. 197.

¹ CCD/PV.517, pp. 11-18.

is emphasized by the universal demand for the strengthening of international security through the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of States and at the same time through the releasing of the resources and funds which are being spent on arms, in order to use them for peaceful purposes, for raising the standard of living of people. A solution to this problem is required by the need to normalize the international situation, which, more than a quarter of a century after the end of the Second World War, is still characterized by tension, a number of unsettled post-war problems and a spiralling arms race.

32. Considering the solution of this important problem to be one of the bases of its policy, the Soviet Union has put forward an extensive programme for the struggle for peace and the strengthening of international security as expounded by Mr. Brezhnev in his report to the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, a programme which envisages the implementation of a whole range of measures for putting an end to the race in all types of armaments and the achievement of disarmament to the fullest extent. In his speech of 11 June last Mr. Brezhnev noted that the documents of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

contained a whole set of concrete proposals aimed at both the adoption of partial measures and the creation of the foundations for general and complete disarmament.

He emphasized further that:

We regard the proposals of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union not as propaganda slogans but as slogans of action reflecting the political goals which in our time are coming increasingly within our reach.²

33. Many of the disarmament measures contained in the set of proposals put forward at the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union fall directly within the competence of the Committee on Disarmament. Among them, I may mention the following:

- the conclusion of treaties banning nuclear, chemical and bacteriological weapons;
- the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, everywhere and by all;
- the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world;
- the dismantling of foreign military bases; and
- the reduction of military expenditures, in the first place by the great Powers.³

The Soviet side will do its utmost to translate these proposals into reality. Naturally, success in carrying them out will depend on the position of other States also, and primarily on the position of the nuclear Powers. The importance of these proposals is all the

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 24 (July 13, 1971), p. 8.

³ See *ante*, pp. 195-197.

greater in view of the unceasing arms race in the world and the growth of stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of States. The realistic nature of these proposals and the vital necessity of implementing them are based on the fact that in many countries the movement against militarism and aggression and against the arms race is gaining scope and strength.

34. Among the specific questions which should be discussed at this session of the Committee on Disarmament as a matter of priority and on which the agreement of its members has to be reached, the following should be mentioned: the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons; a ban on all kinds of nuclear explosions, including those underground; the complete demilitarization of the seabed. The work of the Committee in considering the problem of disarmament needs to be organized in such a manner that, side by side with the discussion of the aforesaid questions, efforts would also be made towards stopping the race in all types of armaments and towards achieving broad measures of disarmament, both nuclear and general.

35. In regard to some of the aforesaid problems, it should be noted that in the work of the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament an important place was occupied by the question of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. Nine socialist countries proposed the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on the destruction of such weapons.⁴ The draft convention was submitted at the twenty-fifth session of the United Nations General Assembly and was then referred to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration.

36. Consideration of this question at the General Assembly and in the Committee has shown that it does not appear to be possible to agree on the simultaneous prohibition of both these types of weapons of mass destruction because of the opposition of some Western Powers. In order to break the deadlock in solving this problem, the socialist countries members of the Committee submitted for its consideration a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of only bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and for their destruction.⁵ At the same time an important feature of that draft is that it reflects the desire of its sponsors not only to pave the way to the complete prohibition of bacteriological weapons but also to create the best pre-conditions for the complete prohibition of chemical means of warfare.

37. In submitting this proposal the sponsors—the socialist countries members of the Committee—emphasized in their statements when presenting the draft convention that in their position

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 533-537.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

of principle they based themselves on the need for the complete prohibition and elimination of both chemical and bacteriological weapons and that in this question they unswervingly adhere to the position expressed in their proposal on the cessation of production and on the destruction of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. The sponsors of this proposal would be gratified if, on this basis, one succeeded in reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on this problem. It is precisely to ensure at the earliest possible date the complete prohibition of chemical weapons that the draft convention on bacteriological means of warfare submitted by the socialist countries on 30 March provides for the assumption by States of definite obligations in regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

38. At the spring session of the Committee on Disarmament many representatives expressed their attitude towards the draft convention of the socialist countries and a number of representatives postponed their statements on this problem pending consultations in their capitals. We hope that the debates on this question at this session will enable the Committee to make progress towards reaching agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction.

39. The elimination of the threat of a nuclear war is an important task in the struggle for peace: hence the necessity to solve nuclear disarmament problems. The Soviet Union gives primary importance to that task. In order to reverse the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Government has proposed that a conference of the five nuclear weapon Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the Chinese People's Republic, France and the United Kingdom—should be convened in the near future. That conference would consider questions of nuclear disarmament as a whole. The agreement achieved at the conference could cover both the entire complex of nuclear disarmament measures and partial measures leading to that aim. The recently published statement of the Soviet Government in connexion with the proposal for such a conference points out that

... progress in the matter of nuclear disarmament would undoubtedly contribute to the solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament, would have a favourable influence on the entire international situation and would be conducive to the strengthening of confidence in the relations among States.⁶

40. In proposing the convening of a conference of the five nuclear Powers the Soviet Union based itself on the premise that the talks on the limitation of the nuclear arms race and on disarmament will of course continue through the channels existing at the present time, in particular in the Committee on Disarmament.

41. The cessation of all nuclear weapon tests, including those underground, is one of the concrete and priority tasks of nuclear

⁶ *Ante*, p. 314.

disarmament. The Soviet Union considers that task to be very important. We have on several occasions declared our willingness to come to agreement without delay on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection for control over such prohibition. However, the solution of that problem is impeded by the United States of America and some other Western Powers, which put forward as a condition for such a prohibition the carrying out of obligatory international on-site inspections for the purpose of control. The groundlessness of that position has been quite obviously proved by many competent persons. That policy of the United States administration on the question of control over the prohibition of underground nuclear explosions has recently been opposed in the United States by such public figures as the former United States representative on the Committee on Disarmament, Mr. William Foster, the Republican Senator Clifford Case and a group of scientists who had prepared at the request of the Pentagon a special report on seismic methods of detecting explosions.⁷

42. We hope that a sound approach to the solution of this problem will prevail and that as a result it will be possible to take a political decision on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. It is precisely such a decision, and not studies of a technical nature, that could lead to positive results.

43. It is also a task of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations on further measures for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed and the ocean floor and in the subsoil thereof. The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof provides for the achievement of that task. Under article V of that Treaty the parties to the Treaty undertake

... to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.⁸

Therefore, it appears necessary to consider thoroughly every aspect of this problem and to conduct negotiations for the elaboration of a mutually acceptable agreement on further steps for the demilitarization of the sea-bed. The draft treaty on prohibition of the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof submitted by the Soviet Union to the Committee in March 1969⁹ could serve as a basis for the continuation of such negotiations. The provisions of that draft could be a starting point for negotiations on an agreement on the

⁷ Department of Defense, Advanced Research Projects Agency, working paper, *Copies of Papers Presented at Wood's Hole Conference on Seismic Discrimination* (2 vols., 1970).

⁸ *Ante*, p. 10.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 112-113.

problem which was envisaged when concluding the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and which was included in article V of the Treaty.¹⁰

44. The limitation and cessation of the strategic nuclear arms race is an important task alongside the other problems in the field of disarmament. The rapid development of technology in that field makes the solution of this urgent and vital problem ever more pressing. We fully realize that it is a complex task and that it concerns, first of all, the major nuclear Powers—the Soviet Union and the United States. As is known, talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on this problem have been held since 1969 alternately in Helsinki and in Vienna. It seems necessary to mention that in the course of the talks, as has already been pointed out by the United States representative, the sides:

... have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favourable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.¹¹

The Soviet Union believes that the importance of these negotiations is undoubtedly increasing in the present international situation. A positive outcome would be in accordance with the interests of the peoples of the two countries and with the task of strengthening universal peace.

45. While setting ourselves the task of achieving agreements on disarmament, it is necessary at the same time to make efforts to translate the decisions already agreed upon into reality. It is essential that such international instruments as the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹² the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,¹³ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and other international instruments should fully play the role assigned to them by the States. This applies above all to adherence to the aforesaid agreements and their ratification.

46. In connexion with the fact that the elaboration of a treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed was one of the important assignments in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, I should like to inform members of the Committee that yesterday, 28 June, the

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 298.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof. I take this opportunity to appeal to the States represented at this Conference which have not yet ratified that Treaty not to postpone their ratification of it. If militarily important States are not parties to international agreements on disarmament, this will considerably reduce the effectiveness of the great efforts which many States are making to limit the arms race and to achieve disarmament. Our Committee, the composition of which is highly representative, should play a great role in the fulfilment of agreed decisions in the field of disarmament. The adherence of all States members of the Committee to the international agreements concluded in relation to disarmament would contribute to progress in carrying out the task before the Committee to limit the arms race and to achieve disarmament.

47. In reaching agreement on separate partial measures in the field of disarmament, one of the major tasks of the Committee must always be kept in mind—the problem of general and complete disarmament. We note with regret the lack of progress in solving this important problem. The Soviet side intends to make efforts to ensure progress in working out and reaching an agreement on this problem and calls upon all members of the Committee to contribute in every way to progress in this direction.

48. Before concluding our statement, we should like to point out that the Soviet Union has taken an important initiative in regard to the ensuring of European security by proposing to begin negotiations on the limitation of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss the question of the limitation of both foreign and national armed forces. It stands to reason that on these questions we should act in close contact with our allies. In doing so, the Soviet Union bases itself on the premise that practical results leading to a solution of this problem would be of great importance for ensuring peace in Europe and throughout the world. We note with satisfaction that the Soviet proposal has been received with definite interest in the majority of the countries of the West.

49. Those are the views of the Soviet delegation in connexion with the session of the Committee on Disarmament which is opening today. We express the hope that as a result of the work of this session we shall be able to make progress in solving the tasks facing the Committee.

50. May I take the present opportunity to welcome our new colleagues in the Committee, the representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Khosbayar, and the representative of Yugoslavia, Ambassador Cvorovic and to wish them every success in their new functions. I should like also to welcome the

Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Pastinen, the Alternate Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Epstein, and their colleagues, and to offer them our best wishes. I should like also to welcome back all our colleagues attending the present meeting of this Committee.

UAR Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Suggestions in Regard to the Draft Convention on the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins and on Their Destruction, June 29, 1971¹

1. *Article I*: add in the first line after the word “undertakes” the following:

... never in any circumstances to engage in research, ...

The first sentence will thus read:

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to engage in research, develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire: ...

2. *Article II*: add after the words “accumulated weapons” in the fourth line, the words “and agents”.

3. *Article III*: Provisions of this article should also preclude the receipt by the State Party to the Convention of assistance, encouragement, etc. ... by any other state, particularly a non-party to the proposed Convention.

4. *Article VI*: The provisions of this article should take into account the fact that there are instances when relations between some States are of a nature as not to allow of its normal implementation.

5. *Article IX*: The following elements should be reflected in the provisions of this article:

(i) The principle of the prohibition of research, development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their means of delivery as well as the destruction of both.

(ii) The obligation to implement this principle through negotiations.

(iii) The element of urgency and importance of achieving a chemical convention.

6. A *new Article* is to be added providing for the procedure of withdrawal from the Convention.

¹ CCD/328, June 29, 1971. The draft convention appears *ante*, pp. 190-194.

Remarks of United States Expert (Lukasik) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Research on Seismic Detection, Location, and Identification of Earthquakes and Explosions, June 30, 1971¹

Introduction

As is well known, the United States as its contribution to progress towards a comprehensive test ban has devoted considerable effort to the study of the seismic detection, location, and identification of earthquakes and explosions. This research has been directed toward improving detection capability and location accuracy, the development of discrimination criteria, and the installation of appropriate instrumentation to provide the necessary seismic data to support the discrimination research. This presentation reviews our work regarding the present state-of-the-art of seismic verification and its concomitant limitations. We shall review the progress to date in pursuing this research from teleseismic distances, for which some major tools, including two new large arrays, are just now coming into full operation. Notwithstanding the success that may be achieved in such research, there are inherent limitations to seismic techniques for the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty which we shall also mention.

Discrimination Criteria

Clearly there is a relationship between an understanding of source mechanisms and an understanding of seismic signatures arising from those sources. Thus, much emphasis is being placed in our current research programme on earthquake and explosion source mechanisms. The effect of the source time-function, the source dimension, the inherent symmetry of explosive sources and asymmetry of earthquake sources, the focal depth, and realistic earth structures have all to be taken into account in developing theoretical models of seismic sources.

As discussed perhaps most recently at the Woods Hole conference on seismic discrimination, theory supported by experimental data now suggests several methods to distinguish between earthquakes and explosions. Although the technique may or may not prove to be practical in a real world noise environment, we feel this development is extremely important. As long as progress is totally dependent on empirical correlations to suggest differences between earthquakes and explosions we shall suffer from the severe limitation introduced by the small size of the explosion sample. For a full understanding of the seismic verification aspects relevant to a test ban, explosions at arbitrary locations, in a variety of media, and at low yields, should be considered. The practical

¹ CCD/330, June 30, 1971. Dr. Lukasik's remarks were made at an informal meeting of the CCD.

management of a nuclear test programme tends to limit the variety of locations, media, and the number of low yield explosions to the point where the available empirical evidence is inadequate or at least ambiguous. But the combination of theoretical insight coupled with empirical observations may offer the possibility of reasonably definitive scientific extrapolations where data are deficient.

As an example, in the $M_s:m_b$ method, it is believed that the source time function affects the $M_s:m_b$ ratio for earthquakes in a manner different from explosions and that the source dimension function results in a more efficient radiation of surface waves for earthquakes than for explosions. In a similar manner, the depth of focus, as well as source time and dimension, affect the spectral content of surface and body waves from earthquakes and explosions. Although the question of why some earthquakes exhibit unusually little surface wave radiation is still not resolved, the theory of the seismic source as it is now understood indicates that in principle the separation of shallow earthquakes and explosions will continue below magnitude 4.5. Indeed, recent data on $M_s:m_b$ indicate that the method which applies at $m_b 5$ extends below 4.5, whether discrimination is based on 10, 20, or 40 second Rayleigh waves. It should be noted, however, that with decreasing magnitude there is increasing overlap of the earthquake and explosion populations in part as a result of the small signal-to-noise ratios involved and in part due to regional variations in tectonic stress, attenuation, and surface wave propagation. The former can be improved by increased signal-to-noise ratio although the problem becomes greater at longer ranges; but the practicality of calibrating all seismic regions of interest is unknown.

Another discrimination approach which previously appeared promising was the shape of the amplitude spectra of Rayleigh waves. Recent theoretical results have demonstrated, however, that this is not the case, and that earthquake source orientation has a drastic influence on the shape of the surface wave spectra. For example, a shallow focus dip slip fault has been found to give a spectrum similar to that of an explosion.

Two important points concerning long period P , S , and $Love$ waves have emerged from our research. The ratio of Love to Rayleigh waves appears to be a useful, but not as yet fully developed, discriminant. Also the P -wave spectra (0.3 to 3 Hz) of the Aleutian explosions LONG SHOT and MILROW were quite different from the P -wave spectra of Aleutian earthquakes of comparable body wave magnitude. Corner frequencies for these earthquakes were approximately one decade lower than for the explosions.

The possibility of tectonic energy release has been studied but the effects so far observed have been minor and have not weakened the $M_s:m_b$ criterion.

We have also examined the utility of the short period P -wave for

identification. It would appear that we will rely on the P wave for event detection for a long time to come and in some cases the P wave will be the only signal available for further analysis. The P wave may, at sufficiently high signal-to-noise ratios, show an unambiguous earthquake first motion and it may also show pP and sP phases that are adequate to establish the depth of focus with sufficient precision to exclude an explosive origin. Furthermore, $S-P$ time differences, P arrival time residuals, and the use of master events can provide useful ways to determine source depth.

Short period spectral ratio techniques have been somewhat less successful and must at best be considered diagnostic aids. We have found that the influence of propagation path and receiver site characteristics are such that the techniques must be carefully "tailored" in order to be useful. For example, techniques useful at LASA to identify presumed explosions in Eastern Kazakhstan fail when applied to NORSAR data on the same events nor are they useful to identify explosions in Nevada recorded at NORSAR.

A general problem with all seismic discriminants, both short period and long period, is that they fail when applied to small events near the detection threshold of the network due to signal-to-noise limitations. The aim of the ARPA large array programme and the Very Long Period Experiment is to explore techniques to enhance signal-to-noise ratios thereby extending the effectiveness of discrimination criteria to events of lower magnitude at teleseismic distances. A further aim is to demonstrate the feasibility of the automatic digital processing of the large number of events which occur at lower magnitudes.

Large Array Programme

The mechanism for signal-to-noise enhancement in long and short period arrays is essentially different. Long period noise, for periods of less than 25 seconds such as that induced by oceanic storms, is generally coherent across the aperture of our large teleseismic arrays. The noise reduction relies on the formation of narrow beams which allow the noise to be subtracted from the signal by beam steering. The short period noise, on the other hand, is incoherent at sensor spacings of a few kilometers and noise suppression relies on the number of elements in the array, the signal-to-noise ratio increasing as the square root of the number of elements. Two of ARPA's three large teleseismic arrays are a combination of short and long period instruments, while the third is composed entirely of long period sensors.

The first of these arrays, the Montana LASA, was completed in 1965 and has operated continuously since that time. Its current configuration comprises 345 short period and 16 three-component, long period instruments distributed over a 200 km aperture. The teleseismic detection threshold of LASA, at the 90% incremental level for the distance range of 20° to 90° is about m_b 4.2 for short period signals using automated data processing techniques. As a result of experience gained at LASA, improve-

ments were incorporated in the Norwegian array, NORSAR, particularly in respect to the sensor spacing and distribution, automatic array monitoring systems, and automated data processing. A six-month operational test and evaluation of NORSAR was initiated in February 1971. NORSAR, which is operated by the Royal Norwegian Council for Scientific and Industrial Research, comprises 132 short period seismometers and 22 three-component long period instruments. The teleseismic zones from which LASA and NORSAR will record seismic events overlap and this will allow increased corroboration between events particularly when our aim of multi-array analysis is attained shortly. The recently completed Alaskan array, ALPA, is concerned with the long period region of the spectrum. This array comprises 19 three-component instruments in 60-foot boreholes. ALPA and NORSAR will allow corroborative data to be obtained for long period signals from events in many of the world's seismic regions.

Very Long Period Experiment

A companion programme to the large arrays is the Very Long Period Experiment initiated to obtain seismic data covering the 30-60 second spectral band by utilizing recently developed high gain broad band instruments. This instrument will be installed at carefully selected, deeply buried, very quiet sites and is expected to be capable of recording seismic signals much smaller than normally recorded by the World Wide Standard Seismic Network instruments in this frequency band. A prototype system has been operating at Ogdensburg, New Jersey, for the past two years with encouraging results. Identical systems have been installed at five other locations: Fairbanks, Alaska; Charter Towers, Australia; Chiang Mai, Thailand; Eilat, Israel; and Toledo, Spain. Plans call for improved instrumentation at four other stations in the near future.

Automatic Data Processing

In discussing the large array programme, attention is often focused on the distribution of instruments, their siting, response characteristics, and monitoring utility. One of the major research objectives, however, has been to test the feasibility of operating and maintaining such an array and at the same time process the large amount of data in an effective manner. There are over ten times as many events to process if the array is operating at a m_b 4.0 magnitude threshold rather than at 5.0. Thus the very improvement in signal-to-noise ratio sought from the arrays, which allow the detection of smaller magnitude events, imposes a critical constraint on the data processing; it must be automated in order to handle the greatly increased volume of data. Furthermore, recording systems must necessarily be digital rather than analog.

The focal point for data from the three large arrays is the Seismic Array Analysis Center in Alexandria, Virginia, which also handles data from the Very Long Period Experiment. Multi-array

analysis can thus be performed to compare signals from different azimuths for the various discrimination criteria previously mentioned. However, the implementation on a routine basis of a new generation of azimuthal and spectral discriminants would require a major transformation and expansion of even this very advanced data acquisition and analysis facility.

Seismic Location

An essential element of a seismic verification capability is accurate location of all detected seismic events. The location error is dependent upon the accuracy with which average travel time curves and regional travel time anomalies are known, and to a large extent on the number and azimuthal distribution of recording stations about the source area.

As a result of our research programme improved *P*-wave world average travel time tables, based on 400 earthquakes and a number of large nuclear explosions (well recorded worldwide), have been developed. Azimuthally-dependent station corrections have been established for our major seismic observatories and source corrections have been calculated for a number of source regions.

We have found that location error has been observed at essentially all sites where known source locations are available for comparison. One important cause of errors in estimates of epicenters is source bias, i.e., variation in velocity with azimuth and incidence angle in a source region. Tectonic regions known to display significant bias (errors of 25-45 kilometers) include the volcanic island chains of the Aleutians and Hawaii. Where bias can be effectively removed by use of calibration events to determine regional travel time anomalies, it appears possible to locate large events to within a few kilometers if recorded by a sufficient number of instruments well-distributed in azimuth.

However, neither statistical study of large numbers of earthquakes nor the use of master earthquakes provides a solution to the bias problem. Only explosions or shallow earthquakes well recorded by local networks can provide calibrations for estimating source bias from the various source regions. As previously discussed, the practicality of this is unknown.

As an example of the improvement possible with the application of travel time anomaly corrections, consider the locations determined for 19 Nevada explosions recorded at teleseismic distances by a network of 4 to 13 stations. Mean location error was 26 km without corrections for travel time anomalies. The error was reduced to 3 km when pre-determined travel time anomalies derived from other nearby explosions were utilized in the calculations.

Future Prospects for Seismic Verification

Since the thrust of our concern at this meeting is the future as much as the past and present, it is appropriate to comment on our expectations of the amount and the rate of progress that might be

expected in the area of identification and detection by seismic means. In the area of discrimination criteria, considerable progress has been achieved during the past decade by a number of research workers in various countries. Judging from the progress made to date and the wealth of ideas currently being discussed for further improvements, it appears that the problem of discriminating earthquakes from explosions by seismic means is a difficult but not totally insoluble problem. However, background seismic noise will almost inevitably constitute a limitation on how far this progress can be pursued, and we anticipate that some uncertainties will persist above the identification threshold. Improved seismic instrumentation is clearly needed to attain further advances below magnitude 4.5 and to assess the limits of teleseismic discrimination.

We have seen that to translate the greater scientific understanding of the identification problem into improvements in the seismic verification capability requires more sophisticated installations than currently exist. One might suggest that it will become important, for instance, to upgrade the capability to detect *P*-waves at lower levels than is currently feasible in order to enhance detection and location. Similarly, it would also seem important to improve identification capabilities preferably down to where tamped nuclear explosions at the few kiloton level can be readily identified at teleseismic distances. Likewise, expansion of the existing network of seismic arrays and individual stations would seem highly desirable. This expansion would help to provide coverage for seismic events in all land areas, particularly those in the northern hemisphere.

Many of these improvements would undoubtedly require considerable time and they would represent a substantial capital investment. Much effort would have to go into determining where these additional facilities should be located in order to achieve maximum performance.

As the recent Canadian study has shown, of the large number of existing seismic stations it is the sophisticated array stations and the single instrument stations in strategically located quiet sites that provide most of the capability. The array stations have generally required several years for site selection and installation. Quiet single instrument sites similarly require time for site surveys and the installation is certain to involve a remote location in order to minimize man-made noise.

Nevertheless, various combinations of new stations at quiet locations, long and short period arrays, and the latest in broadband long period instruments could provide much of the data. Decisions will also have to be made on the design of such a network based on the discrimination criteria employed.

The cost of new installations is very difficult to estimate until the number, size, and specific locations of the stations are known. In general, cost estimates become less reliable the further one departs from an existing understood system. Also, it must be kept

in mind that optimum system performance requires a good deal of operating experience before it is actually achieved, and it is crucially dependent on the quality of system management. The more one relies, as one will have to, on sophisticated techniques such as automatic real time digital processing and high gain long period instruments, the more important overall system management will become.

Limitations of the Seismic Verification Method

It should be recognized that seismic means alone are not sufficient to achieve the identification of earthquakes and explosions in all cases, even when the magnitude of the event would seem sufficient. Moreover, it seems unlikely that such a goal will ever be realized because of inherent limitations in the method. In the first place, identification can only take place where detection has preceded it. The practical limit for the teleseismic detection of short period signals is set by the natural noise field of the earth. Array technology, including the use of sophisticated digitized adaptive filtering has provided a means for increasing the signal-to-noise ratio. It must be recognized that there may be some minimum practical detection threshold for short period signals.

At higher magnitudes, it should be remembered that there are now several ambiguities per year above magnitude 4.5 which cannot be resolved. Considering the vagaries of seismic sources and seismic propagation paths, it seems likely that there will continue to be circumstances where natural events cannot be distinguished from explosions by seismic means alone. Also, as teleseismic identification thresholds are progressively lowered, explosions will be identified whose origin is non-nuclear, without the seismic means for drawing the distinction between them and nuclear explosions of the same magnitude.

Detection can also be lacking where the noise field is temporarily high, as in the case of the saturation response of seismometers to large earthquakes anywhere in the world and the interference of their aftershocks. Such high noise fields may be sufficient to blank out explosions of significant yields. It is also possible that there would not be identifiable seismic signals from an underground explosion of a device pre-emplaced in or near a naturally seismic region and detonated a short time after the onset of the signals from a larger magnitude earthquake. This could be the situation if the earthquake were at least $1/2$ to 1 magnitude units larger than the explosion magnitude and if the epicenter were within a few hundred kilometers of the location of the nuclear explosion. In some seismic regions of the world this would seem to indicate the possibility that a number of explosions of significant yields could take place in a year. Even if signals from such explosions were detected, they might be interpreted as those from a natural earthquake. This would be particularly true of an earthquake with a definite aftershock sequence.

Neither should it be overlooked that the seismic coupling from an explosion would be reduced if it took place in an underground

cavity. Cavities already exist that have been washed in salt domes by solution mining techniques in the course of the storage of hydrocarbons. Moreover, with the inherent limitations in detection already noted, partial, as well as complete, decoupling would affect the ability to detect and identify seismic signals.

Italian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Problem of Underground Nuclear Explosions, July 1, 1971¹

At the informal meeting held on June 30, 1971 with the participation of experts, the delegation of Italy submitted to the Committee some views on the problem of underground nuclear explosions.

These views are summarized in the present working paper for further consideration by the Committee.

In joining the delegations that requested the convening of the informal meeting of June 30, 1971, the delegation of Italy meant to stress once again the extreme urgency of the problem of stopping underground nuclear tests. It also meant to reaffirm the view that initiatives for the institution of an international seismological data exchange system might lead to substantial progress in the detection and identification of seismic phenomena and thereby favour the solution of the problem of underground testing.

From the very outset Italy has always lent its support to such initiatives whether in the Committee on Disarmament or in the United Nations General Assembly where, more recently, Italy was a co-sponsor of Resolution 2663 A (XXV) initiated by the delegation of Canada.²

The delegation of Italy is well aware of the complexity of the problems of establishing an effective international seismological data exchange system. Nevertheless, it feels that by joint efforts in studying the technical aspects of this problem positive results can definitely be achieved. The working papers which have been circulated by other delegations provide the Committee with a useful picture of current studies and research in the field of seismology and at the same time hold out prospects of further technical advances.

The delegation of Italy, as a preliminary contribution, submits, therefore, to the Committee the following considerations:

(1) In the view of the Italian delegation the problem of external monitoring is linked with three fundamental assumptions:

(a) Efficient collaboration and organization among the various nations concerned in regard to data processing and to the exchange of scientific reports.

¹ CCD/331, July 1, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-686.

(b) An adequate, homogeneous network of monitoring stations with standard seismographs. In this connexion, considering for the time being only the northern hemisphere, Italy thinks that such well known bodies as LASA, Norstar and Alpa should be integrated with other networks particularly in the Mediterranean area.

(c) In the present situation and even allowing for further desirable improvements in national seismic organizations, if a reasonable threshold for external monitoring in terms of magnitude is to be accepted, it should not fall below 4.75 for explosions in hard rock.

(2) The threshold value of 4.75, indicated above, may seem somewhat pessimistic, especially in the light of the working paper CCD/327 introduced by the Canadian delegation on June 29, 1971.³ However, with reference to intercontinental paths which are the most significant for worldwide monitoring purposes, the Italian delegation considers that the value of $M_s = 4.3$, taken as a basis in the Canadian paper, can be attained by national organizations in North America and Northern Europe but not by stations in the Mediterranean basin. This is explained by the fact that in the latter areas the geographical distribution of seismic observatories was designed for different purposes than that of the identification of underground nuclear explosions.

Another fact which must not be disregarded is that amplification of the short-period seismographs of many Mediterranean stations cannot be carried beyond certain limits because of the presence of intense microseismic activity peculiar to the Mediterranean basin. The predominant periods shown up by this microseismic activity are of the same order as those of body waves with the result that the application of appropriate filters produces distortions in the amplitudes of the waves whose periods are to be identified.

This is amply confirmed by measurements carried out at the Central Observatory of the National Institute of Geophysics at Monte Porzio of earthquakes of magnitude 4.5 approximately, and at distances of 3000 to 4000 km.

These remarks do not take into account the possibility of "decoupling" which would obviously pose a number of problems thereby making the definition of the threshold more difficult.

The definition of a threshold, moreover, raises another question which in the opinion of the Italian delegation should be carefully examined: it seems beyond question that for external monitoring purposes the threshold will have to be expressed in terms of magnitude only, rather than in terms of yield. Hence arises the necessity to determine the magnitude-yield ratio between error limits of the order accepted in the case of earthquakes, that is a quarter of the unit of magnitude. It is a known fact that such

³ *Ante*, pp. 342-357.

correlations are regional in character in so far as they depend on the geology of the station sites. They are also related to the actual paths of the waves reaching the stations.

This problem has already been solved by seismology within satisfactory limits and a similar method can be adopted by the various national organizations for use at their observation stations.

Once an acceptable magnitude-yield ratio has been obtained, a threshold value should be determined bearing in mind that the distribution of seismic observatories in many countries is not sufficient to guarantee adequate results as far as the problem of nuclear testing is concerned since it was designed for research in other fields such as pure seismology and tectonics.

The above remarks should be taken as a purely technical contribution to the problem of defining a threshold. They leave of course the door open to other solutions for a gradual reduction of underground nuclear tests such as those envisaged by the distinguished representative of Canada in his constructive proposals of 6 April last.

(3) Concerning the possible improvements in international detection and identification techniques, the Italian delegation suggests the adoption of a programme along the following lines:

(a) Establishment of an international centre for the co-ordination of research, dissemination of scientific reports on results obtained and data storage.

(b) Sub-division of each continent into zones with their own centres responsible for data gathering and processing and execution of study programmes. The Mediterranean area should form a single zone to be organized with its own centre following criteria and methods already adopted in North America and Northern Europe. In this way, an important deficiency in the detection and identification system in the Northern Hemisphere could be eliminated.

(c) Commitment by national authorities to bring their existing observatories into line with agreed standards and, where necessary, remedy any deficiencies.

(d) Commitment by Governments to bear operational, equipment and research costs and to lend their assistance in the improvement of a world wide seismological network along the lines indicated by Resolution 2663 A (XXV) of the UN General Assembly.

Particular attention, however, should be paid to the problem of explosions in alluvium over which there is a good deal of uncertainty. In this regard, the Italian delegation was particularly interested in the statement of the Netherlands delegation on 29 April last concerning the possibility of identifying explosions in alluvium by other means.⁴

⁴CCD/PV.512, pp. 8-17.

(4) As regards the most suitable approach in order to find adequate solutions to the problem of nuclear tests, the Italian delegation believes that very careful consideration should be given to proposals which offer a way out of the deadlock brought about by the divergent positions taken in this Committee and a chance of making at least partial progress, pending a complete solution to the problem.

In this connexion the Italian delegation draws the Committee's attention to the suggestions put forward in Italian working papers ENDC/234 and ENDC/250 of 23 August 1968⁵ and 22 May 1969⁶ respectively according to which the regulation of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes should temporarily be separated from that of underground nuclear explosions for military purposes. Those suggestions, implying a prior notification to the IAEA of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, were aimed at reducing the scope of the field not yet covered by the 1963 Treaty⁷ and, therefore, at creating a more favourable situation for the solution of the problem of underground nuclear explosions.

Communication of data concerning underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes would favour, moreover, the improvement of existing seismological verification capabilities.

United States Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical Weapons Verification, July 5, 1971¹

This paper examines three possible areas of CW verification: (1) safety features in plants producing nerve agents, (2) the sealing and monitoring of plants formerly producing nerve agents, and (3) sampling to detect possible nerve agent production.

A. Safety Features of Plants Manufacturing Nerve Agents

1. Safety features are a usual—and often distinctive—attribute of processing facilities which deal with toxic materials. The final stages of organophosphorus nerve agent manufacture, involving some of the most toxic known substances, demand especially stringent controls to safeguard operating personnel and surrounding areas. Many, although not necessarily all, of the following safety features might logically be expected in connexion with nerve agent production:

—The building in which processing is conducted is likely to be unique in design. The specifications may call for it to be constructed with solid, airtight walls and roof, with all openings

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 586-587.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 218-219.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹ CCD/332, July 5, 1971.

having tightly fitting closures with a minimum possibility for air leakage. A building designed and constructed in this manner would make it possible to have a continuous pressure differential between the exterior atmosphere, the work areas within the building and the toxic product production areas. The maintenance of lower atmospheric pressure in the production areas would help to prevent any accidental leakage of toxic materials from reaching other sections of the plant or its surroundings.

—Intermediate products produced during agent manufacture are highly reactive with oxygen and moisture of the atmosphere. In many instances, the materials are pyrophoric, i.e., spontaneously flammable with the atmosphere or its components. Because of this, the equipment and process operations would be expected to have comprehensive vent control systems. They would be likely to include provisions for inert gas purge of all equipment as well as the maintenance of inert gas blankets over all process and storage vessels to prevent contact with the atmosphere. Vents from all process equipment lines and storage vessels would probably lead to a central vent where the gases can either be “scrubbed,” i.e., separated by chemical and mechanical means, from the atmosphere or “flared,” i.e., burned under controlled conditions to prevent accidents.

—Pumps used in nerve agent plants would probably be of a type which insure positive control of possible leaks of material to the atmosphere. Because of the problems of keeping pumps leakfree, process flows might be by gravity. Submerged pumps could be used in storage and supply vessels to minimize the likelihood that accidental leakage could spread.

—Within the process building personnel areas would very probably be separated from the process areas by airtight construction. All normal production operations could be conducted by controls located in the personnel areas. For example, valves which may require manual operation for process control could be provided with reach rods which extend into the operating area through airtight packing glands, i.e., seals made of an impervious material, installed in the walls separating the process area from adjacent corridors. Windows would probably be provided in the walls between the safe corridors and the process area to permit observation of the process and of any personnel that are in the toxic area. There may also be closed-circuit television, with the receiver in the control room using a portable television camera which can be plugged in at various locations in order to permit visual observation of activities within the process area by control operators.

—All personnel who work in the general area would probably be supplied with individual protective masks. There would be a number of gas alarms located throughout the building in order to give automatic warning of malfunctions creating a toxic situation. Test animals, such as rabbits, may also be kept in cages in critical

areas to provide indications of leakage of toxic materials. All persons who enter the toxic area would normally wear full protective clothing. Portable radio receivers and transmitters may be provided for use inside such protective suits. This would allow standby safety operators in the corridor to communicate with personnel within the toxic area.

—Doors into the toxic area may lack handles or other means of opening from within the toxic area, and exits from the process area would be through air locks, with self-closing doors. Each air lock would probably be equipped with sprays and with sufficient spray heads to thoroughly drench any person passing through the exit. The first or inner spray would likely be connected to a 5% caustic system and the outer spray connected to a service water system for rinsing. Waste from these showers would drain into the chemical waste system.

—The process area may be equipped with overhead spray heads for spraying a caustic solution or water as controlled by valves in the corridor. Caustic spray is useful to detoxify equipment and to neutralize agent spilled within the area. Water sprays may be used to wash down the equipment and to wash away caustic contamination from the process area. These same sprays may be used in the event of fire in the toxic area.

—There may be special arrangements in the plant and process design to reduce the hazards of sample taking. Special sample chambers may be provided which discharge a predetermined amount of material which will not overflow sample bottles. An interlock could be provided through the wall between the process area and the laboratory so that samples can be passed directly into a laboratory hood without the sample taker leaving the toxic area. Provisions may be made within the toxic area to decontaminate and dispose of returned samples.

—Emergency facilities, to include air for instrument operation and power for lighting, operation of the air “scrubbers”, and ventilation, may be provided as a backup in the event of normal power failure. This may include a system for automatic activation of the auxiliary power source in an emergency.

2. Any facility found to be equipped with many or all of these safety features would merit further investigation. The presence of these safety features would, however, not be determinative of nerve agent production. What is considered to be a necessary margin of safety may vary significantly from country to country, between civilian and military-run facilities and from one plant to another. There are also some kinds of commercial chemical production, including that involving organophosphorus compounds, which are potentially very hazardous for plant personnel and, if not adequately controlled, damaging to the environment. Such considerations may justify maximum possible safety controls in commercial plants similar to what might be expected in nerve

agent production. However, while safety features and environmental safeguards associated with nerve agent production may be found in some commercial manufacturing, they are nevertheless sufficiently unusual to merit serious attention in the broad study of CW verification.

B. Sealing and Monitoring of Production Facilities

1. One task facing a verification system for an agreement prohibiting production of chemical weapons is assuring that facilities which previously manufactured organophosphorus nerve agents refrain from proscribed activity.

2. There are several ways to dispose of former nerve agent plants. For instance, they might be converted for commercial manufacturing. This would raise one type of verification problem, which has been frequently discussed in the CCD, based on the need to assure that commercial manufacturing is not replaced or supplemented by agent production.

3. Former nerve agent facilities could also be dismantled and the sites used for activities unrelated to chemical processing. While offering verification advantages, dismantling would be expensive and deny future possible use of the facilities for some non-proscribed purpose.

4. A third approach would be to shut down agent facilities, but to defer the decision on their further disposition. This would preserve the option of converting a plant to other uses at some future date, or of eventually dismantling it.

5. Closing down former nerve agent plants would raise another type of verification question. Assuming the location were known, verification's major role would be assuring that activity was not resumed at the site. One way to gain this assurance would be through sealing the facility. This could involve placing some form of sealing devices on doors, fans associated with ventilation equipment, or on certain key valves in the process equipment. This would have to be done, however, in such a way that an inspector checking such seals would be able to tell whether they had been tampered with. This would depend on techniques involving tamper-resistant unattended safeguards. These have been studied in connexion with safeguarding power reactors and other nuclear facilities. A progress report on a joint Canada/USA safeguards research and development project sponsored by the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada and the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was presented at an IAEA symposium in Karlsruhe, FRG, in July 1970. The project's purpose was development of a practical system using unattended instruments, the integrity of which would be assured even though all design and operational details were known to participating governments.

6. While it is doubtful that any seal or other technical barrier could be made completely inviolable, there may be ways to give high assurance that an unattended system would show that it had

or had not been tampered with. One possibility would be specially sealed containers around key valves or ventilation equipment controls. The containers might be made of heat resistant Pyrex glass with aluminized inner surfaces. They would need to be the proper shape to fit around the item to be sealed. Once placed around the object, the container might be locked by using a fiber-optic cable threaded through holes in the container. A fiber-optic cable consists of glass fibers, bonded together with epoxy. Random cross sections of such cables show distinctly differing fiber configurations, because of uncontrollable variables in aligning the fibers during manufacture. Each cable thus has its own unique "fingerprint", which cannot be duplicated, but which can be recorded by photographing the optically polished fiber ends. An attempt to pull such a sealing cable free or cut it would distort or destroy the unique "fingerprint". It would not be possible to reproduce an identical "fingerprint". An inspector equipped with a photograph of a cross section of the original sealing cable would be able to compare its configuration with that in the locking device and notice any differences. Efforts to penetrate the glass container without disturbing the sealing cable could be made discernible in a number of ways. For instance, the interior aluminium coating referred to above would help to make even small holes visually obvious.

7. Another way to ensure that a closed plant was not put into production again would be by the use of seismic sensors. Every production facility with mechanical equipment causes a vibration pattern in the structure, building or ground surrounding the plant. In theory a seismic device could be installed in or at a closed facility to determine the presence or absence of vibrations which accompany manufacturing activity.

8. There are a number of practical questions concerning the utility of sensing devices such as seismic detectors in monitoring a closed-down facility. For example:

(1) How would the sensor function? Would it transmit continuously or only if vibrations exceeded a certain level?

(2) To what degree could the sensors be made tamper-proof?

(3) How frequently would a sensor require maintenance servicing or inspection to assure proper functioning?

(4) At what distances and by what means could sensor signals be monitored?

(5) Could seismic detectors distinguish between vibration patterns? Could they be developed to monitor a fully or partially converted plant to assure that it was not engaged in agent production?

9. There are other types of sensors which might be useful in monitoring a closed down plant if installed in or near the facility. For example, closed circuit television or heat detectors could be of help in determining that a facility was not being used. In addition,

there are a number of sampling techniques—some of which are discussed below—that might be developed for use as remote alarms signalling resumption of activity possibly related to nerve agent production.

C. *Sampling to detect possible nerve agent production.*

1. Organophosphorus nerve agent production is characterized by the presence of distinctive chemical compounds in the later manufacturing stages. They are present to some degree in all materials, including wastes, which have come in contact with the final processes.

2. A number of analytical techniques, which are at various stages of development for other purposes, might have applicability in on-site sampling for nerve agent production. Japanese Working Paper CCD/301 described one such method, gas chromatography. Other techniques of possible interest include infrared spectrophotometry, thin-layer chromatography, nuclear magnetic resonance spectrometry, emission spectrography, electron paramagnetic resonance, colorimetry, enzymatic analysis, and mass spectrometry.

3. It is probably necessary to concentrate CW compounds present in air, water, and soil samples before effective analyses can be carried out by any of these methods. Air and water samples might be concentrated by passing them over absorbent materials like charcoal or ion-exchange resins. Nerve agent compounds present in soil and vegetation samples could be extracted with a solvent. Some analytical procedures require samples with a very high degree of purity. With these procedures, it would be necessary to separate the target compounds from extraneous substances in the samples. For example, only high-quality samples are satisfactory for use with nuclear magnetic resonance techniques. The following analytical techniques, in addition to gas chromatography, might be considered for possible roles in inspection sampling:

—*Infrared Spectrophotometry* detects and identifies small quantities of substances by analyzing the structure of molecules. The infrared absorption spectrum of a compound acts as a sort of “signature” which can be compared with spectra of various possible substances.

—*Thin-Layer Chromatography* (TLC) is a technique for separating the components of mixtures on a thin layer of finely divided solid absorbant. The resulting chromatogram shows a series of small deposits each, ideally, containing a single component of the analyzed mixture which can be visualized and compared to predeveloped signatures.

—*Nuclear Magnetic Resonance* (NMR) is the term applied to spectroscopy used to detect and distinguish between the nuclear particles present in a sample.

—*Emission Spectrography* is based on the principle of supplying additional energy to the electrons of molecules. Since there are

definite energy states and since only certain changes are possible, there are a limited number of wave-lengths possible in the emission spectrum, which can be measured.

—*Electron Paramagnetic Resonance (EPR)* is based on the fact that atoms, ions, molecules, or molecule fragments having an odd number of electrons exhibit characteristic magnetic properties.

—*Colorimetry* is a quantitative method of measuring the amount of a particular substance in solution by determining the intensity of its colour. Most colorimetric methods currently in use are photometric, where the colour intensity is measured by a photoelectric cell. Readings can be made in visible wavelengths as well as in ultraviolet and infrared.

—*Enzymatic Analysis*. Substances which accelerate chemical reactions without being used up in the process are known as “catalysts”; those formed in living cells are called “enzymes”. Organophosphorus nerve agents interfere with the action of an enzyme, cholinesterase, essential to the functions of the nervous system. An analytical system utilizing cholinesterase might be used to detect and measure organophosphorus compounds.

—*Mass Spectrometry* uses an instrument that sorts out ions according to the ratio of mass to charge. Usually, the ionic species are brought successively to focus on a fine exit slit and collected on a device which can measure the intensity.

4. While all of these techniques are of proven value in analyzing organophosphorous compounds under laboratory conditions, their respective usefulness for on-site inspection has not yet been thoroughly examined. There are a number of factors that need to be taken into account, including sensitivity, expense, portability, and speed as well as simplicity of operation under actual sampling conditions. Further study of the technical aspects of inspection should include attention to the question of what kinds of sampling techniques might be most appropriate.

Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Aspects of the Definition of Toxins, July 6, 1971¹

Introduction

According to the definitions given in the UN-report on chemical and biological weapons² and the WHO-report on Health aspects of chemical and biological weapons (1967)³ toxins are to be considered as chemical warfare agents due to their (direct) toxic effects on living organisms and the fact that these effects are not

¹ CCD/333, July 6, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 264-298.

³ World Health Organization, *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants* (Geneva, 1970).

depending on multiplication of the agent as is the characteristic of B agents. However, nowhere has a comprehensive definition of toxins been given allowing a clearcut delimitation, although a useful description of toxins is to be found in the working paper CCD/286, April 1970, of the USA.⁴ In a comprehensive treaty covering prohibition of development, production and stockpiling of both B-and CW-agents a strict definition would not be necessary. For separate treaties, however, a definition seems indispensable.

The term "toxin" is often used in a vague sense. Some authorities consider any poisonous substance of biological origin or occurrence as a toxin, other authorities regard only macromolecules of microbial origin, lethal to man in microgramme amounts, as toxins. In addition there is the question of synthetic or semisynthetic toxins to be considered.

The toxic effects of toxins extend over a wide range, the weakest being comparable to the less toxic chemical warfare agents and the strongest to the most potent biological warfare agents. This is exemplified in the table annexed to this paper.

The fact that some very toxic compounds of biological origin have important use as medical drugs in small quantities must be recognized and provided for in a treaty.

The following is an attempt to discuss briefly the implications of different ways to define the concept toxins for use in a treaty dealing explicitly with toxins.

Possible criteria for the definition of toxins

Criteria, which can be used for the definition of "toxins", are of four main types:

(a) The natural origin or occurrence of the compounds; Examples: Biological, microbial or microbiological, bacteriological.

(b) Degree of toxicity, type of toxic activity, and mode of action; Examples: Highly toxic, toxic in amounts less than one mg, neurotoxic, incapacitating.

(c) The chemical nature of the compounds; Examples: Proteins, macromolecules.

(d) Chemical operations producing toxins and poisonous substances related to toxins. Examples: Synthetic, semisynthetic, chemically modified.

A definition of "toxins" will very likely have to include criteria of more than one of the above types. In the following, some criteria and possible combinations of criteria will be briefly discussed.

Natural origin of toxins

One of the more or less unspoken understandings with the hitherto presented concepts of toxins is that they are chemical

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 168-170.

substances resulting from metabolic processes of living organisms. Thus, in the above mentioned UN-report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, toxins are defined as "biologically produced chemical substances which are very highly toxic and may act by ingestion or inhalation" (paragraph 44). This definition will include not only the classical toxins of microbial origin (e.g., botulinum toxin A) but also toxic compounds of plant origin (e.g., convallatoxin) and animal origin (e.g., tetrodotoxin and many snake venoms).

For warfare purposes, highly toxic compounds of microbial origin are presently of higher potential importance than compounds of other biological origins. One could therefore circumscribe the definition to include only compounds of microbial origin, if such a narrow definition is desired. It would still cover most of the natural toxins of potential warfare usefulness known today.

However, it may turn out that some highly toxic compounds of plant or animal origin are sufficiently stable and easily distributed to have a place in a potent weapon system. In order to anticipate such a situation, it may be advantageous to include toxic compounds of any biological origin in the toxin concept.

An interesting fact is that some toxic compounds arise from non-biological transformations occurring in nature, e.g., hydrolysis and oxidation of substances of biological origin. In a strict sense, these toxic compounds are not "biologically produced", but ought to be covered by a definition of toxins.

Toxicity of toxins

The expression "very highly toxic" used in the above-mentioned UN report reference is somewhat imprecise. Some toxins merit special considerations as warfare agents because they are effective in doses smaller, sometimes several orders of magnitude smaller than one milligramme for a man. This dose is below the dose limits of today's most powerful synthetic agents.

If toxic compounds of any biological origin are considered, this interpretation of "very highly toxic" should include, e.g., botulinum toxin, staphylococcal enterotoxin, tetrodotoxin (fish, newt), and batrachotoxin (frog), see the table. Some of the naturally occurring toxic compounds, excluded by a definition of "very highly toxic", are monofluoroacetic acid (plant: *Dichapetalum cymosum*) and hydrogen cyanide (fungi).

If a minimum effective dose is specified in a prohibition, it would appear natural also to specify the mode of administration, since many compounds will differ considerably in toxicity, depending upon whether they are introduced, e.g., intravenously, orally, percutaneously or by inhalation. However, it is probably more convenient if the criterion of toxins is to be employed to regard all compounds that fulfil the minimum effective dose criterion by any means of administration, as toxins (provided that they also meet certain other criteria).

If the aim of a definition of the toxin concept for warfare purposes is to include only the macromolecular (see below) microbial toxins, criteria may be chosen from their immunological properties. In contrast to other toxic compounds, the macromolecular microbial toxins act as antigens and stimulate antibody (antitoxin) production.

Chemical nature of toxins

Most of the highly toxic microbial compounds are proteins of high molecular weight. However, also other chemical types of compounds are represented, e.g., a highly fever-producing, non-protein macromolecule is known from *E.coli* (minimum effective dose for man 0.0001 mg). Many other types of chemical compounds are found among the highly toxic plant and animal constituents.

The only possible delimitations of the toxin concept by means of purely chemical criteria are by defining toxins as proteins and/or macromolecules. However, in either case, virtually all highly toxic compounds of plant and animal origin, as well as some of microbial origin would be excluded.

Synthesis and semi-synthesis of toxins and of chemically closely related compounds

The criterion based upon some type of biological occurrence or origin does not cover the possibilities of man-made, chemically wholly synthesised substances. Neither does it cover by chemical means modified substances of biological origin or occurrence. Thus, in many cases, slight chemical modifications of highly toxic molecules can be made without major alteration of their toxic properties, e.g., if an extra methyl group is introduced in a part of the naturally occurring batrachotoxin, the toxicity is somewhat enhanced (LD)₅₀ for subcutaneous administration in mice changes from 0.002 to 0.001 mg/kg body weight). This semi-synthetic compound is best prepared from the relatively innocent frog constituent batrachotoxin A. It would not qualify as a toxin, unless a proviso is made to the effect that compounds, closely related to naturally occurring, highly toxic compounds, will be regarded as toxins if they have similar toxic properties.

LSD (lysergic acid diethylamide), which is considered as a potential chemical warfare agent, constitutes another example. It has not been found in nature, but is very closely related to lysergamide (known from plants of the genera (*Argyrea*, *Ipomea*, and *Rivea*). Lysergamide exhibits psychotomimetic activity in doses below the milligramme level, and LSD is about ten times as potent. If only highly toxic compounds of biological origin are considered as toxins, lysergamide, but not its chemically produced derivative LSD, would be embraced by the definition.

Judging by the rapid advances of organic synthesis, it seems very likely that within a decade numerous highly toxic compounds can be prepared, modelled upon naturally occurring complex

substances. A comprehensive toxin definition ought to include these probable synthetic or semi-synthetic compounds.

It is evident that it might be difficult to cover in definitions all the varieties that may arise in this respect from different chemical operations and an expression as "compounds chemically closely related to toxins" may be used although not totally adequate. It should be possible to overcome the imperfection by specifying the nature of the chemical modifications (e.g., substitution, change of an amino acid residue, homologation).

Summary

The concept of toxins must be clearly and unambiguously defined in a treaty obligation.

A definition for treaty purposes might be adopted by a selection from the different criteria listed hereabove, i.e., natural and synthetic origin, toxicity and chemical nature.

TABLE

Examples of toxins and some of their properties

Toxin	LD ₅₀ , mouse, mg/kg bodyweight	Biological origin	Molecular weight
Botulinum toxin A	0.001–0.00003	bacteria	900,000
Tetanus toxin	0.002–0.0001	bacteria	68,000
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B	0.1 (ED ₅₀ monkey)	bacteria	35,000
Ricin	0.6 (dog)	plant	80,000
Batrachotoxin	2	frog	399
Tetrocotoxin	8	fish, newt	319
Saxitoxin	9	dinoflagellate	370
Cobratoxin	50	snake	6,800
Convallatoxin	80 (cat)	plant	550
Curare	500	plant	696
Strychnine	500	plant	334
For comparison, two synthetic compounds are included:			
Sarin	100		140
Mustard gas	8,600		159

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Tanaka) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, July 6, 1971¹

I should like at the outset to extend a welcome to those who have joined us for the first time in our work in the Committee—namely, Ambassador Cvorovic of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Khosbayar of Mongolia. I wish them every success in their new posts.

12. In the first intervention of my delegation at this summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it is my pleasure to refer to the deposit by our Government of the

¹ CCD/PV.518, pp. 7-13.

instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof² in the capitals of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union on 21 June 1971.

13. Today I should like to present my delegation's fundamental views on the problems of disarmament, as well as on basic questions affecting disarmament, in order to facilitate negotiations in the future.

14. This Committee has succeeded in the past few years in working out the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons³ and the sea-bed arms control Treaty. Despite that success in working out those treaties a sense of frustration is felt by many members of the Committee with regard to what has been achieved in their negotiations on disarmament, and we are now facing the problem of how we can meet the expectations of the Members of the United Nations.

15. Of all the disarmament negotiations now taking place the most significant are the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union. On 20 May this year the Governments of these two Powers issued a statement to the effect that they had agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.⁴ I consider it encouraging that the two Powers have reached an agreement on these points at this stage. Although such an agreement is of course limited in nature and still far from the concept of nuclear disarmament, I welcome it as an indication of the possibility of limiting nuclear arsenals, and hope that the negotiations will progress smoothly.

16. The world is watching the progress of the negotiations with much expectation, hoping that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach an agreement not only with regard to defensive weapons but also with regard to measures relating to offensive weapons. If limitation is for the time being to be effected only with regard to the number of nuclear weapons, I believe that further efforts should be made to limit the qualitative development of nuclear weapons as well as to scale down the nuclear arsenals, both defensive and offensive, of the two Powers. I also hope not only that the arrangements between the two major nuclear Powers regarding measures to prevent an accidental outbreak of war will be strengthened, but also that an understanding will be reached between them which will make it possible to avoid nuclear war.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 298.

17. If an agreement is reached between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation of strategic weapons, this not only will be in itself of epoch-making significance in the annals of disarmament but also will contribute greatly to increasing the sense of security in the world. My delegation attaches great importance to this point. The success of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) will, however partial the results may be, have a favourable effect on the progress of negotiations in all other aspects of disarmament now taking place in the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations. I earnestly hope that the two Powers will make even greater efforts to achieve success in their negotiations.

18. The crux of all disarmament measures is nuclear disarmament which affects all other areas of disarmament, and we in this Committee should intensify our efforts to find solutions to the problems involved in it.

19. Among the nuclear disarmament problems which this Committee is now tackling, the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests must be given the highest priority. I am convinced that the conditions are ripe for us to proceed with the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests in the near future.

20. As we are all well aware, to date a large number of States have, with the aim of making possible the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests, put forward many useful proposals or suggestions regarding various measures: for example, a system providing on-site inspection with an agreed number of times a year; a system which would establish an agreed quota of underground tests to be permitted per year, the quota being reduced to nil over a certain period of years; the establishment of a special committee to consider complaints and to decide on the basis of a majority decision whether an on-site inspection is required, and the idea of on-site inspections by challenge. As we are also aware, we have already seen the positions of the United States and the Soviet Union draw closer to each other in the past in regard to the emplacement of "black boxes", the number of on-site inspections, a moratorium system, et cetera. I sincerely hope that the members of this Committee, in particular the United States and the Soviet Union, will decide as soon as possible to achieve the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests by means of an appropriate combination or variation of those proposals, after reviewing them in the light of verification techniques developed since.

21. If a compromise between the United States and the Soviet Union on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapon tests is difficult to achieve at this stage, efforts should be made at least to ban immediately, as a temporary measure, underground nuclear weapon tests above a certain level, at present detectable and identifiable, taking into consideration the seismological approach

which I suggested on 2 March⁵ and on the other useful proposals suggested by other countries.

22. If the United States and the Soviet Union come to a decision to ban all nuclear weapon tests and a treaty for this purpose is concluded, the resulting moral climate will have an important impact upon those States still conducting nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere to reappraise their present policy.

23. I should like to point out the items which, in addition to that problem, this Committee should urgently take up: the cessation of the production of fissionable material for use in weapons; the diversion to peaceful purposes of existing weapons-grade material; and the systems for the control of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States.

24. During the course of the spring session of this Conference I also suggested that, in connexion with the cessation of production of fissionable material for use in weapons the United States and the Soviet Union might agree to transport, under their own controls, agreed amounts of weapons-grade enriched uranium in their stockpiles to non-nuclear-weapon States, where the uranium would be blended, in the presence of representatives of the International Atomic Energy Agency and of the countries concerned, with a view to making it available for peaceful nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon States.⁶

25. I now turn to the question of systems of control of nuclear weapons by nuclear-weapon States. By "systems of control" I mean those measures which governments of nuclear-weapon States are taking with regard to the location, transfer and so on of the nuclear weapons in their possession. The Japanese delegation is apprehensive of the danger of proliferation of nuclear weapons due to unpredictable incidents or accidental occurrences in view of the recent trend towards the diversification and miniaturization of nuclear weapons and also the rapidly changing social conditions all over the world. We believe it is more important than ever that the nuclear-weapon States should assure the international community that they are taking all the necessary measures to prevent nuclear weapons passing out of their control and coming under the control of other States or of organizations or private individuals.

26. Further, at the Committee's session last summer I referred to the regulation of missile tests on the high seas.⁷ Although certain militarily important States involved have already established some kind of system for carrying out their missile tests, including prior notice of a test and the setting up of an off-limits area, it is hoped that all States conducting tests will take all necessary steps to ensure that navigation and fishing on the high seas are not unduly hindered. Also, we earnestly hope that future

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 87 ff.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 89-90.

⁷ CCD/PV.489, pp. 22-23.

missile tests on the high seas will never be carried out in such a manner as to threaten the sense of security of other States.

27. It goes without saying that the achievement of disarmament and the security of the world are interrelated. The tension existing in the world is caused by friction between different social systems and the existence of the so-called "divided States" symbolizes the confrontation between the East and the West. That is one of the causes of the arms race. In this connexion Prime Minister Sato of Japan emphasized at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly, commemorating the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Organization's foundation, the importance of solving the problem of divided States by peaceful means as a step towards securing international peace.⁸ In line with his statement, I believe that united world public opinion on the principle of the renunciation of the use of force for the solution of the problem of divided States would eliminate the threat to peace, thus helping to create a climate favourable to the cessation of the arms race.

28. I believe also that in order to achieve a balanced reduction of armaments of confronting States in the areas of conflict the co-operation of the militarily important States and self-restraint by the weapon producing countries are of vital importance. In that connexion I may add that the Government of Japan is pursuing a policy of not permitting the export of arms or munitions to the areas of conflict.

29. The world is hoping that the international isolation of the Government of the People's Republic of China will come to an end. The participation of that Government in disarmament negotiations is particularly desirable. The Japanese delegation stated last summer that the participation of the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of France was essential to facilitating the negotiations on nuclear disarmament.⁹ Similar views have been expressed by various other members of this Committee. However, while the participation of those two Governments would undoubtedly be useful in facilitating nuclear disarmament their participation should not be made a pre-condition for progress in negotiations on nuclear disarmament, thereby delaying the adoption of concrete measures of nuclear disarmament. In view of the overwhelming superiority of the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union over those of other nuclear States, I believe that all members of the Committee on Disarmament should strive to achieve nuclear disarmament without any such pre-condition.

30. On the other hand it is to be hoped that both the Government of the People's Republic of China and the Government of France will participate, as soon as possible, in various

⁸ A/PV.1877 (prov.), Oct. 21, 1970, pp. 57-58.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 241.

disarmament measures; and above all in the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963.¹⁰ The Japanese delegation hopes that the two Governments, mindful not only of the desirability of strengthening the security of the world but also of the seriousness of the problem of environmental pollution, will pay serious consideration to accession to that Treaty.

31. As to the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, this Committee has been moving, since the Spring session this year, in the direction of formulating a treaty banning biological weapons. If the consensus of the Committee is to complete first the formulation of a Treaty banning biological weapons, my delegation is prepared to go along with such views and to co-operate in such efforts.

32. Meanwhile, last year's United Nations General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) commends that both chemical and biological weapons should continue to be dealt with together, and those States supporting the conclusion of a treaty banning biological weapons also agree that efforts for the prohibition of chemical weapons should continue in parallel.¹¹ The Japanese delegation, taking this situation into consideration, proposed the holding of an informal meeting on the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons in order to facilitate further examination of this problem. The purpose of this meeting is to offer the opportunity to hear the views of experts from member States on the scientific and technical aspects of this question and to provide us with the necessary data for our discussions. It is not intended that we should draw any specific conclusion at such a meeting. The Japanese delegation considers that it is useful to obtain the views of experts in dealing with various kinds of disarmament measures and that the participation of experts from the largest possible number of States, especially the socialist States, is most desirable whenever such meetings are held.

33. I should like to refer to the relationship between the actual conditions of armaments of the countries of the world and international politics. I note with regret that slanderous propaganda on alleged militarism is being made by some States against others. However, in spite of propaganda of this kind, world public opinion could perhaps more fairly judge the objective situation of a specific State if militarism is to mean that a large percentage of a nation's economic power is allocated to military purposes and that the functions of a State, including its foreign policy, are dictated by a small number of leaders for the same purposes.

34. On this occasion I should like to refer to the fact that, in accordance with United Nations General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV), adopted on the initiative of the Romanian delegation, prominent experts from fourteen States, including Japan, are now

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

meeting together and doing important work preparing a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures.¹² I hope that useful data will be acquired through the efforts of those experts to clarify the present situation regarding armaments in the countries of the world and their domestic and international consequences, thereby facilitating the work of disarmament.

35. This Committee is a forum where nations of various regions of the world, including the two super-Powers, work together for a period of nearly six months every year. If the fullest advantage is to be taken of this unique feature of the Committee, I think it useful that members of this Committee exchange views frankly and in a spirit of co-operation, through formal and informal contacts, on the various measures of disarmament as well on questions of world security relating to disarmament.

Statement by ACDA Director Smith at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, July 6, 1971^{1 3}

I am glad to be back in Helsinki with the other members of the American delegation and look forward to resuming work with the U.S.S.R. SALT delegation. We also look forward to seeing our Finnish friends once again.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—SALT IV—recessed at Vienna on a positive note owing to the agreement announced jointly by the United States and the U.S.S.R. on May 20.¹⁴ This provides a framework within which we hope that the negotiations can be pursued more intensively to translate the understanding reached at the highest levels of both Governments into concrete agreement.

The May 20 announcement set forth the intention of both parties to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of antiballistic missile systems together with agreement on certain measures with respect to limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

We return to Helsinki with a renewed sense of purpose.

Canadian Explanatory Comments on Working Paper on Seismological Detection and Identification of Underground Nuclear Explosions, July 7, 1971¹

The working paper, CCD/327,² contains the results of a study of 90 Eurasian earthquakes of shallow depth in 1969, and some 33 underground nuclear explosions in Eurasia at eight different sites

¹² The resolution appears *ibid.*, pp. 691-693. For the report, see *post*, pp. 644-686.

¹³ *Department of State Bulletin*, July 26, 1971, p. 98.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 298.

¹ CCD/327/Add. 1, July 7, 1971.

² *Ante*, pp. 342-357.

during 1968 to mid-1970. It was designed to fill what we consider to be an important gap in the quickly accumulating knowledge on discrimination capability by defining the situation in Eurasia. The two scientists involved in the case study (and here I might note that one was a Canadian and the other a visiting seismologist from another country—in itself a happy, practical example of the benefits to be derived in these problems from international co-operation) first of all devised a refined scale to measure the size of events using the surface waves which they produce. Technical details will be published elsewhere—for our purposes this morning, it is sufficient to point out that the work uses those signals most easily measured on standard instruments. Gross corrections for different path types have been derived that put all observations of surface wave magnitudes or size onto an approximately uniform scale. This intensive study enables data obtained on one continent from events on another to be simply and directly compared with data obtained on the same continental mass as the event of interest (either the American or the Eurasian land masses) for the first time and with considerable clarification.

Using the same scientifically defined conservative threshold of identification that we have adopted in the past and the established criteria for identification involving differences between earthquakes and underground explosions in their relative excitation of two different types of elastic vibrations, namely the body and surface waves, the Eurasian study has an identification threshold best summarized in the refined surface wave scale as surface wave magnitude 3.2, or $M_s 3.2$. This corresponds, we believe, to explosion yields of about 20 kilotons in most natural environments other than dry alluvium. The improvement obtained in this work over the theoretical conservative study of last year arises from the fact that the case study has now identified and used to best advantage the gross geological path effects in Eurasia, and that working with actual events, the two analysts concerned were able to usefully measure and analyze somewhat smaller signals than those assumed in the theoretical study. The stations used were 42 standard seismograph stations widely distributed in peripheral Asian countries and in Europe and the Middle East: these, in general, were stations reported in the returns to the U.N. Resolution and are stations which deposit data in the seismological data centre in the U.S.A. We obtained copies of the data using exactly the same mechanism freely available to anyone in the international seismological community: this is another illustration of the value of the present level of international data exchange. These stations of the World Wide Standard Seismic Network contribute their data routinely to an American centre, as also does the Canadian and other, but not all, national seismic networks.

As a result of this scientific study, it is next appropriate to ask whether our earlier published estimates for North American explosions need revision. To date, the only published network case

studies are those we have made with the Canadian Standard Seismic Network alone: these produced the 10-20 kiloton figure quoted earlier and take full advantage of geological quirks. Experience with the new refined scale and some simple calculations which follow from our earlier study make it highly probable that, if all the useful data with guaranteed availability were employed, the corresponding North American lower limit for identification could be reduced to between 5 and 10 kilotons in most natural environments, dry alluvium and possibly valley tuff being exceptions.

With the definition of the path effects on the surface waves, we next turned to a consideration of the measures which would be necessary to reduce the lower limit in Eurasia to between 5 and 10 kilotons in the regrettable absence of guaranteed available data in much of the interior of the land mass, and we conclude that this is feasible with two steps. The first requires the deployment of a limited number of improved long-period seismograph stations, rather than more deployment of extensive arrays, and the second requires the merging of currently available data from currently deployed arrays and standard stations to achieve the detection and location ability from seismic body wave readings calculated in our technical report of last December.

Thus, two comparatively simple steps should, in our view at present, produce a 5 to 10 kiloton capability at most current northern hemisphere test sites. From material appearing in the scientific literature, much of it from American sources, we are aware of considerable activity towards the partial implementation of these steps, although again, in our view, some of the activity of general research interest and utility is not necessarily directed in the most effective manner towards the resolution of the identification issue.

Delegates may be curious about our prognosis for a capability at 1 to 2 kilotons in most natural environments. Our technical studies lead us to believe at present that such a hypothetical target would require massive investment in arrays situated on the same continent as the events of interest, and some rethinking of the logical processes practised today, of detection, location and identification. We would be in a sounder position to examine and comment on the optimum possibilities when the steps outlined earlier to move towards a northern hemisphere 5 to 10 kiloton capability are complete, and have been documented with adequate studies on populations of earthquakes and explosions from key stations, existing arrays and combined groups of stations. Studies on existing arrays and special upgraded long-period stations, therefore, need urgent documentation. We are also aware that some delegations may express doubt about the capability of the usual method of seismic discrimination at such low yields as 1 or 2 kilotons. Although no studies have yet been made, or at least published, at such low yield values using network observations at

considerable distances from test sites, we believe that enough seismological observations of a highly specialized kind have been made to suggest that the usual discrimination tools would still be effective, if only the signals could be measured. Once again, prior examination of data in the 5 to 10 kiloton range and the corresponding weak earthquakes would provide the basis for a more certain extrapolation of the possibilities.

One or two more difficult points should next be made in order to present our argument fully. Firstly, we would urge delegates to start thinking about explosion yields in terms of the refined surface wave scale we have proposed. As we understand it, movements in this direction can be discerned in American, Swedish and British scientific contributions. The relation which we use with the data available to us is given in the technical working paper: other delegations, particularly those of the nuclear testing powers, with more information can probably improve on it. With a change in viewpoint, some of the East-West arguments of the past regarding the body-wave magnitude and yield relationship become of lesser importance. In any case, we can explain these very largely in terms of the different instrument responses of seismographs tuned to the short-period body waves. More importantly, we believe there are sound semi-theoretical and empirical reasons to advocate the shift of thinking—increased yield precision is obtained because the evidence available to us suggests that, within rather small limits, the refined surface wave magnitude for an explosion is not highly sensitive to the detonation medium. Dry alluvium and possibly valley tuff are exceptions. Our working paper illustrates our belief, for example, that a Kazakh test site explosion of a given yield will have the same refined surface wave magnitude as a Nevada test site explosion of the same yield in hardrock, but that the body-wave magnitudes will be somewhat larger for the Soviet event. There are a number of reasons which might account for this difference—the degree of coupling, differences in the structure of the earth at upper mantle depths, and so on, but these are somewhat secondary to the argument that increased clarity and precision in extrapolation may well follow some change in traditional patterns of thought.

Secondly, we should like to note once again that our working paper has used only one of the many tools at the disposal of the seismologist who wishes to discriminate underground explosions from earthquakes. We, with comparatively modest resources, are conducting research with other discriminants, and we know that our contributions are only a small portion of the total effort and literature in this field. In summary, some of these, perhaps less perfect and sometimes less powerful, criteria, when properly used and often in combination can be extremely powerful down to yields less than 10 kilotons in hardrock. Some of these were mentioned in our technical report of last December, and since that

time additional information and studies have suggested considerable utility for certain specific test site-station combinations.

Thirdly, we should like to explain that it is necessary in the technical papers to discuss events in terms of a defined threshold. Delegates should appreciate that we have adopted what is believed to be a reasonable definition in terms of having a greater than 90 per cent probability of having usable or measurable signals at four stations. As we relax this criterion, the lower limit of yield decreases, and because of the probabilistic nature of the problem we have data, i.e., observations from fewer stations, below this defined threshold. The point of this discussion is to state clearly that discrimination is statistically possible below the threshold figures we have quoted and this is shown clearly in the illustrations—in a sense, therefore, some deterrence exists below our formal thresholds. At this point I might add that we must perforce define scientific discrimination thresholds at defined levels of probability in order to quantify our results: as explained earlier, there is an inherent fuzziness about them. This concept should not be confused with the political concept of a treaty prohibition threshold as a well-defined point, a concept which from time to time has been discussed by different delegations in Geneva. The technical problems with the advocacy of such a clear decision point have been well expressed by the Swedish delegate at the 513rd meeting of this Conference³: we believe these are well known to the professional seismological community.

What lessons can be drawn from the study presented in CCD/327. Firstly, the lack of released information on the precise location and yields of underground nuclear explosions, and on the deployment of seismographic stations and their capabilities in much of the Eurasian land mass makes the situation below about 20 kiloton hardrock yields asymmetric between Eurasia and North America. The release of such information concerning explosions as advocated on 6 April by the delegation of Canada and concerning seismographic stations and their capabilities as called for in Resolution 2604 A (XXIV)⁴ would undoubtedly assist the process of clarification, and help reduce the lower yield limits.

Secondly, we have conducted an international experiment in co-operation, admittedly on a small scale, using data acquired internationally and we consider the results fully justify our insistence on the need for the guaranteed availability of seismic data if countries such as Canada, with only modest resources available, are to be able to identify low-yield and low-intermediate yield underground explosions.

Thirdly, we would welcome and encourage continued international co-operation to make further progress.

³ *Ahte*, pp. 263 ff.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 719-722.

Statement by the Yugoslav Deputy Foreign Secretary (Vratuša) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Biological Weapons, July 8, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, may I first of all thank you very much for the kind words of welcome you have extended to me. It is always a pleasure for me to participate personally in the activities of this Committee. I should like also, in the name of the Yugoslav delegation, to welcome to our midst the new representative of the Mongolian People's Republic, Ambassador Khosbayar.

33. There have been some encouraging signs recently in the disarmament field. At the first meeting of the summer session, the two co-Chairmen reminded us that the Governments of the USSR and the United States had agreed in principle to achieve an agreement this year restricting activities in the sphere of ABMs while at the same time indicating that some other as yet undefined steps relevant to limiting offensive nuclear weapons would be undertaken also.² The representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union pointed out further the readiness of their respective Governments to begin talks in the near future on mutual balanced force reductions in Europe. For the present I shall confine myself to expressing the hope that with the active co-operation of all interested governments these activities will bear fruit.

34. The purpose of my remarks today, however, is to submit some of the views of the Yugoslav delegation on the present state of the negotiations on chemical and biological weapons. Our position on the fundamental problem connected with this question is familiar; it has been stated several times here in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as well as in the United Nations General Assembly and on other occasions. It is reflected also in the memorandum of the nonaligned group submitted at last year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.³ That attitude of ours remains unchanged.

35. However, negotiations on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons have been developing in such a way as to make necessary some more detailed comments, especially since nine socialist countries submitted on 30 March a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins, and on their destruction.⁴

36. Some delegations have already expressed their views on that draft. The Yugoslav delegation has been studying those views very carefully. On 27 April we too submitted our preliminary views.⁵ On that occasion the Yugoslav delegation emphasized

¹ CCD/PV.519, pp. 14-18.

² *Ante*, p. 298.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁵ CCD/PV.511, pp. 13 ff.

especially that it was necessary, in approaching the problem of banning bacteriological weapons and toxins, to preserve an adequate link between the prohibition of chemical weapons and that of biological weapons irrespective of whether they were dealt with in a single instrument or separately.

37. The first point I should like to stress at present is the continuity of negotiations on banning chemical weapons. Actually, this is our basic concern and primary task at this stage. As a matter of fact, since 30 March the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has dealt in large part with the problem of prohibiting biological weapons and toxins, whereas the negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons have not been in proportion to the urgency of their elimination from the arsenals of States, although that urgency was recognized in General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV).⁶ Even if we regard this matter from the formal standpoint it is apparent that we do not have as yet an instrument or instruments accepted as a basis for negotiations on that intricate and complex issue. There is the feeling that this subject is still being discussed in fragments, frequently only from the technical aspect of control. The impression is, therefore, that the necessary political determination to conduct appropriate negotiations on banning those weapons is lacking. In these circumstances we may ask in all seriousness where negotiations on banning biological weapons and toxins only are getting us. We may well ask also if it suffices, in the draft convention on biological weapons and toxins, simply to undertake the obligation in principle and in a generalized fashion to conduct negotiations also on chemical weapons.

38. I agree with the views of the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, who, in his remarks on 13 May, requested the insertion of the obligation not only to conduct negotiations but also to achieve an agreement on prohibiting chemical weapons.⁷ However, even if such an obligation were inserted in the draft convention on biological weapons and toxins it would not have full relevance unless accompanied by suitable political action on the part of States to renounce chemical weapons as a means of warfare generally. It would also lack substance unless, on that basis, appropriate instruments on which to negotiate were elaborated and submitted for negotiation without delay. For the moment we consider this as the primary purpose of our activity here and also later in the United Nations General Assembly.

39. In other words, it should be clear that the separate approach to the issue should not be interpreted as an act intended to isolate the solution of the problem of biological weapons and toxins while postponing negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We look upon these as functionally linked and

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

⁷ CCD/PV.516, p. 8.

think of their separate treatment as a technical device made necessary by the complexity of the problems involved.

40. Another important consideration in the focus of our attention is related to safeguarding the Geneva Protocol⁸ from any kind of direct or indirect weakening. Studying the document of the nine socialist countries we notice that it strives to attain that objective. However, we ask ourselves whether one article in the convention declaring good intentions would be enough to eliminate our fears in this respect. We feel, furthermore, that the text of the convention should retain the elements that consolidate the validity of the Geneva Protocol as an instrument of international law. Those elements were fought for and won in the action conducted during the past few years and there is no reason whatsoever for their not being registered in this convention. I have in mind above all resolution 2603 A (XXIV).⁹

41. Actually, our observations relate for the most part to certain formulations in the preamble which mention only bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins, leaving out chemical weapons. Those formulations should be completed—that is, adequately amended. The same could be said concerning the declaration expressing readiness to continue negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons. For instance, it is hardly acceptable that a review conference to deal with the question of progress made in the field of chemical weapons should be held not earlier than after a period of five years. That conference should be held much sooner—in two or three years at most after agreement has been reached on bacteriological (biological) weapons. I have noted with pleasure that some other delegations have expressed a similar view.

42. The changes that we should like to see in the draft convention on biological weapons and toxins are not extensive. As a matter of fact, the substance is already in the draft and all that remains to be done is to define some points more precisely and to call others by their right names. I assume that it will not be found difficult to act along these lines.

43. Before concluding my statement may I take this opportunity, when discussing the draft of the first international instrument relating to disarmament, i.e., the convention on biological weapons and toxins, to draw attention to the necessity of reaffirming the principle according to which savings from disarmament should be channelled to social and economic development, taking into account primarily the requirements of developing countries. What I have in mind is not so much the amount of the savings from this particular measure of disarmament as the importance of the principle *per se* which has been widely accepted in General Assembly resolutions of the United Nations.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 716-717.

44. Having presented now our preliminary observations on the draft convention on biological weapons and toxins I should like to come back later to the question of assuring continuity of work on elaborating the convention for banning chemical weapons. May I at this stage emphasize once more the readiness of the delegation of Yugoslavia to co-operate with others during this session in elaborating further the elements for the prohibition of chemical weapons and, simultaneously, in endeavouring to improve the draft of the convention on biological weapons and toxins. In our view, this work requires joint efforts and mutual understanding as well as much patience and a spirit of confidence so that whatever we produce here may become the property of all States in common.

Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Atmospheric Sensing and Verification of a Ban on Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons, July 8, 1971¹

Over the past two years many proposals have been put forward for discussion at the meetings of the CCD on possible ways of verifying that an international agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons is being honoured by the signatories. These proposals have ranged from the employment of on-site inspection teams, to remote sensing by sophisticated technical gadgetry. The most reliable verification scheme is one where international inspection teams are permitted within a country. A discussion of such schemes is given in the SIPRI report.² However, the degree of intrusion may not be acceptable and Canada, along with other countries, has been striving to find a method, which is both reliable and acceptable, and during the past six months has examined remote atmospheric sensing of field testing of CW agents.

First the various possibilities of monitoring the industrial and military activities of a country from a distance were considered. The SIPRI report suggested that economic monitoring of a country might provide a good indication of contravention of a chemical arms agreement, but the US reported in a paper last year that in the case of the nerve agents, economic monitoring in itself is not feasible—and the situation would be even more difficult with other known chemical agents.³

We have looked into the possibilities of monitoring a country by means of satellites and while we have limited expertise in the field of military satellite reconnaissance, we are unable to visualize

¹ CCD/334, July 8, 1971.

² *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Weapons*, part IV, *Verification* (prov. ed.), Stockholm, Feb. 1970.

³ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 455-459.

an agency working under the auspices of the UN utilizing such an approach. The British last year concluded that satellites would not likely prove to be very effective. Moreover it would be a very expensive and complex approach to verification which would be available to only a few wealthy nations and under present political structures, not the UN.

We concluded in our survey that the only approach which did not involve intrusion and was within the realms of feasibility was remote chemical sampling of chemical test areas. The SIPRI report expressed some confidence in monitoring chemical testing while the UK in their paper to CCD last year expressed doubt as to its value.

In our study on chemical sampling we assumed that in order for a nation to have a significant chemical warfare capability it must field-test the weapons that it has developed. The size of such a test could range from the detonation of a single artillery shell to the spraying of terrain by an aircraft. We have chosen the case of a large scale aircraft spray trial to illustrate the feasibility of detecting agents downwind of a test site; obviously the larger the experiment the easier would be the possibilities of detecting it. But it is not believed that tests would be carried out with live agent on a scale larger than this since much can be done with simulants: i.e., use of agents relatively non-toxic but which possess physical properties similar to toxic ones and as a result when detonated or sprayed behave in much the same way.

It was assumed that an aircraft could contaminate a strip of terrain of dimensions 1,000 metres cross-wind by 250 metres downwind to an agent density of between 5 and 20 g/m². Downwind concentration (mg/m³) and total dosage (mg. min/m³) profiles for the following agents: mustard, a representative persistent V-agent, and two volatile G-agents, sarin and soman, were calculated. Mustard was assumed to have been laid down to a contamination density of 20 gm/m² while the others were assumed to be laid down to a density of 5 g/m². These agents are representative of those which an industrial country with a CW capability might be expected to possess, i.e., a persistent vesicant, two volatile nerve agents and a persistent nerve agent.

Calculations of the downwind concentrations and the total dosages were made with the aid of a diffusion model which Canada has developed to assess downwind chemical agent hazard. This model is based on classical atmospheric diffusion models; it takes into account the nature of the terrain, the absorptive and evaporative characteristics of the agent, and the meteorological conditions that the programmer wishes to simulate. Since this model is a steady state model, all agent vapour concentrations.

Two extremes of meteorological stability were assumed, namely slight lapse and moderate inversion, and the criteria of detectability of agent used was the level of sensitivity of the various agent

detection devices currently available to the Canadian Armed Forces.

Our studies have amplified the fact that certain agents, especially some persistent nerve agents, are readily absorbed on soil and vegetation over which the agent cloud passes. For example, we do not believe, given the sensitivity of the existing detection equipment, that a persistent V-agent could be detected at distances of more than approximately 10 Kms downwind of our simulated source. And, in our opinion this distance would tend to be optimistic. On the other hand, there is some chance of detecting a large sarin gas source at distances in hundreds of kilometres. And mustard laid down in the contamination density mentioned might be detectable at distances in the tens of kilometres. Again we wish to emphasize that these are theoretical calculations and if anything are overestimates. Obviously if the test involved the detonation of a single chemical artillery shell, the problem of detection would be much more acute.

No clear statement can be made concerning the feasibility of remote chemical detection of CW agent field testing since we would require knowledge of the characteristics of the agents which we are attempting to detect. But from our studies we find that whilst it may be possible to detect some CW agents at considerable distances downwind of their source, it is virtually impossible to detect others at very short distances. Therefore, it is believed that remote atmospheric sensing, by chemical sampling techniques, is not a practical approach to verification unless sampling sensitivities are greatly increased and some form of intrusion is allowed.

It is reasonable to assume that chemical sampling capabilities could be increased, say a thousand fold, and used to identify a nerve agent at an air concentration level of approximately 2.5×10^{-5} mg/m³. Such a level of sensitivity would greatly increase the downwind distance at which detection and identification of agents could take place. However, it is improbable that chemical samplers, even if they had such a capability, could be used on their own and outside a country to verify adherence to a chemical test ban: some countries are just too large, also there is the chance of agent being washed out by moisture and dispersed by natural barriers such as mountains. It is unrealistic to suppose that an agent cloud after travelling for thousands of miles could be detected by the presently available sampling equipments. Thus any country with a large land mass could ensure if it wished to carry out a test, that its activities could not be monitored by a neighbouring country by careful selection of the location of the site and undertaking testing when prevailing winds were in the appropriate direction.

There is another problem. What countries are willing to have such instrumentation, controlled by foreign nationals, within the confines of their national boundaries? Perhaps one might be

restricted to placing them on the borders of a remote country because the country in question may in turn be surrounded by an adjoining country which is again opposed to this intrusion. Under such circumstances one would be forced either to sample from the nearest country willing to permit this intrusion, or from international waters, which might easily be thousands of miles away.

In most studies on possible approaches to verification the constraining factor has been the problem of getting close enough to the source of possible clandestine activities to verify adherence to the international agreement. We believe that remote chemical sampling of the atmosphere to monitor the testing of chemical weapons with the existing, or improved, equipment is not feasible. It might be applicable to small countries but in the case of countries that are thousands of miles in one direction, dilution of the agent cloud over such distances would greatly decrease the possibilities of detection. Then also, as we have pointed out, some agents because of their absorptive characteristics are virtually undetectable a few kilometres downwind of their source.

So far this has all been rather negative. We can suggest, however, a way of using chemical samplers in a verification scheme, which while involving a degree of intrusion might be acceptable to those nations seriously interested in resolving this problem. The effects of industrial pollution on our environment have caused increasing concern within the last few years, as the industrial development of the world has outstripped industry's efforts to dispose of its waste products. In the world today many government agencies have been set up to control pollution and to attempt to make industry operate within strict anti-pollution guidelines. It is now normal to see in the daily newspapers of large industrial cities in the North American continent the measured atmospheric concentrations of sulphur and nitrogen oxides above these cities. We would suggest that since trace quantities of nerve agents from field tests could conceivably be considered as other pollutants in the atmosphere, they could be detected by a national pollution monitoring system which has an international exchange of information.

There would be problems, but the war gases of primary concern, the nerve agents, have their own distinctive signatures. They are organophosphorus compounds, and as such are not easily confused with common industrial pollutants. It might be feasible to develop a "national" monitoring system if nations would agree to collect concentration levels, for example, of organophosphorus compounds within their country. The collection of the data could be carried out by a national network of meteorological stations, whilst transmission and summary analysis of the data could be carried out within the framework of international exchanges such as now exist through the World Meteorological Organization.

In conclusion we can summarize by stating that in our opinion

remote (extraterritorial) chemical sampling for the verification of an adherence to a chemical disarmament agreement does not appear to be feasible. However, in addition to any economic monitoring, considered in other working papers, employed in connection with the control of pollution, the use of samplers for verification by national means and surveyed by an international organization merits further examination. It may be within this context that techniques might be established that would assist in the development of a verification mechanism for a ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

Italian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Some Problems Concerning the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, July 8, 1971¹

During the informal meeting held on July 7, 1971 with experts present, the delegation of Italy dealt with three major technical problems which, in its view, should be tackled with a view to a solution of the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, namely: (1) the compiling of a complete list of agents to be banned; (2) the control of production of such agents; (3) the destruction of stockpiles of chemical agents.

For the Committee's further consideration the views of the Italian delegation are set forth in this working paper.

(1) With regard to the first problem—*compiling of a complete list of agents to be banned*—our delegation has studied with keen interest the various proposals that have already been submitted by other delegations. We note, however, that the Committee has so far been unable to undertake a thorough comparative analysis of the proposals and to draw, where possible, useful conclusions for our further work. In this connexion we should like to stress once again the desirability of the Committee itself taking steps to establish a group of experts with the task of studying such proposals. It will be recalled that on 30 June of last year we submitted a working paper on this procedural matter.²

Among the various suggestions for the compilation of a list, those submitted by the delegation of the Netherlands and of Japan deserve particular attention. The Dutch proposal contained in document CCD/320 of 2 March last,³ has the advantage of covering in a single general formula all the organophosphorus compounds recognized today as chemical agents or as very similar to them; and it includes therefore, by its very comprehensiveness, all those which are or will be synthetically produced, e.g. Sarin, Soman, Tabun, V Agents, Tammelin Esters, insecticides, etc. Even if this general formula leaves out a number of substances officially

¹ CCD/335, July 8, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 270-272.

³ *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

defined as warfare agents (e.g. mustard gas, cyanogen chloride, phosgene, etc.) it does cover all the agents that actually constitute the most dangerous and lethal weapons of chemical warfare. It should not be difficult, however, to reach agreement on a complete list of agents not covered by the formula.

(2) Concerning the second problem—*control of substances to be prohibited*—here again we note that the Committee has no suitable body to study and co-ordinate the various proposals in order that the Committee itself may undertake a proper assessment of this problem.

Some of the working papers and statements of other delegations on the control question have received careful consideration because of the specific data they contain. In his statement of 18 March last the distinguished representative of the United States discussed the percentage distribution of raw material flows in respect of its overall utilization in the economy of a given country. According to this statement, the percentage to be diverted in order to obtain 10,000 tons of phosphorus agents annually was only about one per cent of raw material produced and therefore too insignificant a variation to arouse suspicion and justify a complaint.⁴ This conclusion would appear at first glance to rule out any possibility of pursuing this line of inquiry.

If, however, we look more closely into the implications of the United States representative's argument, the question can be seen in less negative terms. It is true that the percentage variation required for the production of 10,000 tons of phosphorus agents is small in the case where the quantity of raw material is quite considerable. But, by taking into account smaller quantities of raw material, we find that the percentage variation assumes significant values. Let us assume, for example, an economically advanced country processing in one year three million tons of phosphate rock; its raw material production is assumed to be about one-tenth the amount postulated in the American example but well above that of the great majority of countries in the world. It must be considered that this hypothetical country in case of war (and perhaps particularly in such a case) could not avoid devoting very important quantities of raw material to vital economic sectors (fertilizers, fuels, lubricant[s] etc.). It is therefore reasonable to estimate that the amount of phosphorus still available, from which the quantities necessary for the production of chemical agents could be drawn, would be about 50,000 tons; which means that in order to produce 10,000 tons of warfare agents the country would have to divert 2,000 tons (4% of the 50,000 tons) which is quite a significant variation.

The objection that to take a smaller parameter for phosphate rock mined or available could imply a smaller production of chemical agents does not seem convincing. The quantity of agents

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 155 ff.

produced or to be produced does not depend on the availability of raw material, but essentially on military requirements. The latter necessitate that production of chemical agents cannot be kept below a certain level without its becoming of no military significance.

From these considerations it seems clear that, if only one parameter is used for our analysis, controls are not feasible for the generality of countries, but it is equally clear that the number of countries for which controls do not seem feasible would be small. On the one hand, there are a very few countries whose production of phosphate rock is so large that the percentage variation in respect of raw material that might be diverted to weapons production would seem insignificant. On the other, if we examine the geographical distribution of sources of phosphate rock, we find that in the great majority of countries the quantity which can be mined is quite small and seldom such as to allow them to be self-sufficient in respect of its uses for solely peaceful purposes. Thus the method of using only one parameter, because it is not universally applicable, could be only envisaged as a first approach.

In our working paper CCD/304 of 6 August, 1970 concerning indirect controls we formulated a number of questions for a group of experts to work on. One of the questions was related to the use of percentage variation as a first step toward identification of signs to be deemed suspicious in the monitoring of economic data on phosphorus production and flows. We further asked whether in the event of variation in a single parameter not being significant in itself, it might become significant when associated with a variation in one or more other parameters to be found.⁵

In order to clarify better what we had in mind when we posed these questions, the example mentioned above may be further considered with particular reference to the production of phosphorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride as intermediates in the production of agents. The annual production of these intermediates, estimated on the basis of the data already used in this example, would come to 5,000 tons which would be completely absorbed in the production of 10,000 tons of agents and yet would be insufficient. The shifting of a parameter concerning the production of phosphorus trichloride and phosphorus oxychloride would be therefore of very great importance. A further question to be elucidated is whether it will also be sufficiently indicative when applied to those few countries producing large quantities of phosphate rock.

To sum up, it seems to us that on the basis of reliable data for a single parameter a significant number of countries can, even now, be effectively monitored. Additional parameters based on monitoring of percentage variations in respect of phosphorus and organophosphorus substances would enable the range of controls

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 388-390.

to be extended. For this purpose other parameters could be found and taken into account, and their correlation would progressively enable us to establish a model for use in an appropriate computer and thereby create an effective system of controls applicable to the whole world. We feel justified therefore in urging that researchers make a determined effort to identify one or more parameters which, linked to the first, could close all loopholes.

We are well aware that the problem bristles with difficulties. Its solution will necessitate the collection and processing by powerful computers of large quantities of statistical data for the construction of complex models which must be tested out and improved until a definitive model is worked out and proved valid for all cases.

We share in this respect the views expressed by the Japanese delegation in CCD/301 of August 1970 concerning the collection of statistical data.⁶ We appreciate the ingenious method proposed in the Japanese paper for the selection of substances for statistical monitoring. It would be very useful to compare this method with other methods and procedures which experts from other countries may wish to propose. It should be noted that a proposal similar to the Japanese is to be found in the Swedish working paper CCD/322 of 16 March 1971.⁷ Moreover, it seems to us that useful suggestions are contained in the "inspection questionnaire" circulated on July 6, 1971 by the American delegation.⁸

Working paper CCD/332 submitted on the same day by the United States delegation, highlights factors which can be utilized by means of on-site inspection to determine whether a plant is producing prohibited chemical substances, taking into account the characteristics of the plant and the chemical nature of the waste materials released by the plant. The most refined and up-to-date methods have been indicated for the analysis of these waste products. The American paper, which assumes that there will be on-site inspection, is a valuable contribution to a solution of the control problem.⁹ It is reasonable to suppose, however, that this type of inspection cannot be of a permanent and general character. It seems desirable therefore to seek a method whereby a suspicion can be formulated as a basis for a complaint. This in turn could be followed by on-site inspection using, among others, the factors and methods suggested by the United States delegation.

In making these remarks of a methodological character we cannot of course foresee whether the search for a solution, such as the one we have outlined, will produce positive or negative results. We are convinced, however, that the problem must be tackled so that we may know with certainty what is the answer concerning the feasibility of controls. If the results are positive the Committee

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 379-382.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 151 ff.

⁸ Not printed here.

⁹ *Ahte*, pp. 389-395.

will have a suitable gauge for the detection of a dangerous situation. If they are negative we shall at least be able to draw the logical inference for the final elaboration of a political instrument.

(3) Lastly, very careful consideration, in our opinion, should be paid to the question of the destruction of stockpiles of chemical weapons and agents. The Committee has already received a valuable contribution from the Swedish delegation drawing attention to this grave problem at an early stage.¹⁰ Since destruction of large stocks by dumping into the ocean depths is unthinkable, and combustion is not readily practicable, a more logical course would appear to be that of chemical transformation, which implies a timely study of chemical processes and methods to be applied.

A closely related problem is that of controlling the destruction of chemical weapons. Once again we reiterate the necessity of having available the contribution of a group of experts who should be given a precise mandate and asked to report back to the Committee itself. The problem is much too grave and the risks involved are too great.

In joining the other delegations that requested the convening of this meeting the Italian delegation shared the hope that a careful study on the technical level would lead to further progress in our consideration of the problems outlined above.

This meeting may open up prospects for fruitful future contacts between experts along the lines which we have indicated. The interesting new data and information that the Committee has received will require further detailed analysis whose conclusions should be compared and discussed together in another exercise of this kind in order to trace the guidelines for constructive work before the next UN General Assembly.

Statement by the Indian Representative (Krishnan) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Biological Weapons, July 15, 1971¹

I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming, on behalf of my delegation, Ambassador Cvorovic of Yugoslavia and Ambassador Khosbayar of Mongolia, who have recently joined us. I wish them every success in our common endeavours.

3. A new stage was reached in our consideration of the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons when the socialist States members of the Committee submitted on 30 March 1971 a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins only.² The debate on whether or not there should be a joint or simultaneous prohibition of both chemical and biological

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 180-183.

¹ CCD/PV.521, pp. 5-7.

² *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

weapons, which had characterized our deliberations over the last two years, has given place to efforts directed towards reaching a consensus on a draft convention on B weapons and toxins, accompanied by a continuing discussion on how best we can still achieve progress in securing also the prohibition of chemical weapons.

4. In this new situation it is essential to bear in mind three main considerations:

First, the Geneva Protocol of 1925³ should be safeguarded and nothing should be done which might either adversely affect the Protocol or cast doubts on its continuing validity;

Second, negotiations should be actively continued with a view to reaching agreement on a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons also;

Third, there is an integral link between B and C weapons and the Geneva Protocol of 1925 is founded on that principle. Even if, for reasons of expediency, a separate convention on B weapons has to be concluded in anticipation of a prohibition of C weapons also, thus making the prohibition comprehensive, that link should be preserved.

5. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has before it for its consideration two drafts of a convention on B weapons and toxins—the revised United Kingdom draft convention,⁴ which has the support of the United States and certain other members of the Committee, and the draft convention submitted by all the socialist States members of the Committee. Also various delegations have put forward specific proposals and suggestions which pertain to either one or both of those drafts. The task before the Committee is to negotiate a draft convention on B weapons and toxins which would have the general support of members of the Committee and which subsequently would be acceptable to the general membership of the United Nations.

6. A consensus has already emerged in the Committee that the socialist draft convention should be the main basis of our work as it enjoys the broad support of members of the Committee in regard to its framework, concepts, and even most of its formulations. However, certain changes and improvements would need to be made in its preambular part, particularly so as to satisfy the principal concern of the international community that the inseparable link between B and C weapons, on which the Geneva Protocol of 1925 rests, would be fully reflected and respected. For the same reason, article IX in the operative part of the socialist draft convention would need to be amended so as to strengthen the commitment to continue negotiations on the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

7. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would also need to devote its urgent efforts to making further concrete progress towards the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The mandate of the General Assembly is clear and unambiguous. In adopting General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) of 1970,⁵ we have committed ourselves unequivocally to a comprehensive solution of the problem of both B and C weapons. A convention on B weapons only, accompanied by an undertaking, however solemn, to continue negotiations on C weapons, would not conform to the will expressed by the General Assembly and would not satisfy the demand of the international community. We need to show more tangible evidence of advancement towards a solution of the admittedly difficult issues relating to a prohibition of C weapons. We have had—and may expect to have—many useful exchanges of views which serve to enlarge our understanding of the problem. But, in our opinion, this is not enough. It is essential that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should also reach agreement during this current session on at least the principal elements of a draft convention on C weapons. This would not only help set the guidelines along which we should proceed next year but also give concrete shape to our earnest resolve to continue and to conclude negotiations on a C weapons convention.

8. The delegation of India would be ready to co-operate with all other delegations in working out an agreed draft convention on B weapons and toxins and in reaching agreement on the principal elements of a draft convention on chemical weapons.

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Chemical and Biological Weapons, July 20, 1971¹

The practice of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for the last couple of years of holding informal meetings to hear the testimony of experts from our various nations on crucial problems before us has proved to be very valuable indeed. We might, of course, have wished for considerably more leeway in terms of time in order to benefit from a more lively dialogue, or even from opportunities of effective cross-examination of our scientific witnesses. It would also have been desirable to have had a wider range of national scientific communities represented in our midst, because knowledge should not be withheld.

30. The subject of my statement today is the question of chemical and biological weapons. When looking back over the views expressed and the documentation submitted last year, one cannot help being struck by the fact that we have not advanced far

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

¹ CCD/PV.522, pp. 13-21.

during a year. Many of the questions which delegations raised in the wake of the fact-finding expeditions have remained unanswered. The appeals for clarification addressed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to those delegations which have taken on primary responsibility for treaty drafts—and also for policy positions—have to a worrying degree gone unheeded; therefore we do not yet know the outcome of the many proposals submitted by delegations in an attempt to help build an agreement.

31. Queries of a technical order which remain open and which must be explicitly settled before decisions can be reached on any proposals for agreement are mainly twofold, relating to definitions on the one hand and to verification on the other.

32. To be able to apply unambiguous definitions of chemical and biological means of warfare is of paramount importance for deciding on the scope of prospective prohibitions. This is particularly true in the situation we have today where toxins have been added to a draft treaty proposed to be restricted to prohibiting biological weapons. This inclusion of toxins was undertaken without explicit statements about what is to be understood as being covered. We have two bare texts before us concerning the scope of the prohibitions. I will quote the relevant words from the text of the United Kingdom proposal: "microbial or other biological agents or toxins".² And in the proposal submitted by the seven socialist States members of the Committee: "microbial [microbiological] or other biological agents or toxins".³

33. The closest thing to an indication of what is meant by the term "toxins" seems to be the statement made by the United Kingdom representative, Mr. Porter, when he accepted the amendment proposed by the United States. He said:

As the authors of that draft, perhaps the United Kingdom delegation could make it clear that by our acceptance of the amendment proposed it is not our intention to include in the convention a particular chemical substance as such, but rather to recognize explicitly what is already implicit in the convention as at present drafted: that an agreement which prohibits the production of biological means of warfare would prevent the production of chemical agents of biological origin."⁴

34. When the United States representative, Mr. Leonard, formally introduced the amendment concerning toxins, he stated:

As we made clear at the end of our last session, we are prepared to see such a convention cover not only biological agents but also the lethal chemical substances known as toxins. . . . The United Kingdom draft convention . . . would prohibit the use, production and stockpiling of toxins as well as biological agents.⁵

35. I shall refrain from quoting the indicated earlier statement made by Mr. Leonard⁶ which, together with the United States

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 429.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 192.

⁴ CCD/PV.479, p. 8.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 276-277.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 189-190.

working paper on toxins,⁷ presents a very useful description without, however, clarifying whether the United States had a different interpretation of the draft treaty text. I believe many delegations have been more inclined to see the definition in the light of President Nixon's announcement—historically of such great impact—which was reported to us by Mr. Smith in the following way:

Underlining his support for that United Kingdom convention, President Nixon announced on 15 February [I might add that was in 1970] that the United States also renounces preparations for and the use of toxins as a method of warfare, and that it will confine its military programme for toxins, whether produced by bacteriological or other biological methods or by chemical synthesis, to research for defensive purposes only.⁸

I should like to put in italics the words "*whether produced by bacteriological or other biological methods or by chemical synthesis*".

36. I have been scanning the quotations which could be found, so I turn now to the authors of the second draft before us. I have not been able to find any clear interpretation from them either—beyond a statement made by the Soviet representative, Mr. Roshchin, on the now undisputed fact that toxins are chemical warfare agents.⁹

When presenting the draft treaty text on 30 March, Mr. Roshchin used these words:

Desiring to extricate the solution of the problem from the deadlock, the socialist countries declare their readiness and propose now, as a first step towards solving this problem, to reach agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare and toxins only.¹⁰

37. In order to obtain clarification as to the delimitations of the category toxins, a few weeks ago the Swedish delegation submitted a working paper on the definitions of toxins¹¹ and we explained it briefly at the informal meeting of 7 July. These agents are classified as chemical agents; they have direct toxic effects on living organisms but they do not depend on multiplication as do the bacteriological (biological) agents. Our working paper serves to underline the boundary position of toxins in relation to the two main categories of biological and chemical agents. Toxins are chemical means of warfare but are as a rule of biological origin. Because of that boundary position they would, in our opinion, most logically be dealt with in a comprehensive agreement covering both biological and chemical means of warfare, which is what my delegation and others have been advocating. Their exact delimitation would then not need to worry us much, as it goes without saying that they should all be covered without exception, whatever their origin, toxicity or nature.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 168-170.

⁸ The President's announcement appears *ibid.*, pp. 5-6. For Mr. Smith's statement, see *ibid.*, p. 10.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 313-314.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 183.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 395-399.

38. If, however, a limited treaty is first to be established, it is, of course, imperative that toxins—with their, in many cases, supreme mass destruction capabilities—should be included. But then the worries mount about the appropriate definition. The working paper offered a series of criteria, emphasizing mainly natural (biological) origin and synthetic origin, degree of toxicity and chemical nature. Out of those elements a narrower or wider definition could, theoretically, be freely composed. For the task of constructing a draft agreement, however, it seems to us indispensable that the definition used should be such that all toxins that have potential use as warfare agents are covered. It is particularly important that the definition include not only toxins of natural origin but also synthetically-produced or modified compounds with characteristics similar to toxins of biological origin. Such production is already conceivable and might take on much more significant proportions in the future. If such toxins were not explicitly covered by a treaty prohibition, a loophole would be left open which might jeopardize the very purpose of the treaty.

39. As I said earlier, it is not clear what is really meant by toxins in the present treaty drafts; but it should be quite easy to construct the definition needed, translate it into treaty language, and insert it in a draft treaty by a simple amendment. Before the words “or toxins” there should be a comma—that is very important—and thereafter the following could be inserted: “whatever their origin or mode of preparation”.

40. We take it for granted that this interpretation is one that all those concerned would be able to agree upon. If, on the other hand, against our expectations, the intention has been to restrict the prohibition just to toxins of microbiological or other biological origin, not taking into account the possibilities of their chemical production or modification, this must be clearly spelt out—for instance, by stating “and toxins of biological origin”. But several delegations might then have to resubmit the text to their governments for renewed consideration.

41. I am certain that a restriction of that kind would evoke disappointment. If a treaty text with such a narrow scope went to the United Nations, it would probably make an unfavourable political impact. A recommendation of a prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons only is already understood to be restricted to weapons which are judged to be militarily insignificant today. A further restriction of toxins also so as to exclude these sympathetically-produced compounds that might in the future become potent weapons would mean that the political value of what was offered would decrease even more.

42. In this connexion, let me allude to another point of political interest. If a first treaty should concentrate on bacteriological (biological) agents, then the inclusion of toxins would mean, because of their nature as chemical agents, that an

important step in the direction of including chemical agents had already been taken. The Swedish delegation continues to consider it an open question how far into the chemical field a first treaty should go, even if it were agreed that it could only be partial. It is the chemical weapons that, realistically, are most feared by the peoples.

43. The second issue on which the testimony of experts has been quite helpful is that of verification. Scrutinizing their summing-up of the state of that art in relation to control of the production, et cetera, of chemical and biological weapons this year and last, I am afraid we must draw the major conclusion that waiting for technical methods to improve remote control in any decisively new way would mean waiting in vain. Not only will a perfect or nearly perfect verification system, as often in the disarmament fields, remain for ever unattainable, but any kind of significant breakthrough in relation to technical methods of remote control—for instance, by monitoring through sensors mounted in satellites or through economic statistics on flow of substances, et cetera—seems improbable, according to several of the working papers submitted at our recent informal meeting and earlier. May I remind the Committee that Sir Solly Zuckerman evaluated this in a drastic way last year when he said that there was no justification for political leaders to hide behind the scientists?

44. The situation with regard to on-site control offers, technically speaking, greater, even quite promising, opportunities. But here the political inacceptability is probably a real obstacle, as the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons are so often locked up and made invisible within military bounds. We face a seemingly insoluble dilemma: what is technically most promising is politically least feasible.

45. It should not be overlooked, of course, that the possibility of some access would automatically lower the level of apprehension generated by lack of knowledge and thus also lower the requirements for the level of control. In the field of nuclear energy and the production of nuclear-weapon material we have witnessed a gradual increase of access, now embodied in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection system, concurrently with a gradual decrease of apprehension and suspicion. I will not propose an "IAEA" for chemical industries; but I believe the analogy merits some attention.

46. There are at least two practical conclusions which we are forced to draw from such statements concerning facts and potentials as those which I have summarized today.

47. One is that all weapons and agents of relevance to a chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare prohibition share in fairly equal degrees this pessimistic verdict of belonging to a state of near unverifiability if access is not allowed. It certainly does not apply to chemical agents alone; it is also true of

biological agents and toxins, although to varying degrees as between different substances. The same applies, of course, to all weaponized chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare components within military arsenals. Thus separate treatment of biological and chemical weapons, or of biological toxins and toxins synthetically produced, is not warranted by the argument of verifiability.

48. Secondly, a realistic expectation of arriving at an agreement on chemical weapons cannot be made contingent upon any significant future improvement of the possibilities for verification from the outside: that would leave the time dimension open with, I am afraid, no end in sight.

49. Consequently the decision to prohibit the production of any weapon in the chemical and biological field will be as predominantly political in motivation as is now the decision on the part of the two blocs to settle on a prohibition of biological weapons and toxins, and as political as is also the readiness to forgo explicit verification requirements for those categories. However, for some countries which have already unilaterally renounced—without any reservation, in the case of my country—the use as well as the acquisition of the weapons in question, the very opportunity to participate in control activities would add an element of interest to them.

50. This recognition of the similarity in verification possibilities over the whole field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare has led the Swedish delegation, and I believe many others, to treat verification for all categories jointly and by less perfect means. As it is expressed in the memorandum of the twelve:

The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons . . . Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures . . .¹²

This also seems to be foreseen, or at least possible, under the consultation and co-operation formulae of the drafts hitherto presented to us; although some differences of opinion have been expressed about the international elements thereof, as well as about the exact wording. As was the case with the first question I raised today, on the definitions of the scope of a partial agreement, I must state that clarity is desired also concerning the meaning of the verification provisions. Such clarity could be obtained by spelling out in proper treaty language the principle of verification by challenge, and by including “appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter”, as contained in our latest agreement, the sea-bed Treaty.¹³

51. A control system of this kind, which would be made gradually more effective through national legislation, open docu-

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

mentation and international reporting to some appropriate body or bodies, would of course be applicable to the whole field of biological weapons, toxins and other chemical weapons. Therefore, also with regard to verification, the Swedish delegation continues to consider it an open question how far into the chemical-warfare field what I would like to call a first convention on the development, production and stockpiling of biological and chemical weapons should go.

52. The Committee is now discussing as a disarmament measure a convention on biological weapons and toxins. These weapons are, however, regarded as "bad weapons", and to get rid of them does not at present call for any sacrifice of military significance. The value of the convention would therefore be restricted to another "non-armament" measure, cutting off certain further development possibilities but not sacrificing any militarily-important weapons, which is what disarmament is about.

53. The Swedish delegation considers it important (a) that this true nature of a treaty on only biological weapons and toxins be presented, and (b) that pledges to arrive at a comprehensive treaty on chemical weapons should not be pinned on over-optimistic hopes of improvements in technical methods of verification. We must discuss future possibilities in the clear daylight of reasoning. Have we to foresee that the rest of the chemical weapons would only be gradually prohibited as they became militarily insignificant, or as some extraordinary breakthrough occurred in the possibilities of verification? Or can we hope that these truly dangerous weapons will, within the foreseeable future, all become prohibited because they constitute a terror threat to human beings?

54. We have the Geneva Protocol¹⁴ regarding use. We should not overlook the urgency of the need to reach a similarly comprehensive agreement on production et cetera. While it is true, as is often repeated, that the use of some chemical weapons may have been restrained because of the deterrence inherent in a position of symmetry, such as was experienced in Europe during the Second World War, it is also true that chemical weapons have been used in some so-called "down-hill" conflicts where retaliation in kind could not be expected. In future local wars, even rather simple and cheap chemical weapons might become highly significant—for instance, for starving an enemy by destroying his crops—if development, production and stockpiling are not incontestably condemned and adequately prevented.

55. To conclude, the Swedish delegation believes that what the Members of the United Nations want is effective disarmament. They should be told in clear-cut terms to what degree a proposed measure entails effective disarmament or not, and what the hopes are for complete elimination of chemical and biological weapons.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

It is in this light that our Committee should consider its course of action regarding the scope of a first possible agreement in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare and the link to a next one.

56. May I finally add that I find the general comments and specific suggestions made recently by several delegations in relation to treaty texts before us very important? I understand that many delegations have additional questions to raise or suggestions to submit; some delegations also still owe us explanations and replies. After having listened to those, I expect to return to the issue of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare. But we in the Swedish delegation are painfully aware—as, I take it, are all delegations—that, as the previous speaker, the representative of Nigeria, has just reminded us, we have but some six to seven weeks to go before the result of our work has to be submitted to the United Nations for assessment.

Message From President Nixon to the Senate on the Sea-Bed Treaty, July 21, 1971¹

THE WHITE HOUSE, *July 21, 1971.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, opened for signature at Washington, London and Moscow on February 11, 1971.²

This Treaty is the product of intensive negotiations during the past two years at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva and at the United Nations. On December 7, 1970, 104 members of the United Nations voted to commend the Treaty and urged that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.³

In broadest outline this Treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the seabed beyond the outer limits of a 12-mile coastal "seabed zone" defined in the Treaty. The provisions of the Treaty are described in detail in the accompanying report of the Secretary of State.⁴

The seabed is man's last frontier on earth, and that frontier should be a source of promise. This Treaty represents a practical and timely step toward helping protect this new environment. It is a significant addition to the structure of multilateral arms control

¹ S. Ex. H, 92d Cong., 1st sess.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 680-681.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 362-367.

agreements such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty,⁵ the Antarctic Treaty,⁶ the Outer Space Treaty,⁷ and the Non-Proliferation Treaty,⁸ contributing to international security.

I consider this Treaty to be in the interest of the United States and the entire world community and recommend that the Senate give its advice and consent to ratification.

RICHARD NIXON.

Canadian Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Possible Progress Towards the Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests, July 22, 1971¹

Since the Moscow Partial Test Ban Treaty was negotiated in 1963,² Canada has joined other members of the Committee in urging that the obligation to achieve the discontinuance of testing which was accepted by the parties to that Treaty should be fulfilled as soon as possible. Taking into consideration the fact that differing views regarding the nature of an adequate verification system for any ban on underground testing apparently represents the major obstacle to early progress, Canada and a number of other delegations have attempted to focus attention on the evident utility of international seismological data exchange as a method for discriminating between underground nuclear explosions and natural earthquakes. This has involved clarifying what resources would be available for the eventual establishment of an effective world-wide exchange of seismological information designed to facilitate the achievement of a comprehensive test ban. Efforts in this direction are continuing.

Resolution 2663 (XXV) urges governments to consider and, wherever possible, implement methods of improving their capability to contribute high quality seismic data with assured international availability. The same resolution invited the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament "to co-operate in further study of this issue".³

The extended delay in concluding an underground nuclear test ban and the increase in the rate and size of underground explosions which have lent additional urgency to the repeated calls by the United Nations General Assembly for the suspension of all testing, also raise the question of how interim restraints might be imposed in the immediate future. Pending the achievement of a total ban, the Canadian Delegation recommends that certain

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

¹ CCD/336, July 22, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685-686.

transitional or confidence-building measures should be considered which would, without raising verification problems, reduce underground testing and represent progress towards the objective of a comprehensive ban. Such measures, which could be of two general types, might include the following:

(1) measures to help develop seismological identification techniques and facilities which could contribute to the effective verification of a comprehensive test ban through:

(a) advance notification of details of planned underground nuclear explosions in order to assist in further research on seismological identification methods; and

(b) undertakings to co-operate in the use, development and improvement of facilities for the monitoring of underground tests by seismological means;

(2) measures to reduce testing and guard against its harmful effects through:

(a) an undertaking to reduce testing, beginning with high yield testing, as an earnest on the part of the nuclear testing powers of their intent to work towards a complete test ban; and

(b) consideration of further measures to guard against environmental risks connected with underground testing.

Statement by ACDA Acting Director Farley to the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Comprehensive Test Ban, July 22, 1971¹

When I appeared before this subcommittee in April of this year, Senator Case expressed the hope that we were giving serious study to the possibilities of attaining a more comprehensive test ban treaty. As I said then, we have been and are continually doing so. Let me try to give you some idea of why and of the issues we confront.

An adequately verified comprehensive test ban treaty has been an objective of the United States for a number of years. This objective was supported by each of the three preceding administrations and reflected in the text of the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which provided that it was "without prejudice to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions, including all such explosions underground, the conclusion of which, as the Parties have stated in the Preamble to this Treaty, they seek to achieve."² The parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty now number over 100, including not only the United

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Aug. 16, 1971, pp. 182-185.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union but virtually all the non-nuclear-weapon states.

In his initial message to the Geneva Disarmament Conference, on March 18, 1969, President Nixon reaffirmed this policy of the United States as follows:

... the United States supports the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. In view of the fact that differences regarding verification have not permitted achievement of this key arms control measure, efforts must be made towards greater understanding of the verification issue.³

I would like to elaborate this morning both on the potential advantages which we have long recognized that a comprehensive test ban treaty could have and on why those advantages depend upon its being adequately verified.

To the extent that such a treaty was an effective one which in fact prevented underground nuclear testing by others, it would have the following important advantages:

First, it would contribute to our efforts to apply the brakes to U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms competition. It would do so by choking off further improvements by either side of the nuclear components of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons, since testing is important both in developing such improvements and in checking on their effects.

Second, it would contribute to efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries. It would do so in two ways—by creating an even more significant practical obstacle than the Limited Test Ban Treaty to the independent development of nuclear weapons by parties which have not yet acquired them and by reinforcing the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).⁴

It would accomplish the latter by lessening the strongly expressed sense of disparity between the total abstinence that is being asked of non-nuclear-weapon states and the freedom which the nuclear-weapon states now have to continue their own nuclear weapons programs with no restrictions other than those imposed by the Limited Test Ban Treaty. In this connection, it is worth noting that the Nonproliferation Treaty makes a preambular reference to the objective of a comprehensive test ban treaty; requires the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date"; and provides for a conference in 1975 to review the operation of the treaty with a view to assuring that its purposes and provisions are being realized.⁴ Moreover, conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty could help contribute to a decision by some states not yet parties to the NPT to join it.

Third, it would be responsive to a widespread desire in the world community and contribute to a favorable climate for further progress in arms control. One illustration of this point is

³*Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 109-110.

⁴*Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

the resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly last December, by a vote of 112-0, with only one abstention, requesting the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear tests.⁵

Fourth, it would help allay concerns about possible effects of underground nuclear tests on the environment.

But I would like to remind you that the potential advantages which I have just cited would be realized only to the extent that the treaty was broadly acceptable and effective in preventing nuclear testing by the parties. If it did not have this effect, and other parties could conduct significant nuclear-weapons testing without its becoming known, one or more of the advantages cited above could be nullified, and the treaty could become disadvantageous to the parties that continued to be bound by it.

This is why our insistence on adequate verification—verification that would enable us either to determine with confidence that other parties were living up to their obligations or, if they were not, to establish that they were violating them—has always been an inseparable part of our policy of supporting efforts to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The United States has been making serious efforts to contribute to the solution of the verification problem. In the past decade, we have spent some \$274 million on research and development with respect to the detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. Most of this work has been in the field of seismology. The basic problems have been to improve our capability to *detect* seismic signals and to see if we could develop methods by which we could *identify* whether the recorded signals came from an earthquake or an explosion. Both problems were especially difficult at the lower magnitudes, where the number of earthquakes recorded is high. Moreover, we needed an ability to accomplish this detection and identification at considerable distances from the events in question.

We have improved our detection capability by better instrumentation, added knowledge relating to the optimum siting of instruments, and construction of arrays of both long- and short-period seismometers.

With respect to the identification problem, research during the past several years has developed and improved a set of parameters that are useful in differentiating the seismic signals of earthquakes and explosions if these signals are recorded at such amplitudes that they are not obscured by seismic noise. This set of parameters includes such signal characteristics as direction of first motion, complexity of the P-wave signal, the depth of focus as interpreted from times of arrival of short-period body waves, and relative generation of short-period and long-period waves. The widely

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 685-686.

discussed criterion using the ratio of magnitude values based upon surface and body waves is of the latter type.

But the application of these methods depends upon having the operational capability to receive the signals on which they are based. There are significant limitations on present operational capabilities to do so, which depend on the location, nature, quality, and extent of seismic arrays, and the signal-to-noise ratio. And at least at the lower magnitudes, there are inherent limitations, since neither background noise nor the possibility that a signal will be drowned out by signals from concurrent seismic events of larger magnitudes can ever be wholly eliminated. Moreover, present techniques cannot distinguish between nuclear and nonnuclear explosions, although this is significant only at low magnitudes where nonnuclear explosions are also possible.

We have long considered that unmanned seismic stations, or "black boxes," in the territory of a nuclear-weapon party could increase our detection and identification capabilities. We have done some useful work in designing "black boxes" for this purpose.

Even the fullest conceivable application of these methods, however, would leave events that cannot be clearly identified as explosions rather than earthquakes. To help resolve such ambiguities, the first requirement is to locate the event. Thus another aspect of our verification capability is the accuracy with which we can locate seismic events of various magnitudes.

In considering what capabilities for detection, identification, and location may be or become, it is necessary to appreciate the assumptions underlying particular estimates. For example, when an expert speaks of a specific identification threshold, it is important to know:

1. Whether he is speaking of an operational capability we now have or of one which it is estimated could be achieved on the basis of our current state of knowledge;

2. Whether the figure is one at which he estimates we would have a 90-percent confidence that we could identify an event of that size or a higher or lower percentage of confidence;

3. Whether the figure refers to our capability to identify events at a given magnitude (called our incremental capability) or our capability to identify events at that magnitude or higher (called our cumulative capability). (This may make a difference of a few tenths of a magnitude in the claimed threshold, since our superior capability to identify at higher magnitudes is reflected in the cumulative capability figure.); and

4. Whether the corresponding capability to locate the event is to within an area of tens, or hundreds, or thousands of square kilometers.

Even when we have determined the limits of our capability in terms of seismic magnitude, there are difficulties in knowing how

large a nuclear explosion would yield a seismic signal of that magnitude. This will vary by as much as an order of magnitude depending on such factors as whether it is conducted in hard rock or dry alluvium. We are also continuing to study the extent to which determined attempts to evade detection or identification can degrade our capabilities and what we could do about them.

While I am encouraged by the progress made thus far, it is my understanding that there will continue to be a number of ambiguous events of possible significance. Onsite inspections could play an important role in helping deter a potential violator and could provide the parties with added confidence that the treaty was being complied with.

Finally, I should note that the problem of verification is not necessarily confined to distinguishing earthquakes from explosions. If a comprehensive test ban treaty makes provision for peaceful nuclear explosions, we will have to devise and negotiate adequate means of assuring that such explosions are not used as a cover for prohibited weapons testing. This was clearly recognized in the pre-1963 discussions of a comprehensive test ban. We have continued to look at this problem, too, and hope it can be satisfactorily resolved.

My remarks today, Mr. Chairman, have been intended to review the potential advantages of a comprehensive test ban treaty, why adequate verification is essential to make sure that such potential advantages are real ones, and what efforts are being made to solve the verification problem.

In closing, I would like to express my satisfaction that your committee is examining this important matter and thank you for giving me the opportunity to appear before you today.

Letter From the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to Secretary-General Thant: Basic Facts Concerning the Tlatelolco Treaty, July 23, 1971¹

1. At the request of the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United Nations, the text of the reply, dated 4 January 1971, from the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Senate of the United Mexican States, "regarding the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America", has been reproduced *inter alia* in document A/8336 (also issued under the symbol S/10250) of 6 July 1971.² The document in question was distributed in connexion with an item for the twenty-sixth session entitled "Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the

¹ S/10275, July 23, 1971.

² *Ante*, pp. 1-2.

signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".³

2. Analysis of this document leads to the conclusion that in order to form a correct view of the question as a whole account must be taken of some basic facts concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco and Additional Protocol II thereof. The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize the most important of those basic facts.

1. *Position of the Mexican Senate*

3. The reasons which led the Mexican Senate to address an appeal to the legislative bodies of all States for whose signature and ratification the Treaty of Tlatelolco or one of the additional protocols thereof are open are set out in the last paragraph of the appeal in the following words:

From the foregoing it may be seen that the lofty purposes inspiring the Treaty of Tlatelolco have the fervent and total support of the countries of the world and that its provisions have become the expression not of mere aspirations but of a will which is asserting itself at an accelerating pace and with which, we are convinced, no country on earth can fail to associate itself. The ratification and implementation of this instrument by all the countries of Latin America, and of its additional protocols by all nuclear-weapon States or States having territories for which, *de jure* or *de facto*, they are internationally responsible—whether or not they are Members of the United Nations—constitute at this time in the world's history, we firmly believe, a moral imperative which mankind insists must be fulfilled in the interests of a creative peace which will be conducive to further achievements on the path of progress and happiness for all peoples.

2. *Extent of obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

4. The extent of the obligations assumed under the Treaty of Tlatelolco with a view to implementing the regime of total absence of nuclear weapons established in the Treaty is exactly the same for Mexico as for all other States Parties to the instrument.

5. Article 1 of the Treaty, in which these obligations are specified, reads as follows:

1. The Contracting Parties hereby undertake to use exclusively for peaceful purposes the nuclear material and facilities which are under their jurisdiction, and to prohibit and prevent in their respective territories:

(a) The testing, use, manufacture, production or acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons, by the Parties themselves, directly or indirectly, on behalf of anyone else or in any other way; and

(b) The receipt, storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon, directly or indirectly, by the Parties themselves, by anyone on their behalf or in any other way.

2. The Contracting Parties also undertake to refrain from engaging in, encouraging or authorizing, directly or indirectly, or in any way participating in the testing, use, manufacture, production, possession or control of any nuclear weapon.⁴

3. *Extent of obligations assumed under Additional Protocol II*

6. Nuclear-weapon States which, by signing and ratifying Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco become Parties to it, assume the following obligations:

³ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 689-691.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, p. 71.

(a) To respect, "in all its express aims and provisions" the "statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in" the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

(b) "Not to contribute in any way to the performance of acts involving a violation of the obligations of article 1 of the Treaty in the territories to which the Treaty applies"; and

(c) "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Contracting Parties of the Treaty".⁵

7. After expressly mentioning these obligations, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2666 (XXV), adopted on 7 December 1970 by 104 votes to none, affirmed its conviction that they "are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations, which every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter".⁶

4. *Some responsible opinions on the Treaty of Tlatelolco*

8. (a) In its resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, the United Nations General Assembly stated that it:

*Welcomes with special satisfaction the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, which constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and which at the same time establishes the right of Latin American countries to use nuclear energy for demonstrated peaceful purposes in order to accelerate the economic and social development of their peoples.*⁷

(b) In its resolution B of 27 September 1968, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States observed that:

the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, also known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has already established a nuclear-weapon-free zone comprising territories densely populated by man.⁸

(c) In his address delivered at the opening meeting of the first session of the General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL), the Secretary-General of the United Nations said, *inter alia*, the following:

In a world that all too often seems dark and foreboding, the Treaty of Tlatelolco will shine as a beacon light. It is a practical demonstration to all mankind of what can be achieved if sufficient dedication and the requisite political will exist.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is unique in several respects. . . . The Treaty of Tlatelolco is unique in that it applies to an important inhabited area of the earth. It is also unique in that the Agency which is being established at this session will have the advantage of a permanent and effective system of control with a number of novel features. In addition to applying the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency, the regime under the Treaty also makes provision for special reports and inquiries and, in cases of suspicion, for special inspections. There is embodied in your Treaty a number of aspects of the system known as "verification-by-challenge", which is one of the more hopeful new concepts introduced into the complicated question of verification and control.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 689-691.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 620-621.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 672-673.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco preceded the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by more than a year and exceeds it in the scope of its prohibitions and its control features. Both Treaties have a similar goal, but the former Treaty goes beyond the latter in also prohibiting the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons in the area of the nuclear-free zone. . . .

Under the safeguards and guarantees provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and by the operations of the Agency, nuclear energy will be used for exclusively peaceful purposes in the countries within the zone and its benefits will be devoted solely towards the economic development and social progress of your people. Thus, the States members of OPANAL will take the lead in demonstrating to the world that nuclear energy will be, as it should be, a great boon to mankind and not the instrument of its doom.

The States of Latin America, which also include the States of the Caribbean Sea, have laboured hard and built well in erecting the edifice of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. Perhaps history will record that they, too, "built better than they knew". And now OPANAL has come to life. I am confident that it has the good wishes of the Members of the United Nations. As the Agency proceeds with its work for security, for peace and for progress, I feel sure it will continue to have the encouragement and support of the United Nations. Under the Agency's charter—the Treaty of Tlatelolco—you have provided for close links with the United Nations. It is my hope that in the years to come these links will be forged ever stronger for the mutual benefit of both organizations in their common cause.⁹

(d) On the same occasion, the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency said the following:

I am honoured to be invited to be present on this important occasion, when for the first time an international body has been created specifically to ensure compliance with a Treaty under which parties to the Treaty solemnly pledge to use nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes, and to keep an entire sub-continent free from nuclear weapons.

It is also the first meeting of a regional grouping that has accepted the application of safeguards by another organization on their nuclear activities.

Although the concept of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone is not new, the creation of the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America is the first tangible realization of such an ideal. With it the aspirations of the people of Latin America for security and the prospect of wider and more productive applications of atomic energy for peaceful purposes has come nearer to fulfilment. . . .

The Treaty of Tlatelolco might be regarded as the first multilateral treaty in the field of nuclear disarmament which provides for the application of an institutionalized and international control system and as such represents a decisive step forward in the recognition and acceptance of international safeguards.¹⁰

5. Attitude of the United Nations and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States to signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II

9. The General Assembly of the United Nations has adopted three consecutive resolutions, and the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States one, urging the nuclear Powers to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

10. The relevant provisions of these resolutions, which were adopted without a single opposing vote, are:

(a) Operative paragraph 4 of resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, in which the General Assembly:

Invites Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty as soon as possible,¹¹

⁹ A/7681, Sept. 23, 1969, pp. 77-80.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 80-85.

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 620-621.

(b) Paragraphs 1 and 2 of section II of resolution B of 27 September 1968, in which the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States:

1. *Regrets* the fact that not all the nuclear-weapon States have yet signed Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco;

2. *Urges* the nuclear-weapon Powers to comply fully with paragraph 4 of resolution 2286 (XXII), adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 5 December 1967;^{1 2}

(c) The operative paragraph of resolution 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968, in which the General Assembly:

Reiterates the recommendation contained in resolution B of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, concerning the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and especially the urgent appeal for full compliance by the nuclear-weapon Powers with paragraph 4 of General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967, in which the Assembly invited Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sign and ratify as soon as possible Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America;^{1 3}

(d) Operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 of resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which the General Assembly:

1. *Reaffirms* the appeals it has addressed to the nuclear-weapon States in its resolutions 2286 (XXII) and 2456 B (XXIII), to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) as soon as possible and urges them to avoid further delay in the fulfilment of such appeals;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that one of those States has already signed and ratified the Protocol and that another has signed it and is now actively engaged in the ratification process;

3. *Deplores* that not all nuclear-weapon States have as yet signed the Protocol.^{1 4}

6. *Need for Additional Protocol II*

11. With reference to the question whether the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon Powers in respect of the Treaty of Tlatelolco should take the form of formal acceptance of the commitments specified in Additional Protocol II or merely of unilateral declarations, the General Assembly's appeals mentioned in the previous section of this memorandum show clearly that the Assembly is categorically in favour of the first alternative.

12. To this should be added the fact that, as the General Assembly noted in its resolution 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States, after expressing the conviction in its resolution B that "for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary", emphasized, in 1968, that "such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol".

13. It is also pertinent in connexion with this point to quote the very recent statement, of 6 May 1971, made at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the representative of the

^{1 2} *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 672-674.

^{1 3} *Ibid.*, p. 799.

^{1 4} *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 689-691.

Soviet Union who, referring to the draft treaties which the Committee is considering in connexion with the item on the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons, said at the Committee's 514th meeting:

On numerous occasions the Soviet delegation has stated that unilateral declarations cannot achieve the same purpose as international agreements. In this respect we fully support the statement made by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, to the effect that—

... unilateral decisions can be no substitute for internationally-binding agreements. ... And it is, of course, preferable to arrive at a state of affairs in which we shall have an international treaty so that all renunciations will have the same and, we hold, "maximum coverage".^{1 5}

7. Importance of the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II

14. The importance which the United Nations attaches to compliance with the repeated appeals by the General Assembly that the nuclear Powers should sign and ratify Additional Protocol II "as soon as possible" is demonstrated both by the fact that in its latest resolution—resolution 2666 (XXV)—the Assembly, in words used in exceptional cases only, urged them "to avoid further delay in the fulfilment of such appeals" and, in particular, by the fact that the resolution itself contains two decisions, those in operative paragraphs 4 and 5, the texts of which read as follows:

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-sixth session an item entitled "Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)";

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for transmittal of the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it.^{1 6}

Statement by the Swedish Representative (Myrdal) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, July 27, 1971¹

The topic of my intervention today will be the urgent one of a comprehensive test ban, on which the General Assembly has even demanded a special report from this Committee.² In the spring of 1969 the Swedish delegation took what we ourselves described as a somewhat unusual step submitting to the Committee a working paper containing suggestions as to possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests.³ When so doing we tried to underline that our only purpose in presenting such a paper was to contribute to more specific negotiations on this vital subject. The title of the paper was an indication that we did not

^{1 5} See *ante*, p. 284.

^{1 6} *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 689-691.

¹ CCD/PV.524, pp. 5-14.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 687.

³ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 140 ff.

wish to bind any delegation—not even our own—to any particular wording in the various articles of the treaty text as presented.

4. More than two years have gone by since then; and the specific discussions we had then hoped to incite in our Committee are today even more urgently needed. In my previous intervention on this issue on 4 May I tried to point out a number of reasons why immediate progress is so necessary.⁴ I also put some political questions to my colleagues in the Committee; and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the representative of Canada for having answered them so clearly at our opening meeting this summer.⁵ One of the conclusions Mr. Ignatieff reached was that we should aim at a separate treaty for underground tests rather than add to or amend the Moscow Treaty.⁶

5. If the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has made regrettably little progress in the direction of agreeing on a treaty text, there have, however, been many interesting contributions made on substantive questions by other delegations. That has helped my own delegation to develop some new ideas on the form and content of a possible treaty. Some of those recent contributions have dealt with the special subject of verification; and I shall duly take up the thread on that question in the latter part of my statement today, where, I am afraid, I may have to enter into some quite “fine print” of technical details.

6. It is not our intention to submit a revised working paper today, as we should first like to present our ideas quite briefly and tentatively, in order to entice, if I may so put it, other delegations to make supplementary or corrective suggestions. To begin with, there would have to be some small changes in the preamble of document ENDC/242⁷ and also some up-dating of an editorial character in the articles on procedures. The main innovations which apply to the substantive parts are the following:

7. *First*: In the prohibitive article I, we would be ready to introduce the idea of a phasing-out period, as has been proposed by the United Kingdom⁸ and advocated by several other delegations. The length of the period remains to be decided upon. A permissive period of that kind would take account of on-going plans, appropriations and so on, for the immediate future, as we understand that abrupt discontinuance of testing from an early date of entry into force of a treaty might create practical difficulties. In order to obtain both the firm clinching of a test-ban decision and some leeway in terms of time, we would suggest that the detailed provisions for implementation should be laid down in a separate protocol, annexed to the treaty.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 261 ff.

⁵ CCD/PV.517, pp. 20 ff.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 140-142.

⁸ ENDC/232: *ante*, pp. 33-34.

8. *Second*: The important question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as exemptions from the main prohibition deserves to be dealt with in a separate article II. Here, too, the detailed provisions would be laid down in an annexed second protocol. In this connexion I should like to add that when a true arms-limitation measure—as an underground test ban would be—had been definitely achieved, one could afford to alleviate somewhat the Moscow Treaty's rules against venting, in order to facilitate the peaceful uses of nuclear explosives. That would be regulated in the same second protocol. The Moscow Treaty's character of in fact serving only as a "health measure" would thus be complemented by a real arms-limitation measure—without, of course exposing mankind to any risks worth mentioning but, on the contrary, saving it from a nightmarish threat.

9. *Third*: In our old draft we had a verification article II, containing an undertaking on seismological data exchange and a sequence of measures often referred to as "verification by challenge". We have not wanted to tamper with that article, as it has received a certain measure of support from other delegations. In our new article III we would, however, add one paragraph assigning the more detailed provisions for the seismological data exchange to a third protocol, annexed to the treaty.

10. *Finally*, a last amendment of substance would be to include in the text as a new article the idea of a review conference, as suggested by the representative of the United Arab Republic.⁹

11. We thus propose no fewer than three separate protocols, which would contain the more detailed clauses for implementing an underground test ban. There are several practical reasons for doing it this way; but we also hope that this approach would facilitate political decision in principle on the conclusion of the treaty itself. Thereafter the protocols could be worked out in their details, with the assistance of experts when appropriate.

12. The exact order of work and decisions is, of course, left open; but, to take one example, I can see some reason why the third protocol in its definite form could advantageously be worked out after the treaty had come into force and after we had some experience from the phasing-out period on transitional measures for seismological verification.

13. Obviously, all countries would not have the same direct and practical interest in all three protocols; and we could therefore envisage that the list of signatories to the treaty itself and to each of the protocols might vary, perhaps considerably. The second protocol, on peaceful explosions, would concern the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and thus all its members, as also the parties to the Moscow Treaty. On the other hand, the first protocol, which would deal with provisions for the phasing-out period, would mainly concern the nuclear-weapon Powers, which

⁹ CCD/PV.509, p. 15.

could already agree to its contents as a transitional measure. The time-limit of that period is the most important issue for the rest of us; and it would be spelt out in the main treaty text.

14. I have now twice mentioned the possible link between transitional measures and a treaty. I should like in this connexion to express my delegation's strong support for the important Canadian working paper on this question which was submitted to us last week.¹⁰ As I said earlier, the Swedish delegation would welcome any co-operation or proposals from other delegations in order to achieve a revised version of our draft text, which could serve to quicken the pace of our discussion on this issue.

15. As I have just mentioned, we did not want to change the article on verification in the Swedish draft treaty text on an underground test ban. We remain convinced that the verification-by-challenge model, permitting a step-wise, more and more rigorous sequence of inquiries and exchanges of information, and allowing also for some inspection when agreed upon as part of the challenge, would give sufficient assurance. It is primarily based on verification by "national means only", that is, remote control; although it is expected to be improved upon by international co-operation and procedures, particularly in regard to seismological data exchange. It is, finally, enforced through the now generally-accepted complaints procedure of recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations.

16. The viability of a verification procedure by challenge, using seismological methods as a vantage ground, is dependent on three technical conditions. The first and most important is that a sufficiently high deterrence from violations can be established. This is envisaged to be primarily dependent on the ability to identify nuclear explosions from a distance with a sufficiently high probability. A second and corollary condition is that the expected rate of false alarms about earthquakes—in other words, the risk of making an unjustified challenge—should be so low as to be negligible. The third condition is that these capabilities to exert deterrence and to avoid false alarms are applicable to the whole range of event strengths which require identification. Later I will touch upon the substantive political issue of how strict verification requirements need to be in order to allow a decision in principle on a treaty.

17. To the three basic conditions I have mentioned one can add a fourth: namely, that the methods must be feasible in the practical sense by using existing monitoring facilities as they are or after some reasonable improvement or expansion of them.

18. Our informal meeting on 30 June with seismological experts present served to confirm that science can meet rather far-going demands regarding the first-mentioned three main conditions. It also showed how the capabilities of present facilities

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 431-432.

could be effectively expanded by comparatively modest investments. Canada has contributed scientifically by analysing present global possibilities and by mobilizing multinational action for a more effective international exchange of seismological data. It has been supported in this by experts and politically-responsible quarters in several countries. United Kingdom, Italian and Japanese seismologists have stressed the importance of improving the global station network at critical points. The United States has led us to expect that we will soon be able to assess the full capability of the largest arrays when they operate in concert. The Netherlands delegation gave us a study of the global incidence of earthquakes which provided an up-to-date basis for the calculation of where serious problems with risks for false alarms could be encountered.

19. But let me return to the three conditions for identification efficiency, false alarms and the ability to handle weak events. They have to be treated in fairly technical terms; but I hope to be able to present them in an intelligible way, reducing them to their essentials. I myself could not just repeat everything the experts say.

20. The first and second conditions together describe the possibilities of discriminating between explosions and earthquakes. The experimental data available to us about such capabilities are quite uneven in quality and quantity. For some monitoring systems and some monitored areas we have many observations, for others only a few. In consequence, scientific conclusions about verification abilities are more or less founded for different regions. For this reason we have recently begun to employ a method that enables us to delineate those deterrent levels and those rates of false alarms with which we can be confident the monitoring system in question can provide us. By the word "confident" is meant—and I am going to use it persistently in that meaning—the usual confidence level for significant scientific conclusions: namely, that of seeing only a one-per-cent risk of drawing wrong conclusions. This method of finding confident results not only serves to narrow our need for further research; it also provides us with some firm ground to stand on for political conclusions.

21. In our working paper (CCD/329) submitted before the informal meeting we indicated that such confident conclusions are available; and I will now illustrate these by three examples. In all three examples the acceptable rate of false alarms is supposed to be one in a thousand earthquakes in the area in question.

22. First, a network of four widely-dispersed array stations of the British type and four standard stations in Asia gave, for explosions and earthquakes in certain areas in Asia, a confident probability of more than 99.9 per cent for correct identification of detected explosions.

23. Second, a single station in Sweden, measuring nuclear explosions and earthquakes across the Atlantic Ocean in certain

areas of North America, was found to have confident probability of correct identification of detected explosions of 78 per cent or more.

24. Third, a network of Canadian stations, looking at nuclear explosions and earthquakes in certain areas in North America, established a confident probability of 12 per cent at the lowest for correct identification of detected explosions.

25. The probabilities of correct identification mentioned in the first two examples should satisfy, I think, far-reaching demands for assurance about the identification of explosions. We judge, however, that sufficient deterrence against violations would be obtained already with 10 per cent probability of correct identification—that is, for disclosure from abroad. This would mean that the result mentioned in the third example would be satisfactory also. I will return to that matter.

26. I quoted the first two examples to indicate that we have reliable evidence for rather effective discrimination methods. Concerning the important question of to how weak events they can be applied, the first two examples are not relevant, as the equipment of the stations limited the data to events equivalent to 100 kilotons or more. In the third example, however, the Canadian network, situated quite near the events in North America, had been able to register at 12 per cent or more probability of correct identification of explosions, weaker events also, down to about 5 kilotons. This result—5 kilotons—if and when applicable also in other regions with similar relationship between networks and events, would mean quite an improvement on the general range of 20 to 60 kilotons which was quoted three years ago as the then lower limit for identification.

27. This probability of correct identification of an explosion constitutes the deterrence level that prevents a prospective violator attempting clandestine testing. It is obviously the most important item in our quest for a test-ban agreement to be verified primarily by seismic means.

28. The ultimate answer to the question of what is required is, of course, political in nature. We should specify the political requirements on deterrence level and rate of false alarms, so that the experts may have benchmarks against which to evaluate actual verification possibilities. Without them the political decision makers cannot expect to use the seismological method for settling the issue of test-ban verification.

29. The Swedish delegation feels, as I have said, that a deterrence level—that is, a risk of disclosure—of 10 per cent should be sufficient for political purposes. However, I will say a few words on the question of the very weak events.

30. In that connexion we should recall that the seismological experts at our informal meeting pointed out as an inevitable fact—a regrettable one, I would add—that the practical identification ability will be reduced at decreasing event strength and will

disappear altogether at some low level of event strength. Several factors are expected to contribute to this lower limit of monitorable events; we do not know as yet exactly where that limit is. One expert at our informal meeting ventured to guess that the 5-kiloton level would be attainable but not the 1-kiloton level. Perhaps we shall have the opportunity to determine what the lower level is by means of the super-arrays expected to come into joint operation.

31. But, wherever the limit lies, we must be ready to make political decisions about prohibiting nuclear explosions. Thus it is important to discuss what deterrence levels are considered sufficient at what event strengths. At the same time we must decide about acceptable levels for the expected yearly number of false alarms about earthquakes. Here we must take the seismicity of specific areas into account—a question which the Netherlands delegation raised at the informal meeting.

32. It would be fortunate indeed if the limit attainable for monitoring in practice coincided with or fell below the political needs—that is, if test explosions at unverifiably low levels were not militarily significant. But, whatever the answer to that question may be, political decisions usually call for compromises somewhere between all or nothing, between the desirable and the possible.

33. We dare not present any wholly fixed views on what is required; but, in order to catalyze a discussion of these, I think, quite important political requirements, I would offer a table showing lower limits of deterrence which correspond to yields. The figures in my columns have been chosen so as to be not far from what can be achieved technically today.

A deterrence level of 10 per cent corresponds to a yield of	3 kilotons
" 50 "	10 "
" 90 "	30 "

Deterrence levels refer to confidently-established possibilities of correct identification of an underground nuclear explosion, and yields here refer to the seismic equivalent of explosions in hard rock. The deterrence levels are considered to be concurrent with an expected rate of one false alarm about earthquakes in ten years.

34. These deterrence levels which I have just quoted refer to single explosions and would be moved upwards, of course, if a series of explosions were considered.

35. This excursion into the scientific aspects of verification—which has not been too tedious, I hope—demonstrates the value of the assistance of experts. The Swedish delegation will listen attentively to comments on the deterrence levels quoted.

36. We have so far limited ourselves to deterrence levels based upon verification capabilities of seismological methods. But governments are not dependent on those alone. Non-seismological methods, for instance, monitoring by satellites, will—as was also stated at our informal meeting—contribute to raise the level of

deterrence; although such means do not lend themselves to a discussion in quantitative terms.

37. If one should want to move from the circumstantial evidence, which is derived by remote-control methods—and which is already highly reliable for all but the smallest explosions—to something like legally-conclusive evidence, one would have to scrutinize how much more could in reality be won by on-site inspections.

38. Some years ago we dealt at considerable length with the question about conditions and modalities of obligatory on-site inspections. One question is, have technical developments now improved the chances of success of inspection expeditions? Such on-site inspections still seem to be a political requirement on the part of some delegations; but we have been left in the dark as to how such a regulation would fit into an international treaty. In an agreement between two or a few nuclear-weapon parties we can understand how the arrangements would work. But otherwise, in a truly multilateral case with some one hundred parties, a number of question marks remain.

39. If a treaty prescribed some yearly number of on-site inspections, say three, who would then be entitled to ask for them? Would every State party to the treaty have the right to make three on-site inspections per year on the territory of any other State? Or would one State party only have to admit three on-site inspections each year? Would it then be so that the deterrence effect is out when the quota of three inspections have been used up in one year—and pre-emption is easy to arrange if wanted? To our mind, the more flexible system of verification by challenge, allowing for voluntary on-site inspection by invitation or upon request, could provide even more deterrence effect. Furthermore, we believe that any method of verification should preferably be internationalized—the exchange of seismic data as well as the implementation of any on-site inspections.

40. Before leaving this issue, may I express the hope that the delegations particularly of the nuclear-weapon Powers will be in a position soon to answer the questions on the test-ban issue which I raised on 4 May?¹¹

41. The real purpose of my statement today is to underline that the time has arrived when a treaty should be concluded on the basis of knowledge we already possess. It should not be postponed to some uncertain date in the future by being made contingent upon any specified future improvements in verification techniques, however welcome the prospects of such improvements are. The overwhelming reason for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take action now is simply that such action is quite necessary as an answer to world-wide demands for disarmament—demands that grow more and more impatient.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 270.

These demands take on a special urgency when one recalls their connexion with certain disarmament agreements that are as yet insufficiently fulfilled, such as the non-proliferation Treaty.^{1 2} The completion—through a ban on underground nuclear tests also—of the partial test ban of 1963, with its substantial number of adherents, would constitute a desirable supplement to the non-proliferation Treaty which so far has a much less effective coverage.

42. The demands for immediate action can also be seen as hopefully supported by expected positive results from the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Tests for continued development of strategic nuclear weapons would become correspondingly superfluous.

43. From the observations quoted by me today and from earlier conclusions described to this Committee, it is quite clear that strong explosions can be confidently identified without recourse to obligatory on-site inspections. Undeniably there already exists a firm basis for discontinuing large-yield tests. No verification argument can be utilized for justifying any postponement of their cessation. I would, however, in accordance with the thesis we have always sustained, by no means wish to see a treaty limited to prohibiting larger explosions. For general disarmament purposes, yes for general political reasons, all should be included; and all can be encompassed in one treaty, as I do not expect any party to enter it with the intention to cheat and play hazard with the verification risks and chances.

44. An agreement to ban also underground nuclear explosions would be a truly major achievement. It would save mankind from ever more frightening weapons of mass destruction.

45. The Swedish delegation has wanted to make its contribution to the effort to achieve an underground test-ban agreement within the shortest possible time. It is for this purpose that we have today presented some draft suggestions for a fair and workable treaty to ban all nuclear-weapon tests once and for all.

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Bos) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Bacteriological Weapons, July 29, 1971¹

Today I want to limit myself to the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and, in particular, to the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction submitted to this Conference by the Soviet Union and other countries.²

^{1 2} *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹ CCD/PV.525, pp. 5-9.

² *Ahte*, pp. 190-194.

3. From an early stage my delegation has expressed sympathy and support for the approach and principal ideas of the United Kingdom draft convention for the prohibition of biological methods of warfare.³ On 17 March 1970 my delegation stated that that draft was an example of practical wisdom in trying to achieve what seems to be nearest at hand, but that it did not exclude the prospects for progress on chemical warfare and biological warfare being discussed together.⁴

4. From those introductory remarks it will be clear that the presentation of the Soviet draft on 30 March 1971 was welcomed by my delegation because it offered new perspectives to our efforts to attain other tangible results in the field of arms control and disarmament. However, I want to stress from the outset that in my delegation's view the negotiations on the formulation of a ban on the production of chemical weapons have to be continued vigorously. Those weapons constitute a dangerous threat to mankind, and their elimination has to be striven for unceasingly. We have listened with great interest to the various suggestions made in trying to commit the various governments to continue negotiations in good faith towards that end.

5. May I now come back to the Soviet draft convention? That draft has been studied closely by my delegation; and at this stage I should like to submit the following remarks in a spirit of constructive co-operation.

6. Much has already been said in the past on the question of use, which is covered in the United Kingdom draft but not in the Soviet one. Many delegations have expressed their doubts on a renewed reference to prohibition of use, because in their opinion that question is adequately covered by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁵ We nevertheless remain of the opinion that it would be desirable to touch upon the question of use in a convention banning the production and possession of biological and/or chemical weapons. In particular we think that desirable in view of the various reservations now attached to the Geneva Protocol. Of course, in the context of that Protocol the principle of reciprocity made sense because the Protocol did not forbid the parties to produce and possess biological and/or chemical weapons.

7. However, in the case of a treaty ban on the production and possession of those means of warfare, it seems logical that such a ban would presuppose a ban on use under any circumstances: that is, also for purposes of retaliation and vis-à-vis non-parties. Therefore we are in favour of the inclusion of a provision in a draft convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons—and even more so in a future draft on chemical weapons—containing a clear expression of the will of the parties to ban the use for hostile purposes of any of those weapons under any circumstances.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

8. The Soviet draft convention does not contain any definition of biological agents. Mrs. Myrdal, who is our Chairman this morning, in her statement on 20 July drew our attention to the importance of the question of definitions and especially urged that there should be a clear understanding of the meaning of the term "toxins". She suggested that this term should be complemented by the words "whatever their origin or mode of preparation".⁶ We share her concern and are willing to support her suggestion. We also see value in having a definition of biological agents themselves inserted in a draft convention. The United Kingdom draft convention contains such a definition in its article I; while resolution 2603 A (XXIV) provides us with another example of such a definition.⁷ Both definitions cover biological agents which are intended to cause death or disease in man, animals or plants. We attach particular importance to the latter part of this phrasing.

9. Turning to the question of verification, I may recall to the Committee that my delegation, in a statement on 18 March this year, expressed itself in favour of a complaints procedure consisting of two stages.⁸ The first stage of dealing with a complaint should consist of a factual investigation by a body of experts or some other international organ. Only thereafter, at the discretion of the complaining party, could the Security Council be addressed on the strength of the findings of the international organ or body of experts. Under such a procedure one could avoid complaints becoming political and perhaps incriminating at an early stage. In other words, we made a plea for separation of the functions of investigation and political judgement.

10. For the reasons I have just stated, we feel great sympathy for the procedure contained in article III of the United Kingdom draft, because, as was stated by the Nigerian representative on 20 July:

The United Kingdom draft seems better to ensure an automatic and impartial investigation of the use of biological methods of warfare and toxins without any danger of delay.⁹

We have noted with interest that similar views on preliminary fact-finding and political judgement are held by the delegations of Sweden,¹⁰ Brazil,¹¹ Italy¹² and Argentina.¹³

11. Article I of the Soviet draft, which resembles to a great extent article II of the United Kingdom draft, prohibits the development, production, stockpiling or acquisition of microbiological or other biological agents or toxins of such types and in

⁶ *Ante*, p. 424.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 716-717.

⁸ CCD/PV.502, pp. 10-11.

⁹ CCD/PV.522, p. 10.

¹⁰ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 138-139.

¹¹ CCD/PV.510, p. 20.

¹² CCD/PV.512, p. 7.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

such quantities as are not designed for the prevention of disease or for other peaceful purposes.

12. As we have stated before, we would have preferred some other formula instead of the term "peaceful purposes" in this context, in order to avoid any risk of confusion with regard to the interpretation of the word "peaceful" in the field of arms control.¹⁴ In most arms-control measures expressions such as "peaceful purposes" and "peaceful activities" have been used in the sense of non-military purposes and non-military activities. In the present context, however, we seek only to exclude development and so on for weapon purposes, leaving open the possibility of development and so on for certain purposes of passive defence that might be considered as military purposes. I am thinking, for instance, of early warning apparatus and protective clothing for the armed forces. In our view, all legitimate non-weapon purposes can be covered by a wording which combines prophylactic and protective purposes. On the other hand, if the word "peaceful" is retained it should be considered as having no impact whatsoever on the interpretation of the same word in agreements like the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA),¹⁵ the non-proliferation Treaty,¹⁶ the Antarctic Treaty,¹⁷ and the outer-space Treaty.¹⁸

13. As has been suggested by several other delegations, it would be of great value if the draft introduced by the Soviet Union and others were to reflect the contents of sub-paragraph (b) of article II of the United Kingdom draft, which seeks to rule out research directed to weapons development in this field. In our view, a ban on such research would constitute a logical complement to the ban on production.

14. We also believe that article IV of the United Kingdom draft, containing the so-called assistance clause, is valuable; and we should like to join those delegations—Italy, Argentina, Morocco and Nigeria—which have urged the insertion of such a clause in any future convention.

15. Finally, I should like to say a word or two about article X of the Soviet draft, which seems to be inspired by article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty. During the negotiations on that Treaty many countries were afraid that the inequality in position of nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States with respect to the military use of nuclear energy might have repercussions in the field of the peaceful applications of nuclear energy. Article IV of the non-proliferation Treaty was intended to remedy this concern. The situation is not altogether comparable with the situation in regard to biological research, because in the context of

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 97-98.

¹⁵ *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1956*, pp. 915 ff.

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹⁷ *Ibid., 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

¹⁸ *Ibid., 1967*, pp. 38-43.

a biological-weapons convention there will be no question of "haves" and "have nots". Nevertheless, we are prepared to support the inclusion of that article. In particular, it might prove useful in facilitating the exchange of information resulting from research on protective measures against biological warfare.

16. The remarks I have made today certainly have not exhausted the whole subject. Several other points could have been mentioned, but we prefer to come back to the subject at a later stage. By that time we may have a clearer picture of what is emerging from the melting-pot of ideas which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament so often resembles.

PRC Statement on Proposed Five-Power Conference, July 30, 1971¹

On June 15, 1971, the Soviet Government delivered a statement to the Government of the People's Republic of China, proposing to "convene a conference of the five powers possessing nuclear weapons—the Soviet Union, the United States of America, the People's Republic of China, France and Great Britain," at which "the problems of nuclear disarmament as a whole should be considered."² In this connection, the Chinese Government hereby makes the following statement:

All countries in the world, big or small, should be equal. Matters affecting various countries in the world should be jointly discussed and settled by all of them and permit of no monopoly by a few big powers. This is a principle guiding international relations which all countries must abide by. The prevention of nuclear war, the elimination of nuclear threats and the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons are matters affecting the peace and security of all countries of the world, and a few nuclear countries have no right to brush aside the majority of countries in the world and arbitrarily hold a conference to consider and decide upon matters of such great importance.

The history following World War II shows that it is absolutely impossible to settle questions of nuclear disarmament by relying on negotiations only between a few big powers possessing nuclear weapons. In July 1963, the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union concluded the "partial nuclear test ban treaty."³ Subsequently, the Soviet Union and the United States jointly concocted a series of treaties on so-called nuclear arms "limitation," including the treaty on the "non-proliferation of nuclear weapons."⁴ In November 1969, the Soviet Union and the United States started their "strategic arms limitation" talks. But none of

¹ Hsinhua News Agency despatch, Aug. 7, 1971; *Peking Review*, Aug. 13, 1971, p. 5.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 313-315.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

them have restricted in any way the nuclear arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the United States and the Soviet Union have continued their nuclear weapon tests without letup, their production of nuclear weapons is becoming ever more developed, their stockpiles of nuclear weapons are becoming greater and greater and they are stationing in many other countries their troops armed with nuclear weapons; this seriously threatens world peace and the security of the people of all countries. The peoples of the world have long lost their confidence in the disarmament talks between the nuclear powers. They rightly hold that it is impossible to settle the question of nuclear disarmament as a whole by depending on two nuclear superpowers, nor can it be settled by the addition of some more nuclear powers.

China develops nuclear weapons because she is compelled to do so under imperialist nuclear threats, and she does so entirely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the imperialist nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and at present she is not yet a nuclear power, nor will she ever be a "nuclear superpower" practising the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail. At no time will China ever agree to participate in so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries.

Therefore, the Chinese Government cannot accept the Soviet Government's proposal on the convening of a conference of the five nuclear powers.

The Chinese Government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. Firstly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons; secondly, the Chinese Government has declared on many occasions that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons; thirdly, the Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government hereby once again solemnly reaffirms its above stand.

The Chinese Government holds that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States and the Soviet Union which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons should issue statements separately or jointly to openly undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time or in any circumstances; and to dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw to their own countries the nuclear weapons stockpiled and nuclear armed forces stationed on those territories. Whether this is carried out or not will be a test

as to whether they have the desire to realize nuclear disarmament.

The Chinese people will, as always, continue to make joint efforts with the peoples of the world, persevere in struggle and strive for the noble aim of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

News Conference Remarks by President Nixon [Extract], August 4, 1971¹

Q. Mr. President, is there any diplomatic reason you might not visit the Soviet Union before going to Peking? That was suggested.

The President. In view of the announcement we have made on our visit to Peking, that will be the first visit that I will make. Obviously, it takes a great deal of time to prepare a visit and to attempt now to visit—and the Soviet Union, I am sure, feels exactly the same way—to attempt to rush around and have a summit meeting in Moscow before we go to Peking would not be in the interest of either country.

I would add this point, too: When Foreign Minister Gromyko was here, we discussed the possibility of a possible summit meeting, and we had a very candid discussion. He agreed and said that his government leaders agreed with my position, which was that a meeting at the highest level should take place and would be useful only when there was something substantive to discuss that could not be handled in other channels.

With regard to the Soviets, I should also point out that we are making very significant progress on Berlin. We are making good progress on SALT. Discussions are still continuing on the Mideast, although there I will not speculate about what the prospects for success are in view of the fact that Mr. Sisco is presently in the area exploring with the governments concerned what the possibilities of some interim settlement looking toward a final settlement may be.

Having mentioned these three areas in which we are negotiating with the Soviet Union, I will add that if the time comes, as it may come, and both sides realize this, then the final breakthrough in any of these areas can take place only at the highest level, and then there will be a meeting. But as far as the timing of the meeting before the visit to Peking, that would not be an appropriate thing to do.

Q. I was thinking of such a thing as a settlement on the SALT talks.

The President. Mr. Theis, when I said there was good progress being made on SALT, it is still a very technical and sticky problem for both sides because it involves our vital interests. Let me emphasize that in SALT, both sides are asked to make an

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Aug. 9, 1971, p. 1120.

agreement which limits that. This is not unilateral. We, on our part, will be having very severe limitations with regard to our defensive capability, the ABM. They, on their part, will have limitations on their offensive capability, their buildup of offensive missiles.

Neither side can make those decisions lightly, without very, very basic discussions, but the fact that we have at the highest level committed ourselves to working toward an agreement simultaneously this year on both those issues, and the fact that since the talks at Helsinki began that we have made progress, gives hope that we are going to make an arrangement.

But to speculate that maybe we are going to get that done before we go to Peking, I think, would be ill-advised.

Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, August 5, 1971¹

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins intended for use as weapons and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Desiring thereby, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced of the immense importance and urgent necessity of eliminating from the arsenals of states such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as weapons using bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Believing that scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) must in the interests of all mankind be used solely for peaceful purposes,

Recognizing nevertheless that in the absence of appropriate prohibitions the development of scientific knowledge throughout

¹This draft convention was submitted to the CCD on Aug. 5, 1971, by the United States as CCD/338 and Corr. 1 and by the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania as CCD/337. The documents are identical, except that the seven-nation version is entitled "Revised draft Convention . . ."

the world would increase the risk of the use of bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,² and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the purposes and principles of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, which has condemned all actions contrary to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Convinced that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, on which negotiations will be continued,

Anxious to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

- (1) Microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic or other peaceful purposes;
- (2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

ARTICLE II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than ___ months after the entry into force of the Convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect the population and the environment.

ARTICLE III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly, or indirectly, and not in any

²Documents on Disarmament, 1969, pp. 764-765.

way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any agent, toxin, weapon, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

ARTICLE IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

ARTICLE V

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in the application of the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE VI

(1) Each State Party to the Convention which finds that actions of any other State Party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation.

(2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigations which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

ARTICLE VII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

ARTICLE VIII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction and on appropriate measures concerning the equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons for warfare.

ARTICLE IX

(1) The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological

information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

ARTICLE X

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

ARTICLE XI

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

ARTICLE XII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XIII

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of ____ which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by ----- Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XIV

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

Done in ----- copies at -----, this ---- day of -----.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 5, 1971¹

Today a revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction is being submitted for the consideration of the Committee. It is co-sponsored by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Soviet Union and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. We are gratified to note that the draft is supported also by the Government of the German Democratic Republic. A similar draft convention is being submitted for the consideration of the Committee by the delegation of the United States of America.²

3. In presenting this document on behalf of the socialist countries, the Soviet delegation would like to emphasize that its co-sponsors base themselves on the need for the complete

¹ CCD/PV.527, pp. 5-13.

² *Supra*.

prohibition and elimination of both chemical and bacteriological weapons. However, consideration in the Committee and at the General Assembly of the problem of the complete prohibition of those types of weapons has shown quite clearly that a simultaneous solution covering both types would not appear to be feasible at this juncture because of the position of some Western Powers which are unwilling at present to renounce chemical means of warfare. That is why, in order to find the most realistic and practicable way to the solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, the socialist countries declared their readiness, as a first step in solving this problem, to come to an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare only.³ Accordingly, on 30 March the socialist countries submitted to the Committee a draft convention on such a prohibition.⁴

4. In approaching the solution of the problem of prohibiting bacteriological weapons and toxins, the socialist countries set as their objective the achievement of complete prohibition and elimination of bacteriological means of warfare and toxins, bearing in mind the broadest understanding of the latter term. At the same time, the co-sponsors of the draft convention believe that the convention should contain provisions which would strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons,⁵ and would create better prerequisites for reaching agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons as well. In revising this draft the co-sponsors of the draft convention of 30 March based themselves precisely on these objectives and are submitting today a new draft which is the result of consultations and negotiations with a number of members of the Committee on Disarmament.

5. We should like to stress that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting bacteriological means of warfare and toxins for military purposes and providing for the elimination of stockpiles thereof would preclude the possibility of an outbreak of war using these agents; this would correspond to the hopes and interests of all nations, large and small. As a result of the complete prohibition and elimination of these types of weapons of mass destruction, the convention would be a realistic measure in the field of disarmament, a measure which would undoubtedly facilitate progress in reaching agreement on other measures in regard to limitation of the arms race and to general and complete disarmament. The conclusion of such a convention would be a serious contribution towards improving the international situation and strengthening international security and universal peace.

³ *Akte*, p. 186.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

6. Statements made by members of the Committee during the spring and current sessions, as well as consultations carried out by the socialist countries co-sponsors of the draft convention with members of the Committee, showed that the document submitted by them on 30 March represented a good basis for reaching an agreement on the complete prohibition of bacteriological weapons. It was precisely in this sense that many representatives of States members of the Committee expressed themselves.

7. A number of delegations suggested that the co-sponsors of the draft should word certain provisions of the draft more precisely and introduce some amendments. This, in the opinion of those delegations, would facilitate constructive discussion of the aforesaid draft of the socialist countries. Having considered the comments and suggestions made by various delegations in the Committee, the co-sponsors of the draft convention have come to the conclusion that certain amendments and clarifications could be introduced into the text in view of the fact that this would help to complete the elaboration of the draft convention by the Committee.

8. The revised draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins submitted for the consideration of the Committee today includes, in comparison with the draft of 30 March, a number of amendments and additions which have been worked out on the basis of the wishes and suggestions put forward by members of the Committee during the spring and current sessions. The revised text will, we hope, bring us closer to submitting for the approval of the General Assembly a finalized draft on the subject we are considering.

9. I should like to set out briefly the changes that have been made in the text of the draft convention we have submitted. Those changes, I wish to repeat once more, have been worked out in full accordance with the previously-mentioned aims and principles by which the socialist countries are guided in the question of prohibiting bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins. The changes proposed are also intended to unify certain formulations of the draft with due regard to other international agreements in the field of disarmament that have been worked out by the Committee on Disarmament.

10. First of all, it appears necessary to dwell on the provisions of the draft convention relating to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons, which laid down the international legal basis for the solution of the problem of prohibiting those types of weapons. As we have already pointed out, our approach to this question is based upon the premise that the provisions of the draft convention on bacteriological weapons should envisage enhancing the role and place of the Geneva Protocol in international life. The draft convention notes the important significance of the Protocol, reaffirms adherence to its purposes and principles, and calls upon

all States to comply strictly with them (eighth, ninth and tenth paragraphs of the preamble of the revised draft). The draft convention provides further that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Protocol (Article VII of the revised draft).

11. During the negotiations on the draft convention there were revealed different approaches to the interpretation of the Geneva Protocol and of the rules of international law deriving therefrom. The socialist countries base themselves on the premise—and this view is widely supported throughout the world—that the Protocol has established a generally recognized rule of international law on the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. At the same time, some States hold the concept that that international instrument has established an agreed rule of international law which is mandatory only for the parties thereto. Since the negotiations have revealed that the two sides continue to hold different concepts of international law, it has been agreed not to include in the draft convention a provision reaffirming or refuting any of the aforesaid concepts. That does not mean, of course, that the socialist countries have changed to any extent their approach or their concept in this regard. They have invariably based themselves, and continue to base themselves, on the premise that the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a generally-recognized rule of international law.

12. Precisely because of that, the socialist countries do not deem it possible to include in the draft convention a provision prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons, since the prohibition of the use of both chemical and bacteriological weapons has already been decided by the Geneva Protocol. The incorporation in the convention of a provision prohibiting the use of bacteriological weapons could weaken the Protocol—first, because it would somehow detract from the significance of the already-existing prohibition laid down by the Protocol; and secondly because different approaches to the prohibition of bacteriological weapons on the one hand and of chemical weapons on the other would be allowed; and that would likewise be contrary to the purposes and principles proclaimed by the Geneva Protocol. However, we have agreed to include in the second paragraph of the preamble of the revised draft an expression of intention to exclude completely the possibility of the use of bacteriological weapons. That provision of the preamble, which is not a repetition of the declaration of the prohibition of use already contained in the Geneva Protocol, must reflect the natural result of the conclusion of the convention, since the cessation of the production of biological weapons and the destruction of stockpiles thereof would also mean the complete exclusion of the possibility of their use.

13. Thus we should like to emphasize that the provisions

relating to the Geneva Protocol in the revised draft convention on bacteriological weapons are intended to enhance in every possible way the international significance of the Geneva Protocol for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare.

14. An important purpose of the draft convention is to ensure progress towards achievement of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of States. Provisions contained in the convention lay down the obligations of States to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning the equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical weapons as a means of warfare.

15. The draft convention expresses the conviction of the parties to it that an agreement on bacteriological weapons will facilitate progress towards the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons (eleventh paragraph of the preamble). The article of the convention concerning a conference of States Parties to it to review the realization of its purposes and provisions provides for the review at such a conference of the question of the realization of its provision relating to the prohibition also of chemical weapons (article XI). As to the time of convening the aforesaid conference, an important addition has been made to the effect that the conference may be convened before the expiration of the five-year term after the entry into force of the convention, if that is requested by a majority of the parties to it. This conference would be called upon and would be able to play a great role in achieving progress towards the prohibition of chemical weapons. It would hardly be expedient to lay down straightway the time of convening such a conference in the text of the convention, since the course of events will show when such a conference should be convened.

16. The obligations contained in the draft convention of the socialist countries with regard to the prohibition of chemical weapons, together with the more precise provision concerning the time of convening a conference to review the implementation of the purposes and provisions of the convention, create the proper prerequisites for progress in solving this problem. As a result of the assumption of the aforesaid obligations the prospects for the prohibition of chemical weapons will certainly be more favourable than they are today. For its part, the Soviet Union will contribute in the most active way to achieving an agreement on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

17. In any convention an important place is occupied by the provisions designed to ensure its realization, and consequently the viability and effectiveness of the agreement contained in it. The draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons

submitted to the Committee for consideration is based upon a combination of international and national guarantees of its fulfilment. The draft provides in the first place for the obligation of States to take, in accordance with their constitutional processes, the necessary measures for the implementation of the prohibitions laid down in the convention. Those measures must be taken within the territory of a State under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. The corresponding provisions on the responsibility of States for the implementation of the obligations under the convention, contained in articles IV and V of the draft convention of 30 March, have been united in article IV of the draft convention submitted today.

18. Secondly, it provides for the obligation of the parties to the convention to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems that may arise in the application of its provisions. In the event that a State party to the convention finds that actions of any other State party constitute a breach of the obligations assumed under the provisions of the convention, it may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations and co-operate in carrying out the investigation undertaken by the Security Council. The procedure envisaged for lodging a complaint with the Security Council in the event of a breach of the convention ensures in the best possible way the implementation of the task of an objective investigation of the circumstances of the breach and the adoption of prompt and effective measures for its suppression.

19. The system of safeguards contained in the draft is reinforced by the provisions of the convention regarding the convening of a conference to review the operation and implementation of the provisions of the convention. The combination of those provisions guarantees the effectiveness and viability of the agreement on the complete prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins.

20. The draft convention submitted to the Committee today includes a provision regarding the right to withdraw from the convention which is similar to the corresponding provisions of the non-proliferation Treaty,⁶ the sea-bed Treaty⁷ and a number of other international agreements in the field of disarmament. This provision regarding withdrawal from the convention was put forward by many delegations during the discussion of the draft convention which took place at the spring and current sessions of our Committee. This provision ensures the observance of the sovereign rights of each State party.

21. I should now like to say a few words about other changes in the text of the draft convention.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

22. In the draft convention of 30 March the provision regarding the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of all bacteriological agents and toxins, as well as the relevant equipment and means of delivery, laid down a three-month term for these purposes. Since during the negotiations on the draft the view was expressed by some States that this period might prove to be insufficient for them, it is proposed in the revised draft that the period of time for destruction should be laid down later, taking into account all the necessary data for this.

23. Taking into consideration the danger of bacteriological weapons, a provision has been included in the draft to the effect that in implementing this article safety precautions shall be observed to ensure reliable protection of the population and the environment.

24. To the list of basic obligations under the convention—not to produce, stockpile or acquire bacteriological weapons and toxins—there has been added an obligation not to retain already-accumulated stockpiles of these means of warfare. This addition makes the prohibitory provisions of the convention more comprehensive.

25. The first and second paragraphs of the preamble of the draft convention of 30 March concerning the interrelationship of the problem of the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, and the determination of the parties to the convention to act with a view to achieving general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control, have been combined in one paragraph in the revised draft. In speaking of general and complete disarmament, we have in mind that it will include the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and biological. We deem it necessary to emphasize this, since this convention deals with the elimination and prohibition of one type of such weapons, namely, bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins. However, as we have stated on numerous occasions, our aim is the complete prohibition and elimination from the life of mankind of nuclear and chemical weapons as well.

26. The text of the convention also includes terminological classifications and some drafting improvements.

27. Those, on the whole, are the amendments and additions introduced into the draft convention of 30 March. The elaboration of the draft convention on bacteriological weapons submitted today has been carried out with due regard to the views and positions of the members of the Committee on Disarmament put forward during the spring and current sessions of the Committee. The amendments introduced were the result of a search for such a solution to controversial questions concerning the complete prohibition of one of the types of weapons of mass destruction as would create an acceptable basis for the conclusion of an international convention for that purpose. We hope that the

submission of the revised draft convention by the socialist countries will facilitate speedy agreement on its text and will expedite the process of preparing a convention on the complete prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare.

28. In submitting the revised draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins for consideration by the States represented here, the socialist countries base themselves on the premise that the conclusion of such a convention would enable the participants in the negotiations on disarmament to devote greater attention and efforts to negotiations regarding the prohibition of chemical weapons, as well as regarding other questions which are on the agenda of the Committee.⁸

29. We think that discussion of the proposed agreement on bacteriological weapons and toxins should not entail any weakening of interest or of efforts in solving the problem of the prohibition of chemical weapons. As in the past, the Soviet delegation continues to insist on the need to conduct in a constructive spirit the negotiations on the immediate prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their complete elimination from the arsenals of States.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 5, 1971¹

Today the United States delegation is tabling for the consideration of the Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.² A parallel draft in Russian is being tabled by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR. This draft convention is based primarily on the draft tabled by those delegations on 30 March.³ However, it owes much of its inspiration and its language to the draft originally tabled on 10 July 1969 by the delegation of the United Kingdom.⁴ That draft, which the United States supported, presented the basic framework for an agreement on biological weapons; and the Committee, I believe, is deeply indebted to the constructive and thoughtful approach, as well as the craftsmanship, demonstrated by the United Kingdom in its pursuit of this project.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 583-584.

¹ CCD/PV.527, pp. 13-18.

² *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

³ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁴ The original British draft appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 324-326. For the revised version, see *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

31. As many members of the Committee have pointed out, a convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons is not a complete solution to the problem of chemical and biological warfare. It represents, however, a solution to an important part of that problem—the control of weapons which are by far the deadliest and most indiscriminate of the chemical and biological methods of warfare. These are weapons to which a significant amount of military research has been devoted. Stockpiles of lethal and incapacitating biological agents, and of toxins, have been accumulated in the past. Although these weapons have never been used in actual hostilities, the possibility of such use has been of serious concern to many States.

32. Permit me to recall in this regard remarks which Dr. Joshua Lederberg, a distinguished biologist, made to this Committee in August of last year. Dr. Lederberg referred to his long-standing fear that molecular biology could be exploited for military purposes and eventuate in a weapons system which could become the most effective means for removing man from the planet. “A serious military investment” in the development of molecular biology, he said, “could be expected to outstrip [the] already breathtaking pace of advance” in this field “by many fold”.⁵ Moreover, he continued, “the potential undoubtedly exists for the design and development of infective agents against which no credible defence is possible, through the genetic and chemical manipulation of these agents. It is thus clear to me”, Dr. Lederberg concluded, “that if we do not do something about this possibility, work will go forward and my fears will become realities”.⁶ There thus exists both an opportunity and an urgent need to control these powerful weapons before they are thrust into the mainstream of military planning by the force of technical progress.

33. The United States delegation believes that the development here of a widely-acceptable draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons for submission to the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations would be a major accomplishment. As a number of delegations have pointed out, such a convention would represent not only an agreement for the prevention of new armament but a real disarmament measure. We have said before, and we continue to believe, that the completion of such a project would in no way detract from our continued efforts to develop further effective measures for international control of chemical weapons.

34. Let me turn now to the draft convention itself and comment on some of its most important provisions and issues.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 356.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 359.

35. One point which has been stressed by a number of delegations is that a new convention in this field should not in any way undermine the Geneva Protocol of 1925⁷ or cast any doubt on its continuing validity as an international legal instrument. We entirely share that view. In our opinion the convention we are negotiating will support and strengthen the Geneva Protocol. The Protocol is specifically and unambiguously protected by article VII, which precludes any possibility that the new convention might in any way be interpreted as limiting or detracting from obligations assumed under the Protocol. Moreover, the ninth preambular paragraph of the draft reaffirms the adherence of States parties to the convention to the purposes and objectives of the Protocol. The fact that this convention would as a practical matter strengthen the Geneva Protocol is reflected in the second preambular paragraph, which expresses the desire of the parties by means of this convention "for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons."

36. Let me discuss some of the other provisions of the draft convention in the order in which they appear. Article I contains the basic undertakings of the treaty. It prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention, not only of the living organisms referred to as microbial or other biological agents, but also of the chemical substances known as toxins. The second paragraph of article I extends the prohibition to weapons, equipment, or means of delivery designed to use the agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. As the Swedish delegation has indicated, the inclusion of toxins in the convention adds significantly to the breadth of this first agreement in the field of chemical and biological weapons.

37. Article II sets forth the requirements for destruction of all the prohibited agents, toxins, weapons, and equipment. The destruction should be as soon as possible but not later than a specific number of months after entry into force of the convention. We have deliberately left the number of months blank so that it might be filled in after consultations within the Committee, taking into account practical considerations related to destruction of biological weapons. I would like to draw attention, also, to the clear requirement in article II that all necessary safety precautions be observed to protect the population and environment.

38. Article III contains provisions designed to prevent the proliferation of biological and toxin weapons. It is very similar to article I of the non-proliferation Treaty.⁸ As a result of the biological and toxin weapons convention, all parties would cease to possess or manufacture these weapons. It should therefore be

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

clearly in the interest of all parties that the non-proliferation provisions be as precise and as effective as possible.

39. Article IV establishes the responsibility of each State party to take any necessary measures to ensure that development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents and equipment specified in article I does not take place within its territory, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere. This article is intended to make more effective the application of the treaty's prohibitions and thus contribute to the full realization of its objectives.

40. Articles V and VI contain provisions for dealing with problems that might arise in the application of the treaty's provisions. Article V sets forth the basic undertaking for consultation and co-operation among the parties. Article VI sets forth the procedure for complaints to the Security Council in the event that a party believes that there has been a breach of obligation. In this situation, the complaining party should submit all possible evidence regarding the complaint to the Security Council. The Security Council shall subsequently inform the parties of the results of the investigation. Every party undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may undertake, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council.

41. I have already discussed article VII in the first section of my remarks.

42. With regard to article VIII, I would first like to recall President Nixon's message of 23 February to this Committee in which he said that—

... in any biological weapons convention, we will support an unambiguous commitment engaging all parties to undertake further negotiations regarding limitations on chemical weapons.⁹

Such a provision has been included as article VIII of the draft convention tabled today. I know that this undertaking, and the words in which it is couched, are of particular importance to other members of the Committee. They are no less important to the United States. As President Nixon made clear in the letter to which I have already referred, we are determined to pursue the task of finding solutions to the difficult problems of verifying further measures dealing with chemical weapons. The discussions we have already had in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on this subject bear witness to the seriousness with which we have embarked on this task. We are prepared in this convention to undertake a legal obligation to pursue this work. We would not, of course, have been prepared to support a formulation which disregarded the real problems which have to be solved to develop effective controls on chemical weapons.

⁹ *Ahte*, p. 20.

43. Article IX of the draft calls attention to the importance attached to co-operation among States in the continued development of peaceful applications of biological agents and toxins. The need for such co-operation is clear in the light of the global character of the problems to which these applications are relevant, particularly those in the areas of health, nutrition and environmental protection. These are not, of course, matters within the primary competence of this Committee; and the elaboration of new practical measures of co-operation in this area must be left to other national and international bodies. However, article IX lays down a general commitment to facilitate, to the greatest possible extent, the exchange of equipment, materials, and information relevant to peaceful uses of the agents which are the subject of this convention. The article specifies that the convention is to be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of parties or international co-operation in the field of peaceful biological activities.

44. This is an area of scientific endeavour which holds great promise for the future of mankind. It is therefore of the highest importance that, as we interdict the use of these powerful tools of science for hostile purposes, we work to facilitate their availability to all States for the humanitarian and social purposes which are their proper objective.

45. Article X sets forth a provision for amending the treaty similar to those contained in other recent arms-control agreements.

46. Article XI of the draft convention contains a provision for a review conference five years after the entry into force of the convention or earlier. This is similar to provisions contained in the sea-bed arms-control Treaty¹⁰ and in the non-proliferation Treaty, but with one significant difference: it provides for the convening of a review conference earlier than five years after the entry into force of the convention if that is requested by a majority of the parties to the convention. The Yugoslav delegation and a number of others have stated in this Committee that an earlier conference might be desirable to review the operation of the convention, including in particular the provision for further negotiations on chemical weapons.¹¹

47. Moving to article XII, we agree with the view, expressed earlier by the delegation of the United Arab Republic¹² and, we believe, shared by a number of others, that the convention should contain a withdrawal clause like that included in earlier arms-control agreements. The convention presented today contains such a clause. Article XII also specifies that the treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 412.

¹² CCD/PV.516, p. 11.

48. Articles XIII and XIV contain standard formal clauses. The number of ratifications required for entry into force has not been specified. The United States believes that the convention should enter into force at an early date and that the required number of ratifications should therefore be relatively small. We would welcome hearing the views of other delegations on that question.

49. I shall not go further today in elaborating upon the provisions of the draft. The United States is pleased that it has been possible today to present parallel agreed texts of a draft which can serve as a focus for the Committee's negotiation of a convention to prohibit the development, production and stock-piling of biological and toxin weapons. We shall continue to listen closely to the views of other delegations, as we now concentrate our efforts on specific improvements in this text.

50. It is our earnest hope that all delegations will share in the difficult and complex negotiations which must be carried through in the coming weeks if we are to complete a widely-acceptable convention for submission to the forthcoming session of the United Nations General Assembly. We believe that task can be accomplished, and that it will redound to the credit of this Committee as an effective negotiating body.

Statement by the Italian Representative (Caracciolo) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 10, 1971¹

I should like first of all to congratulate the co-Chairmen of our Committee on the happy outcome of their negotiations for a draft treaty on the prohibition of biological weapons and toxins. To those negotiations, started two years ago on the motion of the United Kingdom delegation,² which has since then continued its efforts tenaciously and effectively, the other delegations in this Committee have made positive contributions both in official statements and in numerous contacts and exchanges of views.

16. Nevertheless, it is certain that in the final phase of those negotiations the realism and the will to succeed shown by the two co-Chairmen was what overcame the obstacles blocking an agreement between them; and that agreement, in the form of two parallel texts identical in their English version, has just been submitted to the Conference.³

17. The ball now comes back to the Conference and to the delegations which during the next few weeks will desire to make their contribution to the consideration of the texts proposed to them and to make known their opinions and suggestions, in order

¹ CCD/PV.528, pp. 8-13.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 318 ff.

³ *Ahte*, pp. 456-460.

to arrive before the end of this session at a single text receiving the greatest possible number of votes and fulfilling, at least in part, the mandate given to us by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2662 (XXV).⁴ The Italian delegation, for its part, will not fail to make its customary contribution to this common task as soon as it has completed its present study of the texts just submitted to us.

18. Allow me for the moment in my statement today to stray temporarily from the draft treaty concerning biological weapons and to try to consider our future work. I would point out that, though it is normal for us to welcome the first result of our activity in 1971, nevertheless we may not rest on our laurels. In other words, we may not lose sight of the inexorable march of the calendar, nor forget the task which we must still accomplish. We have already used more than half the time, roughly speaking, which is normally allotted to the work of this session; and our most pressing task is still to give effect to the resolutions which the United Nations General Assembly has addressed specifically to our Conference.

19. Thus, even if at the end of this present session we have done our utmost to comply with resolution 2662 (XXV), we shall still be far from having done what is needed to draft satisfactorily the special report asked of us urgently in resolution 2663 (XXV).⁵ To give appropriate effect to that resolution is moreover, in our opinion, the best way of starting to fulfil the obligations imposed by article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.⁶ That task therefore deserves absolute priority, which no delegation appears to challenge.

20. Resolution 2663 (XXV), as everybody knows, is made up of two parts—A and B—that are really two distinct resolutions.

21. On the first part, it can be said, our Committee has already done good work. The statements made during our spring session, the informal meeting with experts held at the beginning of the present session, and the working papers submitted by several delegations, including my own,⁷ will certainly enable us to gather by the end of this session a body of specific information. This could assist national governments—as the General Assembly asked of us—to supply seismological data of high quality based on a guaranteed international exchange system, and also to increase their help to improve world capabilities in seismology. Much, however, remains to be done in order to comply satisfactorily with the second part, part B, of resolution 2663 (XXV).

22. Our informal meeting of 30 June helped to bring out the different aspects of the technical problems of establishing a control system. It enabled us to evaluate the divergencies which

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 685-687.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 386-389.

still exist in the interpretation of certain technical and scientific data; but at the same time it showed us the possibility of a progressive reduction of present difficulties—provided always that we continue to devote the necessary attention to them. It was encouraging in this respect to hear a number of delegations assure the Committee of the determination of their Governments to continue the extremely serious work on these problems that they have undertaken.

23. Nevertheless, despite the comparison of ideas and experiences which that meeting stimulated, and despite the imposing body of documentary material supplied to us, one has the impression that the Committee has arrived at an impasse from which it can only emerge by an effort of initiative and co-operation. It is as though we had assembled most of the parts of a mosaic but could not put them together for lack of the inspiration necessary for the creation of a model.

24. Therefore the information yielded by the work done so far by the Committee must be used to give a fresh drive to its activities in this direction and to lay the foundations of a lasting agreement. I realize that the road leading to that result bristles with obstacles; but I feel that they will be overcome more easily if we decide to aim from now on at two precise objectives. The first is to work out a series of interim and partial measures likely to create an atmosphere of confidence and facilitate subsequent progress towards a complete test ban; the second is to give the Committee the appropriate methodological instrument with which it could devise a final and complete solution that could then be translated into a legal commitment.

25. The first of those two objectives has already been outlined constructively and effectively by the Canadian representative in proposals submitted on 29 June⁸ and summed up in the excellent working paper CCD/336.⁹ Those proposals suggest interim measures which we consider timely and urgent.

26. With regard in particular to measures designed to facilitate the development of techniques and installations in seismology which are likely to contribute to an effective system of verification, I should like to emphasize that Italy has already given its support to the idea—which is the basis of the Canadian proposals—of international co-operation in seismology. This was the very requirement which inspired the suggestions contained in our working paper CCD/331.¹⁰

27. We are equally convinced of the value of the Canadian proposals aimed at a progressive reduction of underground tests even before the conclusion of a formal agreement, and at protecting the environment against the effects of those tests; because that danger is a source of growing concern to us all.

⁸ CCD/PV.517, pp. 19-24.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 431-432.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 386-389.

28. The Italian delegation is geady to collaborate in a thorough study and a final statement of all these proposals. Therefore we hope that they will receive wide support within our Committee and in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

29. The second objective to be attained, as I have already indicated, is methodological. It is to find the way to tackle and solve the basic problem which is the main obstacle to the conclusion of a test-ban treaty: that is, controls. As long as the present divergencies persist, it is difficult to see how formal commitments can be reached.

30. In this connexion it must be noted that the proposals aimed at laying down at once the legal lines of a treaty banning underground tests presuppose conditions and hypotheses which, however attractive and encouraging they may seem, nevertheless must be verified and analysed later before they can serve as a basis for general agreement. Consequently at this stage any discussion on the form and language of a treaty seems to us like putting the cart before the horse. That is why it appears to us necessary, before we engage in that discussion, to make a more thorough study of the limits and possibilities of the techniques of detecting and identifying explosions.

31. It is true—as the informal meeting of 30 June confirmed—that several States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament are already carrying out such studies at considerable expense, and are ready also to put the conclusions from their studies at the disposal of others. Nevertheless, those generous contributions are not sufficient. If technical research remains confined within a national frame, the concrete prospects of a progressive approximation of the various positions on control will inevitably be more limited because of the fatal lack of co-ordination of effort. To be precise, without a direct and permanent international dialogue the work of the Committee could hardly avoid dispersion.

32. I do not believe that the Committee, faced with that situation, should wait passively for the next session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. It might be wiser to take the appropriate steps to convince the General Assembly of its firm desire to begin to seek a solution likely to clear the way towards a general and complete agreement.

33. Such a solution could be found more easily by adopting a method of work which would permit the development, within the Committee itself and on systematic bases, of the technical study of all the problems linked to verification of a prohibitory treaty. The method might be that of a constant dialogue with and among national experts in a sub-committee or working-party which would meet fairly regularly and, of course, act within the Committee and under its strict direction.

34. I know very well that any idea suggesting a change in the Committee's present methods of work raises difficulties. However,

I wish to emphasize that the suggestion which we are putting forward is not a procedural innovation. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament established in its early days—to be precise, on 21 March 1962—a sub-committee to consider the question of a treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests,¹¹ and to my knowledge there is no record in the archives of its dissolution. Taking into account modifications in structure corresponding to present requirements, we have there a valid procedural precedent.

35. This suggestion I am making is a logical consequence of the line of conduct followed consistently by the Italian delegation, which consists in recommending to our Conference a systematic study of the technical aspects of the problems on which we are negotiating. By using the method suggested for the study of the present problem we could give our work the impulse which we desire. Far from wanting to limit the proper functions of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament or to interfere with its own practices and traditions, our idea is simply to put at its disposal an effective working instrument.

36. I dare to believe that if we come to the next session of the General Assembly having decided among ourselves to continue, from our next session onwards, discussion on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests both in its political context—that is, at the level of our plenary Conference—and in its technical context—that is, in a sub-committee or group working only for us and according to the directions we give it—the reaction of the international community will undoubtedly be positive and we shall not risk blame for lack of courage or imagination.

37. I should like to submit these few considerations for attention and examination to the other delegations and the two co-Chairmen, while assuring them that my delegation is always ready to continue this discussion in the most appropriate time and manner.

Statement by the British Representative (Hainworth) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 10, 1971¹

With permission, I should like to speak not as Chairman but as leader of the United Kingdom delegation.

58. As my Canadian colleague has done for his delegation, I should like today to give the views of my delegation on the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons

¹¹ See ENDC/PV.6, p. 27.

¹ CCD/PV.528, pp. 19-28..

and on their destruction, contained, in parallel versions, in CCD/337 and CCD/338.²

59. In my statement of 6 April³ I welcomed the move of the Soviet Union and its allies in tabling on 30 March⁴ a draft convention on biological weapons.⁵ I said that I felt that the Committee now had the material to enable it to arrive at a consensus on the subject and thus to present an agreed draft convention to the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly. Lord Lothian, in his statement at our meeting on 22 April, continued the process of detailed negotiation which he described as necessary in order to reach an agreed text on a convention on biological weapons. He looked forward to the early tabling of a generally-acceptable working text, to which it would no doubt be necessary to put some finishing touches before the Committee reported to the United Nations General Assembly.⁶ I believe that the draft contains many of the basic elements of such a text and I accordingly welcome its appearance.

60. My delegation is glad to recognize that there is a majority in the Committee in favour of concluding a draft convention on biological weapons first, as we of the United Kingdom have urged so often in the past. We have always been conscious of the importance of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament negotiating such a measure of real disarmament in order not to allow the opportunity before us to vanish in the face of scientific progress or military developments. I am therefore particularly glad that we have progressed to the point where it has been possible for parallel texts to be tabled which, as the United States representative said, can serve as a focus for the Committee's negotiation.⁷ The device of parallel texts seems to me well suited at this stage, when we are dealing with texts for negotiation. Clearly—and I say this in no critical spirit—the texts in CCD/337 and CCD/338 have some imperfections of language, and we shall have to work further on them. It is also clear that, as other delegations have already expressed views which have not yet been taken into account, and that as still other delegations have reserved the right to speak again on the subject, there will be further changes to this text.

61. Nevertheless, the parallel texts now before us already represent, as they stand, many of the views of delegations; and they meet a substantial number of points to which I drew attention in my statement of 6 April.

62. In the first place, the inconsistencies in the references to "weapons" and "agents" contained in CCD/325/Rev.1⁸ have been ironed out.

² *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

³ CCD/PV.507, p. 13.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 186 ff.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁶ CCD/PV.510, pp. 5-8.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 472.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

63. Likewise, there is now clear provision for the destruction of agents.

64. Next, we are appreciative of the efforts which the sponsors of the draft have made to deal with the references to the Geneva Protocol of 1925,⁹ as well as to General Assembly resolutions on this subject, in a realistic and uncontentious fashion.

65. Likewise, I believe that the formulation contained in article VIII, committing parties to conduct negotiations in good faith on effective measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction, adequately meets the criteria I set out on 6 April. On that occasion I said that it would be important to phrase the commitment to further negotiations on chemical methods of warfare carefully in order to make it both realistic and widely acceptable.

66. Likewise, I am glad to note that advantage has been taken of earlier experience gained in this Committee in formulating international instruments of arms control to agree effective and previously-supported formulations for the non-proliferation provisions contained in articles III of CCD/337 and CCD/338.

67. Likewise, my delegation believes that the addition of the phrase "under strict and effective international control" to the revised first preambular paragraph of the present draft is consistent with the previously-adopted position of the Committee on general and complete disarmament.

68. Finally, the addition of a standard withdrawal clause brings the draft convention into line with earlier instruments.

69. As I have already said, the negotiating texts, while taking account of many views already put forward, do not include some of the more recent ones. A number of delegations have spoken in favour of features of the United Kingdom draft convention contained in document CCD/255/Rev.2.¹⁰ These, of course, have our whole-hearted support. We also see merit in some of the other suggestions and ideas already put forward. My delegation would, moreover, have no difficulty in taking into account the view expressed in the United Arab Republic working paper that there are instances when relations between States may make difficult a normal implementation of the procedures envisaged in article V of the new parallel texts.¹¹

70. Now I should like to turn to points not covered in the new texts. My delegation is still of the opinion that in a comprehensive convention dealing with biological warfare we should ensure that the parties undertake never, in any circumstances, to conduct, assist or permit research for purposes of the sort that are being prohibited under the draft convention. In this context I am glad to

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

¹¹ *Ante.*, p. 378.

note the support of the delegations of the United Arab Republic,¹² Pakistan,¹³ and the Netherlands.¹⁴ Such a provision will, in our view, be particularly important in a convention which as drafted now, rightly, we think, encourages under article IX the fullest possible exchange of information for the use of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes.

71. Members of the Committee know already of the interest of my delegation in the question of the prohibition of "use". It has always been the United Kingdom view that any convention we negotiate on biological weapons should be as comprehensive as possible. The differences between the scope of the provisions contained in the United Kingdom proposal CCD/255/Rev.2 and those contained in the present parallel drafts are perhaps most clearly illustrated by the difference between the titles of those two documents. The draft in CCD/255/Rev.2 is entitled "Revised draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare". This expresses the objective which the United Kingdom delegation feels the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should strive to achieve. The new drafts are confined to a "Draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction". This is a less ambitious objective.

72. The representative of the Soviet Union, in introducing the draft in Document CCD/337, said more than once that he wished to see the elaboration of a convention on the complete prohibition of bacteriological means of warfare. That is a position which my delegation is happy to support. In the same speech on 5 August Mr. Roshchin also stressed that the conclusion of a convention banning biological means of warfare and toxins for military purposes and providing for the elimination of their stockpiles would exclude the possibility of war with the use of those means.¹⁵ We can see the force of such an argument—to which I shall return shortly—and we agree entirely with the desirability of such an aim.

73. The United Kingdom delegation believes that an ideal convention on biological weapons should include an article providing for the express renunciation by all parties of the use of such means of warfare. A number of my colleagues have expressed the contrary view, arguing that such a provision is inappropriate to the sort of convention we are now trying to elaborate. Various arguments have been used.

74. The first argument has usually been that by repeating in the new draft convention an undertaking that is already enshrined in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 we should somehow detract from the significance of the existing prohibition prescribed by that Proto-

¹² CCD/PV.516, p. 9.

¹³ CCD/PV.519, p. 13.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 452.

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 463.

col. This I find totally unconvincing. Under the Geneva Protocol the parties promise not to do certain things in specified circumstances. One of these promises is not to use bacteriological methods of warfare. That promise was made in circumstances in which nothing was said about the preparation of such methods of warfare. The new convention which we are seeking to elaborate goes further, by providing for agreement not to prepare those methods of warfare. It is entirely relevant to repeat the earlier promise in an instrument to which it is wholly germane.

75. I can think of no other instance where repetition in a new international instrument of a promise made in an earlier one has been held to invalidate the earlier one. Indeed, I have some evidence that this view is shared by the Government of the Soviet Union. Perhaps the Committee will allow me to illustrate this. In the Treaty on the peaceful use of outer space of 27 January 1967, article IV reads, in part, as follows:

States Parties to the Treaty undertake not to place in orbit around the Earth any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction, install such weapons on celestial bodies—[I repeat the phrase “install such weapons on celestial bodies”]—or station such weapons in outer space in any other manner.¹⁶

76. Now, I am quite certain that it is not the intention or desire of the Soviet Government—as it most certainly is not that of Her Majesty’s Government—to cast any doubt on the validity of that Treaty. But the Soviet Government finds it in no way inconsistent to repeat part of the undertaking, the part I read twice, in a proposed fresh instrument; for in the Soviet draft entitled “Treaty Concerning the Moon”, attached as an annex to General Assembly document A/8391 of 4 June, will be found in article II, paragraph 2 the following:

States Parties undertake not to place in orbit around the Moon any objects carrying nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction or to install such weapons on the surface of the Moon or in its subsoil.¹⁷

I repeat “or to install such weapons on the surface of the Moon or in its subsoil”.

77. I believe we all agree that the Moon is a celestial body.

78. The next argument we have heard is that by repeating the undertaking in the Geneva Protocol not to use bacteriological methods of warfare, and by not at the same time repeating the other undertaking, namely, not to use certain chemical methods of warfare—which would in any case not be relevant to a biological-weapons convention—one would somehow weaken the earlier obligation. This too I find quite unconvincing. We note that article VII of the new parallel drafts states that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. That is so clear that there can be no question of detracting. And, if I may say so, I think it should set at rest the anxiety which the

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38-43.

¹⁷ *Ante*, p. 301.

representative of Poland seemed to be expressing at one point in his statement today.

79. I should like to illustrate the point I am making by taking a more homely parallel. Surely, if a man on the occasion, say, of his marriage, promises publicly not to beat his wife and also not to starve her, and if, years later, in a discussion on corporal punishment, he reiterates positively that he would not in any circumstances beat his wife, then no one suspects, far less supposes, that he intends to start starving her the next day.

80. The third argument advanced is that under a biological-weapons convention we shall undertake not to develop, produce, possess or acquire biological means of warfare and the attendant ancillary equipment; therefore we shall not be in a position to use these things, and accordingly it is superfluous to say that we shall not use them. As I indicated earlier, I confess that this has an undoubted appeal as an argument of pure logic. It is, however, important to note that neither the United Kingdom draft in CCD/255/Rev. 2, nor the new parallel drafts, would in any way prevent the production and stockpiling of biological agents for peaceful purposes. Article X of the parallel drafts, indeed, offers positive encouragement to this.

81. Under these drafts, however, I am advised that legally the reservations to the Geneva Protocol will continue to subsist, conferring a legally-valid international right to retaliatory use of the weapons we are discussing by those who have made reservations of this nature. If this legal entitlement subsists, then there is bound to be a risk that other parties to the new biological-weapons convention we are negotiating might become suspicious and fearful of what would otherwise be quite innocent activities. This, in turn, might lead to a weakening of the convention. It is rather the failure to enunciate the repudiation of all use of these weapons completely than its reiteration that would detract from the significance of the existing prohibition prescribed by the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

82. I believe I am not alone in this interpretation of the position. In his statement of 29 July the representative of the Netherlands drew attention to the views of his delegation in favour of including a provision containing a clear expression of the will of the parties to ban the use for hostile purposes of biological weapons.¹⁸ The representative of Italy stated on 29 April that an agreement which did not envisage the prohibition of use would leave doubts as to its validity in all circumstances.¹⁹ Likewise the representative of Nigeria, on 20 July, urged the view that a comprehensive biological-weapons convention offered a useful opportunity for mending the hole in the Geneva Protocol left by the reservations regarding the right to use biological weapons in

¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 450.

¹⁹ CCD/PV.512, pp. 6-7.

certain circumstances.²⁰ From what I have heard this morning I believe I am right in thinking that the representative of Canada is sympathetic to that point of view.

83. My delegation would like to draw one other consideration to the attention of the Committee. It is important to take account of the effect of what we are doing now in the field of biological weapons on the chemical-weapons agreement for which we shall be committed to work. We must therefore think about what we are doing on biological weapons in a chemical-weapons context. For chemical weapons, because of the nature of some of the possible agents concerned, which are normal industrial chemicals and which could not be eliminated by a convention on the prohibition of production and possession of chemical weapons, use of chemical weapons would have to be carefully and effectively covered. Surely, then, in an instrument on biological weapons, which so many delegations have stressed are linked to chemical weapons both in the Geneva Protocol and in many other ways, we should take care to consider the precedents we are setting.

84. My delegation has of course noted with interest and appreciation that the second preambular paragraph of the new drafts contains a reference to the desire of all the parties "for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons". We welcome this paragraph as a major step in the right direction and consider that it is entirely right that this aim should find its appropriate place in the draft convention we are seeking to elaborate.

85. Verification of a draft convention on biological weapons is a subject that continues to interest many members of the Committee. It is that aspect of arms-control agreements that traditionally has been dealt with at this stage in negotiations. My delegation has spoken on previous occasions of the advantages of a procedure that is prompt, impartial and effective, and which takes place prior to political consideration. In this connexion we have noted that on 29 July the representative of the Netherlands drew attention to the number of speakers who had already urged the separation of the functions of investigation and political judgement.²¹ He instanced himself and the representatives of Nigeria, Sweden, Brazil, Italy and Argentina.

86. The United Kingdom delegation has from the outset stressed the significance of verification of use and the great importance of including in a biological-weapons convention a procedure for verification of use. On a previous occasion my delegation has drawn attention to the effectiveness of such a procedure for verification of use in deterring violations of the

²⁰ CCD/PV.522, p. 9.

²¹ *Ante*, p. 451.

provisions on development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons and on their destruction.²² It seems to me that it is only by investigation of complaints of use that we can be certain of establishing a procedure that will be both speedy and relatively easy to carry out.

87. The reason for this is that a complaint of use would be lodged by a State that considered it had been the victim of an attack. The evidence it would offer would in all probability include direct examination on its own territory. Allegations of a breach of the other bans would almost certainly have to be based on extra-territorial evidence. But evidence of use—I repeat, by direct examination on the territory of the complaining State, not on that of the State complained against—would provide very strong evidence that another State had violated the ban on the production and possession of biological weapons in order to be able to use them.

88. Yet a further advantage of such a procedure would lie in the reduced opportunities for false accusations backed by insufficient evidence. It is not too difficult to imagine a situation in which a State might accuse another of breaking, for example, the ban on production but without being able to produce evidence to justify such an accusation. In such circumstances recriminations and a hostile atmosphere might easily be engendered. We ought to be negotiating to eliminate the risk of this sort of thing.

89. The representative of Sweden seemed to me to have something of the same sort in mind when on 27 July, speaking on the subject of the comprehensive test ban, she referred to the desirability of “a step-wise . . . sequence of inquiries and exchanges of information”, only finally enforced through the “now generally-accepted complaints procedure of recourse to the Security Council of the United Nations.”²³ In the case of biological weapons I would venture to suggest that the procedure we have outlined for verification of allegations of use might be more appropriate than the model of verification by invitation. But I too would like to think that such a provision separating the fact-finding stage from the stage of political consideration by the Security Council had become hallowed by our experience in negotiating treaties, and that it will find its place in the draft eventually commended to the General Assembly by this Committee.

90. Turning now to the third component of the complex of provisions covering use that appear in the draft contained in document CCD/255/Rev.2, namely, assistance to victims, I should like to record that the United Kingdom delegation continues to agree with the delegations of the Netherlands, Italy, Argentina, Morocco and Nigeria, which have urged its insertion in a future convention. I should also like to comment on the points raised by

²² CCD/PV.510, pp. 6 ff.

²³ *Ante*, p. 444.

the representative of Nigeria on 20 July.²⁴ He asked for clarification of the words "appropriate assistance" in article IV of the United Kingdom draft. In our view this term should be understood primarily as meaning action of a medical or relief nature to assist the victim. Furthermore, in order to make the purpose quite clear, we should be ready, if this is the general wish, to consider amending the wording of the article on this matter to make it clear that such assistance would be at the request of the offended party.

91. Before completing my remarks today I should like to take up the invitation extended by the representative of the United States when he asked for the views of delegations as to when it was desirable that a biological-weapons convention should enter into force.²⁵ The United Kingdom delegation agrees that such an instrument should enter into effect as soon as possible, and that therefore the number of ratifications required to bring it into force should be relatively few.

92. In conclusion I should like to say that I believe we now have before the Committee a draft which contains much of what the United Kingdom delegation would like to see in an ideal convention on biological methods of warfare. Those provisions that have been covered are, in my view, in all their essentials satisfactory. There will none the less need to be some touching-up work done; and, as I have attempted to indicate, I believe there will need to be some additions to take account of the views of other delegations. Some of those have, of course, already been put forward. It has been my purpose in speaking today to put forward United Kingdom comments at as early a date as possible. I hope that the comments of other delegations which may wish to speak will be forthcoming very soon, so that we can speedily reach agreement on a draft which we as a Committee shall commend to the United Nations General Assembly this autumn.

Interview Between Chou En-lai and James Reston [Extract], August 10, 1971¹

May I ask you, sir, how you view the control of nuclear arms? You are now one of the nuclear powers.

Mr. Chou—No, we are not a nuclear power. We are only in the experimental stage. And what is more, that has been the case throughout the period from 1964 to the present, seven years already. We will not test when there is no need. We know it is quite expensive and a waste. And it is not beneficial to the improvement of the livelihood of the people.

²⁴ CCD/PV.522, p. 11.

²⁵ *Ante*, p. 472.

¹ *New York Times*, Aug. 10, 1971, p. 15.

It is quite clear, we can see, that the two big powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, having embarked on the mass production of nuclear weapons—cannot get down from the horse, so to speak. But can they thereby monopolize nuclear weapons. No, they cannot.

We produced nuclear weapons by ourselves. We manufacture nuclear weapons because we are forced to do so in order to break the nuclear monopoly. And our aim is the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. And so every time we make a test, we declare that we will never be the first to use nuclear weapons. You will see what we Chinese say counts.

Mr. Reston—Do you want to see a world conference on this question? How can this ghastly problem be solved when the world is now spending about \$220-billion a year on arms. It is a disgrace to the intelligence of the human family. What are we to do about this question, and what can China do to help?

Mr. Chou—We do not agree with the Soviet proposal for a conference of the five nuclear powers.² They want to lasso us by that means. We have expressed our disapproval,³ Britain said that she would not take part in the conference, and France too now says that she would not take part either.

We are calling for the convening of a conference of all countries of the world, big or small—because all the countries of the world, regardless of their size, should be equal—for the purpose of reaching an agreement on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as a first step, on the nonuse of nuclear weapons. Once everyone agrees on the nonuse of nuclear weapons then what will be the need for the production of nuclear weapons?

Mr. Reston—Why do you use the word “lasso”?

Mr. Chou—When I said “lasso,” it means if they want to drag us into such an affair. They will, first of all, demand that we sign on the partial nuclear test ban treaty,⁴ on the nonproliferation treaty⁵ and so on. How can we sign them?

But we undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The people of the world have indeed noted the fact that these two big powers are using so much money on nuclear weapons. Your Defense Secretary, Laird, himself admits that with so many nuclear weapons it is not possible for the United States and the Soviet Union to fight a nuclear war. The two peoples will oppose such a war.

Mr. Reston—True.

Mr. Chou—Since you do not want to have a nuclear war, then the United States and the Soviet Union should first undertake forthrightly that neither of them will be the first to use nuclear

² *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

³ See *ante*, pp. 453-455.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

weapons, and then to go on to the next business. Because by reaching such an agreement, people will feel at ease. Secretary Laird said, now the U.S. should be prepared for conventional warfare. So Laird is telling Japan to strengthen the modernization of conventional weapons in Japan.

Tripartite Draft Security Council Resolution Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and Toxins, August 10, 1971⁶

The Security Council,

Highly appreciating the desire of a large number of States to subscribe to the Convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction,

Bearing in mind that under article . . . of the Convention the States Parties shall have the right to lodge complaints with the Security Council together with a request for their consideration by the Council,

Recognizing the need for the adoption of appropriate measures with a view to ensuring the observance of the obligations contained in the Convention,

Taking into consideration the desire of the States Parties to co-operate with the Security Council for the purpose of ensuring the strict observance of the obligations contained in the Convention,

1. Declares its readiness:

—to consider immediately any complaints lodged under article . . . of the Convention,

—to take all necessary measures for the investigation of a complaint,

—to inform the States Parties to the Convention of the result of the investigation;

2. *Calls upon* all States Parties to the Convention to co-operate for the purpose of implementing the provisions of this resolution.

Statement by the Canadian Representative (Ignatieff) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 10, 1971¹

Today I should like to offer some comments of a preliminary

⁶ CCD/339, Aug. 10, 1971. The draft resolution was submitted by Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland.

¹ CCD/PV.528, pp. 5-8.

character on the agreed and parallel drafts of the treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons of warfare, which were submitted on 5 August by the delegation of the United States of America and by the delegation of the Soviet Union together with a group of socialist countries.²

4. As the representative of the United States noted in his statement in presenting the draft,³ the text which has now emerged owes much to the proposals originally put forward by your predecessor, Sir, on behalf of the delegation of the United Kingdom on 10 July 1969 in document ENDC/255,⁴ and later amended in documents ENDC/255/Rev.1⁵ and CCD/255/Rev.2⁶ in August 1969 and August 1970. I believe that the delegation of the United Kingdom is to be commended for having just over two years ago demonstrated the foresight regarding progress on arms control and disarmament which has led to the present hopeful situation in this Conference.

5. As the Canadian delegation, on 31 July 1969, was among the first of those which welcomed the United Kingdom initiative and urged that negotiations on proposals to seek agreement on the prohibition of biological weapons should be pressed forward while consideration of the problems involved in a ban on chemical weapons should proceed concurrently,⁷ we naturally welcome the fact that both co-Chairmen have now come to share this view.

6. I should therefore like to commend also the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States of America for the effort they expended in bringing before us an agreed draft convention. The flexibility that has been shown by both augurs well for the conclusion of a draft convention by this Committee for presentation to the United Nations General Assembly this autumn. While there still remains unresolved the important issue of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, it now appears possible that we shall at least partially fulfil the obligations placed upon us by the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly in its request that we continue to search for results in the prohibition of both chemical and biological weapons.⁸

7. The draft convention now before us provides us, in the view of my delegation, with a sound basis for an international agreement. It has already taken into account some of the contributions of other delegations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament; and, after any other agreed amendments have been incorporated, this document should emerge as a

² *Ahte*, pp. 456-460.

³ *Ahte*, p. 467.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, p. 327.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 431-433.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

⁷ CCD/PV.424, pp. 6-8.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

significant arms-control treaty—indeed, as has been noted already, the first actual disarmament treaty we have had from this Committee.

8. The comments I wish to offer this morning are intended to be of a constructive character. Some of these points have been raised by other delegations; and we would hope to see a further examination of them in our discussions during the remainder of this session and at the United Nations General Assembly.

9. We continue to have some concern over the lack of any reference in the operative paragraphs of the treaty to the question of use. We have no desire to detract in any way from the importance of the Geneva Protocol,⁹ and indeed we share the desire of all other members here to strengthen and supplement that historic document. However, as the Committee is aware, most nations attached reservations to their ratification of the Protocol, making it for many parties a first-use prohibition only. Thus, with the draft convention under consideration prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons, and the Geneva Protocol being for many a first-use prohibition only, there remains for parties to both conventions the right of retaliatory use.

10. We appreciate that the right of retaliation is an academic one, or could be represented as such if the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons were prohibited; but it would nevertheless be, in our view, a more comprehensive and satisfactory approach if some reference were made in the operative paragraphs of the draft convention to prohibition of any use in any circumstances. Perhaps the most efficacious manner of dealing with this might be to incorporate into article VII of the draft before us some language which would render null and void for parties to this convention any reservations which they might have entered in the past with respect to the possible use of weapons prohibited under this draft convention.

11. We would also wish the Committee to examine further the question of verification, particularly with respect to allegations of use. As members are aware, this matter was covered in the draft convention placed before the Committee by the United Kingdom and supported by several delegations; and we believe that that approach merits further study. Would-be parties to the convention must be satisfied that verification procedures are both precise and adequate.

12. The Swedish delegation has made some interesting observations concerning the definition of toxins,¹⁰ and this term may not be as clear as we would wish in the draft as it stands before us. Technical expertise should be brought to bear on the question;

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 395-399.

and the matter of the definition of toxins should be resolved in order to avoid difficulties of interpretation at a later date.

13. Article II of the draft convention provides for the destruction of existing stocks of biological weapons and toxins within an agreed period of time. While we would not consider it desirable to incorporate at this stage any more detailed provision in the text of the treaty, some consideration should be given to ensuring that any nation now possessing biological weapons has in fact taken any required action to ensure conformity with the provisions of article II. That could be done by notification to depository Governments that any action required had been taken by the end of the period allotted for that purpose in the convention.

14. Several delegations have noted the need for a firm commitment to continue in good faith negotiations for the conclusion of a ban on the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons; and the delegation of Nigeria in particular has put forward some useful suggestions in this regard.¹¹ We consider, on balance, that the present language of the draft convention is adequate, provided that not only the letter but also the spirit is followed in continuing negotiations on chemical weapons. However, the Canadian delegation does not rule out the possibility of further improvements, if that is the consensus of the Committee. My delegation does not intend to reduce in any way its efforts to find solutions to the problems confronting us regarding the prohibition of agents of chemical warfare, and in particular the question of verification. We are hopeful and confident that other members of the Committee will do likewise.

Pakistani Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Underground Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, August 12, 1971^{1 2}

The relationship between an underground test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions has been recognized and often emphasized. In this context two considerations have to be borne in mind: first an underground test ban should not deprive the signatories of the benefits which may be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions. Second, and more important, an exception for peaceful nuclear explosions must not serve as a loophole permitting either the proliferation of nuclear weapons or as a means of conducting explosions for military purposes. This need arises from the fact that there is no difference between nuclear weapons and the so-called peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Hence a clause permitting peaceful nuclear explosions should be so worded that it

¹¹ CCD/PV.522, pp. 12-13.

¹² CCD/340, Aug. 12, 1971.

cannot be misconstrued to mean that it permits the conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions by non-nuclear-weapon States themselves. Accordingly, it is proposed that an underground test ban treaty should include, as in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,^{1 3} two kinds of provisions: one for the nuclear-weapon States, the other for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

2. As regards the nuclear-weapon States, the treaty should prohibit all underground nuclear weapon test explosions. They may, however, be permitted to conduct explosions which are carried out for construction or peaceful purposes only and which take place in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately, either as an independent agreement or as a protocol to a comprehensive test ban.

3. As regards non-nuclear-weapon States, the treaty should include a separate provision which would prohibit all underground explosions whether they are in the category of "weapon tests" or not. In other words, non-nuclear-weapon States must not conduct any kind of nuclear explosions whatsoever including peaceful nuclear explosions. Non-nuclear-weapon States may obtain the benefit of peaceful explosions conducted for them or on their behalf in accordance with the provisions of the international agreement referred to in paragraph 2 hereof.

4. Lastly, as it has been suggested that separate provisions should be included for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the category of such States has to be defined. It is, therefore, proposed that the following provision as the second sentence of paragraph 3 of Article IX of the Nuclear-Non-Proliferation Treaty, should be included in the proposed treaty:

For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1st January 1967.

Statement by the Pakistani Representative (Naik) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear Test Ban, August 12, 1971¹

It is almost eight years since the partial test-ban Treaty prohibiting nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was concluded in 1963.² In the preamble to the Treaty the signatories pledged that they would seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and stated that they were determined to continue negotiations to that end. It is depressing to note that the pledge given by the signatories, and especially by the three nuclear Powers parties to the Treaty, has not so far been redeemed. It is not the intention

^{1 3} *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹ CCD/PV.529, pp. 5-11.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

of my delegation to undertake an analysis of the factors which have prevented the achievement of a comprehensive test ban, which appeared to be in sight eight years ago; but it might be pertinent to offer comments on some of the generally-accepted and often repeated reasons for the lack of progress in this respect.

3. Ostensibly the main obstacle has been the lack of agreement on a system of verification for the strict and faithful implementation of the ban on underground tests. While one side insists that on-site inspection is a *sine qua non*, the other side maintains that national means of detection are sufficient to detect any violations of an underground test ban.

4. Many constructive and imaginative proposals have been offered to break this deadlock. In 1962 the Soviet Union proposed the use of automatic stations, or "black boxes", in addition to existing manned national means of detection.³ In 1965 Sweden proposed international co-operation for the detection of underground explosions by the exchange of seismic data, or the establishment of a "detection club".⁴ The following year Sweden proposed an arrangement generally referred to as "verification by challenge".⁵ In 1968 the United Kingdom proposed the establishment of a special committee to consider complaints about violations of an underground test-ban.⁶ Lastly, since 1969 the delegation of Canada has been pursuing the very interesting suggestion that seismological means of detection could provide an acceptable solution to this difficult problem.⁷ The representative of the Netherlands further elaborated that idea in his statement of 29 April.⁸

5. This list of proposals is by no means exhaustive and I have not mentioned some other equally interesting and constructive proposals and amendments to proposals. A close examination of the proposals and the discussions on them clearly affirms that the lack of progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban is not by any means due to lack of ideas, suggestions and definite proposals aimed at resolving the issue of verification. It is—it has to be concluded with regret—due to a lack of political will to resolve this issue.

6. It seems to us that the present is an auspicious time to launch efforts to create and strengthen the political will to achieve a comprehensive test ban through the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting underground nuclear tests; because an agreement has been reached at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) that the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union will concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the

³ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, p. 1153.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 390-393.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 130-139.

⁶ ENDC/232.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1970, pp. 390-393.

⁸ CCD/PV. 512, pp. 8 ff.

limitation of the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems and, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, the two sides will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. I need hardly mention that the agreement at SALT has a direct bearing on the issue of underground tests; and an effort to ban such tests, following it, should prove particularly fruitful since that agreement is evidence of the fact that the political will on both sides is now sufficiently strong to overcome the hitherto insurmountable difficulties relating to a verification system of an underground test ban.

7. It is generally accepted that another reason for the lack of progress with regard to a comprehensive test ban or an underground test ban is the fact that two of the nuclear Powers have not adhered to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and are continuing to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Consequently the other nuclear Powers, it is argued, cannot be expected to renounce the limited privilege of conducting underground tests. Several other members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have already expressed their feeling that they remain unconvinced by that argument. My delegation also shares that feeling for the following reasons.

8. First, as one nuclear Power—namely, the People's Republic of China—has never been associated with the negotiations which resulted in the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963, it is hardly surprising that it should find it impossible to adhere to it. Secondly, while the partial test-ban Treaty was being negotiated the views of another nuclear Power—namely, France—were not taken into consideration and, as a result, that Power has also not found it possible to sign it. Thirdly, pursuant to the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty, no special effort has been made to obtain the adherence of those two nuclear Powers except for the adoption of a number of resolutions by the United Nations General Assembly urging all States which had not done so to adhere to it without further delay. Fourthly, it has to be recognized that at the moment it is the balance of nuclear forces of the United States and the Soviet Union which determines the issue of war and peace. An agreement involving those two Powers on any measures relating to nuclear disarmament will be of decisive importance. It is therefore specially their responsibility to seek an agreement on an underground test ban.

9. Taking account of all those considerations, my delegation finds itself unable to accept the proposition that an underground test ban is not possible since two nuclear Powers are not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty. However, at the same time my delegation reiterates its position, indicated on many previous occasions, that the exclusion of the People's Republic of China from the disarmament negotiations and the denial of its legitimate right to represent China at the United Nations constitutes a self-created disability which must be eliminated forthwith. We

have no doubt that the restoration of its legitimate rights to the People's Republic of China at the United Nations and its inclusion in the disarmament negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other forums would facilitate general agreement on measures of nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban.

10. In this context my delegation wishes to express our satisfaction at the recent announcement by President Nixon that he will be visiting China some time before next spring. It is our assessment and hope that President Nixon's visit to China will be conducive to the normalization of relations between the two great Powers and will thus strengthen international peace and security. Equally important, it is our hope that the People's Republic of China will be enabled to represent China at the United Nations this coming fall, and that that great Asian and world nuclear Power will be able to participate in the disarmament negotiations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in other forums, thus making these negotiations more meaningful and facilitating the achievement of universally-acceptable agreements on measures of disarmament.

11. Many concrete proposals have been put forward since 1969 aimed at facilitating an agreement on an underground nuclear test ban. In 1969 Sweden submitted a working paper suggesting the possible provisions for a treaty banning underground tests.⁹ We also listened with close attention to Mrs. Myrdal's statement on 27 July in which she shared with us "some new ideas on the form and content of a possible treaty".¹⁰ My delegation has previously expressed its appreciation of the initiative taken by Sweden; and it remains our view that the Swedish working paper should serve as one of the basic documents. We have carefully examined that working paper and it is our view that there is some scope for improving, strengthening and clarifying its provisions. Accordingly my delegation has submitted a working paper¹¹ which relates to the Swedish working paper or to any revised version of it which may be submitted, as well as to any proposed draft treaty on the subject.

12. Often in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly the relationship between an underground test ban and peaceful nuclear explosions has been recognized and emphasized. In that context two considerations have to be borne in mind: first, an underground test ban should not deprive the signatories of the benefits which might be derived from peaceful nuclear explosions; second, and more important, an exception for peaceful nuclear explosions should not serve as a loophole which would permit the proliferation of nuclear

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 442.

¹¹ *Supra*.

weapons. While paragraph 3 of article I of a possible draft treaty on underground nuclear-weapon tests in the Swedish working paper takes into account the first consideration I have just mentioned, it does not deal specifically with the second consideration, only by implication. There is therefore a need to clarify that aspect of the issue in that draft treaty, as indeed in any other draft treaty which may be submitted on this subject.

13. I have just stated that it should be ensured, in any draft treaty banning underground tests, that an exception in it permitting peaceful nuclear explosions should not serve as a loophole which would permit the proliferation of nuclear-weapon States in particular and nuclear weapons in general. This need arises from the fact that there is no difference between nuclear weapons and the so-called peaceful nuclear explosive devices. Hence a clause permitting peaceful nuclear explosions should be so clear that it cannot be misconstrued to mean that it permits the conducting of peaceful nuclear explosions by non-nuclear-weapon States themselves. Accordingly my delegation proposes that an underground test-ban treaty should include, as in the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty,¹² two kinds of provisions, one for the nuclear-weapon States and the other for the non-nuclear-weapon States.

14. As regards the nuclear-weapon States, the treaty should prohibit all underground nuclear-weapon test explosions. They should be permitted, however, to conduct explosions which are carried out for construction or other peaceful purposes and which take place in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately. However, even while permitting such explosions, care has to be taken to ensure that such explosions are not a disguised form of the testing of nuclear weapons. In this context my delegation endorses the proposal referred to by the Netherlands representative in his statement on 29 April that peaceful nuclear explosions should be conducted with such nuclear explosive devices as had been tested before.¹³ It is our view that such a provision should be included also in the draft treaty.

15. As regards non-nuclear-weapon States, the treaty should include a separate provision which would prohibit all underground explosions whether or not they were in the category of weapon tests. In other words, non-nuclear-weapon States must not conduct any kind of nuclear explosions whatsoever, including peaceful nuclear explosions. Our working paper, however, clearly adds that those States—that is, non-nuclear-weapon States—may obtain the benefit of peaceful explosions conducted for them or on their behalf in accordance with the provisions of the international agreement mentioned in paragraph 2 of that working paper.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹³ CCD/PV. 512, p. 16.

16. Lastly, as it has been suggested that separate provisions should be included for nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, the category of such States has to be defined. We propose, therefore, that a provision be included in a draft treaty on underground tests having the same wording as the second sentence of paragraph 3 of article IX of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty, which reads as follows:

For the purpose of this Treaty, a nuclear-weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.

17. We hope that the working paper which we have submitted and the provisions of which I have just explained will commend itself to the members of the Committee and will prove to be useful in drafting a treaty on an underground test ban.

18. As regards the various other interesting and constructive suggestions put forward in this Committee, my delegation would like to explain briefly our position on one or two specific points. First, it is the view of my delegation that the proposed treaty should provide for the prohibition of all underground nuclear test explosions without any threshold, for we share the misgivings voiced by the representative of Sweden in this regard in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 4 May.¹⁴ Secondly, as to the nature of the agreement to be concluded, we support the suggestion that it should be a new agreement prohibiting underground tests only. In other words, no attempt should be made to reopen and renegotiate the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 in order to make it a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We endorse also the proposal that this new agreement should preferably be in the form of a protocol to the Moscow Treaty.

19. Before concluding, I would join once again those representatives who have so often reminded this Committee that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2663 B (XXV),¹⁵ requested this Committee to undertake two specific tasks: first, to continue as a matter of urgency its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests; and, second, to submit a special report to the next session of the General Assembly on this issue.

20. Whereas just about five weeks remain before the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly opens, we in this Committee have shown little effort to fulfil the earnest desire of an overwhelming majority of the Member States of the General Assembly. Time is running out for us in more ways than one. Not only shall we have to face the General Assembly within a few weeks, but also, as the representative of the United Arab Republic pointed out so aptly on 20 April:

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 264-265.

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 687.

... the non-nuclear-weapon States have a particular concern of their own in seeing a comprehensive test-ban agreement concluded, and concluded soon; since an increasing number of them are, or will be, reaching the stage of nuclear proficiency at which only a political decision is needed to turn them into nuclear-weapon States.¹⁶

A single such unfortunate decision by a non-nuclear-weapon State would demolish the entire edifice on which we have been endeavouring to build a complete and universal nuclear non-proliferation régime. Once that edifice crumbled, time would seem to become tragically irrelevant.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Tanaka) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, August 17, 1971¹

Our deliberations in this Committee on the question of banning chemical and biological weapons, one of the most urgent items before the present session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, are now entering a new stage with the submission of parallel texts of a draft convention on the banning of biological weapons and toxins by the United States and the socialist States on 5 August.² The Japanese delegation intends to present its views on those texts of the draft convention in the near future.

56. Today I should like to express my delegation's views on the question of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. It goes without saying that the realization of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is the crux of nuclear disarmament and the most important question imposed upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963.³ With a view to achieving the early solution of this problem, the United Nations General Assembly has requested on numerous occasions that this Committee should continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations concerning the banning of underground tests. The members of this Committee have also put forward many useful suggestions and proposals in formal and informal meetings of the Committee in order to facilitate its deliberations. To my great regret, however, we have not yet been able to achieve any satisfactory results in this regard.

57. I am convinced that it is high time for this Committee to renew its determination by making further efforts at this juncture to reach a solution of the problem of banning underground tests, which has been pending for many years, thereby enabling us to meet the expectations of the Members of the United Nations. It is undeniable that there exist many obstacles to the realization of the banning of underground tests. On the other hand, however, it

¹⁶ CCD/PV.509, p. 11.

¹ CCD/PV.530, pp. 20-25.

² *Ahite*, pp. 456-460.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

is true also that most of those obstacles have been gradually removed in recent years.

58. First of all, I should like to point to the marked progress of the *détente* which has developed lately between the United States and the Soviet Union, reflected in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). It can be said that the promising and concrete indication of progress discernible in those talks could imply that the political obstacles to the underground nuclear-test ban are now gradually diminishing. Although the SALT are aimed, as we understand it, for the time being primarily at the quantitative limitation of strategic nuclear weapons, they should in my view lead in the due course of time to qualitative limitations. Accordingly I feel strongly that the United States and the Soviet Union should intensify their efforts, in parallel with the SALT, to achieve a ban on underground tests, which serve the qualitative sophistication of nuclear weapons.

59. Secondly, I should like to draw attention to the objective circumstances which seem to indicate the possibility of our making substantial progress in the prohibition of underground tests. As we are all well aware, the United States and the Soviet Union have carried out numerous underground tests in the past. I venture to think that, from the point of view of discovery in the field of military technology, the law of diminishing returns is now applicable as a matter of general principle, in the case of underground tests.

60. Furthermore, I should also like to point to the progress which has been made in the field of verification techniques concerning underground tests since the conclusion of the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963. We believe that, in addition to the steady development of seismological means, the introduction of such methods as reconnaissance satellites and their combined use are now making it possible to improve our verification capability to a considerable degree. It is therefore our belief that this Committee should now embark as soon as possible upon a re-examination of concrete measures for the banning of underground tests, from a new angle and in accordance with the development of verification techniques.

61. In this connexion I should like to pay a high tribute to the contributions made by the delegations of Canada, Sweden and other States with regard to the solution of this problem. In addition to the submission during the spring session of 1969 of their working paper on a draft treaty on this subject,⁴ the delegation of Sweden put forward another concrete suggestion this session on 27 July, including the concept of a phasing-out period.⁵ I believe that such a useful contribution should provide another

⁴*Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 140-142.

⁵*Ante*, pp. 442-443.

important impetus and facilitate the deliberations on this question.

62. Also, the delegation of Canada has put forward this year realistic and flexible suggestions on a series of transitional measures, including advance notification of details of planned nuclear explosions, co-operation in detecting underground tests by seismological means, and measures to reduce testing and guard against its harmful effect on the environment.⁶ My delegation supports all those measures.

63. Needless to say, it would be most desirable for an agreement to be reached in the very near future with regard to the realization of the comprehensive and immediate prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. But, if it is difficult to achieve such an agreement in a single bound, I believe that we should take steps as a transitional measure for the reduction of underground tests, leading to the realization of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. This kind of step-by-step approach is by no means a peculiar one, applicable only to the question of a comprehensive test ban; it is the only feasible approach in any disarmament measure, whenever we are unable to agree on a comprehensive and immediate solution.

64. As I have stated above, we should implement those transitional measures as soon as possible as the first step towards the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests with a view to facilitating a substantial discussion in this Committee. To this end I should like to urge major nuclear-weapon States to reduce, either through unilateral action such as self-restraint or, if possible, through joint action based upon mutual understanding, the number and scale of underground tests, now being conducted so frequently, with particular emphasis on the high-yield tests detectable and identifiable by extraterritorial means. In the light of the remarkable progress in the field of verification techniques, as I mentioned earlier, the possibility of conducting clandestine underground tests which might jeopardize the present balance of nuclear deterrence is believed to be small; although it is not yet possible to detect and identify all the underground tests of low yield.

65. Accordingly, I believe that conditions have become ripe for an early implementation of measures to reduce underground tests. In this connexion I recall the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union at one time in the past adopted measures of self-restraint regarding their nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere. Unfortunately those measures of self-restraint did not last long. However, in my view, objective situations with regard to this question have changed greatly compared with the cold-war days. Furthermore, the reduction of underground tests by the major nuclear-weapon States, together with progress in the Strategic

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 205-208.

Arms Limitation Talks, would not only contribute to increasing the sense of security in the world, but also constitute an important step towards our ultimate objective of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

66. Since our ultimate objective is to achieve the realization of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, I deem it necessary that this Committee pursue active negotiations for a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, while implementing transitional measures which would lead us closer to our goal. In this connexion there is no doubt that the nuclear-weapon States themselves, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, possess much pertinent material and information relating to the science and technology of verification, which is the key to the realization of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We hope, therefore, that the United States and the Soviet Union, which provide the co-Chairmen of this Committee, will make active contributions to the formulation of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, taking into account the many useful proposals on this question so far submitted to this Committee. Furthermore, mindful of the fact that in the past the co-Chairmen have submitted draft treaties to this Committee during the course of our negotiations on other important disarmament measures, we feel it appropriate that the United States and the Soviet Union should make similar efforts in this direction.

67. With regard to the question of verification, we are all aware that the United States maintains the position that adequate on-site inspection is necessary; while the Soviet Union insists that verification could be based solely on national means. However, I recall in this connexion that both the United States and the Soviet Union have made various concrete proposals in the past on the question of verification; and that their positions have drawn closer to one another on such matters as the installation of "black boxes", the number of on-site inspections, and so on. Accordingly we earnestly hope that, in the light of the progress in science and technology since achieved, the United States and the Soviet Union will now put forward concrete proposals relating to the question of verification with a view to harmonizing their respective positions on that question.

68. In this connexion we should like to point out that the scientific and technological information and material available to this Committee in its deliberations on the question of verification have come mainly from public statements or published material of Western countries. I hope that, in order to make our deliberations more fruitful, all militarily-important States will co-operate more actively in providing relevant information on that question.

69. Finally, I should like to express my sincere hope that these nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the partial test-ban Treaty will co-operate positively in realizing the reduction of

nuclear-weapon tests and the final goal of a comprehensive test ban. At the same time it is not appropriate, in my view, to make the participation of all nuclear-weapon States a precondition for the negotiation of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; and I am convinced that the initiative taken at this juncture by the major nuclear-weapon States on this question will serve to meet the expectations of world public opinion and will create a climate for the realization of the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests to be observed by all the nuclear-weapon States.

Eleven Nation Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Suggestions on Desirable Changes in the Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 17, 1971¹

Pursuant to the Resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations regarding the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,² as well as the Joint Memorandum of the Group of Twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament concerning the basic approach in regard to the treatment of the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons,³ which was commended by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its Resolution 2662 (XXV),⁴ and in view of the present state of negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, whereby the prohibition of only bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction seems to be now possible, the eleven countries submit the following suggestions for consideration and acceptance by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. However they take no stand at the present stage of negotiations on the need and desirability for any further suggestions that might be submitted by its members, individually or jointly.

A. PREAMBLE

1. In paragraph one:

- (i) *add* the words "chemical and" before the word "bacteriological".
- (ii) *delete* the words "and toxins intended for use as weapons".

¹ CCD/341, Aug. 17, 1971. The paper was submitted by Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the UAR, and Yugoslavia. The draft convention appears *ante*, pp. 456-460.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 716-717.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 453-455.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

2. In paragraph two:
 - (i) *add* the words "chemical and" before the word "bacteriological".
 - (ii) *delete* the words "and toxins".
3. In paragraph three:
 - (i) *add* the words "chemical and" before the word "bacteriological".
 - (ii) *delete* the words "immense", "urgent" and "and toxins".
4. In paragraph five:
 - (i) *add* the words "chemistry and" before the word "bacteriology".
5. *Redraft* paragraph six so that it reads as follows:

Recognizing that the application of scientific knowledge in the field of chemistry and bacteriology (biology) for weapons purposes would increase the risk of the use of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

6. *Move* the paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 at the beginning of the preamble, so that they become paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 respectively.

7. *Redraft* paragraph eleven so that it reads as follows:

Recognizing that an agreement on the elimination of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures for complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end.

8. *Insert* a new paragraph twelve which would read as follows:

Affirming the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

B. OPERATIVE PART

9. At the end of Article V *add* the following paragraph:

Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

10. *Redraft* Article VIII so that it reads as follows:

Each State Party to this Convention accepts the principle of complete prohibition of chemical weapons and undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and on their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

11. At the end of Para. 1 of Article IX *add* following sentence:

Parties to the Convention shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

Statement by the Italian Representative (Caracciolo) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 19, 1971¹

I should like today to make known the views of my delegation on the draft treaty prohibiting biological weapons and toxins contained in the two parallel texts presented on 5 August by the United States and by the Soviet Union jointly with other socialist countries.²

3. In my statement on 10 August I congratulated our co-Chairmen upon the realism and sense of responsibility which they showed in reaching a common agreement which could make our future work easier.³ Our analysis of the new draft has confirmed that it constitutes a very useful basis for constructive negotiations. As far as we are concerned, I should like to add that it has taken into account, on several points, comments made previously by the Italian delegation.

4. Of course, this draft must be further improved before a text can be produced which can meet our aims adequately. It seems to us that the work of touching up the present provisions of the draft ought not to present major difficulties. A number of delegations, moreover, have already raised points which in their opinion call for changes. For my part I should like especially to concentrate my statement today upon a problem for which, it seems to me, no adequate solutions have yet been proposed although it has been the subject of a number of statements during this session—namely, the problem of verification.

5. This problem is all the more important because the draft provides for the complete cessation of current activities and the destruction of existing means: in this sense the treaty under discussion would be, as has been rightly emphasized, the first measure of actual disarmament yet adopted. Consequently we must not underestimate the value as a precedent which the verification system chosen for this treaty would have in relation to other disarmament agreements which we hope to conclude, in particular that concerning chemical weapons.

6. It would also have to be borne in mind that a truly effective verification system could be used either for applying the provisions prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons—for instance, those in the draft treaty which we are studying—or for keeping watch at the same time for violations of the Geneva Protocol's express prohibition of the use of biological weapons.⁴ The verification procedure could even be set

¹ CCD/PV.531, pp. 5-10.

² *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

³ CCD/PV.528, p. 8.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

on foot under this treaty by a complaint of the use of biological weapons, because such use would be by itself conclusive evidence that a certain production had continued or that certain stocks had not been destroyed and that the treaty had therefore been violated.

7. For solving the problem of verification the new draft merely gives in its article VI a right to complain to the Security Council. It seems, therefore, that insufficient account has been taken of the anxiety that gave rise to the provision in the United Kingdom draft for intervention by another organ which could use its own functions to secure an impartial preliminary examination of the complaint.⁵ I have already, in my statement of 29 April, expressed certain doubts of the wisdom of relying exclusively on the action of the Security Council, which might be paralysed at the moment of decision by the veto of a permanent member.⁶

8. Consideration of the objective requirements of a system of verification has led us to the following observations which I should like to bring to the attention of the Committee.

9. It seems to us that, in order to tackle the problem in a realistic way, we must base ourselves upon one essential consideration: that violations that required verification would not always—at least *prima facie*—look like an act or situation justifying an immediate recourse to the Security Council as if there were a threat to international peace and security.

10. One example will be sufficient to support that argument. Article IX of the draft treaty authorizes the development, production, use and exchange of biological agents and toxins for peaceful purposes and seeks to promote international co-operation based upon those activities. A similar authorization is implicit in article I. Let us suppose that a contracting party wishes to show that a certain cycle of production, a certain type of research or an exchange of material carried out under article IX had military purposes. It is then necessary, of course, to verify the observance of the treaty. But an immediate intervention of the Security Council on a complaint based upon mere suspicion might trigger a political conflict before any technical inquiry into the nature of the activities complained of had shown the international scope and possible repercussions of the case.

11. It would therefore be desirable to provide in the procedure a verification phase allowing such an inquiry to be carried out by an impartial organ before recourse to the supreme political authority. Otherwise there would be a risk of giving all disputes relating to the implementation of the treaty a political character.

12. It could be claimed that the Security Council can itself order a technical investigation of the facts forming the basis of a complaint. Of course the Security Council could use the powers

⁵*Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

⁶CCD/PV.512, p. 7.

conferred upon it by article VI of the draft treaty and take such a decision; but such decisions would inevitably be affected by the political reactions which would be provoked by the investigation of each complaint. Consequently, if no organ were specifically designated by the treaty to carry out technical inquiries, the Security Council might in each case request a different organ to carry out the necessary inquiry; thus the inquiries might not be based on uniform criteria, although uniformity of criteria would be necessary in order to prevent different interpretations of similar cases, which would weaken the credibility of the treaty.

13. It seems to me, therefore, that those preliminary reflections confirm the necessity, which has moreover been emphasized by various delegations, for the establishment of a real distinction between the function of inquiry and the intervention of the Security Council, and hence to provide for them two distinct phases in the procedure. Several delegations have suggested, in order to meet that need, that the procedure indicated in the new draft should be amplified by a formula similar to that adopted in article III, paragraph 5, of the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed which provides for the use of "appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter".⁷

14. That suggestion undoubtedly improves on the present wording of the draft; but we think it could be made still clearer. In fact, a text phrased in general terms would have the not inconsiderable drawback that it would almost be necessary to await the first violation of the treaty before deciding on the appropriate international procedure. In other words, that wording would leave open the question of the procedure to be applied in each specific situation.

15. Such a scheme might have been justified for the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed, because there was no organ in that sphere to which the technical duties of verifying the application of the Treaty could have been allotted in advance. Where, however, the treaty covers an area where organs of that type already exist, it appears to me logical to explore the possibility of using them systematically for the verification procedure.

16. It seems to us, therefore, that the most constructive way of tackling our problem would be to see whether there exists in the biological sphere a technically-qualified international organ which might in some way be linked with the mechanism of verification. Perhaps the World Health Organization might be that organ. Because of its prestige and its institutional vocation, it might help to apply the treaty with the necessary objectivity and competence. In this connexion it seems to me that, as a result of the agreement it has concluded with the United Nations under Article 57 of the

⁷ *Ante*, p. 9.

Charter, the World Health Organization has already established with the United Nations links of co-operation which could be used in the way we suggest. Of course, the possibilities of intervention by the World Health Organization cannot exceed the limits fixed for its institutional activities. A procedure authorizing and regulating recourse to the World Health Organization under the treaty on biological weapons should take account of that requirement.

17. For the moment I will merely put forward this idea for reflection. If the Committee were interested in it, the Italian delegation would be happy to collaborate in the drafting of concrete proposals.

18. I should like now to turn for a moment to a specific problem raised by article IX of the new draft, the content of which seems to us on the whole very positive, as I have already emphasized in an earlier statement.

19. Certain biological research aimed at protecting the civilian population and thus authorized by article IX is carried out in some countries by services formally linked to the military administration. If we give too restrictive an interpretation to the present wording of this article, we shall risk hampering that activity. In order to avoid that risk we should like to make a slight amendment to the present text. To be more precise, in the three passages of the article in which the words "for peaceful purposes" or "in the field of peaceful . . . activities" occur we suggest adding either the words "and for protection" or the words "and for civilian defence".

20. I should like now to put forward certain considerations on the relationship between the Geneva Protocol and the treaty which we are now drafting. In submitting their new draft the co-Chairmen emphasized that its object was to strengthen the Geneva Protocol;⁸ this is confirmed, moreover, by article VII and various paragraphs of the preamble. Since, however, the new draft does not contain a specific prohibition of the use of biological weapons, a doubt could subsist, at least in form, about the maintenance of the reservations to the Geneva Protocol and in particular of those concerning the right of reprisal.

21. We understand very well the logic of the reasoning according to which the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons would tend to make their use practically impossible and consequently to ensure, implicitly and despite those reservations, a total application of the ban imposed by the Geneva Protocol. Nevertheless, we deem it desirable that the purpose of prohibition of the use of biological weapons should be clearly stated in the new treaty. We therefore obviously appreciate the inclusion of the second paragraph of the preamble in the draft. Nevertheless, we would suggest that, in

⁸ See *ante*, pp. 461 ff.

order to state this purpose even more clearly, the following words should be added after the words "as weapons" at the end of that paragraph: "thus reinforcing the prohibition already contained in the Geneva Protocol".

22. Lastly, there is another point which I should like to stress. The new draft does not contain any commitment to assist signatory States suffering from violation of the treaty. That is a commitment which, in our opinion, the contracting parties must undertake even under a treaty which does not specifically prohibit the use of biological weapons. Consequently we think that a provision similar to that in article IV of the United Kingdom draft could be written into the draft under discussion, with the changes of wording which the new context might make necessary.

23. I hope that the problems to which I have referred and our suggestions will be considered favourably by the Committee as our work continues.

24. In my statement on 10 August I expressed the hope that the efforts made by the authors of the parallel texts would be completed by the constructive action of the other delegations.⁹ It is precisely in that spirit that I have today submitted my delegation's contribution to the common task in the hope that it will help in the final revision of the draft treaty on biological weapons.

Statement by the Moroccan Representative (Khattabi) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 19, 1971¹

On 5 August our co-Chairmen, Mr. Roshchin of the Soviet Union and Mr. Leonard of the United States of America, submitted for our consideration two identical draft conventions on the complete prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons and on their destruction. One of those drafts (CCD/337) was submitted by nine socialist countries, six of which are members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the other (CCD/338) by the delegation of the United States of America.²

33. The submission of those two agreed and parallel texts is a significant event in itself, illustrating the spirit of good will that has animated the sponsors in their search for possible and acceptable solutions to problems of disarmament. I should like therefore to congratulate the co-Chairmen, as well as the other co-sponsors of document CCD/337, on the result of their efforts, which has now provided us with a reasonable basis for negotiations aimed at eliminating, by successive and uninterrupted stages,

⁹ CCD/PV.528, p. 11.

¹ CCD/PV.531, pp. 13-16.

² *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

bacteriological and chemical weapons, both of which have been condemned by the international conscience and by a number of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

34. My delegation has noted with satisfaction that those two documents have incorporated a considerable number of important suggestions made by certain delegations, at the same time drawing to the best advantage on the draft convention submitted last year by the United Kingdom delegation.³ Those suggestions are reflected in articles I, II, III and IV, and in article XII which contains a withdrawal clause.

35. By covering agents, weapons, equipment and means of delivery the present text of article I establishes more clearly and broadly the scope of the prohibition, by requiring the parties to undertake not to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain the prohibited items. I would emphasize that the expression "or retain" is a new and important feature, which would end all possibility of the use of bacteriological means of warfare.

36. The new feature of article II is, first, that it stresses the need to eliminate bacteriological and toxin weapons as rapidly as possible from military arsenals; and secondly that it prescribes the adoption of all necessary precautionary measures for the protection of the population and the environment. Nevertheless, this provision calls for two comments from us. First, our delegation believes that the international community ought to be informed by States parties to the treaty which possess bacteriological and toxin weapons as soon as they begin the destruction of those weapons. Notice of that operation might be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Secondly, my delegation believes that the term "population" appearing in the sixth line of article II should be in the plural—"populations"—; because in reality, when the provisions of that article are executed, the necessary precautionary measures should be taken to protect not only the population of the country possessing bacteriological means of warfare but also the populations of other countries that might be exposed to contamination, in view of the unpredictable manner in which microbiological agents are disseminated.

37. Moreover, article III of the two parallel texts reinforces and appropriately complements the prohibitions so as to forbid the proliferation of bacteriological and toxin means of warfare.

38. Article IV in its present form is highly pertinent in providing for national control measures likely to increase confidence between States parties to the treaty that they are willing to respect the obligations they assume under it.

39. My delegation fully appreciates the efforts that have improved certain paragraphs of the preamble and many provisions of the operative part of the parallel drafts, but believes that, in

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

order to achieve a consensus by which a broadly-agreed text could be submitted to the next session of the United Nations General Assembly, it would be necessary to take into account as far as possible other suggestions made by delegations which have been inspired by resolutions of the General Assembly relating to the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

40. My delegation, like many others, attaches considerable importance to preservation of the links between the elimination of bacteriological and toxin weapons and of chemical weapons. Unfortunately we have noted that the two parallel texts do not satisfactorily meet that major concern. The reference in the eleventh preambular paragraph and in article VIII to continuing negotiations on measures for prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons does not in fact go beyond the stage of a simple declaration of intention, which cannot replace a formal commitment to recognize the principle of such a prohibition and to continue negotiations with a view to reaching agreement on this question as soon as possible. In that connexion document CCD/341, submitted by eleven delegations including my own, contains in our view very useful suggestions capable of filling the gaps which still exist in the constant search for effective measures for the elimination by successive stages of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare.⁴

41. My delegation, moreover, has noted with regret that the reference in the tenth preambular paragraph to resolutions of the United Nations relating to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons has been changed in a way which makes it incomplete, in fact unnecessary. We understand the reasons that led the sponsors of the two texts to draft the paragraph in its present form; but it is difficult to imagine such a diminished and minute version of the body of important resolutions on this subject adopted by the General Assembly. For that reason I should like to propose an amendment of the tenth preambular paragraph to read as follows:

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has on several occasions condemned all acts contrary to the principles and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.

That wording seems to us closer to reality. It also takes into account the different positions taken with regard to the decisions adopted unanimously by the United Nations.

42. In my statement of 6 May I said on behalf of my delegation that

... the existence of an agreement prohibiting the development, manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons and of toxins ... would render purposeless the reservations made to the Geneva Protocol concerning the use of bacteriological weapons.⁵ It is thus to be hoped that the Powers directly interested will give us their opinion on this ... question.⁶

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 277-278.

In this connexion we noted with great interest that Mr. Ignatieff, the representative of Canada, put forward a pertinent suggestion in his statement on 10 August when he said:

Perhaps the most efficacious manner of dealing with this might be to incorporate into article VII of the draft before us some language which would render null and void for parties to this convention any reservations which they might have entered in the past with respect to the possible use of weapons prohibited under this draft convention.⁷

In our opinion that suggestion deserves the Committee's close attention.

43. Of article VII of the parallel drafts of the convention I will venture to say that it could prove a two-edged sword, since the Geneva Protocol is accompanied by reservations forming an integral part of it. Article VII could thus give rise to erroneous interpretations according to which the reservations entered to the Protocol would remain valid.

44. I should like also to draw the attention of the Committee to a pertinent proposal which has its origin in article IV of the United Kingdom draft convention. My delegation believes that the convention on the total prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins must provide for the furnishing of the appropriate humanitarian assistance to a State party which so requests and is exposed by another State, in violation of the provisions of the convention, to danger resulting from deliberate use or accidental or chance dissemination of bacteriological agents or toxins intended for military purposes.

45. Furthermore, my delegation has studied carefully a proposal put forward by the Swedish delegation in the statement made on 20 July by Mrs. Myrdal, the representative of Sweden. Accordingly my delegation supports the Swedish suggestion to the effect that—

Before the words "or toxins" there should be a comma . . . and thereafter the following could be inserted: 'whatever their origin or mode of preparation'.⁸

46. In conclusion, may I reiterate a suggestion which I made during my statement on 6 May? That suggestion is that there should be an understanding on the cessation of production of chemical weapons immediately after the entry into force of the convention banning bacteriological weapons.⁹ My delegation believes that such a measure would tend to strengthen confidence between States while contributing to the establishment of a climate favourable to the effective elimination of chemical weapons.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 488.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 426.

⁹ *Ahte*, p. 280.

Mexican Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Additional Article in the Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 24, 1971^{1 0}

1. *Insert* a new Article IX which would read as follows:

Pending the agreement referred to in Article VIII, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. The agents in question are listed in the Protocol annexed to this Convention.

2. *Renumber* the subsequent articles accordingly.

Moroccan Working Paper on the Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 24, 1971¹

1. Amend the text of the tenth preambular paragraph to read as follows:

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principle and purposes of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925.²

2. (a) The international community should be notified of the execution of the provisions of article II by States Parties possessing bacteriological or toxin weapons as soon as they destroy them or divert them to peaceful purposes. The notice of that operation could be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, through him, to all States Parties.

(b) The term "population" in the last sentence of article II should be replaced by the plural "populations".

3. Insert a new article reading as follows:

Each State Party to this Convention declares its intention to supply, within the limits of its ability, appropriate humanitarian assistance to another State Party which so requests and is exposed by another State, in violation of the provisions of the Convention, to danger resulting from deliberate use or accidental or chance dissemination of biological agents or toxins intended for military purposes.

4. There can be no doubt that the preparation of a viable convention completely and finally prohibiting bacteriological and toxin weapons requires that all States Parties shall be absolutely certain in law that the reservations formulated by many States to the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 have been declared null and void with regard to the prohibition of the use of bacteriological and toxin weapons.

Failure to cancel those reservations would be likely to limit the very scope of the Convention and also to give rise to erroneous interpretations of article VII of documents CCD/337 and CCD/338.³

^{1 0} CCD/346, Aug. 24, 1971. The draft convention appears *ante*, pp. 456-460.

¹ CCD/347, Aug. 24, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ante*, p. 458.

A legal solution should therefore be found for this problem.

5. It would be highly desirable to reach agreement, immediately after the entry into force of the Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons, on actual cessation of the production of chemical weapons.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Demilitarization of the Sea-Bed, August 24, 1971¹

One of the important practical results achieved in the field of disarmament is the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.² The accomplishment of that measure must undoubtedly be regarded as a positive event in the international life of our time. The fact that the Treaty on the sea-bed has already been signed by over eighty States and that a number of States have ratified it shows that it has obtained wide international recognition. The Soviet Union, as we have already announced, has ratified that international instrument. Among other members of the Committee, Bulgaria, Japan and Hungary have also ratified it.

3. The Treaty on the sea-bed was brought into being by the fact that as a result of rapid scientific and technical progress in recent years mankind has come close to the opening up of a new environment—the sea depths, the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof. Besides peaceful forms of the utilization of that environment there has also arisen a possibility of its being widely used for military purposes, the achievement of practical results in the field of military use outstripping the development of that environment's peaceful exploitation, which is to a great extent connected with considerations of economic expediency.

4. Regarding the military aspects of the use of the sea-bed, the Soviet Union has from the very beginning of the consideration of this problem in international forums been in favour of the complete demilitarization of that environment. That position has been supported by other socialist countries. The discussions in the Committee on Disarmament and at the General Assembly have shown that that approach is shared by many States.

5. The Soviet Union's proposal for a radical solution of the problem of demilitarization of the sea-bed³ has encountered the opposition of some Western Powers. The reason for this is that they are already carrying out a number of measures of military importance on the sea-bed, and that plans for a considerable

¹ CCD/PV.532, pp. 5-10.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 112-113.

extension of military activities in the aforesaid environment are being elaborated.

6. In the situation that came about, when a complete solution of the question of the cessation and prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed failed to obtain the support of some Western Powers, a way-out consisted in reaching agreement on a partial solution of the problem. That approach was put into practice through the conclusion of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which was signed in the capitals of the depositary States—the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom—on 11 February. One can say with certainty that the entry into force of the Treaty on the sea-bed is already a foregone conclusion and that it will soon take its place alongside the international agreements already in force.

7. In discussing the draft treaty on the sea-bed in the Committee on Disarmament, many representatives stressed that it would be wrong to be content with a partial solution of the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed. It was pointed out that such a solution would not ensure the complete prevention of the extension of an arms race to the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. In his statement on that question the representative of the United Arab Republic, Mr. Khallaf, said:

... the limitation of the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction only, while leaving the question of conventional military uses in abeyance, cannot be looked upon with equanimity, as it would pose with time an inevitable and every-increasing threat which does not respond to the world-wide desire that the sea-bed be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes.⁴

8. Now that a partial solution of the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed has been found by prohibiting the use of that environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction, it is necessary to exert efforts to reach agreement on wider measures regarding the prohibition of military activities in the aforesaid environment.

9. The urgency of solving that problem is dictated by the fact that the improvement and development of weapons and military equipment have recently created a real threat to the peaceful use of the sea-bed. Practical possibilities are showing up for switching the race in conventional arms to the sea-bed and its subsoil.

10. In this connexion Mr. Natorf, the representative of Poland, emphasized that—

... since the beginning of the discussion on the question of the demilitarization of the sea-bed considerable scientific and technical progress has been made, which opens up ever greater possibilities of utilizing the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes. It is unnecessary to prove here that this trend of development has an unfavourable influence on the peaceful utilization of the sea-bed.⁵

⁴ ENDC/PV.421, p. 30.

⁵ CCD/PV.528, p. 17.

11. In this connexion one cannot fail to observe that already in some countries ideas are being fostered and plans are being elaborated for the use of that environment for quite specific military purposes, such as the establishment of naval bases for material and technical supplies, submarine bases, maintenance bases for submarines, command posts, storehouses for arms and ammunition, communication centres and other installations. The following statement on this question by an American jurist, L. Gouldy, is worthy of note. He said in 1967:

In the near future when man is able to create semi-permanent dwellings under water, the naval authorities will deem it necessary to establish permanent stationary installations for maintenance of submarines, research and communication stations, storehouses and repair shops (submarine San Diegos, Gibraltors, Malts and Guantanos in miniature). These installations could be emplaced on the sea-bed and in its subsoil.⁶

12. Such statements regarding the possibility of using the sea-bed and its subsoil for military purposes are close to reality. Already at the present time military circles in some countries are taking practical measures for the emplacement of military installations in areas under water which are now accessible.

13. To reduce the scope of the arms race, to strengthen international security and to ensure better conditions for the peaceful use of the sea-bed, there should be, in our opinion, no delaying of efforts to solve this problem on a broader plane than that envisaged by the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in that environment. In approaching this question it is also necessary to start out from the fact that States parties to the Treaty have assumed an obligation—
... to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof.⁷

14. Furthermore, when completing its work on the Treaty last year the Committee decided, in accordance with the proposal of the delegation of Poland, to keep on its agenda the question of further measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor. That proposal of the delegation of Poland was based on the need to enable the members of the Committee to—

... raise the question of further steps leading to the demilitarization of this important area whenever they see that a question is ripe for discussion, without waiting for the review conference...⁸

15. We should like to draw the attention of members of the Committee to the fact that the model draft articles of a treaty on the use of the sea-bed for peaceful purposes submitted recently by the Soviet Union for consideration by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-bed contain a provision (article VI, para. 1) prohibiting the use of the sea-bed

⁶ *Proceedings of the Second Annual Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute*, 26-29 June 1967, p. 103.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 10.

⁸ CCD/PV.471, p. 7.

and the subsoil thereof for military purposes.⁹ They also contain a provision to the effect that the treaty is without prejudice to any measures which have been or may be agreed upon in the context of disarmament negotiations. The inclusion of the aforesaid provisions testifies to the fact that the Soviet side attaches great importance to further measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed. The prohibition of the use of the sea-bed for military purposes would facilitate to the greatest extent the development of international co-operation in the exploration and exploitation of the resources of the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof.

16. In raising the question of the urgent need to make further efforts towards reaching an agreement to widen the measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed, we should like to emphasize that there are now a number of favourable factors for successful progress in this direction. One of the positive factors in this regard is that during the consideration in the Committee on Disarmament of the Soviet Union's proposal of 18 March 1969 on the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes¹⁰ a wide range of problems relating to the task of demilitarizing the sea-bed was discussed. As a result of this discussion and of the subsequent elaboration of the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed, the principles and, later, concrete proposals concerning definition of the area covered by the Treaty, the system of control and a number of other questions relating to the prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed were agreed upon and established. These principles and provisions approved by the General Assembly and recognized by a large number of States parties to the sea-bed Treaty can be successfully used in elaborating a treaty on further measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor.

17. Furthermore, for consideration of the scope and character of the prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed a basis is available in the form of a draft treaty on the sea-bed submitted by the Soviet Union to the Committee on Disarmament on 18 March 1969. The proposals contained in that draft for the complete demilitarization of that environment obtained the support of many States both in the Committee on Disarmament and at the General Assembly of the United Nations. Besides the support given by many States to the idea of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed, a number of representatives on the Committee on Disarmament have put forward compromise alternative solutions of this important and urgent problem.

18. Thus, for example, the representative of Sweden and Mexico declared themselves in favour of prohibiting the emplacement on the sea-bed of all types of weapons with the exception of

⁹ A/AC.138/43.

¹⁰ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 118 ff.

means of communication, navigation and tracking submarines. As for the form of such prohibition, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, suggested that a treaty should include a general characterization of the prohibitions without detailed enumeration of prohibited weapons, but should state only the nature of exempted structures and installations.¹¹ The representative of Mexico proposed to enact in article I of the treaty the principle of the prohibition of all military activities on the sea-bed, and to provide in its article II an exemption from this principle: that is, a stipulation should be included to the effect that the provisions of article I shall not be interpreted as prohibiting activities of a purely passive defensive character (tracking submarines), or not of a directly military character (such as the use of military personnel for peaceful purposes).¹²

19. The representative of Ethiopia, supporting in principle the demilitarization of the sea-bed, declared that the emplacement of "certain purely defensive military mechanisms" on the sea-bed should be permitted to the coastal States within the 200-mile zone adjoining the twelve-mile area.¹³

20. Compromise alternative solutions of the question of the scope of the prohibition of military activities on the sea-bed have also been put forward in the statements made by the representatives of India¹⁴ and Canada¹⁵ in the Committee on Disarmament, as well as in the statements made by other representatives in the Committee.

21. Thorough examination and consideration of all aspects of the problem of the further demilitarization of the sea-bed with due regard to the compromise alternative solutions of this problem put forward by members of the Committee should be a starting-point for active consideration by the Committee of the vitally important problem of prohibiting the military use of the sea-bed. Certainly, its positive solution requires, first of all, political decisions by the participants in the negotiations. The discussion to be undertaken in the Committee on Disarmament regarding the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor would be a useful catalyst facilitating the taking of political decisions by States in this field.

22. In conclusion, we should like to emphasize that there are no valid arguments for postponing consideration of the question of further measures for the demilitarization of the sea-bed. It is easier to solve many aspects of the problem now than it will be in the future. The lengthy experience of negotiations on disarmament questions has shown that to put off the solution of a number of problems concerning disarmament will inevitably result in

¹¹ ENDC/PV.422, pp. 14 ff.

¹² ENDC/PV.426, p. 17.

¹³ ENDC/PV.430, p. 32.

¹⁴ ENDC/PV.428, p. 8.

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 375-376.

additional difficulties arising later. These difficulties will become particularly great if military activities in the field under consideration develop rapidly and assume wide dimensions. Nowadays progress in science and engineering has a positive impact on the peaceful use of the sea-bed. At the same time, however, it creates the prerequisites for an arms race in this environment. This arms race has not yet reached such dimensions that it cannot be stopped. But in future the situation may change.

23. We express the hope that our observations on the problem of the demilitarization of the sea-bed will be considered with due attention by the members of the Committee on Disarmament and that the current session of the Committee will be able to lay the foundations for the further elaboration of the question of the measures which we are called upon to accomplish by the relevant provisions of the Treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed.

Statement by the Japanese Representative (Tanaka) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 24, 1971¹

The delegation of Japan has consistently been trying with other delegations to achieve the ultimate goal of a complete prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. The fact that our delegation,² last year supported the United Nations General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) as well as the fact that our delegation has, in the past year and again this year, promoted the opening of informal meetings in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of chemical and biological weapons, illustrates our sincere efforts for the solution of this vital question.

25. It is indeed gratifying to note that, at such an informal meeting on 7 July, many experts presented their valuable views and many useful data on the question of verification, which is vital to the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. I am convinced that the frank exchange of views and the data supplied by those experts through such a meeting have greatly helped our Committee in obtaining the deeper understanding of the magnitude of the problems we are faced with as well as their implications. However, it seems that there still lie ahead many difficult problems which have to be solved before we come to a satisfactory solution.

26. In the meantime the socialist States submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament their draft convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons³ in a

¹ CCD/PV.532, pp. 11-17.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

³ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

desire to "extricate the solution of the problem from the deadlock" in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.⁴ Later the United States and the Soviet Union respectively submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament separate but identical texts of a draft convention.⁵

27. Furthermore, the eleven non-aligned countries submitted on 17 August their joint working paper containing suggestions on desirable changes to the above-mentioned parallel texts.⁶ Thus we now have before us four working papers on the same question, namely, those submitted by the delegations of the United Kingdom,⁷ the United States, the socialist States and the eleven non-aligned countries.

28. Today I should like to present the views of my delegation on several points which we consider to be of great importance, by way of comparing those four papers before us. A careful study of all those documents shows that there now seems to be a consensus in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to concentrate for the moment on formulating a draft convention on the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons. As I have already indicated in my previous statement on this question, the Japanese delegation is prepared to comply with such a consensus in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.⁸ Furthermore, I take note that the identical drafts which were submitted by the United States and by the socialist States have been elaborated on the basis of the British draft. In this respect I should like to pay a high tribute to the contribution of the British delegation.

29. The first question I wish to take up concerns the scope of prohibition. Here there is the problem of the definition of toxins. That question was raised in the Swedish working paper.⁹ We share the view expressed by the Swedish delegation that there should be no loophole in this regard which might arise from the characteristic of toxins and from the possibility of the synthetic production of toxins. At the same time we think that neither the co-authors of document CCD/337 nor the author of document CCD/338 have any intention of leaving such a loophole in their respective drafts;¹⁰ nor does the present wording in those texts leave serious doubt in that regard. However, the Japanese delegation is prepared to accept the formula set out by the Swedish representative on 20 July¹¹ if such a formula is considered by the majority of the members of the Committee to be useful in completely eliminating any ambiguity on that point.

⁴ See *ante*, p. 186.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁸ CCD/PV.509, p. 5.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 395-399.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 426.

30. The more difficult problem we have to face is whether or not we should include the prohibition of use in our convention. Many delegations have already expressed their views, one way or the other, on that question. In our opinion, however, all the arguments have one thing in common: that is to say, that the conclusion of the present convention should in no way weaken but should strengthen the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹² Viewing it from that angle, our delegation does not believe that the provision in article I of the British draft would have any adverse effect on the Geneva Protocol. Indeed, that provision would serve to strengthen the Protocol.

31. Needless to say, the question of the prohibition on use has arisen mainly because of the two factors involved in the Geneva Protocol. One is that the prohibition in the Protocol was based on reciprocity among the parties. The other is that many parties to the Protocol have their reservations attached to the Protocol and have still not yet withdrawn them.

32. At the same time we have not failed to appreciate the argument put forward by the socialist representatives to the effect that the conclusion of a convention prohibiting the production, stockpiling and so on of bacteriological (biological) weapons would render meaningless the reservations attached to the Protocol. In that sense we indeed welcome the insertion of the second preambular paragraph in the parallel texts. Still, my own feeling is that our efforts to eliminate completely the legal effects of the reservations attached to the Protocol rather than leave the matter as a *de facto* consequence would in no way diminish the value of the Protocol. We might also have to take into consideration the fact that, although we prohibit the development, production and so on of biological weapons, there might yet be a possibility that biological agents for peaceful purposes could be converted to war purposes within a short period of time.

33. Moreover, there is article VII in the parallel drafts, which provides that nothing in the convention shall be interpreted as in any way "limiting or detracting from"—and here one might think that this includes the reservations—the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol. I notice that the representative of Morocco made the same point in his most recent intervention.¹³ If we are to retain such an article—and I am sure that the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament would wish to do so—would it not be useful to have in our convention a clear-cut provision prohibiting the use in any circumstances of biological and toxin weapons as a means of warfare, in order to eliminate once and for all any ambiguity surrounding this question?

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹³ *Ante*, p. 509.

34. For the reasons I have stated, my delegation shares the views expressed by the British representative at our meeting on 10 August.¹⁴ Likewise we are interested in the suggestion on the same subject put forward by the Canadian representative on the same day.¹⁵ However, if the majority of the members of the Committee feel that the question of use should not be dealt with in the present convention, I would venture to suggest that those countries which still attach reservations to the Geneva Protocol might declare the withdrawal of their reservations at the time of their ratification of or accession to the present convention.

35. With regard to the procedures to be followed in case of a suspected breach of an obligation assumed under the convention, we share the views expressed by the delegation of the Netherlands on the need for separating the procedures for fact-finding in connexion with a suspected violation from those for the political decision on such a violation.¹⁶ Accordingly, if the present convention is to contain the prohibition on the use of biological and toxin weapons, we deem it appropriate that it should have provisions similar to those in paragraph 1 of article III of the British draft, which relates to procedures regarding complaints addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As we understand it, the statement of the representative of Nigeria on 20 July was along those lines.¹⁷

36. The conclusion of the convention now under discussion would bring to an end the deterrent against the use of biological and toxin weapons allegedly due to the right of retaliation deriving from the reservations to the Geneva Protocol. In such circumstances an assured procedure for impartial fact-finding upon a breach of the obligation stemming from the prohibition of those weapons would not only constitute an important deterrent against such a violation but also have the effect of a possible deterrent against the clandestine production or stockpiling of those weapons.

37. As to the procedures for use in the event of a suspected violation of the prohibition on production, stockpiling and so on, the substance of article VI of the parallel drafts is similar to that of paragraph 2 of article III of the British draft. In order to assure effective implementation of the provision, however, I believe it is important to have a Security Council resolution similar to that proposed in the British draft as an integral part of the present convention.¹⁸ In that sense I welcome the proposal introduced by the Polish delegation¹⁹ as a move in the right direction.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 476-484.

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 488.

¹⁶ CCD/PV.502, p. 10; *ante*, p. 451.

¹⁷ CCD/PV.522, p. 10.

¹⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 431-432.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 486.

38. I should like now to turn to the question of a link between chemical weapons and biological weapons. The importance of this question has been emphasized in particular by the non-aligned countries whose efforts have now produced working paper CCD/341.²⁰ Regarding the suggestions contained in Part A of the non-aligned countries' paper, which would add references to chemical weapons in several preambular paragraphs of the convention, we can appreciate the intention of these suggestions. So far as we are concerned, we consider it would be appropriate to have such a reference in the pertinent paragraphs, taking due account, of course, of the relevance of such references to the subject-matter in question.

39. As I stated at the outset, the Japanese delegation is most anxious to achieve the ultimate prohibition of chemical and biological weapons and is determined to seek such an objective. We would welcome it, therefore, if such a determination on our part could be clearly reflected in the preamble to our convention. Apart from such an expression of our determination in the formulation of any provisions in the operative part of the present convention, under which we would undertake a specific legal obligation, the utmost care will have to be taken not to leave any ambiguity in the wording which might give rise to different interpretations and thus become a cause of conflict in the implementation of the convention. With that in mind, the Japanese delegation is prepared to accept the provisions, as far as they go, in article VIII of the parallel drafts.

40. Turning now to the suggestions of the eleven non-aligned countries as to the desirable changes to the same article, we are fully cognizant of their intentions and appreciative of their concern in this regard. Having said that, I should like to present my observations on those suggestions. In doing so I base myself strictly upon our concern, as stated above, with regard to the exact scope of a concrete legal obligation, as well as upon my sincere desire to ensure the broadest possible acceptance in the Committee of such important suggestions.

41. Our determination completely to eliminate chemical weapons as weapons of mass destruction is already reflected clearly, I believe, in the first preambular paragraph of the parallel drafts. At the same time, it goes without saying that, in seeking the objective or principle of the complete elimination of chemical weapons, thus achieving the effective elimination of those weapons from the arsenals of all States, there is an important problem of verification. In fact, the memorandum of the twelve non-aligned States says that—

The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, as indeed adequate verification is also essential in regard to the success of . . . disarmament.²¹

²⁰ *Ante*, p. 500.

²¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

Such a basic approach, as is well known, was commended in United Nations General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV).^{2 2}

42. Accordingly, in accepting the principle or the objective of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons, my delegation deems it most desirable that the delegations concerned try to work out a suitable expression or formula which would also reflect the importance of verification of an effective and complete prohibition.

43. Finally, I should like to touch upon a point which I believe is also related to the question of a link between chemical and biological weapons. Here I have in mind article XI of the parallel texts. The Japanese delegation wishes to welcome that article, as it opens the way for a review conference on the convention being held earlier than five years after the entry into force of the convention, if and when so requested by a majority of the parties to the convention—

... with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized.^{2 3}

44. The Japanese delegation has presented its views on those points which it regards as most important on the question of the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins by comparing four working papers submitted to this Committee. In so doing, I have tried, while basing myself on the parallel draft texts of the convention, to clarify our position on several points the taking into account of which would make those texts more desirable. I sincerely hope that the authors of those texts will seek a happy marriage between their texts and those of the British and the eleven non-aligned States, while taking into account what I have said above.

45. As pointed out by other delegations, when concluded the present convention, though it is in a somewhat limited field, will have great significance as the first disarmament agreement in the true sense of the words. It is my earnest hope, therefore, that we shall strive for the successful formulation of our convention at the present session and that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will be able to submit the draft convention to the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly as a document of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

46. At the same time we must exert from now on even greater efforts to achieve our objective of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons in order to live up to the expectations of the other Members of the United Nations. The Japanese delegation is pledged, as ever, to the fullest co-operation to that end. With this in mind, I should like to present to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament our two working papers, the one

^{2 2} *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

^{2 3} *Ante*, p. 459.

concerning the biological approach to the question of verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons,²⁴ and the other containing the remarks made by our expert at the informal meeting of 7 July on chemical and biological weapons.²⁵ Also I take this opportunity to submit to the Committee another working paper containing the remarks of our expert at the informal meeting of 30 June on the question of a comprehensive test ban.²⁶

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear Test Ban and Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons, August 24, 1971¹

I should like today to express a number of general considerations concerning the two items on which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has concentrated its efforts during the 1971 sessions, which are about to end: the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, and the elimination of chemical and microbiological weapons.

48. With regard to the first of these two questions—that is, the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests—my delegation feels that the examination of that item is virtually exhausted and that it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to add anything fresh in that respect. It seems to us, therefore, that the most useful thing would be to perform an exercise of recapitulation and selection which could bring out the fundamental aspects of the question, among which it is worth while to highlight the following:

(1) That in the third preambular paragraph of the Moscow Treaty, which was opened to signature on 5 August 1963—that is, more than eight years ago—the three original parties to the Treaty expressed their determination “to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time” and “to continue negotiations to this end”.²

(2) That despite that free and solemn undertaking, not only have underground explosions not been ended but the annual average of tests of nuclear weapons in all environments—most of them admittedly underground—carried out since 1963 have been nearly twice as high as that of those carried out between that date and 1945, when the first experimental explosion took place, since that average increased from 27.9 to 45.5.

²⁴ CCD/343, Aug. 24, 1971.

²⁵ CCD/344, Aug. 24, 1971.

²⁶ CCD/345, Aug. 24, 1971.

¹ CCD/PV.532, pp. 17-25.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

(3) That our present impasse is essentially the same as that which existed when the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament appointed at the beginning of its work in 1962 a sub-committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, specifically to work for the suspension of nuclear tests.

(4) That the essential cause of this prolonged stagnation is that neither the position of the United States, which holds that on-site inspections are necessary, nor that of the Soviet Union, which maintains that the use of national means of detection is sufficient, has undergone any substantial change.

(5) That this rigidity of positions is incomprehensible to many delegations, including that of Mexico, which are convinced neither that a reasonable minimum of on-site inspections accompanied by the necessary safeguards would offer any danger to the territorial State, nor that recourse to national means of detection only would enable clandestine tests to be made on a scale which could affect—and of course this is the only factor which really counts—the existing strategic balance.

(6) That this immobility and stratification of the positions of the nuclear super-Powers has aroused deep-seated suspicions in world public opinion concerning the true reasons for their attitudes, since their apparently irreconcilable differences over acceptable procedures are really based on maintenance of an advantageous monopoly of underground tests.

(7) Lastly, that the situation thus created, unless quickly remedied, may in a not distant future wreck the purposes of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.³

49. It is precisely because of what I have just summarized that the delegation of Mexico, desiring to help in finding a compromise formula which would enable the two super-Powers to meet halfway in order to reach the goal which the General Assembly has been repeating to us year after year, ventured through me to ask on 25 March a question of the delegation of the Soviet Union and of the United States.⁴ This question was and remains, whether either, or better both, those delegations would be prepared to accept in principle, as a basis for discussion in order to solve the problem of verification without the need for on-site inspections, a proposal similar to that generally known as the proposal of "black boxes", a name which we have been accustomed to assign from the beginning to automatic seismic stations, whose origin I had the opportunity to recall in full detail in the statement in March to which I have just referred. Unfortunately the succeeding five months do not seem to have been long enough for a reply to be prepared to our very specific question. We venture to hope, however, that during the time which still separates us from the end

³ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁴ *Ante*, p. 170.

of the work of the present session the Committee will hear a statement from the representatives of the two super-Powers on this subject.

50. This bird's-eye view of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests would be incomplete if it did not recall before concluding that the General Assembly, in its resolution 2663 B (XXV), requested the Committee on Disarmament "to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of its deliberations" on this question.⁵

51. I shall repeat in this respect what I have already said at the inaugural meeting on 23 February. We believe that the Committee cannot now ignore this request, as it ignored last year a similar request which it received from the Assembly at the 1970 session. I shall add, moreover, that it would be fitting, as a conclusion to this report, for the two super-Powers which appoint co-chairmen to the Committee to agree to include assurances that the prolonged studies and negotiations which have taken place in this international forum since its creation will be translated very soon into at least partial specific measures which will alleviate the deep-seated anxiety which the multiplication of underground nuclear-weapon tests is causing to the world.

52. Failing this, the General Assembly of the United Nations may consider at its next session that the moment has come to repeat with especial force the condemnation of all nuclear-weapon tests which it solemnly proclaimed in its resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962,⁶ and to fix a precise time limit for their unconditional cessation, as it did then in that same resolution—which undoubtedly had a by no means negligible influence in hastening the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty.

53. What is now called the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, for the abolition of which a number of procedures have been examined, we well know to be of much more recent origin than the question of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. Nevertheless, what I said of the other question applies also to this: that practically nothing new can be said about it in view of the exhaustive examination which it has been given since the United Kingdom's first draft convention was submitted in July 1969.⁷

54. I shall therefore merely recall some of the main heads of Mexico's position; I shall make a number of comments on the two identical draft conventions which have been submitted to the Committee⁸ and on the working paper of the eleven non-aligned countries relating to them;⁹ and I shall explain the reasons which

⁵ CCD/PV.495, p. 23.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1029-1032.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 324-326.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 486.

have led us to submit another working paper containing a proposal to insert in them an additional article.¹⁰

55. The main reasons for our unswerving attitude towards the matter are shortly these.

(1) We feel that the question of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and microbiological weapons was definitely settled by resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which the United Nations General Assembly declared that such use was contrary to the generally-recognized rules of international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol,¹¹ and defined the scope of that prohibition by stating that it includes "any chemical agents of warfare" and "any biological weapons of warfare" without any exception.¹²

(2) We feel that the same reasons which made it advisable in 1925 to enact a joint prohibition of both types of weapons, chemical and biological, exist now for employing an identical method of jointly prohibiting their development, production and stockpiling and of eliminating them from the arsenals of all States in accordance with the basic approach recommended in General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.¹³

(3) In regard to verification methods and the requirements which they must fulfil if they are to be acceptable, and because 100 per cent certainty cannot be attained in dealing with chemical and microbiological weapons, we think that we should accept any verification system which would provide reasonable assurance that the convention is being observed, without attempting a manifestly impossible perfection. Moreover, in order to evaluate this system correctly, account would have to be taken not only of its intrinsic effectiveness but also of the very considerable additional scope of the national detection methods which, as we all know, are available to States and, more particularly, to the few Powers which possess those terrible weapons of mass destruction.

56. Having regard to these requirements, my delegation remains convinced that without any difficulty whatever, either in form or in substance, the necessary changes could be made in the two identical draft conventions of the United States and the socialist countries so that they could apply not only to microbiological weapons and toxins but also to chemical weapons.

57. What I have just said is sufficiently illustrated by the evolution of our discussions of the subject; and the least that can be said is that it has been rich in extraordinary aspects. We were told at the beginning that biological weapons lacked military importance because to use them would be as dangerous for the attacker as for the attacked, and that we should have to begin by

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 510.

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 716-717.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

prohibiting those weapons exclusively although verification of such prohibition would be—I quote—“simply impossible”. Later we were told the opposite: that those weapons are “powerful weapons” which could be converted into—and I quote again—“the most effective means of wiping man from the face of the earth”.

58. Despite that, and although, as we all know, nobody could claim that verification of the prohibition of those weapons would be any less difficult than verification of the prohibition of chemical weapons, it is still insisted that a treaty should first be concluded dealing only with microbiological weapons and toxins. It is certainly that rather strange development which not long ago led the Swedish representative, Mrs. Myrdal, to ask with justified irony:

Have we to foresee that the rest of the chemical weapons would only be gradually prohibited as they became militarily insignificant, or as some extraordinary breakthrough occurred in the possibilities of verification? Or can we hope that these truly dangerous weapons will, within the foreseeable future, all become prohibited because they constitute a terror threat to human beings?¹⁴

59. Be that as it may, it is a fact that the two identical draft conventions to which I have referred compel us to decide whether we could accept, as a first step towards the elimination of chemical and microbiological weapons, a convention applying only to the latter and including toxin weapons, the origin of which is mixed.

60. Since those two draft conventions constitute one of the few cases in which the two super-Powers have reached agreement, my delegation, without in the least renouncing its preference in principle for a simultaneous prohibition, would be ready to accept a trial of this procedure of successive prohibitions on condition that there are solid links between the convention relating to microbiological weapons and that which must necessarily complement it, namely a convention on chemical weapons; and that those links should not be limited to a recital of good intentions, with regard to which the example of the preamble to the Moscow Treaty, to which I referred at the beginning of my statement, has made us—why not say it?—somewhat skeptical.

61. That is why the Mexican delegation is one of the delegations of the eleven non-aligned countries which have presented a number of concrete suggestions in working paper CCD/341.¹⁵ That is also why my delegation has decided to submit separately, in conformity with the final paragraph of the introduction to document CCD/341, a supplementary proposal to insert in the two identical draft conventions the additional article which is reproduced in working paper CCD/346:

Pending the agreement referred to in Article VIII, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 424.

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. The agents in question are listed in the Protocol annexed to this Convention.^{1 6}

Of course the inclusion of this new article IX would mean that the appropriate changes would have to be made in the numbering of the subsequent articles of the two draft conventions.

62. We believe that the adoption of the moratorium which we propose for a specific category of chemical weapons offers many advantages and has no drawbacks. Among the advantages would be the effect, if not of the elimination, at least of the freezing for military purposes of a fairly broad group of chemical agents, which, because of their degree of toxicity, are more dangerous and cannot be used for peaceful purposes, for example the so-called neurotoxic agents. Another advantage which cannot be ignored is that the moratorium would provide convincing evidence that the Powers possessing chemical weapons really intended that the undertakings in article VIII—which we presume would include the suggestions made by the eleven non-aligned countries—should not remain on paper but be translated into action as soon as possible.

63. Concerning the absence of drawbacks, it is enough to say that the question of verification, which has been the main argument against the total prohibition of chemical weapons, does not seem to apply to this case; because a control system which is accepted as a satisfactory guarantee of the prohibition of all microbiological weapons and all toxins must necessarily also be a satisfactory means of supervising the mere freezing of those supertoxic chemical agents which have no civil or peaceful uses. Nor is there any apparent difficulty in reaching agreement on an initial list, however small, of those agents, because there already exists abundant material for such a list in the reports on chemical and microbiological weapons by the Secretary-General of the United Nations,^{1 7} by the World Health Organization,^{1 8} and by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI),^{1 9} and also in the valuable working documents presented to the Committee by the delegations of Japan,^{2 0} the Netherlands^{2 1} and Sweden.^{2 2}

64. It seems to us important that because this initial list is selective it could be drawn up immediately without difficulty. Its inclusion not in the body of the convention but in an annexed protocol would enable it to be revised later with the help of experts until it was made as complete as possible, in keeping with

^{1 6} *Ante*, p. 510.

^{1 7} *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 264-298.

^{1 8} World Health Organization, *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants* (Geneva, 1970).

^{1 9} *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare* (prov. ed., Stockholm, 1970).

^{2 0} *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 379-382.

^{2 1} *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

^{2 2} *Ante*, pp. 151-154.

the suggestion in the working paper submitted by the Italian delegation.²³

65. In conclusion I should like to make certain observations on the two topics that I have dealt with in my statement, in the hope that the Committee will bear them in mind when preparing its report to the General Assembly on the results of its work this year.

66. Regarding chemical and microbiological weapons, it seems to us that the Assembly is expecting of us something more than a draft convention aimed at eliminating only weapons concerning which, as I have already pointed out, this Committee has informed the Assembly that they have neither military nor practical value; while in regard to the more dangerous and frequently-used weapons—chemical weapons—we confine ourselves to a declaration of good intentions. We feel that the international community is entitled to demand at least a document dealing with chemical weapons also, even one so limited as to be hardly more than a symbol—the execution of acts which would give greater credibility to these promises.

67. Concerning the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests, we believe it is necessary to remember that we have reached a point in time when impatience is beginning to yield to indignation, a point similar to that which nine years ago produced General Assembly resolution 1792 A (XVII), to which I have already referred. That state of mind of the peoples of the world is easy to understand, because they note that the prolongation of the present situation has within it several serious dangers. One of these is that it perpetuates the unbridled race to perfect the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, which U Thant has quite rightly described as armaments schizophrenia and as “The product of the awful alphabet and arithmetic of ABMs . . . and MIRVs”.²⁴ It also gives the other nuclear Powers an excuse to continue to contaminate the air and sea with their tests in both those environments; and it could tear to pieces the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was worked out with so much toil.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Restraints on Conventional Armaments, August 26, 1971¹

During the past twenty-five years there has been little sustained international discussion of the question of restraints on conventional armaments. Relatively little attention or careful analysis has

²³ *Ante*, pp. 417-421.

²⁴ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fourth Session, Supplement No. 1A* (A/7601/Add. 1), p. 4.

¹ CCD/PV.533, pp. 5-16.

been devoted at arms-control talks to the problems resulting from the unrestricted development and accumulation of these weapons. And even today, at this Conference and at the United Nations General Assembly, the question of possible limitations on conventional weapons is not a generally popular topic.

3. Why, we might ask, has the international community been reluctant to come to grips with this issue? When there is broad concern about expenditure on armaments, why has there been no widely-supported search for possible limitations on those weapons to which so large a part of military spending is directed? And why, when security is one of the paramount concerns of all States, has there been no general effort to enhance security through agreements or understandings regarding conventional weapons?

4. In my statement today I want to touch on a few of the factors that underlie existing attitudes towards these issues. I shall also outline some of the reasons why, in the view of the United States delegation, it is in the interest of all countries to give serious thought to the question of developing suitable restraints on conventional weapons. Finally, I shall discuss ways in which we might co-operate in seeking progress on these problems.

5. First, then, let us consider factors that underlie contemporary views towards the possibility of achieving limitations on conventional weapons. Why is the establishment of such restraints not universally acknowledged as a goal of international endeavour?

6. The history of efforts to negotiate effective limitations on conventional weapons is in itself not encouraging. We all know of the failure of such attempts between the two world wars. And our recollection of that failure—the failure of the League and the failure of the various conferences and commissions that sought limitations on weapons which are now called conventional—cannot but influence attitudes towards similar efforts today.

7. Subsequently, in the aftermath of the Second World War and indeed throughout the past quarter-century, there has been a feeling, widely and strongly held and shared by my Government, that first priority in the field of arms control must be assigned to restraints on nuclear weapons in other weapons of mass destruction. The awesome destructive force of nuclear weapons has in itself made clear to the international community the need for international efforts towards nuclear-arms control and disarmament. Such efforts are now in progress. At the same time, the urgency attached to the problem of nuclear weapons has largely overshadowed the question of restraints on conventional arms.

8. In addition to the historical perspective and the issue of priorities, we are influenced, I believe, by the seemingly intractable difficulties posed by the variety of the weapons themselves and by the complexity of the relationships among different weapon systems. A number of possible restraints affecting nuclear weapons—the handles, so to speak, of nuclear-arms control—do not appear to be readily applicable to conventional weapons.

Restraint on nuclear-weapon tests is an obvious example of measures for which conventional parallels are not immediately apparent. There are, of course, other factors that have influenced the attitude of the international community towards the question of conventional-arms control. There has been fear that restraints on conventional weapons, or even a serious international effort to explore the possibility of such limitations, might undermine the security, limit the influence, increase the dependence or curtail the economic opportunities of one or another country.

9. In the light of these factors it is not surprising, after all, that there is some doubt about whether conventional weapons can be a subject of fruitful international negotiation. It may appear to some inevitable that governments will continue to make decisions regarding conventional weapons exclusively in the light of their own security needs, determined exclusively by themselves. We appreciate that reservations regarding the subject of conventional-arms control are held in sincerity and good faith. It should be clear against the background of the factors I have just discussed that in my Government we do not underestimate the difficulties of making progress in this area. Nonetheless, it remains our conviction that the development of restraints on conventional weapons is a matter of vital concern to the international community. This is the considered view of the United States.

10. I should like now to discuss three of the basic factors which underlie this view.

11. First, we believe that our efforts, like all efforts to achieve a peaceful world, must relate to the fundamental objectives and standards that the world community is striving to achieve. Our work is only one part of a complex, ever-shifting pattern of international events.

12. Shortly after assuming office, President Nixon provided his instructions to the United States delegation to this Committee. Permit me to recall a key paragraph of those instructions. The President stated that in the carrying out of his instructions—

... the United States delegation should keep in mind my view that efforts toward peace by all nations must be comprehensive. We cannot have realistic hopes for significant progress in the control of arms if the policies of confrontation prevail throughout the world as the rule of international conduct. On the other hand [the President continued] we must attempt to exploit every opportunity to build a world of peace—to find areas of accord—to bind countries together in cooperative endeavours.

The President concluded that “A major part of the work of peace is done by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee”, which is now, of course, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.²

13. During this century, as we all know, an historic evolution—a shift, if you will—has taken place regarding the most basic norms of international conduct. New standards and objectives, developed gradually in earlier years, have been set forth clearly in the Charter

²*Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 110-111.

of the United Nations. Under the Charter the Members of the United Nations are to act in accordance with the principle that—

All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.³

14. In previous centuries there was no rule, or certainly no universally-recognized rule, limiting the use of force as a continuation or extension of diplomacy. The Charter, however, prescribes for all of us that—

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.⁴

We all know how difficult can be the realization of these great principles. Despite good faith on all sides, international violence can break out. Conflict can take place between parties each of whom genuinely believes that the other is to blame. Nonetheless, what is important is that all States today share the view that the use of force inconsistent with the Charter is banned. This is the rule that must be strengthened. This is the rule that all countries believe should not be violated.

15. What is the relevance of these broad concepts to our task here? If our Governments truly accept these new standards as guidelines for the international community, as we believe they do, then there should be a corresponding new conception regarding the requirements for weapons. The devastation of modern warfare in this century, even before the development of nuclear weapons, must compel us to encourage in every way an increased understanding and evaluation of weapons and armed forces on the basis of their ability to preserve the peace. Measures of international arms control and international discussion of the control of conventional weapons can surely contribute to these objectives. The existence of fundamental and basic principles of international conduct regarding the use of force should impose a duty on all of us to search for all ways, including possible restraints on conventional arms, that will contribute to a world of greater stability, a world of greater international co-operation, a world free from the threat or use of force.

16. I should like to turn now to a second and very practical reason why a search for restraints on conventional weapons should be of interest to all countries. When this subject is raised there will be concern in the minds of many about whether efforts towards conventional-arms control might not inevitably increase the dependence of some countries on others. Traditionally, the unfettered freedom of a government to develop and possess weapons has been seen as symbolic of its sovereignty and central to its independence. The possibility of restraints on this freedom may be regarded by some as a threat to sovereignty and a threat to independence.

³*American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, p. 135.

⁴*Ibid.*

17. We question the validity of this view. We question it because it is not supported by the existing realities regarding the security of States, and the realities of their independence, dependence and interdependence with respect to other States. The security of States has never in the past been as interdependent as it is today. This acute interdependence is a result not only of the advent of nuclear weapons. It is a function of the vast and rapid development of transportation which has created a world which has been described as a "global village". It is, as well, the result of the volatility of technology.

18. In earlier times, weapons technology was relatively stable. Production lead times were quite long. Transportation of arms and armies over long distances was a relatively slow process. Today, however, conditions are very different. Fast transportation and mass-production capabilities have made possible the sudden appearance of significant armaments anywhere in the world. Thus countries can now find themselves in a situation in which their security might be endangered by rapid changes or by expansion in the armaments of an adversary.

19. In such a world the security of all States is vulnerable. No government can maintain total security through its unilateral decisions. The unilateral decisions of one government regarding weapons must constantly be re-evaluated in the light of the unilateral decisions of adversaries or of neighbouring countries and in the light of the development of new weapons technology. In the absence of any agreed restraints, States large and small can be caught in cycles of wasteful and costly expenditures on arms. Their security needs can be determined not by their own decisions but by the technological advances and the decisions of others—or by the advances that they may fear might be made or the decisions that they may fear might be taken by others.

20. It is, of course, clearly in the interest of all countries to examine whether the working-out of conventional arms-control arrangements could have the effect not of reducing the independence but of reducing the dependence, both of individual States and of entire regions, on the unilateral decisions of others. Such arrangements, it would appear, could well provide an opportunity for the security needs of participating States to be determined, to a greater degree than they are today, by concerted or harmonized decisions which these States could take in consultation and co-operation with their neighbours.

21. There is a third aspect of the question that I would like to touch on today: the relationship of conventional-arms control to the overall direction of work in the disarmament field. My delegation is convinced that, in devoting increased attention to the question of conventional weapons, we would not be re-ordering our priorities. The prime importance of measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament is recognized by all, as is the need to seek restraints on chemical and

biological weapons. An effort to come to grips with the problem of conventional weapons should proceed concurrently with work in other fields. It need not, and should not, derogate from the priority of other issues. This is particularly true since we are still at a preliminary and exploratory stage in dealing with conventional weapons.

22. I should like to recall in connexion with our long-range work objectives that both of the disarmament plans of the early 1960s—the United States “Outline of Basic Provisions of a Treaty on General and Complete Disarmament in a Peaceful World”⁵ and the Soviet “Draft treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict international control”⁶—contained provisions for reductions of many conventional weapons by all parties in the first stage.

23. In commenting on these plans last year I expressed the view that we began to make real progress towards general and complete disarmament when we began to examine what we could accomplish with respect to individual measures. We have in fact, during the 1960s, made progress on a number of individual measures included in the first stage of the general disarmament plans. Other measures contained in those proposals are the subject of continuing discussion and negotiations both in this Committee and in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). With respect to conventional weapons, however, there has not been a broadly-supported effort during the past decade to explore ways in which progress, or even first steps, towards the goal of general and complete disarmament might be made.

24. I should now like to discuss what we think might be a realistic way to encourage progress in the field of conventional-arms control. A comparison with our efforts in the field of nuclear-arms control suggests a basic approach.

25. The discussion of possible restraints on weapons of mass destruction has been intensive throughout the last twenty-five years. During that time a great many possibilities have been explored, ideas have been exchanged, insights have been achieved. The difficulties of certain approaches have been understood, the advantages of others have been accepted. As a result, a framework of concepts, a common vocabulary, a body of objectives, have grown up. These are the tools for meaningful discussion. Without them agreements could not be fabricated.

26. No comparable set of tools exists as yet to help us in the field of conventional-arms control. It is our suggestion that we pursue the discussion of the problems in this field, as well as the possible objectives, possible steps, possible solutions, in order to develop a better understanding of what might be practicable and desirable and what might not be. An intensified discussion and

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 77-102.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 111-140.

exploration of these matters would not, of course, bind any country to any particular approach; it would, however, begin the process of ascertaining how conventional-arms control might contribute to security. This approach would not require dramatic submissions of new proposals or disarmament blueprints; in fact, valuable raw material for discussion is already at hand.

27. Members of this Committee have initiated some discussion of broad alternatives, as well as of more specific possibilities. For example, there have already been some expressions of view in this Committee regarding the basic alternatives of exploring regional approaches on the one hand, and attempting on the other hand to develop global approaches. All of these ideas can be subjected to useful analysis.

28. With respect to the regional approaches, some specific steps toward negotiations have indeed been taken. Serious consideration is being given to the task of achieving a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe. Exploratory talks to that end were proposed in the NATO Declaration[s] at Reykjavik in 1968⁷ and at Rome in 1970.⁸ In June of this year indications of readiness by Soviet leaders to consider reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe were welcomed in the NATO communiqué issued at Lisbon.⁹

29. I should like to recall in this regard that the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, has stated that a natural approach to the issue of conventional armaments is

... the regional one, for instance the convening of regional conferences on the initiative of the States of a certain region to discuss the prevention and limitation of armaments on a regional basis.

Mrs. Myrdal added:

Encouraging developments may be at hand in this regard in Europe. We might possibly discuss here ways and means by which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament might encourage further such regional efforts, involving perhaps parts of the world other than Europe.¹⁰

30. The possibilities for conventional-arms limitations vary considerably, of course, from one area to another. In some parts of the world the political environment would appear to make regional agreements difficult to achieve in the short term. Nevertheless, the experience in one area where such arrangements are pursued may provide a stimulus and useful insights for other areas, even though the solutions to problems would undoubtedly vary widely from one region to another. In addition, small steps to limit or avoid conflict, and the passage of time, may eventually make regional arrangements possible even where they are unlikely today. Certainly in Europe the prospect for negotiations on force reductions did not seem bright ten or fifteen years ago.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 449-450.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 229-230.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 307-311.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 84.

31. The United States has put forward in recent years a number of suggestions that might provide a basis for exploration of approaches to conventional-arms control. In his 1970 report on United States foreign policy President Nixon discussed, as an issue for the future, the question of limiting the flow of weapons to regions in conflict. He stated that—

... when peace is in everyone's interest, we must find a way to control conflict everywhere. We must not be drawn into conflicts by local rivalries. The great Powers should try to damp down rather than fan local passions by showing restraint in their sale of arms to regions in conflict. We stand ready to discuss practical arrangements to this end.¹¹

32. In August of last year our delegation submitted to this Committee a paper setting forth a number of possible principles for regional arms-limitation agreements,¹² which is the approach that has seemed to us to offer the most promise. The paper contained six principles relating to the general nature of possible regional agreements on conventional arms which Mr. Foster had presented to the Committee in 1966.¹³ The first of those principles, I should like to recall, touched upon the relationship between restrictions on production and restrictions on importation of weapons. That relationship is, indeed, an important one. We recognize that some countries have been concerned that an approach which focused particularly on the question of transfer of weapons might somehow have an unbalanced application. Further discussion of the relationship between restraints on production and restraints on transfer might clarify the ways in which those interrelated restraints could contribute to security at lower levels of cost.

33. Our paper of last August also introduced three suggested new guidelines for discussion. The third of those suggested that countries might make available to others in their region information regarding national policies as to production, purchase or supply of arms. The motivation behind that suggestion was, of course, to encourage an approach that could help to avoid new tensions or imbalances within a region. Perhaps, in a broader context, increasing exchange of information regarding any unilateral or individual restraints as to production, purchase or supply of arms could lead to voluntary adoption of comparable restraints by others and thus result in greater international security. That approach might have particular relevance with respect to weapons which have not yet been integrated into the mainstream of military procurement.

34. The possible principles for conventional-arms control arrangements presented by the United States last year were, of course, meant to be neither exhaustive nor definitive. They were offered as a stimulus to discussion and to exploration of issues. We

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 32.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 406-408.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 226-230.

would invite comments, general or specific, regarding any of the issues touched upon.

35. Some members of our Committee have suggested that there may be other approaches to the problem besides those that are strictly regional. The representative of Morocco has discussed that viewpoint,¹⁴ as has the representative of Argentina.¹⁵ In our view there need not be any conflict in pursuing both regional and global approaches to conventional-arms control. Indeed, some of those approaches may have considerable substantive overlap. General principles that are applicable to the problem posed by conventional weapons throughout the world can also apply to problems in specific areas. In addition, concrete approaches to specific regional problems might suggest principles that would have a more general application.

36. We appreciate that some who have urged a global approach are not thinking primarily of limited measures which, although designed for a specific region, might have application in other regions, but instead are thinking of limitations that would restrict a large number of countries through some uniform quantitative or qualitative formulas. This latter approach clearly raises a large number of complex questions which have yet to be explored. Could categories of weapons be selected which realistically took into account the differing geographic configurations of countries or their differing relative requirements for weapons for external and internal security? Can some global qualitative limitations be envisioned that would enhance the security of individual States and promote international security generally? What are the possibilities for verification or assurance procedures related to such restraints?

37. I have raised those questions to illustrate the need for thorough analysis of the substantive issues involved. Debate and exchange of ideas regarding such issues—though it may involve great complexities and require much patience—is the only way we may be able to ascertain which are the doors that may open towards mutually-beneficial achievements.

38. These questions also illustrate that no single member of this Committee or any single group of delegations can devise a realistic over-all plan or prescription for action. The needs and aspirations of all participants must be taken into account. For our part, we would welcome the fullest examination of all ideas that any delegations believe would be helpful to us in our task.

39. There are two thoughts with which I would like to conclude.

40. First, we will not be able to contribute to progress regarding conventional weapons—or even to a better understanding of the issues involved—without the vigorous participation of all

¹⁴ CCD/PV.491, p. 27.

¹⁵ CCD/PV.501, p. 17.

our members. I should like to recall, if I may, remarks by the then Secretary of State of the United States at the first meeting of this Committee in March 1962. He said:

... Countries situated in every region of the world are confronted with their own conflicts and tensions, and some are engaged in arms competition. We are not here dealing solely with a single struggle in which a few large States are engaged, with the rest of the world as spectators. Every State has a contribution to make in establishing the conditions for general disarmament in its own way. Every State has a responsibility to strive for a reduction of tension and of armaments in its own neighbourhood. . . .¹⁶

41. Secondly, however limited our first efforts might be in the field of conventional-arms control, they can have a significant impact on the atmosphere in which governments make their decisions concerning armaments and disarmament possibilities. This is an aspect of our work which I mentioned last year in my statement on general and complete disarmament. I said at that time:

... During the 1950s most governments probably expected that the arms race would continue to spiral upwards. Today, however, many are no longer certain that this will happen. The measures that have been achieved, the forces of international co-operation they have set in motion and the further negotiations they have engendered have helped to create an expectation throughout the world that armaments may level off or even spiral downwards. Thus, although the problems with which we are dealing often seem intractable, we must continue to try to solve them in a realistic and purposeful way, keeping in mind that too slow a pace could result in a loss of momentum which could impair the relatively favourable atmosphere that our earlier measures helped to create.¹⁷

42. Let us keep in mind, then, that one of the aims of our work is this: to affect the way in which governments make decisions about armament- and arms-limitation possibilities. Let us make clear that the possibility of arms-control arrangements can play a significant and helpful role. Let us make clear that the members of this Committee, to which the United Nations looks for a lead in the disarmament field, are determined to come to grips with the vast question of conventional armaments at the same time as we continue our pursuit of measures pertaining to weapons of mass destruction. Let us ensure that arms-control possibilities in the area of conventional weapons, as well as weapons of mass destruction, are investigated and are brought home to the international community. This is a task that could have far-reaching benefits for all countries, large and small.

Statement by the Argentine Representative (de la Guardia) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, August 26, 1971¹

On 29 April the Argentine delegation made a number of comments² on document CCD/325/Rev.1, submitted by nine socialist countries and dealing with bacteriological (biological)

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, p. 142.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 256-257.

¹ CCD/PV.533, pp. 16-19.

² CCD/PV.512, pp. 17-21.

weapons.³ Now that this has taken on a new aspect under symbol CCD/337, and is accompanied by another identical text submitted by the United States (CCD/338),⁴ my delegation wishes to make new comments on it in the certainty that we now have before us a more developed text, both technically and politically. The effort at conciliation made by the sponsors of the parallel texts provides the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament with a valuable means of analyzing and discussing the future provisions of a treaty on bacteriological weapons.

44. First of all, my delegation wishes to point out that it agrees generally with most of the provisions of the parallel texts. However, we should like to make some more suggestions not incompatible with the basic agreement which made this presentation possible and which, in our opinion, would improve it.

45. The first observation is purely formal and is designed to cover an obvious omission. By articles I and IV States parties to the convention undertake not to "develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain" microbial or other biological agents or toxins. Though we understand that the sponsors may have felt disinclined merely on aesthetic grounds not to extend the title of the draft convention, which is already rather long, we wonder whether there is not an omission in the title, which only refers—as document CCD/325/Rev.1 does—to the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons, and not to their acquisition.

46. Turning now to the substance: my delegation, in its statement of 29 April to which I have referred, commented on articles IV and V of the document of the socialist countries. Article IV deals with international responsibility, and my delegation made certain observations in order to correct some shortcomings which we observed in it. Article V did not appear to us necessary, because we felt that the secondary obligation to enact legislation to give effect to the convention was already directly expressed in the primary obligation laid down in article 1.

47. In the revised text contained in the parallel documents, the former article IV referring to international responsibility does not appear, and the former article V dealing with the obligation to enact the necessary legislation, which is now article IV, has been amended. The new wording seems to us to incorporate some of our suggestions, but not in the way we had in mind when we proposed them, because they were intended to emphasize the responsibility, which has now disappeared. My delegation will not object to the present article IV, since the sponsors of the parallel texts insist on its inclusion; but we should have preferred the article concerning responsibility to be retained.

³ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

48. We approve the inclusion in the new text of the withdrawal clause in article XII, the absence of which had been pointed out by a number of delegations.

49. We still believe, moreover, as we said in our statement—to which I have already referred—, that despite the objections of several delegations, certain ideas contained in the United Kingdom document CCD/255/Rev.2⁵ would make an excellent contribution to the drafts now under consideration. The first of these is the procedure proposed in its article III for complaint to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who would order the necessary investigation as a step preceding the recourse to the Security Council provided by article VI of the parallel drafts. At the meeting before last the representative of Italy also supported that idea most convincingly.⁶

50. Secondly, we should like to refer again to article IV of the United Kingdom text concerning the supply of adequate assistance, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to any injured party against whom the Security Council finds that biological means of warfare have been used. My delegation believes that that provision would supplement the system proposed in article VI of the parallel texts.

51. Another idea which my delegation would like to see in the final convention is that contained in document CCD/328, submitted by the delegation of the United Arab Republic, which would insert in article III of the parallel drafts a provision precluding the receipt by any State party to the convention of assistance or encouragement by any other State, and particularly by a State which is not a party to the proposed convention.⁷

52. My delegation can also accept for inclusion in the drafts the proposal made the the Swedish delegation on 20 July to insert a definition of toxins which would cover all their possible forms.⁸

53. I should like to refer now to the interesting suggestions submitted by eleven non-aligned countries in document CCD/341.⁹ In the first place my delegation wishes to state that, although it is not a co-sponsor of that document, we are not opposed to it and, on the contrary, consider it a very useful instrument for negotiation on this aspect of our work. We should like to make a number of observations essentially concerning legal technique. Thus, in the light of the joint memorandum contained in document CCD/310¹⁰ and of General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV),¹¹ which contains this idea, we believe that the first, eighth, tenth and eleventh preambular paragraphs of the parallel texts, although they have certain faults because they were

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 503 ff.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 378.

⁸ See *ante*, p. 426.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

negotiated with great difficulty, and also the operative provision in article VIII, reflect more adequately than does the proposed amendment the present real international situation of the establishment of a legal link between bacteriological and chemical weapons.

54. This, however, does not affect the position which has been stated a number of times by our country and which coincides with that expressed by the majority of the delegations present here: that we consider it not only important but urgent that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should deal with the question of chemical weapons, in compliance with paragraph 6 of the joint memorandum, which states that—

It is essential that both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States.^{1 2}

55. Besides these observations, we feel that document CCD/341 makes certain interesting contributions which my delegation has particular pleasure in supporting. One is the new twelfth preambular paragraph which advocates the use of savings derived from disarmament for economic and social development, in particular of the developing countries. We also give full support in the operative part to the addition to article V, which improves the consultative procedure in that article; also to the addition to article IX, paragraph 1 concerning international co-operation in scientific discoveries in bacteriology for peaceful purposes.

Swedish Working Paper Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Suggestions on Possible Provisions of Underground Test-Ban Treaty, September 2, 1971¹

The States concluding this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the "Parties to the Treaty",

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to undertake effective measures in the direction of nuclear disarmament,

Urging the co-operation of all States in the attainment of this objective,

Recalling the determination expressed by the Parties to the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water in its preamble to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end,²

^{1 2} *Ibid.*, p. 454.

¹ CCD/348, Sept. 2, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

Convinced that a continued testing of nuclear explosives brings about unforeseeable consequences in regard to imbalance and mistrust between States,

Heeding the appeals of the General Assembly of the United Nations for the suspension of nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Affirming the principle that the benefits of peaceful applications of nuclear technology, including any technological by-products which may be derived by nuclear-weapon States from the development of nuclear explosive devices, should be available for peaceful purposes to all Parties to the Treaty, whether nuclear-weapon or non-nuclear-weapon States,

Affirming also the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament, should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to prohibit, to prevent and not to carry out any underground nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other underground nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction or control. This obligation is subject to the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of this Article and in Article II.

2. For each nuclear weapon state this Treaty shall be fully operative after a period of . . . months from the entry into force of the Treaty, during which period any nuclear weapon test explosions shall be phased out in accordance with the provisions laid down in Protocol I annexed to this Treaty.

3. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes, furthermore, to refrain from causing, encouraging or in any way participating in the carrying out of any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion prohibited under this Treaty.

Article II

The provisions of Article I of this Treaty do not apply to nuclear explosions which are carried out for construction or other peaceful purposes and which take place in conformity with the separate Protocol II annexed to this Treaty.

Article III

1. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith to ensure the full observance and implementation of this Treaty.

2. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith in an effective international exchange of seismological data in order to facilitate the detection, identification and location of underground events.

3. Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes to co-operate in good faith for the clarification of all events pertaining to the subject matter of this Treaty. In accordance with this provision, each State Party to the Treaty is entitled

(a) to make inquiries and to receive information as a result of such inquiries,

(b) to invite inspection on its territory or territory under its jurisdiction, such inspection to be carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting Party,

(c) to make proposals, if it deems the information available or made available to it under all or any of the preceding provisions inadequate, as to suitable methods of clarification.

4. Each State Party to this Treaty may bring to the attention of the Security Council of the United Nations and of the other Parties to the Treaty, that it deems another Party to have failed to co-operate to the fullest extent for the clarification of a particular event.

5. Provisions for the seismological data exchange referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article are laid down in the separate Protocol III, annexed to this Treaty. Special provisions for the seismological data exchange during the phasing-out period and for the explosions for peaceful purposes referred to in Articles I and II are laid down in the Protocols I and II respectively.

Article IV

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Treaty and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article V

... years after the entry into force of this Treaty, a conference of Parties to the Treaty shall be held in Geneva, Switzerland, in order to review the operation of this Treaty with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized. The review conference shall determine in accordance with the views of a majority of those Parties attending whether and when an additional review conference shall be convened.

Article VI

1. This Treaty shall be open for signature to all States. Any State which does not sign the Treaty before its original entry into

force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____ which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

3. This Treaty shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by... Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositary Governments of this Treaty.

4. For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited after the original entry into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform the Governments of all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession, the date of the entry into force of this Treaty, and the receipt of other notices.

6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article VII

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration. Each Party shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Treaty, if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other Parties to the Treaty and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article VIII

This Treaty, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the States signatory and acceding thereto.

In witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto, have signed this Treaty.

Done in _____ at _____, this ____ day of _____.

**Letter From Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary-General
Thant: World Disarmament Conference, September 6, 1971¹**

On the instructions of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I hereby request the inclusion in the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the United Nations General Assembly, as an important and urgent item, the question of a World Disarmament Conference. In submitting this question to the United Nations General Assembly, the Soviet Government is guided by the following considerations.

Among the problems which arouse the concern of all the peoples of the world and which require the speediest possible solution, the problem of disarmament is one of the highest priority. The international situation of the future will to a great extent depend upon its solution, which may lead, on the one hand, to a lessening of international tensions and a slowing of the arms race or, on the other hand, to continuing preparations for war at an ever-increasing pace and an increased threat of another world war.

In recent years a few agreements have been reached which to some extent limit the dimensions of the arms race. Such agreements include: the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water,² the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,³ the Treaty on the principles guiding the activities of States in outer space,⁴ and the Treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. Negotiations currently in progress between States have led to the consideration of several other specific measures aimed at the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. However, it must be admitted that fundamental progress towards controlling the dangerous practice of stockpiling and improving armaments has yet to be made.

This cannot fail to arouse the concern of those peoples who are vitally interested in the strengthening of peace and international security. The Soviet Union fully shares this concern. For that reason, it has constantly and persistently advocated, in the United Nations as well as elsewhere, a broad programme of disarmament, even general and complete disarmament.

Guided by unflinching desire for effective measures to put an end to the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, the Soviet Government has recently proposed the calling of a conference of the five nuclear Powers, who bear special responsibility for the maintenance of international security and on whom, above all, the

¹ A/8491, Sept. 7, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

³ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

success of nuclear disarmament depends.⁵ The Conference would take concrete and practical steps towards the solution of this problem. The Soviet Union believes that the conference of nuclear Powers, provided of course that all nuclear Powers prove willing to work towards an agreement, could be a major success in working out a broad spectrum of measures for nuclear disarmament or individual measures which would gradually lead to that end. This approach to the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament is the most realistic and is best in keeping with the interests of all peoples.

At the same time, the course of events on the international scene makes it desirable to encourage more active efforts on the part of all countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, to solve the problems relating to disarmament.

This goal also, in the opinion of the Soviet Government, could be served by the calling of a world disarmament conference. The conference could become a forum where all countries of the world without exception could jointly discuss the problems of disarmament in all their ramifications and attempt to find feasible and generally acceptable means of solving those problems. In order to be successful, such a conference must be truly universal. All countries should be represented at the world disarmament conference on the basis of equality. Of special importance would be the participation in the conference of all States which possess significant armed forces and armaments.

The Soviet Union believes that the world disarmament conference could consider the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament, with regard to both nuclear and conventional armaments. At the same time, inasmuch as the nuclear armaments race arouses the greatest anxiety among peoples, primary attention could be devoted to the questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, if the majority of the participants in the conference should so desire.

The Soviet Government hopes that the General Assembly will express itself on the question of a world disarmament conference and take such decisions as would facilitate agreement between States concerning the calling of the conference.

I would ask you, Mr. Secretary-General, to view this letter as an explanatory memorandum, as provided under rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, and to circulate it as an official document of the United Nations General Assembly.

(Signed) A. GROMYKO
Minister for Foreign Affairs
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 313-315.

Statement by the Argentine Representative (de la Guardia) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Sea-Bed Treaty, September 7, 1971¹

5. My delegation intervenes today very briefly merely to inform the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that on Friday, 3 September, Argentina signed the Treaty on the sea-bed in London, Moscow and Washington.² My delegation wishes to express in this Committee the satisfaction of the Argentine Government at having signed an instrument capable of promoting general and complete disarmament under effective international control. We also wish to emphasize the importance of the negotiating procedures in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament which culminated in the drafting of the Treaty and in which our delegation co-operated actively, as is shown in the acceptance by the co-sponsors of articles I, II and IV, which were drafted entirely by our country, and of substantive amendments to article III.

6. At the meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament held on 1 September 1970, when the final version of the Treaty was submitted, both the Soviet representative and the United States representative stated that such an international instrument was not expected to solve or influence the solution of any of the pending problems relating to the law of the sea: rather, its strict objective was to prevent the extension to the sea-bed and the ocean floor of the race in nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The full texts of those statements are to be found in the record of that meeting.³

7. In his turn, the representative of Argentina stated:

One of the constant anxieties which have guided our action has been to avoid, by all the means available to us, the risk that the draft might, by virtue of its sphere of application, affect the position of various States on questions relating to international maritime law and most particularly to the territorial sea and the continental shelf. We have stated, and emphatically repeated, that a document of this nature could not and should not, either directly or indirectly, attempt to solve or even interfere in the complex problems pertaining to the law of the sea. For that reason we have taken due note of the statements made by the co-sponsors of the draft that this is not the aim of the Treaty and that its provisions are in no way designed to, nor do they seek to, undermine, strengthen, or affect the positions of States, or to prejudice or influence future decisions on those questions, or to confirm or annul existing or future obligations assumed under international instruments.

I continue to quote what was said at that time:

On the basis of those assertions, to which we attach the value of a formal commitment or undertaking, and by virtue of the provisions of article IV—the so-called disclaimer clause—by whose letter and spirit we abide strictly, we wish expressly to record the view that we interpret the references to the freedoms of the high seas as in no way implying a pronouncement or judgement on the different positions relating to questions connected with international maritime law. In the same context, we understand that the reference

¹ CCD/PV.536, pp. 5-7.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 480-485, 485-489.

to the rights of exploration and exploitation by coastal States over their continental shelves is included solely because those could be the rights most frequently affected by verification procedures. In other words, we preclude henceforward any possibility of strengthening, through this document, certain positions concerning continental shelves to the detriment of others based on different criteria.⁴

When my country signed that document it recorded this interpretative declaration.

8. Allow me to reiterate that it is the will of the Argentine Government to continue to co-operate in the work of the Committee and to adhere to the agreements achieved here after negotiation between all the States desiring to contribute to that task.

Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Saraiva Guerreiro) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Sea-Bed Treaty, September 7, 1971¹

9. I have a short communication to make to the Committee. Before I do so, permit me to express our satisfaction at the presence here of the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Sharp, and also to address a word of welcome to the new representative of India in this Committee, Ambassador Banerjee, who I am sure will make as great a contribution to the work of this Committee as did his predecessors.

10. I have the honour to announce that on 3 September Brazil signed in London, Moscow and Washington the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.² On that occasion the Government of Brazil placed on record the following statement:

Nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as prejudicing in any way the sovereign rights of Brazil in the area of the sea, the sea-bed and the subsoil thereof adjacent to its coast. It is the understanding of the Brazilian Government that the word "observation" as it appears in paragraph 1 of article III of the Treaty refers only to observation that is incidental to the normal course of navigation in accordance with international law.

11. May I recall further that last year, when supporting the draft in its final form, I had the opportunity of making a declaration on our understanding of some of its provisions? That declaration is to be found in the record of the meeting of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 3 September 1970.³

⁴ CCD/PV.492, pp. 16-17. For previous Argentine statements on this question, see CCD/PV.445, pp. 17 ff.; CCD/PV.454, pp. 7-8; *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 284-285.

¹ CCD/PV.536, pp. 7-8.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ CCD/PV.494, pp. 11-13.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Underground Test Ban [Extract], September 7, 1971¹

First of all, we should like to welcome here the distinguished Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada, Mr. Sharp. We await with interest the statement he is to make in the Committee, and we are delighted that he has deemed it necessary to take part in our meeting.

13. We also welcome the new representative of India, Ambassador Banerjee. We wish him every success in his new post and at the same time ask him to transmit to Ambassador Krishnan the expression of our kindly feelings and our great appreciation of the fact that for a long time we worked together in our common task.

14. We note with satisfaction the statements made today by the representative of Argentina and the representative of Brazil, who have informed us that their representatives had signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof.²

15. Today the Soviet delegation intends to devote its statement to the problems of nuclear disarmament. Those problems invariably occupy an important place on the agenda of the Committee. At the current session our efforts have been mainly concentrated on completing the elaboration of a draft convention prohibiting bacteriological weapons and toxins. At the same time, various aspects of the halting of the nuclear arms race continue to attract the attention of members of the Committee. It cannot be otherwise, since the need for and urgency of nuclear disarmament are conditioned by the degree of danger which nuclear weapons represent and accordingly by the desire to save mankind from the threat of war in general and a nuclear war in particular.

16. It is awareness of the magnitude of this threat and of the need for efforts to counteract it that determine the Soviet Union's approach to the problems of nuclear disarmament. Our position of principle on these questions was expressed in the proposals formulated in the documents of the twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was held last spring. The disarmament programme put forward by the Soviet Union provides, among other measures, for the prohibition of all types of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons; the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, including underground tests, everywhere and by everyone; the promotion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; and the nuclear disarmament of all nuclear-weapon States.³

¹ CCD/PV.536, pp. 8-17.

² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

³ *See ante*, pp. 195-197.

17. Among the afore-mentioned problems of nuclear disarmament, the question of prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests is being discussed most vigorously in our Committee. The fact that attention has been given to this question in the statements made by a large number of delegations both at many previous sessions of the Committee and during the current session is certainly based on concrete reasons. In the eight years that have passed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty banning tests in three environments,⁴ no solution to the problem of prohibiting underground tests has yet been found. The discussion in the Committee on this problem shows how great is the importance attached by many delegations to its solution within the context of achieving nuclear disarmament, and how urgent they consider the need for the earliest possible prohibition of all types of nuclear tests.

18. During the discussion of this problem at the spring and summer sessions of the Committee on Disarmament a number of ideas and proposals concerning ways of solving it were put forward. A prominent place in the discussion was occupied by proposals to prohibit underground nuclear-weapon tests not all at once but through separate, partial steps leading to the accomplishment of that aim. One of the proposals submitted by Canada, the United Kingdom and Japan and which found a response in statements by other delegations, consists in establishing a certain "threshold of magnitude" for underground nuclear tests above which no tests of nuclear weapons are to be carried out.⁵ To what extent would such a step contribute to the cessation of underground tests?

19. Before answering that question we should like to recall that at one time the idea of a "threshold of magnitude" was put forward by the United Arab Republic,⁶ not, however, in the sense of permitting tests below the established threshold, but in combination with the declaration of a moratorium on the conduct of such explosions, that is, explosions below the threshold of magnitude 4.75 (according to the Richter Scale). That United Arab Republic proposal really pursued the aim of a complete cessation of all types of underground nuclear-weapon tests and for that reason was supported by the Soviet Union, which regarded that proposal as a constructive contribution by its sponsors to the solution of the problem in question.

20. If, in the light of that fact, we turn to the idea of establishing a certain "threshold of magnitude" for underground nuclear tests outside the link with a moratorium on all underground nuclear tests below the established "threshold", it must be admitted that such an approach would not provide a solution of

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 33-34, 37-38, 87-88.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, p. 427; *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 344-345.

the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, nor would it create more favourable prospects for progress towards its solution. We share the doubts of a number of delegations—Sweden, the United Arab Republic, Ethiopia and the Netherlands—about the effectiveness of the “threshold” approach as such. In particular we recognize the cogency of the arguments advanced by the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, against the proposal to establish a “threshold”. She said:

There are two sets of reasons, of which one may be called political and one technical, why the Swedish Government has all along hesitated to support the threshold proposal. It would, in our view, be another half-measure, perhaps limiting arms development in some directions but leaving other directions open for so-called improvements of nuclear weapons.⁷

21. In fact, it can hardly be doubted that establishing a “threshold of magnitude”, while at the same time authorizing nuclear explosions below the established “threshold”, would have the result of stimulating the conduct of nuclear explosions of lower yield, which would thus become, as it were, legalized. Such a solution would entail the development of nuclear weapons of small capacities or, as the representative of Japan, Mr. Tanaka, described it, a “miniaturization” of nuclear weapons.⁸ Thus the establishment of a “threshold of magnitude” would not put a stop to the building up of nuclear arsenals, nor would it contribute towards nuclear disarmament, which many countries, including the Soviet Union, are striving to achieve. On the contrary, it would encourage new efforts to devise improved types of warheads and thus would promote the development of nuclear weapons as a whole. It goes without saying that that is not the path along which we would wish to direct efforts towards disarmament and arms limitation.

22. Referring to the technical aspects of the “threshold” proposal, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, pointed out that it was not possible to determine beyond dispute whether an event—that is, an underground nuclear explosion—lay below the established threshold or not. She then said:

The threshold concept would thus introduce serious technical problems which an all-out ban wholly avoids. Even if we could agree on a treaty text solving these problems, much controversy could still be foreseen in the subsequent operation of a threshold treaty.⁹

23. In fact, the implementation of the “threshold” proposal could create conflict between parties to the agreement as to the degree of precision with which it is possible to determine over varying distances the yields of nuclear explosions—that is, whether they lie above or below the established “threshold”. A treaty of

⁷ *Ante*, p. 264.

⁸ CCD/PV.518, p. 10.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 265.

such a nature, containing the seeds of discord between States, would not only fail to ensure the establishment of better relations among the parties to it but might also entail a deterioration in the international atmosphere.

24. The idea of a so-called "descending quota" of underground nuclear explosions has been put forward as a partial or intermediate approach to the solution of the problem. It is envisaged that during a certain period of time nuclear weapon tests would be permitted but that their number would be limited and reduced every year, falling to zero by the end of a certain period. Such a proposal was submitted by the United Kingdom in document ENDC/232 and supported by Canada and several other delegations.

25. In considering this proposal in the light of the search for a solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, one is bound to come to the conclusion that it does not provide an answer to any of the problems that have arisen in connexion with the aforesaid aim of banning underground nuclear tests. Thus in this connexion the question quite naturally arises: on what would the system of guarantees of observance of the commitments under an underground test ban be based? If the system is to be based upon national means of detection, then one cannot understand why there is any need at all for a transitional period with a "descending quota" instead of prohibiting any nuclear-weapon tests as quickly as possible and completely. To include in the treaty banning underground test explosions a transitional period with a "descending quota" of such explosions would only complicate the achievement of an agreement on this problem, which is complicated enough already. If the proposal for a "descending quota" of explosions implies control over the observance of the treaty through obligatory on-site inspections, as proposed by the United Kingdom in particular, this would take us back into the vicious circle created by some Western Powers which, by putting forward a far-fetched demand for inspections, block the solution of the problem of putting an end to all nuclear-weapon tests, including underground tests.

26. The proposal for a "descending quota" of underground nuclear explosions would in no way solve the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, or even bring us closer to its solution. All the obstacles which at the present time stand in the way of progress towards its solution would not only remain, but to them would be added many other difficulties connected with the establishment of quotas for various States, the periods of their validity, and so on.

27. In addition to the aforementioned proposals, in the course of the discussion in the Committee on Disarmament on underground tests the representative of Canada, Mr. Ignatieff, suggested notification in advance of projected underground explosions and

of programmes for conducting such tests.¹⁰ In his opinion that would facilitate the solution of the problem of stopping underground nuclear-weapon tests. The Soviet delegation does not share that opinion. Of course, nuclear-weapon testing programmes are of a certain interest, not from the standpoint of disarmament but for the development of nuclear weapons, for the military use of nuclear energy. The publication of underground testing programmes would facilitate the acquisition of information by certain military services of other States but would not facilitate the solution of the problem of putting an end to underground nuclear tests.

28. Thus we should like to point out that the ideas and proposals put forward by several delegations regarding transitional or partial ways of solving the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests which according to the representative of Canada "exist in great variety" do not at all create any possibilities for making progress towards such a prohibition.¹¹ As a matter of fact, such proposals could only complicate the solution of the problem and create the illusion that some sort of new approaches to it have emerged.

29. We have been told here that on questions of disarmament and in particular on the question of banning underground nuclear explosions one should not take an "all or nothing" attitude. We agree in principle with such an approach but we do not accept such a line when we are offered illusory concepts simply to fill the gaps resulting from unwillingness on the part of the Western Powers to take the necessary political decision to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests.

30. In these conditions it seems odd, to say the least, that of late certain delegations in the Committee on Disarmament have begun to devote increased attention to the study of the technical aspects of control over the prohibition of underground tests. Thus the representative of Italy, Mr. Caracciolo, suggested that a sub-committee or working party be established for that purpose.¹² If the States concerned are not prepared to adopt a political solution to the problem, no setting up in the Committee of sub-committees or working parties, no organization of technical studies and discussions, will bring us closer to the desired goal of putting an end to underground nuclear-weapon tests. The development of the discussion of the technical aspects of this problem would only cover up the lack of real progress. As we understand it, that is what the Swedish delegation had in mind in stating that "the time has arrived when a treaty should be concluded on the basis of the knowledge we already possess."¹³

¹⁰ CCD/PV.517, p. 20.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 207.

¹² See *ante*, p. 475.

¹³ *Ante*, p. 448.

31. The question of the use of so-called "black boxes"—that is, automatic seismic devices for the purposes of control over the cessation of nuclear tests—was also raised during the discussion of the problem of such tests. The representative of Mexico, Mr. García Robles, was interested, in particular, in our present attitude to the idea of the use of such boxes,¹⁴ which were referred to in the initial stages of the work of this Committee. The idea of "black boxes" was put forward nine years ago at the Pugwash Conference of scientists in August 1962 in Cambridge.¹⁵ It was supported by the Soviet Union with a view to facilitating a political solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests. We held then, as we continue to hold now, that control over the prohibition of tests can be ensured through national means of verification. The United States, being unwilling to stop nuclear-weapon tests, declined the proposal concerning the "black boxes" and continues to adhere to its position of 1962 in regard to them.

Since the consideration of this question nine years ago failed to lead to any progress by the Committee in the direction desired, are there any data today that would show that a resumption of the discussion of the question of so-called "black boxes" might produce a different result? It seems to us doubtful whether resumption of the discussion of the "black boxes" question would take us any further in solving the problem of underground nuclear explosions.

32. In considering the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, the question of the legal form of an appropriate agreement was raised. The representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, asked whether delegations preferred a separate treaty banning underground tests or an addition in the form of a protocol to the Moscow Treaty,¹⁶ or a renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty so as to include underground nuclear tests also.¹⁷ It seems to us that it would be preferable to elaborate an independent treaty without any renegotiation of the Moscow Treaty. An approach such as that would not entail the risk of reconsidering problems already settled by the Moscow Treaty, a treaty which has obtained such wide recognition as one of the most important international instruments of our time. Moreover, we should like to point out that the question of the legal form of the treaty is of a derivative and, on the whole, secondary nature. The achievement of agreement on the legal form of the treaty will not be difficult if there is agreement on the essential questions. At this stage, when unfortunately we are still far from a concrete solution of the problem of banning nuclear tests, there is hardly

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 167-170.

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 863-865.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹⁷ See *ante*, p. 270.

any point in considering the legal aspect of the treaty, the outline of which, regrettably, cannot yet be seen.

33. Those are our views on the questions raised in the Committee during the discussion of the problem of banning underground nuclear-weapon tests. In considering the basis for the solution of this problem we should like to stress that the Soviet Union, as we have stated repeatedly, is ready to sign an agreement on the cessation of underground tests of nuclear weapons on the basis of national means of detection of underground nuclear explosions. We have stressed on numerous occasions that modern science and technology have reached such a level of development that it is possible to ensure control by national means of detection which would give all States the assurance that an agreement banning underground nuclear-weapon tests was being conscientiously fulfilled by everyone.

34. To ensure the most reliable guarantees of strict fulfilment by the parties to such an agreement of the obligations assumed by them we consider it possible to use international co-operation in the field of seismic data exchange. The Soviet side favours such co-operation within the framework of an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests, bearing in mind in this connexion that control over its observance will be exercised without any inspection of an international character. At one time Sweden put forward a proposal for a so-called "detection club" based upon co-operation in seismic data exchange.¹⁸ The Soviet side stated its positive attitude to that proposal on the understanding that States were not, by virtue of their participation in the "detection club", to assume any obligations in regard to the carrying out of international inspection and control on their territories. The submission of seismic data by States would only be carried out on a voluntary basis and the assessment of selected data would not be made by any international body but by each State for itself.

35. In connexion with the consideration of the basis on which the question of the problem of control over the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests should be settled, we note with satisfaction that an ever-growing number of States are inclined to agree with the point of view that national means of control are sufficient. Thus, speaking on this question, the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Myrdal, said:

The Swedish delegation is quite convinced that, with the present state of the art, sufficient deterrence against cheating can be obtained without obligatory on-site inspections.

In the same statement Mrs. Myrdal said:

¹⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 390-393.

We find a clear signal that the wind of change is going against the claim for obligatory on-site inspection in statements made recently by our highly-respected former co-Chairman, Mr. William Foster.¹⁹

36. Unfortunately one is compelled to note that the wind of change referred to by Mrs. Myrdal has not yet touched the official position of the United States, the country which has conducted the majority of nuclear-weapon tests in the world. At the time the United States delegation rejected the Swedish proposals of 1 April 1969 aimed at seeking a compromise solution of the test-ban problem.²⁰ The position of the United States remains uncompromising even at the present time, despite the increasing recognition in the United States itself of the possibility of solving the problem on the basis of the use of national means of detection. Thus, in an article published in the *Washington Post* of 11 April this year, Thomas O'Toole and Marylin Berger stated:

Such dramatic strides have been made in detecting distant underground atomic explosions that scientists can now discriminate between earthquakes and the smallest nuclear tests conducted either by the United States or the Soviet Union . . .

37. Despite the fact that the possibility of control over the cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests by national means has been widely recognized, we still see no signs of progress towards the solution of the problem of banning such tests. This is due to factors of a political nature, namely the political reluctance of the United States to agree to such a prohibition. That is the reason for the submission of unjustified demands for obligatory on-site inspection to verify compliance with the treaty.

38. The question of prohibiting underground nuclear-weapon tests is an essential part of the problem of nuclear disarmament. Its solution would be of great political and economic significance. Its political significance would lie in the fact that such a measure would greatly improve the existing situation in the world and would contribute to the implementation of other measures in the field of disarmament. The economic significance would consist, in particular, in the fact that the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests would facilitate the diversion of fissionable materials to peaceful uses, including the conducting of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

39. The question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes is in many respects connected with that of nuclear-weapon tests. One important and complicated task is to work out the technical aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions and an appropriate international agreement within the framework of which, and through appropriate international procedures, it would be possible to make available the benefits deriving from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 268.

²⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.²¹ Article V of that treaty, as is well known, provides that such explosions should be carried out on a non-discriminatory basis and that charges for research and development should be excluded.

40. The Soviet Union and the United States are carrying out an exchange of views on the technical aspects of peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. The third stage of the Soviet-United States technical talks on that problem was held last July and the following communique was published at its close:

In the period 12-23 July 1971, Soviet-American technical talks on peaceful nuclear explosions were held in Washington, D.C. These talks were a continuation of the technical talks on the same subject held in April 1969 in Vienna and in February 1970 in Moscow.

The USSR delegation at the talks was headed by I. D. Morokhov, First Deputy Chairman, State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic Energy of the USSR, and the United States delegation was led by Clarence E. Larson, Commissioner, the United States Atomic Energy Commission.

During the talks the parties continued the discussion of problems relating to technical and theoretical aspects of applications of peaceful nuclear explosions and exchanged scientific and technical information of mutual interest.

Particular attention was devoted to consideration of the problems of ensuring safety in the conduct of underground peaceful nuclear explosions.

The exchange of views that took place has extended mutual understanding of the problems associated with the uses of peaceful nuclear explosions, and will facilitate more successful work in this field of atomic energy uses.

The parties have come to the conclusion that it would be useful to continue technical exchange in the future, concentrating on the safety problems related to carrying out peaceful nuclear explosions and on separate engineering projects involving peaceful nuclear explosions.

Both delegations have noted with satisfaction the positive role which is being played by the IAEA in the study of scientific and technical aspects of the uses of peaceful nuclear explosions and expressed their willingness to facilitate the development of these activities within the framework of the Agency.

41. In concluding our statement on the problem of underground nuclear explosions, we should like to point out that this problem is only a part, though an important one, of the immense task of nuclear disarmament. This task comprises a number of other problems on which we intend to state our views in the future.

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Statement by the Canadian External Affairs Minister (Sharp) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Nuclear Test Ban, September 7, 1971¹

First of all I wish to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for your cordial greetings and to express my appreciation for the welcome extended to me by other representatives of the Committee who have already spoken.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

¹ CCD/PV.536, pp. 20-21.

47. I am very glad that my presence in Geneva to address the Fourth International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy affords me this opportunity to speak to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on a subject to which Canada attaches the greatest importance. I refer to the need for a complete ban on nuclear testing, including underground testing. Canada has a particular interest in the special report on this subject which I understand the Committee will be presenting to the General Assembly at its coming session.

48. There are political difficulties—to which the Soviet representative has referred—as well as technical difficulties to be overcome before a complete test ban is possible. Many States of the world, including Canada, believe that we cannot longer delay a determined effort to reach a total ban on underground nuclear testing. We believe that until this can be achieved, all Members of the United Nations would wish to appeal to those Governments which are conducting nuclear tests to put restraints on the size as well as the numbers of tests they are now carrying out, and to announce such restraints. This is a simple concept that does not involve any complications. Canada is not proposing an agreement limiting tests to some threshold which obviously would be difficult to determine.

49. Time is running out if the non-proliferation Treaty² is to become fully effective. The highest priority should be given by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to all those measures required to make the non-proliferation Treaty viable, and in particular to the ending of all nuclear tests. Canada stands firmly with those governments which have a special concern that all obstacles to the full implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty should be removed before the precarious equilibrium among the nuclear-weapon Powers is further disturbed by the emergence of new nuclear Powers or by some new scientific or technological development.

50. I should remind the Conference that the non-proliferation Treaty was designed to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons vertically as well as horizontally. It is not enough to deny the acquisition of nuclear weapons to those countries capable of producing them. Unless the nuclear Powers themselves put an end to the proliferation of their own nuclear weapons, in qualitative as well as quantitative terms, the full non-proliferation régime stands in danger.

51. At the root of the qualitative proliferation lies the continuation of nuclear-weapon tests. For this reason Canada attaches the greatest possible importance to all measures which would put an end to all nuclear tests by all governments in all environments. Our position is based on the concern we share with others for the safety of the whole world community. This concern

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

has a particular meaning for Canada, faced as we are with the possibility that one of the highest-yield tests ever carried out will take place in our neighbourhood later this year.

52. It is a complex and difficult problem that the Committee is trying to solve. I believe that all men everywhere are looking for a safer and better world and see one way to such a world—the step-by-step reduction, first in the growth of the nuclear arsenal, and in due course in the nuclear arsenal itself. Where should they look if not to the United Nations, and to this Conference which is its chosen instrument?

Statement by the Netherlands Representative (Bos) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Underground Test Ban, September 9, 1971¹

In my statement today I should like to make some remarks about the question of the cessation of underground nuclear-weapon tests.

3. First of all, I welcome the opportunity to introduce briefly the working paper on the seismicity of the United States, the Soviet Union and China submitted by my delegation.² This document is based, with some clarifications and modifications, on the paper which was presented by our seismological expert, Dr. Ritsema, to the informal meeting on 30 June. The underlying study of the seismicity of certain chosen regions was undertaken in view of a feeling of uncertainty among members of delegations about the frequency of seismic events of given magnitudes in certain regions of the world. Large discrepancies had been found in this respect in oral and written communications on the subject, and consequently the efficacy of detection and identification systems for smaller magnitude events was not clear. The purpose of the Netherlands working paper is to clarify that controversy by a statement that can be verified by all of us, since it is derived from data available to anyone. It gives in simple terms what is known about the seismicity of those parts of the world where unidentified events could give rise to concern within the framework of a comprehensive test ban.

4. The working paper shows, for instance, that, with the present seismic monitoring system, annually about three earthquakes in the Soviet Union with a magnitude roughly equivalent to that of explosions in hard rock of 10 kilotons or higher may pass unidentified. For the United States that number is one and for China seven. With a modest and feasible improvement of the identification capabilities, those numbers could even be lowered considerably. For example, with an identification system as indicated in the Canadian working paper CCD/327, on an average

¹ CCD/PV.537, pp. 5-11.

² CCD/349.

only one earthquake a year in the Soviet Union down to such a magnitude would not be distinguished from an explosion.³

5. Moreover, it should be borne in mind that the figures given in the paper are on the conservative side. No use has been made of the location of centres of population in the earthquake areas of the countries. If such regions also were excluded from the study, as were the border regions with neighbouring countries, the numbers of earthquakes that might be interpreted erroneously as explosions would be lowered accordingly.

6. It may be remarked also that many explosions have been identified as such during the past eight years although of a magnitude below that of the 90 per cent probability identification level as given in the Canadian study by Drs. Whitham and Basham. It has been found that under favourable conditions actual identification is sometimes better than was theoretically predicted.

7. Having said that with regard to my delegation's latest working paper, I should like now to revert to my intervention in this Committee of 29 April in order to clarify one of the points I raised on that occasion. The argument in my statement of 29 April on the problems of verifying a comprehensive test ban was based essentially on the following considerations:

First, none of the proposed verification systems would make it possible to identify all types of underground nuclear explosions.

Second, when discussing requirements for a comprehensive test ban, both seismic and non-seismic observation possibilities have to be taken into account.

Third, the principal aim of verification is deterrence from evasion.

Fourth, the possibility of on-site inspection can enhance deterrence.

Fifth, the risks that may arise from the partial evasion of a test ban by a rival Power have to be weighed against the risks arising from the continuation of underground tests without restriction.⁴

8. Although I could comment in further detail on each of those five considerations, I shall limit myself to the first one because we think that this point is helpful for viewing the question of on-site inspection in its proper proportions.

9. With respect to the possibilities of detection and identification by national means, we can divide the whole spectrum of possible underground nuclear explosions into three categories: explosions that can be detected, located and identified; explosions that can be detected and located but not identified; and explosions that cannot be detected at all or, in some cases, can be detected but cannot be located. It is only with respect to the second category that the question of on-site inspection comes under consideration, for in order to carry out any on-site

³ *Ante*, pp. 342-357.

⁴ See CCD/PV.512, pp. 8-17.

inspection it is necessary first to detect and locate a seismic event. With respect to the third category, the possibility of on-site inspection is of no avail. That implies that all parties to the test ban negotiations have always been prepared to accept some risk of evasion.

10. If we compare the different proposals that have been made on the verification of a comprehensive test ban, we should realize that we are never offered a choice between a comprehensive test ban with a risk of evasion and a comprehensive test ban without a risk of evasion; for with none of the proposed systems will there ever be 100 per cent certainty that a comprehensive test ban is fully complied with. Therefore I said in my statement of 29 April that—

... we must in any case ponder the question of what is more important: the banning of all tests, with a risk that small explosions could go on undetected, or the continuance of underground tests without restriction.⁵

11. In order to view the controversy on verification in its proper proportions, it might be useful to describe the three above-mentioned categories of explosions in more quantitative terms.

12. First of all, as to the category of explosions which can be detected and identified by national means with a high degree of certainty, it should be concluded from the Canadian analysis of 1970⁶ that this category comprises explosions down to a yield of about 50 kilotons in hard rock in the Northern Hemisphere, using the present seismic monitoring system. However, in their excellent new analysis of 29 June, the Canadian experts showed that explosions down to a yield of about 20 kilotons in most natural environments, except dry alluvium, can be identified with the present system.⁷

13. Moreover, it is indicated in their paper, as it was in our working paper CCD/323,⁸ that it seems possible to install a seismic monitoring system capable of identifying hard-rock explosions down to a yield of about 5-10 kilotons in the Northern Hemisphere. Such a system can be achieved mainly by the installation of a number of long-period vertical seismometers (LPZ-instruments) at selected places. I may add that even if sometimes there should be natural earthquakes which behaved as explosions, the recent Netherlands working paper indicates that their number would be very small in this range. In this context I may refer also to the article by Dr. Ericsson which was circulated by the Swedish delegation.⁹

14. With respect to explosions in dry alluvium, the seismic detection and identification possibilities relate to yields about

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 15.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 390-393.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 342-357.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 159-165.

⁹ U. A. Ericsson, "Event Identification for Test Ban Control," *Bulletin of the Seismological Society of America*, vol. 60, no. 5 (Oct. 1970), pp. 1521-1546.

tenfold those given for hard-rock explosions. However, explosions in dry alluvium of a yield of 20-30 kilotons or higher would normally cause cratering of the surface, which might be discovered, for instance, by satellite photography.

15. The third of the three categories I mentioned, that is the category of explosions that cannot be detected at all or, in certain instances, may be detected but not located, comprises explosions of a few kilotons or less in hard rock as well as bigger explosions in dry alluvium. In contrast to the first category, the carrying-out of nuclear test explosions in dry alluvium becomes interesting here because for yields under about 10 kilotons there seem to be better possibilities of avoiding the phenomenon of cratering. Incidentally, a would-be test-ban violator would probably take no risk of being found out and therefore would only test explosive devices well under 10 kilotons. I may mention in passing that of the relevant countries some have only very restricted areas where there are sufficiently thick layers of dry alluvium.

16. From what I have said so far about the first and third categories of explosions we can get a clearer view of the scope of the second category—namely, the only category which has relevance to the problem of on-site inspection. This category now seems to comprise a range of yields between a few and about 20 kilotons and may be further reduced by the introduction of advanced methods and instruments. At the same time, the number of earthquakes equivalent to explosions in this range is relatively small, which would restrict the possibility of violating a test ban without raising serious suspicion. When we say that on-site inspections can serve to strengthen the deterrence from evasion, we should take account of those facts and figures for the second category of explosions—that is, the category of explosions that can be detected and located but not identified by national means—in order to obtain a correct understanding of the dimensions of the problem.

17. After that amplification of the verification problem, I should like now to give our reaction to the questions asked by the Swedish representative at our meeting of 4 May.¹⁰

18. Her first question was whether any delegation could state specific political reasons, contingent upon the present situation—for instance, in connexion with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)—why we should make efforts to elaborate a threshold treaty despite the general political and technical objections to such a solution. I have already stated my delegation's views on the threshold idea in my statement of 29 April,¹¹ and I think those still hold. We do not think that a formal threshold treaty, even in the present situation, is a very suitable solution of the test-ban problem, although it is better than nothing at all. However, we can imagine that even without a formal treaty the

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 270.

¹¹ CCD/PV.512, pp. 10 ff.

major nuclear Powers would restrict themselves in the performing of test explosions. In this respect we are thinking especially of those tests which are clearly related to weapons which it is hoped will be encompassed by a SALT agreement and which can be identified easily by national means.

19. The second Swedish question related to other partial agreements, such as a phasing-out agreement. In answer to that question my delegation wishes to state that we can accept a phasing-out solution if the phasing-out period is not too long and if there is a real prospect of a complete cessation of tests in the near future.

20. In reply to the third question, concerning the relationship between a ban on underground tests and the Moscow Treaty,¹² we would prefer to see such a ban laid down in an independent treaty. We know, of course, that the Moscow partial test-ban treaty contains references to a comprehensive test ban in its preamble and in its article I, paragraph 1(b), and in view of this one could also envisage covering underground tests in an additional protocol to the Moscow Treaty. But such a protocol, as we see it, would probably be longer and more complicated than the original Treaty, as it would have to include, for instance, provisions about complaints and verification and about exceptions for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Furthermore, complications could arise with regard to the questions of participation, entry into force, and amendment of the protocol if it were linked to the Moscow Treaty. The third possibility mentioned by Mrs. Myrdal, namely, incorporating the ban on underground tests in a revision of the Moscow Treaty itself, would not be advisable in our view because we see some risk in renegotiating a text which now enjoys such great standing and wide acceptance.

21. The Swedish delegation asked in its fourth question whether we wish to work simultaneously on a treaty and on a series of transitional measures facilitating and leading up to a comprehensive solution. My answer is that the Netherlands delegation is willing to work simultaneously on all possible measures which can promote a comprehensive test ban. In particular, I wish to state that my delegation is prepared to lend its support to all the suggestions for transitional or confidence-building measures contained in the Canadian working paper CCD/336.¹³

22. The other questions put forward by Mrs. Myrdal on 4 May were directed to the nuclear-weapon Powers. In this connexion I may also refer to the interesting suggestions made by the delegation for Sweden for the provisions of a treaty including a phasing-out period and regulations concerning peaceful nuclear explosions.¹⁴ As I said, we are willing to support every construc-

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 431-432.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 422-423, 541-544.

tive idea which can promote a comprehensive test-ban treaty; but before my delegation comments in detail on the different provisions of the proposed treaty and protocols, it prefers to await the comments of the nuclear-weapon Powers in the Committee.

23. Looking back on our Committee's study of the test-ban question in the course of this year, I think we can agree that great progress has been made in clarifying the scientific aspects of the issue. It may be questioned now whether we should expect much from a further exploration of these aspects. My delegation has the impression that the scientific aspects and the technological possibilities have been almost fully explored and that relatively little can be added to the picture by a further continuation of the scientific and technical discussions. If this is correct, I wonder whether we should not conclude that the time has come for the Powers most directly concerned to make such political decisions as are needed in order to achieve the comprehensive test ban for which we are all striving.

American-Soviet Communique on Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, September 24, 1971¹

The US-USSR negotiations on limiting strategic armaments continued in Helsinki from July 8 to September 24, 1971.

The US delegation was headed by the Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Gerard Smith. Members of the delegation Philip J. Farley, J. Graham Parsons, Paul Nitze, Harold Brown, and Royal Allison participated in the negotiations.

The USSR delegation was headed by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V.S. Semenov. Members of the delegation P.S. Pleshakov, A. N. Shchukin, K. A. Trusov, and R. M. Timerbaev participated in the negotiations.

The delegations were accompanied by advisors and experts.

In accordance with the May 20, 1971, understanding of the Governments of the US and the USSR,² the delegations have engaged in detailed consideration of issues relating to an agreement on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems, and have given consideration to issues involved in agreeing on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. Some other related questions were also discussed.

Certain areas of common ground with respect to such limitations have been developed during this phase of the negotiations, and a clearer understanding was achieved concerning issues to be resolved.

The two sides express their appreciation to the Government of

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 18, 1971, pp. 403-404.

² *Ante*, p. 298.

Finland for creating favorable conditions for holding the negotiations. They are grateful for the traditional Finnish hospitality which was extended to them.

Agreement was reached that negotiations between the US and the USSR delegations will be resumed on November 15, 1971, in Vienna.

Statement by President Nixon on Approval of the American-Soviet Agreements on Improvement of the Direct Communications Link and Measures To Reduce the Risk of Nuclear War, September 24, 1971¹

The President has approved two agreements that have been negotiated by the United States and Soviet SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks) delegations.

The first agreement concerns measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the United States and USSR.²

The second agreement—which will serve in part to implement the first one—provides for the improvement and modernization of the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link, or “Hot Line,” which was established in 1963.³

The agreement on reducing the risk of nuclear war covers three main areas:

—a pledge by both sides to take the steps each considers necessary to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons.

—arrangements for rapid communication should a danger of nuclear war arise from such nuclear incidents or from detection of unidentified objects on early warning systems.

—advance notification of certain planned missile launches.

The agreement on the Direct Communications Link will provide for improvements which will take advantage of technological developments since the link was established in 1963. Specifically, two satellite circuits will be established, one by each side, as well as multiple terminals to increase reliability of the link. The Soviet Union will provide a circuit through a satellite system of its own and the United States will arrange for a channel through Intelsat.

Secretary Rogers and Foreign Minister Gromyko plan to sign these agreements in Washington on September 30, 1971.

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Sept. 27, 1971, pp. 1318-1319.

² *Post*, pp. 633-635.

³ *Post*, pp. 635-639; *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 236-238.

IAEA General Conference Resolution (XV)283: Further Principles for the Assessment of Members' Contributions Towards the Agency's Administrative Expenses, September 27, 1971¹

The General Conference,

(a) *Being informed* of a set of arrangements providing for the financing of the safeguards activities of the Agency which the Board of Governors has endorsed,

(b) *Taking note* of an understanding that those arrangements would not be invoked as a precedent for other financing arrangements either within the Agency or in other international organizations, and

(c) *Considering* it desirable to supplement the principles for the assessment of Members' contributions towards the Agency's administrative expenses, which it approved by Resolution GC(III)/RES/50,² with further principles that will reflect the arrangements in question,

Establishes the following principles for the assessment of Members' contributions towards the Agency's administrative expenses to supplement those it approved by Resolution GC(III)/RES/50:

(a) The Agency's administrative expenses shall be divided into:

(i) Non-safeguards expenses, which shall include all expenses required to be apportioned among Members in accordance with Article XIV.D of the Statute except safeguards expenses; and

(ii) Safeguards expenses, which shall include all expenses relating to the Agency's safeguards activities;

(b) Non-safeguards expenses shall be borne by Members in proportion to their respective base rates of assessment calculated by application of the principles set forth in Resolution GC(III)/RES/50.

(c) Safeguards expenses, after deduction of such amounts as are recoverable under agreements relating to safeguards between the Agency and parties to such agreements that are not members of the Agency, shall be borne by Members as follows:

(i) Each Member on the list provided for in sub-paragraph (ii) below shall contribute a minimum amount determined by applying its rate of assessment for 1971³ to the safeguards section of the Regular Budget for 1971⁴, but shall contribute a larger amount corresponding to one half of its base rate of

¹ IAEA doc. GC(XV)/RES/283, Oct. 8, 1971.

² IAEA, *General Conference, Third Regular Session, 22 September-2 October 1959: Resolutions and Other Decisions*, p. 7.

³ See GC (XIV)/RES/267.

⁴ GC (XIV)/RES/264.

assessment or equal to 16.9% of the sum which it contributes under sub-paragraph (b) above, whichever is the less, if each of the latter amounts is greater than the minimum amount.

(ii) The list,⁵ which shall be drawn up by the Director General (and will be kept under review by the Board of Governors), shall comprise Members, except those that have notified the Director General that they do not wish to be included, having per capita net national products of less than one third of the average per capita net national product of the ten Members having the highest per capita net national products, the per capita net national products being identified by examination of the documents used by the Committee on Contributions of the General Assembly of the United Nations, and

(iii) Any Member not on the list shall contribute on a scale to be determined by proportionately increasing its base rate of assessment in such a way that the total contributions of such Members make up the balance of the safeguards expenses.

Twelve Nation Memorandum Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, September 28, 1971¹

In the Joint memorandum of the group of twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare, the group had expressed the following views:

(i) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare;

(ii) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of States;

(iii) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, as indeed adequate verification is also essential in regard to the success of any measures in the field of disarmament. Reasonable guarantees and safeguards should, therefore, be devised to inspire confidence in the implementation of any agreement in the field of C and B weapons. Verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an

⁵ See GC (XV)/RES/284.

¹ CCD/352, Sept. 28, 1971.

acceptable system which would ensure effective implementation of the prohibition.²

This basic approach was commended by the General Assembly of the United Nations in its resolution 2662 (XXV).³

The group of twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have taken note of the evolution of negotiations which has since taken place, whereby only the elaboration of a Convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction seems possible at the present stage. However, the group wishes to emphasize the immense importance and urgency of reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons also.

Bearing in mind the recognized principle of the elimination of chemical weapons as well as the firmly expressed commitment to continue negotiations in good faith until early agreement is reached on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, the group offers the following elements on which such negotiations should be based:

1. An obligation to prohibit the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition and retention of chemical agents of types and in quantities that will be defined in future agreed provisions, and weapons using such chemical agents as well as equipment or means of delivery designed to facilitate the use of such agents or weapons.

2. An undertaking not to assist, receive, encourage or induce any State, group of States or international organizations in the above mentioned prohibited activities.

3. An undertaking to destroy or convert to peaceful uses, taking all necessary safety precautions, all chemical agents, weapons, equipment or means of delivery and facilities, specially meant for the development, production and stockpiling or for using such agents or weapons.

4. An undertaking to disband and not to establish anew special military or other forces for using chemical agents or weapons.

5. The problem of verification should be treated in accordance with the suggestions contained in the Joint memorandum of the group of twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

6. A clear understanding whereby future agreed provisions for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons are not to be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by the Parties under the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁴

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

7. Future agreed provisions should be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the research, development, production, possession and application of chemical agents for peaceful purposes or hindering the economic or technological development of States Parties.

8. An undertaking to facilitate the fullest possible exchange of chemical agents, equipment, material and scientific and technological information for the use of such chemical agents for peaceful purposes.

9. A recognition of the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The group is firmly convinced that the CCD should proceed with the task of elaborating, as a high priority item, agreed provisions for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The Group finally expresses the hope that the elements suggested in the preceding paragraphs would receive general acceptance so that early agreement could be reached on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their effective elimination from the arsenals of States.

Revised Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, September 28, 1971¹

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,² and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

¹ CCD/353, Sept. 28, 1971. The revised draft convention was submitted by Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, USSR, U.K., and U.S.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of states, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

(1) Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

(2) Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this Article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in Article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to the Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, this Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to the Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to the Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of this convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State

under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to the Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of this Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the

preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to this Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of this Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of _____ which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositaries of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of this Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary

Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

Done in ___ copies at _____, this ___ day of _____, ____.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Revised Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, September 28, 1971¹

We have before us today, co-sponsored by twelve delegations, a new revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.²

3. This new text incorporates a large number of ideas and compromises reflecting views of almost every delegation. We therefore believe it must in all fairness be regarded as a product of this entire Committee. With this thought in mind, let me comment briefly on the draft, particularly those aspects which reflect changes from the drafts of 5 August.³

4. In accordance with suggestions made by a number of delegations, in particular several non-aligned delegations, the preamble to the convention has been substantially changed and reorganized. A basic objective of the changes proposed in working paper CCD/341⁴ was to broaden the scope of the preamble by including references to chemical weapons, as well as to biological and toxin weapons.

5. Many of the specific proposals contained in CCD/341 have been accepted, and the basic objective has, we believe, been achieved. At the same time, these changes necessitated some other alterations in the text which, while not, we believe, detracting from the objectives which the sponsors of CCD/341 had in mind, were necessary to avoid possible prejudice to the positions of various governments, including my own, with respect to certain aspects of the issue of chemical weapons. We believe that the combination of changes relating to this issue represents a mutually acceptable solution which reflects hard bargaining and significant adjustments by all sides.

6. The second, third and fourth paragraphs of the new preamble were the eighth, ninth and tenth paragraphs in the draft of 5 August. The change in the position of these paragraphs is

¹ CCD/PV.542, pp. 5-11.

² *Supra*.

³ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

again in response to a proposal contained in working paper CCD/341. The text of the fourth preambular paragraph is, however, different from that of the tenth paragraph of the 5 August draft. The new language, which was proposed by the representative of Morocco,⁵ is considered by my delegation—and, I believe, by most others—to be a substantial improvement on the old version. The ninth and tenth paragraphs, which were the second and seventh paragraphs of the 5 August draft, remain unchanged except for an editorial revision in the first phrase of the ninth paragraph. That revision, while apparently minor in nature, was the subject of particularly difficult discussions among us, and it represents a substantial adjustment reflecting the strongly-held views of a number of delegations.

7. In addition to the foregoing, a few minor editorial changes have been made in various paragraphs to improve the flow of the preamble as a whole or to achieve consistency.

8. Finally, it will be noted that the fifth and sixth paragraphs of the 5 August draft have been deleted from the preamble. While those paragraphs created no problems as the preamble was originally written, a number of difficulties became apparent when an attempt was made to adjust those paragraphs to the broad scope of the preamble favoured by a number of non-aligned delegations. After repeated efforts to find a mutually satisfactory solution to these difficulties, it was concluded that the best solution in this case would be to delete these paragraphs, which did not seem essential to the force or logic of the preamble.

9. There are three changes in article I. First, the phrase “never in any circumstances” has been inserted in place of the word “not” in the 5 August draft. That phrase appeared in article I of the United Kingdom draft convention.⁶ Its insertion in the present convention was originally suggested by the Egyptian delegation.⁷ This addition is one to which my delegation and several others attach considerable importance because it seems to us very helpful in dealing with two rather difficult problems.

10. There has been some discussion during the course of our deliberations regarding the effectiveness of this convention in the event of armed conflict between any of the parties. It is our view, which appears to be shared, that this convention, as a companion measure to the Geneva Protocol,⁸ would, like the Protocol, remain in full force and effect in time of war. The addition of the phrase “never in any circumstances” reinforces this view, since war would obviously be one of the “circumstances” referred to. This change does not, of course, prejudice the rights of parties under the withdrawal clause of article XIII in the conditions set forth in that provision.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 510-511.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 378.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

11. A further question has been raised concerning the relationship between this convention and the reservations of many parties to the Geneva Protocol, by which they have retained the right to use weapons covered by that Protocol under certain circumstances. While this convention does not affect legal rights and obligations of States under the Geneva Protocol, the addition of the phrase "never in any circumstances" in article I will serve to emphasize the intention of parties to this convention that reservations to the Protocol should not, as a practical matter, result in any exception to the total prohibition of biological and toxin weapons achieved by the present convention.

12. The second change in article I is the addition of the phrase "whatever their origin or method of production" after the word "toxins" in the first paragraph. This change was suggested by the Swedish delegation as a means of ensuring that the concept of "toxins" will be interpreted broadly, thus enhancing the significance and effect of this convention as an arms control and disarmament measure.⁹ The phrase is intended to make it clear that the prohibitions of the convention extend to toxins produced by chemical synthesis as well as those produced by bacteriological or any other biological methods.

13. The final change in this article is the addition of the word "protective" after "prophylactic". Such a change was originally suggested by the Netherlands delegation¹⁰ and, though not precisely in this form, by the Italian delegation also.¹¹ We believe this addition clarifies an important point. While the word "prophylactic" can be interpreted broadly to include a wide variety of measures for the prevention of disease, we believe it generally bears the connotation of protection of the human body from the effects of organisms or substances to which the individual may be directly exposed. We thus interpret the word "prophylactic" as clearly encompassing medical activities, such as diagnosis, therapy and immunization, and research relating thereto.

14. There is, however, a somewhat different class of activities which are intended to be covered by the term "protective". This category would include, for example, the development of equipment and devices, such as protective masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems, detection and warning devices, and decontamination equipment. Research and testing in these areas might well require laboratory quantities of certain agents and toxins. We think it is clear that this class of activities, as well as that covered by the term "prophylactic", is to be considered permitted under the convention, and we agree with the delegations of the Netherlands and Italy that this point should be clarified in the text itself through the addition of the word "protective". At

⁹ *Ante*, p. 426.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 452.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 505.

the same time, to avoid any possible ambiguity, we want to state unequivocally that the word "protective" is not intended to convey any broader meaning which would in any way permit possession of biological agents or toxins for weapons purposes on the theory that such weapons were for "defensive" warfare, retaliation, or deterrence. We believe there can be no ambiguity on this point.

15. I should like to make one further comment of a general nature concerning article I. Paragraph (1) refers to microbial or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes. This paragraph is intended to establish a prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of such agents or toxins for any purpose other than those indicated. Thus this article would not permit any quantities of such agents or toxins to be developed, produced, stockpiled, acquired or retained for hostile purposes or for purposes of use in armed conflict; and it would not permit the stockpiling or retention for non-peaceful purposes of quantities that, when produced or acquired, had a justification for a peaceful purpose, such as meeting hospital requirements.

16. In article II, the word "populations" has been inserted in place of "the population". This change, suggested by Mr. Khattabi of Morocco,^{1 2} is intended to make it clear that, in implementing article II, governments should take whatever precautions might be necessary to protect the populations of all States.

17. It will be recalled that the number of months allowed for complete implementation of article II was left blank in the 5 August draft. After consultations, we have inserted, as a suggestion, a period of nine months. It seems to us that this figure is both realistic and appropriate. For a State whose instrument of ratification or accession is deposited subsequent to the entry into force of the convention as a whole, the nine-month period would, in accordance with paragraph (4) of article XIV, begin on the date on which that State deposited such an instrument.

18. We believe it would be desirable and appropriate for each State party to inform the other States parties, through notices to depositary governments, of actions taken in implementation of the provisions of article II, and the United States intends to do so as soon as it has completed all necessary steps in compliance with that article.

19. Articles III and IV have not been changed from the 5 August draft. These articles are designed to prevent the proliferation of weapons covered by the convention as well as to make more effective the application of the treaty's provisions and thus contribute to the full realization of its objectives.

20. Articles V, VI, and VII strengthen the convention by

^{1 2} *Ante*, pp. 510-511.

establishing a framework for consideration of any problems arising under the convention and for assistance to any party endangered as a result of a violation.

21. Article V now provides for consultations and co-operation in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of the convention, as well as in situations involving the application of specific provisions. This reflects a view, which we believe is widely shared, that such consultations and co-operation should not necessarily be limited to narrow questions of the technical violation of any particular article but should encompass as well any problems concerning the achievement of the over-all objective of the treaty. In accordance with a suggestion contained in working paper CCD/341, the article also provides that such consultation and co-operation may be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

22. Article VI contains provisions regarding recourse to the machinery of the United Nations Security Council, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, in cases in which a violation is suspected.

23. Article VII, the new article on assistance, is responsive to the suggestions of a number of delegations, including those of Argentina, Italy, Morocco, Nigeria, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. While the article does not, of course, affect the obligations or the exercise of the rights of the parties under the United Nations Charter, it reaffirms those rights and obligations in the specific context of a possible violation of the present convention. It thus stresses the importance attached by all States parties to the strict observance of the convention by placing the question of a possible violation, resulting in danger to any State which has agreed to abide by its prohibitions, on the highest plane of international concern. The nature of the assistance to be provided following a request by the endangered State party would of course be in accordance with the Charter. However, in the light of the danger which would be most likely to exist in such a situation, we consider that medical or other humanitarian or relief assistance would be suitable.

24. We would like to note further that, while the article by its terms, would not apply until a decision by the Security Council that a party had been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the convention, States parties would of course remain free to provide assistance they deem appropriate in the interim. As in other situations where a country is in need of humanitarian assistance, we expect that many countries would wish to offer assistance as soon as possible in any event.

25. Article VIII ensures that this convention can in no way be interpreted as prejudicing or detracting from the Geneva Protocol.

This has, of course, been a major objective of many delegations in these negotiations and one which we believe is universally shared.

26. As all delegations are aware, article IX was the subject of particularly intensive negotiations. The article contains a new clause along lines requested by eleven non-aligned delegations in CCD/341. The basic point of that proposal has thus been included, namely, that article IX should state unequivocally an objective of the further negotiations provided for in that article—effective prohibition of chemical weapons. We believe this is an important commitment which should eliminate any doubt as to the positions of States parties on the need for continued, urgent consideration of this problem. This point is of course emphasized as well in the preamble, particularly in its seventh paragraph.

27. In addition to incorporating the basic objective of the sponsors of working paper CCD/341 with respect to this article, we have accepted a number of suggestions contained in that paper regarding the specific language of the article. For example, the States parties would now undertake to “continue”, rather than to “conduct”, further negotiations, and with a view to reaching “early” agreement, as was suggested in the working paper. Moreover, the words “affirms” and “recognized” have been inserted in response to suggestions made by a number of non-aligned delegations during the course of our negotiations on the language of this article.

28. Article X expresses what we regard as an important corollary to the elimination of the use of biological agents and toxins for weapons purposes. With a significant addition proposed by non-aligned delegations, it now contains a broad undertaking of States parties to co-operate in efforts to facilitate the widest possible use of these materials for peaceful purposes. In addition, it provides for the implementation of the convention in a manner which avoids hampering the economic and technological development of States parties or international co-operation in this area. We believe that this expanded article, perhaps more than any other, reflects the basic objective of our negotiations: to turn scientific efforts from the paths of destruction to the service of all mankind.

29. The remaining articles of the convention have been fully discussed in earlier statements. In paragraph (3) of article XIV, the number of ratifications required for entry into force of the convention had been left blank in the 5 August draft. However, it seems to us that the number twenty-two, which was used in the case of the sea-bed arms control Treaty negotiated here last year,¹³ is equally appropriate in the case of this convention, and we have therefore inserted that number, in the absence of any indication within the Committee of other preferences.

30. We believe that the development of this convention since

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

30 March represents a major accomplishment on the part of this Committee. It has required a great deal of dedicated work on the part of all delegations to resolve, in a mutually acceptable way, many differences which have arisen in the course of our work concerning aspects of this convention.

31. Our governments have all attached great importance to the work in which we have been engaged, and it is not surprising that there have been some differences in perspective. But it is precisely the importance of this work and these differences in perspective that have made the negotiation of this convention a truly remarkable feat for the Committee.

32. My Government has accepted many changes from the draft of 5 August which it sponsored. It has done so in the realization that this convention is significantly strengthened as a truly negotiated instrument reflecting the views of many delegations.

33. Our progress in these negotiations has been due in large part to the mixture of idealism and pragmatism, the abilities and goodwill of all the delegations which have participated. I am confident that our progress this year will demonstrate once again to the international community the value of our Committee as an effective negotiating body.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Revised Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, September 28, 1971¹

Today a new revised draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction is being tabled for the consideration of the Committee on Disarmament.²

35. The submission of the new revised draft convention on bacteriological weapons marks the completion of an important stage in the Committee's consideration of the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological means of warfare. As a result of prolonged and intensive work, we have succeeded in preparing the draft which is proposed for consideration by the Committee and which, we hope, will be submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations. This means that there are real possibilities of concluding in the very near future yet another agreement in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. It is important also that this convention will be the first to deal with disarmament as such, and will involve the complete elimination from the arsenals of States of one type of weapon of mass destruction.

¹ CCD/PV.542, pp. 11-19.

² *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

36. The conclusion of a convention on bacteriological and toxin weapons, towards which a real and important step is being taken today, will help to improve the international situation and will increase the possibilities of solving other problems of disarmament. In the first place, it must pave the way for the elimination of yet another means of mass destruction—chemical weapons—from the life of human society.

37. From the outset of the discussion on this question, we have taken and we continue to take the position that the best solution to the problem would be the simultaneous prohibition of both bacteriological and chemical weapons. As is known, this approach of the socialist countries has obtained wide support in the Committee on Disarmament and in the General Assembly of the United Nations. It was precisely this approach that constituted the basis of the draft convention submitted by the socialist countries concerning the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons.³ While agreeing to the prohibition at this stage only of bacteriological and toxin weapons, the socialist countries have nevertheless continued their efforts to ensure that the convention being drafted should contain provisions which would facilitate and accelerate the solution of the problem of chemical weapons.

38. Today, as the preparation of the convention enters its final stage, we should like to note with satisfaction that the discussion on the draft convention has been businesslike and constructive. As a result of the fact that the participants in the negotiations have displayed an interest in concluding a convention and a desire to find mutually-acceptable solutions, it has been possible to agree on the document submitted today.

39. What ensured the successful elaboration of the convention on bacteriological and toxin weapons? The same reasons which earlier ensured the successful preparation and conclusion of other agreements relating to the field of disarmament—the Treaty on the partial prohibition of nuclear weapon tests,⁴ the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁵ and the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor.⁶ Each of these international instruments is based on the desire of States to live in peace, to solve problems by negotiation and to seek possibilities of reducing the burden of armaments. It is precisely by pursuing this objective that success can be achieved in the matter of disarmament. It is important that the main task should not be obscured by less essential, secondary considerations. The main objective in solving disarmament problems is to save mankind from incalculable disasters, and from a thermonuclear catastrophe.

40. During consideration of the socialist countries' draft

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 533-537.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

convention of 30 March⁷ and of the parallel drafts of 5 August,⁸ various amendments, proposals and considerations were advanced. All of them have been carefully examined and studied. The overwhelming majority of them are reflected in the new revised draft.

41. I should now like to turn to the changes that have been made in the draft convention. The main trend in the discussion was that many States submitted proposals for strengthening the provisions in the draft linking the convention with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. This trend reflects the concern of many States at the danger inherent in the replenishment of the arsenals of States with weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons. We understand and share that concern. Many members of the Committee advocated a strengthening of the provisions linking the convention with the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Proposals to that effect were submitted and have been taken into account in preparing the new draft convention. Thus, the main changes in the draft lie in the fact that it now provides a more definite basis for further negotiations and the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

42. The basic provision on this question is contained in article IX. This article now not only includes an undertaking to continue negotiations on chemical weapons in good faith, but also defines the specific objective of the negotiations—effective prohibition of chemical weapons by reaching an agreement on this question. It is also stressed that such an agreement should be reached at an early date.

43. The relevant provisions of the preamble have also been strengthened. In the first and seventh paragraphs, amendments have been made to extend the provisions of these paragraphs, which previously referred only to bacteriological weapons, to cover chemical weapons as well. In these paragraphs it is now stated that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their elimination will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control; and stress is placed on the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States both these types of weapons. Moreover, in the eighth paragraph of the preamble it is recognized that a convention on bacteriological weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of chemical weapons.

44. A significant role in solving the problem of chemical weapons could be played by the conference to review the operation of this convention with a view to assuring that the

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. The provisions in article XII concerning this conference have not been changed. However, as the question of chemical weapons has been stated more forcefully and more clearly both in the preamble and in the operative part, this article has now become more weighty and decisive.

45. Worthy of note, also, is the sentence included in article V, on verification of the application of the convention. This sentence provides for consultation and co-operation between the parties to the convention in solving any problems which may arise, not only in the application of the provisions of the convention, but also in relation to its objective. This amendment has a direct bearing on negotiations on chemical weapons, inasmuch as one of the most important objectives of the convention, as they are now set forth in the preamble and in article IX, is the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

46. On the whole, the changes which have been made, together with the provisions already contained in the convention, create the necessary prerequisites for progress in solving the problem of chemical weapons.

47. Important provisions in the draft are those which refer to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 on the Prohibition of the Use of Chemical and Bacteriological Weapons.⁹ Article VIII stipulates that no provision of the convention shall be interpreted as limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol. Furthermore, in the preamble the important significance of the Protocol is recognized, adherence to its principles and objectives is re-affirmed and all States are called upon to comply strictly with them. As suggested by the non-aligned countries, these provisions, which were previously placed at the end of the preamble, have been moved to the beginning.¹⁰ The former eighth, ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs have now become the second, third and fourth paragraphs respectively. Moreover, as proposed by Morocco, the fourth preambular paragraph now states that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹¹ The socialist countries consider that the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons is a generally-recognized rule of international law. On the whole, the draft convention meets the need to reinforce the Geneva Protocol.

48. Important changes have been made in the convention as a result of amendments to article I, concerning the basic prohibitions. In its present form this article binds the parties "never in any circumstances" to resort to the acts prohibited in the article.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 501.

¹¹ See *ante*, pp. 510-511.

This phrase was inserted on the proposal of Egypt.¹² Such a formulation undoubtedly strengthens article I in which it is now emphasized that the prohibitions provided for in the convention remain effective both in peace time and in war time. Nothing in this convention gives grounds for other interpretations.

49. Some delegations have also raised the question that States, at the time of ratification or accession to the convention, should withdraw their reservations to the Geneva Protocol in so far as bacteriological weapons are concerned. The phrase "never in any circumstances" covers this question, too. Furthermore, in the ninth preambular paragraph it is stated that the parties to the convention are determined to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological agents or toxins being used as weapons. This provision—which is not a re-statement of the prohibition of the use of such weapons, which is already contained in the Geneva Protocol—reflects the result of the conclusion of the convention, since the cessation of production, and the elimination, of stockpiles of bacteriological and toxin weapons will completely exclude the possibility of their use. This solves the problem of reservations with regard to such weapons.

50. At the suggestion of the delegation of Sweden, a clarification has been inserted in article I specifying that the prohibition covers toxins "whatever their origin or method of production".¹³ This formulation excludes the possibility of interpreting article I as prohibiting only certain types of toxins. In its statement introducing the former draft of 5 August, the Soviet delegation, on behalf of the co-sponsors, explained that the broadest possible understanding of the term "toxins" was intended.¹⁴ The Swedish amendment is in conformity with this understanding and makes the formulation more complete from the legal point of view.

51. A clarification has been included in the wording of paragraph (1) of article I to the effect that the prohibition does not apply to agents of types and in quantities which are intended for protective purposes. The inclusion of the word "protective" is based on authoritative explanations by scientific experts that, for the development and testing of means and methods designed for protecting individuals and the population against bacteriological agents, it is essential to have a certain quantity of such agents. There are of course no grounds for considering this wording as a loophole for violating the convention, since it refers to agents which may be kept exclusively for peaceful purposes and the mention of prophylactic and protective purposes makes this provision quite specific.

52. The blank space in article II has been filled in with the words "nine months", the period during which bacteriological weapons must be destroyed or diverted to peaceful purposes.

¹² *Ante*, p. 378.

¹³ *Ante*, p. 426.

¹⁴ *See ante*, p. 461.

53. During the discussion on the draft convention suggestions were made that States parties to the convention should give appropriate notification of the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of stockpiles of bacteriological and toxin weapons in accordance with article II. The Soviet Union is prepared to give such notification on the understanding that other States parties to the convention will do likewise. In this connexion, we are guided by the consideration that paragraph (5) of article XIV of the convention states that the depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of—*inter alia*—“other notices”. Thus, notifications concerning the implementation of article II may be made through the depositary governments, which will bring them to the notice of all other parties to the agreement.

54. The new revised draft convention submitted today contains a detailed system for ensuring its observance, based on a combination of international and national guarantees. It includes an obligation for States to take the necessary measures, in accordance with their constitutional procedures, to comply with the prohibitions provided for in the convention, and also an undertaking by the parties to the convention to consult one another and co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in its application. Such consultation and co-operation may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. If a party to the convention finds that other parties are acting in breach of the obligations assumed under the convention, it may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations and co-operate in carrying out investigations initiated by the Council. The system of guarantees contained in the draft is strengthened by the provisions of the convention concerning the convening of a conference to review the operation of the convention and the realization of its purposes and provisions.

55. A new feature in the system of verification is the provision concerning international procedures, which is a development of the corresponding provisions in the previous draft. This addition has been made in response to proposals by the group of non-aligned countries¹⁵ and by certain Western States—Italy¹⁶ and the Netherlands.¹⁷ This amendment also takes into account the point made by Egypt that there are instances when relations between some States are of a nature as not to allow of the implementation of the provision on direct consultation and co-operation between parties.¹⁸

56. The formulation regarding international procedures has been taken from the corresponding provision of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction

¹⁵ *Ante* pp. 500-501.

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 503-505.

¹⁷ CCD/PV.502, p. 10; *ante*, p. 451.

¹⁸ *Ante*, p. 378.

on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor. We believe that this question, which was extensively discussed during the drafting of the sea-bed Treaty, was solved in the proper manner in that Treaty, and that the solution may serve as a good precedent in the present case.

57. In accordance with proposals made by many States—Morocco, Nigeria, Argentina, Italy, the Netherlands and others—a new article, article VII, has been included in the convention. This deals with assistance to any party to the convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the convention. This wording of the article appears to us to be more correct than the formulation which referred to assistance only in the case of the use of bacteriological and toxin weapons, since the convention deals with the prohibition of the production and development of those weapons and not their use, which is already prohibited by the Geneva Protocol. The formulation adopted has a wider sense and is directly connected with the content of the convention as a whole. Under article VII, not only the use of the prohibited weapons, but also a violation of the convention by producing or acquiring the prohibited types of weapons, may serve as grounds for a decision by the Security Council declaring that a danger exists as a result of violation of the convention.

58. The question was also raised as to what is understood by the word “assistance”. Views were expressed that the term meant medical or relief measures. We agree that for the purposes of the convention it means medical and other humanitarian assistance. At the same time, other measures may be taken in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations for the protection of the security of the party attacked and for the maintenance of peace, as provided for in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. It should be noted also that article VII of the convention does not, of course, exclude the provision of assistance on the basis of other agreements and obligations in keeping with the United Nations Charter.

59. We consider that the amendment to article X, adopted at the suggestion of the non-aligned States,¹⁹ is a useful addition. It deals with co-operation in the development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology for peaceful purposes.

60. The blank space in article XIV, paragraph (3), has been filled in with an indication to the effect that the convention will enter into force after the deposit of the instruments of ratification by twenty-two governments, including the depositary governments. In this case the corresponding provision in the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor was taken as a precedent.

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 501.

61. The amendments incorporated in the draft convention in response to proposals by a wide range of States members of the Committee, strengthen the convention, in our opinion, and clarify its provisions. The draft convention prepared in the Committee is thus the result of the collective efforts of all its members, and is a carefully prepared and well thought-out document.

62. I would like to express the hope that the Committee will approve the draft convention which has been submitted, and that it will soon become an international instrument with legal force.

Statement by the British Representative (Hainworth) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Revised Draft Convention on Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, September 28, 1971¹

The Committee has been very patient in recent sessions in listening to United Kingdom views on biological warfare. At the risk of trying this patience a little further I wish to speak today on the same subject in support of the draft convention in CCD/353, which, as will be seen from the heading, the United Kingdom delegation is pleased to co-sponsor.²

64. My delegation is particularly grateful to the authors of the drafts contained in CCD/337 and CCD/338 of 5 August³ for the attention and consideration with which they have listened to our views and the extent to which they have found it possible to meet the United Kingdom points of view in the revised draft before us now. My delegation wishes to make clear its welcome for this new draft and its general satisfaction with its contents.

65. The United Kingdom delegation is of course by no means the only one to have had account taken of its views. There have been quite a number of changes since 5 August. Many of these have been in response to the working paper CCD/341 tabled by eleven non-aligned delegations.⁴ Other changes have been made at the suggestion of individual delegations. Some of these changes the United Kingdom delegation is especially happy to welcome. For example, we are pleased to see the incorporation in article V of the language suggested by the eleven delegations in CCD/341. We are also glad to note the extent to which it has been possible to take account of the suggestions made by the Egyptian delegation in working paper CCD/328⁵ and by the Moroccan delegation in CCD/347.⁶

¹ CCD/PV.542, pp. 19-23.

² *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

³ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 378.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 510-511.

66. Certain other suggestions put forward by delegations were, frankly, a good deal less attractive to the British delegation. But we have always recognized the need to compromise during serious negotiations of this sort. On certain issues in the draft before us we feel we have reflected this spirit of compromise to the maximum extent in order to meet the strongly held views of other delegations, whose sincerity we respect even if we are not always in agreement with the conclusions they have drawn. Likewise, we acknowledge with appreciation that the same spirit has been shown by other delegations in being prepared to go along with points to which my delegation attaches particular significance.

67. On 10 August I made a full statement in the Committee describing the sort of improvements to the 5 August drafts that I thought should be made.⁷ In the course of those remarks I noted with appreciation the appearance of what was then the second preambular paragraph. I went on to say that it was entirely right that the aim of excluding completely for the sake of all mankind the possibility of biological agents and toxins being used as weapons should find its appropriate place in the draft convention. After due reflection my delegation has come to the conclusion that the current wording of this preambular paragraph and its position as the penultimate paragraph are appropriate. Placed as it is, so close to the operative part of the new convention, it is in the view of my delegation a clear expression of the objective of the draft convention. In these circumstances—and I hope that in view of his statement on 24 August⁸ what I am about to say will please the representative of Mongolia—we have not continued to press for an explicit operative undertaking by the parties never in any circumstances to engage in biological methods of warfare.

68. If I may be allowed to summarize the thought behind my statement of 10 August, it was that the United Kingdom delegation considered that we should ensure by the coming into force of the convention on biological weapons that there was no practical or legal possibility of biological weapons ever being used.

69. My United States and Soviet colleagues have already mentioned that there was in the minds of some delegations a question as to whether the convention would be operative in time of war. This was not a matter on which the United Kingdom was ever in any doubt, but the addition of the four words “never in any circumstances” to the key undertakings in article I will have removed any residual doubts other delegations may have had.

70. There remains, however, the problem of whether the reservations to the Geneva Protocol⁹ can be said to have been cancelled. We have taken note of the arguments advanced by a number of delegations in the Committee that it will be impossible

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 476-484.

⁸ CCD/PV.532, pp. 25-28.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

in practice for States to use biological agents or toxins for non-peaceful purposes when they have bound themselves not to develop, produce or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins, except for peaceful purposes. We trust therefore that, even though the reservations to the Geneva Protocol may legally remain in force, for all practical purposes the risk of biological weapons or toxins actually being used for hostile purposes will be reduced to negligible proportions.

71. In my statement of 10 August I stressed the advantages that my delegation saw in making it clear that whatever complaints procedure we devised for the convention would cover complaints involving the use of biological weapons. In this way we should arm the convention with the best practicable deterrent possible against a violation of its provisions.

72. The three articles V, VI, and VII form what might be called the "complaints" or "verification complex". Under article V parties may approach each other to try to establish the facts of a given situation. If for any reason a direct approach should not be appropriate, provision is made for an indirect approach. The manner of such an indirect approach is not set out in detail but the formulation, which has already been quoted, namely "appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter", is wide and flexible. It could embrace many different avenues for consultation and co-operation to solve any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the convention. The procedure under article V is separate from, but closely related to, the complaints procedure in article VI. As such it is entirely consistent with United Kingdom suggestions for a procedure, when appropriate, prior to activation of the Security Council, and one which for example, by establishing the facts in a given situation, might help the Security Council in its consideration of a complaint. Such evidence, obtained under the procedures envisaged in article V, could then be used as the basis for a factual report to be submitted as an integral part of a complaint made to the Security Council under article VI.

73. On occasion, however, there may be reasons why parties would not wish to go through the procedures envisaged in article V. There may be interests of speed or other reasons that would make a party wish to take a complaint direct to the Security Council. It is the view of my delegation that normally the Security Council will decide to initiate an enquiry into the facts of the situation if there has been no prior enquiry under the provisions of article V. Naturally, the results of this enquiry would be part of the information conveyed to parties. It is now, I think, common ground between delegations that proof that biological or toxin weapons have been used is likely to be the most readily available

and the most unequivocal proof of a breach of the undertakings under articles I and II. Accordingly my delegation believes that the provisions of articles V and VI constitute a powerful deterrent against any temptation to initiate biological methods of warfare in contravention of this convention or the Geneva Protocol.

74. The United Kingdom delegation has from the outset emphasized the value of including an assistance article in any convention dealing with biological warfare. In the form in which it appears in CCD/353, article VII, which owes much to the ingenuity of the wording proposed by the Moroccan delegation, will be of considerable value.¹⁰ When I spoke on 10 August I indicated my delegation's views on the form this assistance would take. It will surely be a major factor, to be taken into account by any State which might, in contravention of the new convention, be planning to produce and use biological weapons and toxins, if it knows that the effect of such a contravention will immediately be countered by the most appropriate quantity and type of vaccines, relief and other humanitarian aids that the world can deploy. It is also in my view right to make provision for a physical manifestation of the sort of response the world community would wish to make to show its repugnance at such use.

75. Naturally there might be occasions, for example when a State's ally was attacked, when additional assistance possibly of a military nature in accordance with the United Nations Charter would be appropriate. Obviously, however, military assistance would only be given at the specific request of the injured party. Equally, any other State party would not be obliged to give military support if it did not wish to. The form of assistance desired would be decided in the first place by the requesting party, but it would also be for the assisting State to decide whether the assistance requested was something which it could or was prepared to supply.

76. In conclusion, my delegation takes the view that the present draft represents a sound and realistic basis for agreement. While inevitably it does not fully meet the wishes of all delegations here, we believe that it is, in terms of international negotiation, the best available compromise in present circumstances. Accordingly, I call on my colleagues in the Committee to round off the work of the past sessions by forwarding, with the approval of the Committee, the draft biological weapons convention in CCD/353 to the United Nations General Assembly. There, it is our hope that the United Nations will adopt an appropriate resolution commending the draft to the nations of the world and calling for the convention to be opened for signature at an early date so that it can come into force as soon as practicable. We can then concentrate our future endeavours on those many other problems of arms control and disarmament that remain before us, including

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 570-571.

chemical weapons. In view of the history of the negotiation of this convention the United Kingdom delegation is naturally particularly pleased at the prospect of this satisfactory conclusion to the deliberations which I think I may fairly say were initiated by the United Kingdom delegation in July 1968 [1969].^{1 1}

Statement by Foreign Minister Schumann to the General Assembly [Extract], September 28, 1971¹

... France, in so far as disarmament is concerned, neither can nor will be content with words or appearances. Disarmament must consist in eliminating, under effective international control, existing arms and in forbidding any new manufacture of them. Moreover, the result of all the efforts made in New York, in Geneva and elsewhere since the end of the Second World War is that no arms have in fact been destroyed. On the contrary, we are watching the most fantastic arms race the world has ever known. Several bans, whose effectiveness remains to be demonstrated, have been declared on the proliferation of nuclear arms or on their deployment in areas which were up to now inaccessible to man.

Those bans, whatever their individual merits, are unfortunately misleading and can give rise to the belief that disarmament has begun, while the existing arsenals and their power to destroy never stop growing. A "disarmament" carried out in this way can only promote the development of hegemonies and division of the world by installing an order in which only the super-Powers would retain the ability to exercise their sovereignty.

France has obviously not adjusted itself to such a prospect. That is why it has insisted on keeping the possibility of providing itself with the necessary means to ensure its defence and maintain its independence. But it remains nonetheless highly in favour of any undertaking for true disarmament, which in an age of nuclear armaments demands, first of all, settlement of the problem of those armaments. How can that be achieved, if not by a concertation of the States which possess them? That is why France just recently took the opportunity of recalling its position in favour of a conference of the five nuclear Powers. It hopes that the conditions for that conference will one day be achieved.

Is this to say that for the moment nothing can be done to reduce the threats which weigh on humanity? The United States and the USSR have, for their part, entered into talks aimed at lessening the risk of a nuclear confrontation between those two Powers. To that end, in Vienna and in Helsinki, they are planning to set mutual limits on the development of their strategic arms. But the balance they hope to reach that way is not the only thing

^{1 1} *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 324-326.

¹ A/PV. 1942 (prov.), pp. 21-23.

which could be called upon to avert the risk of nuclear war. In the absence of a true disarmament agreement between the five, but in the hope of opening ways to that agreement, would it not be possible also to plan, starting now, co-operation between the nuclear Powers to prevent an accidental, mistaken or surprise release of the terrible weapons at their disposal? The creation of such a security system most certainly provides a practical means of progressing toward a world where the risks accompanying the existence of nuclear arms, without yet being eliminated, could at least be reduced. France, for its part—and I confirm and announce this formally—is ready to contribute to that.

For it is only to avoid submission to any system of blocs and—I deliberately repeat myself—of hegemony that we have had to provide ourselves with the means of deterrence, after having asked in vain for an internationally controlled ban on nuclear arms. In this field as in others, the desire for independence is a contribution to world equilibrium and, consequently, to peace. However, our experiments—I voluntarily refrain from mentioning experiments for which other countries are responsible—would, in our view, cease to be legitimate if they were to endanger life—first of all, of course, the life of a man, but also the life of the flora or fauna on land and in the sea.

Have we set ourselves up as the sole judges of the adequacy of the precautions taken, which lie first of all in the remoteness of the sites? Not at all. We have not been satisfied with installing by ourselves a system which, for five years, has surveyed the development of radio-activity at various points of the globe.

We have invited scientists and researchers from the countries concerned to take part in our observation and surveillance work. This is a unique and unprecedented effort of international scientific co-operation. Each year we report the results of these observations to all the Members of the Organization, without concealment or hindrance.

We have taken care to report to the committee of our Organization which is qualified to evaluate, as its name indicates, the harmfulness or harmlessness of ionizing radiation. Consequently, those who would charge us, not only without proof but against all proof, with running the risk of pollution which our experiments, and ours alone, might entail would be taking to task not us, but the authority and the conscience—while indisputable and for that matter undisputed—of a scientific committee of the United Nations.

Let me add that those explosions—by the very fact that they take place in the atmosphere—are not even registered by the most sensitive seismographs on the American continent, which register all the variations, however weak, in the earth's crust; consequently, they cannot have any relation to any seismic shock. You

will then understand that we trust good faith and common sense to do justice to the simple truth.

**Statement by Foreign Minister Gromyko to the General Assembly
[Extracts], September 28, 1971¹**

If one wants to select an area of international relations where the interests of all States come into contact and where a push by the United Nations is particularly needed to accelerate progress, that would be the area of questions relating to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. The arms race is fraught with new and unknown dangers. Its negative impact on the life of society is deeper today and more dangerous than ever before. The post-war expenditures on armaments have been several times higher than the annual national income of all the developing nations of the world. This squandering of material and intellectual resources is taking place at a time when many millions of people have no bread with which to assuage their hunger or a roof over their heads with which to shelter themselves from the rain and the cold, and when more than a third of the world's population is illiterate.

It would be wrong to believe that nothing has been done to curb the arms race. Nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water have been banned, the proliferation of those weapons among States has been stopped, the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction in outer space, on celestial bodies and on the sea-bed and the ocean floor has been averted; the conviction is growing that the solution of the question of banning underground nuclear weapons tests should not be postponed any longer, and the idea of establishing nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world and of dismantling foreign military bases in foreign territories is gaining increasing support.

Efforts to ban and eliminate bacteriological weapons are heading in the right direction. The negotiations for an appropriate convention are nearing their completion. This should become an important practical step not only in limiting the arms race but also in actual disarmament. This question concerns the complete elimination of a specific kind of weapon—and a weapon of mass destruction at that. Ahead lies the task of prohibiting and eliminating chemical weapons also.

Of late the need for measures to prevent accidental or deliberately provoked incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons has been more deeply realized. This purpose is served by the agreement recently concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union.²

¹A/PV.1942 (prov.), pp. 52-59.

²*Ante*, pp. 633-635.

The strategic arms limitation talks between the USSR and the United States of America are continuing. They are now concentrated on the elaboration of an agreement on anti-missile systems. Unless the deployment of anti-missile defence systems is brought to a halt now, a chain reaction of competition between offensive and defensive weapons is bound to develop, as was the case in the past between naval armour and the artillery shell—only this time it will be an immeasurably more dangerous and far more expensive competition. The positive outcome of the talks would meet the interests of the peoples in both the USSR and the United States, as well as the task of strengthening universal peace. Considering the increasing importance of the talks, the Soviet side is making efforts to achieve understanding, which should of course be based on the principle of equal security. But the success of the talks depends to the same extent on the other side too.

What has been achieved in the field of limiting the arms race is only a threshold to disarmament. Important as it may be, to stop there would mean evading the solution of the fundamental problem. And we are convinced that from the viewpoint of possibilities this problem does lend itself to solution. The question therefore lies entirely in whether there is a will to solve it.

The Soviet Union recently made a proposal to convene a conference of the five Powers possessing nuclear weapons—the Soviet Union, the United States, the People's Republic of China, France and the United Kingdom—to consider questions of nuclear disarmament.³ One of the nuclear Powers we approached, France, supported that initiative of the Soviet Union; but another declared its negative position,⁴ and then the two remaining Powers hastened to allege that under these circumstances the convening of the five-nuclear-Power conference had become an "academic" question.

The Soviet Union does not believe that the other nuclear Powers have already said their last word. All those who view things realistically appreciate that nuclear disarmament can only be achieved with the participation and the consent of all five nuclear Powers and that they cannot surrender that responsibility.

A radical solution of disarmament questions naturally requires a united effort by all States, whatever the size of their territory and population or their level of military might and economic potential. The Soviet Government believes that the convening of a world disarmament conference, with the participation of all States of the world, would meet the task of enhancing still further the efforts in the struggle for disarmament and that it is expedient to discuss this question at the current session of the General Assembly. Accordingly, we have asked for the inclusion of the relevant item in the agenda of this session.⁵

³ *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 453-455.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 544-545.

In the past—the not-too-distant past—States have already approached the question of convening a world disarmament conference, but for various reasons efforts to convene such a conference have so far been unsuccessful. However, today the general political situation is more favourable to this idea.

It is necessary to take advantage of such a development since, although negotiations on disarmament have been conducted in a variety of forums in the post-war years, not once have the States gathered together to discuss disarmament questions. Yet this problem surely concerns everyone without exception. The universality of a world conference, with every State taking part in it, could contribute to its success.

The tasks facing such a world disarmament conference are, no doubt, immense. Therefore, it should perhaps be made into a permanent forum or, to be more precise, a forum to function over a long period. Its sessions could be held regularly—say, once every two or three years. Considering the fact that the nuclear arms race is causing the greatest concern among the peoples of the world, first priority should be given, if a majority of the participants at the conference so desired, to questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, the use of which cannot be tolerated by the human conscience.

It would be advisable to hold the world conference outside the framework of the United Nations so that it could be attended by all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not. It stands to reason that its convening should in no way diminish the significance of the forums and channels for disarmament negotiations which are being used at present, including the Committee on Disarmament. On the contrary, the Committee on Disarmament should intensify its work.

Both the existing channels of negotiations and those which may come into being in the future would contribute to preparations for the convening of the world disarmament conference, and later to the practical elaboration of specific disarmament agreements in accordance with the decisions of the world conference.

The States of the world should obviously be allowed a certain amount of time for the necessary consultations on questions pertaining to the convening of the world disarmament conference. In this connexion we believe that the General Assembly could invite States to agree, not later than 1972, on the date of the conference and on its agenda.

In accordance with the foregoing, the Soviet delegation would like to submit for the consideration of the General Assembly the following draft resolution:

[The draft resolution appears *infra*.]

In our view, this draft speaks for itself. We call upon all delegations to pay due attention to it.

When considering all these questions, whether within the framework of the United Nations or outside it, nobody should forget that disarmament talks are taking place at the time when the arms race is not only continuing but gaining speed as well. This is in fact something like a vicious circle. But this circle can and must be broken. The supreme, the highest interests of mankind demand it.

Disarmament is the most reliable way to strengthen international security and to secure peace. . . .

Soviet Draft Resolution Submitted to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, September 28, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Expressing profound concern over the continuing arms race and particularly the nuclear arms race,

Noting that the further stockpiling, development and perfection of armaments are resulting in international complications, intensifying distrust in relations among States and creating a threat of war which would do incalculable harm to the peoples,

Recalling its resolutions on disarmament questions and particularly resolutions 41 (I) of 14 December 1946 on the need for an early formulation of measures for the reduction of armaments and elimination of atomic weapons,² 1378 (XIV) of 20 November 1959 on general and complete disarmament,³ 2030 (XX) of 29 November 1965 on the convening of a world disarmament conference,⁴ 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969 declaring the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade⁵ and 2661 A (XXV) of 7 December 1970 calling on the nuclear-weapon Powers to bring about an immediate halt in the nuclear arms race and to cease all testing as well as deployment of offensive and defensive nuclear-weapon systems,⁶

Recognizing that, although the disarmament negotiations have produced a number of useful agreements preventing still more dangerous forms and developments of the arms race, these negotiations have not yet led to agreement among States on effective measures of disarmament,

Noting further the special responsibility of the nuclear-weapon Powers for the early achievement of an understanding on nuclear disarmament measures,

¹ A/L.631, Sept. 28, 1971, and Corr. 1, Sept. 29, 1971. The draft res. was later cosponsored by Rwanda (A/L.631/Add.1, Nov. 16, 1971). It was not put to a vote. On Dec. 15, 1971, Mexico and 26 other nations submitted a draft res. (A/L.659), which was adopted by the G.A. on Dec. 16 (*post*, pp. 909-910).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 47 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 1545.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 585.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 713-715.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 681-682.

Reaffirming at the same time the interest of all peoples in the cessation of the arms race and the adoption of disarmament measures, particularly measures for nuclear disarmament, as well as the desirability of participation by all States in the elaboration of such measures,

1. *Proclaims* the urgent necessity of resolutely intensifying the efforts of States with a view to the adoption of effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

2. *Expresses the conviction* that the convening of a world disarmament conference to consider the whole range of disarmament questions and especially the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons is a matter of expediency and urgency;

3. *Calls upon* the Governments of all States to contribute to the preparation and early convening of a world disarmament conference and ensure its fullest success and for this purpose to co-operate with each other by holding the necessary bilateral and multilateral consultations;

4. *Calls upon* the Governments of all nuclear-weapon Powers to discharge their special responsibility for the speedy solution of nuclear disarmament questions and to promote the success of the world disarmament conference by every possible means, including joint action to establish the prerequisites for the achievement of an understanding on these questions;

5. *Requests* the Committee on Disarmament to make further efforts to work out measures for the curtailment of the arms race and for disarmament, which will also contribute to the success of the world disarmament conference;

6. *Deems* it desirable that agreement should be reached among States before the end of 1972 on an actual date for the convening of a world disarmament conference and on its agenda;

7. *Decides* to include the item "United Nations assistance in the convening of a world disarmament conference" in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.

Statement by the Brazilian Representative (Saraiva Guerreiro) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Bacteriological Weapons and Savings From Disarmament, September 29, 1971¹

Today I wish to present the views of my delegation on the revised text of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (bio-

¹CCD/PV.543, pp. 11-12.

logical) weapons and toxins and on their destruction.² Members of this Committee will recall that from the very inception of this debate the Brazilian delegation has consistently advocated the widest possible prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. With equal consistency we have systematically refrained, however, from any prejudgement on the form and timing of our participation in several joint documents. The first in time was document CCD/310 by the Group of Twelve members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.³ The second document was resolution 2662 (XXV) of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which commended the basic approach set forth in CCD/310 for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.⁴

28. We are all familiar with the concepts of those documents and I need not remind the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of their content. When, on 5 August the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR on the one hand and the delegation of the United States on the other tabled identical draft conventions on this question,⁵ we undertook together with the other members of the Group of Twelve a thorough examination of the texts to ascertain the extent to which our views had been met. This led eventually to our presenting in company with ten other delegations a set of suggested modifications to documents CCD/337 and CCD/338. This was document CCD/341.⁶ The objectives of this document were presented with accuracy by the delegation of Yugoslavia in introducing it to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and I will not go back to them.⁷ Suffice it to say that it was a constructive attempt to add precision and sometimes further dimensions which we regarded as indispensable to the parallel texts submitted on 5 August. We now have in front of us a revised text of the draft convention. We acknowledge that a considerable effort has been made to take into consideration the main components of our common position. Undoubtedly the text is now sufficiently precise on the essential questions of the prohibition of biological weapons and the linkage between such prohibition and that of chemical weapons, which remains to be agreed upon. The incorporation of changes inspired by several of the suggestions of the eleven countries has made this draft convention a more balanced text in view of the improvements to which I have just alluded. It is the considered opinion of the Brazilian delegation that the convention is a useful first step on the road towards the comprehensive banning of chemical and biological weapons. And I would agree with those who see in this

² *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁷ CCD/PV.530, pp. 25-27.

achievement a positive event in the evolution of international relations and of disarmament negotiations in particular.

29. Having thus stated the general reaction of my delegation, I wish to touch briefly on two specific points relating to this draft convention. In making a comparative examination of document CCD/341 and the draft convention now under consideration one cannot fail to notice one conspicuous omission—the reference to the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be channelled into the promotion of economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. The importance of this concept and the potential magnitude of its resulting benefits are so considerable and even self-evident that they require no elaboration on my part. This has always been asserted both in bodies dealing with disarmament and in those concerned with economic development. I doubt whether either the importance of the principle or the extent of its positive effects can be questioned. That is why I am convinced that more thought will have to be given to this matter in relation to the first measure of actual disarmament, that is, the draft convention on the prohibition of biological weapons. While this question does not impair the general support for the draft convention that I have already expressed, I wish to state at this stage that the link between the draft convention and the principle that savings from disarmament should serve the purpose of economic development remains a matter which it is indispensable to settle in a constructive manner.

30. Finally, with reference to article IX the Brazilian delegation wishes to place on record its understanding that the sweeping wording of the undertaking in this provision in no way constitutes a prejudgement of the precise nature and scope of the prohibition of chemical weapons. The provision, in our view, is fully in line with the position set forth in document CCD/352 submitted by the Group of Twelve.⁸ In the light of this understanding, the Brazilian delegation regards this paragraph as a very important commitment to complement in the early future what is at present being achieved by a draft convention limited to biological weapons.

**Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the
Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Use of Savings
From Disarmament, September 29, 1971¹**

I would like to make some brief comments in connexion with the remarks just made by the representative of Brazil, Mr. Saraiva Guerreiro.² His delegation and others, including the delegation of

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

¹ CCD/PV.543, pp. 13-14.

² *Supra*.

Nigeria a few moments ago, have urged that, in connexion with this first real disarmament agreement in recent times, there should be a recognition of the relationship between potential savings from disarmament and the satisfaction of urgent social and economic needs, particularly in the developing countries. We appreciate that those delegations which have stressed this point have done so with a constructive intent and in accordance with positions taken by their governments as a matter of high principle.

32. All members of the Committee undoubtedly recall the remarks of Mr. Gibson Barbosa, the Minister of External Relations of Brazil, who addressed this Committee in the summer of 1970, noting the vast expenditures on sophisticated armaments and the benefits which could be derived if a small fraction of such resources were used to generate investments highly necessary for the improvement of the quality of life in countless countries.³ Delegations will also remember the comments of Dr. Anton Vratuša, then Deputy Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia, who, speaking at the very next meeting of the Committee, similarly called our attention to the importance of this question.⁴

33. My Government shares the view that one of the important objectives of agreements in the field of disarmament is the freeing of resources which can be used for the welfare of people everywhere, including for the economic and social development of the developing countries. The specific way in which such resources as may be freed are, in the end, utilized is, of course, a matter which must be decided by each government in accordance with its constitutional process. As we proceed from this convention to additional measures involving actual disarmament, we believe that all governments should keep in mind the premise, which has been reflected in a number of resolutions of the General Assembly, that the utilization of a substantial proportion of those resources for development purposes can contribute materially to the economic and social well-being of all people.

34. The United States, which fully shares this premise, attaches considerable importance and priority to helping to meet development needs. We hope that further measures of disarmament will result in the release of significant resources and thus contribute to economic and social development.

35. We feel sure that all countries share an interest in avoiding delay in actual progress on disarmament, with all its implications for world peace and security. We therefore particularly welcome the positive approach of the Brazilian delegation, which has expressed its general support for the convention and has stated that the question of savings from disarmament must be dealt with in a constructive manner.

³ CCD/PV.477, p. 7.

⁴ CCD/PV.478, p. 27.

Nine Nation Memorandum Submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament: Comprehensive Test Ban, September 30, 1971¹

The delegations of Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia are deeply concerned that it has still not been possible to reach agreement on a comprehensive ban of nuclear weapon tests.

This matter has been the object of many years' work. As early as 1959 the question of the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests was included in the agenda of the United Nations General Assembly.² Since then resolutions on the urgent need of such suspension have been adopted by the Assembly each year.

In 1962 the General Assembly condemned all nuclear weapon tests and asked that they cease immediately and not later than 1 January 1963.³ The Eight Nations Joint Memorandum of April 1962 was endorsed as a basis for negotiations.⁴ The eight non-aligned members of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament presented several such joint memoranda outlining their views on this matter between 1962-1968.

In the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, the three nuclear weapon Powers parties to the Treaty committed themselves to seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.⁵

In its latest resolution on the subject, 2663 (XXV) of December 1970, the General Assembly urged all States that had not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and again called upon all nuclear weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments.⁶

The General Assembly in the same resolution requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of these deliberations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, in his letter to the Co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, dated February 16, 1971, wished to draw attention, in particular, to this mandate.⁷

The nine delegations want again to call to serious attention the fact that all nuclear weapon States have not yet adhered to the

¹ CCD/354, Sept. 30, 1971. The memorandum was submitted by Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia.

² General Assembly *Official Records: Fourteenth Session, Annexes, Agenda Item 69.*

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. II, pp. 1029-1032.

⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 334-336.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685-687.

⁷ CCD/318, Feb. 23, 1971.

Partial Test Ban Treaty and that nuclear weapon tests are still carried out in the atmosphere. They are also gravely concerned that nuclear weapon tests—some of great magnitude—are continued underground by parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, contrary to the expectation of world opinion and in contradiction to the aim of that Treaty. It must be recalled that the prospects of an early banning of nuclear weapon tests in all environments was held out by the nuclear weapon States as their contribution to the halting of the nuclear arms race, complementing the commitment of non-nuclear weapon States in the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons not to acquire nuclear weapons.⁸

Attention has been drawn earlier to the fact that underground tests have led to leakages of radioactive debris outside the territorial limits of testing States. The nine delegations wish to underline that even an occurrence of such radioactivity which does not generate health hazards still constitutes an infringement of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. They understand that such releases have continued to occur, thus resulting in an undesirable weakening of the integrity of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.

The nine delegations express the hope that the bilateral negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms will very soon bring about a first positive result and thereby pave the way for immediate further efforts in the field of nuclear disarmament. An agreement on a comprehensive test ban could in its turn have a positive influence upon the continued bilateral negotiations between the USA and the USSR on the limitation of strategic arms. Such an agreement is in fact indispensable to halt the politically devastating and economically wasteful qualitative arms race in the nuclear sphere and to create the necessary climate for further measures of disarmament.

The nine delegations note with satisfaction the scientific progress taking place in the field of seismology. Considerable attention has been devoted in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the technical aspects of the verification of a ban on underground nuclear weapon tests. The nine delegations are convinced that the verification problem could be resolved on the basis of national means, i.e., remote control supplemented and improved upon by international co-operation and procedures. The two methods complement each other. An adequate international exchange of seismological data from national stations should be promoted by concrete measures in order to facilitate such a solution of the verification problem. Such measures, coupled with a withdrawal clause and provisions for relatively frequent review conferences, should ensure that the required deterrence level is obtained.

The nine delegations affirm the benefits of the application of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes to all countries and are

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

of the opinion that the peaceful application of nuclear explosives needs to be regulated. The International Atomic Energy Agency should play an important role in this context.

The nine delegations ardently desire to see an immediate and comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests. Such tests endanger the existence of all treaties concluded so far in the nuclear disarmament field, as well as the continued disarmament negotiations. Renewed and urgent efforts must thus be made to conclude a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, whereby the Partial Test Ban Treaty will be completed. Both treaties should be adhered to by all nuclear weapon States.

The nine delegations particularly expect the testing nuclear weapon States to give priority to this question and to take an active and constructive part in working out a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. They note that concrete proposals and suggestions relating to such a treaty have been made by several members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament including some members of the Group of Twelve. They request the nuclear weapon States to submit urgently their own proposals so that purposeful negotiations can be immediately undertaken.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, September 30, 1971¹

The Soviet delegation would like to make a few general comments, since we assume that the Committee on Disarmament will today be concluding its session for this year.

33. The unceasing arms race is having a most negative effect on the situation in the world. The special danger of the arms race in modern times arises from the existence of nuclear missile weapons whose capacity for destruction and annihilation—in the event of their use—constitutes a threat of extreme magnitude to all mankind. In addition, the arms race is swallowing up vast amounts of material resources and human effort, thereby imposing a heavy burden on the peoples of the majority of countries in the world and impeding the improvement of their living standards and, at times, the satisfaction of man's most vital needs in the field of food, clothing and housing.

34. In the interests of strengthening peace and security and raising the living standards of the peoples, it is essential to make every effort to stop and turn back the arms race. The situation in the world will, to a considerable extent, depend on the solution of this problem. Disarmament is the material basis for a policy of reducing tension and improving the international atmosphere.

¹ CCD/PV.544, pp. 12-18.

35. Since it attaches great importance to the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union has actively been conducting a steadfast struggle for the elimination of the threat of war, for the termination of the arms race and above all for the prohibition and elimination of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological. The struggle for disarmament is an important and integral part of the policy of our State. The Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union this spring approved an extensive programme relating to problems of disarmament and international security.² The objective of this programme is the nuclear disarmament of States possessing such weapons, and the intensification of the struggle to stop the race in armaments of all types.

36. Recently some concrete results have been achieved in reducing the threat of war, and some progress has been made in limiting the nuclear arms race, as a result of the joint efforts of many countries. Important international agreements—on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests in three environments,³ on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space⁴ and on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁵—have been drafted and adopted and have entered into force. This year, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor,⁶ has been signed and will, we hope, enter into force in the near future.

37. Agreement has been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States of America on measures to prevent the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control.⁷ Agreement has also been reached on measures to improve the line of direct communication between the USSR and the United States, using for this purpose artificial Earth satellites.⁸

38. Without these agreements mankind would be living in an even more dangerous and unstable atmosphere. The mere thought of the prospect of increased poisoning of the atmosphere and the waters of the world's oceans by nuclear test explosions, of the proliferation all over the world of the most terrible weapon of modern times, of the extension of the arms race to outer space and the sea-bed, and of the increased risk resulting therefrom that any conflict might develop into a nuclear war, is enough to enable one to assess the importance of what has been achieved. This also explains why all the agreements which have been reached, limiting the arms race, have received wide international support, and many States have become parties to them.

² See *ante*, pp. 195-197.

³ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

⁷ *Post*, pp. 633-635.

⁸ *Post*, pp. 635-639.

39. In the elaboration of these international measures, the Committee on Disarmament is playing a positive role. It is precisely within the framework of this Committee that agreement has in the main been reached on the non-proliferation and sea-bed treaties and now on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons.

40. It must be noted, however, that there has been no radical progress towards curbing the dangerous process of piling up and refining armaments, that the arms race as a whole has not been stopped and turned back, that armaments and military budgets are continuing to increase, and that important and urgent disarmament measures such as the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction—above all nuclear weapons—are still awaiting a solution.

41. An important question in limiting the arms race and reducing the threat of war is the question of excluding chemical and bacteriological weapons from the arsenals of States. The Soviet Union and other socialist countries have been, and still are, in favour of solving this problem as a whole. This position, as we understand it, is shared by a large number of States.

42. The present session of the Committee on Disarmament has made an important contribution to the solution of this problem. Its practical result has been the elaboration of an agreement on a draft convention on the prohibition of the development and production of bacteriological and toxin weapons.⁹ The conclusion of such a convention will prevent the possibility of unleashing a war using these means, and will serve the cause of improving the international atmosphere and strengthening peace and international security—which is fully in keeping with the interests of all peoples. The convention will become an agreement concerning the implementation of a disarmament measure as such; and this will contribute to progress towards agreement on other measures in the field of disarmament and, in particular, it will make it possible to concentrate efforts on the drafting of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. The conclusion of a convention representing a partial solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological weapons would at the same time be an important prerequisite for solving this problem as a whole.

43. As we know, the convention contains provisions concerning the need to continue negotiations on chemical weapons. An important contribution to the elaboration of the provisions of this convention, and in particular the provisions concerning the prohibition of chemical weapons, has been made by the non-aligned States members of the Committee on Disarmament. We must state in this connexion that the joint memorandum which they have prepared and submitted to the Committee on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

chemical weapons and on their destruction is a document which deserves careful study.¹⁰

44. We believe that the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons will continue to be the subject of unremitting efforts by the States members of the Committee.

45. A substantial measure of nuclear disarmament would be the immediate discontinuance, everywhere and by every one, of nuclear weapon tests including underground tests. The Soviet Union, as we have already stated, is prepared to sign an agreement on the discontinuance of underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of national means for the detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions. Modern science and technology, as we have already said on a number of occasions, have in their development reached a level which makes it possible to ensure verification by national means, giving all States the assurance that an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests is being conscientiously complied with by every one.

46. The discussion of this question in the Committee on Disarmament has shown that the overwhelming majority of States attach great importance to it. Discussion of the question has also shown that many States are in favour of the earliest possible adoption of political decisions on the problem of underground tests, and that there is increasingly wide recognition of the possibility of ensuring a ban on underground tests on the basis of national means of verification.

47. Unfortunately the United States, which has been responsible for the majority of the nuclear weapon tests carried out in the world, is in fact, by its demand for compulsory on-site inspections, blocking the solution of this vital problem. It is difficult to interpret its position otherwise than as unwillingness to agree to the discontinuance of underground nuclear weapon tests.

48. A matter which requires joint efforts is the elaboration of measures for the further demilitarization of the sea-bed. We have a good basis for work in this direction—the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, which contains a provision to the effect that the parties to the Treaty undertake to continue negotiations on the subject,¹¹ and also the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union in 1969 concerning the prohibition of the use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor for military purposes.¹² We would like to emphasize once again that many aspects of this problem are easier to solve now than they will be in the future. Delay in solving it would give rise to additional difficulties.

49. While giving due attention to individual disarmament measures, we should not relegate to the background the problem of general and complete disarmament. Discussions on disarmament

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

¹¹ *Ante*, p. 10.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 112-113.

questions at the sessions of the General Assembly and in other forums have shown that a large number of States are interested in the solution to this problem.

50. For considering the entire complex of disarmament questions, relating to both nuclear and to conventional armaments, it is important to secure the participation, on the basis of full and equal rights, of all States—both Members of the United Nations and the specialized agencies and States which are not members of these international organizations. To undertake this great and important task the Soviet Union is proposing the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all States in the world.¹³ Such a conference could be a forum in which all States without exception could jointly consider disarmament problems in their entirety and seek practicable and generally-acceptable ways of solving them. The genuine universality of such a conference would be an important guarantee of its success. Of special importance would be the participation in the disarmament conference of all States possessing considerable armed forces and armaments.

51. In connexion with this proposal of the Soviet Union, I should like to read out an excerpt from the statement made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Mr. A. A. Gromyko, at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly which is now being held in New York. On 28 September he said:

The tasks facing such a world disarmament conference are, no doubt, immense. Therefore, it should perhaps be made into a permanent forum or, to be more precise, a forum to function over a long period. Its sessions could be held regularly—say, once every two or three years. Considering the fact that the nuclear arms race is causing the greatest concern among the peoples of the world, first priority should be given, if a majority of the participants at the conference so desired, to questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, the use of which cannot be tolerated by the human conscience.

It would be advisable to hold the world conference outside the framework of the United Nations so that it could be attended by all States, whether Members of the United Nations or not. It stands to reason that its convening should in no way diminish the significance of the forums and channels for disarmament negotiations which are being used at present, including the Committee on Disarmament. On the contrary, the Committee on Disarmament should intensify its work . . .

The States of the world should obviously be allowed a certain amount of time for the necessary consultations on questions pertaining to the convening of the world disarmament conference. In this connexion we believe that the General Assembly could invite States to agree, not later than 1972, on the date of the conference and on its agenda.¹⁴

52. I should also like to quote the following excerpts from the draft resolution introduced during the current session of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union in connexion with the proposal to convene a world disarmament conference:

The General Assembly, . . .

Requests the Committee on Disarmament to make further efforts to work out

¹³ See *ante*, pp. 544-546.

¹⁴ *Ante*, p. 594.

measures for the curtailment of the arms race and for disarmament, which will also contribute to the success of the world disarmament conference;

Deems it desirable that agreement should be reached among States before the end of 1972 on an actual date for the convening of a world disarmament conference and on its agenda;

Decides to include the item 'United Nations assistance in the convening of a world disarmament conference' in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.^{1 5}

53. I should like to express the hope the members of the Committee will make the greatest possible efforts to ensure progress in the solution of disarmament problems.

54. Before concluding my statement, I should like to thank Mr. Pastinen, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Epstein, his Alternate, and also all the members of the Secretariat who have provided us with very favourable conditions for the conduct of the work of the Committee on Disarmament, for our negotiations and for the successful accomplishment here of the task which we intended on this occasion to complete during the present session of the Committee on Disarmament.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, September 30, 1971¹

Before we close this final meeting of our 1971 session, I too should like to comment briefly on the general course of our work this year.

56. Looking back to the opening day of this year's work, I should like to recall that President Nixon stated in his message to this Committee that:

The tasks before the Committee are very important to world security. As in the past, genuine progress can best be made through patient and careful work towards mutually beneficial measures. Opportunities for such progress can and must be realized.²

57. I think it can be a matter of satisfaction to all members of the Committee that we have been able to seize such an opportunity during negotiations this year. The draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological and toxin weapons which we are forwarding to the General Assembly represents a solid achievement.³ By ensuring that scientific advances in the field dealt with in this agreement are channelled strictly to peaceful purposes, the disarmament measure that we have developed here will contribute to the security of all people. Thanks to the contributions of all delegations, for all have participated in this effort, the draft we are forwarding to the

^{1 5} *Ante*, pp. 595-596.

¹ CCD/PV.544, pp. 18-21.

² *Ante*, p. 20.

³ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

General Assembly will, I sincerely believe, command the broadest support in the international community.

58. In connexion with the statement made today by the representative of Burma, I should like to make one comment, namely, that compliance with article VII of this convention would, of course, be in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that, as the United Kingdom representative stated, it would be for each party to decide whether it was in a position to supply the assistance requested.⁴

59. Valuable work has been done during this session on the problems of verification with respect to prohibition of chemical weapons. In this regard, the United States delegation appreciates the important contributions of the experts who attended our meeting on this subject on 7 July. For our own part, we are determined to pursue the search for sound and reliable arms control measures dealing with chemical weapons. The joint memorandum on chemical weapons recently tabled by twelve delegations⁵ will, we trust, play an important role in our continued efforts to find sound solutions to the problems we face in this field.

60. Members of the Committee have devoted a great deal of attention this year to the comprehensive test ban question. We believe that the informal session which was held on this subject, as well as the working papers and statements which Committee members have devoted to this issue, have contributed to a substantially greater understanding of the verification issue. We would mention our own paper regarding the considerable effort which the United States has devoted to the study of the seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and explosions, and our expectations as to the progress that might be achieved in this field in the future, and we hope that paper also will contribute to our work here.⁶ I note that today a number of delegations have tabled a new paper on this subject.⁷ We will study it with interest and care. We will also study the many suggestions put forward by individual delegations.

61. Among the many subjects discussed this year is the question of nuclear-free zones, on which a number of interesting statements have been made. In this regard the United States delegation welcomes the further progress that has been achieved with respect to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America—the Treaty of Tlatelolco.⁸

62. With regard to other measures in the nuclear field, the representative of Italy has informed us⁹ of the unanimous

⁴ *Ante*, p. 589.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 379-386.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 600-602.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69-83.

⁹ CCD/PV.541, p. 6.

approval by the Council of Ministers of the European Community of the mandate given to the European Commission to begin negotiations on verification with the International Atomic Energy Agency as provided for in article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.¹⁰ This, of course, represents a most welcome development and it highlights the very positive work which is going forward to bring the non-proliferation Treaty fully and widely into operation in all respects.

63. My own delegation drew attention again this year to the question of restraints on conventional armaments. It is our belief that an intensified discussion and exploration of possible objectives and possible solutions in this field would be extremely useful. A better understanding of what steps might be practicable and what steps might not be practicable with respect to controls on conventional weapons would surely be in the interest of the entire international community.

64. We believe that this Committee can contribute—and indeed has an obligation to contribute—to the effort which must be undertaken if the world is to be able to limit and eventually cut back on its expenditures on conventional weapons—weapons which have consumed, and which continue to consume, such a large amount of the world's resources. I believe that the Secretary-General's report on the arms race¹¹ underlines the importance of this problem.

65. I ask the indulgence of members of the Committee for quoting one of my earlier statements. I said last year that:

If we stop to think for a minute about the world as it is likely to develop during the 1970s, we must recognize that it will be neither a static nor a placid world. The pattern of international politics is changing, and perhaps faster now than at any time since the Second World War. This process of change, of accelerating scientific discoveries and social evolution, is inevitable—in fact, it is essential for progress; but it is also a process accompanied by turbulence.¹²

66. I believe we all sense that this is indeed the situation that we face today. And I believe that we all recognize that in this atmosphere of change one constant element of international relations will be the continuing need for serious progress towards the crucial objectives of arms control and disarmament. My delegation is convinced that this Committee, because of the expertise that it has developed, because of the seriousness of purpose and goodwill which all its members have brought to bear on the tasks before it and because of the spirit of compromise and accommodation which characterizes our work, can play a vital role in finding the paths to progress towards the goals which we all share.

67. Finally, on behalf of the United States delegation—and I am sure our sentiments are shared by all participants in this

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹¹ *Post*, pp. 644-686.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 251.

Committee, and indeed they were expressed a few moments ago by the Soviet Co-Chairman—I should like to express our sincere appreciation to the members of the United Nations Secretariat. They have continued to perform their demanding tasks, on which the successful conduct of our work depends, with great skill and dedication. I would like to thank particularly the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Ambassador Pastinen, and the Alternate Representative, Mr. Epstein. I ask them to convey our appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, and also to the interpreters, translators, ushers, verbatim reporters, the reproduction personnel and other members of the staff, who have our gratitude for the efforts they have made on our behalf. As in past years, I would like particularly to express our thanks for the truly heroic task they have accomplished so quickly in preparing translations and placing before us only moments ago copies of the Committee's final report.

Report by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission, September 30, 1971¹

INTRODUCTION

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament submits to the United Nations General Assembly and to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a progress report on the Committee's deliberations on all questions before it for the period 23 February 1971 to 30 September 1971, together with the pertinent documents and records.

Included in this report is a detailed account of the negotiation to which the Committee devoted an important part of its work during 1971, regarding the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and, in particular, regarding a Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The text of the draft of the Convention is contained in Annex A.

This report also includes accounts of the Committee's work during 1971 on further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, non-nuclear measures, other collateral measures, and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A Special Report on the Question of a Treaty Banning Underground Nuclear Weapons Tests is set forth in Part III of this document.

¹ CCD/356, Oct. 1, 1971. The documentary annexes are not printed here.

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFERENCE

A. *Procedural Arrangements*

The Conference reconvened on 23 February 1971.

Two sessions were held, the first from 23 February to 13 May, 1971, and the second from 29 June to 30 September 1971. During this period the Committee held 50 formal plenary meetings during which members set forth their government's views and recommendations for progress on the questions before the Committee. The Committee also held 4 informal meetings without records.

In addition to the plenary meetings described above, members of the Committee met frequently for informal multilateral consultations on disarmament questions of common interest.

The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, in their capacity as Co-Chairmen of the Committee, also held meetings to discuss procedural and substantive questions before the Committee.

B. *Participants in the Conference*

Representatives of the following States continued their participation in the work of the Committee: Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Egypt, Ethiopia, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Sweden, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States of America, and Yugoslavia.

II. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE DURING 1971

In a letter dated 16 February 1971, the Secretary-General of the United Nations transmitted to the CCD the following resolutions adopted at the twenty-fifth Session of the General Assembly:

- A/RES/2661 (XXV)—Question of general and complete disarmament, together with document A/8191 and Corr.1, referred to therein²
- A/RES/2662 (XXV)—Question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons³
- A/RES/2663 (XXV)—Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests⁴
- A/RES/2667 (XXV)—Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,⁵

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 653-658, 681-683.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 685-687.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 691-693.

and also the following resolutions which dealt with disarmament matters.

- A/RES/2660 (XXV)—Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof⁶
- A/RES/2664 (XXV)—Implementation of the results of the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States⁷
- A/RES/2665 (XXV)—Establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control⁸
- A/RES/2666 (XXV)—Status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2456B (XXIII) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco).⁹

Members of the Committee were assisted in their examination and analysis of possible disarmament measures by numerous messages, working papers, and other documents that were submitted to the CCD (annexes B and C), and by the plenary statements of Committee Members (Annex D).

On 23 February 1971 the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations delivered a message from the Secretary-General to the Conference recalling that the General Assembly, in its declaration on the occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the United Nations, while welcoming the important international agreements which have already been achieved in the limitation of armaments, called for the early negotiation of further agreements and expressed the hope that negotiation would move forward from arms limitation to a reduction of armaments and disarmament everywhere. The message stated that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, which has contributed so much to the successful negotiations of these treaties during the past decade and which is continuing to perform a major role in the difficult search for ways to halt and reverse the arms race, should take due notice of this urgent call of the General Assembly at its commemorative session.¹⁰

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 680-681.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 687-688.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 689.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 689-691. For res. 2456 B (XXIII), see *ibid.*, 1968, p. 799. The Tlatelolco treaty and protocols appear *ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69-83.

¹⁰ CCD/PV.495, pp. 6-9.

The Committee continued work in accordance with its provisional agenda on the following measures in the field of disarmament:

- A. Further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.
- B. Non-nuclear measures.
- C. Other collateral measures.
- D. General and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

A. *Further Effective Measures Relating to the Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race at an Early Date and to Nuclear Disarmament*

Members of the Committee continued their work in 1971 on questions relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

In accordance with General Assembly resolution 2663 (XXV), which requested the Committee to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of its deliberations, a special report on the results of the Committee's deliberations on this question has been prepared and is set forth as Part III of this document.

The delegations of Poland (CCD/PV.501¹¹ and 510),¹² Hungary (CCD/PV.502),¹³ Morocco (CCD/PV.504),¹³ Canada (CCD/PV.507¹⁴ and 517¹⁵) and the USSR (CCD/PV.517)¹⁶ called for the accession to the Partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963¹⁷ by as many countries as possible.

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A number of delegations made reference to the bilateral discussions between the governments of the USSR and the US on the limitation of strategic armaments. While expressing the hope that these talks would reach early agreement on significant measures to restrain and turn back the nuclear arms race, many members stressed that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should continue to accord the highest priority to measures in the field of nuclear disarmament. A number of delegations also stressed the importance of qualitative as well as quantitative limitations and reductions of strategic armaments and

¹¹ Not printed here.

¹² *Ante*, pp. 245-254.

¹³ Not printed here.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 201-208.

¹⁵ Not printed here.

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 371-378.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

urged that the CCD receive adequate information about the progress of these negotiations.

The USSR delegation outlined to the Committee the programme of disarmament put forward by the Soviet Union in the spring of 1971 which provides, *inter alia*, for the conclusion of treaties banning nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction; the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, everywhere and by all, the promotion of the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world; nuclear disarmament of all nuclear-weapon states (CCD/PV.507,¹⁸ 517,¹⁹ 536²⁰).

The subject of nuclear free zones was also discussed.

The delegation of Mexico tabled a Working Paper on some basic facts leading to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) and its Additional Protocol II (CCD/342).²¹

The representative of Romania reaffirmed the support of his government for the creation of a zone free from nuclear weapons in the Balkans (CCD/PV.526).²¹

The delegation of Sweden, citing the Antarctic Treaty²² and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, suggested that countries in defined regions consider taking independent initiatives towards establishing nuclear free zones (CCD/PV.535).²³

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The USSR delegation drew the attention of the Committee to the draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons submitted by the USSR in 1967 to the XXII session of the United Nations General Assembly (CCD/PV.495, 507).²⁴

The delegation of Czechoslovakia suggested an undertaking by nuclear-weapon states not to use nuclear weapons as a means for launching an attack (CCD/PV.512, 519).²⁵

The delegation of Romania stressed the importance of elaborating an agreement aimed at the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.526).²⁵

Proposals regarding the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons were also advanced by the delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.502, 542),²⁵ Mongolia (CCD/PV.501),²⁵ Poland (CCD/PV.501)²⁵ and Bulgaria (CCD/PV.500).²⁵

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¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 208-215.

¹⁹ *Ante*, pp. 371-378.

²⁰ *Ante*, pp. 548-556.

²¹ Not printed here.

²² *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

²³ Not printed here.

²⁴ *Ante*, pp. 21-30, 208-215. For the Soviet draft convention, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 420-421.

²⁵ Not printed here.

The representative of Japan (CCD/PV.497) proposed that fissionable material for use in weapons should be transferred to peaceful purposes.²⁶

The United States delegation called attention to its proposal for cut-off in the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes and said that the adoption of inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the cut-off would be a step toward a more universal system of safeguards on fissionable material production (CCD/PV.516).²⁷

A number of delegations expressed the hope that additional countries would accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Satisfaction was expressed by a number of delegations with the progress which has been made by the IAEA in elaborating a safeguards system in accordance with Article III of the NPT and with the work already accomplished by the IAEA with respect to its role in the implementation of that treaty.

The representative of Italy informed the Committee of the unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers of the European Communities of the mandate given to the European Commission to begin negotiations on verification with the International Atomic Energy Agency as provided for in article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (CCD/PV.541).²⁸

B. *Non-Nuclear Measures*

QUESTION OF CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS

During the 1971 sessions of the Committee, members continued their efforts to achieve progress on all aspects of the problem of the elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

In pursuing their work on this question, members kept in mind the recommendations of General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV) which had taken note of:

(a) the revised draft Convention for the Prohibition of Biological Methods of Warfare, submitted on 18 August 1970 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,²⁹

(b) the revised draft Convention on Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons and on the Destruction of Such Weapons,

²⁶ *Ante*, pp. 84-92.

²⁷ *Ante*, pp. 285-289.

²⁸ For the non-proliferation treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465. The Italian statement is not printed here.

²⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

submitted on 23 October 1970 to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session by Bulgaria, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics,³⁰ and

(c) the working papers, expert views and suggestions put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee.

Resolution 2662 (XXV) had commended the following basic approach for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare which was contained in the joint memorandum submitted on 25 August 1970 by the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia:

(a) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare;

(b) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States;

(c) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition.³¹

Possible steps for progress in this field were discussed in detail by members of the Committee in their plenary statements. In addition, an informal meeting on the question of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) warfare was held on 7 July 1971 at the request of the delegations of Canada, Italy, Japan and Sweden.

The following working papers were submitted to the Committee on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare:

The prohibition of chemical warfare agents (Netherlands, CCD/320);³² a model for a comprehensive agreement concerning the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare (Sweden, CCD/322);³³ the destruction of chemical and biological

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 533-537.

³¹ For the 12-nation memorandum, see *ibid.*, pp. 453-455.

³² *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

³³ *Ante*, pp. 151-154.

means of warfare (Sweden, CCD/324);³⁴ verification techniques relating to safety features, the sealing and monitoring of plants formerly producing nerve agents, and sampling of nerve agent production (US, CCD/332);³⁵ the definition of "toxins" (Sweden, CCD/333);³⁶ atmospheric sensing and verification of a ban on development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons (Canada, CCD/334);³⁷ some problems concerning the compiling of a list of chemical weapons to be banned, indirect control of the production and destruction of stockpiles of such agents (Italy, CCD/335);³⁸ a biological approach to the question of verification on the prohibition of chemical weapons (Japan, CCD/343);³⁹ the question of verification on the prohibition of chemical weapons (Japan, CCD/344);³⁹

On 30 March 1971 the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, and the USSR tabled a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) weapons and toxins and on their destruction (CCD/325).⁴⁰

On behalf of the co-sponsors of this draft, the USSR delegation reaffirmed their position regarding the need of achieving the complete prohibition and elimination of both chemical and bacteriological weapons and indicated readiness, as a first possible step, to reach agreement on the prohibition on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons (CCD/PV.505).⁴¹

A general consensus emerged in the ensuing discussion of the proposals which had been placed before the Committee. While a number of Committee members had advocated a comprehensive approach to the question of prohibition on chemical and biological weapons, it was recognized that in the new situation it would be possible at this time to negotiate as a first step a draft convention on biological and toxin weapons; that in taking this step the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925⁴² should be safeguarded and that nothing should be done which might in any way cast doubt on the validity of that instrument and that the Committee should continue to work urgently for concrete progress on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

A number of specific suggestions with respect to the draft texts proposed in CCD/255/Rev.2 and CCD/325 were made by members in plenary statements and a working paper proposing

³⁴ *Ante*, pp. 180-183.

³⁵ *Ante*, pp. 389-395.

³⁶ *Ante*, pp. 395-399.

³⁷ *Ante*, pp. 413-417.

³⁸ *Ante*, pp. 417-421.

³⁹ Not printed here.

⁴⁰ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁴¹ *Ante*, pp. 183-190.

⁴² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

modifications in CCD/325 was submitted by the UAR delegation (CCD/328).⁴³ The delegation of Mexico reiterated its preference for a comprehensive approach and suggested that unilateral renunciation of biological weapons would be sufficient while a treaty banning both chemical and biological weapons was negotiated (CCD/PV.513).⁴⁴ The delegation of Yugoslavia suggested that the convention reflect the idea that savings from disarmament should be channeled to social and economic development, taking into account primarily the requirements of developing countries (CCD/PV.518[519?]).⁴⁵

After consultation with Committee members and consideration of views expressed in plenary sessions and relevant working papers, the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the USSR, and the delegation of the United States tabled on 5 August identical draft conventions (CCD/337 and CCD/338) on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction.⁴⁶

All members of the Committee engaged in intensive discussions regarding possible changes and amendments to the proposed text of the Convention. A number of specific suggestions were placed before the Committee:

The delegations of Hungary, Mongolia and Poland submitted a draft Security Council resolution (CCD/339).⁴⁷

After intensive consultations the representatives of Brazil, Burma, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the UAR and Yugoslavia tabled a working paper (CCD/341) suggesting a number of amendments to the text.⁴⁸ The paper suggested a preambular paragraph regarding savings from disarmament and recommended several changes in the preamble designed to reflect the common basic approach of its sponsors that a link be maintained in respect of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. It also recommended changes in Article VIII (presently Article IX) designed to strengthen the undertaking on further negotiations concerning chemical weapons and to reflect the position of the delegations mentioned above regarding the principle of complete prohibition of chemical weapons, and additions to Article V and Article IX (presently Article X).

The delegation of Mexico submitted an additional amendment suggesting a moratorium on the development, production and

⁴³ *Ante*, p. 378.

⁴⁴ *Ante*, pp. 270-275.

⁴⁵ Not printed here.

⁴⁶ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁴⁷ *Ante*, p. 486.

⁴⁸ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

stockpiling of highly toxic chemical agents for weapons until agreement is reached on a comprehensive treaty (CCD/346).⁴⁹

Other amendments were proposed in a working paper submitted by the representative of Morocco (CCD/347).⁵⁰

A number of suggestions were made in plenary statements by the representatives of Argentina (CCD/PV.512),⁵¹ Brazil (CCD/PV.510),⁵¹ Canada (CCD/PV.528),⁵² Italy (CCD/PV.512),⁵³ Japan (CCD/PV.532),⁵⁴ Netherlands (CCD/PV.502, 525),⁵⁵ Nigeria (CCD/PV.522),⁵⁵ Sweden (CCD/PV.499, 522),⁵⁵ the UAR (CCD/PV.516)⁵⁵ and the UK (CCD/PV.507,⁵⁵ 510,⁵⁵ 528)⁵⁶ regarding the strengthening of the procedures for ensuring fulfillment of the provisions and purposes of the convention.

In order to accommodate as many of the specific suggestions for changes in the convention as possible, and in order to develop formulations which would result in broad support for the convention, intensive discussions were held within and among various groups in the Committee.

While work proceeded on the convention regarding bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia formulated a joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. This memorandum was presented to the Committee on September 28 (CCD/352).⁵⁷ Emphasizing the immense importance and urgency of reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons, the memorandum offered elements on which negotiations should be based.

With respect to the convention regarding bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, the intensive discussions within the Committee resulted in the tabling on 28 September of a revised draft of the convention by the delegations of Bulgaria, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Italy, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.⁵⁸ This draft is set forth in Annex A.

Article I provides that parties undertake never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile, acquire, or retain biological agents or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of

⁴⁹ *Ante*, p. 510.

⁵⁰ *Ante*, pp. 510-511.

⁵¹ Not printed here.

⁵² *Ante*, pp. 486-489.

⁵³ Not printed here.

⁵⁴ *Ante*, pp. 516-522.

⁵⁵ Not printed here.

⁵⁶ *Ante*, pp. 476-484.

⁵⁷ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

⁵⁸ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes, as well as weapons, equipment and means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. The Preamble refers to the determination of the parties, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons.

The broad definition of toxins was included at the suggestion of the Swedish delegation (CCD/PV.522).⁵⁹ The phrase "never in any circumstances," contained in Article I of the United Kingdom draft convention (CCD/255/Rev.2)⁶⁰ was included at the suggestion of the UAR delegation (CCD/328).⁶¹ In this connexion the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union made statements concerning reservations to the Geneva Protocol insofar as they applied to weapons covered by the convention (CCD/PV.542).⁶² Statements to the effect that the convention would continue to be effective in wartime were made by the delegations of the United States (CCD/PV.542),⁶³ Soviet Union (CCD/PV.542)⁶⁴ and the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.542).⁶⁵ The word "protective" was inserted as a result of suggestions by the delegations of the Netherlands (CCD/PV.525)⁶⁶ and Italy (CCD/531).⁶⁷ The delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union made statements to the effect that this word in no sense provides a basis for circumventing the convention; it makes clear that the development of devices or methods for protecting individuals or populations against biological agents is not prohibited (CCD/PV.542).⁶⁸

Article II sets forth the requirements for destruction of the agents, toxins, weapons, and equipment prohibited by Article I within nine months after entry into force of the convention. The delegations of Canada (CCD/PV.528)⁶⁹ and Morocco (CCD/PV.531 and CCD/347)⁷⁰ proposed that notification be given to depository governments regarding implementation of Article II. Statements calling on parties to give notice of fulfilment of the obligations of this provision were made by the delegations of the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.542) and the United States (CCD/PV.542).⁷¹

⁵⁹ *Ante*, pp. 423-430.

⁶⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 428-431.

⁶¹ *Ante*, p. 378.

⁶² *Ante*, pp. 511-516.

⁶³ *Ante*, pp. 573-579.

⁶⁴ *Ante*, pp. 579-586.

⁶⁵ *Ante*, pp. 586-590.

⁶⁶ *Ante*, pp. 449-453.

⁶⁷ *Ante*, pp. 502-506.

⁶⁸ *Ante*, pp. 573-586.

⁶⁹ *Ante*, pp. 486-489.

⁷⁰ *Ante*, pp. 506-509, 510-511.

⁷¹ *Ante*, pp. 573-586.

Provisions designed to prevent the spread of biological and toxin weapons are contained in Article III.

To ensure the effectiveness of the treaty, Article IV established the responsibility of each party to the convention to take any necessary measures to ensure that the activities prohibited in Article I do not take place within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or under its control anywhere.

Article V provides that parties shall consult and co-operate regarding any problems that may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. At the suggestion of a number of delegations, as contained in Working Paper CCD/341,⁷² this Article also provides that consultation and co-operation pursuant to this Article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI provides that any State Party to the Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of the obligations deriving from the provisions of this Convention, may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations.

Article VII, concerning the provision of assistance, was included at the suggestion of the delegations of Argentina (CCD/PV.512),⁷³ Italy (CCD/PV.512),⁷³ Morocco (CCD/PV.514),⁷⁴ Nigeria (CCD/PV.522),⁷⁵ Netherlands (CCD/PV.525)⁷⁵ and the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.507, 510).⁷⁵ Statements were made by the delegations of the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.528, 542),⁷⁶ the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.542),⁷⁷ and the United States (CCD/PV.542)⁷⁸ to the effect that assistance should be provided only at the request of the endangered party and that medical and other humanitarian assistance would be fitting in light of the character of the Convention. In addition, the delegation of the United Kingdom stated that it would be for each party to decide whether it could or was prepared to supply the assistance requested (CCD/PV.542).⁷⁹

Article VIII provides that nothing in the Convention should be interpreted as limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol. The Preamble contains clauses whereby the parties note the important significance of the Geneva Protocol, reaffirm their adherence to its purposes and

⁷² *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁷³ Not printed here.

⁷⁴ *Ante*, pp. 276-280.

⁷⁵ Not printed here.

⁷⁶ *Ante*, pp. 476-484, 586-590.

⁷⁷ *Ante*, pp. 579-586.

⁷⁸ *Ante*, pp. 573-579.

⁷⁹ *Ante*, pp. 586-590.

principles, call upon all States to comply strictly with them, and recall that the General Assembly has condemned actions contrary to the Protocol's principles and objectives.

Article IX reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, contains an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures regarding chemical weapons. The Preamble refers to the importance and urgency of eliminating, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents and recognizes that the Convention represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures regarding prohibition of chemical weapons.

Article X sets forth provisions designed to facilitate international co-operation regarding peaceful applications in the field of bacteriology (biology).

Article XII provides for a conference to review the operation of the Convention with a view to assuring that the purposes of the Preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provision concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized.

Provisions concerning amendments, withdrawal, entry into force, and formal clauses are contained in Articles XI, XIII, XIV and XV.

Delegations expressed satisfaction with the general consensus achieved and with the process of negotiation and the spirit of accommodation which resulted in the inclusion of amendments responsive to their suggestions. A number of delegations pointed out that final decisions of their governments would be taken at a later stage. Hope was widely expressed that the draft convention would be commended by the General Assembly and opened for signature at an early date.

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The representative of the United States (CCD/PV.533) proposed that, while continuing work on measures pertaining to weapons of mass destruction, the CCD also devote intensified discussions to the question of conventional arms control. The delegations of Argentina (CCD/PV.500),⁸⁰ Italy (CCD/PV.500),⁸⁰ Sweden (CCD/PV.497,⁸¹ 535),⁸² Romania (CCD/PV.499),⁸² and Czechoslovakia (CCD/PV.535)⁸² addressed the question of conventional weapons and expressed their respective views.

⁸⁰ Not printed here.

⁸¹ *Ante*, pp. 77-84.

⁸² Not printed here.

C. Other Collateral Measures

In his message to the CCD at the beginning of its 1971 session the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed the signature on 11 February in London, Moscow and Washington of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof and stated that the Treaty deserves universal adherence and full implementation.⁸³ The representatives of the USSR (CCD/PV.517),⁸⁴ Japan (CCD/PV.518),⁸⁵ Mongolia (CCD/PV.538),⁸⁶ the United Kingdom (CCD/PV.541)⁸⁶ and Hungary (CCD/PV.542)⁸⁶ informed the Committee regarding their ratification of this Treaty. The representatives of Sweden (CCD/PV.497),⁸⁷ Argentina (CCD/PV.536)⁸⁸ and Brazil (CCD/PV.536)⁸⁸ made statements in connexion with the signature of this Treaty by their governments.

A number of delegations spoke about the importance they attach to continuing negotiations in good faith, in accordance with Article V of the Seabed Treaty, concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the seabed, the ocean floor, and in the subsoil thereof. The delegation of Poland proposed the beginning at the proper time and under suitable conditions of discussion of further steps for the demilitarization of the seabed and the ocean floor. It recalled that the question of the prevention of an arms race on the seabed remains on the agenda of the Committee (CCD/PV.501).⁸⁸ The representative of the Soviet Union proposed a thorough examination of all aspects of the problem of further demilitarization of the seabed with due regard to the various proposals which had been put forward by members of the Committee (CCD/PV.532).⁸⁹ The delegation of Sweden stressed the importance of acting without delay to preserve the seabed for peaceful purposes (CCD/PV.535).⁹⁰

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The delegation of Yugoslavia devoted a statement to the question of a European Security Conference and expressed the view of the Yugoslav Government on its preparation (CCD/PV.505).⁹⁰ The delegation of Czechoslovakia drew the

⁸³The treaty appears *ante*, pp. 7-11. For the Secretary-General's message, see CCD/PV.495, pp. 6-9.

⁸⁴*Ante*, pp. 371-378.

⁸⁵*Ante*, pp. 389-405.

⁸⁶Not printed here.

⁸⁷*Ante*, pp. 77-84.

⁸⁸Not printed here.

⁸⁹*Ante*, pp. 511-516.

⁹⁰Not printed here.

Committee's attention to the importance of convening a conference on European security and co-operation at which, besides all aspects of European security, the problem of disarmament, including the question of reduction of conventional armaments, could be discussed (CCD/PV.519)⁹¹ and (CCD/PV.535).⁹¹ This question was also touched upon by the delegations of Hungary (CCD/PV.502),⁹¹ Poland (CCD/PV.501,⁹¹ 510⁹²) and Sweden (CCD/PV.535).⁹³

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The delegation of Romania proposed that the CCD examine the question of the freezing and reduction of military budgets (CCD/PV.520).⁹³

D. General and Complete Disarmament

Discussion continued regarding the question of general and complete disarmament during the 1971 sessions of the Committee taking into account General Assembly resolution 2661 (C) (XXV).⁹⁴

The delegation of Mexico recommended that special attention be given to the comprehensive programme of disarmament contained in General Assembly document A/8191 (CCD/PV.496).⁹⁵

The delegation of India suggested that an appropriate balance should be maintained among measures to prevent armament, measures to limit armament, and measures of disarmament; that it would be useful for the Soviet Union and the United States to submit revised draft treaties on general and complete disarmament; that the Joint Statement of Agreed Principles for Disarmament Negotiations (ENDC/5)⁹⁶ be considered the basis for concrete work in the Committee; and that the general order of the Committee's priorities be on the lines suggested in the declaration on disarmament issued by the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned States, held in Lusaka in September 1970 (CCD/PV.504).⁹⁷

The delegation of Hungary suggested that the Committee should pay special attention to the Joint Statement (ENDC/5) when dealing with or elaborating on general and complete disarmament (CCD/PV.502).⁹⁷ The delegations of Bulgaria (CCD/PV.500),⁹⁷ Mongolia (CCD/PV.501).⁹⁷ Hungary

⁹¹ Not printed here.

⁹² *Ante*, pp. 245-254.

⁹³ Not printed here.

⁹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 682-683.

⁹⁵ For A/8191, see *ibid.*, pp. 653-658. The Mexican statement is not printed here.

⁹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 439-442.

⁹⁷ Not printed here.

(CCD/PV.502),⁹⁸ Romania (CCD/PV.499 and 526)⁹⁸ and the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.516)⁹⁹ declared their readiness to continue efforts with a view of achieving a positive solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament.

The representatives of Mexico, Sweden and Yugoslavia submitted as a Conference document the Declaration on Peace and Disarmament, presented to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Nobel Peace Prize Laureates, 21 September 1970 (CCD/321).¹

The delegation of Italy suggested the possibility of establishing a small working group to examine the principles of an organic programme of disarmament (CCD/PV.500)¹ and proposed that the Committee resume work on the problem of general and complete disarmament, as the main item on its agenda at its next session, taking also into account the organic method proposed by Italy in document CCD/309² and the suggestions contained in the other documents mentioned in resolution 2661/C (XXV) (CCD/PV.537).³

The delegation of Romania suggested that progress towards general disarmament could best be ensured by starting negotiations for the drafting of a treaty and that official and informal meetings of the Committee be devoted to a thorough study of all aspects of this problem (CCD/PV.526).³

The delegations of Japan (CCD/PV.497 and 518),⁴ Romania (CCD/PV.499 and 526),⁵ Mongolia (CCD/PV.501),⁵ Argentina (CCD/PV.501),⁵ Pakistan (CCD/PV.503⁵ and 529⁵), Canada (CCD/PV.507)⁶ and the UAR (CCD/PV.509)⁷ made statements regarding the desirability of participation in disarmament negotiations by all militarily important states, including all nuclear weapons states.

III. SPECIAL REPORT ON THE QUESTION OF A TREATY BANNING UNDERGROUND NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS

Since Resolution 1252 was adopted by the XIIIth UNGA in 1958,⁸ subsequent sessions of the General Assembly have

⁹⁸ Not printed here.

⁹⁹ *Ante*, pp. 289-293.

¹ Not printed here.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 440-445.

³ Not printed here.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 84-92, 399-405.

⁵ Not printed here.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 201-208.

⁷ Not printed here.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1214-1217.

repeatedly adopted resolutions on the urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. Following the signature of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, United Nations Assembly resolutions have referred to the determination expressed by the parties in the preamble to that Treaty to continue negotiations "to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time".⁹

General Assembly Resolution 2663 (XXV) requested the CCD to continue, as a matter of urgency, its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and to submit to the Assembly at its twenty-sixth session a special report on the results of its deliberations; it also urged CCD members to co-operate in further study of the question of facilitating the achievement of a comprehensive test ban through the international exchange of seismic data.¹⁰

Having in mind the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly, members of the Committee during 1971 continued to work on the question of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests. A number of delegations stated that there was growing concern regarding nuclear testing, because of its relationship to the continuing nuclear arms race and to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Many members stressed in their plenary statements the great importance they continue to attach to the early achievement of a comprehensive prohibition of the testing of nuclear weapons. A number of possible approaches toward progress in this field were presented and considered.

GENERAL DISCUSSION ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN

Specific recommendations were made by Committee Members regarding the nature of a possible comprehensive test ban agreement.

The delegation of India called for the full observance of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and adherence to it by states which were not yet parties; the negotiation of a separate treaty to prohibit all underground nuclear weapon tests and a simultaneous agreement on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (CCD/PV.504).¹¹

The delegation of the United Arab Republic called for the inclusion in any comprehensive test ban of some form of verification by challenge, recourse to the Security Council, mention of a review conference, and the traditional withdrawal clause (CCD/PV.509). It expressed the view that a comprehensive test ban treaty should ultimately bear the signature of all nuclear

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685-687.

¹¹ Not printed here.

powers and called for adherence to the partial test ban treaty by those of them who have not yet adhered to it (CCD/PV.509).¹²

The representative of the Netherlands called for consideration by the CCD of the arms control aspects of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions, parallel to the studies by the IAEA on other aspects. He drew attention to the need to develop a system to prevent explosions from being used for weapon testing under the guise of peaceful purposes, and suggested that an international body should be authorized to satisfy itself that only nuclear devices already tested were being used for peaceful nuclear explosions (CCD/PV.512).¹²

The delegation of Sweden outlined six questions regarding the negotiation of a comprehensive test ban and asked delegations to provide answers to clarify the directions in which negotiations might proceed (CCD/PV.513).¹³

The delegation of Canada (CCD/PV.517),¹⁴ the Netherlands (CCD/PV.537),¹⁵ the Soviet Union (CCD/PV.536)¹⁶ expressed views regarding these questions.

The delegation of Pakistan submitted a working paper which stated that there is no difference between nuclear weapons and peaceful nuclear explosive devices and proposed that an underground test ban treaty include two kinds of provisions: for the nuclear states such a treaty would prohibit all underground nuclear weapon test explosions, but permit explosions for peaceful purposes in conformity with an international agreement to be negotiated separately; for the non-nuclear weapon states it would prohibit all underground explosions (CCD/340).¹⁷

The delegation of Japan requested the nuclear weapons states, particularly the United States and the Soviet Union, to make active contributions to the formulation of a treaty on the comprehensive prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, including concrete proposals relating to verification, and urged that the participation of all nuclear weapon states should not be made a precondition for the negotiation of such a treaty (CCD/PV.530).¹⁸

The delegation of Sweden presented (CCD/PV.524)¹⁹ a revised version of suggestions put forward in its earlier working paper (ENDC/242)²⁰ on possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests; as annexes to any such treaty, three

¹² Not printed here.

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 261-270.

¹⁴ Not printed here.

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 558-563.

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 548-556.

¹⁷ *Ante*, pp. 489-490.

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 496-500.

¹⁹ *Ante*, pp. 441-449.

²⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 140-142.

Protocols were proposed which would provide for a phasing out period for nuclear weapon tests, for the administration of peaceful nuclear explosions, and for the development of an international seismological data system. This revised draft treaty text was incorporated in a working paper presented by the Swedish delegation (CCD/348).²¹

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that the Soviet Union favours the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, everywhere and by all and is ready to sign an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection (CCD/PV.495,²² 507,²³ 536,²⁴).

The Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada suggested that the CCD could not delay longer a determined effort to reach a total ban on underground nuclear testing and also appealed to those governments conducting nuclear tests to put restraints on the size and number of tests in their testing programme and to announce such restraints (CCD/PV.536).²⁵

The delegation of the Soviet Union suggested that it would be preferable to elaborate an independent treaty without any renegotiation of the partial test ban treaty, and stated that one important and complicated task would be to work out an appropriate international agreement whereby the benefits accruing from the peaceful application of nuclear explosions could be made available to the non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT (CCD/PV.536).

The delegations of Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia presented a joint Memorandum on a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CCD/354), in which they noted that concrete proposals and suggestions relating to a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests have been made by several Committee Members, including some members of the Group of Twelve countries.²⁶ The memorandum states that the delegations mentioned above request the nuclear weapon states to submit urgently their own proposals so that purposeful negotiations could be immediately undertaken. The memorandum was submitted on the final day of the session and was not discussed.

A number of delegations made suggestions regarding a treaty to ban underground tests above a certain threshold and regarding certain interim measures pending completion of a comprehensive ban.

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 541-544.

²² *Ante*, p. 26.

²³ *Ante*, p. 212.

²⁴ *Ante*, p. 544.

²⁵ *Ante*, pp. 556-558.

²⁶ *Ante*, pp. 600-602.

DISCUSSION ON THRESHOLD OR PARTIAL MEASURES

With respect to the threshold concept, several delegations expressed views.

The delegation of Japan suggested that the Committee study the merits and demerits of prohibiting, first of all, underground nuclear weapon tests above a certain level of magnitude (CCD/PV.497).²⁷

The delegation of Ethiopia suggested that a threshold approach might lead to a situation in which tests for the perfection of smaller nuclear weapons could continue for a long time to come (CCD/PV.498).²⁸

The representative of Czechoslovakia expressed support for the proposal submitted by the UAR in 1964 (ENDC/144)²⁹ calling for negotiation of a treaty banning underground tests above the seismological magnitude of 4.75 together with a moratorium on all other explosions below that limit (CCD/PV.500),³⁰ and favoured an immediate ban on all underground tests of nuclear weapons irrespective of whether the explosions would be strong or weak (CCD/PV.535).³⁰

The delegation of the UAR suggested that it would seem unnecessary to discriminate between various sizes of yield or to embark upon a partial and preliminary agreement and proposed an immediate and comprehensive solution of the problem (CCD/PV.509).³⁰

The delegation of the Netherlands discussed difficulties in connection with the threshold approach even in combination with a voluntary moratorium on explosions beneath the threshold, and suggested that the Committee should head for a complete rather than for a partial solution. The threshold approach should be kept in mind as a possible solution to which to fall back (CCD/PV.512).

The delegation of Sweden expressed the view that a threshold approach could lead to a half measure that would leave open the possibility for improving nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.513), and suggested that tests of all levels should be encompassed in one treaty (CCD/PV.524).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that it supported the UAR proposal on the prohibition of underground tests above the magnitude of 4.75 together with a moratorium on underground nuclear explosions under this limit. It suggested that fixing a certain threshold for underground nuclear tests, if not linked to a moratorium on all underground tests below that threshold, would not lead to a solution of the problem banning underground nuclear tests and could create conflict between parties about whether the yields of nuclear explosions were above or below the threshold (CCD/PV.536).

²⁷ *Ante*, p. 87.

²⁸ Not printed here.

²⁹ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1964, p. 427.

³⁰ Not printed here.

DISCUSSION OF INTERIM MEASURES OR RESTRAINTS

Several delegations also expressed views on interim measures or restraints on nuclear testing programmes.

The delegation of Italy recalled its previous suggestion that advance notification of all underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes be provided to the International Atomic Energy Agency (CCD/331).³¹

The delegation of Canada submitted a working paper recommending that, pending the achievement of a total ban on nuclear testing, consideration be given to measures to reduce underground testing and guard against its harmful effects through: (a) an undertaking to reduce underground testing, beginning with high-yield testing as in earnest on the part of the nuclear testing powers of their intention to work toward a complete test ban; and (b) consideration of further measures to guard against environmental risks connected with underground testing (CCD/336).³²

The delegation of Sweden suggested that there should be a link between transitional measures and the treaty banning underground nuclear weapons (CCD/PV.524).

The delegation of Italy expressed the view that a series of interim and partial measures would create an atmosphere of confidence and facilitate subsequent progress towards a complete ban on testing and suggested that interim measures leading to a progressive reduction of underground tests even before the conclusion of a formal agreement would be useful and timely (CCD/PV.528).³³

The delegation of Japan suggested that major nuclear weapon States, either through unilateral action or through joint action, reduce the number and scale of underground tests, with particular emphasis on the high-yield tests detectable and identifiable with extra-territorial means (CCD/PV.530).

The delegation of the Soviet Union stated that a transitional period of descending quotas would only complicate the achievement of a treaty banning underground test explosions since existing obstacles would remain and new difficulties would arise in connexion with establishment of quotas for various States and the periods of their validity (CCD/PV.536).

DISCUSSION ON VERIFICATION OF UNDERGROUND TEST BAN

Members of the Committee devoted detailed attention to the question of verification of a prohibition on underground nuclear weapon tests.

The delegation of Ethiopia suggested that progress in the last several years in the national and international means of detecting

³¹ *Ante*, pp. 386-389.

³² *Ante*, pp. 431-432.

³³ *Ante*, p. 473.

and identifying underground tests is narrowing the differences that have so far persisted on the verification issue, and that it therefore becomes necessary to consider seriously the question of on-site inspections. He recalled that the nuclear weapon powers were, in 1963, on the verge of agreement regarding the question of on-site inspections and proposed that until further progress in the field of verification makes them obsolete, at least one on-site inspection a year be accepted by the nuclear powers as a confidence-building undertaking (CCD/PV.498).

The delegation[s] of Poland (CCD/PV.501)³⁴ and Hungary (CCD/PV.502)³⁴ expressed the view that States have at their disposal sufficient means for detection and identification of nuclear explosions and that what is needed now is a political decision.

The delegation of Mexico suggested that renewed consideration be given to the role of automatic seismic stations ("Black boxes") proposed in 1962 for verification of underground test ban and asked whether the delegations of the USSR and USA would be ready to accept in principle such a proposal as a basis for negotiation to solve the verification problem without on-site inspections (CCD/PV.504).³⁵

The delegation of the Netherlands invited the Committee to consider the question of what is more important, banning all tests with a risk that small explosions would go on undetected by whatever means of verification, or the continuation of underground tests without restriction. The delegation also noted that verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures and that any comprehensive test ban should take into account all available national means of verification, seismic and non-seismic (CCD/PV.512,³⁶ 537³⁷).

The delegation of the UAR suggested an immediate and comprehensive solution based on means of verification other than on-site inspections (CCD/PV.509).

The delegation of Sweden suggested that adequate deterrence could be obtained without on-site inspections and that inspection by invitation carried out in the manner prescribed by the inviting party is sufficient (CCD/PV.513).

The delegation of the United States stated its continued belief that adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban requires on-site inspection (CCD/PV.516).³⁸

The delegation of Italy proposed the continuation on systematic bases of the exchange of views among experts in order to co-ordinate their studies on all the problems linked to verification, and, to this end, suggested the establishment of a sub-committee

³⁴ Not printed here.

³⁵ *Ante*, pp. 167 ff.

³⁶ Not printed here.

³⁷ *Ante*, pp. 558-563.

³⁸ *Ante*, p. 286.

or a working group of experts, within the committee and under its direction, taking into account the precedent already established by the Disarmament Conference in 1962 (CCD/PV.528).

The delegation of the Soviet Union, recalling earlier discussion of "black boxes", expressed doubt whether resumption of the discussion of this proposal would lead to progress towards the solution of the problem of underground nuclear explosions (CCD/PV.536).

DISCUSSION ON INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION IN EXCHANGE OF SEISMIC DATA

International co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, the improvement of world-wide seismological capabilities, and further study of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests were also discussed.

The delegation of Canada submitted a working paper (CCD/336), recommending that, pending achievement of a total ban on nuclear testing, consideration be given to measures to help develop seismological identification techniques and facilities which could contribute to the effective verification of a comprehensive test ban through: (a) advance notification of details of planned underground nuclear explosions in order to assist in further research on seismological identification methods; and (b) undertakings to co-operate in the use, development and improvement of facilities for the monitoring of underground tests by seismological means.

At the request of the delegations of Canada, Ethiopia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, the UK and Yugoslavia, an informal meeting was held on June 30, 1971 regarding the question of the cessation of the testing of nuclear weapons. The experts present at this meeting discussed seismological methods of monitoring a comprehensive tests ban.

In this connection, delegations presented working papers to the Committee on the following subjects; a summary of existing and potential seismic capabilities for detection and identification of underground nuclear explosions (Netherlands, CCD/323)³⁹; results of a seismological study of 90 earthquakes and 33 underground nuclear explosions in Eurasia from 1968 to 1970 (Canada, CCD/327)⁴⁰; a summary of six scientific papers and hitherto unreported research on problems related to the seismological verification of a ban on underground nuclear explosions (Sweden, CCD/329)⁴¹; progress made in the study of the seismic detection, location, and identification of earthquakes and explosions and the inherent limitations to seismic techniques for the verification of a comprehensive test ban treaty (United States, CCD/330)⁴²; an

³⁹ *Ante*, pp. 159-165.

⁴⁰ *Ante*, pp. 342-357.

⁴¹ *Ante*, pp. 358-362.

⁴² *Ante*, pp. 379-386.

outline of the problems of teleseismic detection in the Mediterranean area and suggestions for an international center for co-ordination of research and exchange of seismic study and for the completion of the existing world network with a new center in the Mediterranean area (Italy, CCD/331); the usefulness of ocean bottom seismographs and a universally acceptable means of determining the magnitude of seismological events (Japan, CCD/345)^{4 3}; the seismicity of the USA, the USSR and China (Netherlands, CCD/349)^{4 3}; and on the improvements to the existing seismic network which could result from further special studies (UK, CCD/351)^{4 3}.

The delegation of the UAR affirmed that a comprehensive test ban treaty should ensure that all countries will be able to obtain seismological data of concern to them and also provide procedures in case the data raises a question of, or points conclusively to, a violation (CCD/PV.509).

The delegation of the Soviet Union suggested that the publication of underground testing programmes would facilitate the acquisition of information by military services of other states and would not assist in the solution of the problems of halting underground nuclear tests. It favoured co-operation in the field of seismological data exchange in the context of an agreement prohibiting underground nuclear weapon tests on the understanding that control over its observance will be exercised without any international inspection (CCD/PV.536).

The United Kingdom delegation drew attention to certain seismological scientific findings which cast grave doubt on the adequacy of purely national means of verification; further research was required to see to what extent it was possible to improve present seismic capabilities (CCD/PV.541).^{4 3}

The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will, in its continued negotiations on this matter as a priority item take into consideration the discussion of possible approaches to a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests and the various proposals which were put forward during the 1971 sessions of the Committee.

* * * * *

The Committee agreed to reconvene on a day to be established by the Co-Chairmen in consultation with all members of the Committee.

This report is transmitted by the Co-Chairmen on behalf of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

United States of America

^{4 3} Not printed here.

Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, September 30, 1971¹

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties:

Taking into account the devastating consequences that nuclear war would have for all mankind, and recognizing the need to exert every effort to avert the risk of outbreak of such a war, including measures to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,

Believing that agreement on measures for reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war serves the interests of strengthening international peace and security, and is in no way contrary to the interests of any other country,

Bearing in mind that continued efforts are also needed in the future to seek ways of reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

Each Party undertakes to maintain and to improve, as it deems necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control.

Article 2

The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of an accidental, unauthorized or any other unexplained incident involving a possible detonation of a nuclear weapon which could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war. In the event of such an incident, the Party whose nuclear weapon is involved will immediately make every effort to take necessary measures to render harmless or destroy such weapon without its causing damage.

Article 3

The Parties undertake to notify each other immediately in the event of detection by missile warning systems of unidentified objects, or in the event of signs of interference with these systems or with related communications facilities, if such occurrences could create a risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the two countries.

Article 4

Each Party undertakes to notify the other Party in advance of any planned missile launches if such launches will extend beyond its national territory in the direction of the other Party.

¹ TIAS 7186. The treaty was signed at Washington on Sept. 30 and entered into force on that date.

Article 5

Each Party, in other situations involving unexplained nuclear incidents, undertakes to act in such a manner as to reduce the possibility of its actions being misinterpreted by the other Party. In any such situation, each Party may inform the other Party or request information when, in its view, this is warranted by the interests of averting the risk of outbreak of nuclear war.

Article 6

For transmission of urgent information, notifications and requests for information in situations requiring prompt clarification, the Parties shall make primary use of the Direct Communications Link between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.²

For transmission of other information, notifications and requests for information, the Parties, at their own discretion, may use any communications facilities, including diplomatic channels, depending on the degree of urgency.

Article 7

The Parties undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at further implementation of the purposes of this Agreement.

Article 8

This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 9

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*For the United States
of America:*

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

*For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:*

A. GROMYKO

Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures To Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link, September 30, 1971¹

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Noting the positive experience gained in the process of

² See *infra*.

¹ TIAS 7187.

operating the existing Direct Communications Link between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which was established for use in time of emergency pursuant to the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed on June 20, 1963,²

Having examined, in a spirit of mutual understanding, matters relating to the improvement and modernization of the Direct Communications Link,

Have agreed as follows:

Article 1

1. For the purpose of increasing the reliability of the Direct Communications Link, there shall be established and put into operation the following:

(a) two additional circuits between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics each using a satellite communications system, with each Party selecting a satellite communications system of its own choice,

(b) a system of terminals (more than one) in the territory of each Party for the Direct Communications Link, with the locations and number of terminals in the United States of America to be determined by the United States side, and the locations and number of terminals in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to be determined by the Soviet side.

2. Matters relating to the implementation of the aforementioned improvements of the Direct Communications Link are set forth in the Annex which is attached hereto and forms an integral part hereof.

Article 2

Each Party confirms its intention to take all possible measures to assure the continuous and reliable operation of the communications circuits and the system of terminals of the Direct Communications Link for which it is responsible in accordance with this Agreement and the Annex hereto, as well as to communicate to the head of its Government any messages received via the Direct Communications Link from the head of Government of the other Party.

Article 3

The Memorandum of Understanding Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding the Establishment of a Direct Communications Link, signed on June 20, 1963, with the Annex thereto, shall remain in force, except to the extent that its provisions are modified by this Agreement and Annex hereto.

² *Documents on Disarmament*, 1963, pp. 236-238.

Article 4

The undertakings of the Parties hereunder shall be carried out in accordance with their respective Constitutional processes.

Article 5

This Agreement, including the Annex hereto, shall enter into force upon signature.

Done at Washington on September 30, 1971, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

*For the United States
of America:*

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

*For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:*

A. GROMYKO

Annex to the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures To Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link

Improvements to the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link shall be implemented in accordance with the provisions set forth in this Annex.

I. CIRCUITS

(a) Each of the original circuits established pursuant to paragraph 1 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963, shall continue to be maintained and operated as part of the Direct Communications Link until such time, after the satellite communications circuits provided for herein become operational, as the agencies designated pursuant to paragraph III (hereinafter referred to as the "designated agencies") mutually agree that such original circuit is no longer necessary. The provisions of paragraph 7 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963, shall continue to govern the allocation of the costs of maintaining and operating such original circuits.

(b) Two additional circuits shall be established using two satellite communications systems. Taking into account paragraph I (e) below, the United States side shall provide one circuit via the Intelsat system and the Soviet side shall provide one circuit via the Molniya II system. The two circuits shall be duplex telephone band-width circuits conforming to CCITT standards, equipped for secondary telegraphic multiplexing. Transmission and reception of messages over the Direct Communications Link shall be effected in accordance with applicable recommendations of international communications regulations, as well as with mutually agreed instructions.

(c) When the reliability of both additional circuits has been established to the mutual satisfaction of the designated agencies, they shall be used as the primary circuits of the Direct Communications Link for transmission and reception of teleprinter messages between the United States and the Soviet Union.

(d) Each satellite communications circuit shall utilize an earth station in the territory of the United States, a communications satellite transponder, and an earth station in the territory of the Soviet Union. Each Party shall be responsible for linking the earth stations in its territory to its own terminals of the Direct Communications Link.

(e) For the circuits specified in paragraph I (b):

—The Soviet side will provide and operate at least one earth station in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Intelsat system, and will also arrange for the use of suitable earth station facilities in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Molniya II system. The United States side, through a governmental agency or other United States legal entity, will make appropriate arrangements with Intelsat with regard to access for the Soviet Intelsat earth station to the Intelsat space segment, as well as for the use of the applicable portion of the Intelsat space segment.

—The United States side will provide and operate at least one earth station in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Molniya II system, and will also arrange for the use of suitable earth station facilities in its territory for the satellite communications circuit in the Intelsat system.

(f) Each earth station shall conform to the performance specifications and operating procedures of the corresponding satellite communications system and the ratio of antenna gain to the equivalent noise temperature should be no less than 31 decibels. Any deviation from these specifications and procedures which may be required in any unusual situation shall be worked out and mutually agreed upon by the designated agencies of both Parties after consultation.

(g) The operational commissioning dates for the satellite communications circuits based on the Intelsat and Molniya II systems shall be as agreed upon by the designated agencies of the Parties through consultations.

(h) The United States side shall bear the costs of: (1) providing and operating the Molniya II earth station in its territory; (2) the use of the Intelsat earth station in its territory; and (3) the transmission of messages via the Intelsat system. The Soviet side shall bear the costs of: (1) providing and operating the Intelsat earth station in its territory; (2) the use of the Molniya II earth station in its territory; and (3) the transmission of messages via the Molniya II system. Payment of the costs of the satellite communications circuits shall be effected without any transfer of payments between the Parties.

(i) Each Party shall be responsible for providing to the other Party notification of any proposed modification or replacement of the communications satellite system containing the circuit provided by it that might require accommodation by earth stations using that system or otherwise affect the maintenance or operation of the Direct Communications Link. Such notification should be given sufficiently in advance to enable the designated agencies to consult and to make, before the modification or replacement is effected, such preparation as may be agreed upon for accommodation by the affected earth stations.

II. TERMINALS

(a) Each Party shall establish a system of terminals in its territory for the exchange of messages with the other Party, and shall determine the locations and number of terminals in such a system. Terminals of the Direct Communications Link shall be designated "USA" and "USSR".

(b) Each Party shall take necessary measures to provide for rapidly switching circuits among terminal points in such a manner that only one terminal location is connected to the circuits at any one time.

(c) Each Party shall use teleprinter equipment from its own sources to equip the additional terminals for the transmission and reception of messages from the United States to the Soviet Union in the English language and from the Soviet Union to the United States in the Russian language.

(d) The terminals of the Direct Communications Link shall be provided with encoding equipment. One-time tape encoding equipment shall be used for transmissions via the Direct Communications Link. A mutually agreed quantity of encoding equipment of a modern and reliable type selected by the United States side, with spares, test equipment, technical literature and operating supplies, shall be furnished by the United States side to the Soviet

side against payment of the cost thereof by the Soviet side; additional spares for the encoding equipment supplied will be furnished as necessary.

(e) Keying tapes shall be supplied in accordance with the provisions set forth in paragraph 4 of the Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding, dated June 20, 1963. Each Party shall be responsible for reproducing and distributing additional keying tapes for its system of terminals and for implementing procedures which ensure that the required synchronization of encoding equipment can be effected from any one terminal at any time.

III. OTHER MATTERS

Each Party shall designate the agencies responsible for arrangements regarding the establishment of the additional circuits and the systems of terminals provided for in this Agreement and Annex, for their operation and for their continuity and reliability. These agencies shall, on the basis of direct contacts:

(a) arrange for the exchange of required performance specifications and operating procedures for the earth stations of the communications systems using Intelsat and Molniya II satellites;

(b) arrange for testing, acceptance and commissioning of the satellite circuits and for operation of these circuits after commissioning; and,

(c) decide matters and develop instructions relating to the operation of the secondary teleprinter multiplex system used on the satellite circuits.

Remarks by Secretary of State Rogers on the Signature of the Agreements on Nuclear Accidents Measures and the Direct Communications Link, September 30, 1971¹

Mr. Minister, Excellencies, distinguished guests: We are pleased to have you join us today for this ceremony to sign two agreements concluded between the U.S.S.R. and the United States. The first is an Agreement on Measures To Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,² and the second is an Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures To Improve the USA-USSR Direct Communications Link.³

I would like on this occasion to pay tribute to the delegations at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks headed by Minister Semenov and Ambassador Gerard Smith and their associates who worked on these agreements. These men and many people who worked with them deserve special recognition for the achievement which is the occasion for this ceremony.

[Signing of agreements.]

Men of good will have tried through the ages to eliminate the causes of war. Their efforts have in large part gone unrewarded. In our own era the awful specter of nuclear conflict has caused us to redouble our efforts as we realize that continued failure to get at the root causes of conflict could lead to world disaster.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 18, 1971, pp. 399-400.

² *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

³ *Supra*.

The agreements we have just signed reflect this new imperative of the nuclear age. The obligations undertaken today by the Soviet Union and the United States testify to their resolve that an accident or misunderstanding must not lead to a nuclear catastrophe. They represent realistic and concrete steps forward, taken in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which declares the determination of its members to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."⁴

I would like to emphasize two points in particular.

First, these agreements are in the interest of all nations. The concern over nuclear war is universal, and the agreements we have signed are in response to that concern.

Second, the achievements we register today are proof of the advantages of a sober and realistic approach in dealing with arms control. We have long since learned that rhetoric is no substitute for concrete achievement. Our delegations have proceeded successfully on the premise that what is needed is hard and realistic and persistent work on a practical and step-by-step basis.

When the delegations return to Vienna in November, they will continue their work to reach agreement on limiting antiballistic missile systems and on measures to curb offensive strategic weapons in accordance with the understanding announced in Moscow and Washington on May 20.⁵ Considerable progress has been made in this larger endeavor, but much remains to be done.

As we enter into the next phase of negotiations, Mr. Minister, we must intensify our efforts to reach agreements to limit the means, as well as the risk, of waging nuclear war. We shall strive toward this objective. I hereby reaffirm my country's pledge, as expressed by President Nixon to continue to do all it can to bring about a "full generation of peace."⁶

Remarks by Foreign Minister Gromyko on the Signature of the Agreements on Nuclear Accidents Measures and the Direct Communications Link, September 30, 1971¹

Mr. Secretary of State, ladies and gentlemen: It has given me a feeling of gratification to sign, on behalf of the Soviet Union, two agreements between our countries—on measures to be taken by both our nations to guard against the accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under their control² and on measures to improve the U.S.S.R.—United States direct communications link through the use for this purpose of artificial earth satellites.³

⁴*American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, p. 134.

⁵*Ante*, p. 298.

⁶*Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Mar. 1, 1971, p. 308.

¹*Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 18, 1971, p. 400.

²*Ante*, pp. 633-635.

³*Ante*, pp. 635-639.

Both these agreements originated in the course of the Soviet-American Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. They represent, so to speak, the first tangible result of those negotiations which began in late 1969.

True, the agreements signed today do not yet solve in any way the substance of the problem of limiting strategic armaments. This task is still outstanding and the participants in the talks should seek ways to solve it.

At the same time these agreements are steps in the right direction, since they serve to relax international tensions and reduce the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war.

From this standpoint they are fully in accord with the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, and, in our view, they meet the interests of all nations and peoples. It is for this reason that the Soviet people welcome the agreements that were signed today, as an example of the fact that, given the mutual desire and good will, useful results can be achieved.

I would like to express the hope that these agreements will be followed by other agreed steps resulting from the negotiations underway between, or with the participation of, our two countries.

Letter From the Ceylonese Representative (Amerasinghe) to Secretary-General Thant: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, October 1, 1971¹

I am directed by my Government to request that, in accordance with rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the following item be placed on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly as an item of an important and urgent character:

“Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.”

In the pursuit of international peace and security and of general and complete disarmament, several positive measures have been adopted by the United Nations.

These measures include the declaration of continental areas as nuclear-free zones. The best examples of such measures are the Treaty of Tlatelolco² and the Organization of African Unity's Declaration of Africa as a nuclear-free zone.³

The Government of Ceylon considers that the progressive application to areas of the world of the principle of demilitarization and of exclusion of military competition in various forms would contribute substantially to the cause of international peace.

Recent years have shown a noticeable trend in the development

¹ A/8492, Oct. 1, 1971.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 1964, pp. 294-295.

of international law and practice towards the principle that areas not assimilated to national jurisdiction constitute an international domain that should be subject to international regulation and international responsibility. Cases in point are the agreements on outer space⁴ and Antarctica.⁵ The principle has been further elaborated in the Declaration on Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction which recognizes the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind.⁶

In seeking the inscription of the item "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly, the Government of Ceylon's purpose is to secure United Nations approval of an international domain, subject to international regulation and international responsibility, covering the entire high seas of the Indian Ocean. Existing circumstances in the Indian Ocean, as distinct from other oceans of the world, are specially conducive to the application of this policy to the area. The presence of the military and naval forces of the great Powers in the Indian Ocean areas has not yet assumed significant proportions.

None of the great Powers nor any of the medium Powers are contiguous States. The major maritime nations are geographically remote from the Indian Ocean area nor are the economic interests of the great Powers involved to any appreciable degree in the area.

The countries of the Indian Ocean need conditions of peace and tranquility in which to transform and modernize their economies and societies. It is imperative to the success of these efforts that the Indian Ocean should be preserved as an area of peace.

Immediate action is considered necessary to arrest and reverse certain trends which have lately become manifest and which, if allowed to continue, would render the progressive militarization of the Indian Ocean unavoidable. The admission of the item is, therefore, sought under rule 15 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly.

The main features of Ceylon's proposals are that the entire high seas area of the Indian Ocean will be declared a peace zone to be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. This would mean the exclusion of armaments, defensive or offensive, and military installations from the prescribed area. Warships and ships carrying war-like equipment will exercise the right of transit but may not stop other than for emergency reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature. The use of the sea-bed area by submarines, except for reasons of a mechanical, technical or humanitarian nature, is to be prohibited. There will be a prohibition on

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 698-701.

naval manoeuvres, naval intelligence operations and weapons tests in the area. These are the main features of the proposal.

I should be glad if this letter were treated as the explanatory memorandum required by rule 20 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and circulated as an official document of the United Nations.

**Address by Secretary of State Rogers to the General Assembly
[Extract], October 4, 1971¹**

A Berlin agreement will be a milestone along the road to a more peaceful and cooperative Europe. Pivotal in the portion already agreed to is the firm commitment to unrestricted transit traffic of civilian persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and West Berlin.² Particularly significant is the obligation the Soviet Union has undertaken to insure that this traffic will be unimpeded, that it will be facilitated, and that it will receive preferential treatment.

The value of this agreement will depend not on how the obligations have been formulated on paper, but on how they will be carried out on the ground. Truly unhindered movement to and from Berlin would greatly reduce tensions and remove one of Europe's most dangerous flashpoints. Halfhearted or grudging implementation of the agreement would only perpetuate fears and suspicions. The willingness of the German Democratic Republic, in its discussions with the Federal Republic of Germany, to translate general obligations into specific commitments and subsequently to put those commitments into actual practice will be the crucial test.

Achievement of a final Berlin agreement and its effective implementation could lead to broader progress. It would, for example, make more realistic the prospects of a European conference with United States and Canadian participation. It would accelerate the movement—desired by the people of Eastern as well as of Western Europe—toward the reduction of tensions on the Continent.

It is to this end that the United States is pursuing the possibilities of negotiation on a mutual and balanced reduction of military forces in Europe.

Two years ago President Nixon pledged to the General Assembly that the United States was determined to limit, and then reverse, the buildup of strategic arms. He said we intended to conduct our negotiations with the Soviet Union "soberly and seriously . . . seeking to reach agreement, rather than to make propaganda."³

In May of this year, the United States and the Soviet Union

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Oct. 25, 1971, pp. 438-439.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 318 ff.

³ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, p. 454.

announced their intention to achieve agreement on both defensive and offensive strategic arms, initiating a new stage of intensive work. As a result, although no agreement has yet been reached, we have come closer together on the concepts and details of an agreement to limit antiballistic missile systems. On May 20 we made an announcement which contemplates that agreements to limit defensive and offensive weapons will be reached "together."⁴ When talks resume in Vienna next month, it is therefore agreed that discussions in greater detail will be undertaken on the limitation of offensive weapons.

Meanwhile, these negotiations have already produced two valuable agreements, one on preventing nuclear accidents from leading to war⁵ and the other on improving "Hot Line" communications between Washington and Moscow by use of satellites.⁶

There has also been encouraging movement in multilateral negotiations. Here, too, the United States intends to work constructively for further concrete results. In particular, we urge this General Assembly to seek broad ratification of the convention to prohibit the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons.⁷

The Soviet Union has suggested the creation of a periodic world disarmament conference to be established outside the United Nations.⁸ Frankly, we are skeptical that such a generalized approach would produce specific accomplishments. All postwar experience indicates that a concrete, step-by-step approach offers better prospects for success than more grandiose schemes, which tend to generate many words and few results.

At a time when the prospects are promising for participation in the United Nations by the People's Republic of China, and perhaps others as well, there would seem to be no reason for establishing still more world disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework.

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Report by Secretary-General Thant on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, October 22, 1971¹

FOREWORD BY THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

1. The primary purpose of the United Nations, as set out in its Charter, is to maintain international peace and security. The

⁴ *Ante*, p. 298.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 635-639.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 607-608.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 196.

¹ A/8469, Oct. 22, 1971.

Charter also provides for this primary purpose to be promoted "with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources".²

2. Within days after the signing of the Charter in San Francisco on 26 June 1945, the explosion of the first atomic bomb ushered in the nuclear age. Since then disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, has been unanimously recognized as the most important problem facing the world. Despite continuous and intensive efforts, both within and outside the United Nations, the results achieved in resolving the problem have been far short of the needs. The arms race has continued. Military expenditures have steadily increased and more and more sophisticated weapons of mass destruction have been developed and stockpiled. The accumulation of weapons has reached a stage where it is more than sufficient to destroy all life on earth. The resulting situation constitutes a real threat to international peace and security. The need to halt and reverse the arms race before it reaches the point of no return is, therefore, a matter of grave concern to the international community.

3. It was with these considerations in mind that in 1970, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary of the United Nations, I wrote:

While progress in disarmament has been slow, science and technology—in particular nuclear technology—have advanced at a formidable pace. Tremendous material resources and human creativeness have been applied to destructive rather than constructive purposes; and, despite repeated assurances to the contrary, the world becomes less secure with every new generation of more sophisticated weapons. This situation not only poses a continual threat to international peace, but also has a deep unsettling effect on human society, because of the dangers, anxieties and burdens it generates.

4. I also proposed, on 22 May 1970, in a statement entitled "Politics of Disarmament", that a study be undertaken of the economic and social consequences of the arms race, so that the problems of the continuing arms race and of massive military expenditures would be better understood and more fully publicized.³ Such a study should evaluate the effects of the incessant and rapidly increasing diversion of resources from peaceful to military purposes. This, I stated, would help to create a fuller understanding of the needs and the possibilities for reordering our priorities in the decade of the 1970s.

5. At its twenty-fifth session, the General Assembly, at the initiative of Romania, included in its agenda an item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security". Following the consideration of this item, the General Assembly unanimously adopted resolution 2667 (XXV) which, *inter alia*, called upon the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military

² *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I, p. 141.

³ See *UN Monthly Chronicle*, vol. VII, no. 6 (June 1970).

expenditures and requested that the report be transmitted to the General Assembly in time to permit its consideration at the twenty-sixth session.⁴

6. Pursuant to this resolution, I appointed the following group of 14 consultant experts to assist me in the preparation of the report called for by the General Assembly: Mr. Gheorghe Dolgu, Professor of Economics, University of Bucharest, Member of the Romanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences; Mr. Willem F. Duisenberg, Professor of Macro-Economics, University of Amsterdam; Mr. Vasily S. Emelyanov, Corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow; Mr. Plácido García Reynoso, formerly Professor of Mexican Legislation on Economics, School of Economics, University of Mexico, Mexico City; Mr. Vojin Guzina, President of the Federal Commission of Nuclear Energy, Belgrade, Professor of Economics, University of Belgrade; Mr. Douglas Le Pan, University Professor, University of Toronto, formerly Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Canadian Department of External Affairs, Ottawa; Mr. Ladislav Matejka, Deputy Director of the Research Institute for Planning and Management of National Economy, Prague; Mr. Akira Matsui, Commissioner, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Tokyo; Mr. Jacques Mayer, Directeur des synthèses économiques à l'Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris; Mr. Maciej Perczynski, Professor of Economics, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw; Mr. Mullath A. Vellodi, Joint Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Bombay; Mr. Henry C. Wallich, Professor of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.; Mr. Kifle Wodajo, Minister in the Foreign Service of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa; Lord Zuckerman, formerly Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United Kingdom; Professor Emeritus, University of Birmingham, Professor at Large, University of East Anglia.

7. Mr. Mangalam E. Chacko, Deputy to the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Security Council Affairs, whom I designated as my representative to be in charge of the preparation of the report, served as Chairman of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures. Mr. Alessandro Corradini, Chief of the Committee and Conference Services Section, Disarmament Affairs Division, acted as Secretary of the Group. The Group was also assisted by Mr. Sidney Dell, Director of the New York Office of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, by Mr. Frank Blackaby, until recently editor of the *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament*, and by members of the Department of Political and Security Council Affairs.

8. The Group of Consultant Experts held three sessions, between February and September 1971, in connexion with the

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

preparation of the report. In an opening statement I made to the Group at its first meeting, I drew its attention to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV), which should serve as the basis for the terms of reference of the experts. The various considerations, which the General Assembly had taken into account in requesting the preparation of the study and which coincided with my own views, were set out in that resolution. I expressed confidence that the Group would assess the magnitude of the dangers of the arms race and the economic burdens which it created and that it would consider the most effective ways of reducing and finally eliminating both the dangers and the burdens and thus facilitating the implementation of much needed programmes of economic and social development in the coming decade. I also expressed the hope that the Group would be able to submit a unanimous report.

9. In the preparation of its report, the Group had before it, in addition to the information made available by the individual experts, replies of Governments to a note verbale dated 1 March 1971 enclosing a questionnaire sent by the Secretary-General in pursuance of paragraph 4 of resolution 2667 (XXV) as well as communications received from specialized agencies and from non-governmental organizations and institutions in response to requests addressed to them by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 5 of the resolution.⁵ The note verbale of the Secretary-General, the replies of Governments and the communications from the specialized agencies and from non-governmental organizations and institutions are reproduced in an addendum to the report.⁶

10. I am gratified that the Group of Consultant Experts has been able to submit a unanimous report embodying its findings and conclusions. After carefully studying the report, I have been impressed not only by the high level of competence with which the experts carried out their difficult and delicate task, but also by the effective way in which they have analysed the facts, set forth their views and drawn their conclusions. I should like to take this opportunity to express to the experts my appreciation and thanks for accepting my invitation to serve on the Group in a personal capacity and for having submitted to me a unanimous and valuable report.

11. I have decided to accept the report of the Group and to transmit it to the General Assembly, as the report called for by resolution 2667 (XXV).

12. In so transmitting the report, I should like to make a few brief observations. Although statistical study of world military expenditures, as the experts point out, is still in its infancy and comparatively little research into the question has been encouraged, the scale of the economic burden resulting from the arms race can be readily appreciated from the figures carefully

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 75-77.

⁶ Not printed here.

assembled by the experts. Some of these figures deserve special mention. In 1961, when the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*⁷ was being prepared, the world was spending roughly \$120 billion annually for military purposes, equal to \$150 billion at 1970 prices. By 1970 annual military expenditures exceeded \$200 billion. The experts also estimated that if annual military expenditures continue to absorb their present percentage of world output, they could well reach the level of \$300-350 billion (at 1970 prices) by 1980, with a total outlay for the current decade of about \$2,650 billion, 750 more than was spent from 1961 to 1970.

13. The report stresses that in a period during which no major countries have been at all-out war with each other, it is a new departure for the world to devote so large a proportion of its resources to military uses. It also points out that, although the relative share of world output devoted to military uses seems to have levelled off in the past few years, there is no ground for optimistic inferences, because the allotment of a constant percentage of a steadily rising world output to military expenditures is precisely a formula for an unending arms race. It is equally apparent that a falling percentage could conceal an absolute increase in military expenditures. Moreover, a decline in the volume of resources, relative to gross national product or even in absolute terms, could be more than offset by the development of more deadly weapons.

14. Naturally enough, a good part of the report is devoted to an analysis of the national consequences of the arms race and military expenditures, with stress on "lost opportunities" in the civil field, as a result of resources being allocated for military purposes. Due attention is also given to the broader international consequences, in particular, the negative effects on international security, restrictions on international trade, and negative impact on the volume of aid by the developed to the developing countries. The report also makes it clear that whatever "spin-off" effects there may have been from military technology into the civilian field, it can reasonably be assumed that they could have been generated without the competitive challenge of militarism.

15. A very positive feature of the report is that, in dealing with the quantitative aspects of the arms race, it never loses sight of the more subtle but equally alarming consequences of the qualitative aspects of the arms race. With the acceleration of technological change, the perils which military expenditures have brought in their wake have become so acute as to provide man with the means of his own ultimate destruction. Security cannot, therefore, be achieved by further accumulation of destructive power. For, in the words of the report, the arms race has already resulted in the

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 42-48.

stockpiling of more destructive power than has any conceivable purpose.

16. Finally, as regards the conclusions contained in the report, I find them not only convincing but inescapable. I endorse these conclusions, and in doing so, I wish to express the hope that this report will contribute, in some measure, to the achievement of the primary purpose of the United Nations, to which all Member States are equally dedicated. The facts and figures which are assembled in the report and the conclusions contained in it should galvanize the world community into more strenuous and effective action to halt and reverse the arms race.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

25 October 1971

Sir,

I have the honour to submit herewith the unanimous report of the Group of Consultant Experts on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and Military Expenditures, which was appointed by you in pursuance of paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.

The consultant experts appointed in accordance with the General Assembly resolution were the following:

Mr. Gheorghe Dolgu

Professor of Economics, University of Bucharest; Member of the Romanian Academy of Social and Political Sciences

Mr. Willem F. Duisenberg

Professor of Macro-Economics, University of Amsterdam

Mr. Vasily S. Emelyanov

Corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Moscow

Mr. Plácido García Reynoso

formerly Professor of Mexican Legislation on Economics, School of Economics, University of Mexico, Mexico City

Mr. Vojin Cuzina

President of the Federal Commission of Nuclear Energy, Belgrade; Professor of Economics, University of Belgrade

Mr. Douglas Le Pan

University Professor, University of Toronto; formerly Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Canadian Department of External Affairs, Ottawa

Mr. Ladislav Matejka

Deputy Director of the Research Institute for Planning and Management of National Economy, Prague

Mr. Akira Matsui

Commissioner, Japan Atomic Energy Commission, Tokyo

Mr. Jacques Mayer

Directeur des synthèses économiques à l'Institut national de la statistique et des études économiques, Paris

Mr. Maciej Perczynski

Professor of Economics, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Warsaw

Mr. Mullath A. Vellodi

Joint Secretary, Department of Atomic Energy, Government of India, Bombay

Mr. Henry C. Wallich

Professor of Economics, Yale University, New Haven, Conn.

Mr. Kifle Wodajo

Minister in the Foreign Service of Ethiopia, Addis Ababa

Lord Zuckerman

formerly Chief Scientific Adviser to the Government of the United Kingdom; Professor Emeritus, University of Birmingham; Professor at Large, University of East Anglia

The report was prepared between February and September 1971, during which period the Group held three sessions, the first two in New York from 16-19 February and from 20 May to 3 June, and the third session in Geneva from 23 August to 5 September 1971.

I have been requested by the Group of Consultant Experts, as its Chairman, to submit its unanimous report to you on its behalf.

Respectfully yours,

(Signed) M. E. CHACKO

Chairman

Group of Consultant Experts

The Secretary-General
United Nations
New York

INTRODUCTION

1. The discussions and negotiations which have been pursued in the United Nations and elsewhere in order to achieve the basic goal of the maintenance of peace and the elimination of war have led to some initial steps in the field of arms limitation and disarmament.⁸ Nonetheless they have not succeeded in halting, let alone reversing, an arms race which has grown ever more perilous over the years, and ever more wasteful of human and other resources. The resolution of the General Assembly which called for the present report emphasized that world military expenditures have been continuously increasing.

2. In 1961, when the report of the Secretary-General entitled *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*⁹ was being prepared, the available data indicated that the world was then spending about \$120 billion annually for military purposes,

⁸ The Antarctic treaty (*ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556); the limited test-ban treaty (*ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293); the outer-space treaty (*ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43); the Tlatelolco treaty (*ibid.*, pp. 69 ff.); the non-proliferation treaty (*ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465); the sea-bed treaty (*ante*, pp. 7-11).

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1962*, vol. I, pp. 42-48.

roughly equivalent, at today's values, to \$150 billion. Ten years later we find the figure standing at about \$200 billion. The trend to produce and accumulate ever more sophisticated and ever greater numbers of costly and deadly weapons continues uninterruptedly. More and more States, including a growing number of smaller or developing countries which desperately need to use such resources as they can command for productive social ends, have found themselves impelled along this path.

3. Nuclear weapons constitute the most fearful category of armaments to which military expenditures are devoted, and these pose the greatest threat which mankind now faces. "The threat of the immeasurable disaster which could befall mankind were nuclear war ever to erupt, whether by miscalculation or by mad intent, is so real that informed people the world over understandably become impatient for measures of disarmament additional to the few measures of arms limitation that have already been agreed to."¹⁰

4. Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons have consumed only an insignificant part of total expenditures on arms, but the ominous shadow they cast over the world is totally disproportionate to their cost. The United Nations considers chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons as belonging to the category of weapons of mass destruction, and has insistently called for their elimination.

5. By far the largest part of the total of military expenditures which is devoted to equipment is, however, consumed in the development, production and purchase of conventional weapons such as aircraft, tanks and guns, the weapons which have been used in the wars which have marred this last decade. This generalization applies as much to the nuclear Powers as to the non-nuclear States.

6. The 1962 report of the Secretary-General, *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*, considered the scale of the resources then being devoted to military purposes, and the peaceful uses to which they might otherwise be put. It dealt with the conversion problems that could arise, and the impact of disarmament on international economic relations and on aid for economic development. It concluded that all the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament could be met by appropriate national and international measures, and that the diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use could benefit all through the improvement of world economic and social conditions.

7. We have been asked to approach the same general problem from the point of view of the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures. We do so with a sense of urgency, in the recognition that until a halt is put to the

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 476 ff.

race, there can be no assurance of international peace, and the threat of war, and particularly of nuclear war, will continue to plague the world; and that the pressing economic and social needs of the world, especially of the developing countries, make it imperative to secure the earliest possible release of resources now pre-empted by the arms race.

I. QUALITATIVE ASPECTS OF THE ARMS RACE

8. The decade of the 1960s was marked by a greater spread and by a more extensive technological elaboration of armaments than any which preceded it. During the period, there were no developments comparable to the emergence of radio or radar, jet engines or rockets, nuclear weapons or electronic computers. Yet the decade will be remembered because over the years which it encompassed, supersonic flight became commonplace, not only in the military forces of the highly industrialized nations, but also in those countries in relatively early stages of economic development; because of the diversification of nuclear weapons in the armouries of a few major Powers, and because their multiplication meant the accumulation of destructive power, only a fraction of which would be enough to eliminate life on earth; because the development of ballistic missiles, and the sophistication of their guidance and control systems, made any point on earth open to precise attack by nuclear warheads; and because space technology added a new dimension to the field of military communications and surveillance. In short, the decade will be remembered because these, as well as other developments too numerous to mention, characterized the arms race of the period.

9. The make-up of military budgets varies from country to country, but it can safely be said that in the major arms-producing countries on average about half goes to personnel costs and the rest to a combination of research and development, purchase of equipment, construction and operations. The estimated total for world military expenditures over the period 1961 to 1970 is \$1,870 billion (at 1970 prices) (see section II, table 1, below), of which it can be reckoned that about \$600 billion was devoted to the purchase of equipment. By far the larger proportion of this sum was spent on conventional arms—guns and ammunition, transport vehicles and tanks, communications and surveillance equipment, aircraft and ships. The outlays on nuclear arms which the nuclear Powers have made over the years, and which are also included in this sum, have resulted in the stockpiling of weapons with a potential destructive power infinitely greater than that of all other armaments put together. The weapon-systems associated with nuclear armaments are not only extremely costly to produce, but as the 1967 report of the Secretary-General entitled *Effects of the Possible Use of Nuclear Weapons and the Security and Economic Implications for States of the Acquisition and Further Development of These Weapons* indicated, their vast “over-hit-

ting" power makes them, in no conceivable sense, a substitute for conventional arms. As that report also pointed out, "it is highly debatable whether there are any circumstances of land warfare in which such weapons could be used as battlefield weapons or, if they were so used, would confer any military advantage to either side in the zone of contact".¹¹ And as the Secretary-General's further report of 1969 indicated, the same general conclusion applies to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.¹² Both of these categories of armament constitute weapons of mass destruction, not weapons in the sense in which the term is normally understood.

10. Of the total of \$1,870 billion which went to military expenditures over the period 1961 to 1970, an estimated 10 per cent—somewhat less than \$200 billion—was devoted to military research and development. This work was highly concentrated in the six countries¹³ which now account for more than four fifths of total military expenditure. Although only a minor part of the total, it is this outlay for research and development which determines the main feature of the modern arms race—the qualitative changes in armaments.

11. On the surface it would seem that the effort to improve the quality of armaments, or to defend against them, follows a logical series of steps in which a new weapon or weapon-system is devised, then a counter-weapon to neutralize the new weapon, and then a counter-counter-weapon. But these steps neither usually nor necessarily occur in a rational time sequence. The people who design improvements in weapons are themselves the ones who as a rule envisage the further steps they feel should be taken. They do not wait for a potential enemy to react before they react against their own creations.

12. These features of the arms race show up very clearly in the field of long-range nuclear weapons. First there was a rapid change in the means of delivery, starting with the switch from manned bombers to liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles, beginning with intermediate and moving on to rockets of intercontinental range. Solid-fuelled missiles soon followed, deployed in concrete silos, in order to protect them from attack. In parallel, submarine-launched ballistic missiles were developed and deployed.

13. Not only did the variety, technical complexity, and cost of the means of delivery of strategic nuclear weapons increase during the decade, the number of nations with a nuclear capability also increased by the addition of France and the People's Republic of China.

14. With the introduction of ever more sophisticated and less vulnerable means for the long-range delivery of nuclear warheads,

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 510.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 256-298.

¹³ The United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

nations turned their efforts in military research and development to the problem of detecting and intercepting ballistic missiles. Special radar networks were set up to give early warning of missile firings, and towards the end of the decade, anti-ballistic missiles were being developed and even deployed. Simultaneously, efforts were directed to the devising of missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVs) capable of being aimed at a number of targets from a single launch, and so, theoretically, of overwhelming anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defences.

15. The research and development effort which has been devoted to nuclear armaments over the sixties has been enormous. It has involved far more than the traditional techniques of the aerospace and electronic industries. It has also penetrated the marine sciences and proved a powerful spur to studies of space technology. Military satellite communications, supplementing more conventional methods of communication, have also been deployed, as have also space surveillance systems.

16. Vast technological developments have occurred in weapons and weapon-systems designed for air, land and sea warfare. The development and deployment of supersonic aircraft, equipped with air-to-air weapons, has greatly increased the cost and complexity of what are still regarded as conventional fighter aircraft. A modern fighter-bomber costs ten times the aircraft of 10 years ago which it replaced, while a sophisticated interceptor aircraft today could cost more than \$10 million, compared with \$150,000 for the corresponding aircraft of World War II. The vulnerability of such expensive weapons to attack when deployed on airfields, as well as that of their fixed bases, has in turn encouraged the production of vertical take-off aircraft and of the armed helicopter. These developments have widened the range of aircraft in service and the scale of the aeronautical research which has been called upon to support their development.

17. The familiar chain of new weapon, counter-weapon and counter-counter-weapon has also characterized the sphere of land warfare. The dependence of armies on armoured vehicles has intensified, the response to this change being the continued elaboration of sophisticated anti-tank weapons. Helicopters have been brought into greater use, in the effort to increase the mobility of land forces, particularly for the conduct of military operations in areas where communications are poor. This again, has increased the "depth of capitalization" of the armed forces, that is to say, the ratio of equipment costs to total military expenditure. But here, too, a counter-measure has appeared in the shape of the one-man anti-aircraft missile.

18. In the naval sphere nuclear and gas turbine propulsion have added new dimensions to the design of ships' machinery, at the same time as the armament systems of a ship have become a much more important element in its cost. The increasing vulnerability of surface vessels to air attack has been countered by the develop-

ment and installation of anti-aircraft missiles. Counter-measures have followed, such as the stand-off bomb, which can be launched from beyond the range of the ship-borne missile, and the ship-to-ship guided missile. A whole new range of technologies has been brought into use in naval warfare in the past decade.

19. National inventories of stocks of armaments are never published, but some figures are available which reflect these various qualitative changes. At the outset of the decade, hardly any intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) had yet been deployed. By the end of the decade the estimated numbers were 2,150. In 1960 the deployment of submarine-launched ballistic missiles was negligible. By the end of the decade, some 55 nuclear-missile submarines were operational, comprising about 800 missiles, capable of delivering about 1,800 warheads.¹⁴

20. From 1960 to 1968 the world stock of fighting vessels is estimated to have increased from 4,550 to 4,900. This relatively small increase in numbers masks the much larger increase in the value of this stock (at 1968 prices, the value of the stock in 1960 was about \$34 billion, as compared with \$60 billion in 1968, a 75 per cent rise).¹⁵

21. A much more striking change occurred over the period in the world stock of supersonic fighters. At the opening of the decade their estimated number was 6,000. By the end it had doubled. In 1960 there were 15 production programmes for supersonic aircraft; by 1970 these too had doubled.¹⁶

22. This brief sketch of the qualitative changes in armaments that have taken place over the decade has been drawn only in bold outline. It does not point to any but a few categories of weapons, any more than it does to the arsenals of the countries in which they are to be found. But what it does show is that while the cost of the arms race in terms of the resources which it consumes is highly alarming, the mounting sophistication and destructiveness of the weapons which result from it are even more so. This stark fact needs to be kept clearly in mind when we come to consider the implications for the arms race of any decrease which nations might make in their military expenditures.

II. THE ARMS RACE IN TERMS OF RESOURCES

23. The scale of the economic burden resulting from the arms race, and which the picture drawn in the previous chapter reflects, can be readily appreciated, even if some of the figures may lack precision.

24. As already noted, military expenditures for the world as a whole added up to an estimated total of \$1,870 billion (at 1970 values) over the period 1961 to 1970 inclusive. During the 10

¹⁴ *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70*, pp. 46 ff.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 307 ff.

¹⁶ Hoagland, John H., *World Combat Aircraft Inventories and Production, 1970-75* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970).

years from the beginning of the decade, annual expenditures have increased by more than \$50 billion to reach their present level of about \$200 billion.¹⁷ The latter figure represents between 6 and 6.5 per cent of the total of world gross national product (see table 1). Military expenditures are in fact now running at two and a half times what all Governments are spending on health, one and a half times what they spend on education, and 30 times more than the total of all official economic aid granted by developed to developing countries.¹⁸ The economic scale of current world military expenditures can be realized even more dramatically when one remembers that they all but equal the combined GNP of the United Kingdom and Italy, or that of the developing countries of South Asia, the Far East and Africa together, with a total population of 1,300 million.

25. In a period in which no major nations have been at all-out war with each other, it is a new departure for the world to devote so large a proportion of its resources to military uses. Compared with previous periods in which the more highly industrialized countries were not at war with each other, such as the years before the First World War of 1914-1918, or the early 1930s before the Second World War, there have been two major changes. First, the world's standing armies are much larger than they used to be. Second and more important, the qualitative changes in weaponry described in the previous chapter mean that the weapons with which these armies are equipped have grown immensely in lethal power, in cost and in complexity. Up to now the "second industrial revolution"—for example, the commercial and technological exploitation of computers and electronics—has probably had a much more powerful impact on the military than on the civil sector. In consequence, the relative share of world output devoted to military uses in the years since 1949 has been at least double what it was in 1913, when there had already been three years of competitive rearming between the great Powers. It then stood somewhere between 3 and 3 1/2 per cent of world GNP. From 1950 to 1970, in the period following the Second World War, the share of world output going to military uses has been about 7 per cent. In short, if we compare the period after the Second World War with that before the First, world military

¹⁷ The sources used in this chapter are given in the foot-notes to charts 1 A and 1 B. The statistical study of world military expenditures is still in its infancy and comparatively little research into the question has been encouraged. This is mainly because of the issue of secrecy. Even allowing for this, and for the lack of comparable official data for different countries, a good deal could be done to improve the international comparability of national figures. The margin of error in the figure of \$200 billion for annual world military expenditures at the end of the 1960s is not known, and any figure for total expenditures between \$170 and \$230 billion would be plausible. There is a much smaller margin of error in the calculation of trends. In trend calculations, the main point is that the definition of military expenditure in the main countries should be consistent from year to year.

¹⁸ It should be noted, however, that in many countries a large proportion of spending on health and education is private.

expenditure has risen about twice as fast as world output. It is a highly disturbing fact that the world has increased the volume of resources which it is devoting to military uses at least twenty-fold during the course of this century.

26. Over the past 20 years, the rise, though rapid, has been irregular (see chart 1 A). It has tended to go up sharply in periods of crisis or war, and then level off for a number of years, but without returning to the pre-crisis figure. Thus, in the short space of the three years between 1949 and 1952, world military expenditure doubled in real terms. It then remained approximately level for nine years. It rose to a new plateau in the early sixties, and then very substantially from 1965 to 1967. It then levelled off.

27. The calculation of any trend depends greatly on the time period included. If one takes the whole period for which estimates are available—that is, from 1949 to 1970—the long-term average rate of rise in world military expenditure, at 5 per cent a year in real terms, has been roughly in line with the rate of growth of the world national product. But during the post-war years the rate of growth in world national product has been unprecedentedly high. Consequently the absolute level of military spending increased very considerably over this period. Proportionately more of the increase came in the first half—the time of the Korean War—than the second half of the whole period.

28. During the period 1960-1970, the movement of military expenditures, as well as of their share in GNP, was irregular. As shown in table 1, the level of military expenditures increased considerably in real terms, but their share in GNP decreased somewhat by the end of the 1960s.

TABLE 1. WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND GNP
1960-1970¹⁹

(Amounts in billions of constant 1970 dollars)

<i>Year</i>	<i>World military expenditures</i>	<i>World GNP</i>	<i>Military expenditures as percentage of GNP</i>
1960	150.5	2,023.5	7.4
1961	156.1	2,116.6	7.4
1962	167.6	2,213.7	7.6
1963	174.2	2,313.7	7.5
1964	174.0	2,462.4	7.1
1965	174.9	2,589.8	6.8
1966	190.5	2,732.0	7.0
1967	206.5	2,842.8	7.3
1968	209.9	2,963.9	7.1
1969	209.6	3,096.0	6.8
1970	202.6	3,204.1	6.3

¹⁹ Estimates prepared by the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World totals are based on national data adjusted to uniform definitions of military expenditures and GNP, in so far as available information permits.

29. It is customary, and obviously convenient, to use the share of the national product as a common measure for almost all kinds of expenditure; for example, expenditures on health and education, as well as military expenditures. On the other hand, the latter can hardly be regarded politically in the same category as expenditures on health and education, as a "collective good" which should always and inevitably be accorded a given share of the national output—a claim which is often deployed by the military in discussions about the size of defence budgets. There is another reason why it is misleading to treat military expenditures in this way. People might suppose that were the calculated percentage of the national product devoted to military expenditure by rival States to remain steady, they would not be engaged in an arms race. Equally, a falling percentage of national product could be taken to imply that an arms race was "going into reverse". Neither of these inferences would necessarily be true. Indeed, a steady percentage of a constantly rising world output would imply an unending arms race, at the same time as a falling percentage could conceal an absolute increase in military expenditures. The arms race has both qualitative and quantitative components. A decline in the volume of resources, relative to GNP or even in absolute terms, could be more than offset by the development of more deadly weapons. Economic evidence alone, therefore, cannot demonstrate that the arms race is abating.

30. World military expenditure is highly concentrated in a few large countries. Six countries out of 120 alone accounted for more than four fifths of the world total for the decade of the sixties.²⁰ These countries—mainly the major industrial countries of the world which were involved to the limit of their resources in the Second World War—dominate, and indeed largely determine, the world trend. Not only do they account, in parallel with their relatively enormous contribution to world GNP, for the bulk of military expenditure. For a variety of reasons, partly historical, partly political, they also devote to military spending a larger proportion of their resources—about 8 per cent of their output, as an average—than do most other countries.

31. Developing countries play a lesser role in the global arms race. With nearly half of the world's population, they account for only about 6 per cent of world military spending, and their influence on the world trend in expenditure, and on the technological arms race, is consequently minimal. Further, they devote a smaller share of their resources to military purposes than do the major industrialized countries. Over-all only about 3½ per cent of their total national output goes to their armed forces. Averages for the group of developing countries as a whole are,

²⁰ The 120 countries cover all the countries in the world with any significant military expenditure. The six major countries are: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, France, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany.

however, misleading. At the top end of the scale, some nine developing countries devote more than 10 per cent of their output to military purposes. At the lower end, there are 11 countries for which the figure is less than 1 per cent.

32. Although military spending in developing countries is very low in relation to that of the advanced countries, it is significant that in the decade of the sixties the rate of growth of military expenditures was appreciably faster in the developing countries than the world average—in contrast to what has happened in the six nations which are the major military spenders. Against a world rise of about 3 to 4 per cent a year, military spending in the developing countries has been increasing at a rate of some 7 per cent a year (see chart 1 B). When the needs of economic development are so pressing, it is a disturbing thought that these countries should have found it necessary to increase their military spending so speedily, particularly when their *per capita* income is so low. To the citizen of a developing country, with a *per capita* income of about \$200 a year, even the diversion of a few dollars for military purposes may rob him of one of the necessities of life.

33. The rapid rate of increase in military spending in developing countries should, however, be interpreted with caution. The arms race in the third world can be directly related to the wars in which it has been engaged. But as is fully recognized, some conflicts have not been conducted independently of the great Powers, which have provided considerable supplies of weapons and of finance. In other regions military expenditures have been rising from a very low base. A number of new States have been building up their armed forces virtually from nothing. When stated in terms of percentages, the rates of increase in these countries will obviously appear very high.

34. In addition to its qualitative aspects, the arms race has been discussed so far in terms of expenditure. This is the right basic measure for a study which is designed to ask what the resources now absorbed for military purposes imply in terms of the sacrifice of other opportunities. There are, however, other measures which may have some contribution to make to the analysis.

35. Theoretically it should be possible to measure the number of men involved in the arms race—that is, the “manpower absorption of military expenditure”. Unfortunately, these calculations are difficult in practice. The number of men in the armed forces is known for most countries,²¹ but it is all but impossible to calculate precisely the numbers engaged in the production of goods used by the military—particularly in countries where weapons are only one product of multipurpose firms. Overhead labour has to be allocated between the firm’s civil and military

²¹ There are, however, problems of comparability and coverage in estimating world totals. Some countries have paramilitary forces, which could either be classified as part of the armed forces, or as part of a police force. Other countries rely heavily on reservists who serve for a small part of the year.

production before any useful calculation can be undertaken. On general grounds one would expect that the percentage of a country's total manpower employed directly or indirectly in defence would correspond fairly closely to the percentage of military expenditure in its gross national product. When a country relies heavily on conscription for manning its armed forces, and when it pays its conscripts a relatively low wage, estimates of its military expenditure may, however, give a spuriously low indication of its military outlays, since the labour content of that expenditure has been undervalued. In that case manpower is a better reflection of the country's military effort. On the other hand, where there is no conscription, it is the manpower estimate in some countries which probably gives too low a figure, because it does not allow for the fact that the average technological skills of people employed either directly or indirectly in defence are in general above the average national level.

36. It has been estimated that about 50 million people—more than the whole working population of, say, the United Kingdom and the Federal Republic of Germany—are engaged directly or indirectly for military purposes throughout the world. The available information does not permit a more precise figure, nor can it be said how the numbers have varied over the years. Fairly accurate figures for the armed forces alone are available, but they are not a good substitute for expenditure estimates—partly because the armed forces have become increasingly capital-intensive. Not only is the ratio of equipment costs to total expenditure rising, but in a number of countries the armed forces have been employing an increasing number of civilians to do work which was previously done by servicemen.

37. It is worth noting, however, that the figure for the personnel in the world's armed forces as a whole reached a total of 23 to 24 million by 1970, and that it had been rising at a rate of about 2 per cent a year during the decade of the sixties. Very little of this rise occurred in the six major countries, whose increase in military spending can be accounted for mainly by the elaboration of the weapons they produced or bought. Virtually all of the increase in military manpower occurred in the developing countries, whose share of the over-all total for the world's armed forces is now about 37 per cent, in contrast to a 6 per cent share in military expenditure. Over the past decade the numbers in their armed forces have been rising by 4 per cent a year.

38. Two other possible measures of the arms race may be briefly mentioned. It would be of some interest if a measure could be provided of changes in the world's stock of weapons—a "depreciated capital stock" estimate. This is, however, more a theoretical than a practical possibility. There is only fragmentary information about existing stocks, and about the proportions of military expenditure which are devoted to weapons procurement. Counts of weapons would be quite inadequate, because of the

trend to product improvement which makes, for example, a new combat fighter a very different weapon-system from one built 10 years ago.²² The description of the arms race in terms of stocks of weapons has to be largely qualitative.

39. Another conceivable measure—which could help quantify the qualitative aspects of the arms race—would be an estimate of the world stock of lethal power, which of course went up astronomically when nuclear weapons came into being. The figure is now so enormous—some years ago it was equivalent to some 15 tons of TNT per head of the world's population²³—that it all but defies the imagination. In any event, estimates of this kind have a greater relevance to a military than to an economic and social analysis of the arms race. For the purpose of this report, measures of expenditure must therefore remain primary. It is on the basis of them that calculations can be made of the real cost of military spending, that is to say, of the alternative uses to which the resources, had they not been claimed for military expenditures, might have been put.

III. THE DYNAMICS OF MILITARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT

40. The extent to which military expenditures affect other fields of public and private spending becomes clearer when the dynamics of the race, as reflected in the continuing elaboration of armaments, are understood. Many complicated factors are involved, and they seldom appear the same either to the nations which for one reason or another are caught up in the race, or to those which remain on the sidelines as spectators. Obviously the scale of the resources which are provided for the maintenance of armed forces and for the acquisition of armaments is determined by political decision. When they so decide, Governments do change the level of their military expenditures upwards or downwards. Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that the process of action and reaction which characterizes the arms race, certainly the arms race in sophisticated weapons, means that security is increased as more is spent on armaments. Indeed in the field of nuclear weaponry the reverse appears to be the case. Each new step in the elaboration of such armaments usually ushers in a more perilous stage of uncertainty and insecurity. Furthermore, every new generation of weapons and weapon systems inevitably demands more and more resources which could be used for different economic and social purposes. By encouraging the development of certain areas of technology, and by providing


²² An estimate has been made of the world stock of fighting ships—which suggests that over the period 1950-1968, it rose by some 5 per cent a year (see *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70*, p. 307). There is little doubt that the world stock of small arms has been rising rapidly. Production has remained high, and most such weapons have a very long life, so that some produced at the turn of the century are still in use. But these are only fragmentary contributions towards a calculation which, with the present restricted flow of information, is not possible.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 381.

CHART 1A

POST WAR TRENDS IN WORLD MILITARY EXPENDITURE:


(absolute figures in constant (1970) dollars)



Sources for Charts 1A and 1B: SIPRI for data of years 1949-1959 and USACDA for data of years 1960-1970.

CHART 1B

PERCENTAGE CHANGES IN MILITARY EXPENDITURE FROM 1961:
 (index numbers based on constant price figures 1961=100)



resources for basic fields of science which might bear upon the development of sophisticated weapons, the arms race also inevitably affects the direction and tempo of a country's scientific and technological development. In its time its effect has been to encourage work in certain fields of knowledge and to retard progress in others. It stimulates a demand for certain classes of specialist and for certain kinds of specialized information, without which desired military projects could not be achieved. Short of powerful political decision in a contrary direction, this process, particularly so far as it concerns sophisticated modern weapons, could go on indefinitely.

41. The basic reason for the momentum of the arms race is very simple. It is laid bare in the brief account which was given in section I of some developments that have occurred over the past decade. Countries usually try to keep their military forces up to date and to improve their arsenals of weapons. The soldier does not wish to be outnumbered or "out-gunned" by a potential enemy, or potentially out-manoeuvred because of his greater mobility, or neutralized by his better defences. This applies as much to the developing countries which import their weapons as it does to the most powerful industrial nations which develop and manufacture them.

42. It is the latter—not the former—which are the pace-setters for the arms race. They too are the ones which, partly as a result of the development of technology for military purposes during the Second World War and the succeeding cold war, have also had a considerable impact on the development of science-based industries in the civil field which are complementary to those which provide military *matériel*, for example aircraft. The military technologist is urged relentlessly to work at the frontiers of applied scientific knowledge, and to incorporate in the design of new weapons or weapon systems the most advanced engineering techniques.

43. The arms race of the major Powers is now a competition to achieve an advantage not just in quantity but even more in quality—in the speed of aircraft, in the range and accuracy of ballistic missiles, in the manoeuvrability of tanks, in the efficiency of radar systems, and so on. The arms race has in fact become essentially a technological race, the achievements of one side spurring the other to improve on the technological advances which it might have made itself. Sometimes the spur comes not from some clearly-defined threat but from an imagined technical advance made by the other side. Secrecy in military affairs makes it inevitable that a potential enemy will usually be suspected of being stronger than he actually is. Consequently both sides strive continuously to improve the quantity and quality of their arms. So it is that the arms race becomes based on the "hypothesis of the worst case", that is to say, one of two sides designs its

programme of development on the assumption that its rival could, if it so decided, be the stronger.

44. That is one aspect of the force behind the race. There is another. Before a new weapon is completed, the military designer is as a rule already designing a more effective model which—he hopes—will not only be more effective in performance, but also less vulnerable to defences which the other side might introduce in response to a new threat. Obsolescence thus also becomes a characteristic of the technological arms race. What one has is never good enough. This is where the criteria which govern military and civil industry diverge. In civil industry the amount of money spent on development projects is determined mainly by social, economic and commercial considerations—by considerations of cost, markets, competition and potential profit. In the sphere of defence, research and development projects are limited only by the extremes to which scientific and technical knowledge can be mobilized and pushed, and by the extent to which nations are capable of, and are willing to divert resources from, other social, economic and political ends.

45. Over the period of the 1960s, the degree of this diversion was considerable, not only, and not surprisingly, in those States which at one time or another were engaged in active hostilities, but also in those which were spurred to arm in the climate of the cold war. Moreover, the effect of the increasing sophistication of military equipment was far greater than would be implied merely by a numerical statement of the economic resources involved. The process was inevitably associated with a very focused research and development effort, which depended on the services of a disproportionate number of professional scientific and engineering personnel. Although their ratio to the total professional labour force has fallen in some countries since the early sixties, it still remains impressive. Probably at least a quarter of the world total of scientists and engineers who are engaged in research and development are in fact still employed on military work, and military research and development probably absorbs some \$25 billion of an estimated world total research and development expenditure of some \$60 billion.²⁴ Considerable managerial talent and technical skill is also absorbed by the armed forces, and in many cases military personnel go through long and extremely expensive courses of training in special educational establishments. The increasing sophistication of weapons always means that whatever the percentage of a national budget which goes to military expenditures, the corresponding percentage in terms of the use of professional scientific manpower will be higher. It is

²⁴ Estimate derived from the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, *The Research and Development Effort in Western Europe, North America and the Soviet Union* (Paris, 1965) and *SIPRI Yearbook of World Armaments and Disarmament, 1969/70*, pp. 288 ff.

usual to find that in countries with developed military industries, the proportion of the labour force of the engineering industry which is absorbed in the production of military equipment is far greater than the percentage of GNP which goes to military expenditures, and that the percentage of all qualified scientists and engineers employed on military research and development is even higher.

46. In addition to the heavy demands for scientific and technological manpower which occur during the period of development of new weapons, qualitative changes in armaments also generate quantitative and qualitative changes in manpower within the armed services. The numbers of skilled technicians required for the maintenance of ever more sophisticated equipment have to increase, and higher standards of skill and training on the part of operating personnel also become essential. As complex armaments began to spread to the developing countries during the past decade, those countries have also been diverting more of their scarce technical manpower to military purposes, paying for them to be trained abroad, or employing foreign technicians, all to the detriment of a more fruitful use of national resources.

47. It would be an exaggeration to claim that military research and development, and the derived technological and educational demands which it generates, still attracts the "best brains" to be found in the pool of scientific and engineering manpower of the major industrial Powers. But since the "best" are always scarce, there can be little doubt that military research and development, by "bidding" for a share of the best, can have an inflationary effect in the scientific market.

48. The record of advanced weapons programmes in the sixties provides many illustrations of the abandonment of costly projects before their completion, and after hundreds of millions of dollars had been poured into them. Examples of this are only too easy to find in the records which have been published by Western countries. The advanced United Kingdom fighter-bomber TSR2; the United States anti-aircraft system Mauler; the air-launched nuclear missile Skybolt of the United States, as well as various kinds of land-based missiles of several countries, all came to an end in the course of development, after an enormous expenditure of resources. Sometimes the work was stopped because of the impossibility of overcoming a technological or scientific hurdle. Sometimes it came to an end because the conception on which it was based changed owing to a new military appreciation of the "need", or because of development in a potential enemy's armoury. More usually, projects have been abandoned because they have run up against a barrier set by the absolute size of the economy of the country concerned. New weapons always cost more, sometimes several times more, than their predecessors. Since abandoned projects are likely to be replaced by other projects, the

process of abandonment increases the economic waste caused by the arms race.

49. Because of their inherent tendency to rise, research and development expenditures always stand to consume more and more of any defence budget. Their growth has therefore to be restrained. If these expenditures are not kept down, and if projects are not cancelled, the proportion of GNP allocated to military spending will have to increase. It is not only that new technology always costs more to achieve than the "state of the art" which it succeeds, or that, once it has been developed, a generation of weapons, designed to replace another, inevitably turns out to be much more costly to manufacture. There is the further point that personnel costs usually go on rising during the period of years that separates the conception of a new project from its completion—a period rarely less than from seven to ten years. New weapon-systems continuously require more highly qualified personnel, and therefore personnel costs tend to rise faster than in the civil side of the economy.

50. The economic implication of the rising tendency of research and development costs, together with the rise in personnel costs, is that more and more countries are compelled to opt out of some sectors of the technological arms race. The countries concerned might then concentrate their defence efforts on producing traditional armaments and importing other weapons from abroad. As a consequence, richer countries are enabled to continue longer in the technological arms race, as they can export modern weapons and so produce them on a larger scale, with reduced unit costs.

51. To be in the arms race costs more each year. No country, however, can achieve greater security by devoting to the arms race more and more of its resources. Security is unobtainable because already the race has resulted in the stockpiling of more destructive power than has any conceivable military purpose. Meanwhile, the arms race has caused economic damage by encouraging the continuation of vast and prohibitively costly military research and development projects, which many informed people believe to be incapable of completion because they have long since passed the point of rational technological ambition.

52. The arms race is thus a hindrance to development both because it draws heavily on available material and human resources, and because it adds to the threat to peace. In its essence, it is incompatible with normal economic and social development.

IV. THE NATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURE

53. The resources which are allocated for military purposes are a broad indication of what is denied other avenues of public and private expenditure. If countries had not expended their means for

military purposes, they could obviously have put the resources so consumed to many other uses.

54. Whatever their nature, and however much they interact, the alternatives which have to be sacrificed in order to maintain a military establishment can, for convenience, be classified under the general headings of the goals of immediate consumption, whether private or public, and those which serve the purpose of future economic growth. It is the former category which is in general epitomized in the well-known catchword "the choice is between guns and butter".

55. Poverty and slums exist even in the richest countries. Housing is still an unsatisfied demand; in every country, including the richer ones, its improvement calls for an immense amount of investment both in urban and rural areas. Housing investment, together with slum clearance and urban renewal, represents only about 3-3 1/2 per cent of the world's total national product,²⁵ although if one considers all "housing services" the percentage is somewhat higher. But in the world as a whole far fewer resources were devoted to new housing during the sixties than to military expenditures. This is particularly true of the major countries.

56. Health services, like education, which is dealt with below, constitute a major demand which is less than adequately satisfied, even in the richest countries; and in the poorer countries, with high death-rates from preventable diseases, with large numbers suffering from chronic sickness, and with high infant mortality, there is a crying need for more resources. The comparison of world expenditure on health and military expenditure is a difficult one, since health services in some countries are entirely publicly financed, and in others are mainly privately financed. But, as already noted, for the world as a whole, military expenditure is about two and a half times the estimated total of publicly financed health expenditure.²⁶ A rough calculation suggests that all medical research in the world consumes only about \$4 billion. This compares with some \$25 billion which it is estimated is now spent on military research and development.²⁷

57. Then there is the major problem of protecting the environment, which is only now beginning to be understood. Military operations obviously have their polluting effects, and can bring about major environmental devastation. The vast destruction which is associated with modern war is the extreme case. Nuclear tests result in radio-active contamination, which affects far more than the territories where the tests are made. They are an isolated illustration of the environmental damage that can be caused by armaments. The use of defoliants is another proven environmental

²⁵ Estimate derived from United Nations national accounts statistics.

²⁶ *World Military Expenditures, 1970* (ACDA Pub. 58, 1971), p. 10.

²⁷ See *ante*, p. 665, n. 24.

hazard. These represent some direct aspects of the environmental picture associated with military activities.

58. The indirect aspect is the diversion to military purposes of the resources required for the major task of repairing the environmental ravages of the past, and of preventing the further depredations which could become increasingly urgent as population multiplies. There is no need in this report to spell out the environmental threat. But what needs to be said here is that the cost of correcting and preventing environmental damage is certain to prove enormous, and that a vast amount of field study, laboratory research and development work will be called for if solutions to problems of environmental pollution, whether national or international in nature, are to be dealt with on a realistic basis. The same general observation applies to the problem of using the earth's physical resources in a way which does not endanger the likely needs of future generations. Processes to prevent pollution, including the recycling of waste, are however very costly because they demand either plant modifications or new plants, or such things as new sewage systems. Resources are hardly likely to be made freely available to tackle all the problems which are entailed in this field; and obviously resources for the protection of the environment are bound to be taken from other fields of public expenditure, including military expenditure.

59. Another important aspect of military expenditures is their effect upon economic growth. To the extent that the arms race inhibits growth, this economic effect reinforces all that has been said about its impact upon consumption, whether private or public.

60. A fast rate of economic expansion is, of course, one of the central economic objectives of most countries. In economic theory, relationships are postulated between growth in the stock of capital and the size and quality of the labour force on the one hand,²⁸ and the rise in output on the other. The social factors which are involved in this relationship, and which can be regarded as the educational and technological factors that affect the labour force, are usually treated under the heading "investment in man"—investment in order to increase the health, well-being, education and physical and organizational potentialities of a country's citizens. Needless to say, many of these types of social investment are ends in themselves. But they are obviously also very potent factors in the rate of economic growth. Military expenditures undoubtedly absorb resources which are substantial enough to make a considerable difference both in the level of investment for civil purposes and in the volume of resources which can be devoted to improving man's lot through social and other services.

²⁸ The rate of technological change can be regarded either as a component of these two or treated as a separate factor.

61. There is no doubt that a transfer of resources from military to civil uses would provide further possibilities for an increase in the rate of economic growth. Whether a reduction in military spending increases the rate of growth through its impact on investment depends on various considerations. Since the investment required to support a given volume of military outlays may be of the same general order of magnitude as the investment requirements for the same level of civil expenditure, a decline in military expenditure would not, without active government intervention, necessarily lead to an over-all increase in investment. The impact on the rate of growth also depends upon the magnitude of the additional output resulting from this investment, that is, on the so-called capital/output ratio. While these considerations would not permit precise quantitative predictions about the effect of a reduction in the share of military expenditure on the over-all rate of growth, it is certain that there would be a once-and-for-all increase in the amount of goods available for civil purposes and that from then on the economy would grow at permanently higher levels.

62. Governments have the ability, within limits, to redirect resources in the economy. They are not bound to follow previous patterns; if they wish to use resources freed from the arms race to increase the level of investment, they can do so. It is government funds which would be released as a consequence of an abatement of the arms race, and it is for Governments to decide how the resources so released are to be allocated.

63. It is entirely reasonable to compare fixed investment with military expenditure, and to see whether a reduction in military expenditure could make a significant difference to the investment level. For the world as a whole, military expenditure—at 6-6½ per cent of world national product—is about a third as large as fixed capital formation—20 per cent of world national product. Clearly, therefore, given a conscious decision to this effect, the investment level could be given a significant upward shift.

64. There is no lack of investment opportunities in the world. Most countries have waiting lists of investment projects, particularly in the public sector, which they are unable to start through lack of resources. Calculations have been made for several developed countries of the increase in output which might result from given increases in capital expenditure. It appears that the marginal capital/output ratio is between three and four, which means that on average one could expect an additional unit of output for every three to four units of additional investment. A ratio of this kind is, of course, only a very rough guide, but it suggests that if a country which for instance had previously been devoting 6 per cent of its national output to military uses transferred half of this expenditure to increasing its investment in the civil sector, it would

experience a perceptible effect on the growth rate of its economy.²⁹

65. Many developing countries do not have an industrial sector capable of arms production, and so import most of their arms from abroad. A reduction in their arms spending would produce savings and, therefore, free foreign exchanges resources which could be used for the import of more investment goods, thus facilitating a higher rate of growth.

66. For these countries, the need for adequate investment is particularly acute. At their present level of investment the gap between their standard of living and that of the industrialized countries is not likely to be satisfactorily narrowed for years to come. One of the basic problems of growth in many developing countries is to find the resources for the creation of new productive sectors which are now more or less entirely lacking and for a massive expansion of infrastructure, in transportation for example, and in agriculture. This huge unsatisfied requirement for capital was recognized in formulating an International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development Decade. General Assembly resolution 2626 (XXV) stated that in order to attain a 6 per cent growth rate in developing countries—corresponding to a 3.5 per cent growth rate per head—the ratio of gross domestic savings to national product should rise by 0.5 per cent a year, until it attained the level of about 20 per cent by 1980. For this to be accomplished, as the resolution points out, the developing countries must “keep the increase in their current public expenditure under close scrutiny with a view to releasing maximum resources for investment”. Yet one of the largest items in current public expenditure in many of these countries is military expenditure.

67. What all this means in terms of the denial of alternative opportunities is revealed clearly in an economic study of 44 developing countries over the period 1951 to 1965.³⁰ This indicated that that part of their military expenditures which went to procurement diverted domestic and foreign resources equivalent to about 4 per cent of their gross capital formation. A reduction in military expenditure would permit at least part of this to serve the purposes of investment.

68. The level of education is a social factor of particular importance to economic growth. Far more is involved here than

²⁹ The simple use of a marginal capital/output ratio of 3 would suggest that such a transfer would accelerate the growth rate by 1 per cent. This is clearly an overstatement, since there are few examples of relatively sudden increases in the level of investment of this magnitude. But even if the effect on the growth rate were only half as big as that suggested by the normal capital/output ratio, it would still yield a very considerable increase in output over time.

³⁰ Emile Benoit, et al. *Effect of Defense on Developing Economies*, 2 vols., Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., 1971.

just the scientific and engineering knowledge which goes into research and development and which leads to new techniques and new technology. The managerial ability and experience necessary to organize and control production processes, and the skill and adaptability of the workers on the shop-floor, are just as important, if not more so. There are, however, broader educational needs than this. In many countries there is still a great deal to be done in raising the literacy rate; one of the requirements of faster economic growth in these countries is an increase in the number of workers who can read and write. Over and above this, there are the demands for education, not just for the purpose of accelerating economic growth but, as an end in itself, widening people's range of experience and broadening their minds.

69. "Research and development" has been institutionalized in modern industrial societies, so that innovation is no longer so haphazard a process as it was in the period of the isolated inventor, although its results still remain uncertain. In consequence, research and development's share in the national product of industrial countries has risen fast. For example, research and development consumed only an estimated 0.3 per cent of the national product of the United States before the Second World War. The figure was about 1 per cent at the start of the 1950s. In 1969 it was 3 per cent.³¹ There has been a similar upward trend in the Soviet Union, with the share of research and development expenditure in net material product rising from 1 per cent in 1940 to 3.7 per cent in 1966.³² Other highly industrialized countries have not lagged far behind.

70. This illustrates another way in which reduced military spending may affect the rate of growth. As was said in the previous chapter, the arms race has been associated with a sharply focused research and development effort and has absorbed a high proportion of the total professional manpower and the limited resources which the countries involved have available for all research and development. A reduction in arms spending is likely to result in a decline in the total amount spent on research and development. None the less, concentration of the remaining research and development outlays on production exclusively for civil purposes would lead to an improvement in the efficiency with which capital and other resources are utilized and hence would accelerate the rate of growth.

71. In most countries more is still devoted to military purposes than is spent on education generally, and overwhelmingly more than goes to research and development for the civil sector of the economy. Obviously the situation would be different if a sizable part of the financial resources now devoted to military uses were

³¹ United States Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1957* (Washington, D.C., 1960); *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1970*, 91st ed. (Washington, D.C., 1970).

³² *Strana Sovietov za 50 let* (Moscow, 1967), pp. 242 and 244.

directed to improving the facilities for education and for expanding civil research and development in order to enlarge and improve the base for further economic and social development. But, as has already been pointed out, at least as important is the fact that the armed forces in industrialized countries absorb a disproportionately large share of the available technically skilled personnel. Modern armies are equipped with highly sophisticated armaments whose development, maintenance and operation demand the use of highly skilled manpower all along the line. The "opportunity costs" of military expenditures (by which are meant the alternatives of spending which the latter pre-empt) have therefore to be thought of not just in terms of a financial measure. The qualitative human aspect is at least as critical.

72. Private consumption, as well as provision for such social services as education, health, housing and transportation, together with the cost of protecting our physical environment, is clearly in direct competition with military expenditures. Rising standards of living—in the context of the world in which we now live—mean more expenditure on all these things. Were military expenditures to fall it would assuredly be expected in some, if not all countries, that more resources would be released for personal spending. The majority of a population would hardly agree to forgo entirely this advantage of a reduction in military expenditure.

73. The effects of military expenditure on the economy are not limited to the diversion of resources from other uses. Military expenditures also tend to disturb and destabilize the course of the economy in general, particularly when they fluctuate sharply. The size of defence appropriations is decided primarily on political and military grounds, and military expenditures do not easily accommodate to changes in the economic situation of a country. The rest of the economy has only too often had to be adjusted, to fit in with military exigencies and with the time-cycle of military developments.

74. This consideration becomes obvious when, for some reason or other, the authorities decide that military expenditure has to be sharply increased, as has happened on more than one occasion in the post-war period (chart I A). In developed market economies, the authorities are faced with a number of unpalatable alternatives in raising the necessary additional resources. First, they can acquire these resources through increased taxation or borrowing, thereby slowing the growth in personal consumption or private investment. Alternatively, spending on such programmes as welfare services or education could be reduced relatively or even absolutely. This would mean that military expenditures dislocate long-term social policies. There is also the possibility that the authorities might fail to make sufficient adjustments either by way of increased taxation or by way of reduced social expenditure, and so allow excess demand to force up prices and cause inflation or accelerate its pace. An inflationary process, once generated, is

difficult and costly to stop. Experience shows that a sharp upswing in military expenditure can have effects which will be felt for many years.

75. In the centrally planned economies, military expenditures also set considerable constraints on the flexibility with which the economy can be planned. Military adjustments undertaken on the grounds of political considerations tend to disturb the economic proportions in the civil sector, and the problem of preserving proper equilibrium between supply and demand for various industries and sectors becomes appreciably more difficult.

76. In developing countries, the tax-base is limited. The pay of civil servants and the cost of military forces often take up much of a central Government's revenue. Further, since in many such countries much of the finance for investment comes from the Government, there is a direct conflict between military expenditure and development. Equally, military spending often represents a heavy burden on the balance of payments for the purchase of arms from abroad. And even when weapons are provided as "aid", they not only tend to absorb a large part of the country's skills, but at the same time mean the diversion of a significant part of the country's limited funds to the development of the necessary military infrastructure, such as airfields or roads, for which there may be comparatively little civil use.

77. Apart from general destabilizing effects on the economy, the disturbing effects of the fluctuations which so often characterize military programmes tend to be concentrated in the particular regions and particular industries where military procurement takes place. Furthermore, as has been noted earlier, the technological arms race makes for rapid obsolescence, and often, as was indicated in section III, for the abandonment of major industrial projects in which tens of thousands of men may be employed. Sudden changes of direction have in the past led to considerable local disruption, great waste of capital and, at least in some countries, high regional unemployment. We agree, none the less, with the findings of the Secretary-General's 1962 report, *Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament*, to the effect that no major instability need result from disarmament.

78. In terms of balance of payments, it is usually the developing countries which stand to lose most from their military expenditures. The reasons are not far to seek. As weapons become more sophisticated and more expensive to develop, fewer countries are able to produce them; for as is becoming increasingly obvious, advanced military technology is now the prerogative of the powerful industrialized countries. If therefore a developing country wishes to acquire sophisticated weapons, and if none of the countries manufacturing them wishes to provide them by way of military aid, the developing country could incur a considerable balance-of-payments cost in acquiring either the weapons or the background technology (or both). The credits from the arms trade

go to countries with highly developed defence industries; the debits go to countries without them.

79. Against this, it is sometimes argued that developing countries gain from the sale of strategic materials, and that they would consequently suffer if there were substantial reductions in military expenditures by the industrialized Powers. However, calculations made by Professor Leontieff for the year 1967, on the hypothesis that total military demand was transferred proportionately to the various categories of civil demand, show that for a selected group of strategic materials, there was no commodity, except perhaps bauxite, where the impact on sales would have been significant (see annex III).^{3 3}

80. Military expenditures have also had the effect of increasing the disequilibrium in countries' balance of payments—and that is both a national and international consequence of military expenditure. The United Kingdom, and recently more particularly the United States, have incurred substantial military expenditures in maintaining troops outside their own borders. These factors have contributed to the difficulties both of sterling and of the dollar. Such disequilibria in world payments undoubtedly have slowed, and at times even threatened to reverse, world progress towards further relaxation of restrictions on trade and payments.

81. Against the long catalogue of harmful effects of the arms race and military expenditure, one benefit which has been claimed is the spur given to technological progress. Obviously, if there is such a benefit, if war is the mother of invention, the cost in human lives and misery has been far too high a price to pay for it.

82. During the Second World War certain scientific and technological advances were accelerated, such as the development of atomic power, of computers, of air transport and radar, and of electronics in general. Vast research and development organizations were set up to implement precise technological programmes. The adoption of this new organizational approach was due to the need to accelerate the steps from fundamental research to practical applications, and this has undoubtedly left its mark on all advanced technologically based industry today. But, if countries are prepared to set the right priorities and if the right motivation is generated, they ought to be able to achieve even more rapid technological progress without war or an arms race. Moreover, it has to be borne in mind that, while during the war some forms of technical advance were accelerated, others of equal or perhaps greater importance for mankind were retarded, and the same is true of the arms race.

83. Particularly important in the contemporary setting is the fact that military and space technology appears to be becoming more and more specialized, and less and less adaptable to civilian

^{3 3} Not printed here.

use.³⁴ Moreover, military secrecy always retard[s] the pace at which civil benefits can be extracted from military developments.

84. More important than this, the specialized features which have been imparted by military demands to the pattern of research and development were clearly not designed to solve the world's present social and economic problems, and far less those which population growth and environmental protection pose for tomorrow. Moreover, relative to what has been spent on military research and development, medical and biological research, research into the environment, and research particularly directed to the needs of developing countries, have consumed few resources. If even a fraction of what has gone into military research and development were provided for a frontal attack on some of the main economic and social problems of the world, one ought to expect much larger benefits in the peaceful uses of science than have come from the spin-off from military research and development, given a powerful sense of purpose and the same institutionalized techniques of organization and management which military research and development has stimulated.

85. Whereas it is possible to consider the economic consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures in quantitative terms, their social consequences can only be discussed qualitatively. It stands to reason that military expenditures also have profound social consequences, and the shadow of possible disaster which modern armaments cast over the world is clearly the most ominous. An armed world which is always adding to its potential not only in conventional armaments but also in weapons of mass destruction; a world which is spanned by the surveillance systems that new military technology has made possible; and a world that knows that no part of it can be protected any longer from direct attack by nuclear missiles, is a fearful place for hundreds and hundreds of millions who strive to better their lot. The fear and tension which this situation induces is a factor which serves to inflame conflicts both between groups and between nations.

86. Against the background of the Second World War, the fear engendered by the nuclear arms race was one of the factors which stimulated the post-war disillusion of the youth in many countries, whatever the level of their military spending. Every child learned that he lived in a world in which violence had become commonplace, and which was now stocked with sufficient lethal power to wipe out all human life. He learned that weapons infinitely more

³⁴ An OECD report has commented that "the technological requirements of defence and space are diverging from those of civilian industry, which means that the possibility of such direct transfer will tend to diminish". OECD, "The Effects of Military and Space Research on Civilian Technology", *Government and Technical Innovation* (Paris, 1966), p. 31.

destructive than the bombs which were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were in a state of constant readiness, and that a military or human or even a technical error could have devastating consequences. This awareness has undoubtedly helped to create a psychological background of uncertainty, of fear and anxiety, and sometimes of social rejection or disillusion. Some Western social psychologists tend to ascribe to the arms race and to the horrors of war a belief which prevails in some of the younger generation that the world is an irrational place in which the improvement of society, through economic growth, is a hopeless cause. There are, of course, other major contributing factors, such as the problems which the multiplying populations of the world will have to face if they are to find the resources with which to exist; or the rapid spoliation of our physical environment. Whatever the importance of these other major problems, there can be no question but that the continuing arms race and the growth of violence in the world add to the disaffection of millions of people.

87. The arms race also tends to change traditional relationships between the civilian and military sectors of the economy. The military sector means more than the military forces themselves. It includes the firms and industries which serve them, the scientific institutions where their research is done, and the political establishments and ministries that owe their power to the arms race—a combination which has come to be called the “military-industrial complex”. President Eisenhower commented on the American situation in these words: “The conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience. The total influence—economic, political, even spiritual is felt in every city, every Statehouse, every office of the Federal Government”. But it should be emphasized that this is in no sense an exclusively American phenomenon. The military-industrial complexes everywhere become concerned to preserve themselves, and consequently to maintain the circumstances which gave birth to them. Only political decision can break the circle. Fear of a potential enemy leads a country to set up a military establishment, and this establishment in turn acts to keep the fear alive. It will suspect and question the sincerity of any conciliatory moves from the other side, and in general act to preserve a political image of the world as one which will always require a high state of military preparedness. That is a further social consequence of the arms race.

88. Yet another is the threat to democratic processes which can arise. The spirit of militarism is opposed to the spirit of democracy and peaceful progress in the world.

89. Whatever the varied and numerous considerations which keep the arms race alive, they therefore not only entail heavy economic sacrifices, but also weaken those processes of social evolution which provide our only real hope for the future of the human species.

V. THE INTERNATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMS RACE AND MILITARY EXPENDITURES

90. Regardless of the impact that a country's military expenditures may have on the attitudes of its people and on the implementation of national policies in the civil field, the purposes which these expenditures are meant to serve are by definition international in character. Periods of international tension are usually associated with an acceleration in the arms race; and in turn a speeding-up of the race exacerbates international tension. We live in an era of opposing blocs, with powerful armies poised against each other, and an era in which the reaction time of automated nuclear missiles is immeasurably swifter than the pace at which diplomacy normally works. It is an atmosphere which generates fear and a sense of insecurity.

91. The massing of armaments and the continued development of new weapon-systems cannot but generate more suspicion and greater tension than exists at the start, and by so doing provoke hostile reactions—ranging from a stepping-up of military expenditures to talk of war—on the part of those who feel threatened. This applies to all armaments, whether they come into the category called conventional, or that designated “weapons of mass destruction”. The accumulation of weapons also increases the possibility that force might be resorted to as a means of dealing with international problems. The competition in nuclear weapons obviously overshadows all other aspects of the arms race, since a nuclear war would put the future of the entire world at risk.

92. Regional arms races in conventional weapons, which reflect divergent international interests, whether political or economic, and which in turn are sustained by supplies of arms from arms-producing Powers, are also immensely important in the exacerbation of international tensions. The importance of trade in modern weapons for the countries which produce them has been referred to in section III. Moreover, the rate of obsolescence in modern armaments is such that considerable quantities of surplus war material become available each year, the resale value of which greatly exceeds its scrap value. There is consequently a strong economic motive to search for markets for such material. Equally, the build-up of weapons and of armed forces may well tempt some countries to seek a military solution to disputes with their neighbours. Quite apart from the severe sacrifices in life and resources which conflicts in the developing areas of the world entail, these at the same time carry the risk that they might spread to neighbouring countries, and inevitably they imply the additional danger that the military forces of some other countries, especially major Powers, could become directly involved, with consequences which it would be impossible to predict.

93. The arms race inevitably exacerbates international tensions and inevitably undermines the purposes and principles of the

United Nations Charter. The efforts both within and outside the framework of the United Nations to encourage measures toward disarmament have had, as said earlier, valuable results. The treaties that have been negotiated so far are important first steps, which have helped to prevent the state of international tension in the world from becoming more serious than it still remains.

94. The foregoing considerations underline the necessity for all States to pursue their efforts toward disarmament, in particular nuclear disarmament. Therefore, the present negotiations of the United States and the Soviet Union to stem the arms race, as well as all other international efforts of both nuclear and non-nuclear States, must be regarded as being in the interest of all countries.

95. International suspicions and fears, however, do far more than poison relations in the political sphere. They also damage the economic and social well-being of the world by impeding exchanges between peoples whether these be of trade and the flow of capital, or of knowledge and technological "know-how". If there were no arms race, trade and other exchanges would almost certainly be easier. A halt to the arms race could by itself be an important stimulus toward the relaxation of other existing barriers, and in this way could have a beneficial effect on international trade.

96. International trade has grown at a very high rate over the past few decades, and has by far surpassed the rate of growth of world output. However, the arms race, together with other important and related factors, has imposed a serious constraint on the expansion of exchanges between peoples.

97. Military considerations have limited trade in so-called strategic commodities and have led to the creation of rival trade groupings involving, *inter alia*, restrictions on trade in some of the products of advanced technology. During the 1950s there was heavy stress on the prevention of any trade which would help a potential adversary's economic or military development. Since then some liberalization has taken place and world trade has moved further towards more normal patterns. But the restrictions which still remain are of considerable importance in the case of a number of commodities, many of which are of key importance in modern industrial and engineering development.

98. The same strategic considerations also inhibit technological and scientific exchanges between countries. This can be regarded as an extension of the strategic embargo on international trade. Obviously, military interests are not the only limiting factor here; there are property rights in technological development, and nations quite naturally will wish to profit from the technological advances for which they themselves are responsible. The effects of the prevailing arms race are not felt equally over all fields where unimpeded exchanges between peoples would be to the benefit of all. For example, there are few impediments to academic exchanges in the basic sciences. But if the arms race continues, and

weapon-systems become more and more elaborate, an increasing number of technological developments would tend to be guarded by the nations responsible for them. In so far as these new developments have civil applications, this is a hindrance to the international spread of new technologies—and indeed a hindrance to their spread to the civil sector all over the world.

99. Military considerations also influence the pattern of world trade in a more general way, although often these defence considerations are outdated. Countries are concerned about their dependence on foreign trade for vital supplies in time of war. This is one of the reasons some industrial countries advance in order to justify the protection they afford their agriculture and some categories of their manufacturing industry. In a disarmed world, they would at least not be able to advance this reason for their protectionism.

100. Stockpiling of raw materials as a consequence of the arms race is also a factor which in the past has distorted world trade. The tendency towards stockpiling seems to be declining, but there is still the possibility that the reduction of stockpiles can create market distortions. Some nations are so concerned about this possibility that international machinery has been proposed to deal with the problem.³⁵

101. Trade between the centrally planned and the developed market economies has clearly been affected by the arms race and by the tensions between the two systems. Even if the latter did not exist, there would still be problems in increasing trade between countries with basically different economic systems. But, in a disarmed world, trade between market and centrally planned economies could hardly fail to rise. At the moment, it accounts for only 5 per cent of world trade. The developed market economies, however, account for 62 per cent of world manufacturing output and the centrally planned economies for 31 per cent.³⁶ Although these figures cannot by themselves provide an indication of what level of trade it would be reasonable to expect, the figure of 5 per cent is by any account extraordinarily small. It is therefore bound to rise, and significantly, the faster the arms race comes to a halt.

102. The developing countries, in which more than two thirds of the world's population live, which account for about 15 per cent of the world output and whose share of world exports was about 18 per cent in 1969 (down from about 27 per cent in 1953), would also benefit immediately from a cessation of the arms race. As was pointed out in section IV, the arms they import lead to distortions in their trade. Whether a developing country pays for imported armaments in cash or through the export of primary products, its growth potential is adversely affected at a

³⁵ See General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 39-49.

³⁶ U.N. Statistical Office, *The Growth of World Industry*, vol. I (*Statistical Papers*, series P, no. 7).

particularly vulnerable point, through the consequential pre-empting of scarce foreign exchange resources.

103. In a world free of tensions, and increasingly disarmed, the level of trade could well be higher simply because world output might have reached a higher level. It has already been pointed out that in certain circumstances the resources now devoted to military use could lead to greater economic growth. In the past the general experience has been that, for every 1 per cent added to world output, about 2 per cent is added to the volume of world trade. Any stimulus to world output, therefore, is likely to have a more than proportional effect on the development of trade.

104. An increase in world output clearly could also have a powerful impact on the volume of aid provided by the richer to the poorer countries. One major effect of the arms race and military expenditure has been to reduce the priority given to aid in the policies of donor countries. It is true that in the post-war world, nations have recognized that world economic development is a common problem, about which they have been ready to take common action, but such action has, in fact, been limited. When countries are devoting a large part of their resources to military preparations against each other, the suspicion of tension which this creates tends to spread through all their relations. It inhibits co-operation and prevents countries from combining their forces in a united effort to deal effectively with the development problem on the scale required. Some aid becomes viewed not exclusively or even primarily in terms of a solution of the problems of the third world, but as a means of acquiring influence in a particular region, or of denying influence to some other country.

105. As already noted, total world military expenditures are some 30 times the level of official development assistance, which now adds up to some \$7 billion. The sum has fallen steadily throughout the 1960s not only in relation to the gross national product of the donor countries, but also to that of the developing countries; in 1970 such assistance was equivalent to only one third of 1 per cent of the combined GNP of the donor countries. Official aid now contributes resources equivalent to 10 per cent of investment in developing countries, but this falls far short of United Nations objectives. Additional external resources are obtained from the private sector, notably in the form of suppliers' credits, as well as portfolio and direct investment. Funds of this kind do not fall within the definition of aid since they usually require a high return, often including a substantial risk premium. But clearly they contribute to the volume of investment in the developing countries. A slowing of the arms race would make more such funds available both by increasing the supply of resources and by reducing the risk premium.

106. The General Assembly has set targets both for the total flow of capital—which it is proposed should reach 1 per cent of

the gross national product of the developed countries by 1975—and for the flow of official development assistance alone, which should reach 0.7 per cent of gross national product.³⁷ While a number of countries have made progress towards these targets in recent years, the over-all tendency has been for the share of aid in the gross national product of the developed countries to fall rather than rise.

107. It would take only a 5 per cent shift of current expenditures on arms to development to make it possible to approach the official targets for aid. A more substantial curtailment of the arms race would permit for the first time the kind of massive transfer of resources which could make a fundamental change in the prospects for social and economic development. The volume of fixed investment in the developing countries is estimated to have been around \$65 billion in 1969. A shift of 10 per cent from world military expenditure to investment would provide enough resources to raise the figure by almost a third.

108. Obviously, if the “disarmament dividend” were to become a reality, there would be many other claimants besides aid for the resources freed in developed countries. Many of these, whether in the public or private sector, have already been referred to. None the less, any wise assessment of world problems could not fail to give additional aid a very high priority.

109. Given a “disarmament dividend”, there are reasons for being optimistic that developed countries would be prepared to budget for some increase in aid. Donor countries, when pressed by demands for more aid, often urge that they cannot do more because of competing domestic demand for public resources and, in some cases, because of balance-of-payments difficulties. Consequently, lower levels of military expenditure would remove an important obstacle to the expansion of aid. In 1953, in General Assembly resolution 724 A (VIII), Member Governments were urged: “when sufficient progress has been made in internationally supervised world-wide disarmament, to devote a portion of the savings achieved through such disarmament to an international fund, within the framework of the United Nations, to assist development and reconstruction in underdeveloped countries”.³⁸ The complementary objectives of the Disarmament Decade and the Second United Nations Development Decade illustrate the same point.

110. The way the resources made available for aid are utilized makes all the difference to the effectiveness of their impact on the growth of the developing countries. Priorities have to be set, problems properly explored, and the best available measures used for their solution. Here much help could be provided to the developing countries by scientists and technologists of the industrialized countries, which have already developed the institu-

³⁷ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), p. 43.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, *Eighth Session, Supplement No. 17* (A/2630), p. 10.

tional framework for carrying out such work. The Pearson Commission thought that a realistic target for the developed countries would be to earmark, by 1972, 5 per cent of their public research and development resources for developing countries of which at least a half should be spent in the developing countries themselves.³⁹ It was the view of the United Nations Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development that developed countries should devote an increasing proportion of their research and development expenditure to specific problems of developing countries, selected in consultation with those countries, and for this purpose aim at reaching, by the end of the current decade, a desirable target of 5 per cent of their non-military research and development expenditure.⁴⁰ It must be remembered, however, that the scientists, engineers and industrialists who would be "released" if military expenditures fell in the donor countries are highly specialized in the skills they have been using, and that they are not necessarily the people who could help in raising the yields of crops or in developing water supplies. It will take time before the resources which were devoted to their training and employment produce a generation of men competent to handle what are called the "research and development problems of development". Hopes in the research and development field should be high, but they should not be raised too high.

111. On the other hand, hopes should be high when the question of aid is considered in its entirety. More and more resources are clearly required, and these could become far more readily available as the weight of military expenditures decreases. To that extent aid and the arms race are linked. But whereas the latter adds to our burdens and perils, the former can only help in bringing about, and in maintaining, a peaceful world.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

112. From time immemorial States have relied on military forces to further their interests and to enhance their security. Today is no exception. But with the acceleration of technological change, the perils which military expenditures have brought in their wake have become so acute that it is no exaggeration to say that the arms race has finally provided man with the means of putting an end to his species. That is the most obvious of its consequences. Political wisdom has so far averted his final disaster. It cannot, however, insure against military miscalculation or against human or technical error, both of which could lead to the same fearful end. This is the first thing that must be concluded about the consequences of the arms race. The threat of ultimate

³⁹*Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*, (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969), p. 205.

⁴⁰*Science and Technology for Development, Proposals for the Second United Nations Development Decade: Report of the Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development* (United Nations publication, Sales No.: E.70.I.23), p. 14.

disaster it has generated is by far the most dangerous single peril the world faces today—far more dangerous than poverty or disease, far more dangerous than either the population explosion or pollution—and it far outweighs whatever short-term advantage armaments may have achieved in providing peoples with a sense of national security.

113. More than this. The arms race makes more acute the very international strains to which it relates. Political differences become sharpened by the fear and suspicion which the amassing of armaments generates. International trade, already impeded by other factors, is slowed, particularly in the products of advanced technological industry. Military expenditures contribute to acute imbalances in the international payments. Cultural exchanges stagnate. In short, armaments, which are supposed to provide security, provoke the very political differences which nations may assume they will help dissipate.

114. As this report has made clear, the cost of the arms race is enormous, and because of it, resources have been denied almost every other field of social activity. In total, it consumed nearly \$1,900 billion from 1961 to 1970. If annual military expenditures continue to absorb their present percentage of world GNP, they could well reach the level of \$300-350 billion (at 1970 prices) by the end of the decade, with a total outlay for the decade of some \$750 billion more than was spent from 1961 to 1970.

115. The military expenditures which cast the greatest shadow over the world are those of the major Powers, which between them account for the bulk of all such spending. Arms races between the developing countries are, however, no less dangerous. There is the risk of conflicts spilling over to third countries, or indeed to the major Powers. The military expenditures of these countries deplete the resources which could otherwise be used for development. In particular, the military forces of the developing countries are immensely costly in terms of scarce trained manpower, which would otherwise be available to help in the enormous task of development. Many of these countries have started on their paths of national independence under conditions in which the allocation of their resources is grossly distorted.

116. This report has considered the opportunities lost as a result of the arms race. Economic aid has suffered. Enormous social problems lie ahead for all countries. Public services, health, education, housing, and now the protection of the environment—a task which becomes ever more urgent, and one which has to be faced not only on a national but on an international scale if a tolerable physical environment is to be assured for tomorrow—all need the resources which the arms race consumes.

117. If men can combine under the threat of war to solve problems which might have been left unformulated in the slower pace of peace, they should be able to do so in facing the challenge of the future. The Second World War began at a climactic moment

in the development of modern science, and was a critical influence in the mobilization of national talents. New scientific knowledge was only too ready for exploitation in the prosecution of war. Whatever "spillover" effects there may have been from the resulting military technology, we could hope today that they could have been generated without the competitive challenge of militarism. New measures of technological concentration and of industrial organization have been learnt in the past few decades. All these lessons can be used in the interests of peace.

118. As was stated in the preamble to General Assembly resolution 2667 (XXV), a halt in the arms race would contribute effectively to the improvement of international relations and the maintenance of world peace and security.⁴¹ Every effort to retard the race would help, for any retardation would make it possible to release resources for peaceful uses, including aid. We share both the conviction and the hope that increased aid to developing countries would be a natural consequence of substantially reduced military expenditures.

119. The enormous cost of the arms race in human and other resources will become even clearer than it is today when the pace of the race is slackened as a result of concerted international political decision. War, whether between the developed or developing Powers, is not an answer to any of man's imminent problems. While we live under its threat, we are even held back from agreeing on the priorities of the social problems that beset us all. We can see some of the dangers that the future holds—dangers arising from the disharmony between rapid population growth on the one hand, and the possible exhaustion of resources on the other, dangers arising from the spoliation of our physical environment. These are the big problems whose solution is impeded by the diversion of resources to military expenditures. These are the problems which only become more insoluble in the climate of the arms race. The arms race must be stopped not only because of the immediate perils it holds for us all, but because the longer it continues, the more intractable the problems of economic growth, social justice and the environment will become.

120. It is our unanimous conclusion that:

(1) A substantial reduction in the military expenditures of all countries, particularly of those whose military expenditures are highest, should be brought about as soon as possible. The sooner concrete measures of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament, are achieved, and the arms race is thereby halted and reversed, the faster will be the progress towards the goal of general and complete disarmament.

(2) Regardless of their size or their stage of development, all countries share the responsibility of taking steps which will help achieve this goal.

(3) A halt in the arms race and a significant reduction in

⁴¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

military expenditures would help the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional aid to developing countries.

(4) In order to draw the attention of the Governments and peoples of the world to the direction the arms race is taking, the Secretary-General should keep the facts under periodic review.

Staff Report for the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: Prospects for a Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty, November 1, 1971¹

INTRODUCTION

Since the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty in 1963²—one of the most significant arms control measures of the nuclear age—the world has been spared the consequences of nuclear testing in the atmosphere by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. While continued testing by France and China—countries which did not sign the Treaty—has stimulated vigorous objections by many governments, nuclear testing virtually disappeared as a public issue following the Limited Test Ban. Meanwhile, the rate of nuclear testing actually increased and the arms race continued its own momentum, only marginally restrained by the inconvenience posed by having to conduct nuclear tests underground.

Recently the subject of nuclear testing has returned to the arena of public discussion. The multimegaton tests by the United States in Alaska and the U.S.S.R. in the Arctic have recalled attention to this subject and to the lack of progress since 1963 toward a comprehensive test ban (CTB) covering underground tests as well. The question has been raised with increasing frequency—what are the barriers to a ban on *all* nuclear tests? The hopes and expectations generated by the Limited Test Ban Treaty, when it seemed that we were so close to a total ban, have remained unfulfilled.

The possibilities of movement toward a CTB have always foundered on the question of on-site inspection. In 1963 the dispute focused on the *number* of permissible inspections (although there were other unresolved issues involving on-site inspection). The United States insisted on seven such inspections, while the U.S.S.R. would accept only three. Subsequently the Soviets took the position that on-site inspection was no longer necessary and that national means of verification were sufficient. In contrast, the U.S. position has remained unchanged since 1963.

¹ *Prospects for a Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: A Staff Report Prepared for the Use of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate* (Com. print, 92d Cong., 1st sess.).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

In that period, however, enormous advances have been made in seismology so that it is now possible, through seismic means alone, to identify underground explosions to a degree unknown five years ago. It is now possible to deploy a new seismic monitoring network which would constitute a powerful force in the monitoring of a CTB. In addition, even presently deployed systems are vastly superior to those deployed a few years ago. These advances would seem to justify, indeed require, a reassessment of the U.S. position regarding on-site inspection. Yet there is little evidence that the United States is preparing any initiative in this area. In fact, funding for seismic programs since 1969 has been diminishing, not increasing, a trend which does not suggest a high priority for further progress in this area.

Many of the nations at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva are becoming increasingly impatient with the lack of progress toward a CTB and the lack of precise proposals or serious negotiations on the part of the nuclear powers. They raise the difficult question of whether the nuclear powers are taking the further steps toward disarmament which were promised the non-nuclear powers upon the signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.³ The lack of progress toward a CTB has become the focal point of attention, and the continued U.S. insistence on on-site inspection is viewed by many of those nations as an untenable position in light of seismic improvements. Most recently Canada has parted company with the United States on this issue, calling for the United States to make a determined effort to eliminate the "political difficulties" caused by its insistence on on-site inspection.

The issues involved are extraordinarily complex. The following is an analysis based on material developed in public hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law and Organization held on July 22 and 23, 1971. This Report may serve as a basis for further discussion of the obstacles to a comprehensive test ban and to a reassessment of the possibility of an initiative in this area, including the significance of on-site inspection as an element in the U.S. negotiating position.

PARTICIPANTS IN THE HEARINGS

On July 22 Mr. Philip J. Farley, Acting Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), set forth the Administration's position with respect to a CTB.⁴ On that day the Subcommittee also heard testimony from Dr. Franklin A. Long, who was Assistant Director of ACDA for Science and Technology during the period when the Limited Test Ban Treaty was concluded. Now a professor of Chemistry and Director of the Program on Science, Technology and Society at Cornell University, Dr. Long testified as to the relative risks and benefits of a CTB

³*Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁴*Ante*, pp. 432-436.

for the United States. On the same day, Dr. Bernard T. Feld, Professor of Physics at MIT and President of the Council for a Livable World, appeared on behalf of the Task Force for the Nuclear Test Ban and discussed the effects of a CTB on the nuclear arms competition in the non-nuclear world.

On July 23, the Subcommittee heard testimony from Senator Mike Gravel of Alaska and Mr. John Havelock, the Attorney General of Alaska, regarding the Cannikin nuclear test on Amchitka, from Dr. Carl Walske, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Atomic Energy, on the military effects of a CTB, and from Dr. James N. Brune, Professor of Geophysics at the Institute of Geophysics and Planetary Physics and Scripps Institution of Oceanography at the University of California, San Diego, as to the current status of seismic means of identifying earthquakes and explosions.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING A CTB

The United States has pledged, under the Limited Test Ban Treaty, to seek to achieve "the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time." This commitment was recalled in the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and provision was made for a conference in 1973 which will, among other things, review the progress made toward that end.

As indicated by many of the witnesses testifying before the Subcommittee, including Philip J. Farley, Acting Director of ACDA, speaking for the executive branch, the principal benefits to be derived from an effective comprehensive nuclear test ban include the following: First, a CTB would render significantly more difficult the development of nuclear weapons by those signatories which do not yet have them, and it would reinforce the Non-Proliferation Treaty by encouraging adherence to that Treaty by the countries which have not already done so. The purposes of the NPT are an important foreign policy objective of the United States which should not become obscured with the passage of time and the direction of attention to more pressing matters. As Franklin A. Long stated before the Subcommittee:

... It is reasonable to suppose that the longer the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. postpone active negotiations [on a CTB], the more discouraged the currently non-nuclear nations will become and the more likely it is that they will make a decision to develop their own nuclear weapons. And a world of ten or twenty nuclear weapon states is not one which I contemplate with anything but apprehension.⁵

Furthermore, it seems likely that even if a country will not adhere to the NPT, its ability to develop an effective nuclear capability would be severely curtailed, if not entirely eliminated, if it were a party to a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Japan, India, Israel and the United Arab Republic are examples of countries which are parties to the Limited Test Ban Treaty but not

⁵*Prospects for Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Law, and Organization of the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, Ninety-second Congress, First Session, p. 53.*

to the NPT. Adherence by those countries to a CTB would represent an important achievement in the pursuit of nuclear nonproliferation.

In addition, a CTB would eliminate the possibility of adverse environmental effects caused by underground nuclear testing. Finally, and most important, an effective comprehensive test ban would dampen the arms race by curtailing further improvements in nuclear warheads by the nuclear powers adhering to the Treaty, and it would be a natural supplement to agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union at SALT.

MILITARY CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON A CTB

Although established United States policy has for many years supported the achievement of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified, the military considerations involved in that policy determination must be examined in any review of the prospects for a CTB. The factors weighing against a CTB are in essence the military corollaries of its principal advantage. One major argument advanced in opposition to a CTB is that it would preclude the improvement of our nuclear weapons stockpile which might in turn somehow hamper our ability to deter nuclear war.

Nevertheless, the weapons systems currently maintained by the United States are now adequate to deter a Soviet attack. To continue that capability, it should not be necessary to have the most efficient or sophisticated warheads theoretically available. In fact, precluding such improvements on both sides would be an effective way of insuring the continuation of that capability. In developing any new weapons systems which may become necessary, the configuration of such a system may have to be modified to fit a warhead already in the stockpile rather than using a newly developed optimum warhead which could not be relied upon without testing. Of course, all the other components of the system could be tested, a much more important matter since the basic characteristics of nuclear reactions are well known. Therefore, while a CTB may preclude the "optimum" exploitation of new military technology, there is no evidence to suggest that it would fundamentally hinder the maintenance of a sufficient deterrence capability by the United States.

It can also be argued that we cannot maintain confidence in the continuing reliability of our existing warheads without continuous testing. The potential reliability problem is, however, put into perspective by information furnished by the Department of Defense to the Subcommittee as a result of the hearings. DOD stated that

... Validation tests of nuclear assemblies are not conducted after a warhead has entered the stockpile unless such tests are deemed necessary to determine performance degradation which is suspected because of evidence obtained in the stockpile sampling program, or to demonstrate that defects have been satisfactorily corrected.⁵

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 129.

There were only five principal cases since the mid-1950s cited by the Department of Defense where a nuclear test was an integral part of a corrective program, and the corrections involved were designed either to meet stricter safety standards or to correct a metallurgical or mechanical problem which developed after the warhead entered the stockpile. In a statement entitled "Stockpile Reliability in the Absence of Nuclear Testing" the Department of Defense added:

... [Stockpile] Reliability may be affected by decisions to incorporate seemingly acceptable improvements into nuclear assembly systems without validation from a nuclear test. Changes affecting reliability may also be made in an effort to correct a defect developing in a nuclear assembly system.⁷

There is no question but that improvements in weaponry will be hindered by a CTB; that is, of course, one of the purposes of such a Treaty. Acceptance of a CTB necessarily entails foregoing even "seemingly acceptable" improvements to the stockpile if they present a serious threat to stockpile reliability. As to changes designed to correct a defect developing in a particular type of warhead, it would appear that if a CTB were implemented, such defects would have to be remedied by a previously tested method or by replacing the warhead *de novo*, thereby restoring whatever effectiveness it had at the time of its entry into the stockpile. The Department of Defense adds:

.. Of course, the reliability of the stockpile will be affected by the willingness of the government to spend possibly large sums of money to work around recognized deficiencies without nuclear tests. With such funding available the loss in reliability could often be avoided or delayed, although in the absence of nuclear testing corrective measures might involve longer periods of system degradation and might involve settling for a warhead performance well off the optimum.⁸

There may be significant economic costs attached to a CTB, but those costs would be minor in comparison to the benefits derived from a Treaty and the savings derived from not testing and indefinitely replacing warheads to match improvements by the Soviets.

An additional problem concerns the possibility that a potential defect would be discovered which was not the result of aging but was inherent (but unknown) in the warhead at the time it entered the stockpile. There is no doubt that it would be a very serious matter if a metallurgical or mechanical problem were discovered in one of the warheads in a strategic system, provided the problem could not be corrected by substituting a completely rebuilt warhead (i.e., if the problem were not one which had developed merely as a result of aging). At the same time, it seems inconceivable, after all the testing which has been done by the United States to date, that such a fundamental problem could now exist in warheads which are part of our strategic systems. This appears to be one of the extremely improbable risks which we can afford to take, in view of the benefits of a CTB, assuming the

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 106.

⁸ *Ibid.*

other problems can be worked out. Furthermore, since nuclear testing is not primarily used to determine reliability of stockpiled weapons, the probability of discovering such a weakness would not be significantly affected by a CTB.

Any diminution of confidence in the reliability of a nuclear stockpile should operate with comparable effect on all nuclear powers which are parties to the Treaty, and hence a CTB could be a stabilizing factor which would actually enhance the existing state of mutual deterrence. Furthermore, since the United States has conducted approximately four times as many tests as the Soviet Union since 1963 (based on the announcements of nuclear tests by the AEC), it would seem to follow that a CTB would leave the United States in an established position of significant relative advantage, another consideration favoring a CTB from the U.S. point of view.

The Verification Question

Reflecting the clear preponderance of considerations favoring a CTB, the policy of the Nixon Administration, as well as of preceding Administrations, has been unequivocally in favor of a comprehensive test ban adequately verified. It is the requirement of adequate verification which has raised most of the difficult problems. This requirement is of central importance in considering whether to proceed with a CTB, since successful violations by the Soviet Union over a period of time could conceivably upset the existing military balance. The United States could not adhere to a CTB if the possibility of evasion by the Soviet Union were so great that the United States had no confidence that the Treaty's benefits were in fact being realized. In fact, widespread suspicion of clandestine testing, even though created by natural seismic events, could itself add to international tensions. At the same time, it is clear that no verification system can be implemented which will guarantee that no violation has occurred. There will always be a yield threshold below which the chance of detection is very low. This would be the case even if the Treaty called for on-site inspection. The concern with adequate verification is not directed to such an ambitious goal. The purposes of verification procedures are instead to deter a nation from conducting prohibited tests by rendering significant violations so likely to be discovered that a possible evader will not judge clandestine testing to be worth the risk. Therefore, an evaluation of what constitutes adequate verification is a highly inexact art since it depends on political judgments and unknown future conditions which could lead a nation to conclude that it was worth taking great risks to pursue a test program, as well as depending on the inherently uncertain capability of seismic monitoring systems (and other intelligence means) which could detect clandestine tests.

A significant portion of the current debate on verification has focused on whether it is possible to identify earthquakes and

explosions down to a magnitude of 4.0 on the Richter scale. Such a capability would undoubtedly increase our ability to detect clandestine violations of a Treaty and hence would have an incremental, if unquantifiable, effect on deterring such violations. Nevertheless, being able to identify earthquakes and explosions down to a magnitude of 4.0 should not be regarded in itself as a prerequisite of a comprehensive test ban or as a key which will solve all the problems inherent in the questions involved.

It should also be noted that the statement that a system has the capability of identifying earthquakes and explosions down to a given magnitude generally refers to a 90% incremental probability of identification of the stated magnitude. Just as there is no magic in the magnitude 4.0, there is no magic in the 90% probability factor. Even if there is less than 90% probability of identifying explosions at successively lower magnitudes, there will always be some prospect of identification and hence some deterrent effect on a potential evader. For example, a 50% probability, or even less, probably would be adequate for the very low magnitudes in view of the fact that a single test of small yield would have no effect on the strategic balance. The decreasing scale of probability of identification should be calculated for various yields detectable by various possible monitoring networks and should become part of the debate on a CTB.

In testimony before the Subcommittee, Professor James N. Brune pointed out that it is now theoretically possible to identify earthquakes and explosions down to a magnitude of about 4.0 on the basis of previously established discrimination criteria. He suggests that a new seismic monitoring system, using currently available instrumentation, could be constructed internationally to exploit this possibility.⁹ The executive branch's position on this issue has been articulated in a statement by Dr. Stephen Lukasik to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva. The executive branch's approach is more cautious, but is not inconsistent with that of Dr. Brune as a matter of principle. The executive branch agrees that in principle the ability to identify earthquakes and explosions will continue below a magnitude of 4.5, although it does not commit itself to any specific lower limit. Dr. Lukasik also recognized that the exploitation of that capability would require a massive investment in new instrumentation:

Improved seismic instrumentation is clearly needed to attain further advances below magnitude 4.5 and to assess the limits of teleseismic discrimination.

We have seen that to translate the greater scientific understanding of the identification problem into improvements in the seismic verification capability requires more sophisticated installations than currently exist . . . expansion of the existing network of seismic arrays and individual stations would seem highly desirable . . .

Many of these improvements would undoubtedly require considerable time and they would represent a substantial capital investment. Much effort would have to go into

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 139-145.

determining where these additional facilities should be located in order to achieve maximum performance.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the executive branch does not propose to proceed at this time with the deployment of a new seismic monitoring network. By deferring such a move, it is apparently felt that the U.S. will gain time to assess the data produced by three large seismic arrays, two of which are just now becoming operative, and a companion program involving new instruments (for measuring very long period waves) at ten stations, four of which have not yet been completed. This will permit the testing of a variety of discrimination criteria, exploration of techniques to improve the effectiveness of discrimination criteria (enhancing surface to noise ratios) and improvement of means to locate seismic events. Time is also needed for completion of the necessary site surveys and agreements. Under the executive branch's approach, after approximately two years we will have greater understanding of the best design for a new network (which will depend on the discrimination criteria chosen) and the optimum siting and distribution of instruments; and we will then have acquired useful experience in the actual operation of a large and complicated network, including experience with the automated data processing techniques which become increasingly important as lower magnitudes are approached.

It seems to be conceded by all that the capability of a seismic monitoring network can be developed to identify explosions down to somewhere in the neighborhood of magnitude 4.0. It is also clear that substantial investments in equipment will be necessary to implement that capability, although that cost, perhaps up to \$200 million, is insignificant when compared to the amounts spent on arms and the value derived from a CTB. Although we cannot be certain at this time that a new seismic monitoring network will attain the hoped for identification capability at magnitude 4.0, it seems highly probable that it will reach a capability near 4.0. Upon the deployment of such a system, it is clear that there would be a very powerful additional deterrent available to police a CTB.

ON-SITE INSPECTION

The executive branch insists that on-site inspection is indispensable to adequate verification of a CTB. On-site inspection would certainly create an additional inhibition against violations of a Treaty, but the question is how significant this would be and whether it is necessary. A factor which must weigh very heavily in the consideration of these issues is that, even without on-site inspection, a country would be inhibited from violating such a Treaty in view of the probable political and diplomatic consequences of being caught.

Furthermore, on-site inspection is useful only in dealing with a limited range of seismic events. On-site inspection is of no help in

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 384.

explaining events at the lower end of the magnitude range where the events cannot be detected (or in explaining events which cannot be located). And it is not necessary for events at the higher end of the range because seismic means should be adequate. To place the role of on-site inspection into proper perspective it would be helpful to have available calculations showing the numbers and magnitudes of events in which on-site inspection would be theoretically useful, assuming various seismic capabilities.

OTHER FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED

There will always be some ambiguous events of possible significance even above the identification threshold, but their number will decrease rapidly as magnitude increases. Since the number of such events will depend on the operating efficiency of the seismic monitoring systems deployed, the extent to which the number can be lowered from its present level is not now predictable with any degree of precision.

In weighing the risks inherent in a CTB, consideration must be given to the possibility of detection of violations by other means and to the military significance of violations. Some events can be eliminated from concern through the use of other diagnostic aids and inferences from other known factors, utilizing both seismic instruments and other intelligence means. Although these means of interpretation may only help eliminate events in an unpredictable or fortuitous fashion, their potential provides an additional deterrent against evasions. At the same time, there will always be some unidentified events, especially at the lower magnitudes.

In assessing the significance of unidentified events (or events below the identification threshold) other variables must also be considered. If the event is an explosion, the magnitude of the event does not reveal the yield of the exploded device. Extrapolating the yield from the magnitude of the event requires consideration of the soil in which the device is tested and the extent, if any, to which efforts have been made to "decouple" the impact of the explosion. According to Dr. Carl Walske, an explosion recorded at a magnitude 4.0 would be equivalent to about 1½ KT if the test were in granite or 12 KT if the test were in alluvium.¹¹ At magnitude 4.5 the comparable figures are approximately 6 KT and 45 KT. Although an evader could thus maximize the chance of escaping detection by testing in alluvium or comparable dry "soft" soil, such soil would be the most likely to collapse or leave a crater at the surface after a test, which renders it more susceptible to detection by other intelligence means.

Of greater theoretical concern are possibilities of evasion. These possibilities include the use of a very large cavity in which to explode the device ("decoupling"), a technique which can be

¹¹ *Hearings*, p. 119.

enhanced by encompassing the device with a material which will absorb energy from the blast to reduce the seismic waves. In addition, it is possible to explode the device in a seismically active area concurrently with an earthquake of great magnitude so that the seismic waves generated by the explosion become mixed with those from the earthquake (known as "hiding in an earthquake"). The first of those methods requires extensive activity and a substantial period of time to prepare. The larger the explosion, the larger the hole would have to be and hence the more activity involved and time required. The activities associated with any substantial clandestine testing program present great enough risks to constitute a significant impediment against exploiting these decoupling techniques. The other technique, hiding in an earthquake, poses formidable uncertainties with regard to the location and timing of explosions. The use of a number of large arrays and sophisticated seismic analysis presents a significant possibility of detection in the use of this technique as well. The same deterrent applies to the use of a coordinated succession of nuclear tests designed to simulate an earthquake.

Furthermore, it must be noted that the possibilities of successful evasion through any of the techniques mentioned are greatest at the low yield level where the military significance of testing, from the point of view of the overall strategic balance, is of lesser significance. As yields (and hence military significance) increase, the possibility of evasion falls off. The practical ceiling for these techniques may not be significantly different from that resulting from the use of soft soil for testing. While the possibilities of evasion through decoupling or hiding in an earthquake cannot be ignored, on balance they seem to pose an acceptable risk far outweighed by the benefits to be derived from a CTB. Indeed it would seem that a CTB resting on seismic verification means alone would provide a high degree of assurance that high yield violations were not occurring, a defensible objective in itself.

Since 1963 many advances have been made, particularly in seismology, which make the time auspicious for a hard look at the continuing need for on-site inspection. It is clear that the deployment of a variety of seismic stations and arrays would add considerably to the deterrent available to police a CTB. At the same time, there are a number of problems which must be explored further, including the timing and other details involved in achieving optimum results from the deployment of new instrumentation, the deterrent effects achievable by the network deployed, and the handling of peaceful nuclear explosions.

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

A major impediment to a CTB is posed by the possible continuation of peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). Since it would be possible to pursue weapons development in conjunction with a

PNE program, it must be recognized that the possibilities of evasion through these means are at least as serious as the problems inherent in seismic identification. There does not appear to have been any exploration of the amenability of other nations to the idea of a total ban on all nuclear explosions, including those for peaceful purposes. Since this would seem to be inconsistent with the expectations of many non-nuclear countries, and in view of the active Soviet PNE program, it may be that a ban including peaceful explosions is impractical. On the other hand, if on-site inspection were eliminated as an issue, perhaps it would be possible to induce other states to forego the limited potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions as a price required to be paid for a CTB.

If not, the most promising procedure would seem to involve supervision of peaceful nuclear explosions by the International Atomic Energy Agency or a new international body established for the purpose. There would be many problems such as the mechanics of supervision, control of instrumentation, supply and control of the nuclear device, timing of the explosion and composition of the decision-making body. Negotiation of these problems would inevitably consume a considerable period of time, during which it would be possible to acquire additional confidence in seismic identification possibilities and to assess the true capability of the entire seismic network as deployed.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 3, 1971¹

The twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations is now starting consideration of the item on the convening of a world disarmament conference, which was inscribed on the agenda of this session pursuant to a proposal of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In his statement in the general debate, on 28 September, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Comrade Gromyko, stated the main reasons which guided the Soviet Union in putting forward this proposal.²

In our statement today, the delegation of the USSR intends to spell out more in detail the position of the Soviet side concerning the concrete objectives and tasks of a world disarmament conference, the composition of the conference, and the way in which it must be convened, as well as the role which must be played by the United Nations in connexion with such a world disarmament conference. The Soviet Government took a new initiative in the field of disarmament, since it considers that the implementation of specific and effective measures to put an end to

¹ A/PV.1978 (prov.), pp. 6-26.

² *Ante*, pp. 592-595.

the arms race, which is exhausting the peoples and is dangerous to peace, as well as disarmament measures, is important in the common struggle of the peoples and Governments of peace-loving States for the strengthening of international security.

The question of disarmament is the most important international and political problem of our time. We cannot condone a situation where the world would get accustomed to the arms race as an inevitable, insuperable and permanent evil. The achievement of the consistent implementation of disarmament agreements would not only make it possible to devote billions to constructive aims—billions which are now spent for the arms race and war preparations—but at the same time would contribute to limiting and doing away with the danger of a world thermonuclear catastrophe, would contribute to limiting and putting an end to armed conflicts that are dangerous for the cause of peace.

Since the very beginning of the creation in Russia of the Soviet Republic, after the Great October Socialist Revolution, whose fifty-fourth anniversary we shall soon celebrate, the young socialist State took as a basis for its foreign policy the principles of peace, disarmament and co-operation among peoples. The great founder of the Soviet State, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, proclaimed: "Disarmament is the ideal of socialism". The Soviet Union has constantly, firmly and unflinchingly followed this road.

Recently, this policy was again confirmed in the programme of peace and international co-operation adopted by the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. In his report to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to the Congress, the Secretary-General of the Party, Leonid Brezhnev, declared:

The struggle for the end to the arms race, to the race in nuclear as well as conventional arms, the fight for disarmament, until general and complete disarmament is achieved, will continue to be one of the most important orientations of the foreign-policy activity of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet State.³

The Soviet Union, in its policy of mutual relations with other countries and peoples, is guided by the fact that the accumulation of military threats can be slowed down and finally liquidated through the peaceful settlement of disputes, which make for more tense relations among States, and the development of these relations on the basis of strict adherence to the principles of peaceful co-existence and the provisions of the United Nations Charter. To eliminate the danger of unleashing of war, it is important that effective and widely supported agreements be concluded to curtail the arms race and to ensure disarmament.

The movement to halt the arms race has gone forward ever since the end of the Second World War, continuously, and to an ever-increasing degree. In the last decade this movement yielded positive results in the form of the conclusion of international

³ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 12 (Apr. 20, 1971), p. 12.

agreements concerning various sectors of the arms race, mostly nuclear weapons, agreements which were generally welcomed and approved of. These are the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water,⁴ the Treaty on the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons in outer space,⁵ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁶ the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil thereof.⁷ Recently, the Soviet Union and the United States signed, among others, an agreement on measures to reduce the danger of the unleashing of rocket and nuclear warfare.⁸ We hope that soon the first agreement will be concluded in the field of actual disarmament, a convention prohibiting and ordering the destruction of bacteriological weapons, the draft of which has been prepared by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and which is now to be considered and adopted by the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly.⁹

The importance of these treaties consists not only in the fact that they settle various specific problems confronting them. In the wider international arena, these agreements are important also because they clearly and convincingly confirm the possibility of limiting the arms race, given goodwill and a desire of States to act in this direction. Further—and this has specific practical importance—in the agreements already concluded there are specific provisions which could be used in the future for working out other treaties and conventions bearing on wider aspects of the disarmament problem.

We would like to take note of the positive role played in the conclusion of those agreements by the United Nations, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and other international organizations. It is in this framework that disarmament problems have been considered in recent years. At the talks on disarmament which are now going on in different forums, some new measures are envisaged which could be taken with a view further to reduce the pace of the arms race and to ease international tensions.

Generally speaking it is, however, necessary to recognize that so far there has been no fundamental move towards halting this dangerous process of stockpiling and perfecting of weapons. The world, to the great regret of all peoples, continues to live in conditions of a continuing and ever-accelerating arms race.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

According to existing data which are now known from the recently published Report of the Secretary-General, drafted by a special group of experts on the consequences of the arms race, the annual military expenditures in the world increased from \$120 billion in 1961 to over \$200 billion in 1970.¹⁰ That represents between 6 and 6.5 per cent of the overall world gross national product. This means that mankind, by devoting such enormous means to weapons of destruction and annihilation, in fact undermines the material basis for its own existence.

In the ten years from 1960 to 1971 almost \$1,900 billion were spent for military purposes. Tens of millions of people are now diverted from peaceful constructive labour. In 1970, according to the same report, the world total of armed forces amounted to between 23 million and 24 million men and it should be added to this that about 50 million men are now working in the military sectors of the economy of States—scientists, engineers and workers.

In this connexion we must also stress the fact that the vortex of the arms race has drawn into it many developing countries for whom every single monetary unit and national resources is indispensable for national development, just as air is indispensable for a living organism. The military expenditures of developing countries, according to preliminary data, in 1970 amounted to more than \$12 billion. That amount of non-productive expenditure is much higher than the resources which are available to these countries every year through the State for development purposes.

These are the terrifying figures and facts characterising the continuing arms race. According to the experts, if the arms race continues, by the end of the present decade annual military expenditure in the world may reach the sum of \$300 billion, in other words they will increase by about \$100 billion as compared with their present level. Military expenditures as a whole in this decade could reach the astronomical sum of \$2,500 billion—in other words, they would be an even greater burden on the people than in the previous decade and will retard the solution of economic and social problems confronting the peoples of the world.

All this makes it even more urgent and necessary for all States, irrespective of their size or level of development, to take collective, common measures to put an end to the arms race to ensure the reduction of military expenditures and the adoption of other measures which would lead towards general and complete disarmament. Measures to put an end to the arms race and significantly to reduce military expenditures would contribute to the social and economic development of all countries, to improving international relations and to strengthening peace and security.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 644-686.

In these conditions, in the view of the Soviet Government, the problem of disarmament is acquiring a qualitatively new and even more timely significance. It is indispensable, therefore, to take new additional international measures in order to activate and mobilize the efforts of all States, without exception, in order to settle disarmament problems as soon as possible. And that is what many resolutions adopted at previous sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations asked us to do.

What is the best and most effective way to reach this objective? Striving to find an answer to this question, the Soviet Government carefully analysed the state of affairs at the disarmament talks carried on within the United Nations in the Committee on Disarmament and other bodies and came to the conclusion that it was appropriate to activate consideration of disarmament problems and to this end to convene a world disarmament conference in which all States would participate. In proposing the convening of such a conference, the Soviet Union took into account the fact that the idea of calling a conference in which all States of the world would participate, a conference specially devoted to disarmament problems, is extremely popular and is widely supported by world public opinion and by the Governments of the majority of States.

As early as 1964 the Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries at the Cairo Conference spoke most decisively in favour of the convening of such a conference.¹¹ A year later the twentieth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted a special resolution in which it approved a proposal on the convening of a world disarmament conference to which all countries must be invited.¹² Unfortunately, in view of the negative position of some States that resolution was not implemented.

The question of the need to convene a world disarmament conference becomes even more acute and timely in our time. The idea of convening such a conference continues to enjoy the support of a large number of States. In September 1970—last year—the participants of the third Conference of Heads of State and Government of the non-aligned countries held in the capital of the Republic of Zambia, Lusaka, in the Declaration on Disarmament adopted by them expressed the unanimous opinion that:

... it may be useful to convene a world disarmament conference at an appropriate time open for participation to all States.¹³

In the view of the Soviet Union the time has come when the General Assembly of the United Nations must again give the most careful consideration to the question of calling a world disarmament conference and take the necessary decisions which would

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 443-448.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1965, p. 585.

¹³ NAC/CONF.3/Res. 10, para. 3.

promote its convening. This is the aim of the Soviet proposal. The convening of such a conference and consideration by it of a wide range of problems relating to disarmament is designed to increase the importance of the problem of disarmament in contemporary international life and to draw the attention of Governments and public opinion in all States in the world to this important problem upon whose solution depend the well-being and perhaps the very existence of many countries and peoples and the existence of the whole of mankind. At the conference it would be indispensable to have an exchange of views and to work out practical ways and means of halting and turning back the arms race, and immediately to prohibit and eliminate nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, their production and their use.

The conference would be the forum at which all countries of the world, on a footing of equality and without any exclusivism or discrimination, would together consider disarmament problems in all their facets and search for practical and generally acceptable approaches towards their solution. The success of such a conference would to a very large extent depend upon the consistent respect for the principle of universality when its membership is decided upon. All countries, without exception and on a footing of equality, must be represented in such a world meeting devoted to one of the most important problems of our day, the problem of disarmament.

It goes without saying that in this connexion the participation in the conference of all States having considerable armed forces or armaments would be of great importance. At present the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations is trying to have the United Nations become a truly universal, international association of States. Year after year this just principle, which must be the very foundation of the United Nations, continues to advance towards its full implementation. But we are in duty bound to recognize that within this Organization the principle has not yet been fully applied.

The world disarmament conference must not suffer from any such shortcoming. Disarmament concerns all, each and everyone. That is why the conference should be called outside the framework of the United Nations, so that all States can take part in it irrespective of whether or not they are or would be Members of the United Nations at the time the conference is convened. When such conditions are created, where the doors of the United Nations are open to all States without exception, then, of course, the category of countries which to this day have been prevented from taking part in the activities of the United Nations will disappear. But so far we have to take account of realities, and that is why we have to present and settle the question of the composition of the world disarmament conference in this manner, so that there can be no discrimination against anyone.

In speaking of the programme of work of the world disarma-

ment conference we should like to note once again that such a conference could consider the whole range of disarmament problems relating to conventional armaments and armed forces as well as weapons of mass destruction. Since the increasing stockpiling of thermonuclear weapons is a matter of the greatest concern for the peoples of all States, priority, if the majority of the participants in the conference so wish, could be devoted to problems of the prohibition and the liquidation of nuclear weapons, whose existence threatens the life of millions upon millions of people and the fate of whole States and continents.

At this point we cannot fail to express satisfaction at seeing that during the general debate at the present session of the General Assembly many delegations touched upon the proposal concerning a world disarmament conference and came out in favour of convening such a conference. We witnessed positive reactions to this proposal on the part of the representatives of India, Iran, Poland, Austria, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Mongolia, Afghanistan, Brazil and many others. This shows how timely was the raising of the question of the convening of a world disarmament conference and the need for all States and peoples to bend their common efforts with a view to carrying out this proposal.

However, we must draw attention to the fact that the Secretary of State of the United States Mr. Rogers, speaking about the world disarmament conference in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly, expressed some scepticism concerning the convening of such a conference. In this connexion we should like to explain that such a world disarmament conference could in fact become the high and all-embracing representative international forum at which representatives of the Governments of all countries, without exception, would have an opportunity of expressing their position and their views and of putting forward ideas and proposals on all aspects of the disarmament problem.

The work of such an important international forum would help States to determine and agree upon the most urgent aspects of the disarmament problem, and to point out practical and mutually acceptable and agreed ways and means of limiting and putting an end to the arms race. And every State would have an opportunity of propounding its views and position on partial disarmament measures as well as on the general and noble final objective in this field, that is to say, general and complete disarmament.

Such possibilities, which are opened up by a world disarmament conference, could give useful impetus to talks on the various specific aspects of this problem, and we cannot but express regret at Mr. Rogers' statement.¹⁴ Let us hope that he took a merely preliminary view and that he will revise his opinion as a result of

¹⁴ See *ante*, p. 644.

the consideration of this question at the present session of the General Assembly.

The usefulness, the need for large-scale international consideration of all aspects of the disarmament problem is beyond doubt, nor is it doubted. That is proved by the historical experience of lengthy talks on this problem. Let us take as an example an important problem such as the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in three environments. We could recall that the United Nations played an important and positive role in solving this problem. It is in the United Nations, in 1954, that the delegation of India took the initiative towards measures to put an end to nuclear tests.¹⁵ All subsequent discussions in the United Nations and in other international forums led to the beginning of specific talks between three nuclear Powers: the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom, which resulted in the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty on the prohibition of nuclear explosions in three environments, a treaty fully and unconditionally approved by the United Nations.

We are deeply convinced that the world conference proposed by us would play an extremely effective role in starting large-scale and serious international negotiations on disarmament. At the same time we want to emphasize that the convening of such a conference should in no way detract from the importance of forums and channels for disarmament negotiations which are being used at present, including the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The recommendations and decisions of the world conference could become a new and effective incentive for continuing and activating such talks.

While holding to this view, the Soviet Union takes into account the wide range of peculiarities, complexities and the specific nature of the various aspects of the disarmament problem. It is very significant in this connexion that almost at the same time as a proposal was made to call a world conference where all disarmament problems could be widely debated, including nuclear disarmament, a conference of the five nuclear Powers—the USSR, the People's Republic of China, the United States, France and the United Kingdom—was being proposed.¹⁶

The full prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons will become possible only when all States possessing nuclear weapons agree to take this bold and important step. It is these States that are invested with special responsibility to mankind, and awareness of this responsibility must lead them to the negotiating table.

To judge from preliminary data which have appeared for the time being outside the framework of the United Nations, the impression is created that not all nuclear Powers are ready to engage in such talks. Let us hope that this is but a temporary phenomenon and not a final position.

¹⁵ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 412-413.

¹⁶ See *ante* pp. 313-315.

The conference of nuclear Powers could take decisions consonant with the interests of all peoples; this, to a very large extent, could contribute to the success of the world disarmament conference. The proposals to call such a conference and to convene a conference of the five nuclear Powers quite logically complement each other. Considering the question of co-ordinating the activities of the world disarmament conference with other bodies active in this field, one could bear in mind, for instance, the fact that the draft treaties and agreements worked out in more restricted organs—such as the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament—would then be presented to the world conference. The conference, having taken a decision of principle on some specific matter, would send it back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament for practical elaboration, for conclusion and report to the next conference.

The struggle for disarmament is not a short-term ephemeral campaign and the achievement of agreements limiting the arms race and leading to general and complete disarmament is a complex, serious matter, requiring serious collective efforts on the part of all States and much time.

In view of this realistic situation and the tremendous importance of the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union is of the view that the world disarmament conference should probably become a permanent international forum active for a long time. We feel that the conference could be convened periodically to consider the state of affairs in the matter of the solution of disarmament problems. The sessions of the conference, as proposed by the Soviet delegation, could be held once every two or three years.

In recent times, as the Assembly is aware, the attention of all countries was riveted on new and important problems such as the peaceful uses of atomic energy, the use of the resources of the sea-bed and the protection of the environment. In view of the universal importance of these problems, the United Nations, at sessions of the General Assembly and in its other bodies, carefully considered these problems and decided to call special international conferences which would be devoted to their further elucidation in detail. At the present time, as representatives know, pursuant to these decisions, work is being carried out to prepare a series of such conferences: the world conference on the law of the sea and the world conference on the problems of human environment. This year the highly successful fourth Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held in Geneva. I doubt that anyone would be bold enough to assert that the problems of the limitation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament are of less importance and significance for the peoples of the world and the whole of mankind than, for instance, questions of the sea-bed and human environment, problems for which the General Assembly

has taken decisions to convene special world conferences. The contrary would be much closer to the truth.

Quite justly, many call disarmament the question of questions. What they mean is that progress in the field of disarmament to a very large extent determines the favourable solution of many other problems and is in fact the main problem. In what direction are international events and international life going to move? Towards the strengthening of general peace and the security of peoples? Or towards an increase in the threat of a world thermonuclear catastrophe? This is how history poses this question, and it is these facts which, in our view, abundantly prove the need to call a special international conference, with the participation of all States, to consider the problems of disarmament.

The Soviet delegation realizes that some time will be necessary to prepare and convene the first world disarmament conference since the end of the war. This time is necessary for consultations between States and for all kinds of preparatory measures. In this connexion we have proposed that the General Assembly should request States to agree, not later than the end of 1972, on the timing of the conference and on its agenda. This proposal is contained in the draft resolution of the Soviet delegation on this item.¹⁷ The Soviet Union, at this session of the Assembly, takes the initiative with regard to convening a world disarmament conference after the Government of the USSR undertook a comprehensive analysis of the situation created during various talks dealing with the slowing down of the arms race and the problems of disarmament. We carefully scrutinized and assessed the results achieved in this field. We analyzed the prospects concerning various problems still to be settled.

In our opinion, in the fight for achieving one of the most noble and important objectives of present-day mankind—general and complete disarmament—a world conference on disarmament can and must play an important positive role and will be an important link in the chain of measures designed to protect human civilization from a destructive and murderous thermonuclear catastrophe. Everybody recalls that before the Second World War attempts were made to call world conferences on disarmament, but at that time, alas, they did not lead to any constructive results since, in those years, forces seeing in war a means to attain their self-seeking, expansionist and anti-popular objectives were preponderant.

The times have changed. Our experience of the Second World War and of subsequent conflicts has taught us much. Dozens of economically and militarily powerful States and peoples of all countries are on the side of peace and disarmament. In these conditions, we are deeply convinced, a world disarmament

¹⁷ *Ante*, pp. 595-596.

conference can and must lead to positive results, which would be in keeping with the interests of all peoples and the whole of mankind.

The USSR delegation, on the instructions of the Soviet Government, asks all participants in the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations to approve the proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference and thus to make a useful contribution to the slackening of the arms race and an easement of international tensions. The holding of such a conference would symbolize the portentous fact that the Governments of all States, deeply aware of their responsibility, will together tackle and solve the problem of disarmament, a most complex and vitally important task.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Issraelyan) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon [Extract], November 5, 1971¹

As representatives are aware, the Soviet Union has always advocated the progressive development of international law on outer space in the interests of all peoples. We have always proceeded on the assumption that the creation of a stable international legal basis for the activities of States in outer space serves the cause of peace and helps to strengthen mutual understanding and co-operation among States. It is for this reason that the USSR took the initiative which led to the conclusion of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,² and the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space.³

The Soviet Union also took a very active part in preparing the Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects.⁴ We did so because it is our understanding that the norms of law should exercise a stimulating effect on scientific and technical progress and should ensure the utilization of the most up to date science and technology in the interests of peace and for the welfare of all mankind. The attainment of this goal, the elaboration of juridical norms, should proceed in parallel and, in some cases, should precede the elaboration of technical programmes in any particular area so that when the time comes to put these programmes into effect they may be based on appropriate international legal norms, ensuring that achievements in the

¹ A/C.1/PV.1820, pp. 13-22.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 38-43.

³ 19 UST 7570.

⁴ A/RES/2777 (XXVI), Feb. 8, 1972.

conquest of outer space may be used to improve human life on earth and to develop science and culture.

Why does the necessity arise to elaborate and conclude a special treaty concerning the moon, as the Soviet Union is proposing? First of all, from the fact that a qualitatively new phase in the history of the moon has begun, a phase in which we proceed to the direct conquest of the moon, followed by direct utilization of the moon by man. When we are no longer talking of an approach to the task but rather of the practical solution of problems, we need not only general international legal norms based on general principles but rather more specific ones, and this would be in keeping with the international legal experience and practice which has already grown up. If I may give an example, the general principle contained in article V of the outer-space Treaty of 1967, to the effect that States should give all possible assistance to astronauts in case of accidents, distress or emergency landings on the territory of another State or on the high seas, received further detailed elaboration in the agreement on the rescue of astronauts of 1968. Similarly in the special international instrument a detailed development was given to the general provisions concerning liability which were contained in the 1967 Treaty. The process of elaborating new international legal documents based on generally recognized norms of international law and the provisions of the outer space Treaty of 1967, and governing various areas of space activity, is entirely legitimate and obviously can be expected to continue in the future.

I should like now to offer some explanations concerning the Soviet draft treaty on the moon.⁵ This draft was annexed to the letter from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, addressed to the Secretary-General to which I have already referred.⁶ At the request of the Soviet delegation the draft treaty was supposed to have been circulated yesterday to the members of the First Committee but for reasons that are not clear to us this has not yet been done by the Secretariat. We express the hope that the draft treaty will indeed be circulated for the information of members in the near future. In our opinion the text of such a treaty should formulate clearly a number of most important provisions. It should of course in no way set out to be all-encompassing, too detailed or contain provisions seeking to regulate all aspects of the diverse activities of States on the moon. At the present stage that would obviously be premature and in any case it would be incorrect in substance.

In preparing that draft we were guided primarily by the idea that it should develop and specify provisions which would be applicable to the specific circumstances of the moon and to the present stage of a conquest of the moon, the basic provisions and

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 300-305.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 298-300.

principles of international agreements on outer space already in existence, first and foremost the 1967 Treaty. The Soviet draft, first of all, contains a number of important new provisions. It contains new provisions concerning the prohibition of any military utilization of the moon and circumlunar space. The 1967 outer space Treaty said that outer space, including the moon, should be used only for peaceful purposes and forbade the placing in orbit around the earth of any objects with weapons of mass destruction, the installation of such weapons in outer space by any other means, placing military bases on celestial bodies, the conduct of military manoeuvres and the testing of any weapons. The provisions of the draft treaty proceeding from the new stage, the beginning conquest of the moon, go considerably further, forbidding on the moon any threat or use of force, any other hostile actions or threats of such actions and also the use of the moon to commit hostile actions in relation to the earth and space objects. That is in article I of the draft treaty.

In addition to the 1967 Treaty, there is a prohibition on placing in moon orbit or placing in the subsoil of the moon weapons of mass destruction. That is contained in article II of the Treaty. The draft treaty concerning the moon for the first time stipulates that activities on the moon shall be carried on, with due regard to the interests of present and future generations and with respect for the rights of all States, without exception, to explore and use the moon.

The draft contains a number of new norms prohibiting the appropriation in any manner whatsoever of parts of the lunar surface and subsoil and also any act aimed at such appropriation. By comparison with article II of the outer-space Treaty in which outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies are declared as not being subject to national appropriation, the Soviet moon treaty says that the surface and the subsoil of the moon cannot be the property either of States or of international, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, national organizations, bodies corporate or individuals. It is also stated that the moon cannot be the object of any transactions whose purpose is to acquire the right of ownership to part of the lunar surface or subsoil.

The draft proposed by the Soviet Union enshrines the right of States to carry out scientific activity on the moon freely, and to that end to instal both manned and unmanned stations, to land their space objects on the moon, to launch them from the moon, to dispose their equipment and personnel there. The specific norms regulating the practical activity of States in their conquest of the moon have no analogy in already existing agreements on outer space.

Since activity on the moon involves increased danger for human beings, the provisions of the draft provide for the further development of legal norms requiring States to take all possible

steps to preserve the life and health of man on the moon—article VII of the draft—and also to bear liability for any damage to the personnel or property of another State caused by their activity or the activity of their personnel on the moon. In particular, article VII of the draft treaty includes a new paragraph—paragraph 2—which states that:

It shall be the duty of States Parties to offer shelter in their stations, vehicles, installations or other facilities to persons in distress on the Moon who are part of the personnel of other States parties.

On the question of liability for space activity, article XI of the draft contains a basically new provision establishing, in addition to the norms contained in article VII of the outer-space Treaty, the liability of States not only for damage caused by their space objects but also for the activities of their personnel on the moon.

A number of provisions of already operating agreements concerning outer space are further concretized in the draft treaty concerning the moon.

In my delegation's view a treaty based on the more specific principles I have mentioned would be an important contribution to the formulation and development of international space law. The conclusion of the treaty would foster the further development of international legal norms concerning the activities of States in the exploration of celestial bodies, would be in keeping with the interests of all countries great and small, developed and developing, and would open the way to further fruitful work in the field of law in the interest of all peoples. Such a treaty could serve as a basis for the development, when the time comes, of international legal instruments concerning the activities of man on other celestial bodies—and that time is not so very far off.

Of course, the Soviet Union is proposing its draft only as a basis for the elaboration of a generally recognized international legal instrument determining the legal aspects of the activities of States on the moon.

In the light of what I have said, we consider that the General Assembly should take a decision to instruct the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space to give priority consideration to the question of preparing a draft international treaty concerning the moon with a view to submitting such draft to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.

My delegation, together with a group of co-sponsors, intends to submit an appropriate draft resolution for consideration by the First Committee.

I should now like to address myself to a question connected with our consideration of the outer-space Committee's report. We should like first of all to note with satisfaction that the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee have completed their work on an extremely complex and difficult commission from the General Assembly. They have completed preparation of a draft international convention on liability for

damage which may be caused by objects launched into outer space. That draft, as is well known to everyone, is the fruit of many years of collective effort on the part of the Committee and its Sub-Committee and the result of reasonable compromise by States with diverse legal and social systems. Like any document resulting from compromise, of course, it is not 100 per cent ideal for everyone participating in the agreement, including the Soviet Union, and I should like to draw the attention of the representative of Sweden, who touched upon this question, to the fact that the document we are talking about is the result of compromise. This is the internal logic of any international agreement; without reasonable compromise there can be no international agreement.

On the whole, however, we do consider that the draft convention is a useful and timely document which can be approved by the General Assembly. It corresponds to the modern scale of the activities of States in the conquest of space and the latest developments in space technology. It also takes into account the interests of all States and particularly the nature of the various different existing legal systems. The Soviet delegation considers that approval by the General Assembly of this draft and the early opening of the treaty for signature by all States would be an important contribution to the further strengthening of the legal order in outer space and would encourage the prompt and equitable solution of problems arising from compensation for damage that might arise as a result of activity in outer space.

Statement by the United States Representative (Bush) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 11, 1971¹

The consideration that we are beginning today of the disarmament items on our agenda is one of the most important functions of this body and, in our view, one of the most important functions of the United Nations. The General Assembly's annual review and assessment of the challenges we face and the accomplishments we have achieved in the arms control and disarmament field, together with the over-all guidance set forth in its resolutions, has provided a major stimulus toward progress in this area.

Last year in this Committee there was extensive discussion regarding the question of possible prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons. That debate culminated in the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 2662 (XXV), which took note of the various proposals that had been made for progress in this area, commended the basic approach set forth in the Joint Memorandum of the Group of Twelve, and requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its

¹ A/C.1/PV.1827, pp. 4-15.

consideration of the problem of chemical and biological methods of warfare with a view to prohibiting urgently the development, production and stockpiling of those weapons.²

I believe that all Members of the United Nations can take satisfaction in the work accomplished by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past year towards the realization of that objective. The draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction³ is a solid achievement; it is an achievement that can eliminate the threat of the use of disease as a method of warfare. It is an agreement that is in the interests of all Governments: it is in the interest of all mankind.

I would like to make a number of comments on this draft convention, on the contributions which it embodies, on some of its specific provisions, and on its general significance.

This draft convention is the first concrete result of some three years of international discussion and negotiation on the question of chemical and biological weapons. Incorporated in its provisions is a wide range of ideas, suggestions and compromises reflecting the views of the many delegations that participated in its preparation.

A proposal for a concrete agreement dealing with biological methods of warfare was first put forward by the United Kingdom in 1968.⁴ Important provisions in the present draft Convention are derived from the draft that was submitted by the United Kingdom at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in 1969,⁵ and again, in revised form, in 1970.⁶ Other provisions are based on the draft presented in March of this year by the delegations of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania and the Soviet Union.⁷ The prohibition on the production and stockpiling of toxins, which are among the most lethal means that could be used for warfare, was suggested by the United States Government—by my country.⁸ The broad definition of toxins which appears in article I was included at the suggestion of Sweden.⁹

During the course of the negotiations at Geneva this year, the representatives of Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia presented a paper containing a number of concrete suggestions which are reflected in the present text.¹⁰ Those concerned, in particular,

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 683-685.

³ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 569-571.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 324-326, 431-433.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 428-431.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 276-277.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 395-399.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

changes in the preamble designed to emphasize the link between the prohibitions of chemical and biological weapons and a strengthening of the undertaking on further negotiations regarding chemical weapons. Other proposals reflected in the language of the draft and in the statements that were made regarding its interpretation were put forward by the delegations of Argentina, Canada, Egypt, Italy, Morocco, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.

This brief summary is by no means a complete account of all the contributions that have been made to the formulation of this draft Convention. It does illustrate, however, that this important multilateral instrument has been forged with the significant help and through the significant participation of many, many countries. It is the result of hard work, of compromise and accommodation among many points of view, and of thoughtful and painstaking negotiations.

The provisions of this draft convention and a number of statements made at Geneva regarding its interpretation had been summarized in the Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly. At this time I would like only to highlight just a few points of particular importance.

As the CCD report has noted, it was the desire of all participants in those negotiations that nothing should be done in formulating a new agreement which might in any way cast doubt on the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.¹¹ That Protocol is, in fact, fully safeguarded by the provisions and by the nature of the prohibitions of the present draft. Article VIII specifically provides that nothing in the draft convention should be interpreted as limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol. The preamble contains clauses whereby the parties not only note the important significance of the Geneva Protocol but also reaffirm their adherence to, call on all States to comply strictly with, and recall that the General Assembly has condemned actions contrary to, the Protocol's principles and objectives. Moreover, as a practical matter, the elimination of biological agents and toxins from the arsenals of States will exclude completely the possibility of their being used as weapons.

Another matter of the highest importance to Committee members was that this convention should insure that work was continued on an urgent basis on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Accordingly, article IX of the draft convention reaffirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and sets forth a firm undertaking regarding continued negotiations in this area. The importance and urgency of eliminating weapons using chemical or biological agents and the

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

fact that this agreement represents the first possible step toward the achievement of agreement on chemical weapons is recognized in the preamble. In our view the present draft convention thus fully complies with the approach recommended by the General Assembly in the resolution it adopted last year.

In February, President Nixon indicated in a letter to the CCD that an agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins would enhance the security of all countries and international security as well. He stated:

... because of the rapid transmission of contagious disease, particularly with modern means of communications, any use of biological weapons—by any State in any conflict anywhere in the world—could endanger the people of every country. Additional restraints on biological weapons would thus contribute to the security of all peoples. A prohibition against the possession of biological weapons could also have far-reaching benefits of another character. It could encourage international co-operation in the peaceful application of biological research, a field which may lead to immeasurable advances in the health and well-being of peoples everywhere.^{1 2}

It is thus a matter of particular satisfaction to the United States that article X of the present draft convention sets forth in some detail provisions designed to facilitate international co-operation regarding peaceful application in the field of bacteriology and biology.

In accordance with his decisions regarding United States programmes in this field, and in accordance with the spirit of the draft convention now before us, President Nixon announced on 18 October that the former Army Biological Defense Research Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland, is being converted into a leading centre for cancer research. I should like to quote from the President's statement on that occasion:

This facility, which once was so top secret, which was closed not only to Americans, but, of course, to anybody from foreign lands, now is open to all people in the world. Wherever scientists or doctors may be, whether in Europe, Latin America, Africa or Asia, they can come here. They are welcome to come here to see what we have done, just as we hope they will welcome us, so that we can see what they have done.^{1 3}

This draft convention, which provides for the elimination from the arsenals of States of an entire class of weapons, is a true measure of disarmament. There exists already, I believe a broad measure of consensus in favour of this agreement. I would therefore urge this assembly to encourage prompt and wide-spread support for the draft convention and to request that it be opened for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date.

I should like to turn now, if I may, to a consideration of the challenging task that remains before us, and to the important work that has already been accomplished with respect to further prohibitions regarding chemical weapons. At the CCD this year considerable attention was, as all present know, devoted to this issue. Many delegations contributed through working papers,

^{1 2} *Ante*, p. 20.

^{1 3} *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Oct. 25, 1971, pp. 1425-1426.

through the participation of their leading experts on this subject, in an informal meeting in July, to a better understanding of the central problems of the workability of a chemical weapons verification system. We believe that during the past two years a serious start has been made on exploration of possible approaches to this problem. The task still before us, as we see it, is to sort out and to examine those elements of verification that might be amenable to development as effective tools for ensuring compliance with prohibitions on chemical weapons. Further progress will require study of all promising suggestions. In this regard I should like to note that a memorandum proposing elements as a basis for negotiation was indeed presented to the CCD by a group of twelve delegations.¹⁴ We hope that that document will contribute to continued efforts to achieve sound and reliable arms control measures in this field. For our part, we are determined to pursue this task. We will listen with care to suggestions during the debate in this Committee, which will, we hope, request that the CCD continue its work on this important issue.

In accordance with resolution 2663 (XXV), adopted by the General Assembly last year, the CCD also continued its work on the question of a ban of nuclear weapons tests.¹⁵ As requested in that resolution, a special report on this issue was prepared and has been included as part III of the CCD report to the General Assembly.¹⁶ Set forth in considerable detail, here are proposals and views of Committee members regarding the nature of a possible comprehensive test-ban agreement on the concept of a threshold agreement for partial measures and on interim measures or restraints. Also included are suggestions regarding verification of a prohibition on underground nuclear-weapons tests as well as regarding international co-operation in the exchange of seismic data, the improvement of world-wide seismological capabilities and further study of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests. I am sure that all members of this body will wish to give this report their very careful study and consideration. I can assure them that my own Government will continue to examine all serious proposals for effective controls over a prohibition of underground testing. As many delegations are aware, the United States has devoted considerable effort to the study of the seismic detection, location and identification of earthquakes and underground explosions. We have made our findings broadly available to other countries in the hope that this would contribute to a better understanding of the verification issues. The United States continues to support an adequately verified comprehensive ban on the testing of nuclear weapons. In order to be effective, we believe, verification of such a measure should include on-site inspections.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

¹⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-687.

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 615-622.

Turning now to another aspect of the arms race—and, indeed, in terms of total expenditures on armaments by far the most important aspect—I should like to comment briefly on the need to explore possible restraints on conventional weapons. As the United States delegation pointed out at the CCD this summer, the intensive discussion of ways to control weapons of mass destruction during the past twenty-five years has not only resulted in a number of concrete agreements but has also helped to forge the tools for meaningful discussion on this problem.¹⁷

A body of common objectives and concepts, and a shared vocabulary, have been developed. As yet, we have no comparable tools for dealing with the subject of conventional-arms control. We therefore urge that the international community begin now to try to reach a better understanding of which steps in this field might be possible and sensible and which might not be. Of course, in making this suggestion we need not, and should not, derogate from the priority of other issues. An effort to come to grips with the problem of conventional weapons should proceed concurrently with work in these other important fields.

I would emphasize that a discussion would in no way bind any of the participants to any particular approach. It would, however, initiate the process through which we must pass if we are to ascertain how restraints on conventional weapons can contribute to the security of all countries.

We make this suggestion with the full realization that the question of possible limitations on conventional weapons is not a popular topic. We are aware that there is a widespread reluctance even to consider this matter. We are firmly convinced, however, that if the effectiveness of our work in the arms-control field is to match the solemnity of our declarations, we must come to grips with the question of possible restraints on those armaments to which such a major portion of expenditures on weapons is devoted.

In this regard, my delegation welcomes the publication of the Secretary-General's study on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures,¹⁸ which has been prepared, pursuant to the General Assembly resolution adopted on this subject last year,¹⁹ by a number of distinguished international experts. We are studying that document with great attention.

In the introduction to his report to the General Assembly this year, the Secretary-General pointed out, in paragraph 202, that

During the Disarmament Decade, it is not only important that intensive and uninterrupted work proceed in the field of disarmament; it is also important that all existing treaties should be strengthened.

¹⁷ See *ante*, pp. 528 ff.

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 644-686.

¹⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

The Secretary-General added that

The strengthening of these treaties and their becoming accepted standards of international law will not only ensure that they will be observed and have continuing validity, but will also serve to make additional agreements more readily attainable and acceptable.²⁰

The United States is in firm agreement with this view, and we are pleased that during the past year significant progress has been made in this area.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, which was commended by the United Nations General Assembly last year, was opened for signature in February.²¹ It has already been signed by some 80 countries. My own Government has submitted this Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. We hope that it will enter into force at a very early date.

The dedicated efforts of representatives of many countries have brought us closer to a realization of the objectives of the non-proliferation Treaty. Significant progress has been made during the past year by the International Atomic Energy Agency in elaborating a safeguard system in accordance with article III of that Treaty.

Last year the General Assembly adopted a resolution dealing with the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control.²² The Agency has achieved significant progress in this field, as reflected in paragraphs 94 and 95 of the Agency's annual report.²³ We continue to support further study of this matter within the framework of the IAEA, which, we believe, should be the international body responsible for international activities in this regard.

The United States is deeply conscious of its responsibilities under article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.²⁴ We have sought to meet those responsibilities through a variety of efforts in the arms-control field and, in particular, through our negotiations with the Soviet Union regarding limitations on strategic armaments. These negotiations have been pursued with determination and with steadfastness. While much hard work and intensive negotiation remain before us, the past year has witnessed important and promising developments.

In May, a joint United States-Soviet Union statement announced that the two Governments concerned had agreed "to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the

²⁰ A/8401/Add. 1 (prov.), p. 71.

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

²² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 689.

²³ A/8384.

²⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs)", and that they had also agreed that "together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons". It was announced that the two sides were taking this course in the conviction that it would create more favourable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms, and that those negotiations would be very actively pursued.²⁵

In September, agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union were signed on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and on measures to improve the United States-Soviet Union direct-communications link.²⁶ Secretary Rogers stated at the signing ceremony in Washington that these agreements represented "realistic and concrete steps forward, taken in the spirit of the United Nations Charter, which declares the determination of its Members 'to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war' ". He emphasized as well that "these agreements are in the interests of all nations", and that they "are proof of the advantages of a sober and realistic approach in dealing with arms control".²⁷

During the past year specific steps have also been taken toward negotiations on regional arms-control issues. The task of achieving a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Europe is now being given the most serious consideration. Exploratory talks to that end were proposed in the NATO Declaration in 1968²⁸ and proposed again in Rome in 1970.²⁹ Indications of readiness on the part of the Soviet Union to consider the reductions in armed forces and armaments in Central Europe were welcomed in June in the NATO communique issued at Lisbon.³⁰

In another part of the world, the United States has been gratified with the further progress that has been made with respect to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.³¹

Sound and durable restraints on armaments are possible only when all participants perceive that such limitations are in their own interests. This mutuality of interest can be reached only through a reconciliation of divergent views, through compromise, and through some practical accommodation. I would hope that our important debate on these issues this year will help to promote a much better understanding of our common interests in moving through negotiation toward arms limitations that will provide greater security for all than can be achieved by arms alone.

²⁵ *Ante*, p. 298.

²⁶ *Ante*, pp. 633-635, 635-639.

²⁷ *Ante*, pp. 439-440.

²⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 449-450.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 229-230.

³⁰ *Ante*, pp. 307-311.

³¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69 ff.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 11, 1971¹

The First Committee is today starting its consideration of the problems of disarmament on the agenda of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations. In its approach, the Soviet Union is guided by the fact that the continuing arms race, launched by imperialist circles, is today one manifestation of contemporary international life that prevents a normalization of the situation in the world. The arms race has a direct bearing on the existing international situation, which, for more than a quarter of a century following the end of the Second World War, has been characterized by tension and increasing militarism.

Its special danger in our time is qualitatively growing because of the existence of rockets and nuclear weapons whose destructive potential in case of use presents a tremendous threat for the whole of mankind. At the same time, this growing arms race swallows up tremendous resources and efforts of men, thus imposing a very heavy burden on the shoulders of the peoples of the majority of the countries of the world and preventing an increase in their standard of living and often even the fulfilling of their most vital needs in food, clothing and housing.

In present conditions and in order to prevent wars, to strengthen peace and security, to increase the standard of living of peoples, the most important task is to concentrate every effort on putting an end to the constant increase in armaments and turning the arms race back. The situation in the world depends to a very large extent on a solution to this problem. Are we going to move towards a relaxation of international tensions? Are we going to stop the tremendous increase in armaments? Or, on the contrary, are military preparations going to go forward ever faster, and is the threat of a new world war going to become greater?

The problem of disarmament must, therefore, in international life take one of the key places. Its significance is determined by the nature of the danger resulting from the arms race which threatens the whole of mankind. Attaching great importance to the problem of disarmament, the Soviet Union actively fights for the elimination of the dangers of war, for the end to the arms race, and first of all, for the prohibition and liquidation of weapons of mass destruction—nuclear, chemical and bacteriological. The fight for disarmament is an important and inalienable part of the policy of our country. In the United Nations and in other international arenas the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics puts forward large-scale programmes of nuclear and general and complete disarmament, and at the same time strives to achieve agreement on partial

¹A/C.I/PV.1827, pp. 14-40.

measures in the field of disarmament and the limitation of armaments.

Problems of disarmament were an important part of the work of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the spring of this year. The Congress approved a large-scale programme relating to the problem of disarmament. This programme sets the objective of nuclear disarmament for all States possessing such weapons; the end of all nuclear weapons tests, including underground tests, by all and everywhere; the promotion of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. The programme provides for redoubled effort in the struggle for the end of the arms race in weapons of all kinds.

Pursuant to the constructive disarmament programme approved by the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Union comes out in favour of the practical solution of this problem through co-operation among a wide number of States. The efforts of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to achieve a positive solution of disarmament problems are guided by the desire to maintain peace and international security, by its desire to prevent a world nuclear conflict threatening the whole of mankind with catastrophic consequences.

This is also the objective of the proposal of the Soviet Union on the convening of a world disarmament conference. According to the Soviet side, a contribution to the solution of the disarmament problem must be made by all States, no matter what their economic or military potential. As was stressed in the statement made in the general debate at this session of the General Assembly by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Gromyko, the socialist countries do not claim to possess any monopoly in the policy of peace, nor do they wish to achieve such a monopoly.²

The Soviet Union is ready to unite its efforts with those of all other States in the fight for the limitation of the arms race and for disarmament. In recent years, in the field of the limitation of the arms race some positive results have been achieved. We have seen concluded and ratified international agreements relating to several important measures in this field, among them the Treaties on the prohibition of nuclear weapons tests in three environments—the atmosphere, outer space and under water³—on the non-proliferation of these weapons,⁴ on the prohibition of emplacing them in space as well as on the sea-bed and ocean floor.⁵ And yet these agreements limiting the arms race are but first steps towards disarmament.

One is in duty bound to note that, unfortunately, there still has not been any radical turn to stop the dangerous process in

² *Ante*, pp. 592-593.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

the increase and improvement of weapons. The arms race as a whole has not been stopped, nor has it been turned back; armaments and military budgets continue to increase and important and urgent disarmament measures such as the prohibition and liquidation of all types of weapons of mass destruction, above all nuclear weapons, are still awaiting their solution.

This makes it necessary to redouble our efforts in considering disarmament problems, using all channels and forums, multilateral and bilateral. For that reason the Soviet Union takes an active part in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, trying to have the Committee prepare concrete agreements on measures which would reduce the rate of the arms race and move us towards disarmament. Together with participation in multilateral and international disarmament forums, the Soviet Union is engaged in an exchange of views on disarmament problems on a bilateral basis. Thus, in recent times Soviet leaders have had meetings and talks with the leaders of France, India, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Canada, Cuba and other States, during which much attention has been devoted to disarmament matters. The Soviet Government, as is well known, is also carrying on bilateral talks with the Government of the United States of America on the question of the limitation of strategic weapons. In May of this year agreement was reached between the USSR and the United States on the questions which should have priority in these talks, that is to say, on preparing an agreement on the limitation of the expansion of systems of anti-missile defence and at the same time, during the conclusion of an agreement on this matter, preparing an agreement pertaining to some measures in the field of strategic offensive weapons.⁶

Some positive results of these talks have been achieved. On 30 September agreements were concluded in Washington on measures to reduce the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war between the USSR and the United States and the improvement of the direct line of communications between Moscow and Washington in order to eliminate any dangerous situations.⁷ The Soviet side considers that the agreements which have been concluded are positive steps leading towards reduced international tensions and towards a reduction of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear war. During disarmament talks the USSR has been laying primary stress on the need for the full prohibition and destruction of all types of weapons of mass destruction, especially on the solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament. Endeavouring to make a practical start in the consideration and solution of this cardinal problem in the field of disarmament, the Soviet Government in June of this year addressed itself to all nuclear Powers, proposing that there be convened a conference of these Powers with a view to considering problems of nuclear disarmament.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 298.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 633-635, 635-639.

For many years the Soviet Union has been trying to have States now possessing nuclear arsenals take common measures with a view to liquidating these arsenals. As early as 1 July 1968, the day of the signing of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Soviet Government proposed to all nuclear Powers immediately to start talks to put an end to the production of nuclear weapons, to reduce the stockpiles of such weapons, and subsequently for a full prohibition and liquidation of nuclear weapons under corresponding international controls.⁸ The proposal to convene a conference of the five nuclear Powers⁹ represents a further step in the initiative of the USSR directed at inciting States possessing the nuclear weapon to agree to its prohibition and destruction. The Soviet Union, quite justifiably and realistically, is guided by the special responsibility to mankind which lies on the shoulders of the Governments of countries possessing nuclear weapons. A radical solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament in the final analysis depends upon the willingness of States possessing nuclear weapons to prohibit and destroy them. We hope that in the end the Governments of these States will show that they are aware of their responsibility to the peoples of the world and under pressure of ever more insistent demands of peace-loving public opinion will sit around the table of negotiation in order to create conditions which would for ever put an end to the danger of the outbreak of a war in which nuclear weapons would be used. As a very important measure of nuclear disarmament the USSR advocates the immediate solution of the problem of the cessation of nuclear weapon tests, including underground tests, by all and everywhere.

The prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests is a very important part of the problem of nuclear disarmament. The solution of this problem would have great political and economic significance—political because it would considerably improve the existing climate in the world and contribute to the adoption of other disarmament measures. Its economic impact would consist in that the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests would contribute to the use of fissionable materials for peaceful purposes, including underground nuclear tests for peaceful purposes. The problem of underground nuclear tests was considered in great detail in the Disarmament Committee this year and in previous years. Discussions in the Committee on this problem showed that many countries attached great importance to it, and yet we were still unable to reach agreement on this matter. The Soviet Union, as we have stated many times, is ready to conclude an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests on the basis of national means of detection of underground nuclear weapon tests. Present-day science and technology have developed

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, p. 467.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

to such an extent that it is possible to ensure control through national means, giving an assurance to all States that an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests is being carried out by all in good faith. To ensure the most trustworthy guarantees for strict respect by all parties to such an agreement—strict respect of obligations undertaken by them—we deem it possible to make use of international co-operation in the field of exchange of seismological data. The Soviet side is in favour of such co-operation within the framework of an agreement on the prohibition of underground nuclear weapon tests, it being understood that control over its implementation would be carried out without any inspection of an international character.

Some time ago Sweden put forward a proposal about a so-called detection club which would be based upon co-operation in the exchange of seismological data.¹⁰ The Soviet side declared that it took a positive view of this proposal, it being understood that States must not by dint of taking part in the detection club undertake any obligation to carry out international inspection and control on their own territory. The presentation of seismological data by them could be carried out only on a voluntary basis, and such information would be assessed not by an international body of any kind but by every State for itself. We are happy to note that a growing number of States is inclined to agree with the idea of the sufficiency of national means of detection and control. This was stated in the Disarmament Committee by the representatives of many countries. Unfortunately, the United States, which accounts for most of the nuclear weapon tests carried out in the world, takes a different view. In the question of underground nuclear weapon tests, the United States demands compulsory on-the-spot inspection to control the implementation of the agreement. Despite the fact that the possibility of control by national means of detection—control over the cessation of underground nuclear weapon tests—has been widely recognized, we still do not see any sign of a change in the position of the United States on the question of the prohibition of such tests.

The reason for this can be found in factors of a political nature, that is to say, the fact that the United States of America is unwilling to agree to such a prohibition. The requirement of compulsory inspection on the spot is in fact an obstacle to the solution of this most important aspect of the disarmament problem.

The prohibition of other types of weapons of mass destruction, chemical and bacteriological, would be of very great importance to the limitation and cessation of the arms race. The Soviet Union has constantly striven to obtain full prohibition and liquidation of these types of weapons and insists on the need to take immediate practical steps to liquidate them now. The socialist countries have

¹⁰ *Documents on Disarmament, 1965*, pp. 390-393.

often drawn the attention of other States to the fact that unceasing production, improvement and stock-piling of chemical and bacteriological weapons gives rise to serious threats to mankind. Urgent measures for the liquidation of arsenals of such weapons would contribute to the strengthening of peace and security. An international agreement on this question would create a propitious climate for progress in other disarmament fields. Because of this need fully to prohibit these types of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union and other socialist countries at the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations put forward draft conventions prohibiting the manufacture, preparation and stock-piling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and providing for their destruction.¹¹ A positive consequence of this initiative of the socialist countries was that States started showing more interest in the prohibition of these types of weapons of mass destruction and the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 forbidding the use of chemical weapons and bacteriological agents in time of war.¹² The number of adherents to this important international agreement increased. Important decisions were taken by the General Assembly stressing the role of the Geneva Protocol in the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and the need to prepare measures with a view to full prohibition of these types of weapons.

In conditions of a general consideration of the chemical and bacteriological methods and means of war, many States which previously rejected the proposal that these types of weapons should be prohibited declared that they were ready to agree to the prohibition on manufacture of such bacteriological weapons and toxins and to eliminate them from their military arsenals. The starting point of the socialist countries residing in the recognition of the possibility of a common prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, is a view shared by many States. However, some Western States, the United States of America, Britain and others, expressed their readiness to agree only to the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, trying to explain or justify their negative approach towards the prohibition of chemical weapons by alleged difficulties of controlling the implementation of such an agreement. As a consequence of this, talks on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons found themselves in an impasse for some time and an agreement on this question and its whole scope became impossible.

This impasse on the way to an agreement on prohibition of these types of weapons seriously hampered constructive consideration and solution of other disarmament problems, gave rise to a climate of pessimism and, frankly speaking, undermined efforts aimed at achieving constructive results in disarmament talks.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 455-457; *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 533-537.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

Striving to move the solution of this problem from a dead centre, the socialist countries, as a first step towards its solution, proclaimed their readiness to agree on the prohibition only of bacteriological weapons and toxins. For this purpose the socialist countries, members of the Disarmament Committee, Bulgaria, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, the USSR and Czechoslovakia, on 30 March this year tabled a draft convention on the prohibition of the preparation, the development, production and stock-piling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction.¹³

On the basis of this draft, talks were held in the Committee as a result of which the Committee presented to the present twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly of the United Nations a revised draft convention on this question.¹⁴ The object of this convention is the full elimination of the possibility of using bacteriological weapons and toxins in time of war.

The draft convention presented to the General Assembly is the result of common efforts of all the members of the Disarmament Committee. It includes proposals, ideas, amendments and additions put forward by many members of the Disarmament Committee which considered this draft in very great detail at meetings of the Committee in 1971. The draft convention provides the obligation on States never, under any condition to develop, produce or acquire in any way or to stock-pile bacteriological weapons and toxins as well as the means of delivery of such weapons—article I of the draft. The draft also provides that the prohibited types of weapons must be destroyed as speedily as possible or diverted to peaceful purposes—article II. These key provisions of the convention for the prohibition and liquidation of bacteriological weapons are important because they mean that if they were carried out they would lead to the elimination from the arsenals of States of one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass destruction. Many delegations in the general debate at this session of the Assembly quite correctly underlined that the conclusion and implementation of a convention relating to bacteriological weapons would serve as a first step in the field of practical disarmament.

In connexion with the tabling in the General Assembly of a draft convention on bacteriological weapons the delegation of the USSR considers it necessary to make some clarification and to express some views relating to the content of some of the draft's provisions. Much attention was paid in the Disarmament Committee when the draft convention on bacteriological weapons was discussed and was devoted to discussion of the relation between this draft convention and the prohibition of chemical weapons. This reflects the concern of many States about the danger flowing

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

¹⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

from the concentration in the arsenals of States of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical weapons.

In the draft convention presented to the Assembly a basis is laid for future talks, and an agreement, on the total prohibition of chemical weapons. The main provisions in this connexion will be found in article IX of the draft convention. That provides that the parties to the convention undertake to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition on such weapons, and the concrete objective is noted—effective prohibition of chemical weapons through an agreement—and it is stressed that that must be reached at an early date. The contents of article IX, read together with the provisions of the preamble and some other articles of the draft, create the necessary premises for progress towards the complete prohibition of chemical weapons.

Another important provision of the draft convention relates to the importance of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Article VIII provides that nothing in the draft convention should be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by States under the Geneva Protocol. Further, the preamble notes the importance of that Protocol and confirms that its objectives and principles are correct. All States are called upon to observe them strictly. Generally speaking, the draft convention is aimed at strengthening the objectives of the Geneva Protocol.

Article I of the draft convention provides for the obligation by States never in any circumstances to do any of the prohibited things mentioned in the convention. We would like to note in this connexion that those words “never in any circumstances” show that the validity of the prohibitions contained in the convention holds good in case of peace as well as in times of war. Nothing in the convention makes it possible to interpret it in any other way. We also wish to state that those words in article I, “never in any circumstances”, cover the question of reservations to the Geneva Protocol relating to bacteriological weapons made by various States at the time of their signature concerning some exceptions to the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

Article I of the draft convention also provides that agents of types and in quantities which are designed for protective purposes are not prohibited. We should like to note in this connexion that the word “protective” is based upon the most authoritative explanations of scientists and specialists, according to whom it is necessary to have certain quantities of those agents for the development and testing of ways and means of protecting persons, or whole populations, from biological agents. There is, therefore, absolutely no basis in fact for seeing in that wording any loophole for violation of the convention, since it speaks only of the use of

such agents for peaceful purposes, and the mention of prophylactic and protective purposes is but a concrete expression of that fact.

During consideration in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament of this draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons the desire was expressed that States parties to the convention should serve notice about the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes, under article II, of stocks of bacteriological weapons and toxins. We declare, in this connexion, that the Soviet side is ready to serve such notice, it being understood that other States parties to the convention will do the same. We are guided by the fact that paragraph (5) of article XIV of the draft convention provides that the depositary governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States, among others, of the receipt of other notices. Therefore, notices relating to the condition under article II on the destruction or diversion to peaceful purposes of existing stockpiles of bacteriological weapons and toxins could be sent through depositary governments, which would inform all signatory States.

Pursuant to the proposal of several States, the draft convention on bacteriological weapons contains an article VII concerning assistance to any party to the convention requesting such assistance if the Security Council decides that such party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the convention. By "assistance", as mentioned in paragraph VII, we have in mind measures of a medical nature, or measures designed for rescue operations. In the meaning of this article, therefore, this is medical or humanitarian assistance, and in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations other measures could be taken to assist a State to protect the security of the State which is the victim of aggression, or for the maintenance of peace, as provided for in Chapter VII of the Charter. It goes without saying that article VII of the draft convention does not, of course, exclude the rendering of assistance on the basis of other agreements and obligations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

Those are the remarks and comments of the Soviet side on the draft convention on bacteriological weapons.

Speaking of the significance of this draft convention, we would like to stress that its entry into force would prevent the possibility of the outbreak of war with the use of these agents, which would be in the interests of all States. Compelling States to prohibit and liquidate those categories of weapons of mass destruction, the convention would become an agreement relating to the implementation of actual disarmament measures, which certainly would promote progress and agreement in the field of other measures for general and complete disarmament.

In presenting to the General Assembly of the United Nations the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and toxins the Socialist States are guided by the fact that the

conclusion of such a convention would make it possible for the participants in the disarmament negotiations to spend more time on working out an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons. If at present, during talks on biological weapons, attempts are being made to evade talks on the prohibition of chemical weapons, after the conclusion of the draft convention which we are proposing, prohibiting bacteriological weapons, there will no longer be a pretext for evading such talks.

The Soviet delegation would ask the General Assembly to approve the draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons and appeals to all States to sign this most important international agreement at an early date. We also hope that the Assembly will give firm instructions to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to urgently continue talks which would lead to the development of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

In connexion with other disarmament measures, as we have already had occasion to note, one of the practical results achieved in this field is the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of stationing nuclear weapons and other types of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof. This Treaty arose from the fact that because of the rapid scientific and technological progress of recent years, mankind has come very close to the conquest of a new environment—the deep sea, the sea-bed and the subsoil; and, together with the peaceful uses of this environment, the possibility has also arisen of its large-scale use for military purposes.

On the question of the peaceful use of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, the Soviet Union comes out in favour of complete demilitarization. However, no agreement has been reached on a radical solution of this problem as proposed by the Soviet side. Some Western countries, in this field, have adopted a negative position since they are already carrying out many measures of a military nature on the sea-bed and are developing plans to expand military activities in that environment. In these conditions a possible solution of this problem could be an agreement to prohibit the emplacement on the sea-bed and ocean floor of any nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction.

Now when a partial solution of this problem has been found, it is necessary to bend every effort to reach agreement on wider measures to prohibit military activities in that environment. In approaching this matter we must also take into account the fact that under the Treaty prohibiting the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor, States undertook the obligation:

... to continue negotiations in good faith concerning further measures in the field of disarmament for the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof.¹⁵

¹⁵ *Ante*, p. 10.

To carry out further measures to demilitarize the sea-bed, we are confronted with several favourable factors. Thus, as a result of achieving agreement on the prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed of weapons of mass destruction, principles were agreed upon, and then concrete provisions relating to the definition of the zones to which this treaty would apply, a system of control, and other matters relating to the prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed. These principles and provisions, approved by the General Assembly and later by many States parties to the Treaty on the sea-bed¹⁶ could be successfully made use of as we work on further steps towards a treaty for the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. In addition, to determine the scope and nature of the prohibition of the military use of the sea-bed, there is a basis, a foundation, a draft treaty on the full demilitarization of the sea-bed, presented by the Soviet Union to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in March 1969 and supported by many other States.¹⁷

The General Assembly and its First Committee must also consider many other problems relating to disarmament—among them, the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments, reduction of military budgets, the liquidation of foreign bases on foreign soil, and so on.

Attaching all due importance to partial disarmament measures, we must not lose sight of the need to solve the problem of general and complete disarmament. Talks on disarmament problems in General Assembly sessions and other forums have shown the interest of a large number of States in the solution of important problems in this field, including general and complete disarmament.

On the agenda of this session of the Assembly we find other problems relating to disarmament. The Soviet delegation intends to make its views on them known when we come to the different items on the agenda and proposals relating thereto. To consider all these disarmament problems concerning nuclear and conventional weapons, all States must be involved on a footing of equality. To this end, the Soviet Union proposes the convening of a world disarmament conference with the participation of all countries. Such a conference could be the forum at which all countries together would consider disarmament problems in their full scope and endeavour to find practically realizable and generally acceptable solutions. The true universality of such a conference would be an important guarantee for its success.

Our delegation, in the plenary meeting of the Assembly on 3 November of this year, presented in detail and in an exhaustive manner the proposal of the Soviet Union concerning the conven-

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 112-113.

ing of such a world disarmament conference.¹⁸ As we said in that statement, such a conference should in no way detract from the importance of other channels and forums for disarmament talks, such as, for example, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The convening of a world disarmament conference is directly linked to the task of strengthening international peace and security. In view of the importance of carrying out this measure, we expect that the proposal of the Soviet Union for a world disarmament conference will be duly considered at this session of the General Assembly.

To conclude, may I express the hope that consideration of disarmament problems at this session of the Assembly will contribute to their positive solution and will be a new step towards the solution of problems of the limitation of armaments and disarmament in the interest of all peoples.

Mexican Working Paper Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Inclusion of Additional Article in Draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, November 12, 1971¹⁹

Insert a new article X which would read as follows:

Pending the agreement referred to in article IX, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. The agents in question are listed in the Protocol annexed to this Convention.

Renumber the subsequent articles accordingly.

News Conference Remarks by President Nixon: Prospects for Strategic Arms Limitation Talks [Extract], November 12, 1971¹

Q. Mr. President, you met this afternoon with our SALT negotiating team which is returning to Vienna. Earlier this year you expressed the hope that some kind of agreement could be made. Do you foresee some kind of a SALT agreement before the end of the year?

The President. We have made significant progress in the arms limitation talks. The progress, for example, with regard to the hot line and the progress with regard to accidental war is quite

¹⁸ See *ante*, pp. 696-706.

¹⁹ A/C.1/L.578, Nov. 12, 1971, and Corr. 1, Nov. 15, 1971. The Mexican amendment was withdrawn on Dec. 8, 1971 (*post*, pp. 842-843). The draft convention appears *ante*, pp. 568-573.

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 15, 1971, p. 1514.

significant. Also, we have made significant progress in the discussions on the limitations on defensive weapons and we are beginning now to move into the discussions on offensive weapons.

Whether we are able to reach an agreement by the end of the year, I think, is highly improbable at this point. I say highly improbable—not impossible. It depends on what happens.

Our goal is—and I discussed this at great length with Mr. Gromyko when he was here—our goal is, of course, at the highest level to urge our negotiators to try to find a common basis for agreement. But it must be a joint agreement. We cannot limit defensive weapons first and then limit offensive weapons. Both must go together. It will happen.

I would say this: I believe we are going to reach an agreement. I believe we will make considerable progress toward reaching that agreement before the end of the year. I think reaching the agreement before the end of the year is probably not likely at this time, but great progress will be made and I think by the end of the year we will be able to see then that our goal can be achieved.

Statement by ACDA Director Smith on the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, November 13, 1971¹

Together with the other members of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, I am pleased to be back in Vienna to resume negotiations with the U.S.S.R. SALT delegation. We know from past experience that the Austrian Government and our Austrian friends will make our stay a most agreeable one.

The communique announcing the adjournment in Helsinki of the fifth round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks indicated that our work there had been fruitful, that definite progress had been made.²

The May 20, 1971, understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union established a framework within which both delegations would continue negotiations toward an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems, together with certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive weapons.³

I am under instruction from the President to continue a resolute effort to carry out that understanding.

During this past year we have witnessed, on a broad front, President Nixon's determination to advance the cause of peace through negotiations. This determination has been reflected in the progress of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. You can be assured there will be no letup during this phase.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Dec. 6, 1971, pp. 659-660.

² *Ante*, pp. 563-564.

³ *Ante*, p. 298.

It is my hope, as we resume these negotiations in Vienna, that we may soon bring them to a successful conclusion.

Statement by the PRC Deputy Foreign Minister (Chiao) to the General Assembly [Extract], November 15, 1971¹

We have consistently maintained that all countries, big or small, should be equal and that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence should be taken as the principles guiding the relations between countries. The people of each country have the right to choose the social system of their own country according to their own will and to protect the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of their own country. No country has the right to subject another country to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying. We are opposed to the imperialist and colonialist theory that the big nations are superior to the small nations and that the small nations are subordinate to the big nations. We are opposed to the power politics and hegemony of big Powers bullying small ones or strong nations bullying weak ones. We hold that the affairs of a given country must be handled by its own people, that the affairs of the world must be handled by all the countries of the world, and that the affairs of the United Nations must be handled jointly by all its Member States, and the super-Powers should not be allowed to manipulate and monopolize them. The super-Powers want to be superior to others and lord it over others. At no time, either today or ever in the future, will China be a super-Power subjecting others to its aggression, subversion, control, interference or bullying.

The one or two super-Powers are stepping up their arms expansion and war preparations and vigorously developing nuclear weapons, thus seriously threatening international peace. It is understandable that the people of the world long for disarmament and particularly for nuclear disarmament. Their demand for the dissolution of military blocs, withdrawal of foreign troops and the dismantling of foreign military bases is a just one. However, the super-Powers, while talking about disarmament every day, are actually engaged in arms expansion daily. The so-called nuclear disarmament which they are supposed to be seeking is entirely for the purpose of monopolizing nuclear weapons in order to carry out nuclear threats and blackmail.

China will never participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks between the nuclear Powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries. China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage. China develops nuclear weapons, solely for the purpose of defence and for breaking the nuclear monopoly and ultimately eliminating nuclear weapons and nuclear war. The

¹ A/PV.1983 (prov.), pp. 97-98.

Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and proposed to convene a summit conference of all countries of the world to discuss this question and, as the first step, to reach an agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons. The Chinese Government has on many occasions declared, and now on behalf of the Chinese Government I once again solemnly declare, that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. If the United States and the Soviet Union really and truly want disarmament, they should commit themselves not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is not something difficult to do. Whether this is done or not will be a severe test as to whether they have the genuine desire for disarmament.

Thirty-nine Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, November 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,²

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (document A/8457), dated 1 October 1971,³ and being appreciative of the work of the Conference on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, annexed to the report,⁴

Recognizing the important significance of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare,⁵ and conscious also of the contribution

¹ A/C.1/L.579, Nov. 16, 1971. The draft res. was submitted by the following countries: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Costa Rica, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, Greece, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Liberia, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Rwanda, Somalia, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S., and Zaire. It was later cosponsored by Iran, Jamaica, Madagascar, and Malaysia. On Dec. 2 the 39 cosponsors, joined by Argentina and Yemen, submitted a revised draft resolution, which was later cosponsored by Lesotho, Romania, and Singapore (A/C.1/L.579/Rev. 1). The revised draft was adopted by the General Assembly on Dec. 16 (*post*, pp. 884-889).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

³ *Ante*, pp. 610-633.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Noting that the Convention provides for the Parties to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and call upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Further noting that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons,

Noting that the Convention contains an affirmation of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes,

Convinced that the Convention will contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Commends* the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the depositary Governments to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses the hope* for the widest possible adherence to the Convention.

Thirty-seven Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, November 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,² 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,³ and, in particular, its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970⁴ which, *inter alia*, stressed that the prospects for international peace and security, as well as the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, would be enhanced if the development [,] production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war were to end and if those agents were eliminated from all military arsenals,

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction⁵ is an important step toward the achievement of early agreement for the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the elimination of such weapons from military arsenals of all States,

Noting with satisfaction that the Convention contains an affirmation of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes,

Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,⁶

¹ A/C.1/L.580, Nov. 16, 1971. The res. was submitted by the following countries: Afghanistan, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Syria, Tunisia, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., and U.S. It was later cosponsored by Australia, Costa Rica, Honduras, Iceland, Jordan, Kuwait, Liberia, Madagascar, Malta, New Zealand, Nicaragua, and Rwanda. On Dec. 2 it was replaced by A/C.1/L.596, which was approved by the G.A. as pt. A of res. 2827 (*post*, pp. 890-892).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 793-795.

³ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 717-719.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

Noting that the Convention provides for the parties to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol and to call upon all States to comply strictly with them,

1. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its consideration of the problem of chemical methods of warfare, with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

2. *Requests also* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take into account in its further work:

(a) The views expressed in the Joint Memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction submitted on 28 September 1971 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia (see document A/8457, annex C, CCD/352);⁷

(b) Other proposals, suggestions, working papers and expert views put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee;

3. *Urges* Governments to take all steps that may be possible to contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations by the CCD and which could facilitate rapid progress toward agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of all States;

4. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2162 B(XXI) of 5 December 1966⁸ and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925;

5. *Invites* all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Geneva Protocol;

6. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons, November 16, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, although other members of my delegation have spoken before me and addressed this Committee, nevertheless, since this is the first time that I myself am speaking here; and, furthermore, since I have had the privilege of being able to call myself a two-fold colleague of yours, since we have worked together both here in the Assembly and in the Geneva Committee, I trust that you will bear with me if I repeat the congratulations addressed to you by other spokesmen for Mexico and if I mention, too, how felicitous we believe the choice of the Assembly to have been when it elected you to preside over the work of this Committee for the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly.

The statement that I am going to deliver will deal exclusively with item 28 of the agenda of the Assembly—namely, the question of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. At later meetings I shall make known the views of my delegation on a number of other items touching on disarmament which appear on the agenda of the First Committee.

May I first of all recall that the fundamental reasons for the unshakeable position that we have adopted in this matter could be summarized as follows:

First, we consider that the question of the total prohibition of the use of chemical and micro-biological weapons is something that has already been definitively settled in resolution 2603 A (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which the United Nations General Assembly declared that the use of such weapons would be contrary to the tenets of generally recognized international law embodied in the Geneva Protocol, and also defined the scope of that prohibition when it stated that it included any chemical and biological means of warfare, without any exception.²

Secondly, we believe that the same reasons which in 1925 militated in favour of a joint prohibition being issued on both types of weapons—chemical and biological—still exist today for us, and that we should therefore follow the same path of jointly prohibiting their development, production and stockpiling, as well as their elimination from the arsenals of all States, in accordance with the basic approach suggested and approved by the General Assembly in resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.³

Thirdly, regarding means of verification and the requirements which such means should fulfil in order to be termed acceptable, in the light of the impossibility of being 100 per cent certain in the case of chemical and micro-biological weapons, we believe that

¹ A/C.1/PV.1829, pp. 56-65.

² The resolution appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 716-717. For the Geneva Protocol, see *ibid.*, pp. 764-765.

³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

we should consider acceptable any system of verification which offers reasonable safeguards of observance of the provisions of the convention, without claiming to achieve perfection, which appears impossible. In order correctly to assess such a system, we would, furthermore, have to take into account not only the intrinsic efficiency of that system, but the very considerable supplementary scope of national means of detection which we know all States to possess—and, particularly, the very few Powers that possess those ghastly weapons of mass destruction.

Following those general rules, my delegation remains convinced that without any formal or substantive difficulties for the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction⁴—which, may I say parenthetically, appears in Annex A to the Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament⁵ and which was submitted to this Committee last Thursday by the representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union, the principal authors of that draft—the necessary modifications could be worked out so that the convention would apply not only to micro-biological and toxin weapons but also to chemical weapons.

We are grateful for the improvements that we find in the draft convention in comparison with previous drafts, but I think we ought to recall that these improvements are due, to a large extent, to the efforts made by the group of non-aligned countries members of the Committee. We are also fully aware that the draft convention constitutes the first case in which the two super-Powers have come to an agreement on an authentic disarmament measure, although, as we know, it is a document which covers the destruction of weapons which experts had already decided were unusable.

It is for this reason that in Geneva we did not oppose, and we shall not oppose here, efforts being made to follow a process of successive prohibitions in two different instruments, one of microbiological weapons and the other of chemical weapons. However, as we said in the Committee on Disarmament and as we believe necessary to repeat here, we are convinced that we should endeavour to see that the ties that exist between the convention dealing with microbiological weapons and that which must inevitably complete it in the near future, namely the convention on chemical weapons, should be as close and solid as possible and should not be limited to a mere expression of good intentions, of which latter the example of the preamble of the Moscow Treaty⁶ has made us somewhat sceptical.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 610-633.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

That was the reason why the Mexican delegation decided to join the 11 non-aligned delegations when on 17 August 1971 they submitted a number of amendments in the working paper contained in document CCD/341,⁷ among which was one that led to article IX of the draft convention expressly stating that:

... the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons

and also the commitment to

continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction. . . .⁸

Another result of this presentation was also the fact that on 24 August the Mexican delegation submitted a working paper contained in document CCD/346 in Geneva.⁹ Since, as we see it, that proposal is still appropriate and pertinent, we have asked that it be circulated to the First Committee as a document which is numbered A/C.1/L.578.

The proposal in itself is extremely simple and the text of the new article which we would suggest be added is self-explanatory since it merely reads as follows:

Pending the agreement referred to in Article IX, the States Parties to this Convention undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects. The agents in question are listed in the Protocol annexed to this Convention.¹⁰

Naturally, the inclusion of this article which would then be numbered X, would call for a resulting renumbering of subsequent articles of the Treaty.

We believe that the adoption of the moratorium we have proposed on the specific category of chemical weapons has numerous advantages and we can think of no obstacle. Among the advantages we should cite the fact that if it did not spell the elimination at least it would spell the freezing of a more or less wide group of chemical agents for weapons purposes which, because of their degree of toxicity, are more dangerous and cannot be used for peaceful purposes—such as the so-called neuro-toxic agents. It also has an advantage which cannot be overlooked and that is, that that moratorium would give convincing proof on the part of those Powers that possess chemical weapons of the fact that they are truly ready to ensure that the commitments referred to in article IX will not be merely paper ones but will be implemented as speedily as possible.

When I say that I can see no objection to the adoption of that paragraph, I would say that the question of verification which has been the main argument adduced against the total prohibition of

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 500-501.

⁸ *Ante*, p. 571.

⁹ *Ante*, p. 510.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 729.

chemical weapons, does not seem appropriate in this case, since a system of control that might be accepted as satisfactory to guarantee the prohibition of all microbiological weapons and of all toxins must obviously also be so to supervise the simple freezing of those chemical and super-toxic agents that have no civic or peaceful uses. Nor does there appear to be any difficulty in coming to an agreement on an initial list that, however short, would include such agents, since there is ample documentation in the reports on chemical and microbiological weapons by the Secretary-General of the United Nations¹¹ to prepare such a list, and we might also turn to the reports from the World Health Organization¹² and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI).¹³ There are, furthermore, very valuable working documents submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Japan,¹⁴ the delegation of the Netherlands¹⁵ and that of Sweden.¹⁶

The fact that that initial list which, I must stress, by its selective character could be prepared immediately and without too much difficulty, would be annexed in a protocol to the convention and not included in the body of the convention itself, would allow for later revisions with the assistance of experts until the list could be made as complete as possible, as suggested in the working paper submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the delegation of Italy.¹⁷

We would venture to hope that the large majority of States—in fact more than 100 in number—that for the first time will be able to consider our proposal, since they did not participate in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, will share the view that I have just outlined. We trust that they will find our views well grounded. That specifically was the case for the representative of Ghana, Ambassador Akwei, and may I parenthetically express the appreciation of my delegation for the very valuable support he has given our suggestion. But, I trust that the other delegations in our Committee will find that our views are well founded for, since it has not been possible thus far to achieve a draft convention that will provide for the simultaneous elimination of microbiological and chemical weapons, the international community has the right at least to insist that in the instrument devoted exclusively to the former provision be made to cover the latter, whose military value and possibilities of utilization, are much greater; that certain acts be performed even though

¹¹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 264-298.

¹² *Health Aspects of Chemical and Biological Weapons: Report of a WHO Group of Consultants* (Geneva, 1970).

¹³ *The Problem of Chemical and Biological Warfare*.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 379-382.

¹⁵ *Ante*, pp. 99-101.

¹⁶ *Ante*, pp. 151-154.

¹⁷ *Ante*, pp. 417-421.

they be as limited as to be merely of a symbolic nature but that nevertheless will bolster the promises that have been given us.

Twenty-eight Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, November 18, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968² and 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,³

Recalling further its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,⁴ which commended the following basic approach for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare:

(a) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

(b) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States,

(c) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457)⁵ and, in particular, the Committee's work on the elaboration of a draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction⁶ and its efforts towards reaching early agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons also,

Convinced that the conclusion of a Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their

¹A/C.1/L.581, Nov. 18, 1971. The res. was submitted by the following countries: Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Ceylon, Chile, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Uganda, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. It was later cosponsored by Guyana. On Dec. 2 it was replaced by A/C.1/L. 596, which became pt. A of G.A. res. 2827 (post, pp. 890-897).

²*Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 793-795.

³*Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 717-719.

⁴*Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

⁵*Ante*, pp. 610-633.

⁶*Ante*, pp. 568-573.

Destruction would represent a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons,

Emphasizing the immense importance and urgency for also reaching agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons, thereby reducing a serious threat to mankind and facilitating the achievement of general and complete disarmament under effective international control,

1. Takes note of:

(a) The provisions contained in the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction concerning the determination and a firmly expressed commitment to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

(b) The joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction submitted on 28 September 1971 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/8457, annex C, CCD/352) by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia;⁷

(c) Other proposals, suggestions, working papers, and expert views put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee relating to the question of chemical weapons;

2. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed with the task of negotiating, as a high priority item, agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

3. *Further requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to be guided, in its negotiations for early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, by the elements contained in the Group of Twelve memorandum and also to take into account the views and suggestions mentioned in paragraph 1 above;

4. *Urges* all States to take all measures which could facilitate early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction;

5. *Calls anew* for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,⁸ and invites all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify that Protocol;

6. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the First Committee relating to questions connected with the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare.

Sixteen Nation Amendment to Thirty-nine Nation Draft Resolution on the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, November 18, 1971⁹

Insert a new tenth preambular paragraph to read as follows:

Affirming the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

Saudi Arabian Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, November 19, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Noting that one of the first steps for the strengthening of international security is to dissipate world-wide fears that nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may be used by miscalculation in what could appear a desperate situation,

Considering that for the last few years the United Nations has been preoccupied with finding ways and means for diminishing the pollution of the earth's atmosphere,

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁹ A/C.1/L.582, Nov. 18, 1971. The amendment was submitted to the First Committee of the G.A. by Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Yemen, and Yugoslavia. It was later cosponsored by Cameroon. The amendment was withdrawn after the submission of the revised version of the thirty-nine nation draft resolution, which became G.A. res. 2826 (*post*, pp. 884-889). The draft convention appears *ante*, pp. 568-573.

¹ A/C.1/L.583, Nov. 19, 1971. On Dec. 1 it was revised to omit the words "and in any case before the proposed World Disarmament Conference" in operative par. 2 (A/C.1/L.583/Rev. 1). The revised res. was adopted as pt. B of res. 2828 (*post*, pp. 894-895).

Noting that scientists have been unanimous on the conclusion that the fall-out from nuclear tests is injurious to human and animal life and that such fall-out may poison the earth's atmosphere for many decades to come,

Taking into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests are conducted,

Recognizing that there already exist sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of certain Powers to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable,

1. *Appeals* to the nuclear Powers to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere;

2. *Urges* the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests without delay and in any case before the proposed World Disarmament Conference;

3. *Reassures* the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to raise its voice against nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and earnestly requests the nuclear Powers not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.

Sixteen Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, November 22, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests, including those carried out underground,

Recalling that this subject has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly every year since 1959,

Recalling in particular its resolutions 914 (X) of 16 December 1955,² 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962,³ 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,⁴ 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965,⁵ 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,⁶ 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,⁷ 2455

¹ A/C.1/L.585. The draft res. was submitted by the following countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Sweden. It was later cosponsored by Iran. As modified by the New Zealand amendments (*post*, p. 812), it became pt. C of res. 2828 (*post*, pp. 895-897).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 583-586.

³ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1029-1033.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 627.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 623-624.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1967, p. 731.

(XXIII) of 20 December 1968,⁸ 2604 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,⁹ and 2663 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,¹⁰

Expressing serious concern that the objectives of these resolutions have not been fulfilled,

Noting with regret that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,¹¹

Taking into account the determination expressed by the parties to that Treaty to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times,

Noting the appeal by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the United Nations for progress on this issue,

Noting with special concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Having considered the special report submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in response to resolution 2663 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,

1. *Stresses anew* the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States;

2. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water;

3. *Calls upon* all Governments that have been conducting nuclear weapon tests, particularly those of parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments by all States;

4. *Urges* Governments to take all possible measures to develop further, and to use more effectively, existing capabilities for the seismological identification of underground nuclear tests, in order to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban;

5. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the suggestions already made in the Conference, as well as

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 796-797.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 719 ff.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

the views expressed at the current session of the General Assembly;

6. *Particularly requests* Governments that have been carrying out nuclear tests to take an active and constructive part in developing, in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (or in any successor body), specific proposals for an underground test ban treaty;

7. *Expresses the hope* that these efforts will enable all States to sign, in the near future, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

Statement by the Yugoslav Representative (Mojsov) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons [Extract], November 22, 1971¹

For years now our Organization has been dealing extensively with the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological weapons. World public opinion is unanimous in condemning these weapons of mass destruction and in demanding their complete prohibition and elimination from the war arsenals of all States. This *rationale* has been reflected in many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly during the last few years. This question was also given priority in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, especially this year. The result of these efforts is the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, which is now before us.

In restating the belief of the Yugoslav delegation that the adoption of this convention would mark the first step towards disarmament, I should like to recall some activities preceding the formulation of the draft convention which could serve as guidelines for further efforts aimed at reaching the complete prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

Attaching high importance to the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons 12 States members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, desirous of contributing to a more rapid solution of this problem, have formulated their positions and proposals in a memorandum submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 25 August 1970.² The memorandum stressed the importance and urgency of achieving agreement on the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons, demanded a simultaneous consideration of both

¹ A/C.1/PV.1833, pp. 46-51.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 453-455.

types of weapons, and indicated the possibilities for developing an effective verification system based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures. This basic position embodied in the memorandum of the group of 12 met with broad support during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly. In fact, it served as a framework for resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970.³

Faced, however, with the insistence that in the present stage it is only possible to elaborate a convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and then to proceed with endeavours towards reaching early agreement on chemical weapons, the group of 12 has made its contribution to the formulation of the proposed draft convention.⁴ However, the main efforts of the group of 12 were aimed at introducing into the draft convention provisions confirming the necessity and urgency of prohibiting chemical weapons, and demands for reaching early agreement to this end. The Yugoslav delegation believes that the preambular part and article IX of the draft convention clearly and precisely stipulate the obligations and determination to proceed, without any further delay, with the elaboration of an agreement on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons.

However, we note with great concern that the draft convention does not contain the proposal of the group of 12 countries reaffirming the recognized principles that:

a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

For this reason Yugoslavia is one of the co-sponsors of the proposal contained in document A/C.1/L.582⁵ which is intended to amend the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579.⁶

Pursuing its activities over the years in the field of the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and being consistent in its basic approach to find a simultaneous solution to the problem of these weapons, the group of 12 countries looks upon the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons as the first possible step within an inseparable whole. Important elements are contained in the joint memorandum submitted by the group of 12 countries to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 28 September 1971 for working out an agreement on the prohibition [of] chemical weapons.⁷

Guided by these considerations, 28 countries submitted a draft resolution on the prohibition of the development, production and

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 683-685.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 742.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 732-733.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, which is contained in document A/C.1/L.581,⁸ and which I am honoured now to introduce on behalf of the 28 co-sponsors. The text of this draft resolution is self-explanatory. It reaffirms in the second preambular paragraph the already agreed approach, endorsed by General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV), that the prohibition of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons be dealt with simultaneously.⁹ Since the work on the elaboration of the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction is entering the final phase, preambular paragraphs 3 and 4 of the draft resolution correctly stress that this represents only a first possible step towards the achieving of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons also and underline the immense importance and urgency of acting resolutely towards this end.

In operative paragraph 2, therefore, the General Assembly requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to proceed with the task of negotiating, as a high priority item, agreement on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States. In operative paragraph 3 it also requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to be guided in these negotiations by the elements contained in the memorandum of the group of 12 and also to take into account the views and suggestions put forward in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in the First Committee relating to the question of chemical weapons. Proceeding from the determination and the firmly expressed commitment in operative paragraph 1 (a) to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, in operative paragraph 4 the General Assembly urges all States to take all necessary measures which could facilitate this task. Finally, the General Assembly in operative paragraph 5 calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol¹⁰ inviting those States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify that Protocol. We are confident that this draft resolution proposed by the 28 co-sponsors will meet with broad support and acceptance in our Committee.

With the adoption of an agreement on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons a major threat to mankind would be removed, a threat which, regrettably, has not always been only hypothetical. A substantive step would thus be taken in the direction of general and complete disarmament.

We note with satisfaction that the demand for agreement on chemical weapons has met with the broad response and support of

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 740-742.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

¹⁰ *Ibid.* 1969, pp. 764-765.

the international community and that many States have already advanced sound suggestions and feasible recommendations for also finding an acceptable solution to all controversial questions, including verification. We feel confident that this approach will facilitate the attainment of the goal which has been set in the near future.

Statement by the Saudi Arabian Representative (Baroody) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, November 22, 1971¹

Some of the conventional weapons used during the Second World War and in subsequent conflicts were of such potency that they brought about mass destruction in many regions of the world. Coventry and Dresden were levelled with what came to be known as "block-busters" in the Second World War. Two relatively and, I may say, primitive atom bombs not only levelled Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, but generated worldwide fear that it would become within the power of men to bring about the end of the human species.

This worldwide fear has not abated by the declarations of nuclear Powers that none of them would be the first to use nuclear and similar weapons of mass destruction. If we take such declarations at their face value we still have no assurance that a critical situation will not develop when one of the nuclear Powers, finding itself on the verge of defeat, may in desperation resort to the deployment of such weapons. We cannot afford to feel smug about the fact that man, individually and collectively, can accustom himself to live in fear. Man is an adaptive animal and he has been able to live throughout history under great stress and strain. By the same token, we also do know that immanent fear, even though it may be submerged in the subconscious of the individual by his psychological mechanism of self-preservation, nevertheless conditions the daily behaviour of man and often subjects him to a state of frustration. Such frustration may become very dangerous when it grips communities or nations. The abnormal psychology of the masses is the best example of the cumulative effect of frustration rooted in fear. To put it succinctly, the peoples of the world have been subjected to fear and frustration ever since nuclear weapons came into being. Need I draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that collective frustration has been known to find expression in rebellion and violence. It is that constant fear seething in the hearts and minds of peoples of the world that has been pre-occupying us all, I am sure. The United Nations would lose the confidence of peoples everywhere in the world if we do not give them hope that we are

¹ A/C.1/PV.1833, pp. 63-76.

taking resolute action in order to mitigate, if not dissipate, fears and frustrations.

The draft resolution I shall present is, I hope, a modest step towards that end. It will be noted that the word "urgent" is the first word of the item before us: "Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests". We do not merely say: "The need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests" but, "The urgent need".

For how many years have such weapons been tested? Since 1945 or even I would say since 1943. Almost 30 years have elapsed since tests have been carried out. Fortunately for the world, there was no monopoly of nuclear weapons. Russia developed its own nuclear weaponry and so did Britain, France, and the People's Republic of China. No doubt there are efforts on the part of many other countries which are secretly developing their knowledge and technique of new devices of mass destruction. This is why it will be found that the emphasis in my draft resolution is on fear. The first preambular paragraph of the draft resolution reads as follows:

The General Assembly,

Noting that one of the first steps for the strengthening of international security is to dissipate world-wide fears that nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may be used by miscalculation in what could appear a desperate situation,

We have heard time and again declarations by the nuclear Powers to the effect that they will not be the first to use such weapons. We are not talking here of powers in the abstract. Powers are headed by leaders and leaders are men. And who can vouch for the perfect sanity of any man, whether he is in power or is a man of the street? We have our frailties we have our foibles, and under stress we are apt to behave quite abnormally. Therefore, when they—the United States, or the People's Republic of China, or Britain, or France for that matter—say that their Governments will not be the first to use nuclear weapons, what do they mean? Do they mean the people of France, the people of the United Kingdom, the people of the People's Republic of China, the people of the United States of America who have been demonstrating against such diabolical weapons? No, they are referring to the military hierarchy, to the leaders who after all are human, and they are not immune from error and blunders, as we have noted in two world wars. And I am the contemporary of two world wars.

In retrospect we know what Lloyd George and Clemenceau did at Versailles. In retrospect we know what the victors did in Nuremberg and Tokyo when their enemies surrendered to them. They hanged them. Emotions run high in leaders as they do in the common man or the man in the street. This is why we cannot take at face value declarations that the leaders will not be the first to use nuclear weapons. This is a sort of sweeping statement, if I may say so.

The second preambular paragraph reads:

Considering that for the last few years the United Nations have been pre-occupied with finding ways and means for diminishing the pollution of the earth's atmosphere,

This paragraph is self-explanatory. We are now bedeviled by the industrial pollution of the atmosphere; and added to it would be the fall-out from such nuclear weapons. As I said in my last statement, most of us here are laymen. We are not scientists or physicists. Some of us have heard time and again that some nuclear weapons are clean. Look at the semantics. Is there any such thing as a clean weapon which destroys people by explosion? But they mean that these weapons have no fall-out. Suppose others cannot produce a "clean" atomic or thermonuclear bomb. What then? Would those who have the dirty bomb not use it in revenge if the others used the clean bomb? Where is our intelligence? It is an insult to our intelligence to talk about clean and dirty atomic bombs here.

The third paragraph states:

Noting that scientists have been unanimous in the conclusion that the fall-out from nuclear tests is injurious to human and animal life and that such fall-out may poison the earth's atmosphere for many decades to come,

This is an incontestible conclusion of the scientists. If one is subjected to many X-rays, they say one may develop cancer. The medical profession is very wary about taking excessive X-rays of their patients. They are not used unless those X-rays are imperative for surgery or for advanced cancer. Here the scientists tell us that the cumulative fall-out may poison the whole atmosphere and that those who go through the destruction of the explosion may develop all kinds of illnesses, and undergo not bacterial but cellular transformation in their bodies.

The following paragraph states:

Taking into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests are conducted,

Do you recall what happened to so many sheep in one of the States of the host country where nuclear tests were carried out? And in another context, do we not recall—and this had nothing to do with nuclear explosions—that cans of tuna fish had to be withdrawn from supermarkets and grocery stores because the fish was polluted by industrial mercury dumped into the sea and rivers? How can the leaders of the nuclear powers assure us that we may not be subjected to diseases due to fall-out from the tests—leaving aside their being forced to engage in a nuclear conflict?

The next paragraph reads:

Recognizing that there already exist sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of certain Powers to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable.

This paragraph is self-explanatory. Now I come to three modest—modest, I say—operative paragraphs. The first reads:

Appeals to the nuclear Powers to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere;

We cannot urge them. I did not use the word “urge”, I did not use the word “request”, because we do not want to be rebuffed as a majority if we vote in favour of such a draft resolution as I am submitting today, or a similar draft resolution for that matter. I say “appeals”, not “urges”. We are reasoning with them. We are trying to find a path to their hearts, if not to their minds. The other day my colleague from the People’s Republic of China did not understand me. He thought I was criticizing his country, but I was not. I was referring to all tests whether they are by the United States of America or any other nuclear Power for that matter, and he was not here when I addressed myself to the test that subsequently took place in the Aleutians. So for Heaven’s sake, you representatives of nuclear Powers, bear with us. We are speaking on behalf of the peoples of the world, as proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and not on behalf of Governments. My second operative paragraph is:

Urges the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests without delay and in any case before the proposed World Disarmament Conference;

This paragraph is consonant with the statement I made in the General Assembly a few days ago when I referred to the proposed convening of a world disarmament conference. What is the use of having a world disarmament conference two years from now if an agreement on testing is not reached amongst the major nuclear Powers within six months or so? They will squabble and quarrel in the world disarmament conference and we small nations—and even the big nations if they are big in numbers and small in power, however you label us—we shall be like false witnesses. They will probably come and ask us to be clients of one Power or the other, which we should refuse. We should all be unanimous about this use of nuclear testing as of now, if we want to succeed in the proposed world disarmament conference. The last paragraph reads:

“Reassures the peoples of the world”—I did not say “the Governments of the world” although we are the representatives of Governments.

Reassures the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to raise its voice against nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and earnestly requests the nuclear Powers not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.²

A few last words: most of us in this Committee are middle-aged men, representing a generation governed by elderly leaders many of whom—with all due respect to their personal wisdom—have lived their lives and are approaching the threshold from which, sooner or later, they will make their exit from this world. We, the elderly—and the middle-aged, but you and I, Sir, are elderly—are in

² *Ante*, p. 743.

the twilight of our lives and we should leave the world in a better state than we found it. Like other generations that preceded us, we have made many mistakes for, after all, we are human. Some of us have witnessed the ravages of two world wars and seem to have learned very little from history. No wonder that the youth of the world is seething with unrest. Are there any young people in the public gallery? I am heartened; there are some young people there.

The nuclear Powers are holding the proverbial Sword of Damocles over their heads. Youth wants to build a new world, a world untrammelled by antiquated patterns of balance of power and power politics. Youth is demonstrating, and once in a while youth erupts into violence because of fear and frustration brought about by antiquated policies predicated on serving the narrow national interests of States, big and small. You, my good friend, Mr. Chairman, will recall how angry many of the youth were during the World Youth Congress held in the spring of last year in the General Assembly hall. But all of them wanted to build a peaceful world community. In a few years we shall have to abdicate our powers, since youth are the heirs of this world. We should give them hope that in the meantime the nuclear race will stop and that we shall turn for them a clean page, on which they can write their own history.

**Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the
First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear
Tests, November 23, 1971¹**

My statement today, like the one I made last week, will be confined to one of the disarmament items listed in our agenda. Last Tuesday, I dealt with the question of chemical and microbiological weapons. Today, I shall deal with the item appearing in the agenda of the General Assembly as under the heading "Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament".

May I begin by saying that in my delegation's view consideration of this item is practically exhausted and that it is extremely difficult, not to say impossible, to add anything new to the subject. We therefore believe that it might be best to engage in recapitulation and selection, highlighting the essential aspects of the item, among which the following warrant mention:

1. In the third preambular paragraph of the Moscow Treaty that was opened for signature on 5 August 1963—that is to say, over eight years ago—the three original parties thereto expressed their determination to:

¹ A/C.1/PV.1834, pp. 2-16.

... achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time, determined to continue negotiations to this end . . .²;

2. In spite of that solemn commitment freely contracted, not only have underground explosions not been stopped, but the average annual nuclear weapons tests in all environments, but primarily underground, which have taken place since 1963, has been almost twice that of the explosions between 1945 and 1963, when the first experimental explosion occurred. In fact, the average rose from 27.9 to 45.5;

3. The stalemate in which we find ourselves has remained basically unchanged since the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, at the beginning of its work in 1963, established a Sub-Committee composed of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, and specifically instructed it to consider the question of the suspension of nuclear weapons tests;

4. The prolonged stalemate is due, in the final analysis, to the fact that neither the position of the United States that on-the-site inspections are necessary, nor that of the Soviet Union which contends that the use of national means of detection suffices, has in any way been significantly altered.

5. The rigid position adopted by the nuclear super-Powers has given rise to profound suspicion and concern in world public opinion regarding the true reasons for their attitude, since their apparently irreconcilable differences regarding acceptable procedures simply means, in the end that they remain in the advantageous position of having a monopoly on underground tests;

6. The situation thus created has also led to an alarming race to increase the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, which U Thant quite justifiably termed the "arms schizophrenia";

7. The multiplication and magnitude of underground tests have served as an excuse for the nuclear Powers which have not yet adhered to the Moscow Treaty to continue to contaminate both the atmosphere and the sea with their tests in both environments;

8. That situation, if not speedily corrected, might in the near future vitiate the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was so carefully elaborated.³

Bearing in mind the above conclusions which must inexorably be drawn from any objective examination of both the distant and the immediate background of this matter, my delegation, in consultation with the other 11 States members of the Group of 12 of the Committee on Disarmament and with the valuable co-operation of all concerned, prepared a draft resolution, the text of which has just been circulated in document A/C.1/L.584. It reads as follows:

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

³ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

[The draft resolution was later adopted as pt. B of res. 2828 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 894-895.]

The draft resolution which I have just read out is, we believe, one of those about which we can safely say that it is self-explanatory. Therefore I shall limit myself to making a few remarks regarding the last preambular paragraph and operative paragraph 2.

The inclusion of that preambular paragraph is due to two main reasons.

The first resides in the fact that, despite the commitments contracted in the Moscow Treaty and despite the abundance of constructive proposals which have been constantly submitted by many members of the Committee on Disarmament in order to solve the problem of verification the statements of the two super-Powers on the question very often sound like a "dialogue of the deaf." Therefore, since 1968, the eight States that then comprised the non-aligned group, in its memorandum of 26 August 1968 have expressed their deep appreciation over—and I shall quote from the memorandum itself:

... the fact that no serious negotiations have taken place on these proposals. These proposals should be studied further without delay.⁴

The second reason for the inclusion of that preambular paragraph is even more important. This is that despite any differences that may exist between the two super Powers over the question of verification, the situation in 1971 is totally different from that which prevailed ten years ago; this applies both to the enormous progress achieved on the scientific level and to the considerable degree of increased knowledge and less mutual distrust which has been achieved by the two super-Powers.

We therefore believe that we are justified in stating in the last preambular paragraph of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.584 that: "... there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban..." on nuclear weapons.

My delegation—and I believe that our views are probably shared by many other delegations—would see no objection if in the treaty to prohibit underground testing, provision were to be made for the possibility of allowing a reasonable minimum of inspection *in situ*. We believe that if the procedure to be followed were to be surrounded by adequate guarantees to avoid any vitiation of the objective, there would be no danger of the procedure being abused for other reasons than to strengthen confidence and to make verification more accurate. Furthermore, with equal frankness, we must state that—and again I think that I am speaking on behalf of a number of delegations which share our views—bearing in mind the astonishing progress achieved both in the field of detection and identification of underground nuclear tests and in the field of

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 589-591.

satellite photography, we do not believe that agreement on a treaty based exclusively on national means of detection could spell any danger whatever that any of the nuclear Powers might be in a position to carry out clandestine tests of any magnitude that might affect the strategic balance. Among other reasons for our opinion we have drawn information from a number of statements made by American experts, and I would cite the statement made at the beginning of 1971 by Mr. William C. Foster, a statement which acquires special value and significance for any of us who were able to appreciate his experience, his objectivity and his very carefully considered judgements during the years when he acted as Head of the delegation of his country to the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament.

We are therefore deeply convinced that all that is needed to break the vicious circle surrounding us for so long is the will to do so.

I turn now to the second operative paragraph of the draft resolution. The comment that I would like to add to a very clear paragraph is that the final date on which all nuclear weapons tests are to cease has been left blank. That was done to allow the date to be decided upon bearing in mind the preferences expressed by the majority of delegations in the course of our debates. As far as my delegation is concerned, we believe that an appropriate date might well be that of 5 August 1973. That date will be the tenth anniversary of the signing of the partial test ban Treaty.

We have full confidence that the draft resolution we have submitted may well become one of the most important resolutions of the present session of the General Assembly. I am very happy to stress it already enjoys the support of the majority of the members of the group of 12 of the Disarmament Committee. The other members of that group are awaiting instructions from their Governments. But in the light of their traditional stand on this matter, we believe such instructions will be positive.

World public opinion will doubtless view this resolution, in which we reiterate solemnly and most emphatically our unreserved condemnation in 1962 of all nuclear weapons tests as a much-needed reaction to the failure to implement the many previous resolutions. Once again this resolution will point to one of the most important of the functions of the General Assembly—namely, to act as the spokesman of the conscience of mankind.

Letter From President Nixon to Senator Stennis on American Troops in Europe, November 23, 1971¹

Dear John:

This week the Senate will once again consider a proposal to

¹ *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Nov. 29, 1971, p. 1556.

make a substantial unilateral reduction in United States Armed Forces maintained in Europe for the common defense. I believe passage of such a measure would be a great mistake.

The manifest Congressional concern for a more equitable sharing of defense burdens in Europe and elsewhere has been a significant factor in the formulation of our national policy. We are currently in the final stages of talks to establish improved arrangements for the sharing of the defense burden in Europe, including an agreement with West Germany to offset nearly two billion dollars of United States costs, and the second phase of the European Defense Improvement Program, to be finalized at the NATO meeting beginning December 8.

In the area of East-West relations, we expect that Mr. Brosio will be received in Moscow next week to begin discussions on basic issues in Mutual Balanced Force Reductions. At the same time, the Berlin negotiations have entered the final and most difficult stage. As you know, we are also making significant progress in the SALT negotiations.

Passage of the proposed troop cut would, with one stroke, diminish Western military capability in Europe and signal to friend and adversary alike a disarray and weakness of purpose in the American Government.

We are now preparing to undertake vitally important new initiatives for peace in two great capitals of the world. If these initiatives are to gain positive results in the months and years ahead, I must be able to rely on the firm support and the substantial and creative contribution of a bipartisan Congress. I believe that this ill-timed measure should be rejected, and that our efforts should be directed toward the positive tasks and the great opportunities for achieving a real peace that lie before us.

With best wishes,
Sincerely,

RICHARD NIXON

Statement by the PRC Deputy Foreign Minister (Chiao) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 24, 1971¹

In our speech of 15 November, the delegation of the People's Republic of China made clear the Chinese Government's basic stand on the question of disarmament. Now I would like to make some remarks on the proposal of the Soviet delegation for convening a world disarmament conference.²

¹ A/PV.1995 (prov.), pp. 21-36.

² *Ante*, pp. 731-732.

In the first place, China has always been in favour of disarmament. But, in our opinion, it should not be said in a vague way that the question of disarmament is of paramount importance. It would not do to put the blame for the arms race on all countries, and it would not be correct indiscriminately to demand disarmament by all countries alike. The actual state of affairs at present is that imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism are continuing to pursue their policies of aggression and war, and that many Asian, African and Latin American countries and some medium and small countries are being subjected to threats and aggression. Those countries cannot but build and strengthen their own defence forces in order to prevent and resist foreign aggression, interference, subversion and control.

For instance, the peoples of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cambodia are engaged in a war against United States aggression and for national salvation; the Palestinian and other Arab peoples are engaged in a struggle for their right to national existence and for the recovery of their occupied territories; Guinea and some other African countries are engaged in struggles against the colonialists' armed aggression and threats of subversion; and the peoples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea (Bissau), Zimbabwe, Azania and Namibia are engaged in struggles for national liberation against white colonialist rule and racial oppression. They have taken up arms simply because they are compelled to do so, and it is not at all a question of an arms race.

At present, the question of paramount importance to the peoples of those countries and regions is not, of course, disarmament, but the defence of national independence and sovereignty and the winning of the right to national existence. The idea that all countries must adopt measures for disarmament without distinguishing between the aggressors and the victims of aggression, and between those who threaten others and those who are threatened can only lead the question of disarmament onto a wrong path and benefit imperialism.

Secondly, a quarter of a century has elapsed since the end of the Second World War. To date, the two super Powers are still stationing ground, naval and air forces—well over a million—and have established thousands of military bases abroad. It is those super-Powers which have obstinately rejected the prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, feverishly developing nuclear weapons and contending with each other for nuclear superiority; and they are doing this in order to press forward with their policies of blackmail, expansion, aggression and war. The threat to world peace and the security of the peoples of all countries originates precisely from those two super Powers.

In these circumstances, it is entirely just for the peoples of the world and all peace-loving countries to demand that those two super-Powers withdraw to their own countries all their forces stationed abroad and dismantle all their military bases on foreign

soil, and to demand the adoption of effective measures to prevent nuclear war. The General Assembly of the United Nations is in duty bound to take effective, and not perfunctory, earnest and not superficial, measures to satisfy these just demands and prevent the danger of a new world war, particularly of a nuclear war.

As early as 31 July 1963, the Chinese Government issued a statement advocating the complete, thorough total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and proposing the convening of a conference of heads of government of all countries of the world to discuss this issue. In that statement the Chinese Government proposed the following:

All countries in the world, both nuclear and non-nuclear, solemnly declare that they will prohibit and destroy nuclear weapons completely, thoroughly, totally and resolutely. Concretely speaking, they will not use nuclear weapons, nor export, nor import, nor manufacture, nor test, nor stockpile them; and they will destroy all existing nuclear weapons and their means of delivery in the world, and disband all existing establishments for the research, testing and manufacture of nuclear weapons in the world.³

This proposal of the Chinese Government has received the support of many countries. Regrettably, however, the two nuclear Powers have thus far failed to make a positive response. Instead, since the sixties the two nuclear Powers have concocted the partial nuclear test ban Treaty,⁴ the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons,⁵ and so on. These agreements, which some people laud as intended for nuclear disarmament by accumulative means, are in essence a camouflage for their own nuclear arms expansion in the name of nuclear disarmament, a means for consolidating the nuclear monopoly of the two super-Powers and carrying out nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail against the Asian, African and Latin American countries as well as other medium and small countries. Their main idea is: "Only I can have nuclear weapons; you are not allowed to have nuclear weapons." This is of course unreasonable. In the absence of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, it is impossible to expect the other countries, which are subjected to the threats of the two nuclear Powers, not to develop nuclear weapons for the purpose of self-defence.

Thirdly, in order to take the first step towards the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, one must grasp the key question and not be entangled in subsidiary issues. First and foremost, the countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, and particularly undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. It should not be difficult to undertake such obligations if one truly has the desire to avert a nuclear war and move towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Many

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 272.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

countries are now demanding the establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones. These are just demands which China supports. However, to free these zones truly from the threat of nuclear war, it is necessary, first of all, for all the nuclear countries to guarantee that they will not use nuclear weapons against these countries and zones and will withdraw all their nuclear forces and dismantle all their nuclear bases and nuclear installations from these zones. Otherwise, it will be totally impossible to establish nuclear-free zones or peace zones, and the danger of nuclear war will still exist.

The two nuclear super-Powers have not only produced and stockpiled large quantities of nuclear weapons in their own countries but also established nuclear bases on the territories of other countries; their planes carrying nuclear weapons fly in the air-space of other countries and their warships carrying nuclear weapons ply in the oceans all over the world. This poses a grave menace to the security of the people of all countries. The Japanese people had their own experience in this respect. Therefore, if the nuclear Powers truly do not have the intention to engage in nuclear threats and really want to achieve nuclear disarmament, they should dismantle all their nuclear bases abroad and withdraw all their nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad. Otherwise, how can you expect people to believe that you have any desire for nuclear disarmament?

Fourthly, China is compelled to develop nuclear weapons because it is under the nuclear threat of the two super-Powers. We develop nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence and for breaking the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly and finally eliminating nuclear weapons. China's nuclear weapons are still in the experimental stage, and the experiments are only carried out within the territory of our own country and confined within necessary limits. China will never be a "super-Power" pursuing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear threats and nuclear blackmail, neither today nor ever in the future.

On the occasion of China's first nuclear explosion, the Chinese Government solemnly declared to the whole world,⁶ and I reaffirmed in my speech of 15 November on behalf of the Chinese Government,⁷ that at no time and in no circumstances would China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say. We stand for the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the prevention of nuclear war. But confronted with the danger of foreign aggression, including that of a sudden nuclear attack, the Chinese people cannot but intensify their preparations against war. Our preparations against war are entirely defensive in nature. Our consistent policy is: We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counter-attack. We sincerely

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1964, p. 455.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 731-732.

hope that an agreement can be reached on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. However, before the realization of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, we cannot give up the necessary self-defence.

Fifthly, the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war and the elimination of nuclear threats are matters affecting the peace and security of all countries of the world. On such issues of great importance, all countries in the world, big or small, nuclear or non-nuclear, should have the same say; no handful of countries have the right to brush aside the majority of countries in the world and arbitrarily hold a conference to deliberate and make decisions on such matters. I hereby once again reaffirm on behalf of the Chinese Government that at no time will China ever agree to participate in the so-called nuclear disarmament talks among the nuclear Powers behind the backs of the non-nuclear countries. China has a few nuclear weapons, but she will never join the so-called club of nuclear Powers.

The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the convening of a world conference to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The convocation of such a conference must be truly conducive to nuclear disarmament and the reduction of nuclear war threats and must not be used to cover up nuclear arms expansion and increase the threat of nuclear war; it must help to push forward the struggle of the peace-loving people of the world for the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons and not serve to lull and deceive them.

Such a conference must have a clear aim, that is, to discuss the question of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and as the first step, to reach a solemn agreement on the non-use of nuclear weapons by all nuclear countries at any time and in any circumstances.

The Chinese Government also maintains that in order to realize the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, the United States of America and the Soviet Union, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons should, first of all, issue statements separately or jointly to openly undertake the obligation:

- 1) not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries and against nuclear-free zones;

- 2) dismantle all nuclear bases set up on the territories of other countries and withdraw all their nuclear armed forces and all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad.

As for the level of the conference, we still hold that it should be attended by the heads of government of all countries, but we are

also prepared to hear and consider different opinions. As to whether it should be convened inside or outside the United Nations, this question is open for discussion and consultation among all.

Sixthly, in the opinion of the Chinese delegation, the Soviet delegation's proposal for convening a world disarmament conference has neither set out a clear aim nor put forward practical steps for its attainment. If the Soviet proposal were to be acted upon, such a world disarmament conference would inevitably become a permanent club for endless discussions that solve no substantive problems, which will result in perpetual arms expansion alongside perpetual disarmament talks. This is not in keeping with the desire of the people of all countries, and we cannot agree to it.

International disarmament talks have been going on for many years now, innumerable meetings have been held and innumerable declarations, statements and agreements have been published. The United Nations has passed a great number of resolutions. Although many Member States have favoured these resolutions out of good intentions and in the hope that they may give an impetus to disarmament, the hard facts are that these resolutions remain but empty papers that are utilized by the two super-Powers to hoodwink world opinion.

The Chinese delegation holds that we should sum up the historical experience of the past 20 years and more and draw the necessary conclusions. We should not allow the United Nations to become a tool for implementing the policies of certain big Powers. To meet their political needs of a given time, they resort to various means to secure a majority for the adoption of some high-sounding draft resolutions. However, after the resolutions were adopted, the super-Powers have continued and even intensified their arms expansion and war preparations. The result of this can only be: the greater the number of resolutions adopted, the lower the prestige of the United Nations.

The time has now come to change this inglorious situation. We should endeavour to make a new start. None of us should act rashly and make hasty decisions on such a major problem as disarmament. We should consult each other fully and continue the discussions to find a way truly conducive to disarmament and avoid discussions that lead to no solutions or decisions that are not put into effect, for this can only further disappoint the people of the world.

Therefore, the Chinese delegation proposes that the Soviet draft resolution for convening a world disarmament conference not be put to a vote at this session of the General Assembly.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 24, 1971¹

My delegation cannot fail to express its regret at the negativism in regard to the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference displayed in the statement made today by the head of the delegation of the People's Republic of China.² Since the opening of the Assembly on 21 September this was the second voice raised in opposition to the Soviet proposal. The first was that of the Secretary of State of the United States, Mr. Rogers.³ Thus the Assembly has had an opportunity to witness a curious Sino-American duet of negativism in regard to the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference. This duet struck a sharply discordant note when compared with the statements of the overwhelming majority of delegations at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly and, both in the course of the general debate and in discussions in the plenary meetings of the Soviet proposal for the convening of the conference as well as in the First Committee where for a long time now the discussion has been continuing on the whole great complex of disarmament problems.

One might have passed over this duet—let them sing together against the Soviet proposal—but we cannot pass over the attempt in the statement by the Chinese representative to distort the position of the Soviet Union in regard to disarmament and in regard to nuclear disarmament. We are not accustomed to remain silent when our position is distorted, when we are slandered. The representative of the People's Republic of China in his statement today did everything he could to distort the position of the Soviet Union in the matter of disarmament and to distort facts which are known to the whole world. It is known that for many years now the Soviet Union has fought for disarmament in the United Nations and outside it.

The attempts to distort the Soviet Union's position are in vain; they are invidious attempts to cast doubt on and to discredit its position. How groundless and unwarranted these attempts are may be seen from the fact that the Soviet Union here in the United Nations since 1946—when the People's Republic of China had not yet seen the light of day—as long ago as 1946 we were the first to propose that atomic weapons should be outlawed forever and that their stockpiles should be destroyed.⁴ Having nuclear weapons and the means of delivering them, the Soviet Union for many years, to this very day, has been persistently and consistently carrying on an

¹ A/PV.1995 (prov.) pp. 71-82.

² The PRC statement appears *supra*. For the Soviet proposal, see *ante*, pp. 595-596.

³ *Ante*, p. 644.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 17-24.

isolated struggle among the nuclear Powers, a lone struggle for nuclear disarmament, for the prohibition of the manufacture of these weapons, for the destruction of all their stockpiles, for the prohibition of tests—in one word, for the destruction of all military hardware.

In 1959 from this same rostrum of the United Nations General Assembly the Soviet Union put forward a proposal for general and complete disarmament which met with the broadest support among the nations of the world.⁵ The basis of the Soviet programme for disarmament is the banning and complete destruction of all nuclear weapons and their means of delivery to the target. As is well known, the Soviet Government is also pressing for measures to curtail the arms race, such as the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and the elimination of foreign military bases on foreign soil. We in the Soviet Union have long since liquidated our bases on the territory of the People's Republic of China and this is well known to that country. Recently, after the twenty-sixth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which reaffirmed a programme of peace, security and co-operation among peoples, the Soviet Union put forward the proposal to convene a conference of the five Powers having nuclear weapons—the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, France, China and the United Kingdom—to discuss all questions of nuclear disarmament.⁶

One nuclear Power to which we addressed ourselves, France, has supported this initiative of the Soviet Union, but another has declared a negative position. The other two of the five thereupon hastened to state that calling a conference of five nuclear Powers in present circumstances would remain an academic question. Thus, the one Power which declined the proposal of the Soviet Union helped to conceal the reluctance of the other two nuclear Powers which, for 26 years now in the United Nations and outside, have worked against disarmament, have worked against a ban on the use of nuclear weapons and have spoken out against general and complete disarmament. It may be doubted whether both these Powers will thank the representatives of China for their statement today.

Finally, on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly, upon the proposal of the Soviet Union, there is the question of convening a world disarmament conference which could be the most important international event and could give a new and powerful impetus to disarmament negotiation. Everyone knows, including the representatives of China, that so far in the 26 years which have elapsed since the war there has been no world conference. Every means have been utilized to prevent it. The Soviet Union and its friends in the United Nations and all those who sincerely want disarmament, have bent every effort to secure

⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. II, pp. 1460-1474.

⁶ See *ante*, pp. 313-315.

results. Something has been done; what has been done is little indeed, but the forces of imperialism have prevented us from attaining our objectives and now the statement which has just been made by the Chinese representative at this rostrum to the effect that they are opposed to the Soviet proposal plays right into the hands of those imperialist Powers because they do not wish to convene such a conference. This is in reality the first step taken by the Chinese delegation at the United Nations. This is the reality of this first step.

Can it really be said that the Soviet Union, in proposing all these measures and carrying on its persistent struggle for disarmament in the United Nations is guided only by its own egotistical interests and not by the interests of the whole socialist community and those of all the nations of the world?

As for the Chinese allegations concerning nuclear monopoly, when referring to the Soviet possession of nuclear weapons—has it not played a decisive role, this so-called monopoly, in the fact that many countries, including the People's Republic of China, have not yet become the victims of a nuclear aggression and have had an opportunity to develop towards independence, prosperity and socialism? This is the true policy of the Soviet Union in regard to disarmament. These are the irrefutable facts, and anyone who tries to deny them or pretends that he does not know the position of the Soviet Union is deliberately distorting it for his own selfish and egotistical purposes.

Judging from the statement of Mr. Rogers, the United States, too, has no great enthusiasm for the Soviet proposal. Mr. Rogers threw up a smoke screen of scepticism; and now to this has been added a fog of negativism from the People's Republic of China, distorting the position of the Soviet Union. This, as I have said, is a duet of negativism.

Thus, the proposal of the Chinese delegation not to vote at this session on the Soviet proposal for the convening of a world disarmament conference is the best possible gift that it could make to the imperialists who, for 26 years, have been fighting against disarmament.

We in the Soviet delegation were not at all surprised by the statement of the Chinese delegation. We are accustomed to this. It is no secret to anyone that for many years now the Chinese leaders have done everything possible to slander the domestic and foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist commonwealth, pouring out a veritable flood of slander and monstrous inventions against the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, as I have already noted, at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, put forward a programme of peace and emancipation of peoples. This programme has won the widest possible support among all progressive and peace-loving forces of the world; but the Chinese leaders, pursuing their own narrow objectives, have turned every-

thing upside down. They pretend not to notice that the goals being pursued successfully by the Soviet Union in the international arena and at the United Nations are wholly in the service of national liberation, anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, the interests of peace and the strengthening of international security, disarmament, democracy and socialism. This is a strange way of continuing the anti-Soviet course of the Chinese leadership.

Recently, they have started to put out importunate propaganda which is entirely alien to the true spirit of Marxism and Leninism, concerning the hegemony of two Powers. As has been noted repeatedly, even before the arrival of the Chinese delegation in the United Nations, the division of today's world is not a division into super and non-super Powers. That is not how the world is divided. The only true scientific division of the world is in terms of socialism and imperialism, as between progress and reaction, between the forces of peace and the forces of war. This is the socio-political division of the modern world. It is not the division which the Chinese delegation would have us believe. However, the Peking leaders and now their representatives at the United Nations, together with imperialist propagandists, are pushing their own fable about the two super-Powers which are, allegedly, jointly trying to solve all the troubles of the world behind the backs of countries and peoples. No one will believe this, no matter how these myths may be propagated from this rostrum and elsewhere. Recently, they have shamefully transformed this forum; they are now hiding this myth behind the formula of the two super-Powers. And this evokes an ironic smile from a number of delegations. Surely the members of the Chinese delegation themselves cannot believe this.

The Soviet people and their Party, their Government, like all other peace-loving peoples, have struggled and will continue to struggle against these slanderous fictions. History testifies that the campaign of slander mounted against the peace-loving policy of the first workers' and peasants' state in history, the USSR, has been carried on since the very first day of its existence—since October 1917. However, no one who, either in the past or today has mounted such a campaign of slander and anti-Sovietism and has formed it into a State policy will ever win the day. Neither has this brought laurels to the Peking leaders, and neither will it bring them success here in the United Nations.

The Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, speaking at the Twenty-fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated:

We categorically reject the slanderous fictions in regard to the policies of our party and State being disseminated from Peking and inspired by the People's Republic of China. All these disputes between China and the USSR are all the more absurd and harmful since they are taking place in a situation in which the imperialists are stepping up their aggressive acts against peace-loving peoples, a situation in which, more than at any time in the past, there is need for a joining of ranks, for joint action on the part of all anti-imperialist and revolutionary forces, not the fanning of hostility between two States such as the USSR and China. Such was and remains the line of principle of the

Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Soviet State in regard to the People's Republic of China.⁷

Let us be frank. We expected, and we still hope, that the representatives of China have come here to the United Nations to serve as serious representatives of a serious State to do serious work, with the delegations of all peace-loving countries, including the delegation of the Soviet Union, with a view to strengthening peace and international security, furthering disarmament, and engaging in fruitful co-operation among all nations on an equal footing, in a common struggle against imperialism, colonialism and racism. But from their very first statements we could see that they intended to play the role of those who will bring joy and satisfaction to the imperialist forces in this Organization. For everyone who can grasp the realities of our time, who can look truth in the face without flinching, realizes that the policy of anti-Sovietism being pursued by the Chinese leadership and the position declared in the statement of its delegation today are to the advantage only of the imperialists, the racists, the colonialists, the enemies of peace, disarmament, democracy and friendship among nations and the ideals of socialism in the socialist States.

Such a policy is very pleasing to the imperialists. It is a gift from God to them. You do not have to look far for examples. Only recently, on 18 October as the *Washington Post* reported, the head of the American armed forces in the Pacific, speaking to journalists in the Pentagon, expressed great joy at the policy of the Chinese leadership carrying on this dissension between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. This military-minded admiral, an openly cynical militarist, expressed his hostility to the Soviet Union and his joy at the rift between the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. He expressed himself as follows: "Thank God that the communist Powers in Asia cannot get along together."

But the permanent and unremitting hostility of the *Daily News* towards the Soviet Union was again revealed in the issue of 11 November, when reporting on the arrival of the Chinese representatives in the United States—I think it was the 11th of November the Chinese representatives got here—the *Daily News* published their advice to the American representatives. What advice did the newspaper give Mr. Bush? The United States delegation, counselled the newspaper, should pit Red China and the Soviet Union against [one] another in the United Nations. They should set them at one another's throat. This was the advice given by a United States newspaper to the United States delegation here in the United Nations. Almighty propaganda they call it.

Well, we will see whether the United States follows this advice. However, judging from the statement made by the Chinese representative, he is in fact following that course, a course long

⁷ *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 12, Apr. 20, 1971, p. 7.

since indicated by imperialist propaganda. All of this makes it perfectly clear to whom anti-Sovietism is advantageous, who stands to gain from the slander levelled against the Soviet Union, who stands to gain from dissension between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China. It is to the advantage only of the aggressors and the imperialists. The candor of the United States admiral to whom I referred, and of the press, speaks for itself. It indicates whose windmills are turned by the flow of slander and odious fictions levelled against the Soviet State and the Soviet Republic by the People's Republic of China and against its peace-loving policy, its policy of friendship and its policy of trying to deliver mankind from the threat of a cataclysmic thermonuclear war.

There is something else we have to bear in mind too. The statements made by the Chinese representative from this rostrum, both the first statement made and the statement today are obviously in contradiction with the basic terms of the telegram of greetings that was sent by the Permanent Committee of the Chinese Assembly of the People's Republic of China to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on the anniversary of the October Revolution which we recently celebrated. In this telegram of greetings the need was stressed: "... to support and develop normal relations between China and the Soviet Union, these are the common aspirations of the peoples of our two countries and are in the interests of the keeping of peace".⁸ It is not difficult to see that the essence of the statement by the Chinese representative made from this rostrum is in glaring contradiction to the statement by the Chinese in the telegram to which I have just referred. The question naturally arises: which will be the real position of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations in regard to the Soviet Union and its proposal? Will the Chinese delegation endeavour to ensure normal relations between the Soviet delegation and themselves in the United Nations and in regard to the fight for disarmament and nuclear disarmament? Or will all the Chinese representatives use the United Nations as a platform for further attacks on the Soviet Union to the advantage of the common enemy of the Soviet Union and of China and of the peoples of all the world, namely, imperialism. My delegation would like to state resolutely for the benefit of the Chinese representatives that their anti-Sovietism and their negativism are not an appropriate language for the United Nations. Only businesslike co-operation and a sincere endeavour on the part of all States Members of the United Nations in the interests of the lofty goals of the United Nations Charter can lead to an enhancement of its effectiveness, and help to strengthen world peace and security and to solve the problems of general and complete disarmament and nuclear disarmament, and to develop

⁸ *Peking Review*, no. 46, Nov. 12, 1971, p. 23.

friendship and co-operation among all peoples.

We are in favour of such a common endeavour, and the sooner the Chinese delegation understands this elementary truth, the better for the cause of peace, the better it will be for the United Nations and for the Chinese themselves.

Statement by the United States Representative (Phillips) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 26, 1971¹

I should like to set forth briefly the specific views of the United States on the important question which is before the Assembly.

In the comments of other delegations on this issue during the general debate, in informal talks and in the recent statements we have heard a variety of ideas expressed about a world disarmament conference. There has been a broad measure of agreement among many Members on two basic points: first, on the overriding importance of serious progress in the field of arms control and disarmament; and, second, on the need for flexibility, co-operation and mutual accommodation among all interested parties if such progress is to be made. On those two central points, I can assure representatives, the United States is in agreement with many Members. With those two points in mind I should like to offer the following observations regarding a world disarmament conference.

Representatives will recall that when Secretary Rogers addressed this Assembly on 4 October he stated:

Frankly, we are sceptical that such a general approach—the creation of a periodic world disarmament conference outside the framework of the United Nations—would produce specific accomplishments. All post-war experience indicates that a concrete, step-by-step approach offers better prospects for success than more grandiose schemes, which tend to generate many words and few results.²

The scepticism which the Secretary expressed about an overly broad, unfocused approach with respect to the question of disarmament forums is a long-standing view of the United States and one which we have frequently expressed. It is a view that is based on the following central considerations,

Progress in restraining armaments, progress towards halting and turning back the arms race, progress that is stable and durable, can best be achieved through the working out and the acceptance of concrete agreements among States. Such agreements are most likely to be reached through serious and careful negotiations. They

¹ A/PV.1996 (prov.), pp. 36-41.

² *Ante*, p. 644.

are not likely to be produced through the convening of large and unwieldy conferences. The crucial issues of arms control and disarmament are inevitably and inextricably linked up with the basic national concerns of States. They involve both complex technical problems and broad political questions of great domestic and international sensitivity to Governments.

Serious arms control and disarmament negotiations are thus difficult and complex. Major achievements cannot be registered without careful and lengthy preparations. Negotiations can be conducted purposefully only in forums and in an atmosphere relatively free of polemics. Speeches and documents setting forth the positions of Governments must be directed towards the development of compromises and accommodation. Progress in such negotiations requires businesslike, thoughtful, quiet exchanges of views. It requires patience and persistence—and at times long and frustrating waits while Governments are formulating positions on the proposals of other participants. We would not expect that these would be characteristics of a world disarmament conference.

We recognize that while concrete progress can best be made through the negotiation of sound agreements, a broad and regular review of arms control issues by the international community can provide an important stimulus to arms control efforts. This, indeed, is one of the central purposes of the annual consideration of these issues by the General Assembly. It is a purpose to which a substantial portion of the statements in the general debate and of the work in the First Committee is devoted. In our view, the United Nations General Assembly provides adequate scope and satisfactory procedures. It is the best forum for this purpose. Given the central role of the General Assembly in this area we believe, as Secretary Rogers stated, that

... there would seem to be no reason for establishing still more world disarmament machinery outside the United Nations framework.³

In discussions of the question of arms control forums, many delegations here have ascribed particular importance to a point raised by a number of the members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during the past two years. They expressed the view that the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control talks would be not only desirable but perhaps even prerequisite to progress on the most serious disarmament issues we face. In this regard I should like to recall the statement that Ambassador Leonard, the United States representative to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, made on this subject last June. He stated:

For our part, we recognize that a stable and enduring peace must ultimately be based on broadly accepted limitations on armaments rather than on the unconstrained

³*Ibid.*

competitive development of armaments. We recognize as well that an enduring structure of peace must reflect the contributions and reconcile the aspirations of all nations.

Ambassador Leonard went on to say that,

... accordingly, we would welcome the participation of all nuclear-weapon States in arms control and disarmament efforts in a manner satisfactory to all those States and in a manner reflecting the interests and concerns as well of non-nuclear States.⁴

My Government holds those same views today.

With these thoughts in mind I should like to emphasize that the United States delegation has studied carefully the statements which have been made here on the question of a world disarmament conference. We recognize that a number of United Nations Members see merit in the idea of convening such a conference and that they would like to keep this item before the General Assembly for its further consideration. Many delegations have, however, expressed reservations about one or another aspect of the Soviet proposal. We believe the Assembly should approach this matter in a deliberate and cautious manner. We certainly see no reason at present to attempt to establish a specific date for such a meeting. We are, however, prepared to participate in a further exchange of views regarding the advisability of this sort of conference.

The United States delegation believes that it would be appropriate for any resolution on this subject that might be adopted during the present session of the General Assembly to recognize that the question of a possible world disarmament conference is a matter that deserves careful consideration and to call upon States to consult and to co-operate with each other in considering all relevant questions, including the question of what might be an appropriate time for holding such a conference. We believe such a resolution should place the question of the world disarmament conference on the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly, and should not attempt to prescribe when or in what circumstances a possible meeting should be held. This would enable all interested Governments during the coming year to consider the many suggestions and observations regarding this item that have been made by representatives during the current session of the General Assembly and to consult with one another about them, as well as to develop a fuller consideration of the issues involved. We believe that a resolution along those lines would take account of the variety of views which exists regarding both the desirability of a world disarmament conference and the way in which this question should be approached.

In that connexion my delegation would like to support a suggestion made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Garcia Robles, whose wide-ranging and careful analysis of this subject we listened to with great interest earlier this week. We believe that after the general debate on the question of a world disarmament

⁴ *Ante*, p. 371.

conference is concluded it would be most helpful if voting on any draft resolution regarding this item were postponed to permit further consultations among Members concerning the issues involved.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, November 26, 1971¹

For ten days now the General Assembly of the United Nations has been devoting its plenary meetings to a detailed consideration of a most important and urgent question: the convening of a world disarmament conference, a question included in the agenda of the current session of the Assembly on the proposal of the Soviet Government. The basis of that proposal is that in order to intensify the efforts of all States in the struggle to slow down the arms race and to encourage disarmament the time is ripe for the convening of a special world disarmament conference—a conference in which participation would be assured to all countries of the world without any discrimination, without any country being excluded.

This new initiative stems from the Leninist peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and is dictated by the sincere desire to assist in the strengthening of international peace and security, and to eliminate the menace of a world-wide thermonuclear catastrophe which is hovering over humanity. The achievement of those objectives would be in the interests of all peoples.

The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that the proposal on the convening of a world disarmament conference² not only has led to a wide-ranging debate and become actually a focal point in the work of the current Assembly but also has been supported and greeted favourably by the overwhelming majority of delegations which have participated actively in discussing this most important international matter. In that connexion I should like, on behalf of the Soviet side, to express the deep gratitude of the Soviet Union to all those delegations which have approached this initiative of the Soviet Union with understanding and expressed their support and encouragement for it. In analysing the numerous statements made by the representatives of individual States which have participated in the discussion, the Soviet delegation has come to the following conclusions, linked directly to the approval of the proposal concerning the convening of a world disarmament conference.

The participants in this debate in the General Assembly agree that in such a conference all the States of the world should participate on an equal basis, irrespective of whether they are or

¹ A/PV.1996 (prov.), pp. 41-60.

² *Ante*, pp. 595-596.

are not Members of the United Nations or of its specialized agencies. The objective of disarmament is of interest to everyone. A discussion on disarmament should not allow discrimination against anyone. That fact, it should be stressed, has not been challenged by any single speaker on the subject.

The representatives of the overwhelming majority of countries have expressed themselves in favour of an arrangement whereby a world disarmament conference would discuss all matters pertaining to disarmament, within the whole range of the subject—on the understanding, of course, that the problem of banning and eliminating nuclear weapons should be granted particular priority. Any State should and could raise in the conference any matter whatsoever and submit any proposal whatsoever relating to a curbing of the arms race and to general and complete disarmament which that State, might find it desirable to discuss. The trend recorded in the statements of one or two delegations towards insisting that the conference should consider only one fixed problem and thus eliminate the possibilities for other States to submit their proposals on any other aspect of general and complete disarmament is both unfounded and unreasonable from the point of view of the equal participation of all States in the conference. Such an approach, it is clear, has not found support during the course of the debate in the General Assembly.

In this connexion, and referring to the purposes and objectives of the conference, the Soviet delegation would like to state that it decisively cannot agree with certain allegations—and it is to be stressed that not many speakers have made them—that the Soviet draft resolution does not indicate clearly enough the objectives of its proposals. In order to dissipate any possible doubt on this matter, the Soviet delegation would like to refer to the letter dated 6 September 1971 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Andrei Gromyko, addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, which outlined the approach of the Soviet Union to the objectives and purposes of the conference. That official document clearly and unequivocally states:

... that the world disarmament conference could consider the whole complex of problems relating to disarmament, with regard to both nuclear and conventional armaments. At the same time, inasmuch as the nuclear armaments race arouses the greatest anxiety among peoples, primary attention could be devoted to the questions of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons, if the majority of the participants in the conference should so desire.³

That is a clear and concrete explanation of the main purposes and objectives of the conference.

Anyone who claims that the objective of the conference is unclear is merely trying in one way or another to delay or to procrastinate in connexion with the adoption of a decision concerning the convening of this conference. The Soviet Union's

³ *Ante*, p. 545.

approach to the agenda of the future conference is an elastic one, because the Soviet Union wishes to provide the possibility for all States to submit proposals in the field of general and complete disarmament which in the opinion of these States are the most urgent or are the most ripe for solution. The Soviet Union believes that the priority attention of the world disarmament conference should be devoted to such matters of nuclear disarmament as the cessation of all tests of nuclear weapons by all the countries of the world, the establishment of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world, a complete ban on nuclear weapons and the destruction of stockpiles, as the conscience of humanity cannot accept the use of such weapons in any way. Moreover, the Soviet Union believes that it would be desirable to discuss at this conference other matters that would lead to a relaxation and finally the complete cessation of the arms race and of international tension, including, more specifically, the elimination of all military bases on foreign territories, a decrease in armed forces and armaments in areas where mutual military confrontation is particularly dangerous, a decrease in military expenditures, beginning first of all with the military expenditures of the larger States, and other matters as well—in other words, a discussion in a realistic and concrete way of all matters linked to general and complete disarmament, of all matters leading to the elimination of all stockpiles of nuclear weapons and of all weapons of mass annihilation. Doubtless a discussion of all these problems and a positive solution of all these problems would be welcomed with the deepest satisfaction by all the peoples of the world.

Many of the representatives who have participated in the debate have stressed that particular responsibility for the implementation of disarmament and, more specifically, for the solution of the problem of banning and eliminating all stockpiles of nuclear weapons is borne by the States which possess such weapons. The Soviet delegation fully agrees with this opinion. Quite clearly, if these States were to agree to ban and eliminate their stockpiles of nuclear weapons, then an end would be put once and for all to the danger that is hovering over humanity—the danger of a war being unleashed in the world with the use of thermonuclear weapons of mass destruction.

As far as this matter, so important for all humanity, is concerned, declarations, statements or promises, however brilliantly conceived, are insufficient. The time has come for deeds and not words. The Governments of the nuclear Powers must fully comprehend the depth of the historical responsibility which weighs upon them. The Soviet side believes that these States must do everything possible in order to eliminate for humanity the menace of a nuclear catastrophe, the danger of mass annihilation. In this connexion, not one of the nuclear Powers should hide behind the States that do not possess these weapons. The Soviet Government, as is well known, proposed in the summer of this

year that a meeting of the five nuclear Powers should be convened to make a decisive step leading towards nuclear disarmament.⁴ An objective of this important political initiative was to achieve a situation whereby the nuclear States would fulfil their responsibility to the peoples of the world and adopt concrete measures to eliminate the nuclear arsenals. In the light of this important task, any attempts to allege that the Soviet Union through its proposal would like to arrange for a confrontation of the nuclear States and the non-nuclear States or to claim that the objective is to strengthen the monopoly of the nuclear Powers are absolutely groundless inventions that do not carry any weight at all.

The Soviet proposal for the negotiations of the five nuclear Powers was well linked to the simultaneous proposal for a world disarmament conference. As the Soviet side has pointed out on numerous occasions, these two proposals, these two initiatives of the Soviet Union, do not in any way contradict each other. They actually complement each other and pursue the same objective, to free humanity from the catastrophe that is hovering over it. No one can be persuaded by the rhetorical allegation that all international agreements achieved so far towards a limitation of the nuclear arms race have been concluded to the detriment of the interests of the people and solely in order to strengthen the nuclear monopolies of one or two States possessing nuclear weapons. Contrary to this groundless and invented claim, the Soviet Union believes that such agreements as, for instance, the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear tests in three environments,⁵ the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁶ and the treaty prohibiting the emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor of weapons of mass destruction,⁷ although limited—and this is recognized by us, of course—are unquestionably useful steps leading in the right direction, in the direction of limiting the arms race, in the direction of disarmament. These measures, these agreements, create an excellent base for a further move forward to achieve the main purpose, which is general and complete disarmament, leading to an elimination of the menace of thermonuclear holocaust for humanity. The wide international support for the Moscow Treaty of 1963, banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, is well known.

That agreement was the result of mass demands by the peoples of all countries for a cessation of nuclear explosions, which, through a dangerous contamination of the earth's atmosphere, created in times of peace serious harm to the health and well-being of millions of persons. Following its conclusion, which was preceded by complicated and lengthy diplomatic negotiations both within the United Nations and outside the framework of this

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

Organization, man's environment—the air that he breathes, the food that he eats—has been cleared of many harmful radioactive substances. In that regard specific scientific research and controls have been carried out which have recently been confirmed by the United Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation and published for everyone's knowledge.

It is to be regretted that the prohibition proclaimed by the Moscow Treaty does not cover the fourth environment where nuclear tests are being carried out, that is, under ground. Of no less concern is the fact that the Moscow Treaty was not signed by all States possessing nuclear weapons. The problem of a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons is still on the agenda of the international community and of its main association, the United Nations. The Soviet Union believes that a solution of this specific problem is urgently required.

It was stated at the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that our country decisively stands for the cessation of all nuclear tests everywhere and by all the States of the world.⁸ Today we are obliged to note that those who criticize and attack the Moscow partial nuclear test ban Treaty use various pretexts for continuing their nuclear tests and do not propose any positive grounds for the solution of this problem.

The Soviet delegation would also like to refer to the considerable international significance of yet another important agreement in the field of limiting the arms race, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. At the beginning of the 1960s a group of non-nuclear States raised within the United Nations the question of the urgent necessity to conclude such an agreement. That agreement is now a concrete achievement, but the way leading to it required the elimination of resistance by forces which desired to maintain a grip on the possibilities of disseminating nuclear weapons and possessing nuclear warheads within various aggressive military blocs.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons erected a barrier to the possible extension of the number of those possessing nuclear weapons. The limitation in the number of countries possessing nuclear arsenals facilitates the objective of nuclear disarmament. It is quite clear that it would be more difficult to achieve an agreement to ban and eliminate nuclear weapons if such weapons were possessed by many scores of States and not by just a few States. The danger of a thermonuclear war being unleashed would become greater in such a case.

Thus, it should become clear to anyone capable of understanding it that within the United Nations—the overwhelming majority of whose Members are already participants in existing international agreements, agreements that have already been approved by world public opinion, and limit the arms race—it is out of place to

⁸ See *ante*, p. 196.

attack these agreements. Of greater use at this session of the General Assembly would be statements encouraging further moves towards the conclusion of new agreements in the field of disarmament—agreements that would achieve more effective brakes upon the arms race, including, of course, nuclear arms, and finally lead to general and complete disarmament. Such statements would certainly be more constructive.

It can be stated with satisfaction that such an approach to the solution of the problem at hand has been supported by the majority of delegations at the current session of the Assembly. The Soviet delegation notes with satisfaction that a considerable majority of States views the convening of a world disarmament conference as an international measure which is ripe, useful and necessary—a measure which should without delay be implemented in practice to decrease the arms race and achieve concrete and effective decisions and agreements pertaining to disarmament.

In the opinion of the Soviet delegation those considerations motivate the proposals of various delegations pertaining to the practical way of convening and carrying out the conference. During the course of the discussion of the Soviet proposal, many representatives stressed the importance and the necessity of the careful preparation of the wide international forum required for the consideration of all matters pertaining to disarmament which the world disarmament conference has to be.

One certainly agrees with the statement that the success of this conference will to a considerable extent depend upon the care and the ideas mobilized in preparing it. As far as it is concerned the Soviet delegation is also in favour of the comprehensive and careful preparation of this conference. We are in favour of an arrangement whereby all States would have the possibility of expressing their views—views that would have to be taken into account to guarantee that the world disarmament conference was convened on a mutually acceptable basis and truly reflected in its decisions both the thoughts and the desires of all the peoples of the world. No one—no single sovereign State—should be, in an arbitrary way, deprived of the right and the possibility of participating in such a world forum to be convened on a matter of such great importance for all the countries and the peoples of the world.

However, it must at the same time be stressed that at present certain delegations—only a few, fortunately—are making attempts, still rather limited and modest, to use arguments about the necessity of a careful, lengthy and comprehensive preparation for the convening of the world disarmament conference in order to cover up a clear desire to delay the adoption of a decision on the convening of the conference for an unspecified, unclear period of time—indeed until the Greek kalends.

An oratorical request for adjournment is one thing; the desire to guarantee a successful conference is one thing; but the adoption of

a specific course charted on procrastination in order to torpedo such a proposal is something completely different, and we believe that it runs counter to the opinion of the majority of participants in the debate who stressed their opinions on the subject and who certainly would be against any such course.

We believe that the majority of the participants in the debate would be against that course, charted as it is against the interests of peace and disarmament, and, consequently, against the basic interests of the peoples of the world. We are against negativism regarding the actual convening of the conference; we are against negativism regarding the date of the conference; we are against negativism, in whatever form it may manifest itself in the United Nations—in solo or in duet.

The Soviet delegation has carefully listened to the various views and concrete proposals expressed by numerous delegations during consideration of the matter pertaining to the convening of a world disarmament conference. A number of those proposals have met with our understanding and have been considered by us in a careful and constructive manner. Our delegation has viewed with careful attention and the necessary understanding the various constructive views, considerations and proposals submitted by the numerous delegations which participated in the discussion of the Soviet proposal pertaining to the convening of a world disarmament conference.

We have taken note of the fact that many delegations expressed themselves in favour of a world disarmament conference to be convened within the framework of the United Nations, on the understanding, of course, that as far as participation in the conference is concerned it would be linked to invitations to all States, irrespective of their membership in the United Nations or its specialized agencies.

We have also taken note of the various reasonable, constructive proposals expressed in the statement made by the head of the Egyptian delegation, Mr. El-Zayyat, concerning the practical steps leading to the preparations for the convening of a world conference on disarmament.⁹ Those views, as we know, were widely supported in the Assembly.

The Soviet delegation is authorized to state that the Soviet Government, in its sincere desire to facilitate and hasten the convening of a world disarmament conference, has taken those views and proposals into account and is ready, for its part, to accept the proposal that the world disarmament conference be carried out within the framework of the United Nations.

Quite clearly, the Soviet side bases itself in this connexion upon the understanding—which was widely supported by many other delegations—that the possibility of comprehensive participation in the conference will be provided to all States, without exception.

⁹ A/PV.1985 (prov.), pp. 6-16.

This firm and unchallengeable position is one that is taken into account when the Soviet Union proclaims its readiness to support the proposal to carry out that conference within the framework of the United Nations.

The various views and proposals expressed by the delegation of the Egyptian Arab Republic met with a positive response in the discussion of this matter. Those views pertained to the practical and organizational measures for convening the conference. If we understand correctly, the Egyptian delegation proposed the following: during the course of the preparations for convening a world disarmament conference, the Secretary-General of the United Nations is to undertake a special poll of all States, Members of the United Nations and non-members alike, with a view to obtaining their views and proposals as to the time and place, the agenda, and the over-all operation of the proposed conference. Simultaneously, the Egyptian delegation suggested that the Secretary-General carry out the necessary consultations on the subject with the permanent members of the Security Council.

In that connexion, it is apparently proposed also that opinions pertaining to all matters related to the convening and implementation of the conference will be sought by the Secretary-General of the United Nations from all States parties to one of the following treaties concluded to date in the field of limiting the arms race: the Moscow Treaty banning nuclear weapons in three media, the non-proliferation Treaty, and the Treaty banning the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed or the ocean floor.

The Soviet delegation is authorized to state that, on this question as well, it supports the proposals that it has referred to, and is ready to agree to include these matters in the Soviet draft resolution pertaining to the convening of a world disarmament conference. It agrees, consequently, to include in its draft a text that would reflect the proposals of the Egyptian delegation pertaining to the practical ways to prepare for the convening of that conference, which were so widely supported by the General Assembly.

In concluding my statement, I should like to express the hope that the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference will be supported and approved by the General Assembly. As the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR stressed in his statement, a rapid and successful carrying out of that conference would assist in further activating the negotiations on disarmament with the participation of all the States of the world.¹⁰ That would unquestionably be a monumental achievement on the difficult and complicated path leading to general and complete disarmament, an objective in which all the peoples of the world are so interested.

¹⁰ See *ante*, pp. 544-546.

Statement by the PRC Deputy Foreign Minister (Chiao) to the General Assembly, November 26, 1971¹

The Chinese delegation deems it necessary to make a few remarks in regard to the speech the Soviet representative, Mr. Malik, delivered at the meeting of 24 November.²

First, the Soviet representative tried hard to deny that the Soviet Union is a super-Power and that, like the United States, the Soviet Union attempts to monopolize nuclear weapons and to push its policies of nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats against other countries. Such an attempt is utterly futile. Everyone knows that it is precisely the Soviet Union and the United States, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, that have up to now obstinately refused to undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons and that they have continued to maintain large numbers of armed forces and military bases on foreign soil, including nuclear armed forces and nuclear bases. The partial nuclear test-ban Treaty³ and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁴ jointly devised by the United States and the Soviet Union are something entirely imposed on others; they are aimed at monopolizing nuclear weapons and controlling other countries. We can never agree to them. The Soviet leadership has carried out aggression, subversion, control and interference against other countries. This is clearly known to the representatives of many countries present here. China has had its own experience in this respect, and here I shall not speak at length about the relevant history. Countless facts have shown that what the Soviet leadership is practising is certainly not socialism but, as Lenin put it, socialism in words, imperialism in deeds—that is, social imperialism.

Secondly, the Soviet representative denounced China's disagreement with the Soviet proposal for convening a world disarmament conference as a "Sino-American duet of negativism".⁵ Those are cheap and demagogic words not worth refuting. Who, after all, is singing a duet with United States imperialism? To the north of China, large numbers of Soviet armed forces, including rocket forces, are stationed in the People's Republic of Mongolia. To the east of China, the United States is maintaining a large number of military bases and nuclear bases in Japan proper and Okinawa. Is that not a kind of duet? And that is not true only with regard to China. In Europe, the Middle East, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean and other parts of the world, the Soviet leadership considers the final say rests only with an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. Is that not a duet?

¹ A/PV.1996 (prov.), pp. 61-67.

² *Ante*, pp. 762-768.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 461-465.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 762.

Thirdly, the speech of the Soviet representative is a splendid self exposure. The Soviet representative is upset when others call the Soviet Union a super-Power. Yet his speech has vividly revealed the features of a super-Power which lords it over other countries and orders them about. It is entirely China's own business how the Chinese delegation should speak and act and what stand it should take here. There is no need whatsoever for the Soviet representative to lecture us. The Soviet attitude towards the Chinese delegation is exactly the same as the crude behaviour towards some Afro-Asian countries adopted by another super-Power not long ago. The Soviet representatives have probably become used to acting the patriarch within their small realm, and they consider that whatever they say others will have to obey. Otherwise they will label you anti-Soviet. Distinguished representatives of the Soviet Union, you are wrong. This is not anti-Sovietism; this is opposition to your attitude of great-Power chauvinism and your policies of social imperialism. We have long had experience with such behaviour of yours. The Chinese people do not buy such stuff of yours, and your baton no longer works. The days are gone when the super-Powers could dominate the world. An increasing number of medium-sized and small countries of the world have more and more seen through to your true features. The sooner the Soviet delegation understands this, the better for themselves and the work of the United Nations.

Fourthly, in his speech the Soviet representative unwearily boasted that the Soviet Union had fought for disarmament for more than two decades, putting on the airs of a veteran peace fighter. A simple but important principle of Marxism-Leninism is that one must judge a person not merely by his words but by his deeds. Not long ago, the Soviet Union concluded with a neighbour of China a so-called treaty of peace, friendship and co-operation which is in essence a treaty of military alliance.

With the encouragement and support of this treaty, that country launched a bare-faced armed aggression against Pakistan, another neighbour of China, thus aggravating tension in Asia. This fully reveals the true features of the so-called foreign policy of peace pursued by the Soviet leadership. The Chinese Government and people have consistently maintained that disputes between countries should be resolved through consultation between the countries concerned without resorting to the use of force. The Chinese Government and people will, as always, firmly support the Pakistan people in their just struggle against foreign aggression and for the defence of their national sovereignty and unity.

In short, on the question of aggression and anti-aggression, disarmament and arms expansion, peace and war, one must be judged by his deeds. Bragging and boasting, or putting on the airs of an "old-timer" are of no avail. If the Soviet Government truly has the desire for disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Soviet representative should come forward to this rostrum and

solemnly declare that at no time and in no circumstances will the Soviet Union be the first to use nuclear weapons and that it will dismantle all nuclear bases and withdraw all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad. Distinguished Soviet representative, do you dare to do so? If you are man enough, you will do it. But if you have a guilty conscience and an unjust cause, you will not dare to do so, because although you appear to be tough outwardly, you are in fact timid inwardly. We are certain that you will not dare to do so. Is this not true? Please reply.

Fifthly, in order to enable all the Member States of the United Nations to hold full consultation and discussion on such an important issue as disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, the Chinese delegation has proposed that the Soviet draft resolution for convening a world disarmament conference⁶ not be put to the vote at this session of the General Assembly. Our desire is that we should strive to enable the United Nations on the principle of reaching a consensus through consultation to make a new start on this question that is truly conducive to disarmament. We still hope that our fellow representatives will give serious consideration to our view. However, if the Soviet delegation insists on putting its draft resolution to a vote, the Chinese delegation cannot but declare with regret that China will not participate in the voting and will assume no obligation as to the result of the voting.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Malik) to the General Assembly, November 26, 1971¹

The Soviet delegation did not have, nor does it have, any intention to transform the high forum of an international Organization, the United Nations, into a place for ideological discussions or argument-splitters. This is an altogether different matter and other places and possibilities exist for such arguments. Consequently, I would refer solely to the international and political matters, to the matters now under discussion, on which the Chinese representative, as in his first statement, mobilized many efforts in order to distort the situation governing the peace-loving policy of the Soviet Union, of which we are proud and which is being implemented along the path charted by the great Lenin ever since the October Revolution, and which will be continued by us in the future. He has attempted to cast calumny on it.

Ever since the first session of the General Assembly we have participated not only in the elaboration of the provisions of the United Nations Charter but also in other operations which reflected our desire to implement the Leninist peace-loving policy

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 595-596.

¹ A/PV.1996 (prov.), pp. 67-76.

and co-operate in so doing with the countries of Asia, Africa, Latin America and other continents of the world. Together with other countries of the world we have been struggling for peace, security, disarmament, and for complete co-operation between all peoples and with peoples which desire co-operation with us.

No fairy tales, no inventions, no claims from this rostrum or any other rostrum can in any way distort or calumniate or libel our policy, a policy which was forged and tempered over a period of more than half a century. It is quite clear that the Chinese delegation has adopted the thesis of super-Powers for the subject of disarmament. It is its high horse in this connexion. What is the primary objective of this theory? To cast doubt on the peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union; to confront the Soviet Union with other countries of the world and vice versa, without any preoccupation as to the fact, well known to the Peking leaders, that the Soviet Union is the base for all anti-imperialist forces. These are attempts to confront the Soviet Union with another great Power, the leader of the capitalist camp. The submission of the clearly false and groundless theory of two alleged super-Powers acting against the entire world—all other countries of the world—is, if a spade is to be called a spade, an act of class betrayal by the Chinese leadership.

Thus, in Peking, attempts are being made to cover up the mutual confrontation of the two world systems of socialism and capitalism, and attempts are being made to avoid a genuine struggle against imperialism and aggression. The situation has become such that advice is being given to other countries, to the monopolies of these States, as to how they could better act against one-two super-Powers.

One has also noted that the statements of the Chinese delegation in the Assembly refer on many occasions to the fact that China will never become a super-Power. But, simultaneously, the Chinese representatives insist and stress that the best defender of the smaller Powers is China. What is that but an attempt, under the guise of a claim to fight the one or two super-Powers, to cover up its own hegemonical super-Power aspirations, to achieve its own objectives in the so-called Third World.

It is not an accident that in the halls of the United Nations more and more talk has been heard—even during the short period of the presence of the Chinese delegation here—to the effect that under the guise of the argument of a struggle against the one or two super-Powers China is actually seeking to establish itself as a hegemonical leader of the Third World. China, apparently, is attempting to use this Third World as an arm for its true objectives, namely as a springboard to become immediately a super-super-Power.

That is the crux of the matter, of the counterfeit, invented Chinese operation, an operation which is actually based upon the example of imperialist attempts of the past, particularly the

references to the one or two super-Powers. Such counterfeit, such false theories will not help the Chinese delegation to strengthen its position here, or to gain authority or prestige among the countries of the Third World.

We are deeply convinced that the delegations of the Third World, States which through their historical national revolutions acceded at the end of the fifties and the beginning of the sixties to the membership of the United Nations and which are so numerous here, during the course of their participation in the work of the United Nations and in the course of their collaboration with the socialist States in their struggle for peace, security and co-operation have grown and matured to such an extent that they do not require any claims or suggestions regarding hegemony or control. They will reject anyone who wishes to become their mentor, their leader or their special defender.

The Soviet Union has never threatened anyone and will never threaten anyone. The fairy tale that has been concocted by Chinese propaganda as to the alleged menace to China from the north has been invented in order to lead astray the Chinese people—and all this began in the autumn of 1969. It was not in the Soviet Union but in China that a campaign was unleashed for preparation for a war in the north, against the Soviet Union obviously. That campaign has been whipped up with claims about an alleged attempt to invade China from the north and the entire population of the country is being mobilized in these efforts.

From this rostrum the Chinese representative compared the Soviet troops to the north of China with the American troops to the south. Ladies and gentlemen, this is China as it is: the aggression in Indo-China is placed on the same level with our armed forces that are standing on the Chinese borders of the Soviet Union because China is unleashing hostile propaganda involving war against the Soviet Union. And that is compared with the aggressive war against Indo-China. That aggressive war in Indo-China is compared with the legal preoccupations of the Soviet Union about its security. A reference to this comparison is sufficient to understand what is the ideology of China today.

The representative of China was obviously unhappy at my reference to the Sino-American duet of negativism. But that is a statement which reaches its objective. The representative of China stated, and repeated today, that he is against the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference.² That was also said by the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Rogers,³ and we heard today clear confirmation of the fact by our colleague Ambassador Phillips.⁴ These are facts. The Chinese representative from this rostrum has said he is against the Soviet proposal. The United States representative is against the Soviet proposal. Here is

² The Soviet proposal appears *ante*, pp. 595-596. For the Chinese statements, see *ante*, p. 779.

³ *Ante*, p. 644.

⁴ *Supra*.

your duet. You are challenging it. Well, prove it. Shall I quote the words uttered by both sides? I can well understand that you do not like the appearance of this duet, but after all, everyone here heard the Chinese representative, Mr. Rogers and Mr. Phillips. The verbatim records are available. That is the Sino-American or Americano-Chinese duet, whichever way you want to put it. There is nothing I can do about it.

You are trying to teach us Marxism and Leninism. You are telling us that Marxism asks people to study deeds and not words. We study both deeds and words because your deeds and your words do correspond. You are against the Soviet proposal to convene a world disarmament conference, a proposal that has been supported by the overwhelming majority of the Assembly. This is Marxism in action and the Chinese interpretation of Marxism.

As far as the libelous statement is concerned that the Soviet-Indian agreement and treaty is directed against a particular country, it would be beneath us to answer it. The purpose pursued by the Government of India—I am firmly convinced of this—and the purpose pursued by the Soviet Union—and of this I am absolutely sure, and I stress this fact—is to serve the cause of peace in that part of the world. There is no question of attacking anyone or of directing this treaty against anyone.

As far as nuclear disarmament is concerned, instead of covering up its lack of desire to participate in a conference of the nuclear Powers and in a world conference on disarmament, the Chinese delegation in an ultimatum-like fashion states that the Soviet Union must do this, this, and that. Well, that is no way to act in the United Nations, Sir, the leader of the Chinese delegation. You learn your lesson. You pick up a few bruises in United Nations operations and then you wake up to United Nations reality. What we propose is this: let us meet, let us discuss all the questions, let us discuss all proposals—yours and ours—of all the five nuclear Powers. Why are you rejecting this?

Just a few days ago the representative of China, Mr.—why “Mr.”, let us say the word “Comrade”—Huang Hua, proposed that the response of the Chinese Government to the proposal of the Soviet Union be published as a document.⁵ I do not have the text in front of me but I remember that this document contains a rejection of the proposal of the Soviet Government on the basis of various concocted reasons, instead of an acceptance of the proposal. I have already stated that the refusal of China provided the United States and the United Kingdom with an excellent excuse to reject participation in this conference by saying that China’s rejection of this proposal makes it academic.

Thus I say that China has helped the United Kingdom and the United States to reject the proposal for a five-Power nuclear conference.⁶ These are deeds, and these are words, and Marx can

⁵ See *ante*, pp. 756-761.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 313-315.

be quoted in this connexion. I refer here to the Chinese delegation. The situation is simple: accept the proposal to convene a conference of the nuclear Powers and a world disarmament conference. Let us discuss all matters there. Let us adopt decisions there. Do not engage in ultimatums here; it will be a waste of time and a waste of words.

Perhaps it is time to bring an end to my reply to the Chinese representative.

General Assembly Resolution 2779 (XXVI): Preparation of an International Treaty Concerning the Moon, November 29, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2222 (XXI) of 19 December 1966 stressing the importance of international co-operation in the field of activities in the peaceful exploration and use of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, and the importance of developing the rule of law in this new area of human endeavour,²

Reaffirming the common interest of all mankind in furthering the peaceful exploration and use of outer space for the benefit of all States and for the development of friendly relations and mutual understanding among them,

Taking into account the advances made in recent years in the exploration of outer space, including those resulting from extensive lunar research programmes on the basis of modern science and technology,

Bearing in mind the interest of all mankind in the exploration and utilization of the Moon exclusively for peaceful purposes and in preventing the Moon from becoming a scene of international conflict,

Prompted by the consideration that the Moon, as the only natural satellite of the Earth, has an important role to play in the conquest of outer space and that it should be used with due regard to the interests of present and future generations.

Desiring to further the elaboration of specific rules of international law to govern the activities of States on the Moon on the basis of the Charter of the United Nations and the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies,³ as a means of further developing a sound legal basis for such activities,

¹ A/RES/2779 (XXVI), Dec. 9, 1971. The resolution was adopted unanimously.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 809 ff.

³ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

Considering that special rules should also govern activities in the use of all natural resources and substances of the Moon and other celestial bodies,

1. *Takes note* of the draft treaty concerning the Moon submitted to the General Assembly by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;⁴

2. *Requests* the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and its Legal Sub-Committee to consider, as a matter of priority, the question of the elaboration of a draft international treaty concerning the Moon in accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 38 of the report of the Committee⁵ and to report thereon to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session.

Statement by the French Representative (Mattei) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, November 29, 1971¹

I think it unnecessary to note, in turn, how much, in the field of disarmament reality lags behind the hopes entertained by the United Nations at the end of the Second World War. Several delegations—including my own—have shown, with figures, either here or in the General Assembly, that the arms race had never been as alarming or expensive as it is today.

Deeply aware of this state of affairs and of the dangers which it represents for the security of nations and their development, my Government has always been in favour of general and complete disarmament. The progress of science and technology now gives to weapons, whether nuclear or conventional, such a destructive power that the prospect of a world without weapons will soon become not a mere ideal, but a necessity.

There is no-one today who does not share this conviction. But experts are divided when it is a matter of determining the most appropriate means to translate it into reality. Real disarmament is most often considered to be unrealizable as though put in parenthesis and sacrificed to other problems such as the balance of the forces which share the domination of the world. The mistake then is not to strive to maintain a balance, which is of course indispensable for the peace of the world, but to do so without at the same time working tirelessly for the reduction of armaments, especially of the most fearful weapons.

My Government cannot condone this idea of a mere armistice between man and his power of destruction, an armistice often concluded through discrimination against States, a balance which

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 300-305.

⁵ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-sixth Session, Supplement No. 20* (A/8420), pp. 16-17.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1838, pp. 41-57.

can often be breached even against the will of the Powers which, possessing most of this power, believe that they are controlling events.

This is why the position of France is well known. My Government has always considered that the task of disarmament will remain an illusion as long as the problem of nuclear disarmament, despite its scope and complexity, is not tackled directly. That is why we wish to see an understanding among all Powers possessing nuclear weapons.

These seem to be truisms, commonsense, and I think that this is admitted by most delegations. It suffices to read the statements which greeted the participation of representatives of the People's Republic of China in our work. These statements were due to the conviction that, without the participation of all nuclear States, the hope of true nuclear disarmament would be in vain.

May I, therefore, also welcome the fact that one of the main obstacles which prevented talks between the States has disappeared. Success is not ensured, but my delegation believes that the chances are now better.

Must I point out once again that there is nothing in that hope which is due to our desire to see a privileged position for the role of some States, ignoring the rights of the whole of the international community in a field which is of interest to all? It is not a question of admitting that there is a monopoly for a small number of States in a problem whose solution requires the effective participation of all nations. This can be seen in our desire to have measures of control and verification which must accompany any disarmament measures, to see them have a truly international character, without which these procedures would not fulfil their purpose. In other words, the Five must determine, through talks, the terms of a possible agreement on genuine nuclear disarmament, so that the disarmament talks may achieve concrete results.

These considerations in no way detract from our interest in the talks on the limitation of strategic weapons, currently being held between the Soviet Union and the United States. As such, they are not actually within the framework of genuine disarmament endeavours; nonetheless, until genuine disarmament is achieved, they represent an effort to stabilize the present balance between the two greatest nuclear Powers, and we must hope that these talks will succeed.

The joint Soviet-American communique of 20 May 1971² makes it possible to foresee an initial agreement at an early date. This agreement has not been reached. But measures have been taken between Washington and Moscow in order to eliminate the risks of an accidental nuclear war³; and note must be taken of these measures.

² *Ante*, p. 298.

³ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

I would recall that Mr. Maurice Schumann, speaking on 28 September in the General Assembly, mentioned the interest we had in this, in the absence of a genuine disarmament agreement, but also in the hope that this would open up new prospects.⁴

I now pass on to the items on the agenda which are of the most interest to my delegation. I should like first to thank the Secretary-General for the report which he caused to be drafted upon our request by a group of experts on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race.⁵ This report, due to the initiative of the Romanian delegation, unanimously approved by the General Assembly, is an excellent document which is a tribute to the competence and objectivity of its authors.

This is not the first time that the Secretary-General thus answers an appeal on our part. His devotion to the cause of disarmament, the tireless way in which he justly reminds us of the responsibilities of the United Nations in this field are reasons for the diligence and the care with which he fulfils our requests.

My delegation has always been in favour of this co-operation between the Assembly and the Secretariat. We consider, in fact, that disarmament problems would be easier to settle on the political level, where they must, of course, be raised, if the elements of these problems were analysed impartially by an unchallenged body. There would only be advantages in this report which we have just received being periodically brought up to date to take into account changes which have occurred in statistical fields on which they are based, and to make possible an evermore detailed analysis of the various problems with which it seeks to deal.

I do not intend to undertake a critical review of this report. Generally speaking, the information contained therein is valuable. Its conclusions underline the true dimensions of the disarmament problem to date.

Let us have the courage—and this in no way detracts from what I have just said about the report—not to deduce from the conclusions of the report that all military expenditures are to be condemned *a priori*. We do not live in a world where the right of individual or collective self-defence, recognized by the Charter to all the States, can be abandoned.

It is true that at a time when the progress of science and technology makes it possible to develop evermore perfected weapons at an ever-greater rate, it is difficult to satisfy the needs of defence without engaging in this vertiginous arms race. But we must not have any illusions; disarmament alone will not remedy a situation which makes it always practically impossible. First, conditions must be met enabling States to renounce the use of force without sacrificing their independence; this is the very object

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 590-592.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 644-686.

of the policy of *détente* for which the French Government has been devoting the efforts that are well known to all.

My Government, however, is interested in any genuine disarmament measure which could be agreed upon immediately by the international community. It is in this spirit that it studied with particular care the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons,⁶ item 28 on our agenda.

May I first of all remind the Committee that the French delegation is one of the first to express the hope that the 1925 Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons⁷ would be completed by an agreement prohibiting their manufacture. When in August 1968, we answered the Soviet memorandum of 1 July on disarmament,⁸ my Government, after having recalled the interest it had in seeing the Protocol of 1925 applied by all, declared itself:

... ready to examine the problems raised by the prohibition not only of the use but also of the manufacture of these weapons, control being an indispensable condition for success.⁹

Of course, we had in mind that the authority and the scope of the 1925 Protocol would in no way be breached by measures on which agreement could be achieved. We also hoped, in part for this reason, but also because the credibility of the use of biological weapons remains slight, whilst it is obvious that there are important stockpiles of chemical weapons, that the case of the latter should not be viewed separately from the bacteriological weapons. Finally—as was stated in the text I just quoted from—we thought it indispensable that all prohibition of the manufacture of these weapons be subject to international control.

Is the draft convention presented to us in a position to meet these various concerns? Let us first look at the first two of them: the second, an agreement applying to chemical weapons as well as to bacteriological weapons is, of course, not met. The first, that is to say, an agreement which would not modify the authority and the scope of the protocol of 1925 is, in principle, fulfilled. We do indeed in article VIII see that:

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925 for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare.¹⁰

This provision of the draft actually is more a matter of concern than reassurance. It is obvious that no State, having ratified the 1925 Protocol can be freed from the obligations thus undertaken

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1969, pp. 764-765.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 466-470.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 584-586.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 570-571.

merely because it might adhere to the Convention prohibiting the manufacture of biological weapons.

In principle it was not necessary to specify this. The authors of the draft, however, thought that they were compelled to do so because there is indeed a risk that the 1925 Protocol would appear in the eyes of some as having lost part of its authority. Everybody knows that if chemical weapons were excluded from the draft convention it was because doubts existed as to the prohibition of their use because of the feeling that some of them should be or could be authorized. I doubt that this draft convention would encourage the States not yet having done so to adhere to the Protocol and renounce the use of chemical weapons, or even biological weapons, although they would undertake not to manufacture them.

This is a very serious idea, not only because these are weapons giving rise to a justifiable horror, but also because we are confronted with the first attempt—we willingly agree with this—to set up a genuine disarmament measure. It would be highly regrettable if a step forward were to be followed by a step backward, and that the prohibition of the manufacture of biological weapons should lead to a weakening of the prohibition to use chemical weapons, in other words, that a first step in the field of genuine disarmament should be taken in a manner to prejudice a provision in the laws of war which all countries, even those which have not ratified it, agree to observe.

Was it so urgent to prohibit on the international level the manufacture of biological weapons? Was it unimportant to cast doubt on the scope and authority which the 1925 Protocol would have kept to this day?

Such are some of the questions asked by my delegation about the draft submitted to us. It does not seem to us that a satisfactory answer was given, but we might disregard this if we did not have a more serious objection: the absence of any measure for control or verification of an international nature.

The procedure for complaints contained in the draft may have a deterrent effect in some cases. Added to genuine control, it could complete its effectiveness but it certainly does not have any of the advantages of control. On the contrary, one could reproach it for being cumbersome and more likely to lead to a worsening of the international climate than to ensure respect for the draft convention. Especially it does not put all States on a footing of equality. The weaker will hesitate to resort to it against the stronger, and its implementation could further be rendered nugatory by the veto of one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

This kind of criticism is usually answered by the fact that it is practically impossible to set up control in the field of biological weapons. Therefore the authors of the draft were confronted with the following dilemma: either an agreement without control, or no agreement at all. This is not, in our view, the true problem.

My delegation knows full well the difficulties of control in the field of biological and chemical weapons. It knows that these difficulties are considerable, and even more difficult to overcome if disarmament is limited to those weapons. Within the framework of wider disarmament measures, the possibility and effectiveness of control would indeed be greater.

But what my delegation has to note is that, in this specific case, as in the previous case of an agreement on the non-nuclearization of the sea-bed,¹¹ the question has not been truly raised, as if it had been admitted *a priori* that it would serve no purpose to raise the question. As far as I know, the principle according to which there cannot on the international level be true disarmament without control has never been gainsaid. In order to be the genuine disarmament measure which it could have been, a measure which we would have welcomed, modest though it may be, this draft should have contained at least a minimum reference to this fundamental principle. It would then have played an exemplary role in this virgin field of genuine disarmament.

What we fear is not that we would have to renounce biological weapons in the absence of international control; the French Government has decided to do so.

What we fear is that on the international level this would be the first step towards a policy of disarmament without control. Such a policy would limit itself to prohibiting the manufacture of weapons, the use of which is unlikely in any case. It would have the serious shortcoming of giving credence to the idea that disarmament is forging ahead, whilst the true dangers will not have been allayed, and in the field of verification it will be based on the use of national means of observation and will therefore be discriminatory, since not all States have sufficient means. International control as a principle is the indispensable corollary to any disarmament measure of a contractual nature, albeit partial. If this element is ignored, the draft convention on the prohibition of the manufacture of biological weapons is an extremely dangerous precedent, the existence of which will weigh heavily upon all disarmament work. A State cannot merely have faith in the goodwill of other Powers in a field where its security is at stake.

For those reasons, and to its great regret, France will not be able to envisage adhering to the draft convention as presented to us. Since, however, we do not wish to dissociate ourselves from the condemnation of biological weapons, we wish on a unilateral level most clearly to proclaim our will to renounce once and for all the manufacture of those weapons. The French Parliament has just been seized of a bill prohibiting the development, production, possession, stockpiling, acquisition or granting of all biological agents which are not designed for peaceful purposes, and it also

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

forbids incitement or assistance in this field to any State, any organization or any person whatever.

The agenda of our work also leads us to devote some thought to certain regional disarmament measures. When States or groups of States, of their own volition and for territories over which they exercise sovereignty, decide upon a measure involving denuclearization or demilitarization, it goes without saying that we have nothing to say in criticism thereof, that we ourselves are too desirous of seeing our own independence respected where we exercise our jurisdiction, to question in any manner whatsoever any decisions thus taken.

It is in this spirit that we welcomed in 1966 the undertaking for the denuclearization of Latin America even before it was completed.

In a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission, Mr. Garcia Robles, who, as all of us here know, has given his name to this task, the Ambassador of France in Mexico stated that his Government viewed with full sympathy the efforts that had been undertaken since they were predicated on the free will of the parties.^{1 2}

Today, with the Treaty of Tlatelolco^{1 3} in effect in several of the countries of Latin America, today when the necessary institutions have been set up and are in operation, we can but confirm the feelings we expressed at that time and assure the countries that are applying such measures that we intend to do nothing that would infringe upon the principle of denuclearization which they have freely adopted.

However, any regional disarmament undertaking that might lead to the granting of a right of control by certain countries over others, or that could cast doubt on legal principles of universal application, such as those, for example, concerning the laws governing the high seas, could only give rise to fundamental reservations on our part.

It is in this spirit that France, as a riparian State of that ocean, will follow with particular interest the discussion relating to the proposal made by Ceylon to make of the Indian Ocean a zone of peace.^{1 4} Although we share the legitimate concerns expressed from the rostrum of the United Nations by Mrs. Bandaranaike regarding any development that could sow the seeds of conflict in the waters adjoining certain territories under our jurisdiction we think that it is in the interest of the international community that certain essential principles remain outside all decisions of a specific nature, such as the principle relating to the law of the sea, especially since this subject is soon to be considered on a general level. This is why, although fully agreeing with the concern

^{1 2} COPREDAL/47.

^{1 3} *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69 ff.

^{1 4} See *ante*, pp. 807-809.

expressed by the Prime Minister of Ceylon and considering, too, that consultations on this problem could be useful, should they be required, it seems to us the better part of wisdom for our Committee to avoid taking a position of principle in this matter.

Regardless of how legitimate may be the interest attached to the various points I have just raised, most delegations, I am sure, are wondering about the future of disarmament undertakings. Everything points to the possibility of their entering into a new phase. The feelings of my country concerning the procedures followed during the past ten years, the results achieved and the principles underlying them can only lead us to follow with increased interest and vigilance the future development of a cause to which France will always be profoundly devoted. It was in this spirit that we greeted the proposal for a world disarmament conference. My country will lose no opportunity that will enable it, together with all other nuclear powers, to take part in a practical and effective way, within the framework of the whole international community, in the task of genuine disarmament that still lies ahead for all of us.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Draft Convention on Biological and Toxin Weapons, November 29, 1971¹

In his statement of 11 November, Ambassador Bush discussed the contributions that many nations have made to the formulation of the draft treaty prohibiting biological and toxin weapons.² He also spoke of the significance of some of the important features of that draft treaty. Today I should like to discuss in greater detail some of the specific provisions of the draft and to comment on some of the observations and suggestions put forward here in this Committee.

The United States delegation has listened with interest to the comments of other members on the draft convention. We have been pleased by the constructive and positive nature of the general observations that have been made with regard to this document, and by the co-operative spirit in which specific comments on various formulations have been offered. The character of all these remarks, we believe, bears evidence of the desire of members to ensure that this measure will represent a sound and durable step in the field of disarmament.

During the negotiations this summer there was some discussion regarding the relationship of this convention to the reservations of many parties to the Geneva convention of 1925,³ by which they

¹ A/C.1/PV.1838, pp. 58-70.

² *Ante*, pp. 710-717

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

retained the right to use weapons covered by that Protocol under certain circumstances. A further question was raised regarding the effectiveness of the present convention in the event of armed conflict between any of its parties.

In regard to both of these questions, I should like to call the attention of Committee members to the phrase "never in any circumstances", which is included in the description of the basic prohibitions of the draft convention set forth in article I. This phrase emphasizes the intention of the parties to the convention that, as a practical matter, reservations to the Geneva Protocol should not result in any exception to the total prohibition of biological and toxin weapons achieved by the present convention. Moreover, since war would obviously be one of the "circumstances" referred to, this phrase emphasizes that this convention would remain in full force and effect in time of war. The phrase "never in any circumstances" does not, at the same time, prejudice the rights of parties under the withdrawal clause of article XIII in the conditions set forth in that provision.

Since the representative of Ghana, Ambassador Akwei, raised a question in his statement of 16 November about the withdrawal clause in article XIII, I might say a word on this subject at this time. During the course of our discussions in Geneva, the delegation of Egypt recommended that a withdrawal clause be included in the present convention.⁴ A number of other delegations, including my own, shared the view that the inclusion of a withdrawal clause similar to that of earlier arms-control agreements would be appropriate. The inclusion of that clause in no way implies that a Government would enter into an international agreement of this sort with the thought of later withdrawing. In fact, all parties will be vitally interested in ensuring that no other party would ever be placed in a position where extraordinary events relating to the subject matter of this convention, as article XIII specifies, had jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It is reassuring to note in this regard that during the post-war period no party to an arms-control agreement has ever made use of the traditional withdrawal provision.

Returning now to article I, I would like to emphasize that its provisions would not permit any quantities of biological agents or toxins to be developed, produced, stockpiled, acquired, or retained for hostile purposes or for purposes of use in armed conflict. It would also not permit the stockpiling or retention for non-peaceful purposes of quantities that, when acquired, had justifications for a peaceful purpose, such as meeting hospital requirements.

What, then, is meant by the words "prophylactic" and "protective"? In our view the word "prophylactic" covers activities related to the protection of the human body from the

⁴ See *ante*, p. 378.

effects of organisms or substances to which an individual might be directly exposed. We thus interpret the word "prophylactic" as encompassing medical activities such as diagnosis, therapy and immunization, and related research. The term "protective" applies to the development of such equipment as decontamination systems, protective masks and clothing, air and water filtration systems, and detection and warning devices. Laboratory quantities of certain agents and toxins might well be required for research and testing in these areas. Article I thus makes clear that activities covered by the words "prophylactic" and "protective" are not prohibited by the convention. To avoid any possible ambiguity, however, I wish to state unequivocally that the terms "prophylactic" and "protective" are not intended to convey any broader meaning that would in any way permit possession of biological agents or toxins for weapons purposes on the theory that such weapons were for "defensive" warfare, retaliation or deterrence.

Article II of the convention provides for the destruction of all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery prohibited by article I. It makes clear that in carrying out such destruction safety precautions should be observed to protect populations and the environment. On 18 November, the representative of Australia noted the importance of this aspect of the provision and suggested extending the time-limit for destruction—article II specifies nine months—if this should be necessary to ensure that the environment does not suffer. I appreciate the thoughtfulness of this proposal, particularly in the light of the experience of the United States in destroying such materials. As the Committee is aware, we are now engaged in destroying these materials and are converting biological weapons research and production facilities into health research centres. Extraordinary precautions were undertaken to make certain that destruction of our biological weapons stockpiles would pose no danger either to people or to the environment and, as a result, the process of destruction has taken some time.

We believe, nevertheless, that the period of nine months, which consultations indicated was generally acceptable to the participants in the negotiation of this convention, is both realistic and appropriate in this document. We would assume, that as a country approaches signature and ratification, it would initiate any steps that might be necessary in connexion with article II. Moreover, for States that become parties to the convention after its entry into force, the nine months period specified in article II would, in accordance with paragraph 4 of article XIV, begin on a date on which that State deposited its instrument for ratification or accession.

A number of comments have been made—by the representatives of Australia, Brazil, Ceylon, Ghana, Sweden and others—concerning articles V and VI which set forth the framework for considering problems that might arise under this convention. For

our part, the United States delegation attaches particular importance to article V, which contains an undertaking whereby parties are to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objectives of, or in the application of provisions of, this convention. It specifically provides that consultation and co-operation may be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter. It is our hope that full utilization of such procedures would clear up any doubts that might arise regarding fulfilment of the convention's obligations. At the same time, we believe that the consultations and co-operation provided for in article V should not necessarily be limited to narrow questions of the technical violation of a particular article but should encompass as well any problems concerning the achievement of the over-all objective of the draft convention.

We believe that the draft convention is further strengthened by article VI, which provides that complaints may be lodged with the Security Council of the United Nations by any party which finds that any other party is acting in breach of obligations arising from the provisions of this draft convention. Of particular importance in this regard is the fact that—as members are aware—active consideration is now being given to a Security Council resolution whereby the Council would declare its readiness to consider immediately any complaint lodged under article VI of the draft convention, to take all necessary measures in the investigation of a complaint, and to inform the parties to the convention of the results of the investigation. It is the hope of the United States delegation that a strong and straightforward resolution to this effect will in fact be adopted by the Council.

Articles V and VI of the draft convention represent the result of intensive consultations during the negotiation of this measure. The present formulation represents a carefully worked out compromise among a variety of proposals and, in our view, the strongest possible provision regarding consultation and complaints that could be achieved.

Article VII, the provision on assistance, is responsive to suggestions that were made by a number of countries, including Argentina, Italy, Morocco, Nigeria, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. It stresses the great importance of strict observance of the prohibitions of the convention by placing on the highest plane of international concern the question of a possible violation resulting in danger to a party. The provisions of this article do not, of course, affect the obligations or the rights of parties under the United Nations Charter. Under this provision assistance would be provided only following a request by the endangered party, and it would be for each party to decide whether it was in a position to provide or support the assistance requested. We would consider that medical or other humanitarian

or relief assistance would be suitable. One other point, while the article, by its terms, would not apply until a decision by the Security Council that a party had been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the convention, parties would clearly remain free to provide assistance that they deemed appropriate in the interim. We would expect that many countries would wish to offer assistance as soon as possible—they would in other situations where a country was in need of humanitarian assistance.

Since Ambassador Bush placed particular emphasis in his earlier statement on three of the central features of the draft convention—first, the fact that it fully safeguards and protects the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925; second, that it contains an extremely firm commitment regarding continued negotiations on effective prohibition of chemical weapons; and, third, that it provides for international co-operation in the peaceful applications of bacteriology and biology—I believe there is no need for me to discuss them in greater detail. Instead, I should like to turn now to some of the other specific suggestions that had been made during our consideration of the draft in the First Committee.

The representative of Mexico has suggested an amendment whereby parties would undertake to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling for weapons purposes of chemical agents that have the highest lethal effect.⁵ My delegation appreciates that underlying this proposal is the desire for the greatest possible progress with regard to prohibiting both chemical and biological weapons. We are, however, unable to support the inclusion of such a provision in the draft convention for the following reasons.

Our work in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the question of prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has demonstrated that a better understanding of the problems involved, and of possible solutions, will be required before we will be able to determine what sort of prohibitions in this area will be practicable and reliable. Working papers submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by various delegations have illustrated the extreme difficulty of determining, even by a variety of verification techniques, whether lethal chemical agents or munitions were in fact being manufactured by a particular country. One aspect of the problem is the difficulty of distinguishing between production facilities for chemicals needed for peaceful purposes and production facilities for highly lethal chemical warfare agents.

Another problem is that of defining precisely the chemical agents to be prohibited. The Japanese, Netherlands and Swedish delegations have submitted working papers to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament setting forth a number of possible approaches to this question.⁶ Having considered the research that

⁵ *Ante*, p. 510.

⁶ The Netherlands and Swedish papers appear *ante*, pp. 99-101 and 395-399. For the Japanese paper, see CCD/344.

has been done in this area, it is the conclusion of my Government that an undertaking of the sort suggested by the representative of Mexico could lead to confusion, and perhaps suspicion, among the parties as to whether or not others were observing the specific prohibitions involved. In practice, a small variation in chemical formula could produce an agent which, while technically not included on the list of those to be banned, would retain a high degree of toxicity and lethal effect.

For these reasons, we believe it preferable to follow through with the approach embodied in the present draft convention; that is, to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling for hostile purposes of all biological agents and all toxins and undertake a firm commitment to continue negotiations on effective measures for the prohibition of chemical weapons as well.

I would turn now to the proposal for the addition to the draft resolution on biological weapons of a preambular paragraph regarding the relationship between potential savings from disarmament and the satisfaction of urgent social and economic needs, particularly in the developing countries.⁷ We appreciate the constructive spirit in which 15 delegations have proposed this change. This matter was discussed at some length at Geneva this summer. It was, and remains, a matter of particular importance to the delegations of Brazil and Yugoslavia in accordance with positions taken by their Governments as a matter of high principle.

The view of my own Government on this matter is as follows: we believe that an important benefit of agreements in the field of disarmament can be the release of resources for the welfare of people everywhere, including the economic and social development of developing countries. While we recognize that it would be for each Government to decide, in accordance with its constitutional processes, the way in which such resources are to be allocated, we would hope they would keep in mind the concepts set forth in a number of General Assembly resolutions to the effect that the utilization of a substantial portion of those resources for development purposes can contribute materially to the economic and social well-being of all people.

The present draft convention prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins represents a first step—an extremely important first step—toward the prohibition of chemical and biological means of warfare. As many members of the Committee have noted, it is a true disarmament measure. Its broad acceptance will enhance the security of all countries. It will reduce the risk that the deliberate spread of disease would ever be inflicted on mankind as a means of warfare. It will help to ensure that biological and toxin weapons

⁷The draft res. appears *ante*, pp. 568-573. For the amendment, see *ante*, p. 742.

are eliminated from the arsenals of States. It will help to ensure that advances in the field of molecular biology, now being made at breathtaking pace, will be devoted to the benefit and not to the destruction of mankind. Finally, through its firm commitment regarding negotiations of effective prohibitions on chemical weapons, it will assure that all possible efforts are exerted towards progress on this problem.

The present draft of the convention is the culmination of some three years of intensive debate and negotiation regarding this subject by the international community. A specific proposal for an agreement in this field was first made at Geneva in the summer of 1968.⁸ In the fall of that year, the question of possible prohibitions on chemical and biological weapons was considered in some detail by the General Assembly and a resolution was adopted requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the help of experts, a study on the effects of the possible use of these weapons.⁹ That report,¹⁰ along with draft conventions submitted by the United Kingdom¹¹ and the Soviet Union and its allies,¹² was discussed during the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly in 1969. Following intensive work on this matter in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament during 1970, the question of prohibiting chemical and biological weapons was again thoroughly reviewed last year at the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, which adopted an important resolution on this subject.¹³ The Assembly has thus devoted a great deal of attention to the question of chemical and biological weapons; it has formulated a number of directives for negotiations in this area; and it has performed an important function in spurring progress toward the consensus developed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament regarding the draft convention now before us.

To make certain that the progress achieved will be durable and to make binding the commitment for intensive work on the challenges ahead, we hope that the Assembly will at this session recommend that the draft convention be opened for signature and ratification at an early date so that all Governments wishing to do so may join in an international agreement eliminating biological and toxin weapons.

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 569-571.

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 793-795.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 264-298.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 324-326.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 455-457.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, November 29, 1971¹

Today I shall deal with the item of our agenda the purpose of which is to consider to what extent resolution 2666 (XXV)² has been implemented with respect to the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, known also as the Treaty of Tlatelolco.³

It seems to me that perhaps it would not be superfluous to recall, by way of introduction, certain basic elements and aspects of the Treaty which it is useful never to lose sight of in order to have an adequate perspective for viewing that important multi-lateral legal instrument.

The Treaty of Tlatelolco is the culmination of a noble and bold Latin American enterprise. It is the result of the spontaneous exercise of the joint will of the States of that region. That is why the Secretary-General of the United Nations, U Thant, in the message which, on 12 February 1967 when the Treaty was unanimously adopted, he addressed to the Preparatory Committee that had drafted it, stated:

The nations of Latin America can, with ample justification, take pride in what they have wrought by their own initiative and through their own efforts.⁴

The Treaty of Tlatelolco was the first—and to this day remains the only—treaty through which it has been possible to establish a régime of complete absence of nuclear weapons, applied to densely populated areas and not to inter-stellar space, to the depths of the oceans, or to inhospitable plains under a mantle of perpetual snow.

Following the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, membership in the Treaty rose to 17, with the deposit, by Panama, of its instrument of ratification on 11 June 1971. As regards Additional Protocol I—whereby, as we know, States that are internationally responsible for territories within the area of application of the Treaty undertake to apply to said territories the statute of denuclearization for war purposes as defined in that Protocol—the ratification by the United Kingdom, which was already a fact, was supplemented, on 26 July 1971, by ratification by the Netherlands.

The area of Latin America free from nuclear weapons—which, when it includes all the territories within the area of application of the Treaty, will cover somewhat more than 20 million square kilometres in which, at the present level of population density,

¹ A/C.1/PV.1839, pp. 3-22.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 689-691.

³ For the Tlatelolco treaty and protocols, see *ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69-83.

⁴ COPREDAL press release SG/SM/661.

there will live 280 million human beings—today already includes an area of nearly 7 million square kilometres with a population of about 120 million people.

There is therefore nothing surprising in the fact that the exceptional significance of the Treaty for peace and disarmament has been recognized throughout the world in the loftiest international forums and especially the most representative organ of the international community, the General Assembly of the United Nations and by the highest officer of the Organization, the Secretary-General.

As regards the General Assembly, it will suffice to recall that when the Treaty was placed before the First Committee for the first time, the debates devoted to it took up 12 meetings which were held between 23 October and 28 November 1967. At those meetings the Treaty was the subject of the greatest praise by the representatives of 46 States from the most varied geographical areas, political ideologies and economic systems. To crown those debates, the General Assembly proclaimed in its resolution 2286 (XXII) that the Tlatelolco Treaty, “constitutes an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security.”⁵

As far as concerns the Secretary-General, so as not to abound in too many quotations, I shall limit myself to mentioning the ideas expressed by U Thant on 2 September 1969 at the inaugural ceremony of the General Conference of the Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, when he said:

In a world which too often looks dark and ominous, the Tlatelolco Treaty will shine like a beacon. This Treaty is a practical demonstration for all of mankind of what can be achieved when there is sufficient dedication and the necessary political will.⁶

The many references which, as in years past, have been made now in our debates to the Treaty of Tlatelolco emphasizing its beneficial influence as an example and an encouragement for the creation of other areas free from nuclear weapons on inhabited lands once more bear out the importance quite rightly attributed to the Treaty, and to its beneficial influence for disarmament.

There is, therefore, nothing surprising in the fact that the General Assembly, doubtless being convinced that the full co-operation of the nuclear Powers was necessary for the greater effectiveness of what was initially called denuclearization of Latin America, since its first resolution on the subject, resolution 1911 (XVIII), which was adopted in 1963,⁷ referred expressly to this aspect of the question, one with which the Assembly itself has dealt, after completing and opening for signature the Treaty and its two additional Protocols, dealt with three successive resolutions: resolution 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967,⁸ resolution

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 620-621.

⁶ OPANAL/PV.1 (prov.), p. 17.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 628-629.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 620-621.

2456 B (XXIII) on 20 December 1968,⁹ and resolution 2666 (XXV) on 7 December 1970 in which it has constantly appealed to the nuclear Powers to sign and ratify additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco as early as possible.¹⁰ In the last of the above mentioned resolutions, it urged them to delay no longer in responding to these appeals.

It is precisely to examine the implementation given by the nuclear Powers to the resolution I mentioned in the third place, resolution 2666 (XXV) that agenda item 31 was included for the twenty-sixth session. The fundamental point regarding this question is no doubt the one that [was?] emphasized in 1968 by the conference of non-nuclear States and which the General Assembly reiterated last year by stressing that the co-operation of the nuclear Powers for any treaty which establishes a nuclear free zone should, "be reflected in commitments contracted in a solemn international instrument which would also be legally completely binding like a treaty, a convention or a protocol." Furthermore, this procedure seems to be the only one that is in accord with the basic principle of the sovereign equality of States, since it would be contradictory to that principle if procedures such as unilateral declarations which are deemed to be insufficient in the case of States which do not possess nuclear weapons were to be accepted as satisfactory in the case of nuclear Powers.

I should also like to say a few words about the commitments which additional Protocol II entails for the nuclear Powers which sign and ratify it. In brief, these commitments are the following: (a) "To respect, in all its express aims and provisions, the statute of denuclearization of Latin America in respect of warlike purposes, as defined, delimited and set forth in the Treaty"; (b) "Not to contribute in any way to . . . acts" being practised on the territories to which the Treaty is applicable which entail "a violation of obligations of article 1 of the Treaty"; and (c) "Not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the contracting parties of the Treaty."¹¹ An analysis of these three obligations which additional Protocol II represents for the nuclear Powers parties to it leads to the conclusion that this is far from signifying anything burdensome for those Powers because, as the Assembly affirmed in its resolution 2666 (XXV),

these objections are entirely in conformity with the general obligations assumed under the Charter of the United Nations. Every Member of the Organization has solemnly undertaken to fulfil in good faith, as set forth in Article 2 of the Charter.¹²

I shall now go on to consider what is the present situation of Additional Protocol II in so far as signatures and ratifications are concerned, and what has been the progress achieved since the

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1968, p. 699.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 689-691.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1967, p. 83.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 690.

Assembly adopted its last resolution on the matter. At the same time, I shall give a brief recapitulation of some relevant questions.

After 7 December 1970, when resolution 2666 (XXV) was adopted, the United States, on 12 May 1971, became the second State party to Additional Protocol II. The first, as will be recalled, was the United Kingdom, which ratified the Protocol on 11 December 1969. Therefore, three of the five nuclear Powers have yet to sign and ratify the instrument. They are, in alphabetical order, China, France and the Soviet Union.

I believe that it might be of interest to review some of the main statements made by the representatives of those three Powers in regard to the question about which I am talking, and the rest of my statement will be devoted to this. This will enable us to assess the respective positions and forecasts which seem to be reasonable.

As regards the People's Republic of China, the Preparatory Commission for the Denuclearization of Latin America, which, as I have said, was given the task of negotiating the Treaty of Tlatelolco, decided in 1966 to request its Negotiating Committee, in the manner and following the procedures which it deemed appropriate, to explore informally whether the Government of that country would be prepared to undertake the commitment of respecting the legal status of the denuclearization of Latin America. The Committee carried out the negotiations requested of it, through the Mexican Ambassador to Cairo, Mr. Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, who established contact with his Chinese colleague in the same city. As a happy coincidence, at that time it was Ambassador Huang Hua, who, as we all know, has just been designated Permanent Representative of his country to the United Nations.

The main points of the reply of the Government of China which Ambassador Huang Hua transmitted orally on 8 August 1966 to his Mexican colleague, who, in turn, submitted it to the Negotiating Committee of the Preparatory Commission, are summarized in the second report of that Committee, which is published in document COPREDAL/CN/2 of 29 August of the same year. It reads as follows:

The Government of the People's Republic of China, even though it views with positive sympathy the efforts of the Latin American countries to denuclearize their zone, notes, of course, that all the activities carried out to this end are closely linked to a resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations which was adopted at its eighteenth session.

Since the United Nations has ignored all the rights of the People's Republic in the world Organization, China cannot have anything to do with its activities and is therefore not in a position to support the Treaty on the Denuclearization of Latin America.

The analysis of that statement would seem to warrant reaching a positive conclusion now for a future which we hope will not be distant—perhaps it is even imminent—since from those statements one might logically infer that, now that the question of the representation of China in the United Nations has been solved, all obstacles have disappeared, so that the Government of the

People's Republic of China may become a party to Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The conclusion is further confirmed if one reflects on some of the emphatic statements made in the plenary meeting of the Assembly, on Wednesday of last week by the Chairman of the delegation of China, Deputy Minister Chiao, who, it will be recalled, made clear the following among other things:

First and foremost, the countries possessing nuclear weapons should undertake the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other, and particularly undertake not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or nuclear-free zones. It should not be difficult to undertake such obligations if one truly has the desire to avert a nuclear war and move towards the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Many countries are now demanding the establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones. These are just demands which China supports.¹³

What is also particularly encouraging is the emphasis placed by the delegation of China, both in the statement I have just quoted and in the reply we heard in the plenary meeting on Friday, 26 November, on the importance which its Government justly attaches to having words always confirmed by deeds.

As regards France, there are two very significant pronouncements which should be recalled: in the first place, the one made by the French Ambassador in Mexico, which is the headquarters of the Preparatory Commission, who as an observer of his Government accredited to the Commission addressed to its Chairman on 26 July 1966—when the Commission had not yet completed the drafting of the Treaty—a note in which he indicated the following *inter alia*:

The Government of France, which follows with sympathy, of which you are aware, the efforts of the Latin American countries, has carefully studied the texts transmitted to it through me. Nevertheless, since we are not a party to the negotiations, we cannot pronounce ourselves with a complete knowledge of the treaty until such time as the members of the Committee will have successfully completed their work.

You can nevertheless be sure that France does not thereby welcome less favourably any effort to limit the dissemination of nuclear weapons when it proceeds from the will of the peoples concerned themselves. . . .¹⁴

Secondly, in the statement made at the 1510th meeting of the First Committee, which was held on 27 October 1967, the Permanent Representative of France in New York, in participating in the debates concerning the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which had been open[ed] for signature in February of the same year, expressed himself as follows:

I would not wish to lengthen the Committee's debate which is developing so satisfactorily, and I shall limit myself to saying a few words, but my Government wishes to make known the importance it attaches to the question we are discussing today . . .

Now that those efforts have succeeded and the Treaty of Tlatelolco exists, the French Government expresses its satisfaction at the fulfilment of the hopes with which it associated itself at a very early stage, and it expresses anew its sympathy for the Latin American States which have brought their undertaking to a successful conclusion . . .

¹³ *Ante*, pp. 758-759.

¹⁴ COPREDAL/47. Alfonso García Robles, *The Denuclearization of Latin America* (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1967), pp. 140-141.

My delegation wishes to make it known that the French Government is continuing with the greatest attention the study of the political and legal implications of the texts proposed for its signature. It is doubtless too early to prejudge the results of that study, but I am authorized to confirm that the message addressed last year by France to the representative of Mexico—who was good enough recently to recall its terms and describe them as positive—continues to govern France's attitude.¹⁵

I would be failing in truthfulness were I not to place on record the fact that it has been a matter of profound disappointment for the Latin American countries to observe that the sympathy and the good intentions that were so fully expressed in the two statements from which I have quoted have so far remained on paper. For of us who are aware of the political and legal genius of France and the abundance of its talent, it is truly incomprehensible that after almost five years it has not yet been possible to complete the study of a Treaty which in substance does not differ from many other treaties and which, of course, has nothing mysterious or esoteric about it. I should like to add that unfortunately we have found nothing to alter our reaction, which we believe to be the reaction of all Latin America, in the statement that was made here this morning by the representative of France.

With respect to the original attitude of the Soviet Union, its Ambassador to Mexico, in a note addressed to the Chairman of the Preparatory Committee on 20 January 1967, defined it as follows:

The Soviet Union is in favour of establishing denuclearized zones in the various areas of the world, considering that this will lead to an effective limitation of the displacement and use of nuclear weapons. The establishment of denuclearized zones is likewise of great importance in eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and in limiting the arms race.

The Government of the Soviet Union believes that, in the interest of strengthening peace and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the responsibility for creating denuclearized zones can be assumed not only by groups of States which cover entire continents of vast geographical areas, but also by limited groups of States and even by individual countries. For its part, the Soviet Government is prepared to contract the obligation of respecting the status of all the denuclearized zones which are established in the future, if other nuclear Powers undertake a like obligation.¹⁶

This attitude, so openly favourable to zones free from nuclear weapons, which was defined in the two paragraphs which I have just quoted, has since been reiterated *ad infinitum* by the Soviet Union in various international forums. It can therefore be considered to be a position which at least in theory continues to be valid.

It would therefore seem logical that the Soviet Union would already have at least signed the Protocol. Unfortunately that has not been so, and to explain its failure to comply with the appeals of the General Assembly, it drafted a rather complicated theory, an excellent example of which can be found in document A/8336, of 6 July 1971,¹⁷ on the item we are now considering. An analysis of that theory inevitably leads to the conclusion that, if its validity were accepted, one would automatically accept the theory which

¹⁵ A/C.1/PV.1510, pp. 33-35.

¹⁶ COPREDAL/60, Jan. 23, 1967.

¹⁷ *Ante*, pp. 1-2.

seems to constitute the implicit premise of the Soviet position, the two essential elements of which could be stated as follows:

First, it is not the United Nations but the Soviet Union which has exclusive authority to decide whether or not a nuclear-free zone exists in any part of the world, even though the zone has been established by a multilateral treaty which contains the most complete international system of inspection and control and which, as in the case of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, has received the repeated praise of the General Assembly and of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as well as the praise of the vast majority of the members of the international community.

Secondly, in such cases in which the Soviet Union would agree that the territory of one or several countries constitutes militarily denuclearized zones, the State or States concerned could only aspire to receive from the Soviet Union, and even this after certain conditions and reservations, a unilateral promise conceived in the terms which it deems suitable, and in no case a commitment contracted in one of the treaties which is recognized under law as a solemn international instrument, such as Additional Protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

Such a theory would render null and void the objectives pursued by Additional Protocol II and, furthermore, is in flagrant contradiction with all the resolutions on the subject adopted by the General Assembly and by the Conference of Non-Nuclear States, as may be perceived in document A/8346 of 23 July.¹⁸ Accordingly we venture to hope that a more thorough analysis of all the factors involved in this question will enable the nuclear Power I am referring to finally to heed the urgent appeals of the United Nations, which will surely be reiterated by the Assembly during this session, by adopting the draft resolution which 17 Latin American delegations have just submitted and which is contained in document A/C.1/L.587, sponsored by Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.¹⁹

Since all representatives already have this document and, on the other hand, its contents are such as not to need any explanation, particularly in the light of the considerations I have advanced in this statement, I shall, in conclusion, limit myself to recalling once again what, by virtue of the adoption of resolution 2286 (XXII), in regard to which I had the privilege of being the spokesman for the co-sponsors in the First Committee, I had the opportunity to affirm in the plenary meeting of the Assembly on 5 December 1967, and which I consider continues to be completely up to date:

We are convinced that all those who care for history's judgment of them should take very seriously the duties laid on them by this United Nations resolution. There was a

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 436-441.

¹⁹ Identical with G.A. res. 2830 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 898-899.

stage at which expression of encouragement and goodwill could be very useful for the preparatory work. But the signing of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, designed to ensure the complete and everlasting absence of nuclear weapons from the sub-continent with its more than 250 million inhabitants, has brought that stage to an end. We no longer need high-sounding words, but deeds.

There is one episode in Cervantes' immortal work in which one of the characters, Master Pedro, tells the Knight of La Mancha "*Operibus credite et non verbis*", which corresponds to the traditional Spanish version of the proverb "Actions speak louder than words". We are sure that this will be the criterion by which to judge the conduct of the States referred to in the Assembly resolution, the peoples directly or indirectly concerned with the future of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, whom we believe without exaggeration to include in one way or another all the peoples of the world.²⁰

Fourteen Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, November 30, 1971²¹

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons²² contains an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction,

Believing that it is most desirable that some measures of a preliminary nature be adopted immediately,

Urges all States to undertake, pending agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, to refrain from any further development of stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which because of their degree of toxicity have the highest lethal effects and are not usable for peaceful purposes.

Eleven Nation Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, November 30, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral

²⁰ A/PV. 1620, p. 9.

²¹ A/C.1/L.592, Nov. 30, 1971. The res. was sponsored by Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, and Sweden. It was later cosponsored by Colombia, Malta, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, and Venezuela. A revised version (A/C.1/L.592/Rev. 1) became pt. B of res. 2827 (*post*, p. 892).

²² *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

¹ A/C.1/L.590, Nov. 30, 1971. The draft res. was submitted by Ceylon, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, and Zambia. It was later cosponsored by Burundi and Swaziland. On Dec. 2 the 11 nations, joined by India and Yugoslavia, submitted a revised version (A/C.1/L.590/Rev. 1). *post*, pp. 831-833. A modified version of the revised draft was adopted by the G.A. as res. 2832 (*post* pp. 901-903).

and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity,

Recalling the Lusaka Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries of September 1970 calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which Great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons,

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the area by means other than military alliances as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for diversion of the limited resources of these States from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions,

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a beneficial influence in other regions and promote the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Solemnly declares* that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a Zone of Peace;

2. *Calls upon* the Great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean

(a) To bring to a halt the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) To take action to eliminate from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry;

3. *Calls upon* the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other

major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances in the Indian Ocean and to strengthen international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations

(b) Subject to the foregoing, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration;

5. *Decides* to include the item "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace" in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.

Warsaw Communiqué of Warsaw Pact Foreign Ministers, December 1, 1971¹

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member-states—the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Hungarian People's Republic, the German Democratic Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Rumania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic—took place in Warsaw from Nov. 30 to Dec. 1.

The Ministers examined the question of preparations for convening an all-European conference on security and cooperation.

They noted with satisfaction that a further positive development in the direction of improving the political situation in Europe has taken place recently, which is characterized by growing contacts, progress in the relaxation of tensions and in cooperation, and greater trust in the relations between European states, irrespective of their political and social systems. This

¹*Pravda*, Dec. 3, 1971, p. 4; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 48 (Dec. 28, 1971), p. 21.

development is the result of the efforts and constructive contribution of the states participating in the present conference, as well as the efforts and constructive contribution of a number of other states. New major landmarks in this respect are the signing of the quadripartite agreement on problems connected with West Berlin,² the deepening of political cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and France, and the widening of bilateral contacts between socialist and other European states. The treaties between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Federal Republic of Germany³ and between the Polish People's Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany⁴—signed in 1970—are already facilitating an improvement of the political climate in the relations between these states and exerting a favorable influence on the course of European affairs. The governments of the member-states of these treaties have been carrying out preparations for their ratification. The governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Federal Republic of Germany have been exchanging opinions on the settlement of their mutual relations, the prerequisite for which is the F.R.G.'s recognition that the Munich Pact was invalid from the very outset.

The Ministers expressed their satisfaction with the fact that the G.D.R.'s businesslike and constructive position facilitated favorable negotiations between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G., as well as between the G.D.R. and the West Berlin Senate.

Later the Ministers noted the widening agreement among interested states with respect to the desirability of the earliest convening of an all-European conference on security and cooperation. There is growing understanding that an all-European conference corresponds to the tasks of the gradual transformation of the relations between European states, which will make it possible to overcome the division of the continent into military-political groupings. There have been signs of an essential approximation of views concerning the content of the work of the conference, which should facilitate the creation of a system of commitments that would rule out the use of force or the threat of its use in the mutual relations between states in Europe and that would ensure observance of the principles of territorial integrity of states, respect for their sovereignty, noninterference in their internal affairs, equality, and independence of all states. Approximation of views has also come to light on the question of expanding economic, scientific, technical and cultural cooperation between European countries.

² *Department of State Bulletin*, Sept. 27, 1971, pp. 318 ff.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 403-404.

⁴ Senate Foreign Relations Committee, *Documents on Germany, 1944-1970* (Com. print, 92d Cong., 1st sess.), pp. 884-885.

In view of this development of events the governments of the Warsaw Treaty member-states have drawn the conclusion that a favorable situation is taking shape, making possible an all-European conference in 1972. At the same time, these governments have taken into consideration the fact that certain forces are still opposing the convening of an all-European conference and trying to aggravate the situation in Europe. The Ministers, however, expressed their governments' confidence that the active steps of all who are interested in the transition from a Europe of tension and conflict to a Europe of lasting peace are capable of overcoming the influence of these forces.

The Ministers exchanged opinions about the order of practical preparations for convening an all-European conference. On behalf of their governments they reaffirmed that they consider it desirable to implement the proposal of the government of Finland that all interested states conduct multilateral preparatory consultations for this purpose, where it will be possible to reach agreement on the agenda of an all-European conference, the procedure of its work, and the specific dates and manner of its convocation. The Ministers stated that their governments have decided to appoint plenipotentiary representatives to participate in multilateral consultations together with plenipotentiary representatives of other states with an eye to reaching agreement on questions involved in the preparation and organization of the conference and invite the governments of other interested states to act likewise. They proceed from the fact that the consultations should be carried out in such a way as to speed up the convening of an all-European conference and to contribute to the success of its work.

On the instructions of their governments the Ministers appealed to the governments of all European states, as well as to the governments of the U.S.A. and Canada, to begin practical preparations for an all-European conference immediately so as to ensure its convocation in 1972.

The Ministers also exchanged views on certain international problems exacerbating the international situation and firmly expressed themselves on behalf of their governments in favor of solving these questions by means of a political settlement, with respect for the legitimate rights and interests of the people.

New Zealand Amendments to Sixteen Nation Draft Resolution on Nuclear Tests, December 1, 1971⁵

1. At the end of the fifth preambular paragraph, after the words "5 August 1963," add the following: "and that some continue to test in the atmosphere,".

2. At the end of operative paragraph 2, after the words "and under Water", add the following: "and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty;".

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 1, 1971¹

In connexion with the debate held in the First Committee on disarmament matters the Soviet delegation would like to put forward certain ideas.

Our debate is of great interest; it reflects the concern of a large number of States at seeing the growing rate of the arms race and offers much material for further consideration of concrete items relating to disarmament. Many problems were touched upon in the debate having to do with general and nuclear disarmament, regional disarmament, and especially the reduction of armed forces in Europe et cetera.

Among the concrete disarmament problems a great deal of attention was paid to the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons. Many delegations expressed support for the draft convention submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament relating to the complete prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons.² At the same time some delegations expressed disagreement on finding that chemical

⁵ A/C.1/L.595, Dec. 1, 1971. The 16 nation draft res. appears *ante*, pp. 743-745. The First Committee of the G.A. approved these amendments by a vote of 53 to 3, with 49 abstentions:

In favor : Australia, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

Against: Albania, Algeria, China.

Abstaining: Arghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Congo, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, U.K., United Republic of Tanzania, U.S., Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

The amended draft res. became pt. C of res. 2828 (*post*, pp. 895-897).

¹ A/C.1/PV.1841, pp. 41-52.

² *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

and bacteriological types of weapons were separated and that agreement was reached only on a draft convention prohibiting one of these types of weapons.

We should like to note once again in this connexion that the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, strove to achieve a simultaneous solution of both aspects of this problem, but for reasons well known to all we had to select a solution for the problem which in the present concrete circumstances was the only possible one. Unfortunately, there was no other way.

The representative of Tanzania, Mr. Seaton, in his statement in the Committee on 25 November correctly presented the arguments put forward by the Soviet delegation to explain the situation which led the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to agree on a draft convention only on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons. We should like to stress that the conclusion of a convention on bacteriological weapons creates more propitious conditions for the solution of the question of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. In the view of my delegation, primary importance must be attached to this matter in subsequent disarmament talks and all efforts must be made to ensure its solution at an early date. The Soviet side will act in that direction.

Much was said in the debate on the question of the prohibition of all nuclear tests. Many representatives stressed the urgency of solving this problem. In this connexion, the representatives of some Western countries persistently propounded the view that to settle the question of the prohibition of all underground nuclear tests, it was necessary to solve complex technical tasks which would ensure appropriate control over respect by States of their obligations relating to the prohibition of all nuclear tests.

The Soviet side stresses once again that a solution of the question of the prohibition of all nuclear weapons tests requires above all a political settlement by Powers possessing nuclear weapons. Our position was supported by many delegations in the general debate on disarmament. For instance, the representative of Norway, Mr. Faremo, declared on 25 November:

My Government is also inclined to feel that the test-ban problem now lends itself to a political rather than a technical approach.³

In the debate, the representative of Great Britain, Lord Lothian, without going into the substance of the matter, expressed surprise at seeing that the Soviet delegation in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had rejected proposals relating to a partial solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests. We should like to note in this connexion that in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament proposals were put forward

³ A/C.1/PV.1836, p. 46.

aiming at the partial solution of the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear tests.

The United Kingdom submitted a proposal that there be established so-called yearly quotas for nuclear Powers for all nuclear weapon tests.⁴ The amounts of these quotas were to be reduced from one year to the next. The Soviet side considers that the proposal on the establishment of yearly quotas for nuclear tests does not lead towards a solution of the problem of their prohibition. We asked the United Kingdom delegation: What would be the basis of the system of guarantees of respect for obligations under such a limited prohibition of nuclear tests? If this system is based on the use of national means of detection, then there is no need to have yearly quotas. On the basis of these means of detection it is possible and indispensable to prohibit completely any underground nuclear tests.

We stated further that if underground explosions, carried out on the basis of yearly quotas, are controlled through compulsory inspection on the spot, the whole question again reverts to the vicious circle created by the certain Western Powers which put forward the unfounded requirement of international inspection on the spot, and through this demand in fact blocked the solution of the problem of the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests.

In the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament we expressed the view that the proposal about the so-called diminishing quota of underground nuclear tests in no way solves and even does not bring us any closer to the solution of the problem of the prohibition of nuclear tests. The obstacles in the path of progress will not only remain but other difficulties will accrue linked to the establishment of quotas for various States, time-limits et cetera. At the same time the establishment of quotas for underground explosions would amount, in fact, to legalizing such explosions. We should like to stress that the questions asked by us in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in connexion with the British proposal on diminishing quotas for nuclear explosions, have remained unanswered.⁵

The Soviet delegation, for reasons which we put forward about the British proposal, can also not support the proposal of some delegations that there be a limitation on the number and power of underground explosions. These proposals, unfortunately, do not contain any concrete foundations for the prohibition or cessation of all nuclear tests; they are not conducive to the solution of this problem.

The Soviet delegation would now like to say a few words in connexion with consideration of the question of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The Soviet Union fully

⁴*Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 533-534; ENDC/232.

⁵See *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 556-557; *ibid.*, 1969, pp. 422-423; *ante*, pp. 33-34.

appreciates the idea of creating a zone of peace in that area, but we should like to see that idea carried out in such a way as to be most in conformity with the task of strengthening peace and the security of States in the Indian Ocean, as well as the cause of general peace and security for all peoples.

In this connexion we should like to say that we share the views of the representative of Afghanistan, Ambassador Farhang, who declared in this Committee on 25 November that this question: ". . . deserves careful and sympathetic consideration on the part of all Member States."⁶

Expressing sympathy for the idea of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, the Soviet side, like many other States, is interested in the implementation of that proposal, as it is a genuine measure for strengthening international peace and security and ensuring the further development and strengthening of generally recognized principles of international law.

In the matter of implementing the proposal of Ceylon on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace,⁷ it is necessary, in the view of the Soviet side, to take the following into account: the creation of such a zone must provide for actual measures limiting the arms race and for disarmament in that area. The declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace must, above all, provide for the elimination of existing foreign military bases in that part of the world, which are a serious source of international conflict.

If such a measure is not carried out, the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace will not attain the objective of easing international tension in that part of the world and of strengthening general peace. The declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace must not lead to undermining or weakening existing generally recognized principles of international law; this measure must be carried out in full conformity with generally recognized principles of international law on the freedom of the high seas, enshrined in the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the high seas.⁸

As you know, that Convention provides for freedom of navigation for all ships, including military ships, and for carrying out scientific research with the use of such ships.

The Soviet delegation considers that the proposal of Ceylon to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace must be carefully studied and become the object of agreement among the parties concerned before the General Assembly takes a decision on that proposal.

During the debate, much attention was paid to the organizational aspects of the disarmament talks—membership, procedure for the consideration of questions, and so on. Those matters

⁶ A/C.1/PV.1836, p. 53.

⁷ See *ante*, pp. 807-809.

⁸ 13 UST 2312.

deserve the most serious consideration and attention. The success of the disarmament talks largely depends upon who is engaged in them, how they are carried out, and in what climate. The Soviet side considers that all possibilities must be utilized to ensure progress towards agreement and the adoption of measures limiting the arms race and leading to disarmament. In this connexion, we must first talk about the participants in the negotiations. In fact, all delegations that have spoken in this debate have stressed the need for all nuclear Powers to take part in talks on this problem. Thus the representative of Indonesia, Ambassador Sharif, in his very significant and interesting statement of 24 November of this year, said the following on this matter:

With the People's Republic of China in its rightful place, both in the Assembly and in the Security Council, we may expect full participation of all five permanent members of the Security Council in our joint responsibility to help develop the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments and disarmament, as a means of maintaining international peace and security under the Charter.⁹

The Soviet Union shares the view that all nuclear Powers must take part in disarmament talks. The representatives of the Soviet Union in the General Assembly, in the Committee on Disarmament and in other international forums have often declared that to achieve success in the talks and to agree on disarmament measures in talks and agreements on these matters all militarily significant States must take part—and, in any case, all Powers possessing nuclear weapons. That is why one of the primary tasks in the field of organizational measures for the consideration of disarmament problems is to ensure the participation in the talks on disarmament—especially nuclear disarmament—of all nuclear Powers, together with other States.

The body in which multilateral negotiations are now being carried out, in which agreement is reached on draft agreements on disarmaments, is the Committee on Disarmament, composed of 26 States. We note that many of those who spoke on this matter in the First Committee, including representatives of States which do not take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament, spoke positively about that international body and expressed the view that it was appropriate and necessary for the Committee on Disarmament to pursue its work.

That opinion coincides with that of the Soviet Union on the matter. We think it wrong to take steps at present which would undermine or weaken the activities of the Committee on Disarmament, which has proved to be a useful body for negotiations on disarmament matters. At the same time, we cannot leave unanswered the many critical remarks and ideas expressed during the debate on disarmament about the procedures and activities of the Committee on Disarmament. Some representatives declared that it was necessary to modify the organizational aspects of the activities

⁹ A/C.1/PV.1835, p. 12.

of the Committee on Disarmament; criticism was expressed about the method of having two Powers as Co-Chairmen of the Committee on Disarmament. This makes it necessary, in our view, to consider this question in detail, as well as the methods and procedures of work of the Committee on Disarmament as a whole.

At the same time, we should like to state that one cannot agree with all the critical remarks and ideas expressed about the organization and work of the Committee on Disarmament. During the debate, some delegations tried to present the state of affairs in the Committee in the following manner: that two super-Powers, taking advantage of their position as Co-Chairmen of the Committee, imposed their decisions upon the other participants in that Committee.

This assessment of the situation does not correspond to the reality. It suffices to study the documents relating to the preparation of draft treaties and agreements and the records of discussions in the Committee to come to the conclusion that in fact all participants, all members of the Committee, large, medium-sized and small States alike, have made their contributions in working out and agreeing on draft treaties and agreements. There is no doubt that the draft treaties and agreements approved by the Committee on Disarmament are the results of common, collective efforts of practically all States members of the Committee on Disarmament. If we compare the original draft treaties submitted to the Committee—on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, on prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and ocean floor of all weapons of mass destruction, on the complete prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons—with the final texts presented to the General Assembly for approval, we can easily see the great significance of the contributions made by many members of the Committee on Disarmament to the agreements reached in those international documents. It would suffice to examine the reports submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly to see the great and concrete contributions made by the various members of the Committee in the consideration of disarmament problems as a whole and in working out the international documents on which agreement was reached.

It must be observed that disarmament problems are resolved only through a complex and lengthy procedure of agreement on many problems among many States. There are questions of a political, military, legal and economic nature involved, requiring a search for solutions acceptable to many States. All this consumes a great deal of time. The Soviet side strives energetically to speed up the work of the Committee on Disarmament for agreement on the problems under consideration, but practice shows that this cannot always be done.

In assessing the work of the Committee on Disarmament as a whole, we should like to note once again that, despite the fact that

the Soviet side is not satisfied with the absence of substantial progress in the solution of key disarmament problems, we nevertheless consider the Committee to be a necessary and useful international forum for discussions on problems of disarmament.

The work it has done is a useful contribution to the international co-operation of States in a very important field of international life, namely the limitation of the arms race, disarmament, and the achievement, in this way, of an easement of international tensions and a strengthening of peace in general.

These are the remarks of the Soviet delegation in connexion with the disarmament problems under consideration in this Committee.

Statement by the Ceylonese Representative (Amerasinghe) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 1, 1971¹

The general debate on disarmament is over. The moment of decision on the many draft resolutions that have been submitted on this item has now come. My delegation is greatly obliged to you, Mr. Chairman, for giving us this opportunity at this stage of presenting the draft resolution on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, contained in document A/C.1/L.590, dated 30 November, which we have been privileged to present in the company of the delegations of Burundi, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen and Zambia.²

It is always a rather serious responsibility to present a draft resolution of a somewhat radical nature. We have been told that our proposal has a utopian character, but we are comforted by the thought that the utopias of today are the commonplaces of an enlightened tomorrow. It is in that spirit that we present this draft resolution, and it is in that spirit that we wish the members of this Committee to examine it and to pass judgement on it.

We have had more than one occasion previously to outline the special features of this proposal to declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. In the general debate in the General Assembly, my Prime Minister set out this proposal.³ In the debate in this Committee on the strengthening of international peace and security, and once again in the general debate on disarmament, I went into great detail about our proposal. As I stated on those two occasions, we had, in deference to the criticisms and observations made by those parties who are interested in the proposal and even by those who are not so interested, to modify it.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1842, pp. 48-63.

² *Ante*, pp. 807-809.

³ A/PV.1962 (prov.), pp. 9-13.

We watered it down, and I am afraid that we have watered it down so much that it has become as formless as water. That is why we hope that there will be no difficulty on the part of the Committee in accepting this proposal. Before going into the details of the draft resolution that we have presented, I should like to make a few observations of a general character in regard to our attitude over the years towards the twin subjects of disarmament and peace and the strengthening of international peace and security.

It is somewhat mortifying that any mention of peace in this Organization, which is dedicated to peace and which has even been described, I believe, as a temple of peace, should cause panic. The reason for this is that we have concentrated our attention on the approach that is taken towards international peace and security in that other smaller but extremely august and exclusive body: the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. I find that the attitude towards disarmament seems to be essentially a fatalistic attitude. We have to free ourselves from that attitude and adopt a different attitude, a positive attitude, an affirmative attitude.

This attitude, we like to believe, is expressed both in how our draft resolution on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and in the Declaration that was recently issued at the meeting of Foreign Ministers of the countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations on 27 November 1971, seeking to secure recognition of and respect for South East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.⁴

A careful examination of this Declaration and of our draft resolution will indicate clearly that they are complementary to each other. There is a marked similarity between the two declarations. The countries of Asia, and especially those countries whose Foreign Ministers have subscribed to the Declaration of Ascon of 27 November 1971, have for many years been living in the shadow of war. No one can understand better than they the meaning of war and the consequences of war. No one can, therefore, better appreciate the need of creating conditions of neutrality than they. We applaud their effort because, as I stated just a while ago, it complements our own, and the two together form a pattern, a positive pattern, of peace, which we hope all the Members of this Organization will encourage us in realizing.

Asia is now in its darkest hour, but, as we all know, the darkest hour is just before the dawn. It is that hope for a dawn that we are trying to create by seeking the recognition of the Indian Ocean area as a zone of peace, and, I might say, we hope that it will be coupled, in due course, with the recognition of and respect for South-East Asia as a zone of neutrality. What is significant is that

⁴*New York Times*, Nov. 28, 1971, p. 6.

this proposal for the neutralization of South-East Asia has been presented by countries which themselves are involved in military alliances, but a study of their own declaration indicates that they wish to free themselves from that commitment, so that they can realize neutrality in its truest form.

These two declarations, if honestly implemented—and for that we require the positive support of the great Powers—will herald the dawn of a new day in Asia.

What are the possible objections to the proposal that we have presented in document A/C.1/L.590? I raise this question first, because in the course of the debate, I have heard several reservations being expressed. I shall try to deal with these first, before commenting on the content of our draft resolution, because there is no better approach to a question than to meet your criticism first before you justify your own proposal. We have been asked why, in our declaration, we refer, in operative paragraph 1, to the need for determination of the limits? The reason is obvious. The whole idea, the whole purpose behind the draft declaration is to initiate the process of consultation and negotiation which will result in the final acceptance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Experience in regard to other proposals has shown us that we cannot start with a definition. We start with the assertion, the enunciation, of a principle, and then go on to find the limit within which that principle can be given practical application.

I have in mind the case of the reservation of the area of the sea-bed and the ocean floor and the subsoil thereof beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, and the reservation of that area exclusively for peaceful purposes, and the use of the resources of that area for the benefit of all mankind. We kept it deliberately vague by referring to limits as those beyond national jurisdiction because there was no agreement on what the limits of national jurisdiction were. In this case too, therefore, we find it necessary merely to state that the Indian Ocean should be declared a zone of peace and that the limits of that zone of peace should be left to future determination.

Future determination by whom and by what means? Clearly, through the process of international negotiation and consultation, and final agreement through an instrument in the form of an international treaty.

We have been asked how we can declare an area to be a zone of peace even before we create conditions of peace in the area. My only answer to that question is that if we have conditions of peace in the area, we do not need to declare it a zone of peace; it is so.

We have also been asked how we can reconcile the concept of a zone of peace with the presence of foreign military bases, military installations, fortifications, and so on, and why we do not first ask for the elimination of foreign military bases from the area. My

answer is the same. If we have no foreign military bases in the area, it is quite easy to declare it a zone of peace. But we are giving here what we consider to be the definition of a zone of peace, and what we must try to achieve once again through the process of international consultation and international negotiation.

As I stated in one of my earlier interventions on the subject, we would certainly want to see all foreign military bases removed from this area. This is the cardinal principle of non-alignment, and it is out of the Lusaka Declaration of September 1970 that this idea emerged.

That was the birthplace of the concept of declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and, as anyone who is even remotely acquainted with the concept of non-alignment would know, its central theme is that of the elimination of foreign military bases and it is not peculiar to the Lusaka Declaration. As I said in my intervention in the general debate on disarmament, even the joint statement of the United States and the Soviet Union on the programme of disarmament⁵ indicated that it had to work towards the removal of military bases and fortifications.

It has been stated that the proposal needs careful consideration. Admittedly, that is why we have provided in this draft declaration only for the process of consultation and negotiation. One further observation has been made that it is necessary to proceed from existing universally recognized principles of international law set out in the Geneva Conventions on the law of the sea of 1958 which provide for the freedom of shipping on the high seas and the right of scientific investigation there for all ships, including naval vessels.

I wish to ask those who have raised that question whether there is any syllable in this draft declaration which challenges that right or detracts from those freedoms. We want to preserve the freedom of the seas and their navigation, fishing, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines and over-flight. We also wish to state that all those freedoms and others customarily recognized in international law which are guaranteed under the Geneva Convention, can be exercised only with due regard to the interest of others, and that is all that we seek.

Freedom has meaning only if it does not result in the destruction of freedom and we cannot possibly subscribe to any definition of the freedom of the seas as implying the right to create conditions of anarchy or to roam at will threatening all and sundry. That was not how the concept of the freedom of the high seas was born. It was born out of the desire to prevent piracy and we want to keep it in that form, to prevent a new form of piracy. What we state in this draft resolution is that we do not need the military protection of the great Powers. We want to free ourselves from the necessity of being dependent upon them for military

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 439-442.

protection and we can achieve that only if we accept in good faith and full determination a concept such as this, the declaration of an area as a zone of peace.

Must the wishes of a large group of small nations, in this instance the littoral States of the Indian Ocean and the hinterland States of that ocean, be subordinated to the interests of the great Powers that wish to be free to send their vessels for any purpose whatsoever into the Indian Ocean, vessels not only of peace but their vessels of war. We cannot possibly in this age and time subordinate the peaceful interests of these small States to the will, to the prejudices and predilections of the great Powers. And it is that understanding that we want from them.

Where does the future of the small nations lie? Does it lie in creating conditions of peace in which they can develop their economies, proceed towards the reconstruction and modernization of their economies and their societies? Most emphatically it does. Does it lie in conditions which would compel them to provide markets for the munitions industries, and armaments industries of the great Powers? Most emphatically it does not. We can only save ourselves from that plight if we work with determination and sincerity towards the creation of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. All that we ask is that the apostles of peace who are so well represented in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament should enter into consultations and negotiations to achieve the object that we have in mind.

What this draft declaration seeks to do is to erect some signpost in the direction of peace in what is a tropical jungle. Anyone who has found himself in a tropical jungle, as I have had the misfortune of finding myself once, would know that at the very moment when he thinks he is proceeding towards his destination he is going in the opposite direction. That is why we wish to have some signpost and not for any other reason. Not in order to embarrass one bloc or another; not in order to place one bloc at an advantage over another; and not in order to give a perpetual advantage to one. All we want is that all the great Powers should move out of the area and take their arms and installations away with them. Is that an unreasonable request?

Permit me now to refer in some detail to the terms of our draft resolution. In its preambular part we express the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States to preserve their independence and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity. We have heard quite a lot about that subject, about the need for peace and tranquillity to ensure steady progress in the matter of economic development. We recall the Lusaka Declaration which, as I said, was the birthplace of this whole idea. We express the conviction regarding the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of conditions of peace and tranquillity in the area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other

obligations that call for diversion of limited resources which can ill be spared from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and, moreover—and much more serious than that—because such military alliances involve us in great Power rivalries.

The immediate occasion for the presentation of this proposal to the United Nations is the recent signs of the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean which must pose a serious threat to the maintenance of conditions of peace and tranquillity in the area. The major Powers are themselves now and have for some time been involved in consultations and negotiations with the object of eliminating and arresting the arms race. Almost every instrument that we adopt in regard to disarmament speaks of the arms race but when we do make an effort to stop it in one area there is, as I said, consternation.

We also express in the preamble the conviction that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, that is, the development of the arms race, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security. That proposition is self-evident.

We further express the conviction that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a beneficial influence in other regions and promote the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all in accordance with the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations. I sincerely hope that there is not a single member in this Committee who finds that prospect in the least disturbing. If there is one strain of bacteria that I should like to see disseminated everywhere, it is the bacteria of peace.

To turn to the operative part of this draft resolution, operative paragraph 1,

Solemnly declares that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a Zone of Peace;

We declare our objective and in the subsequent paragraphs we indicate how we can achieve them. Operative paragraph 2,

Calls upon the Great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean

(a) To bring to a halt the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) To take action to eliminate from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of Great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of Great Power rivalry.

Subparagraph (a) only expresses the oft-repeated intentions and desires of the Great Powers themselves. Subparagraph (b) also echoes their own sentiments, but we wish to make it clear to those who have asked us why we do not first eliminate military bases, that we cannot start at the end. We can do that only through the

process of consultation and negotiation. If this were so easily achieved there would be no need even for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Paragraph 3,

Calls upon the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council . . .

for obvious reasons—

and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, . . .

for equally obvious reasons—

in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances in the Indian Ocean and to strengthen international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure

three main purposes.

Before I come to those purposes I should like to state that in referring to the objective of, “establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances in the Indian Ocean and to strengthen international security through regional and other co-operation” we are merely repeating paragraph 11 of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Peace and Security. We consider it most appropriate to cite that paragraph in the context of what we seek to achieve through the process of consultation and negotiation among the three principal parties—the littoral and hinterland States, the permanent members of the Security Council who have the primary responsibility under the Charter for maintaining international peace and security, and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean who depend so largely on the preservation intact of the right of free passage across the Indian Ocean to ensure their vital supplies.

What are the three purposes towards which we wish these consultations to work? The first is that “warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.” (paragraph 3 (a)) This is by no means an infringement of any right that can legitimately be claimed under the doctrine of the freedom of the seas or under the Convention of the High Seas. It would permit vessels, even naval vessels which are engaged in research, to conduct that research without any interference. It would permit warships moving across the Indian Ocean from east to west or west to east going on their mission, whether a mission of war, or peace—which is most unlikely—so long as they are not there to threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity or independence of any littoral or hinterland State. States further off should make provision to secure their own sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence.

We bring this point out in subparagraph (b) when we say that

“Subject to the foregoing,” that is, the limitation imposed on the presence of warships and military aircraft, “the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected.” Where then is there any scope for apprehension or fear in regard to the freedom of the seas as we understand it?

Subparagraph (c) requires that

Appropriate arrangements are [to be] made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Operative paragraph 4,

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration,

Finally, paragraph 5 seeks to ensure that we shall not lose sight of this item after we adjourn from here. We therefore ask that the item shall be included in the provisional agenda of the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly.⁶

I wish to conclude by addressing a special appeal to the major Powers, the great Powers. We wish them merely to enter into consultations with us to achieve what we believe is something which they desire as we do, that is to create an area of peace in a large section of this universe. It would redound to their own advantage just as much as it would redound to ours. We do not wish legal and technical objections to be raised on what is merely a request for consultation and negotiation. I hope that this draft resolution will prove acceptable to an overwhelming majority of the members of this Committee.

Statement by the Italian Representative (Caracciolo) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: General and Complete Disarmament, December 1, 1971¹

Allow me to say a few words to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.589 on general and complete disarmament, sponsored by Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, the Philippines, Sweden, Uruguay and Yugoslavia.² The draft resolution is self-explanatory. It is the logical development of the resolutions approved by the General Assembly on the same subject in its last session. It is also in keeping with the position which my delegation has upheld both in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and in this forum during the past few years.

It also aims at stressing three points. The first is that general and complete disarmament remains the fundamental goal of the

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 641-642.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1842, pp. 63-66.

² Identical with pt. B of G.A. res. 2825 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 882-883.

United Nations. Its achievement is in fact an essential factor for the building of a permanent system of peace based on the principles of the Charter.

Second, this goal can be best attained by carrying out a comprehensive programme of work that would maintain a constant link between the final objective and the partial or collateral measures which can be gradually negotiated. The draft resolution, in the second preambular paragraph, recalls that resolution 2661 C (XXV) offers constructive guidelines in this connexion and, in operative paragraph 2, stressed the usefulness of these guidelines for further discussions and negotiations.³

Third, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, as the only multilateral negotiating body in this field, has an essential responsibility in the pursuit of general and complete disarmament. As underlined in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, the time is ripe for the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to resume work on this objective, which has been overshadowed during the last few years.

May I be allowed to make it clear that by that paragraph we do not intend to change the priority of the urgent problems to which the attention of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been called, nor to divert its activity from negotiation on concrete measures. We only wish to emphasize the organic link which may be established between these measures and to encourage the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to envisage them in a framework likely to promote new efforts towards the final goal.

The development of the debate on the disarmament problems in this forum and in the General Assembly seems to indicate that the remarks I have just made are shared by a large number of Members of the United Nations. I wish, therefore, to express the hope that our Committee will fully support this draft resolution.

Statement by the New Zealand Representative (Scott) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, December 1, 1971¹

When I spoke in this Committee a week ago on the subject of nuclear testing, I said that

My Government is opposed to all nuclear testing by all States and it considers that the nuclear Powers have a duty to come to an early agreement on a treaty banning nuclear testing. It is a matter of particular concern that eight years after the signing of the Moscow Partial Test-ban Treaty the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in which all the nuclear Powers parties to that Treaty are represented, has still not been able to agree on the text of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It is also a matter for concern that two of these nuclear Powers are continuing to carry out large-scale underground tests.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 682-683.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1842, pp. 67-71.

After noting that two States still conducted nuclear tests in the atmosphere, I went on to say:

... the New Zealand Government urges most strongly—and especially in view of the fact that there has very recently been another such test—that there should be an end to all atmospheric testing.

I also said:

Nothing less than suspension of atmospheric testing, given the potential hazard to health which it constitutes, would be an adequate response from all the Governments concerned.²

I want to speak today about the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585, submitted by Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada and other sponsors.³ This draft resolution reflects the views of my Government on the question of underground testing, but my delegation thinks it is deficient in its approach to atmospheric testing.

In 1963 the General Assembly adopted resolution 1910 (XVIII), in which the Assembly noted that it was

Fully aware of its responsibility with regard to the question of nuclear weapon testing and of the views of world public opinion on this matter

and called upon

all States to become parties to the Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, and to abide by its spirit and provisions.⁴

That resolution was adopted by 104 votes to 1, with 3 abstentions. Since then, over 110 Members of the United Nations have become parties to the Moscow Treaty.

In every year since 1964 the General Assembly has urged all States to become parties to the Moscow Treaty⁵ and has expressed concern at the continuation of testing. In 1965, resolution 2032 (XX) contained such a provision; it was adopted by 92 votes to 1.⁶ Resolution 2163 (XXI) was adopted by 100 votes to 1⁷ and also contained this provision, as did the following resolutions: resolution 2343 (XXII), adopted by 103 votes to 1⁸; resolution 2455 (XXIII), adopted by 108 votes to none⁹; resolution 2604 B (XXIV), adopted by 114 votes to 1¹⁰; and resolution 2663 B (XXV), adopted at the last session by 112 votes to none.¹¹

In spite of those repeated expressions of the General Assembly's conviction that nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere should cease, it still continues.

² A/C.1/PV.1835, pp. 42-43.

³ *Ante*, pp. 743-745.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 627.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 623-624.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1967, p. 731.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 796-797.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1969, p. 722.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1970, p. 687.

Earlier in this session of the General Assembly my delegation listened with considerable sympathy as speakers from some countries informed us of the environmental damage which could result from certain underground nuclear tests. No one can dispute that the potential hazard from the continuation of atmospheric testing is infinitely greater. It is a problem which should be the concern of every delegation present here today. For instance, the sea-bed Committee has included a statement in its report saying that in view, among other things, of the possibility of serious harm to the marine environment and marine life in the Pacific atmospheric testing should be stopped in that area. That statement could not be adopted as a consensus view by the Committee because one State opposed it. I need hardly add that one of the elements in the Committee's concern was the importance of eliminating all chances of harm to marine life which is a vital element in the subsistence and economy of the Pacific Islanders.

My delegation has viewed the continuation of atmospheric nuclear testing in the Pacific and elsewhere with increasing concern. We feel that this practice should be brought to an end as soon as possible. The co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 have themselves, in the penultimate preambular paragraph, referred to the special concern with which they note that nuclear weapons test[s] in the atmosphere are continuing. But my delegation considers that that is not sufficient.

We have therefore put forward an amendment to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 which reflects our position. This amendment reads as follows: We would amend the fifth preambular paragraph by adding after the words "5 August 1963" the following words "and that some continue to test in the atmosphere"; and we would amend operative paragraph 2 by adding, after the last word "Water", the following words "and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty". The amendment to the fifth preambular paragraph is self-explanatory. It is a statement of fact added to an expression of opinion by the General Assembly.

The amendment to operative paragraph 2 calls upon States not party to the Moscow Treaty to refrain from testing nuclear weapons in the atmosphere or in the other environments covered by the Treaty. We feel that that is the least the General Assembly can ask of those States. We commend this amendment to members of the Committee and express the hope that it will be adopted by an overwhelming vote.¹²

We recognize that the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 are primarily concerned with the question of underground testing; but in our view we cannot and should not ignore atmospheric testing. Our amendments are thus designed to introduce an element of balance into the draft

¹² The amendments appear *ante*, pp. 743-745.

resolution and to correct what seems to us to be a conspicuous omission from the draft.

Nuclear testing in any environment creates fear and anxiety among people, especially those who reside in the area where tests are carried out. Nuclear testing creates tension and strain in the relations between States. Nuclear testing is destructive of goodwill and of confidence in the intentions and actions of those Powers that, on the one hand, continue to carry out these tests while; on the other, profess to support the principles and goal of disarmament.

Testing has been eloquently deplored year after year in this debate by the great majority of the representatives of the world community. This concern of the international community has been reiterated many times by resolutions of the General Assembly and by the simple and stark fact of the adherence of 110 Member Governments of the United Nations to the Moscow Treaty of 1963. This is an eloquent testimony of the world-wide concern at the continuation of nuclear testing in the atmosphere as in other environments.

Statement by the Maltese Representative (Bellizzi) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Safeguards on New Techniques of Uranium Enrichment, December 1, 1971¹

Mr. Chairman, thank you for permitting me to introduce the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.588.² I shall try to be brief.

It is pertinent to recall that the General Assembly last year adopted by a near-unanimous vote resolution 2261 B (XXV).³ That resolution requested the International Atomic Energy Agency to pay attention, in its study of safeguards under the non-proliferation Treaty, also to the safeguards required with respect to new techniques for uranium enrichment.

In adopting that resolution, the Assembly overwhelmingly showed its conviction that the development of new techniques of uranium enrichment could—unless subject to effective safeguards—pose a serious threat to the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty. Similar fears had been expressed by no less an authority than our distinguished Secretary-General, who, in his statement to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 18 February 1970, had voiced his concern about the possible military applications of the gas centrifuge method of producing enriched uranium—which is only one of the various new methods now being developed in several countries.⁴

¹ A/C.1/PV.1842, pp. 71-75.

² Identical with pt. A of G.A. res. 2825 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 881-882.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 682-683.

⁴ CCD/PV.450, p. 9.

I would again emphasize, as my delegation did last year in introducing the draft that became resolution 2261 B (XXV), that we are fully appreciative of the fact that new methods of uranium enrichment have been developed primarily with a view to the peaceful applications of nuclear energy, and indeed that without such new techniques the supply of enriched uranium may well fall short of the expected demand for peaceful purposes.⁵ We are also highly appreciative of the commendable speed with which the Safeguards Committee of the International Atomic Energy Agency has worked out safeguards procedures pursuant to article III of the non-proliferation Treaty.

However, the concern which we showed last year and which was shared by the General Assembly in resolution 2261 B (XXV) has not been entirely dissipated as a result of the International Atomic Energy Agency's report presented to the Assembly in document A/8384. The two brief paragraphs devoted to the question of safeguards with respect to uranium enrichment plants do not, in the view of my delegation, add much to what we already knew. These paragraphs tell us: first, that the demand for enriched uranium is expected to increase rapidly during the next two decades; secondly, that as a consequence there will be growing interest on the part of many countries in obtaining the capacity to meet this expanding demand for enriched uranium; thirdly, that Agency safeguards have not so far been applied in uranium enrichment plants, and that the structure and content of safeguard agreements, recommended by the Safeguards Committee, were formulated on the basis of experience in applying safeguards to nuclear material in facilities other than enrichment plants; finally, that the Agency will continue to follow developments and pursue its studies of the possible implications of new techniques for uranium enrichment with a view to determining the effect they might have on the application of safeguards in practice.

In my delegation's opinion these bland expressions do not fully respond to the Assembly's request for information. They do not dispel the concern voiced by the Assembly last year, a concern which is grounded in the Assembly's fundamental right to know the manner in which safeguards under the non-proliferation Treaty⁶—which the General Assembly itself had commended to Member States—are to be adapted to the advance of technology.

Accordingly, the purpose of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.588, which representatives will already have had an opportunity to consider, is to voice—in very moderate and indeed complimentary terms—that concern once again and to call for fuller information. We were and will remain concerned that unless uranium enrichment facilities, especially those using new techniques, are brought under effective Agency safeguards, a

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 649-651.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

serious loophole would be left open through which the viability of the non-proliferation Treaty would be threatened. We are all painfully aware of the many other threats to the continued viability of that Treaty. Unfortunately, there is little that we, or the General Assembly for that matter, can do to remove those threats. But when the Assembly identifies an area, as in this case, where it can do something towards plugging a potential loophole, it would be folly to do less.

I do not propose to go over the draft resolution paragraph by paragraph. Suffice it to say that in the view of my delegation it is at the same time both non-controversial and constructive. In its operative paragraphs it expresses confidence in the ability of the Agency to meet, without delay, the obligations to be placed on it in respect of the application of safeguards to nuclear material in all types of civil nuclear facilities, including nuclear enrichment plants using both existing and new techniques. It goes on to request the Agency to include in its annual report to the General Assembly full information on the progress of its work in this field.

My delegation confidently trusts that this draft resolution will enjoy the unanimous support of this Committee.

Revised Draft Resolution Submitted to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 2, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity,

Recalling the Lusaka Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in September 1970, calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons,

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for diversion of the limited resources of these States from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruc-

¹ A/C.1/L.590/Rev. 1, Dec. 2, 1971. The revised res. was submitted by Burundi, Ceylon, India, Iran, Iraq, Kenya, Somalia, Swaziland, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia, and Zambia. For the original res., see *ante*, 807-809. A modified version of the revised draft was adopted by the G.A. as res. 2832 (*post*, pp. 901-903).

tion and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions,

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a beneficial influence in other regions and promote the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Solemnly declares* that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace;

2. *Calls upon* the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean

(a) To bring to a halt the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) To take action to eliminate from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations, logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

3. *Calls upon* the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and to strengthen international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement ultimately reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration;

5. *Decides* to include the item "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace" in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session.

Statement by the Irish Representative (Ronan) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 8, 1971¹

My delegation is greatly obliged to you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity you have afforded us of introducing the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.591/Rev.1 under the item of general and complete disarmament, which we have the honour of presenting on behalf of the delegations of Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan and Ireland.²

The basic purpose of the draft resolution, as stated in its fourth preambular paragraph, is that public opinion should be adequately informed about the problems of the arms race and of disarmament so that it might bring its influence to bear on strengthening disarmament efforts. People everywhere yearn for peace but the armaments race, both nuclear and conventional, creates means whereby unprecedented devastation might be inflicted on the entire world. The peoples of all countries should come to realize this and the necessity of achieving disarmament priorities and objectives.

During the last decade or two, the field of disarmament has become very complex. In addition to general and complete disarmament there are all the problems related to grappling with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, conventional armaments, verification and control and more than a dozen collateral measures of disarmament. It has also come to be increasingly recognized that there is an organic link between disarmament, security and economic development. The subject area has become so large and so involved with technological progress and with political, military and economic questions, that it has become difficult even for experts to keep up with it.

The work of scientific and other expert groups has been of great value in informing not only members of the public but also other experts and members of Governments. I need only refer to the very useful work performed by Pugwash and the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI).

Moreover, the General Assembly has itself called on the Secretary-General to undertake a number of studies with the assistance of consultant experts. These studies have been invalua-

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 3-8.

² Identical with pt. C of G.A. res. 2825 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 883-884.

ble to the Governments of all Members of the United Nations and have served to promote both a fuller understanding of the various problems studied and of possible ways of coping with them.

An encouraging development of the last decade was the establishment with a number of Government administrations of arms control and disarmament agencies and study groups. This development has undoubtedly contributed towards the achievement of some of the arms limitation treaties concluded during the decade.

During the present decade of the 1970s, which has been designated a Disarmament Decade, the problems of the arms race and of disarmament are likely to become more complex and even more urgent. It is, therefore, indispensable that the best brains in government and in the universities and academic institutions be mobilized to work on these problems and to contribute to a better informed public opinion concerning them.

The need for so informing and mobilizing public opinion has, of course, been the concern of the General Assembly previously. The draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.591/Rev.1 would, therefore, in its first preambular paragraph recall General Assembly resolution 1149 (XII) on collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons. In that resolution the General Assembly considered it desirable to seek ways and means of organizing an effective and continuing publicity campaign on a world-wide scale, under the auspices of the United Nations, disregarding all ideological or political considerations, and requested the Disarmament Commission to make its recommendations.³ However, the Disarmament Commission did not meet at that time, and the matter was not pursued further.

The second preambular paragraph would recall General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV), which declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and which, *inter alia*, requested the Secretary-General and Governments to publicise the Disarmament Decade by all appropriate means at their disposal in order to acquaint public opinion with its purposes and objectives and with the negotiations and developments related thereto.⁴

As a corollary, the third preambular paragraph would recall General Assembly resolution 2661 C (XXV) which, *inter alia*, in the context of the Disarmament Decade, recommended to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament that it take into account in its further work and its negotiations the comprehensive programme of disarmament contained in document A/8191 and Corr.1, as well as other disarmament suggestions presented or to be presented in the future.⁵

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 915-916.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 713-715.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 653-658, 682-683.

In its first operative paragraph the draft would affirm the value of conferences of experts and scientists from various countries on the problems of the arms race and disarmament. Such conferences have been a heartening feature of recent years. By achieving wide publicity they have focused much attention on the whole subject.

The second operative paragraph would express support for the practice of commissioning the Secretary-General to prepare, with expert assistance, authoritative reports on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament. The value of the series of such expert reports prepared over the past decade is generally if not universally acknowledged. The wide dissemination of these reports is among the best methods of keeping public opinion informed of armaments problems and disarmament developments.

The third operative paragraph touches on another means of publicity when it would simply declare that progress towards general and complete disarmament would be promoted if universities and academic institutions in all countries would establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race. The role of educators and opinion-makers in this connexion is an important one which should receive every encouragement.

Consequently, the draft would request the Secretary-General to bring the resolution to the attention of all members of the United Nations and also to the attention of UNESCO with a view to its wide publication and dissemination. As it is in close touch with educational and academic institutions, and through its National Commissions, UNESCO would be very well placed to promote the purposes of the draft resolution. In fact, the draft is very much in accord with the work of UNESCO on the strengthening of the bases for peace. Here I would refer to resolution 8 adopted by the General Conference of UNESCO at its sixteenth session in 1970 on UNESCO's contribution to peace and its tasks with respect to the elimination of colonialism and the utilization of UNESCO's programme as a means of strengthening co-operation between European States in the interests of peace and security in Europe. In that resolution, the Director-General was invited to strengthen UNESCO's action for peace, *inter alia*, by studies on information media, including the use of information media in favour of peace.⁶

I would also refer to the monthly publication *The UNESCO Courier*, which from time to time carries very useful articles on important aspects of the arms race, disarmament and peace research. The United Nations has a good ally in UNESCO for dissemination of information and the promotion of research in that whole field. I understand that a representative of UNESCO is present at our meeting, and I would suggest, Mr. Chairman, that if there is no objection you might invite him briefly to address the Committee on the draft resolution under discussion from the point of view of his organization.

⁶ UNESCO, *Records of the General Conference: Sixteenth Session, Resolutions*, vol. I, pp. 79-83.

I might mention, too, that the contents of our draft resolution would be complementary to the item submitted to plenary on the initiative of Belgium, entitled "Scientific Work on Peace Research", which is the subject of the 12-Power draft resolution in document A/L.645,⁷ and also to the work of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) and those specialized agencies which are active in the field of peace research.

Finally, I wish to stress on behalf of the co-sponsors our view that continued and sustained publicity is necessary, particularly during this Disarmament Decade, to disseminate the facts about the arms race and efforts to achieve disarmament, so that the peoples and Governments of the world will be in a better position to understand the problems and to influence solutions.

The draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/L.591/Rev.1 focuses attention on the continuing need for enlightening and informing public opinion in this field and on certain methods of doing so. We consider it timely and appropriate that the General Assembly should formally endorse the value of these methods—namely, expert conferences, expert reports by the Secretary-General and courses and seminars of academic bodies on the problems of the arms race—and so up-date the record of its position on informing public opinion on this vital question. No expenditure of United Nations funds is involved, apart from the normal cost of reproducing and disseminating the draft resolution, if adopted. Accordingly, on behalf of the co-sponsors, my delegation would commend for the support of all members, the draft resolution, which is certainly not controversial, and which accords with the repeated views expressed by all delegations here.

Statement by the British Representative (Hainworth) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971¹

As the United Kingdom delegation is a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1² and A/C.1/L.596³ I should like to say a few words on the subject of chemical and biological weapons. I shall, at the same time, take up some comments made on this subject by a number of representatives in their statements during our general debate.

Some delegations have expressed their regret that there is no explicit undertaking in the draft convention⁴ never to use biological or toxin weapons. As I think representatives are aware, this is a point to which the United Kingdom delegation attaches

⁷ Identical with G.A. res. 2817 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 880-881.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 48-52.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2826 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 884-889.

³ Identical with pt. A of G.A. res. 2827 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 890-892.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

great importance. In the British draft convention submitted in Geneva in 1969, there was such a provision, whereby parties to the convention would have undertaken never in any circumstances to make use for hostile purposes of biological weapons.⁵

However, over the months in Geneva it became apparent that a number of delegations sincerely held deep-seated views that such an explicit provision could in some way damage the Geneva Protocol of 1925.⁶ We were not, and are not, of this opinion ourselves; but since our objective was also to avoid any calling into question of the proven efficacy of the Geneva Protocol, we eventually agreed to co-sponsor a draft convention without such an undertaking contained directly in its provisions. In so agreeing we took note of the arguments advanced by a number of delegations that it would be impossible in practice for States to use biological agents or toxins for non-peaceful purposes when they had bound themselves not to develop, produce, or otherwise acquire or retain biological agents or toxins except for peaceful purposes. We also took note of the force of the words "never in any circumstances", which appear in article I at the suggestion of the Egyptian delegation.⁷

Furthermore, we noted that in the convention itself the penultimate preambular paragraph expressed the determination of eventual States-party, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons. We believe, therefore, that even though reservations to the Geneva Protocol may remain in force, there will never be any question of States making retaliatory use of biological weapons, and that, for all practical purposes, the risk of biological weapons or toxins being used for hostile purposes will have been reduced to negligible proportions.

A separate group of comments has centred on the procedure for dealing with complaints and on the feeling that it would have been better to make the provision for investigation of complaints not only impartial but also virtually automatic. There have also been suggestions that involvement of the Security Council in initiating the investigation of complaints could in some way involve discrimination.

From the start it has been the British contention that an automatic, impartial and speedy procedure for the investigation of complaints—above all, of allegations of use of biological weapons and toxins—would be the most effective deterrent against possible violations. My delegation, this summer in Geneva, put forward these views in some detail and on a number of occasions. Despite the fact that we are a permanent member of the Security Council, we felt not only that our proposals were likely to strengthen the effectiveness of the draft convention but that this was a point to

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 324-326.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 764-765.

⁷ *Ante*, p. 378.

which smaller countries would attach the greatest importance. To our surprise and disappointment there was little support voiced for these views by the non-aligned delegations in Geneva. None the less, we recognize that although the procedures envisaged in our own draft of 1969 have not been incorporated in the draft convention there are a number of improvements to that draft which have been proposed and adopted in a spirit of helpful compromise.

It seems clear to us that the provisions of article V for consultation and co-operation to be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter would, on appropriate occasions, allow for the involvement of the Secretary-General's good offices, as the representative of Ghana suggested would be desirable.

Moreover, the wording of article V makes clear that its provisions concern not only the application of the explicit prohibitions of the convention but also the objective of the convention. The consultation procedure under article V is separate from, but closely related to, the complaints procedure in article VI. As such it is entirely consistent with United Kingdom suggestions for a procedure, when appropriate, prior to the activation of the Security Council, one which, for example, by establishing the facts in a given situation, might help the Security Council in its consideration of a complaint. Such evidence, obtained under the procedures envisaged in article V, could then be used as the basis for a factual report to be submitted as an integral part of a complaint made to the Security Council under article VI.

On occasion, however, there may be reasons why parties would not wish to go through the procedures envisaged in article V. There may be interests of speed or other reasons that would make a party wish to take a complaint direct to the Security Council. It is the view of my delegation that, given a majority vote in favour, normally the Security Council will decide to initiate an inquiry into the facts of the situation if there has been no prior inquiry under the provisions of article V. Political consideration by the Security Council of the results of the inquiry would normally be a second and subsequent stage. Naturally the results of an inquiry would be part of the information conveyed to parties.

Another point of importance to my delegation has been the commitment on further negotiations on chemical weapons. Enough has now been said on the terms of the undertaking in the draft convention itself. I should, however, like to record my satisfaction at the development of draft resolutions on this subject this year. I think we must acknowledge that in the past there has been a certain amount of rancour, motivated undoubtedly for the best of reasons but not, I fear, altogether conducive to a spirit of fruitful negotiations. It has accordingly been most encouraging to

my delegation that these past differences have been put aside and that the two draft resolutions on chemical weapons—those in documents A/C.1/L.580⁸ and A/C.1/L.581⁹—not only were very similar in concept but have now been satisfactorily merged into one draft resolution (A/C.1/L.596) of which my delegation is glad to be one of the sponsors.

Such an attitude of co-operation must hold out increased prospects for success in Geneva in our common search for ways to make progress on this most difficult subject.

Unfortunately, however, the United Kingdom delegation cannot regard the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.592, as revised,¹⁰ as assisting progress in these negotiations. The views of my delegation on the value of unverified moratoriums are well known. We consider—and history teaches us this lesson—that they can actually lead to increased concern about the intentions of other States and even to their being disregarded in secret in the hope of gaining advantage over others who are observing them. Such fears and suspicions do not assist negotiations designed to resolve the difficulties which concern us all equally and which cannot be ignored. We want to see chemical weapons effectively banned and we share the wish to see the most lethal chemical weapons effectively banned, but we must remember that one important factor in the prevention of use of these dangerous weapons has been the certainty of immediate retaliation. We must therefore ensure that any further international instrument designed to ban chemical weapons will be at least as effective.

As I said, we find the approach in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.596 a more constructive approach to help our work forward. Our work undoubtedly will also be helped by the largest possible favourable vote for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579, as revised, commending the draft convention on bacteriological (biological) weapons. With a solid and comprehensive agreement on bacteriological (biological) weapons behind us we shall the better be able to turn our undivided attention to chemical weapons.

Statement by the Moroccan Representative (Khattabi) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Biological and Toxin Weapons, December 8, 1971¹

I should like to make a brief statement on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1.²

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 734-735.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 740-742.

¹⁰ *Ante*, p. 807.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 56-57.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2826 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 884-889.

The draft convention on the prohibition of bacteriological and toxin weapons³ annexed to the draft resolution prompts my delegation to make the following comments. The entry into force of this convention would render unnecessary the reservations formulated in regard to the Geneva Protocol of 1925 concerning bacteriological and toxin weapons.⁴ The ban in article I is limited, as are the obligations under articles II and III of the convention, thus excluding all possible use of such weapons even in time of war.

The meaning of the term "for prophylactic, protective . . . purposes" to be found in article I is, we believe, confined to allowing States to have the means of preventing the appearance or spreading of the malady and combating contamination resulting from the possible use of bacteriological agents, without any notion of reprisals by means of weapons of the same kind. Furthermore, it would be highly desirable for the international community to be informed of the implementation of article II by States parties possessing bacteriological and toxin weapons when they have undertaken their destruction or conversion for peaceful purposes. Notification to this effect could be addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations and, through him, to all States parties. Moreover, the assistance advocated in article VII, if it is to be effective, must be prompt and spontaneous without the need to await the conclusions of the Security Council and, of course, without prejudging its conclusions in any way because that would in reality be assistance fundamentally dictated by the need for human solidarity.

Finally, I should like on behalf of my delegation to affirm that the various provisions of the convention on bacteriological weapons form a totality of obligations binding each of the parties without discrimination. Article VI, which concerns the complaint procedure, cannot be an exception to the rule. Consequently, any discriminatory application of the obligations flowing from the convention—such as, for example, use of the veto to prevent a possible inquiry by the Security Council under the provisions of article VI—would tend to jeopardize the effect of this and the legal validity of the instrument in question, for such discrimination would be likely to hamper implementation of other parts of the convention while obliging other States parties, in order to preserve their own interests, to take all necessary steps including the right to withdraw from the convention.

It is in that spirit that my delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1. However, before concluding I would venture to draw attention to a procedural question concerning the deposit of instruments of ratification and accession to the convention on the prohibition of

³ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

bacteriological weapons. This has been referred to by the representative of Italy. We need to fill the blank still existing in article XIV, paragraph 2, of the draft convention. Perhaps it would be desirable in this regard to follow the example of various other treaties concluded in the field of disarmament, leaving it to the Governments of the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States to act as the depositary Governments for this convention. I place that suggestion before the Committee for its consideration.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971¹

First of all my delegation would like to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.592 submitted by 14 delegations.²

As is known, the Soviet Union, together with other socialist countries, consistently favours the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. On the basis of that position, my delegation supports the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.592, which provides that all States should undertake to refrain from any further work on the development, manufacture or stockpiling for military purposes of any of the most deadly chemicals not usable for peaceful purposes.

Although the draft resolution provides for only a partial solution of the problem of the complete prohibition of chemical weapons my delegation believes that even that approach to the problem could be a step in the direction of a complete solution, which is to ban and destroy all types of chemical weapons.

The Soviet delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution on the understanding that the obligations provided in this draft should be undertaken by States under an international agreement to be drafted and agreed upon among them.

In connexion with what the representatives of the United Kingdom and Sweden said today about the interpretation of article V of the draft convention prohibiting the manufacture and stockpiling of bacteriological and other weapons,³ my delegation would like to state that it adheres to the interpretation of that article given by the Soviet representatives during the consideration of this question in the disarmament Committee. As regards the question touched upon by them and also, a moment ago, by the representative of Morocco—the procedure for taking decisions under article VI of the draft convention for the investigation of complaints of violations of the convention—my delegation thinks

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 58-60.

² *Ante*, p. 807.

³ *Ante*, p. 570.

it necessary to note that in considering cases under article VI of the convention—just as in considering other matters—the Security Council should act in strict accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter.

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971¹

The delegation of Mexico submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in Geneva, on 24 August last, a Working Paper which subsequently was also distributed,² on 12 November, at our request, as a document of the First Committee.³

The aim of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.592/Rev.1, co-sponsored by the delegations of Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Ghana, Ireland, Malta, Morocco, Peru, Sweden, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Mexico,⁴ which I have the honour now to present, is in substance the same as that pursued by the Working Paper to which I have just referred and, for the purposes of the voting in this Committee, it should be regarded as replacing that document. That aim is to ensure that while agreement is being achieved on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, all States undertake to refrain from further developing, producing or stockpiling for warlike purposes chemical agents which, by reason of their degree of toxicity, have the most powerful lethal effects and cannot be used for peaceful purposes.

The co-sponsors of this draft are convinced that the adoption of the moratorium we propose for a specific category of chemical weapons offers a number of advantages and no disadvantage.

Among the advantages it might be worth while mentioning, that it would mean, if not the elimination, at least the freezing of a more or less broad group of chemical agents which, because of their degree of toxicity, are more dangerous and do not lend themselves to use for peaceful purposes, as, for instance, the so-called neurotoxic agents. It would have, also, the not inconsiderable advantage that such a moratorium would provide convincing proof that the Powers possessing chemical weapons are truly disposed to ensure that the commitments referred to in article IX of the convention on microbiological weapons do not remain a dead letter but rather will be translated into deeds as early as possible.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 61-65.

² *Ante*, p. 510.

³ *Ante*, p. 729.

⁴ Identical with pt. B of G.A. res. 2827 (XXVI), *post*, p. 892.

As for the lack of disadvantages, suffice it to say that the question of verification—the main argument adduced against the total prohibition of chemical weapons it would appear—cannot be adduced in this case, since a system of control accepted as satisfactory to guarantee prohibition of all microbiological weapons and all toxins must perforce also be satisfactory for the supervision of the simple freezing of such supertoxic chemical agents as cannot be used for civilian or peaceful purposes.

Of course, the most desirable procedure for the moratorium to acquire its maximum effectiveness would be a procedure resulting from a multilateral agreement. This, however, should be no obstacle, while such an agreement is being achieved, to States assuming the undertaking that we seek, with a provisional character, through the formulation of unilateral declarations.

For all the foregoing reasons, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.592/Rev.1 nurture the conviction that the draft resolution—which we trust will be adopted by the General Assembly on the basis of our text—will constitute a positive contribution to the progress of future efforts aimed at achieving the definitive elimination of all chemical weapons.

Statement by the Yugoslav Representative (Čvorovič) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Chemical and Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971¹

At this stage, when we are approaching the voting on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1² I should like to make two points. First, my delegation views the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1 as being closely and inseparably linked to the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.596.³ Negotiations on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of both chemical and bacteriological weapons represents a continuous and indivisible process aimed at their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States.

Consequently, the conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons is only the first positive step towards an early agreement on the elimination of chemical weapons as well. This approach served as the basic orientation for the activity of my delegation, together with other delegations of the group of twelve, in the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this issue.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 62-70.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2826 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 884-889.

³ Identical with pt. A of G.A. res. 2827 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 890-892.

The final draft of the convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction,⁴ annexed to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1, reflects, in our view, this approach and contains solemnly expressed commitments to continue negotiations until agreement—an early agreement—is reached on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons.

The second point which I should like to mention is the matter of savings resulting from disarmament. Since the adoption of the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) weapons would mark the first step towards disarmament, we would prefer to see the link between disarmament and the promotion of economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries, reflected in the text of the convention itself, as proposed by the group of 12 countries in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva. However, in order to facilitate agreement on this important issue, a group of 16 countries, supported by many others, submitted the amendment in document A/C.1/L.582,⁵ to the original draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.579.⁶ In view of the fact that the idea was generally accepted by the sponsors of this draft resolution, the negotiations between them and the sponsors of the amendment resulted in agreement on the new tenth preambular paragraph as it appears in the revised text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1. Consequently the amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.582 was withdrawn.

In the light of what I have just said, my delegation is ready to vote in favour of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1.

Turning now to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.596, I should like to say a few words. First of all, we should like to express our satisfaction at the successful negotiations between the sponsors of the two draft resolutions contained in documents A/C.1/L.580⁷ and A/C.1/L.581,⁸ resulting in a joint draft which is contained in document A/C.1/L.596. The new draft is sponsored by my delegation as well as by a majority of the sponsors of the original draft, document A/C.1/L.581. In sponsoring this draft, my delegation was guided by the following considerations.

First, the new draft, document A/C.1/L.596, is consistent with the approach and the points agreed upon on previous occasions and particularly endorsed by General Assembly resolution 2662 (XXV), namely, that the prohibition of both chemical and

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁵ *Ante*, p. 742.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 732-733.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 734-735.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 740-742.

bacteriological (biological) weapons should be dealt with as a continuous question.⁹

Second, the new draft points out clearly all references contained in the draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction, expressing the determination and commitment to continue negotiations towards achieving early agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons also, and underlining the importance and urgency of acting resolutely to this end.

Third, the new draft, on the one hand, contains an expression of satisfaction with the agreement reached on the draft convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons and, on the other hand, endorses the view concerning the continuation of negotiations as a high-priority item on the conclusion of an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

Fourth, the new draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.596 recognizes the efforts of the group of 12 and its contribution towards the initiation of negotiations on chemical weapons, and to this end requests the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take into account, in its future negotiations, the nine elements contained in the joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted on 28 September 1971 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament by the group of 12 countries.¹⁰

Finally, the new draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.596 contains a very important provision in which the General Assembly urges Governments to take all steps that may contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations and facilitate early agreement on the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

My delegation certainly hopes that the above-mentioned considerations involving the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.596 will be implemented through negotiation and without delay.

Finally, may I be permitted to state that my delegation will also vote in favour of the draft resolution submitted in document A/C.1/L.592/Rev.1.¹¹ We are of the opinion that the objective of this draft resolution falls within the generally recognized objective of facilitating and speeding up negotiations on the effective prohibition of chemical weapons.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

¹¹ Identical with pt. B of G.A. res. 2827 (XXVI), *post*, p. 892.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971^{1 2}

I should like to make two brief points. First, the United States delegation is pleased that it has been possible to work out a generally acceptable formula on the matter of savings resulting from disarmament. This has permitted wide agreement on the text of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1.^{1 3} This draft resolution has now been co-sponsored by 40 countries, including the United States. In the bringing about of this result, we must recognize the untiring efforts of the representative of Yugoslavia and the co-operative spirit of the other co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.582.^{1 4} The formula is now included as the tenth preambular paragraph in the draft resolution. It states the conviction that the implementation of measures in the field of disarmament should release substantial additional resources, which should promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The second point is that we have listened with interest to the remarks of the Ambassador of Sweden relating to the implementation of the convention on biological weapons,^{1 5} particularly articles V and VI thereof. I am sure that we all share the objective of making certain that the treaty will be implemented fairly and effectively—an objective that has been expressed by many other Members of the General Assembly. The position of the United States regarding the importance attached to the implementation of articles V and VI is more fully set forth in the intervention I made in this Committee on 29 November 1971,^{1 6} which I shall not at this time repeat.

In conclusion, we hope that the amended draft resolution commending the convention on biological weapons will be adopted by a very large majority of the members of this Committee.

Statement by the Philippine Representative (Yango) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Biological Weapons, December 8, 1971,¹

Briefly, my delegation wishes to explain its vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1 on the convention on the prohibition of the development, production

^{1 2} A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 68-70.

^{1 3} Identical with G.A. res. 2826 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 884-889.

^{1 4} *Ante*, p. 742.

^{1 5} *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

^{1 6} *Ante*, pp. 793-799.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1846, pp. 73-77.

and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons, and on their destruction.² Let me say at the outset that my delegation will vote in favour of that draft resolution.

A while ago, the delegations of Yugoslavia, United States and Brazil referred to a previous draft amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.582 but now withdrawn, on the subject of savings derived from disarmament and its connexion to development.³ I wish to recall that my delegation was a co-sponsor of the draft amendment contained in document A/C.1/L.582, which called for inserting in draft resolution A/C.1/L.579⁴ a new tenth preambular paragraph to read:

Affirming the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

As a result of negotiations, however, between the co-sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/L.582 and A/C.1/L.579, the new preambular paragraph, referred to by previous speakers and now incorporated in draft resolution A/C.1/L.579/Rev.1, reads:

Convinced that the implementation of measures in the field of disarmament should release substantial additional resources, which should promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.⁵

In a spirit of co-operation, my delegation will go along with this new wording of the preambular paragraph. However, my delegation desires to place on record that it still maintains and continues to support very firmly the principle that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries. I wish to recall also that in our statement on 26 November on the question of general and complete disarmament we gave our full support to the comprehensive programme of disarmament contained in document A/8191, which has to be taken into account in the further work and negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.⁶ This comprehensive programme of disarmament, in paragraph 8 under its subheading "Principles" provide[s] that "A substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries", which is practically the amendment proposed in document A/C.1/L.582, word for word. I wish to recall further that the initiative taken by my delegation in the Second Committee, during the twenty-fifth session of the General Assembly, on the item on

² The draft res. was adopted as G.A. res. 2826 (XXVI), *post*, 884-889. For the draft convention, see *ante*, pp. 568-573.

³ *Ante*, p. 742.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 732-733.

⁵ *Post*, p. 885.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 653-658.

the economic and social consequences of disarmament was grounded on this principle, in connexion with our desire to establish the link between the Disarmament Decade and the United Nations Second Development Decade. We will, therefore, continue our efforts to support this principle in our sincere belief that there is an integral link that should exist between disarmament and development. It is the hope of my delegation that this principle or link will eventually gain acceptance and recognition.

Statement by the Canadian Representative (Ignatieff) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, December 9, 1971¹

As the Chairman has just stated, we have before us three draft resolutions and an amendment under item 29 of the agenda. First, we believe that the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/L.584² and A/C.1/L.585³ are not mutually contradictory as regards their objective, since they represent different approaches in dealing with the same item on the agenda. We are all aware that the United Nations General Assembly has many times already called for halting of nuclear weapons testing and deplored it in one form of words or another, all to little avail. But this year, in the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.585, a sizable group of like-minded States is endeavouring to highlight ways of trying to come to grips with the real stumbling block and to create the foundation and climate for negotiated progress. The basic purposes of this draft resolution are simple and direct. They are also, in our view, feasible and worth while—indeed all the more worth while precisely because they are feasible. They also constitute interrelated parts of an integrated approach.

The text of this draft resolution is familiar to members of the Committee, so I shall not read it. Let me simply at this point refer to the basic elements and the reasons for them. Before doing so, I should like to note one small error in the draft resolution as circulated. The date referred to in the second preambular paragraph should be 1957 and not 1959.

Now, the basic elements: First, the draft resolution tries in operative paragraphs 5 and 6 to lay a basis for actual, serious negotiations next year in the Geneva Committee “as a matter of highest priority” on the ending by international agreement of underground nuclear weapons testing. Real negotiations on an underground test ban have been in cold storage for little short of a decade. Nuclear weapons testing cannot be brought to a halt definitively and for all time except on the basis of a negotiated

¹ A/C.1/PV.1847, pp. 7-13.

² Identical with pt. A of G.A. res. 2828 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 893-894.

³ *Ante*, pp. 743-745.

agreement. But there cannot be real progress through negotiations unless and until the principal nuclear Powers are willing to submit and discuss specific proposals, rather than standing on directly opposing positions of principle.

The divergencies between the formal positions of the super-Powers so far not only have defied all efforts by other Governments to devise compromises, but also have not been the object of any serious effort to narrow the gap by the two major nuclear States themselves. Contributions by members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have helped towards a better understanding of the parameters and the relevance of the verification problem. Moreover, important suggestions have been put forward, notably by the delegations of Sweden and other States, on the possible contents of a draft treaty and I hope that more such specific suggestions will be made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. But, as we all know, any progress so far has been conceptual and hypothetical rather than real.

The reason for this is quite simply that there have been no negotiations by the super-Powers on an underground test ban, no efforts by them to overcome or split their differences on the technical aspects of verification, no bargaining efforts to narrow the gap between them by compromise; this, despite the fact that the number of on-site inspections that might prove necessary to supplement seismological means of verification has declined and is declining, and despite the fact that in a world of photographic reconnaissance satellites, the intrusive significance of on-site inspection has diminished and continues to diminish.

Second, an immediate objective of the draft resolution, in operative paragraph 3, is the adoption of restraint measures, particularly by the testing States original parties to the Moscow Treaty of 1963,⁴ to curtail in size and number or suspend their nuclear weapons tests, pending the completion of a test ban. Such interim measures of mutual self-restraint could be transitional in so far as they help to create a better climate for genuine negotiations to end all testing. They have recently been criticized, I know, in this Committee. Let me say this: such criticisms would become easier to understand and the need for interim restraints would become less apparent if those who make such criticisms were to give some evidence of willingness to undertake business-like negotiations to reach a compromise solution on a definitive underground test ban.

Third, the draft resolution makes clear throughout, and particularly in operative paragraph 1, the objective of ending not only underground tests but tests in all environments, and in operative paragraph 2 it urges States that have not yet adhered to the Moscow Treaty and to restraints accepted by other testing States to do so "without further delay". It should be noted also

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

that the call for interim restraints in operative paragraph 3 is addressed to all States and is not limited to underground testing.

Finally, in operative paragraph 4, the draft resolution calls on Governments to develop and make use of, to the maximum degree possible, their capabilities for seismological verification of compliance with an underground test ban. This provision is only fitting since it is now universally agreed, I think, that seismological means of detecting, locating and identifying seismic events are fundamental to verifying any underground test ban and to confirming the reality of any halting of underground tests.

Delegations will also be aware that my colleague from New Zealand—as you have already pointed out, Mr. Chairman—on 2 December introduced document A/C.1/L.595,⁵ containing two proposed amendments to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/L.585. Canada and the other sponsors of this draft resolution sympathize with the points made by the New Zealand representative, particularly with the concern he expressed regarding the threat to the environment from continued atmospheric testing. This concern, in fact, was the basis for the negotiation of the Moscow partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 and for many of the draft resolutions in the series of draft resolutions since that time calling for the suspension of all nuclear weapons testing.

It is our belief, however, that the testing programme of non-parties to the partial test ban Treaty has already been adequately dealt with in the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585, in that the first, fifth, sixth and eighth preambular paragraphs refer specifically to the urgent need for the cessation of all nuclear weapons tests, noting that not all countries have yet adhered to the partial test ban Treaty and noting with special concern that nuclear weapons tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing. In addition, operative paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 also deal with the concern expressed by New Zealand by stressing the urgency of halting testing in all environments by all States, by urging States that have not yet done so to adhere to the partial test ban Treaty and by calling upon all Governments that have been conducting nuclear weapons tests

immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests. . . .⁶

This also applies to all tests in all environments and encompasses the New Zealand amendments, which in effect call for interim measures of restraint.

However, a review of the record makes it clear that from an arms control point of view more weapons testing is now carried out underground than in any other environment. As a result, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has been concen-

⁵ *Ante*, p. 812.

⁶ *Ante*, p. 744.

trating on its stated objective of completing the partial test ban by a comprehensive test ban. In line with this, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 has called upon all countries to adhere to the partial test ban Treaty while at the same time it attempts to provide the basis for negotiations to proceed towards halting underground testing.

In sum, we believe that the concerns reflected by the New Zealand amendments are already covered by the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 and that the primary interest for countries involved in disarmament negotiations is for the completion of the partial test ban. The draft resolution in its present form points the way to a comprehensive ban on testing which would prohibit testing in all environments. The New Zealand concern regarding the type of testing which presents the major threat to the environment might better have been the subject of a separate draft resolution or might, we suggest, more suitably have been incorporated in other draft resolutions dealing with nuclear testing. On this basis, if the representative of New Zealand presses his amendments to a vote the Canadian delegation will abstain.

In conclusion, I believe, on behalf of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585, that we are entitled to ask all those who oppose nuclear weapons testing, or wish to do something really effective in bringing the nuclear arms race to an end, to support the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.585 with their vote. For we are not urging that a nuclear Power on one side or the other should lessen the power of its military establishment unilaterally, because it would be of no avail if one side should weaken or lay down its atomic weapons without reciprocity from the other. But, recalling that if the force of atomic weapons were ever loosed on the world no one could win and all would suffer as a result, this draft resolution points the way, before it is too late, to a balanced and negotiated ending to nuclear testing and opens the way to nuclear disarmament.

As the world reverberates like a bell to the sounds and shock-waves of violence, including nuclear testing, let us at this moment give earnest thought to the future and to the implications of continued nuclear testing so fraught with danger to mankind. I address an appeal in particular to all testing States, and especially to the two major testing States conducting underground nuclear tests, that as witness of the earnestness of their solemn commitments to serious negotiation in the Moscow Treaty as well as in the non-proliferation Treaty towards a comprehensive test ban, they now demonstrate a willingness to negotiate.

Statement by the United States Representative (Leonard) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, December 9, 1971¹

It was with deepest regret that the United States delegation learned this morning of the death of Under-Secretary Ralph Bunche. We are all very proud that our country has been able for so many years to contribute the services of such an outstanding citizen to the important work of the Secretariat and, more broadly, to the work of keeping the peace and promoting the welfare of peoples in every part of the world. May I express our appreciation for the tribute to his memory paid by you, Mr. Chairman, and by the other speakers here this morning.

In relation to agenda item 29, on which we have three draft resolutions and one amendment before us, I should like first to explain the reason why the United States will abstain from voting on the Canadian draft resolution,² which comes closer to our own views on this subject than any other draft resolution that has been submitted. I wish to reaffirm the long-standing policy commitment of the United States to work towards the cessation of all our nuclear weapon testing, pursuant to an adequately verified treaty.

Our policy on this matter has not changed. We are compelled to abstain from voting on this draft resolution because of operative paragraph 3, which, *inter alia*, calls upon nuclear weapon States immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of test restraint. If we voted for this draft as it stands, we believe that serious misunderstandings could arise since we might be expected to take some immediate and dramatic new initiative relating to our policy concerning a test ban.

Unfortunately, as we have explained on many occasions, this is not a problem that lends itself to easy and immediate solutions, since further progress towards restraints on testing is tied in closely with both understanding and resolving the complex problem of verification.

We are engaged in serious and purposeful deliberations on arms control restraints in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and the measures described in paragraph 3 of the Canadian draft resolution are included in these deliberations. Because of the complexity of this highly sensitive security area, there is no other prudent and realistic way to achieve meaningful restraints than by careful deliberations. In these circumstances we believe the call for immediate imposition of restraints does not realistically take into account the problems involved.

I should also like to refer to the request to the nuclear Powers to submit specific proposals for a comprehensive test ban. The United States is actively and constructively participating in

¹ A/C.1/PV.1847, pp. 18-22.

² *Ante*, pp. 743-745.

deliberations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We shall, of course, be prepared to make appropriate proposals when we feel that they would lead to progress. For now, we feel that we can continue to be most constructive by our practical contributions towards gaining a better understanding of the verification issue in the continuing deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on the many issues and options involved in further negotiated restraints on testing. Notwithstanding these reservations, we wish to underscore that we intend to work constructively toward a solution.

With respect to the New Zealand amendments,³ we shall abstain because of our abstention on the Canadian draft, and not because of any intrinsic problems with these specific amendments.

With respect to the draft resolution put forward by the representative of Mexico,⁴ we intend to abstain because in our view the condemnation of all nuclear testing and the imposition of arbitrary deadlines are detrimental to the creation of an atmosphere of accommodation which is essential to progress toward meaningful arms control measures. With respect to the twelfth preambular paragraph of the Mexican draft resolution, we should like to point out that basic differences of principle must be resolved in order to achieve the objective of an adequately verified agreement, an objective which we continue fully to support.

The United States also intends to abstain on the draft resolution submitted by Ambassador Baroody.⁵ With respect to operative paragraph 3, we should like to note that in our view the test ban issue is already complex and difficult so that an effort to relate it to the question of nuclear deployments is neither helpful nor appropriate.

Statement by the PRC Representative (Chen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Cessation of Nuclear Tests, December 9, 1971¹

In his recent statement in the plenary General Assembly the Chairman of the Chinese delegation has already comprehensively expounded the basic position of the Chinese Government on the question of disarmament and nuclear weapons. I should like to make a few remarks on the draft resolution concerning the halting of nuclear tests.²

The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. As early as 31 July 1963, the Chinese Government

³ *Ante*, p. 812.

⁴ Identical with pt. A of G.A. res. 2828 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 893-894.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 742-743.

¹ A/C.1/PV. 1847, pp. 41-43.

² See *post*, pp. 893-897.

issued a statement advocating the complete, thorough, total and resolute prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons, and proposing that a summit conference of all countries in the world be convened to discuss that problem.³ We sincerely hope that an early agreement on this matter can be reached.

However, China cannot give up necessary self-defence before the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons is realized. My country is compelled to develop nuclear weapons because it is under the nuclear threat of the two super-Powers. China's necessary and limited nuclear tests are conducted entirely for the purpose of self-defence, for breaking the nuclear monopoly of the super-Powers and, finally, eliminating nuclear weapons.

The Chinese Government has repeatedly made solemn declarations to the whole world since its first nuclear explosion stating that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. We always mean what we say.

The two super-Powers have been working on their nuclear weapons for decades. They have conducted innumerable nuclear tests of all kinds and their nuclear arsenals have swollen immensely. In these circumstances, the partial or complete halting of nuclear tests will not inhibit the continuation of the production and use of nuclear weapons. Therefore the prohibition of nuclear tests will be of no positive significance if not linked with the prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons. It can only serve to consolidate the super-Powers' nuclear monopoly, deprive the other countries of their just right to develop nuclear weapons and resist nuclear threats posed by the super-Powers; it can only spread a false feeling of security and weaken the struggle of the peoples of all countries for the complete prohibition and the thorough destruction of nuclear weapons. The world cannot gain peace and security from the prohibition of nuclear tests which, on the contrary, can only increase the nuclear threat and the nuclear blackmail of the two super-Powers and increase the danger of a nuclear war.

In the past the so-called partial nuclear test-ban Treaty⁴ and the so-called Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁵ concocted by the two super-Powers, have already been proved to be big frauds, aimed at fooling the people of the world. Although some countries have favoured the complete prohibition of nuclear testing out of good intention, certain countries will surely turn it into a means for lulling and deceiving the people of the world. Because of this the Chinese delegation will, under present circumstances, oppose the adoption of the draft resolution on the so-called prohibition of nuclear tests.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 268-272.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 291-293.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

I hereby reaffirm that the Chinese Government and people will, as always, continue to make common efforts, together with the people of the world and all countries that love peace and uphold justice, for the attainment of the noble goal of complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.

Communique of the North Atlantic Council, December 10, 1971¹

The North Atlantic Council met in Ministerial Session in Brussels on 9th and 10th December, 1971. Foreign and Defence Ministers were present.

2. Ministers stressed that their governments would continue to pursue their longstanding objectives of achieving, through a genuine relaxation of tensions, a just and lasting peace and stability in Europe. They recalled that since the creation of the Alliance over twenty years ago the treaty area has been free of armed conflict and that under existing international conditions the North Atlantic Treaty remains indispensable for the security of member States.

3. Ministers examined the international situation and expressed their deep concern over the tragic events in Southern Asia. It is their fervent hope that hostilities between India and Pakistan will give way to an early and peaceful solution of all aspects of the conflict.

4. Turning to developments in and around Europe, including the Mediterranean, Ministers reviewed the status of the various initiatives undertaken or supported by the Allies and assessed the results of the numerous bilateral contacts between the Allies and other European states.

5. Ministers noted the effects which continuing difficulties in trade and monetary policy could have, among other things, on the state of the Alliance. They were encouraged by the various efforts underway in other fora to remedy these difficulties in the economic sphere. The Ministers decided to keep this matter under continuing review.

6. Ministers took note with satisfaction of the signature, on 3rd September, 1971, of the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin.² They also noted that the German arrangements to implement and supplement the Quadripartite Agreement now appear to be nearing completion, and that, once these arrangements have been concluded, the Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States would be prepared to sign forthwith the final Quadripartite Protocol which would bring the complete Berlin Agreement into effect. Ministers expressed the hope that this would soon be achieved.

¹ *Department of State Bulletin*, Jan. 3, 1972, pp. 1-5.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 27, 1971, pp. 318 ff.

7. Ministers viewed this emerging Agreement as an important and encouraging development. Once completed and in effect, the Agreement should bring about practical improvements, while maintaining the Quadripartite status of Berlin and the rights and responsibilities of France, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to Berlin and Germany as a whole. Specifically, Ministers noted that movement of civilian persons and goods between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin will then be unimpeded, and that the residents of the Western Sectors will be able to visit East Berlin and the GDR. Ministers also welcomed the assurance in the Quadripartite Agreement that the ties between the Federal Republic of Germany and the Western Sectors of Berlin will be maintained and developed.

8. Ministers considered that achievement of the Berlin Agreement would also demonstrate that, with a constructive attitude on all sides, it should be possible to reach reasonable solutions between the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic which take into account the special situation in Germany. Ministers took the view that this example would encourage progress on other problems in Europe.

9. Ministers recalled that at their meeting in Lisbon they declared their readiness to undertake multilateral conversations intended to lead to a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe as soon as the negotiations on Berlin had reached a successful conclusion.³ In the light of the encouraging developments referred to above they affirmed their readiness to initiate such conversations on this basis as soon as possible.

10. In this perspective, they propose to intensify their preparations and their bilateral contacts with other interested parties.

11. Ministers also took note of the invitation of the Finnish Government to the effect that heads of mission of the countries concerned accredited in Helsinki should undertake multilateral conversations. They stated that their Governments appreciated this initiative and that they will keep in touch with the Finnish Government in order to consult on this matter.

12. Ministers considered that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should not serve to perpetuate the post-war division of Europe but rather should contribute to reconciliation and co-operation between the participating states by initiating a process of reducing the barriers that still exist. Therefore, Ministers reaffirmed that the Conference should address in a concrete manner the underlying causes of tension in Europe and the basic principles which should govern relations among states irrespective of political and social systems.

13. Ministers took note of the report of the Council in Permanent Session concerning a Conference on Security and

³ *Ante*, pp. 307-311.

Co-operation in Europe. This report examined four areas of discussion at such a conference: (A) Questions of Security, including Principles Governing Relations between States and certain military aspects of security; (B) Freer Movement of People, Information and Ideas, and Cultural Relations; (C) Co-operation in the Fields of Economics, Applied Science and Technology, and Pure Science; and (D) Co-operation to Improve the Human Environment. Ministers requested the Council in Permanent Session to continue these studies with a view to facilitating a constructive discussion of these subjects at the negotiations.

14. Ministers representing countries which participate in the NATO integrated defence programme reaffirmed their long-standing belief that a mutual and balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe which preserves the legitimate security interests of all concerned would maintain security and enhance stability in Europe, make an important contribution to the easing of tension and improve East-West relations generally.

15. These Ministers reviewed the developments with respect to mutual and balanced force reductions since their last meeting in Lisbon. They reaffirmed the decisions taken at the meeting of Deputy Foreign Ministers and High Officials on 5th and 6th October, 1971, to propose exploratory talks with the Soviet Government and other interested governments and to charge Mr. Brosio with this mission on the basis of a substantive mandate. They expressed their thanks to Mr. Brosio for accepting.

16. These Ministers noted with regret that the Soviet Government has so far failed to respond to the Allied initiative in this important area of East-West relations in which that Government had earlier expressed an interest. Noting statements by Soviet leaders to the effect that they hoped East-West talks on force reductions in Europe would begin as soon as possible, these Ministers hope that Mr. Brosio will soon be able to go to Moscow. The interested Allied Governments continue to believe that prior explorations of this question are essential in preparation for eventual multilateral negotiations.

17. These Ministers emphasized the importance they attach to measures which would reduce the dangers of military confrontation and thus enhance security in Europe. They noted that a Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should deal with these aspects in a suitable manner.

18. Ministers noted a report on further studies conducted within NATO on mutual and balanced force reductions since the Lisbon Meeting. They instructed the Permanent Representatives to continue this work.

19. Ministers welcomed the fact that the negotiations between the US and USSR on strategic arms limitations have resulted in concrete agreements to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war and to improve communication arrangements between the two governments. Satisfaction was expressed for the close Alliance

consultation which has been conducted throughout the course of the Strategic Arms Limitations talks. Ministers expressed the hope that these negotiations will soon lead to agreements which would curb the competition in strategic arms and strengthen international peace and security.

20. Ministers reaffirmed their determination to promote progress in disarmament and arms control and reviewed recent developments in these fields. They expressed satisfaction at the measures envisaged to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and their destruction. They hoped that all States will adopt similar measures. Ministers also expressed the hope that headway could be made towards reaching an agreement on the controlled prohibition of chemical weapons. Ministers representing countries which participate in the NATO integrated defence programme noted with interest the efforts being undertaken to find effective means for the verification of an eventual agreement on a comprehensive test ban.

21. Ministers took note of a report on the situation in the Mediterranean prepared on their instructions by the Council in Permanent Session. They reaffirmed their concern about the course of events in this area, while expressing their hope that a peaceful solution would be found in the Eastern Mediterranean. In the light of the conclusions of the report before them, they instructed the Council in Permanent Session to continue consultations on this subject and to follow the evolution of the various aspects of the situation in order to report thereon at their next meeting.

22. Ministers were pleased by the new achievements of the Committee on the Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS) in its studies, especially in the fields of air and water pollution, and by the initiation of a project on the application of modern technology to health care.

23. The Spring Ministerial Meeting of the Council will be held in Bonn on 30th and 31st May, 1972.

24. Ministers requested the Foreign Minister of Belgium to transmit the text of the preceding paragraphs on their behalf through diplomatic channels to all other interested parties, including neutral and nonaligned governments.

25. Ministers of the countries participating in NATO's integrated defence programme met as the Defence Planning Committee.

26. In the light of the considerations outlined in the preceding paragraphs, they emphasised that NATO's efforts to achieve sufficient defence capabilities and the striving for détente are not incompatible but complementary, and that sufficient and credible defence is a necessary corollary to realistic negotiations on security and co-operation in Europe. In the same context and as a fundamental principle, these Ministers reaffirmed the well-known

position of the Alliance that its overall military capability should not be reduced except as part of a pattern of mutual force reductions balanced in scope and timing.

27. These Ministers discussed mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) and reaffirmed their intent to continue their close involvement in the development of common allied positions.

28. They noted the growth of Soviet military efforts in recent years and the indications that the Soviet Union continues to strengthen both its strategic nuclear and its conventional forces, especially naval forces. They therefore agreed on the need for continued and systematic improvement of NATO's conventional forces and for the maintenance of adequate and modern tactical and strategic nuclear forces in order to ensure that the deterrent remains effective at all levels, and in order to avoid weakening the basis of NATO's search for détente.

29. They discussed a follow-up report to the Alliance Defence Study for the Seventies (the AD 70 Study). They welcomed the progress being made by members in improving Alliance defences. In particular they noted with satisfaction the further specific and important efforts announced on 7th December by those European member countries which participated in the European Defence Improvement Programme, and recognised the emphasis which these European member countries are placing on modernising the equipment of their forces, land, sea and air, along AD 70 lines. They also welcomed the substantial improvements to their conventional forces planned by the United States, and they noted with satisfaction the enhanced United States contribution to NATO's strategic deterrent which will result from the deployment of the POSEIDON weapon system. They heard with appreciation the reaffirmation by the United States Secretary of Defense that, given a similar approach by the other Allies, the United States would maintain and improve their own forces in Europe and would not reduce them except in the context of reciprocal East-West action.

30. They endorsed the priority areas which were proposed to them for the further implementation of the AD 70 recommendations. Within these areas they identified for early action certain fields such as additional anti-tank weapons and modern tanks; advanced electronic equipment for certain combat aircraft; improved all-weather strike, attack and reconnaissance air forces; improved air defences and aircraft protection; better maritime surveillance and anti-submarine forces; more maritime patrol aircraft and seaborne missile systems; the replacement of over-age ships; the strengthening and modernisation of local and reinforcement forces on the Northern and South-Eastern Flanks; and larger ammunition stocks for land and air forces.

31. They recognised the global nature of the Soviet maritime capability, and in particular the deployments and activities of the Soviet fleets in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. In their

discussion they reaffirmed the need for appropriate Allied measures, and reviewed progress.

32. They noted the force commitments undertaken by member nations for the year 1972 and they adopted a five-year NATO Force Plan for the period 1972-1976, including many AD 70 implementation measures.

33. They concluded that the aim within NATO should be to allocate to defence purposes, where this is within the economic capability of countries, a stable and possibly larger proportion of their growing national wealth, in order to maintain an adequate deterrent and defensive capability.

34. The Defence Ministers comprising the Nuclear Defence Affairs Committee (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States) also convened to examine reports on the activity of the Nuclear Planning Group during the past year and on its projected work.

35. The next Ministerial meeting of the Defence Planning Committee will be held in the Spring of 1972.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, December 10, 1971¹

The Soviet delegation would like to join those delegations that have expressed their profound sorrow at learning of the death of Dr. Ralph Bunche, who for many years was Under-Secretary-General. We should like to have our condolences, along with those of other delegations, transmitted to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, to the delegation of the United States and to the family of the deceased, Dr. Bunche.

Before voting on the draft resolution submitted by a group of Latin American countries² on the status of the implementation of General Assembly resolution 2666 (XXV)³ concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco),⁴ the Soviet delegation would like to make a brief statement in explanation of its vote.

The Soviet Union has always spoken out in favour of the creation of denuclearized zones in different regions of the world. We are deeply convinced that the creation of that type of region will reduce the number of regions open to the creation of nuclear areas and will avoid the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet delegation considers that denuclearized zones might include groups of States and even entire continents or

¹ A/C.1/PV.1848, pp. 26-31.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2830 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 898-899.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 689-691.

⁴ For the treaty and protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69-83.

parts of the world, or even individual States. This is fully applicable, of course, to Latin America, a region towards which the Soviet Union is ready to assume the commitment of respecting the denuclearized nature of the Latin American States.

With regard to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Soviet Union has more than once expressed its views on that Treaty. Taking a position on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Soviet Union wonders to what extent the provisions of the Treaty do in fact ensure the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, or at least ensure that the territory of participating States will in fact remain denuclearized regions.

Together with provisions which are intended to achieve that end, the Treaty of Tlatelolco also contains, as we have explained a number of times in the past, certain provisions which we feel do not respond to what is required by the tasks set. For example, article 18 of the Treaty provides that the States parties to the Treaty have the right to carry out nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. That means that those States can possess devices comparable to nuclear weapons. Also, the Treaty does not provide for the prohibition of the transport of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices through the territory of States parties to it. This again is an obvious flaw and an important gap in the Treaty. Finally, article 4 defines the zone of application of the Treaty in such a way that in certain circumstances that zone covers enormous areas of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans hundreds of kilometres beyond the territorial waters of States parties to the Treaty. That is not in accordance with the accepted norms of international law and is not acceptable to the Soviet Union.

In taking a stand on the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Soviet Government has very carefully analysed the position assumed by parties to the Treaty with respect to the problems that I have just enumerated. The Soviet Union, as stated in the reply of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR to the Mexican Senate,⁵ noted that with respect to peaceful nuclear explosions the Government of Mexico had stated that it intended to seek a solution which would prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to sign and ratify the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.⁶

The Soviet Union has noted that the Mexican Government does not intend to allow transit of nuclear weapons across its territory, and that it will apply the status of denuclearized zone to the territory of Mexico, including the territorial waters and the air space, the former to be set at 12 maritime miles. In the light of this position adopted by Mexico, the Soviet Union has stated that it is ready to assume the commitment to respect the status of Mexico as a totally denuclearized zone, it being understood that

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 1-2.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

the other nuclear Powers would assume the same commitment to respect that status.

If the other States of Latin America follow the example of Mexico and turn the territories of their nations into entirely denuclearized zones, those States can then also rely on the same respect by the Soviet Union for the status of their territory as denuclearized zones. It is obvious that we feel that other nuclear Powers should be ready to assume the same commitment.

That is the position of the Soviet Union on the Treaty of Tlatelolco and those are the views that the delegation of the Soviet Union felt that we should put forward, explaining why we did not feel that we could ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty. It is obvious that in taking a position on various international problems, the Soviet delegation will take into account the interests of other countries concerned. But, like all other States, the Soviet Union has to take a stand on any treaty or international agreement in accordance with its own views. To assume any other approach would not be acceptable to my country.

The Soviet delegation felt that it should once again affirm its position on the treaty calling for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America at a time when we are voting on a draft resolution like that contained in document A/C.1/L.587, submitted by Latin American States and referring to that Treaty. On that basis the Soviet delegation, therefore, will abstain on the vote on the draft resolution.

Statement by the PRC Representative (Chen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, December 10, 1971¹

Before the voting, the Chinese delegation wishes to make a few remarks with regard to the question of the signing and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.²

In the first place, the Chinese Government's stand on the question of nuclear weapons has always been clear. The Chinese Government has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and has proposed the convocation of a summit conference of all countries to discuss this matter.

Secondly, the Chinese Government holds that the demand which many medium-sized and small countries have put forward for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones, in order to oppose the imperialist policies of aggression and war, is just. China has no soldier stationed abroad; it has no military bases

¹ A/C.1/PV.1848, pp. 32-35.

² For the treaty and protocols, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69-83.

on foreign soil, and has done nothing harmful to other countries. The Chinese Government declared to the world, before the signing of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, that at no time and in no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons. This principled stand and the solemn statement of the Chinese Government constitute the best support for the good wishes of many countries for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones.

Thirdly, the Chinese delegation wishes to point out that at present the two super-Powers have not only produced and stockpiled large quantities of nuclear weapons in their own countries, but also established nuclear bases on the territories of other countries. Their planes, carrying nuclear weapons, fly in the air space of other countries, and their warships, carrying nuclear weapons, ply the oceans all over the world. Therefore, really to free the nuclear-free zones and the peace zones from the threat of a nuclear war, it is necessary, first of all, for all the nuclear countries, particularly the two nuclear super-Powers, to guarantee not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances; to dismantle all their nuclear bases on the territories of other countries; not to stockpile weapons and station nuclear-armed troops on the territories of other countries; and immediately to stop their aggression, interference, control and subversion against other countries. Otherwise, there will be no guarantee at all for the establishment of nuclear-free zones and peace zones.

Fourthly, basing itself on the foregoing views, the Chinese delegation will not take part in the voting on this draft resolution.³ But we would like to take this opportunity to reaffirm that the Chinese people will, as always, continue to work together with the people of various countries, to persevere in the struggle and to strive for the realization of the noble goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons throughout the world.

The present difficulties obstructing the establishment of nuclear-free zones or peace zones in various parts of the world do not come from the Chinese side.

Statement by the Cuban Representative (Alom Gil) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone, December 10, 1971¹

My delegation abstained in the vote on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/L.587, which refers to the Treaty of Tlatelolco.²

³ Identical with G.A. res. 2830 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 898-899.

² A/C.1/PV.1848, pp. 36-37.

¹ The draft res. was identical with G.A. res. 2830 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 898-899. For the Tlatelolco Treaty, see *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 69 ff.

Since the position of my country has been made known a number of times, I presume that it is familiar to all. I shall therefore explain our vote very briefly. We have always appreciated very highly the salutary intentions of the Government of Mexico in advocating the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We have welcomed the active initiatives of the main mover of this Treaty, Ambassador García Robles, the head of the delegation of Mexico at the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly. Furthermore, the traditional friendship that exists between our two people is well known.

Latin American peoples are peace-loving. They wish to live in peace and to guide their own destiny. The United States, which has set itself up as the world policeman, has always opposed these legitimate aspirations. Our hemisphere is surrounded by the military bases of that country. We all know of the nuclear enclave maintained in the colonial bulwark, the sister island of Puerto Rico. The United States still occupies the Panama Canal Zone, where it maintains a very large military complex. Other installations are scattered all over the continent. Despite the expressed will of our people, the naval base of Guantánamo is still occupied and used as an aggressive springboard to hinder the development of our revolutionary process.

The imperialist Government of the United States has unceasingly carried on a policy of economic blockade, pressure, threats and constant harassment of the Cuban people. Today our people is a victim of vandalism against the civilian population, which originates from certain bases in Florida. Lately, a mercenary band carried out a piratical attack against a small fishing village located on the northern coast of Cuba's Oriente Province, called Boca de Samá.

There can be no doubt that Yankee imperialism is continuing its aggressive policy all over the world. The peoples of South-East Asia are the ones suffering most desperately, while, on the other hand, the United States is constantly making cynical statements about withdrawal of troops in order to hide its true purpose which is to continue the war. This is the true nature of the United States: while they speak of peace, they wage war. We recall the days when we too were threatened with a nuclear holocaust by this same Power that still maintains atomic bases in the island colony of Puerto Rico.

For those and other reasons my delegation wishes to state that until the only nuclear Power of our hemisphere is included in the commitment in the Treaty on denuclearization and until that Power has liquidated its military bases in Panama and Puerto Rico and the naval base of Guantánamo, which is encrusted in our own territory, Cuba will not be prepared to make commitments in accordance with this Treaty.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 10, 1971¹

In his statement made a few minutes ago the representative of the People's Republic of China raised a question which is not directly under consideration in this Committee: the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and the prohibition and liquidation of military bases on foreign soil.² Although these questions are not at present under consideration in the Committee, we should like to make a few remarks and clarifications.

On the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons we should like to indicate that the Soviet Union, as long ago as 1967, put forward a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.³ The twenty-second session of the General Assembly requested all States to study that draft convention and carry out talks about the possible conclusion of such an agreement.⁴ The Soviet Union continues to hew to the position that it is necessary to prohibit the use of nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation considers that the decision taken at the twenty-second session of the General Assembly continues to remain in force and must be carried out. On the question of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and the means of delivery from foreign soil the Soviet Union has often made proposals on this score. The Soviet side is constantly leading the fight for the liquidation of all foreign military bases, including those containing nuclear weapons.

Further, in the memorandum of the Soviet Government of 1 July 1968 the question was raised of the prohibition of flights by bomber aircraft carrying nuclear weapons beyond national frontiers and the limitation of the operational zones for missile-carrying submarines.⁵

We should also like to note that the Government of the Chinese People's Republic has not yet adhered to one single treaty in the field of disarmament, and one result is that it continues nuclear tests in the atmosphere and creates a serious danger of radio-active contamination, first of all for countries neighbouring on the Chinese People's Republic. This is where we should like to stop.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1848, pp. 37-41.

² See *ante*, pp. 862-863.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, pp. 420-421.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 626-627.

⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, p. 468.

Statement by the United States Representative (Martin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 10, 1971¹

I should like first to express my deep appreciation on behalf of the United States delegation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other representatives in the First Committee who have expressed regret at the passing of Dr. Ralph Bunche. The United States delegation will see to it that these sentiments are transmitted to Dr. Bunche's family.

The United States shares the desire which we believe motivates the co-sponsors of the draft resolutions before us, that is, to promote conditions of peace and tranquillity in the Indian Ocean area and, in that connexion, to seek to avoid a competitive expansion of military strength on the part of the major Powers.² This motivation, of course, is heightened by the tragic events now taking place in the Indian subcontinent.

The United States believes, however, that there are a number of difficulties with this Declaration. To begin with, this Declaration goes far beyond the usual practice of the General Assembly when considering for the first time a matter as complex as this. It actually places the General Assembly in the position of approving general language in an area which infringes upon disarmament and the law of the sea without the usual careful consideration associated with these subjects. All members are aware that for some time the United Nations has been actively preparing for a Law of the Sea Conference in 1973. The United States is concerned that resolutions such as the Ceylonese proposal, purporting to establish special régimes for particular areas, will undercut this most important United Nations objective of achieving a world wide law of the sea. This is particularly true where the language of the Declaration raises questions regarding such basic principles as freedom of navigation on the high seas. We reject the view that a group of States in a certain region can establish a legal régime for the high seas in that region. This may affect the fundamental security interests not only of States compelled to maintain significant military preparedness in this all too imperfect world, but also of States that rely on the stability created by a political and military balance in order to pursue other important national goals and to avoid diverting too much of their attention and resources to matters of security.

A Declaration such as we are now considering could be a dangerous precedent which could hinder the chances of a successful Law of the Sea Conference. This in itself would be a shame, because I am sure there are many countries that see in this

¹ A/C.1/PV.1849, pp. 16-17.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2832 (XXVI), *post*, pp.901-903.

conference the opportunity to achieve results of significant interest to them.

For these reasons, my delegation will abstain from voting on this draft resolution.

Statement by the PRC Representative (Chen) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 10, 1971¹

The draft resolution on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace² reflects the urgent desire of many Afro-Asian countries to safeguard their national independence and State sovereignty and reflects their just demand to oppose the super-Powers' contention for hegemony and division of spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean. In this sense, the Chinese delegation supports this draft resolution in principle.

At the same time, however, we must point out the following. First, at present peace in the Indian Ocean region is being seriously undermined. With the abetment and support of the Soviet Union, India has launched a large-scale armed aggression against Pakistan with the aim of serving the Soviet Union in its contention with another super-Power for hegemony over the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent. Such flagrant acts of aggression must be severely condemned. Firm support must be given to the Pakistani people's heroic resistance. Aggression must be repulsed; peace must be restored. Otherwise there can be no talk at all about the establishment of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Secondly, while launching and expanding its war of aggression, India is hypocritically making peace-loving gestures and declares itself one of the sponsors of the draft resolution on the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone. This is sheer sinister double-dealing in which India is trying to deceive the world under the camouflage of an international agreement, thus gravely undermining the seriousness³ . . . of the draft resolution. Therefore we deem it essential to tear away India's mask before this draft resolution is voted upon. India is not at all qualified to co-sponsor this draft unless it ceases its acts of aggression.

Thirdly, the Chinese Government's statement that at no time and under no circumstances will China be the first to use nuclear weapons and its consistent stand in favour of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and the

¹ A/C.1/PV.1849, pp. 31-32.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2832 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 901-903.

³ At this point, the Chairman of the First Committee recognized the Indian representative on a point of order. The Indian representative objected that the Chinese statement was not relevant to the agenda item. Mr. Chen then continued his statement. For the Indian reply to the Chinese comments on the Indo-Pakistani war, see A/C.1/PV.1849, pp. 61-62.

prevention of nuclear war are clear to all. This morning I already stated that China has not stationed a single soldier abroad; it has no military bases on foreign soil and has done nothing harmful to other countries.⁴ China will never be a super-Power that carries out aggression, subversion, control, interference or the bullying of other countries—neither today nor ever in the future. The obligations China has undertaken far exceed what the draft resolution calls upon the countries concerned to do. The question now is that the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and India, which have close relations with the Indian Ocean, must undertake obligations. Otherwise the root cause of aggression and the threat to the Indian Ocean and the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent will still remain, and peace and security in that area will have no guarantee at all. This draft resolution has failed to point that out explicitly, and that is a serious defect.

Fourthly, the Chinese delegation hopes that the report the Secretary-General will submit to the twenty-seventh session of the General Assembly will conform with the basic requirements laid down in the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

While making the foregoing statement and reservation, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 10, 1971¹

The delegation of the People's Republic of China has touched upon a question that is not under discussion in the First Committee, namely, the conflict between India and Pakistan. We do not think it necessary to touch upon this question in substance. The position of the Soviet Union on this problem was set forth in the plenary meeting of the General Assembly. We shall confine ourselves in this statement today to reading out an excerpt from the statement made by the Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Comrade Brezhnev, on 7 December of this year at the Sixth Congress of the Polish United Workers Party, when he touched upon the question now under discussion:

Like all partisans of the peace and freedom of peoples, we have learned with deep regret of the armed conflict that has recently erupted between two neighboring States of Asia, and also the events which gave rise to that conflict: the bloody repression of the fundamental rights and clearly expressed will of the population of East Pakistan, the tragedy of 10 million refugees. The Soviet Union firmly calls for an end to the bloodshed, for a peaceful political settlement of the problems that have arisen, taking into account the lawful rights of the peoples, without any interference of external forces, for the creation of conditions for a lasting and a just and stable peace in the region.²

⁴ See *ante*, pp. 862-863.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1849, pp. 62-66.

² *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 49 (Jan. 4, 1972), pp. 11-12.

That the Chinese delegation should have raised the question of the conflict in the Hindustan subcontinent here in the First Committee suggests an intention to prevent the serious and businesslike discussion of matters that are properly before the First Committee at this time. This step on the part of the Chinese delegation is not in conformity with the task which has been undertaken by the General Assembly and entrusted to the First Committee, to try to reach a decision on the urgent and important matters of curtailing the arms race and seeking disarmament, and also strengthening world peace and security.

The First Committee has discussed urgent questions to which the States and peoples attach great importance, and this discussion is coming to a close today. Among those questions were the prohibition of chemical and bacteriological weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; the prohibition of underground tests; general and complete disarmament, and others.

As is known, as a result of the discussion of these questions, both within and outside the United Nations, in recent years important and extremely necessary agreements have been concluded, which shows that where there is goodwill it is possible to attain practical results in this complex and important area of international activity. The position of the Soviet Union on the questions now under discussion in the First Committee is known. Thanks to the active participation in negotiations, and thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, understandings were reached and formal agreements were concluded on a number of other questions: the partial test-ban Treaty,³ the prohibition on the placing of weapons of mass destruction in orbit,⁴ and so on. At this session, finally, a draft convention on prohibiting bacteriological and toxin weapons was agreed upon.⁵

The Soviet Union has made important proposals on other disarmament questions, including a ban on the use of nuclear weapons, the prohibition of the placing of military bases in the territory of foreign States, forbidding bombers to carry nuclear weapons, and so on. We shall continue to press for the implementation of these measures.

As regards the People's Republic of China, we must note that its delegation is showing no readiness to co-operate in carrying out the steps on which agreement has already been reached among a large number of States. The delegation of the People's Republic of China in the First Committee is evidently unwilling to take a practical approach to important questions which are of concern to the peoples of the world and to world opinion in general. The delegation of the People's Republic of China has voted against all

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

resolutions and proposals aimed at putting an end to all nuclear weapons tests; it has taken no part in considering these problems of disarmament. At the same time, that delegation puts forward questions that are not under consideration in the Committee.

This position cannot be otherwise interpreted than as a display of lack of interest in solving the problems of disarmament and as an attempt to hamper the solution of problems which are under discussion in the Committee.

On the vote just taken in regard to declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace,⁶ our position was stated in our declaration of 1 December this year.⁷ We should just like to repeat that the Soviet delegation fully sympathizes with the idea of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. We should like this idea to be embodied in a form which would be most consonant with the task of strengthening world peace and security and the peace and security in the Indian Ocean. In expressing sympathy for the idea of proclaiming the Indian Ocean a zone of peace the Soviet delegation, like other States, would at the same time point out that the creation of this zone must provide for real measures to curb the arms race in that region of the world and that this undertaking must be effected in complete accordance with generally recognized standards of international law.

Our delegation stated that we regard the Ceylonese proposal that the Indian Ocean be declared a zone of peace as worthy of careful consideration, particularly among the parties concerned, before the General Assembly is called upon to take any decision.

Statement by the PRC Representative (An) to the First Committee of the General Assembly, December 10, 1971¹

I should like to ask the representatives of the Soviet Union and India a few questions, in exercise of my right of reply.

First, I should like to say that we are discussing today the proposal of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a peace zone.² In our discussion of this proposal we cannot disregard the situations in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and the Indian Ocean. The situation in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, as is known to all, is that India is launching a large-scale armed aggression against Pakistan. My delegation has pointed out the seriousness of this question during the general debate on this question. It is very pertinent to the question under discussion, because if we do not see the situation before us then we will be irresponsible towards the people of the Indian Ocean and towards the people of the

⁶ I.e., G.A. res. 2832 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 901-903.

⁷ *Ante*, pp. 815-816.

¹ A/C.1/PV.1849, pp. 66-70.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2832 (XXVI) *post*, pp. 901-903.

world. That is why we drew your attention to this question today, because it is entirely relevant to the subject under discussion. That is my first point.

My second point. The present situation on the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent is well known to all. A few days ago we discussed this in the Security Council and also in the General Assembly, and 104 countries voted for the resolution in the General Assembly.³ Many representatives in the Security Council as well as in the General Assembly solemnly pointed out the aggression of India against Pakistan. They all demanded the cessation of such acts of aggression and the withdrawal of aggressive forces. These are the voices heard by all recently in the debates in the United Nations. This is known by all. This is irrefutable. A country sends its troops into another country to commit aggression. What else could it be but aggression? A country engages in secessionist movement, disrupts and interferes in the internal affairs of another country. Is this not the most flagrant act of aggression and violation of the Charter of the United Nations? Such action should be condemned by the people of the whole world. This is undeniable. This is my second point.

My third point. With regard to China's position on nuclear weapons and disarmament, the Chairman of my delegation has made it amply clear more than once before the plenary Assembly. We have also stated our position here in this Committee. That is, we are in favour of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. We in China have made numerous solemn declarations that in no circumstances and at no time would we be the first to use nuclear weapons. Our purpose in possessing nuclear weapons is for self-defence and to oppose control, manipulation and nuclear blackmail by the nuclear super-Powers.

We are of the opinion that the Soviet Union and the United States—the two super-Powers—should first announce before the whole world that they too would undertake the same obligation. This is our most important task at present in the field of disarmament as well as in the prohibition of nuclear weapons. The Chinese delegation takes an active part in the work of the First Committee, but our position and our views cannot be changed. Any smear or slander against China in this respect will be futile.

Similarly, such is also the case with regard to the question of nuclear tests. I made our position quite clear in our last statement. The irrational accusations against us by the representatives of the Soviet Union and India today are entirely groundless. I totally reject such accusations.

³ A/RES/2793 (XXVI), Dec. 7, 1971.

Statement by the Belgian Representative (Van Ussel) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Peace Research, December 14, 1971¹

The problem of war and peace probably saw the light of day at the same time as the human race was born. Despite the legend of the golden age, a great deal of exertion and fumbling efforts were required before slowly becoming aware of himself, the human animal developed into a being endowed with reason and moral judgement and was able to become aware of the good and evil of which he was capable and above all of the scope of this good and this evil when they had repercussions in terms of collective antagonisms. With the development of scientific thought, he had to realize quite quickly that the use of force far from resolving problems always created new ones. The treacherous dilemma of the ends and the means condemned him, however, to repeat over and over the same errors and the same horrors. Unfortunately, the history of mankind is evidence of a perpetual beginning anew.

Scientific thought on war and peace for a long time and until quite recent times dealt exclusively with the history, morality, philosophical science and even theology of war and peace.

Ancient Greece produced two thinkers who, each in his own field of studies, developed opposing theories concerning the use of power. For Plato the city existed as the incarnation of justice and the good. Thucydides, on the other hand, believed that power is the prerequisite and not the justification of the existence of the city.

The Utopian Republic of Plato presupposed an internal rigid organization aimed at achieving an ethical ideal which would guarantee to the collectivity of citizens a minimum means of existence and success in the wars with cities of more or less equal power. The objective imperialist history of Athens, on the contrary, made it possible for the author of "The Peloponnesian War" to discern the causes of the failure of a foreign policy, which boiled down primarily to the neglect of the principle that political power, both internal as well as international, is subject to laws beyond its control or, in other words, that the pursuit of power for itself or without moderation in the long run leads only to self-destructive actions.

From this viewpoint there was much that is still valid in the Peloponnesian War. Viewed as a historical parallel the question of whether the city of Athens should be reinforced with ramparts is quite similar to that which today concerns the great Powers which want to shield themselves behind a cordon of anti-ballistic missiles. A reading of Thucydides for that matter will lead to the observation that the behaviour of small cities in Greece was in no way different from that of peoples of modern times and that they

¹ A/PV.2018 (prov.), pp. 12-25.

allowed themselves to be led to war for the same motives of jealousy, prestige, ambition, rivalry, fear, messianism and economic and political interests.

Still the thinking of Thucydides and Plato had something in common. In each author the fundamental idea and the supreme justification of policy was the city. Transposed into contemporary terminology this means the nation, the State.

If the two different theories of State have continued to divide men when they began to think about political behaviour, they have always allowed themselves to be guided by the premise of the interest of the State without bothering their heads about any system which could have transcended the State. Thus, history was for a long time a science called upon to glorify and justify the actions of princes and sovereign peoples against other princes and other equally sovereign peoples, and on another level of human sciences morality was asked to provide through the devious approach of so-called natural law the theory of the just war and later other increasingly nefarious theories such as that of the State as the absolute manifestation of human will and later that of the State as an instrument of the superior race.

That was not always so far removed from the thinking of another Greek philosopher, Aristotle, for whom the just war was the war that one had won and for whom there were by nature peoples born to be slaves.

The persistence of the conceptual error allows me for that matter to jump lightly over 2,000 years of history and to deal with an important change that occurred fairly recently in scientific thinking on war and peace.

Under the impact of the dramatic events of our century—world wars, revolutions, counter-revolutions, decolonization, racial persecutions, the emergence of nuclear weapons—a whole series of wise men came to the conclusion that the problem of war and peace would never find an adequate solution so long as we continued to tackle it from the angle of the State alone and of inter-State relations. They came to the conclusion that the empirical approach was false and that war should be studied as a phenomenon in itself in order to serve peace, just as medical science studies disease in order to cure the sick. This movement emerged immediately after the First World War and also benefited from the generally accepted belief that it had become absurd to justify war any longer as a normal instrument of policy, as “the pursuance of policy with other means”. It was above all the sociologists who devoted themselves to the study of war as a repetitive social phenomenon, so much so that the Tenth Congress of the International Institute of Sociology, held at Geneva in 1930, was able to greet the birth of a new discipline, that of “the sociology of war and peace”.

The political evolution of the 30s unfortunately, shattered the forward movement of this new and promising initiative; but we

should none the less mention that it produced a work which deserves to be borne in mind—that is, the monumental study of war published by Quincy Wright during the Second World War itself. After that war, Professor Bouthoul forged the term “polemology”, although he experienced great difficulties in having this new branch of scientific thought accepted by scientific circles. The obstacle was this: if you talked about war, this brought you up short, led to sentimental reactions, which prevented you from studying the phenomenon as objectively as you can study a chemical reaction. That is why some decided that they would prefer to use the term to “irenology” instead of “polemology”.

Early in the 60s several things became clear: that peace was provisionally ensured by the nuclear balance; that disarmament was not foreseeable; that the nuclear balance was very fragile and did not exclude errors of calculation or mistakes; that classical war could continue, and was continuing, behind the shelter of the nuclear balance of power; and that the problems of the third world were not settled merely by political decolonization—in other words, that new war-like situations or situations capable of creating war, had made their appearance and that the old had none the less not been done away with.

It is in this condition, therefore, that we must focus our study of the multiplication throughout the world of institutions devoted to polemology or peace research. There is a nuance between this term “polemology” and peace research, the latter term being closer to conflict research. To simplify the question, one could say that polemology is an approach to the phenomenon of war—an approach followed by a French school that tends towards the accumulation of systematized knowledge. Peace research would rather be of an Anglo-Saxon inspiration and directed towards the solution of current problems, whereas conflict research would be a Scandinavian variation of the Anglo-Saxon school and would be concerned not to assimilate the object of research with pacifism.

But it is perhaps an exaggeration to try to settle this by a dispute in terms of language. Behind the semantic difference there lies an interesting discussion of an epistemological nature. The need was felt not only to produce results in terms of knowledge, but to go beyond this and to apply them in the practice of sociology and politics. This implies that there is no difference between polemology and peace research, but that there are certain divergent views on the content of the polemic on which science was founded, and basically it is the conflict, eternal and appropriate to any science, between fundamental research and pragmatic research.

We need not take a position in this academic discussion. Now when we consider the direct object of the work of the polemologists, or peace researchers, we can note at the outset that this is an interdisciplinary science *par excellence*. For example, the economists study the trade in weapons throughout the world. This is the

main point of the Stockholm Institute. Psychologists consider the phenomenon of aggressiveness in the individual and societies. Sociologists like Bouthoul examine war and peace as results of structures and mechanisms of society. Jurists such as Röling deal with the relationship between war and the legal relationship between men and societies. The futurist polemologist examines patiently what measures are likely to bring us closer to a peaceful world order. Existentialist polemologists analyse the means of avoiding imminent wars and the resolving of conflicts, and so on.

All of this finds its place in a synthesis which causes the science of polemology to respond to an absolute need different from that of political science proper, in law, sociology and the discipline of international relations. Polemology thus appears as a positive science and, to use the words of Professor Rapoport, the end purpose of this is to give an instrumental answer designed to have an impact on the environment and to transform it. Its course of action is, therefore, to ascertain the causes of phenomena in order to create adequate instruments designed to transform the consequences. In an editorial published on 2 November last in the daily newspaper *Le Monde*, Professor Bouthoul concluded in this connexion:

To the Roman adage—which has been so many times denied but which is none the less necessary—if you want peace prepare for war, we should add, if we want to put the greatest chance of success on the side of peace, above all in our atomic age, if you want peace know war. In other words, study its biology, its ideology, its functions, its rhythms, its cycles and its periodicities. We cannot circumvent fatalities except by knowing them.

What now is the relationship between the United Nations and the science of polemology? The explanatory memorandum which is annexed to document A/8394 recalls that Mr. Harmel, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Belgium, in his statement at the twenty-fourth session, drew the attention of the General Assembly to the intensive but very scattered development of scientific and interdisciplinary studies concerning the problems of peace, conflict, disarmament and other related questions which all have a close connexion with what constitutes the primary purpose of our Organization, namely, the maintenance of international peace and security. [*He said:*]

I cannot believe that scientific studies, which are of primary concern to us, can leave our Organization indifferent; if we informed ourselves, it would be possible to accept the useful proposals which they certainly contain.²

Indeed it would be somewhat absurd if our Organization were to overlook the scientific studies, generally of a very high level, which could in the long run help States—and above and beyond States, the United Nations—to attain their common fundamental objective. Thus we very much appreciated the fact that the Secretary-General, at his level, in principle made a first step in the direction suggested by Minister Harmel.

² A/PV.1765 (prov.), p. 48 (variant translation).

As is clear from paragraph 118 of the draft budget for 1971:

... the Secretary-General recently approved the creation of a peace research unit in the office of the Director of the Political Affairs Division. The function of the unit is to collect and make available to the Department and the office of the Secretary-General information on the activities of the major organizations and institutes, governmental, non-governmental and academic, which are carrying out peace research... relating to political problems with which the United Nations is concerned.³

There is, therefore, a nucleus here around which we could begin to build something.

But there is even more that can be said. The international community, as it is expressed through our Organization, is somewhat in the situation of Mr. Jourdain, who is speaking prose without knowing it. Obviously, our Organization is not a research institute—to such an extent that the repertory of UNESCO and institutions which specialize in research and peace and disarmament does not classify our Organization as such. But it is equally obvious that it has not stopped producing documents, reports and studies which could be considered as a contribution, at the primary stage, to the research on peace.

Our explanatory memorandum indicates, further, that some organs of the United Nations family, such as UNESCO and UNITAR, have direct work to perform in this field. In a study that is going to be published very shortly, Dr. Yassin El-Ayouty, Assistant Professor at St. John's University of New York, points out that this is also more or less the case of institutions such as the United Nations Research Institute for Special Development at Geneva, the United Nations Research Institute for Social Defence at Rome, the International Institute for Studies on Labour at Geneva, and many others.

To sum up, research on peace is not alien to our Organization. What is lacking is an over-all view of an entire series of interdisciplinary and interorganizational undertakings, an over-all view which would enable our Organization and States to derive advantage from it, to the extent that all of these undertakings have an effective value for the attainment of our common goals in the field of peace and international security.

We are certainly not suggesting that the United Nations itself should engage directly in this work of research on peace, nor are we suggesting that political bodies should engage in this in the exercise of their political responsibility at the discretion of scientists. The only thing—I repeat, the only thing—that we have in mind is a focal point toward which we could turn to obtain, in the light of the Charter, practical and useful information on everything that is being done throughout the world by these knowledgeable people who are active in the search for peace.

The results of the polemology would therefore be brought to the knowledge of Governments which, each in turn, could draw

³ A/8006.

the greatest benefit from this in the individual and collective conduct of their foreign relations. This would also be a way of informing public opinion, because animosity, even war, only too often are part of the mentality and the culture of peoples.

All of these considerations have led my country to submit to the General Assembly the draft resolution which is contained in document A/L.645.⁴ We have done this together with the following countries: Burundi, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Romania and Yugoslavia, and Ireland has also now joined us.

On behalf of my Government, I should like to convey to all of the co-sponsors my deep gratitude. The purpose of the draft resolution is very simple. As is clear from operative paragraph 1, we are asking the Secretary-General:

... to prepare every second year an informational report on scientific works produced by national and international, governmental and non-governmental, public and private institutions in the field of peace research.

By "informational report" we mean primarily a bibliographical summary. In an introduction, the Secretary-General could set forth his views on methodology, on the preparation of this summary, because it is obvious that this in itself implies some research and even a certain degree of selectivity. There are people seeking peace who do not know each other, but whose work is undoubtedly of great interest. There are countries in which there are institutes that could not call themselves a polemological institute or a peace research centre, but whose disciplines are intimately intermingled with the object of this science. Moreover, anything which appears to have polemological connotations on research for peace is not necessarily relevant to the objective pursuit by our Organization. It is in this spirit, therefore, that we must analyse some of the consideranda of the preamble.

The fourth preambular paragraph, which repeats the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security,⁵ brings out that for our Organization the problem, and the study of the problem, cannot be an end in itself. The fifth paragraph of the preamble lays down the principle that the permanent recording of studies on peace and war should be done "in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter"; that is to say, they should refer precisely to what is relevant to these principles and objectives.

Finally, in the case of an informational report, we believe that the Secretary-General could follow up this bibliographical review by information that he would have received from the research group on peace, which is a part of the *Cabinet* of the Director of the Division of Political Affairs. But, in any event, the informa-

⁴ Identical with G.A. res. 2817 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 880-881.

⁵ General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 22-24.

tional report should be objective and descriptive. It is not for the Secretary-General to take a position or to pass a value judgement on the works that have been listed.

Operative paragraph 2 is a means of inviting Governments and the institutions concerned to get into contact with the Secretary-General and to bring to his attention the works, the books, the articles, that they consider fall within the category of relevant studies. Operative paragraph 3 is addressed to UNITAR and the specialized agencies, which are capable of aiding the Secretary-General actively, with a view to the establishment of the informational report.

Finally, in operative paragraph 4, the Secretary-General is asked to present his first biannual report early in the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly. At this time we are not going to ask that an item should be included on the provisional agenda of the twenty-eighth session now, with a view to the consideration of this first report. We will look into this at the time when the report has been issued, for we do not want to bind Governments yet on this point. It is for them to judge when they will have seen the report.

We think that the draft resolution contained in document A/L.645 offers nothing which can be controversial. Thus, we request the assembly to accept it unanimously and without reservations. The co-sponsors sincerely believe that their initiative may lead to a fruitful dialogue between those who seek peace, on the one hand, and the Governments and the Organization, on the other hand. If we succeed in arousing interest in scientific thinking on war and peace, we shall have become more attentive to the interplay involved in this thinking, which after all are the reasons for which the United Nations itself exists.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Safronchuk) to the First Committee of the General Assembly: Peace Research, December 14, 1971¹

The Soviet delegation has attentively studied the draft resolution of Belgium concerning scientific work on peace research.² That proposal has now been brought before the General Assembly for its consideration. We understand the concern of Belgium for the cause of peace. We understand its endeavours to take steps in order further to strengthen international security and to enhance the role played by the United Nations in this noble cause. We certainly do not deny the importance of carrying out scientific work on questions of war and peace. In the Soviet Union we are carrying out basic research on this problem, and this research is carried out by many research institutes within the framework of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.

¹ A/PV.2018 (prov.), pp. 37-41.

² Identical with G.A. res. 2817 (XXVI), *infra*.

In the Soviet Union in recent years dozens of monographs and studies have been published dealing, *inter alia*, with the causes and the nature of the Second World War. A six-volume history of the great war carried out by the Soviet people against Hitlerite Germany has recently been published.³ Soviet historians are participating actively in international conferences and symposia, meetings of scientists and scholars, all of which study the problems of war in modern times.

Soviet historians in their works give particular attention to disclosing the pernicious role played by international monopolies and international imperialist circles in unleashing wars and military conflicts, including wars against peoples who are struggling for their national and social liberation.

At the same time, the Soviet Union has consistently supported efforts to have the United Nations focus its main attention on implementing its principal task as enshrined in the Charter, namely, the maintenance of peace and security. That has been the objective of the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union to the United Nations throughout the 26 years of the existence of the United Nations. Even at the present session of the General Assembly, under the initiative taken by the Soviet Union, important international problems are under consideration, such as the convening of a world conference on disarmament, the prohibition of bacteriological weapons, the strengthening of international security and many others.

The Soviet Union will continue to strive by all means to enhance the role and effectiveness of the United Nations as an instrument for strengthening international peace and security.

However, the Soviet delegation cannot agree with the specific proposals contained in document A/L.645. We realize that certain changes have been made in that text as compared with its original version. Unfortunately, those changes do not affect the substance and they do not remove the objections that our delegation has made from the outset. In our view, the implementation of this draft resolution might have an adverse effect on the activities of the United Nations, since it would divert the attention of the United Nations from the implementation of its main purpose, namely, the maintenance of peace and international security.

Furthermore, as we understand it, the United Nations is not successfully dealing with that task. It would therefore be very useful to focus the attention of the Organization on the most important problems of ensuring peace and security rather than on abstract problems in studies of war and peace. Studies of this kind are very often conducted in dissociation from reality and existing problems. Very often they work counter to the very purposes and objectives of the Charter.

We cannot accept an approach in which certain States—for instance, those which submitted this proposal—are not ready to

³*Istoriya Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny Sovietskogo Soyuz, 1941-1945* (6 vols., Moscow, 1960-1965).

agree that the General Assembly should systematically give attention to such an important document as the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security⁴ but, on the contrary, suggest that the United Nations engage in research work on the subject of peace on a permanent basis.

There is a certain inconsistency in this. Furthermore, as we see it, this draft resolution provides for recommendations inviting the attention of Governments by means of an informational report, whereas the efforts of States should be focused on implementing the Declaration on Strengthening International Security and taking specific measures to ensure the fulfilment of its purpose.

We cannot agree with the proposal that the co-ordination of such research work should be directed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations. As we know, according to the United Nations Charter the Secretary-General is the highest official of this Organization, and he does not have this particular function. To assign such work to the Secretary-General would be tantamount to diverting his attention from his basic function and would have an adverse effect on the work of the Secretariat, for whose work he is primarily responsible.

Finally, the implementation of the proposal contained in document A/L.645 and Add.1-2 would entail, at least in the near future, additional expenses falling within the United Nations regular budget, and in view of the present difficult financial situation of the United Nations my delegation believes that also is undesirable.

In view of those considerations, the Soviet delegation will vote against the draft resolution contained in document A/L.645 and Add.1-2.

General Assembly Resolution 2817 (XXVI): Scientific Work on Peace Research, December 14, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Considering that the fundamental purpose of the United Nations is to save mankind from the scourge of war and to maintain international peace and security,

Considering that scientific research on the problems of war and peace has expanded and that many national and international institutions have made them the subject of their studies,

Noting with interest the work done in this field by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the United Nations Institute for Training and Research,

Conscious of the importance that States attach to the study of

⁴General Assembly Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28 (A/8028), pp. 22-24.

¹A/RES/2817 (XXVI), Jan. 12, 1972. This resolution was adopted by a vote of 59 to 7, with 3 abstentions. The U.S. voted in favor of the resolution, and the USSR voted against it.

the means and recourses to implement the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in order to build peace, security and co-operation in the world,

Considering it desirable to bring to the notice of the international community the work done in the field of peace research by national and international institutions and to promote on a permanent basis, in the light of the purposes and principles of the Charter, a recording of the studies devoted to this subject,

1. *Requests* the Secretary-General to prepare every other year an informative report on scientific works produced by national and international, governmental and non-governmental, public and private institutions in the field of peace research;

2. *Invites* the Governments of Member States and the institutions referred to in paragraph 1 above to provide the Secretary-General, to the best of their ability and competence, with all the information he may require;

3. *Requests* the United Nations Institute for Training and Research and those specialized agencies which are active in the field of peace research to lend their assistance in the drafting of the report referred to above;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly, at the beginning of its twenty-eighth session, the first report prepared under paragraph 1 above.

General Assembly Resolution 2825 (XXVI): General and Complete Disarmament, December 16, 1971¹

A²

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2661 B (XXV) of 7 December 1970,³

Noting with appreciation the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency,⁴

¹ A/RES/2825 (XXVI), Jan. 13, 1972.

² On Dec. 8, 1971, the First Committee of the G.A. approved pt. A by a vote of 76 to 0, with 17 abstentions:

In favor—Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

Against—None.

Abstaining—Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Central African Republic, Colombia, Congo, France, India, Israel, Kuwait, Peru, Romania, Senegal, Spain, United Republic of Tanzania, Venezuela.

Pt. A was approved by the plenary G.A. by a vote of 89 to 0, with 17 abstentions. The PRC did not participate in the voting.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 682.

⁴ A/8384.

Noting with satisfaction the success of the International Atomic Energy Agency in drawing up detailed guidelines for the structure and content of agreements between the Agency and States required in connexion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons⁵,

Noting that the procedures embodied in such agreements are applicable to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle and are to be concentrated on those stages involving the production, processing, use or storage of nuclear material from which nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices could readily be made,

Noting from the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency that detailed safeguards procedures with respect to nuclear enrichment plants, including those employing new techniques of uranium enrichment, have still to be elaborated and applied,

1. *Expresses its confidence* in the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to meet, without delay, the obligations likely to be placed upon it in respect of the application of safeguards to nuclear material in all types of civil nuclear facilities, including uranium enrichment plants;

2. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to include in its annual report to the General Assembly full information on the progress of its work on the application of safeguards in connexion with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, including safeguards on nuclear material in uranium enrichment plants using both existing and new techniques.

B⁶

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1722 (XVI) of 20 December 1961⁷ and 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,⁸

Further recalling its resolution 2661 C (XXV) of 7 December 1970, which urged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to make more intensive efforts to bring about a faster pace towards the achievement of disarmament measures, expressed its appreciation of the important and constructive documents and views submitted at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, and recommended to the Conference that it take into account in its further work and its negotiations the comprehensive programme of disarmament⁹ as well as other documents presented on the same subject,¹⁰

⁵ For the IAEA guidelines, see *ante*, pp. 218-244. The non-proliferation treaty appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

⁶ Pt. B was adopted by a vote of 105 to 0, with 4 abstentions (France, Qatar, Senegal, Upper Volta). Upper Volta and four other countries subsequently informed the U.N. Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favor. The PRC did not participate in the voting.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 741-742.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 713-715.

⁹ For the comprehensive program, see *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 653-658.

¹⁰ Res. 2661 C (XXV) appears *ibid.*, pp. 682-683.

Considering that it has declared the decade of the 1970s as the Disarmament Decade,

Taking into account the proposals, suggestions and views put forward in the General Assembly and in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,

1. *Reaffirms* the responsibility of the United Nations in the fundamental goal of the attainment of general and complete disarmament;

2. *Urges* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, at its next session, to resume its efforts on the question of general and complete disarmament along the lines set forth in General Assembly resolution 2661 C (XXV);

3. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the results of these efforts.

C¹¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling, its resolution 1149 (XII) of 14 November 1957 on collective action to inform and enlighten the peoples of the world as to the dangers of the armaments race, and particularly as to the destructive effects of modern weapons,¹²

Recalling its resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 16 December 1969, in which it declared the decade of the 1970s as a Disarmament Decade and requested the Secretary-General and Governments to publicize the Decade by all appropriate means at their disposal,¹³

Recalling its resolution 2661 C (XXV) of 7 December 1970 which dealt *inter alia* with the comprehensive programme of disarmament,¹⁴

Considering that public opinion should be adequately informed about the problems of the arms race and of disarmament so that it might bring its influence to bear on the strengthening of disarmament efforts,

1. *Affirms* the value of holding conferences of experts and scientists from various countries on the problems of the arms race and disarmament;

2. *Expresses its support* for the practice of requesting the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of consultant experts, authoritative reports on concrete questions relating to the arms race and disarmament;

3. *Declares* that progress would be promoted towards general and complete disarmament if universities and academic institutes in all countries were to establish continuing courses and seminars to study problems of the arms race;

¹¹ Pt. C was adopted by a vote of 110 to 0. Three other countries subsequently informed the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favor. The PRC did not participate in the voting.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 914-915.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 713-715.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 682-683.

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to bring the present resolution to the attention of all Member States and to the attention of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization with a view to its wide publication and dissemination.

General Assembly Resolution 2826 (XXVI): Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, December 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,²

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament dated 6 October 1971,³ and being appreciative of its work on the draft Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, annexed to the report,⁴

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,⁵ and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Noting that the Convention provides for the parties to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calls upon all States to comply strictly with them,

Further noting that nothing in the Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons,

¹ A/RES/2826 (XXVI), Feb. 25, 1972. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 110 to 0, with one abstention (France). The PRC did not participate in the voting.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 683-685.

³ *Ante*, pp. 610-633.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

Noting that the Convention contains an affirmation of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes,

Convinced that the implementation of measures in the field of disarmament should release substantial additional resources, which should promote economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries,

Convinced that the Convention will contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Commends* the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the text of which is annexed to the present resolution;

2. *Requests* the depositary Governments to open the Convention for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date;

3. *Expresses hope* for the widest possible adherence to the Convention.

ANNEX

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction

The States Parties to this Convention,

Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control,

Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,⁶ and conscious also of the contribution which the said Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,

Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling upon all States to comply strictly with them,

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of 17 June 1925,

Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international atmosphere,

Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end,

Determined, for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,

Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort should be spared to minimize this risk,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain:

1. Microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes;

2. Weapons, equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict.

Article II

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to destroy, or to divert to peaceful purposes, as soon as possible but not later than nine months after the entry into force of the Convention, all agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, which are in its possession or under its jurisdiction or control. In implementing the provisions of this article all necessary safety precautions shall be observed to protect populations and the environment.

Article III

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any

way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention.

Article IV

Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention, within the territory of such State, under its jurisdiction or under its control anywhere.

Article V

The States Parties to this Convention undertake to consult one another and to co-operate in solving any problems which may arise in relation to the objective of, or in the application of the provisions of, the Convention. Consultation and co-operation pursuant to this article may also be undertaken through appropriate international procedures within the framework of the United Nations and in accordance with its Charter.

Article VI

(1) Any State Party to this Convention which finds that any other State Party is acting in breach of obligations deriving from the provisions of the Convention may lodge a complaint with the Security Council of the United Nations. Such a complaint should include all possible evidence confirming its validity, as well as a request for its consideration by the Security Council.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to co-operate in carrying out any investigation which the Security Council may initiate, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, on the basis of the complaint received by the Council. The Security Council shall inform the States Parties to the Convention of the results of the investigation.

Article VII

Each State Party to this Convention undertakes to provide or support assistance, in accordance with the United Nations Charter, to any Party to the Convention which so requests, if the Security Council decides that such Party has been exposed to danger as a result of violation of the Convention.

Article VIII

Nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted as in any way limiting or detracting from the obligations assumed by any State under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925.

Article IX

Each State Party to this Convention affirms the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, undertakes to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes.

Article X

(1) The States Parties to this Convention undertake to facilitate, and have the right to participate in, the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials and scientific and technological information for the use of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes. Parties to the Convention in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing individually or together with other States or international organizations to the further development and application of scientific discoveries in the field of bacteriology (biology) for the prevention of disease, or for other peaceful purposes.

(2) This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful bacteriological (biological) activities, including the international exchange of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins and equipment for the processing, use or production of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.

Article XI

Any State Party may propose amendments to this Convention. Amendments shall enter into force for each State Party accepting the amendments upon their acceptance by a majority of the States Parties to the Convention and thereafter for each remaining State Party on the date of acceptance by it.

Article XII

Five years after the entry into force of this Convention, or earlier if it is requested by a majority of Parties to the Convention by submitting a proposal to this effect to the Depositary Governments, a conference of States Parties to the Convention shall be held at Geneva, Switzerland, to review the operation of the Convention, with a view to assuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Convention, including the provisions concerning negotiations on chemical weapons, are being realized. Such review shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.

Article XIII

(1) This Convention shall be of unlimited duration.

(2) Each State Party to this Convention shall in exercising its national sovereignty have the right to withdraw from the Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject matter of the Convention, have jeopardized the supreme interests of its country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal to all other States Parties to the Convention and to the United Nations Security Council three months in advance. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events it regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Article XIV

(1) This Convention shall be open to all States for signature. Any State which does not sign the Convention before its entry into force in accordance with paragraph 3 of this article may accede to it at any time.

(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, which are hereby designated the Depositary Governments.

(3) This Convention shall enter into force after the deposit of instruments of ratification by twenty-two Governments, including the Governments designated as Depositories of the Convention.

(4) For States whose instruments of ratification or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry into force of this Convention, it shall enter into force on the date of the deposit of their instruments of ratification or accession.

(5) The Depositary Governments shall promptly inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each signature, the date of deposit of each instrument of ratification or of accession and the date of the entry into force of this Convention, and of the receipt of other notices.

(6) This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Article XV

This Convention, the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts of which are equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies of the Convention shall be transmitted by the Depositary Governments to the Governments of the signatory and acceding States.

In witness whereof the undersigned, duly authorized, have signed this Convention.

Done in triplicate, at _____, this _____ day of _____.

General Assembly Resolution 2827 (XXVI): Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, December 16, 1971¹

A

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2454 A (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,² its resolution 2603 B (XXIV) of 16 December 1969,³ and in particular its resolution 2662 (XXV) of 7 December 1970⁴ in which it stressed that the prospects for international peace and security, as well as the achievement of the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, would be enhanced if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war were to end and if those agents were eliminated from all military arsenals, and commended the following basic approach for reaching an effective solution to the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare:

(a) It is urgent and important to reach agreement on the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare,

(b) Both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should continue to be dealt with together in taking steps towards the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and their effective elimination from the arsenals of all States,

(c) The issue of verification is important in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, and verification should be based on a combination of appropriate national and international measures, which would complement and supplement each other, thereby providing an acceptable system that would ensure the effective implementation of the prohibition,

Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or bacteriological (biological) agents,

Having considered the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament,⁵ and in particular its work on the draft Convention of the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin

¹ A/RES/2827 (XXVI), Jan. 19, 1972. The G.A. approved pt. A by a vote of 110 to 0, with one abstention (France). The vote on pt. B was 101 to 0, with 10 abstentions (Belgium, Canada, France, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Romania, Turkey, U.K., U.S.). The PRC did not vote on either part of the resolution.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 793-795.

³ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 717-719.

⁴ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 683-685.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 610-633.

Weapons and on Their Destruction and its efforts towards reaching early agreement also on the elimination of chemical weapons,

Convinced that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction⁶ is a first possible step towards the achievement of early agreement on the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on the elimination of such weapons from military arsenals of all States, and determined to continue negotiations to this end,

Recalling that the General Assembly has repeatedly condemned all actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 17 June 1925,⁷

Noting that the Convention provides for the parties to reaffirm their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and to call upon all States to comply strictly with them,

1. *Notes with satisfaction* that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains an affirmation of the recognized objective of effective prohibition of chemical weapons and, to this end, an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling and for their destruction, and on appropriate measures concerning equipment and means of delivery specifically designed for the production or use of chemical agents for weapons purposes;

2. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a high priority item, negotiations with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their elimination from the arsenals of all States;

3. *Also requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to take into account in its further work:

(a) The elements contained in the joint memorandum on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, submitted on 28 September 1971 to the Conference by Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden and Yugoslavia;⁸

(b) Other proposals, suggestions, working papers and expert views put forward in the Conference and in the First Committee;

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 568-573, and *supra*.

⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 566-568.

4. *Urges* Governments to take all steps that may contribute to a successful outcome of the negotiations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and that could facilitate early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the elimination of such weapons from the arsenals of all States;

5. *Reaffirms* its resolution 2162 B (XXI) of 5 December 1966⁹ and calls anew for the strict observance by all States of the principles and objectives of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare;

6. *Invites* all States that have not already done so to accede to or ratify the Protocol;

7. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to submit a report on the results achieved to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament all documents and records of the First Committee relating to questions connected with the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) methods of warfare.

B

The General Assembly,

Noting that the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction contains an undertaking to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and for their destruction.

Believing that it is most desirable that some measures of a preliminary nature be adopted immediately,

Urges all States to undertake, pending agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction, to refrain from any further development, production or stockpiling of those chemical agents for weapons purposes which, because of their degree of toxicity, have the highest lethal effects and are not usable for peaceful purposes.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1966*, pp. 798-799.

General Assembly Resolution 2828 (XXVI): Urgent Need for Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests, December 16, 1971¹

A²

The General Assembly,

Viewing with the utmost apprehension the harmful consequences of nuclear weapon tests for the acceleration of the arms race and for the health of present and future generations of mankind,

Fully conscious that world opinion has, over the years, demanded the immediate and complete cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments,

Recalling that the item on the question of a comprehensive test ban has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly every year since 1957,

Deploring the fact that the General Assembly has not yet succeeded in its aim of achieving a comprehensive test ban, despite eighteen successive resolutions on the subject,

Noting with regret that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,³

Deploring the fact that the determination expressed by the original parties to that Treaty to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time has not so far produced the desired results,

Noting with special concern that the continuation of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere is a source of growing pollution and that the number and magnitude of underground tests has increased at an alarming rate since 1963,

¹ A/RES/2828 (XXVI), Jan. 19, 1972. The votes on the various parts of the resolution are noted below.

² Pt. A was adopted by a vote of 74 to 2, with 36 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—Albania, China.

Abstaining—Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Central African Republic, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea, Hungary, Italy, Japan, Khmer Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Netherlands, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S.

³ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

Having considered the special report submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament⁴ in response to General Assembly resolution 2663 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,⁵

Recalling its resolution 1762 A (XVII) of 6 November 1962, whereby all nuclear weapon tests, without exception, were condemned,⁶

Convinced that, whatever may be the differences on the question of verification, there is no valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban of the nature contemplated in the preamble to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water,

1. *Reiterates solemnly and most emphatically* its condemnation of all nuclear weapon tests;

2. *Urges* the Governments of nuclear-weapon States to bring to a halt all nuclear weapon tests at the earliest possible date and, in any case, not later than 5 August 1973;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session of any measures they have taken to implement it.

B⁷

The General Assembly,

Noting that one of the first steps in the strengthening of international security is to dissipate world-wide fears that nuclear, thermonuclear and other weapons of mass destruction may be used by miscalculation in what could appear to be a desperate situation,

Considering that for the last few years the United Nations has been preoccupied with finding ways and means of diminishing the pollution of the earth's atmosphere,

Noting that scientists have been unanimous in the conclusion that the fall-out from nuclear tests is injurious to human and animal life and that such fall-out may poison the earth's atmosphere for many decades to come.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 626-633.

⁵ *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 685-687.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1029-1032.

⁷ Pt. B was approved by a vote of 72 to 2, with 40 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Bahrain, Bhutan, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Fiji, Ghana, Guatemala, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Somalia, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—Albania, China.

Abstaining—Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, Congo, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Greece, Guinea, Honduras, India, Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Uganda, U.K., United Republic of Tanzania, U.S., Yugoslavia.

Taking into account that underground nuclear and thermonuclear tests may not only create serious health hazards but may also cause as yet undetermined injury to humans and animals of the region where such tests are conducted,

Recognizing that there already exist sufficient nuclear, thermonuclear and other lethal weapons of mass destruction in the arsenals of certain Powers to decimate the world's population and possibly render the earth uninhabitable,

1. *Appeals* to the nuclear Powers to desist from carrying out further nuclear and thermonuclear tests, whether underground, under water or in the earth's atmosphere;

2. *Urges* the nuclear Powers to reach an agreement without delay on the cessation of all nuclear and thermonuclear tests;

3. *Reassures* the peoples of the world that the United Nations will continue to raise its voice against nuclear and thermonuclear tests of any kind and earnestly requests the nuclear Powers not to deploy such weapons of mass destruction.

C⁸

The General Assembly,

Recognizing the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons tests, including those carried out underground,

Recalling that this subject has been included in the agenda of the General Assembly every year since 1957,

Recalling in particular its resolutions 914 (X) of 16 December 1955,⁹ 1762 (XVII) of 6 November 1962,¹⁰ 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,¹¹ 2032 (XX) of 3 December 1965,¹² 2163 (XXI) of 5 December 1966,¹³ 2343 (XXII) of 19 December 1967,¹⁴ 2455 (XXIII) of 20 December 1968,¹⁵ 2604 (XXIV) of 16 December 1969¹⁶ and 2663 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,¹⁷

⁸ Pt. C was adopted by a vote of 92 to 2, with 23 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Bhutan, Bolivia, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—Albania, China.

Abstaining—Algeria, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Ceylon, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, Guinea, Hungary, India, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S.

⁹ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. I, pp. 583-586.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1962, vol. II, pp. 1029-1033.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 1963, p. 627.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1965, pp. 623-624.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 1966, pp. 802-803.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 1967, p. 731.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 796-797.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 719 ff.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 685-687.

Expressing serious concern that the objectives of those resolutions have not been fulfilled,

Noting with regret that all States have not yet adhered to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, signed in Moscow on 5 August 1963,¹⁸ and that some continue to test in the atmosphere,¹⁹

Taking into account the determination expressed by the parties to that Treaty to continue negotiations to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all times,

Noting the appeal for progress on this issue, made by the Secretary-General in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization,²⁰

Noting with special concern that nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere and underground are continuing,

Having considered the special report submitted by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament²¹ in response to General Assembly resolution 2663 B (XXV),²²

1. *Stresses anew* the urgency of bringing to a halt all nuclear weapon testing in all environments by all States;

2. *Urges* all States that have not yet done so to adhere without further delay to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty²³;

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

¹⁹ The clause "and that some continue to test in the atmosphere" was approved by a vote of 49 to 5, with 62 abstentions:

In favor—Australia, Bahrain, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Central African Republic, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire.

Against—Albania, Algeria, China, France, Guinea.

Abstaining—Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Iceland, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.K., United Republic of Tanzania, U.S., Yugoslavia, Zambia.

²⁰ A/8401/Add. 1 (prov.), pp. 19, 69.

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 626-633.

²² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 687.

²³ The phrase "and meanwhile to refrain from testing in the environments covered by that Treaty" was approved by a vote of 55 to 5, with 57 abstentions:

In favor—Australia, Bahrain, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Spain, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—Albania, Algeria, China, France, Guinea.

Abstaining—Afghanistan, Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Came-

3. *Calls upon* all Governments that have been conducting nuclear weapon tests, particularly those of parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, immediately to undertake unilateral or negotiated measures of restraint that would suspend nuclear weapon testing or limit or reduce the size and number of nuclear weapon tests, pending the early entry into force of a comprehensive ban on all nuclear weapon tests in all environments by all States;

4. *Urges* Governments to take all possible measures to develop further, and to use more effectively, existing capabilities for the seismological identification of underground nuclear tests, in order to facilitate the monitoring of a comprehensive test ban;

5. *Requests* the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue as a matter of highest priority its deliberations on a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, taking into account the suggestions already made in the Conference, as well as the views expressed at the current session of the General Assembly;

6. *Requests particularly* Governments that have been carrying out nuclear tests to take an active and constructive part in developing in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, or in any successor body, specific proposals for an underground test ban treaty;

7. *Expresses the hope* that these efforts will enable all States to sign, in the near future, a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests.

General Assembly Resolution 2829 (XXVI): Establishment, Within the Framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an International Service for Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes Under Appropriate International Control, December 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolution 2665 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,²

Having considered the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency on the establishment, within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, of an international service

roon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, Congo, Cuba, Denmark, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, U.K., United Republic of Tanzania, U.S., Yemen, Yugoslavia.

¹ A/RES/2829 (XXVI), Jan. 18, 1972. The G.A. approved this res. by a vote of 103 to 0, with 9 abstentions. The First Committee had previously approved it by a vote of 83 to 0, with 7 abstentions. The U.S. voted in favor, and Argentina, Brazil, Burma, India, Israel, Tanzania, and Zambia abstained.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, p. 689.

for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control,³

Noting with satisfaction that the International Atomic Energy Agency has demonstrated its efficiency with regard to promoting co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear-energy,

Noting further that the International Atomic Energy Agency, in accordance with its statute, is an appropriate organ to exercise functions of an international service for the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions, taking into account the relevant provisions of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,⁴

1. *Commends* the International Atomic Energy Agency for its intensive work on problems in connexion with nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes;

2. *Requests* the International Atomic Energy Agency to continue its activities in this field and to study ways and means of establishing, within its framework, a service for nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes under appropriate international control;

3. *Invites* the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency to submit, in his annual report to the General Assembly, information on further developments and on the progress made in this regard.

General Assembly Resolution 2830 (XXVI): Status of the Implementation of General Assembly Resolution 2666 (XXV) Concerning the Signature and Ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco), December 16, 1971⁵

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 1911 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963,⁶ 2286 (XXII) of 5 December 1967,⁷ 2456 B (XXIII) of 20 December 1968⁸ and 2666 (XXV) of 7 December 1970,⁹

Recalling in particular that in its resolution 2286 (XXII) it declared that the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)¹⁰ constituted an event of historic significance in the efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and to promote international peace and security and that in its resolution 2666 (XXV) it repeated the appeals which on two previous occasions it had addressed to the

³ A/8384.

⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

⁵ A/RES/2830 (XXVI), Jan. 18, 1972. The G.A. adopted the resolution by a vote of 101 to 0, with 12 abstentions. In the First Committee, it had been previously approved 85 to 0, with 10 abstentions. The U.S. voted in favor of the resolution, and the abstainers included Cuba, France, the USSR, and all Soviet allies except Romania.

⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 628-629.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 620-621.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 1968, p. 799.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 689-691.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69 ff.

nuclear-weapon States to sign and ratify Additional Protocol II of the Treaty¹¹ as soon as possible and urged them to avoid further delay in the fulfilment of such appeals,

1. *Reaffirms its conviction* that, for the maximum effectiveness of any treaty establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone, the co-operation of the nuclear-weapon States is necessary and that such co-operation should take the form of commitments likewise undertaken in a formal international instrument which is legally binding, such as a treaty, convention or protocol;

2. *Notes with satisfaction* that the United States of America deposited its instrument of ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America on 12 May 1971, thus becoming a State party to the Protocol, as the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland has been since 11 December 1969;

3. *Deplores* the fact that the other nuclear-weapon States have not yet heeded the urgent appeals which the General Assembly has made in three different resolutions and urges them once again to sign and ratify without further delay Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 2830 (XXVI) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)";

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to transmit the present resolution to the nuclear-weapon States and to inform the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session of any measure adopted by them in order to implement it.

General Assembly Resolution 2831 (XXVI): Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and Its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security, December 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Concerned about the ever spiralling arms race and military expenditures, which constitute a heavy burden for all peoples and have extremely harmful effects on world peace and security,

Deeply convinced that the common aspirations of mankind for peace, security and progress require the urgent cessation of the

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

¹ A/RES/2831, Jan. 18, 1972. The G.A. adopted this res. by a vote of 111 to 1 (Peru), with 3 abstentions. It had previously been approved by the First Committee 94 to 0, with 6 abstentions; the U.S. voted in favor, and Argentina, Brazil, Haiti, Honduras, Iraq, and Peru abstained. At the request of Indonesia, there was a separate First Committee vote on operative par. 3, which was approved 86 to 1, with 9 abstentions.

arms race, particularly of the nuclear arms race, and the reduction of military expenditures, as well as the adoption of effective measures leading towards general and complete disarmament,

Considering that a halt in the arms race and a significant reduction of military expenditures would promote the social and economic development of all countries and would increase the possibilities of providing additional resources to developing countries,

Recalling its resolution 2667 (XXV) of 7 December 1970, in which it requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified consultant experts appointed by him, a report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures,²

1. *Welcomes with satisfaction* the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures³ and expresses the hope that it will help to focus future disarmament negotiations on nuclear disarmament and on the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control;

2. *Extends its thanks* to the Secretary-General and to the consultant experts as well as to the Governments and international organizations that have rendered assistance in the preparation of the report;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to arrange for the reproduction of the report as a United Nations publication and to give it the widest possible publicity in as many languages as is considered desirable and practicable;

4. *Recommends* to all Governments the widest possible distribution of the report so as to acquaint public opinion in their countries with its contents, and invites the specialized agencies as well as intergovernmental, national and non-governmental organizations to use their facilities to make the report widely known;

5. *Recommends* that the conclusions of the report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures should be taken into account in future disarmament negotiations;

6. *Calls upon* all States to intensify their efforts during the Disarmament Decade with a view to promoting negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date and for nuclear disarmament, as well as on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control;

7. *Decides* to keep the item entitled "Economic and social consequences of the armaments race and its extremely harmful effects on world peace and security" under constant review and to place it on the provisional agenda of its twenty-eighth session.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 691-693.

³ *Ante*, pp. 644-686.

General Assembly Resolution 2832 (XXVI): Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, December 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the determination of the peoples of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to preserve their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, and to resolve their political, economic and social problems under conditions of peace and tranquillity,

Recalling the Declaration of the Third Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lusaka in September 1970, calling upon all States to consider and respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace from which great Power rivalries and competition as well as bases conceived in the context of such rivalries and competition should be excluded, and declaring that the area should also be free of nuclear weapons,

Convinced of the desirability of ensuring the maintenance of such conditions in the Indian Ocean area by means other than military alliances, as such alliances entail financial and other obligations that call for the diversion of the limited resources of the States of the area from the more compelling and productive task of economic and social reconstruction and could further involve them in the rivalries of power blocs in a manner prejudicial to their independence and freedom of action, thereby increasing international tensions,

Concerned at recent developments that portend the extension of the arms race into the Indian Ocean area, thereby posing a serious threat to the maintenance of such conditions in the area,

Convinced that the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean would contribute towards arresting such developments, relaxing international tensions and strengthening international peace and security,

Convinced further that the establishment of a zone of peace in an extensive geographical area in one region could have a

¹ A/RES/2832 (XXVI), Jan. 19, 1972. After separate votes on various parts (see below), the res. as a whole was adopted by a vote of 61 to 0, with 55 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against—None.

Abstaining—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

beneficial influence on the establishment of permanent universal peace based on equal rights and justice for all, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. *Solemnly declares* that the Indian Ocean, within limits to be determined, together with the air space above and the ocean floor subjacent thereto, is hereby designated for all time as a zone of peace²;

2. *Calls upon* the great Powers, in conformity with this Declaration, to enter into immediate consultations with the littoral States of the Indian Ocean with a view to:

(a) Halting the further escalation and expansion of their military presence in the Indian Ocean;

(b) Eliminating from the Indian Ocean all bases, military installations and logistical supply facilities, the disposition of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction and any manifestation of great Power military presence in the Indian Ocean conceived in the context of great Power rivalry;

3. *Calls upon* the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, the permanent members of the Security Council and other major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, in pursuit of the objective of establishing a system of universal collective security without military alliances and strengthening international security through regional and other co-operation, to enter into consultations with a view to the implementation of this Declaration and such action as may be necessary to ensure that:

(a) Warships and military aircraft may not use the Indian Ocean for any threat or use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of any littoral or hinterland State of the Indian Ocean in contravention of the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations;

(b) Subject to the foregoing and to the norms and principles of international law, the right to free and unimpeded use of the zone by the vessels of all nations is unaffected;

² Operative par. 1 was adopted by a vote of 60 to 0, with 55 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Philippines, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against—None.

Abstaining—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Khmer Republic, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

(c) Appropriate arrangements are made to give effect to any international agreement that may ultimately be reached for the maintenance of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace³;

4. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress that has been made with regard to the implementation of this Declaration;

5. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace".

Statement by the Mexican Representative (García Robles) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, December 16, 1971¹

I have come to this rostrum today to undertake the honourable task of submitting, on behalf of the 27 sponsors, the draft resolution contained in document A/L.659 which concerns the convening of a world disarmament conference.² This is a draft that was carefully negotiated, and it is the result of laborious and uninterrupted consultations and informal negotiations in which, directly or indirectly, to a greater or lesser degree, the vast majority of the representatives who have dealt with agenda item 97 participated. In addition to the risk of omissions which on occasions like this are almost inevitable, it would take up too much time to try to draw up a list of the many representatives who contributed constructive suggestions and made it possible to work out the draft resolution.

I think it is my duty none the less to mention specifically—and I am sure that no one will feel discriminated against because I do so—the name of the representative of Romania, Mr. Ecobescu, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, who from the very outset until the bitter end contributed tremendously with his tenacity,

³ Operative pars. 2 and 3 were approved by a vote of 52 to 0, with 63 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Algeria, Bhutan, Burma, Burundi, Ceylon, Chad, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, India, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zambia.

Against—None.

Abstaining—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Fiji, Finland, France, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Khmer Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritania, Mongolia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Rwanda, Senegal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, U.K., U.S., Upper Volta, Venezuela, Zaire.

¹ A/PV.2022 (prov.), pp. 32-36.

² Identical with res. 2833 (XXVI), *post*, pp. 909-910.

patience and conciliatory spirit to the happy culmination of the task which we embarked upon two weeks ago.

The draft resolution—and I am sure it has already been considered by all of the representatives—has a very modest immediate purpose. If my memory serves me aright, it was the representative of Egypt who was the first to mention this in the general debate on the item,³ and it later commanded the support of many other delegations. It is the idea that we should facilitate the task of the Secretary-General in preparing a report which would faithfully reflect the positions of States on the item under discussion, and which we hope may make the discussions of the Assembly useful and fruitful at the next session when it considers the possibility of convening a world disarmament conference open to all States.

The text of the operative part of the draft resolution is self-explanatory. I shall therefore confine myself—although even this comment would be superfluous for any careful reader of the text—to explaining that the questions listed in the six subparagraphs which appear in operative paragraph 2 are only examples given by way of illustration of certain items which concern the convening of a world disarmament conference and those which would be particularly valuable and on which the majority of States Members would communicate their views to the Secretary-General.

Of course, what I have just said would in no way prevent any State from exercising its full right to convey to the Secretary-General its opinions and suggestions on any question that it might consider pertinent in connexion with this item, that is to say, the questions dealt with in the draft resolution. Among those could be included, not only without any difficulty but with real advantage even for the clarification of the positions of Member States, the comments that could be made on many other points which were touched on in passing in our debates.

With respect to the preamble, we consider—and now I speak on behalf of the co-sponsors—that it reflects absolutely faithfully a series of self-evident truths. We are sure that no one could call into question the responsibility which devolves upon the United Nations under the Charter in respect of disarmament and the consolidation of peace; indeed, it is axiomatic that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of the disarmament negotiations. Similarly, and above all, in the light of the meagre results that it has been possible to achieve in this area, despite 26 years of continued effort, no one could deny that today it is imperative that every State should make a fresh effort to ensure that effective disarmament measures are adopted, and more particularly, nuclear disarmament measures. We also firmly believe that there would be no one who would call into question the

³ A/PV. 1985 (prov.), pp. 6-16.

premise that the convening of a world disarmament conference, which had been carefully considered and properly prepared, could promote and facilitate the attainment of these objectives.

I have concluded my presentation of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.659.

May I now add that, in view of the fact as I said at the outset, this is a draft that has been negotiated, that was destined to reconcile all of the trends expressed in the debates on this item, the co-sponsors of the draft resolution contained in document A/L.631—those of the delegations of Rwanda and the Soviet Union—have asked me to state that they will not press for a vote on their draft resolution.⁴ Therefore, the General Assembly has before it only the draft resolution of the 27 countries, to which I have [had] the honour of referring.

Inasmuch as agenda item 97 was discussed in plenary meetings, the Assembly has no report from a committee before it and therefore it cannot dispense with the discussion of a non-existent report. Consequently, we believe that what we might advantageously dispense with in this instance are the statements of explanations of vote, since the opinions and suggestions made in response to operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution can be sent in to the Secretary-General by all Member States who wish to do so. They would prove to be much superior to any sketchy explanations that would be made here.

None the less, if any delegation, or delegations, despite the reasons that I have just outlined, were to consider it indispensable for them to explain their vote, I would then request that they at least agree that these explanations of vote should be made after the vote is cast.

My delegation would also like to suggest to the President that, in the adoption of the joint draft, we should select one of the two alternative choices that I shall now proceed to explain very briefly. The first, which is the one that we would prefer, would be that, if all the representatives present were in agreement in supporting the joint draft resolution contained in document A/L.659, it should immediately be put to a recorded vote. The green light that would appear on the listings suspended on both sides of this room would well symbolize the hopes of all mankind, that these further efforts of the Organization, in the interest of disarmament, will not be condemned to a sterile exercise as, unfortunately, has been the case in respect of so many other efforts. If, unfortunately, there were even a single delegation which would feel compelled, in the case of a recorded vote, to record its abstention, we would venture to suggest to you, Mr. President, that, on that hypothesis, we should have recourse to the other procedure which has often been used by the General Assembly; that is to say, that the draft resolution should be adopted by acclamation.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 595-596.

Statement by the PRC Representative (Huang) to the General Assembly: World Disarmament Conference, December 16, 1971¹

At a previous meeting of the General Assembly the Chinese delegation has already stated the basic stand of the Chinese Government on the question of disarmament. China has always been in favour of disarmament. As early as 1963 the Chinese Government proposed the convocation of a conference of the Heads of Government of all countries of the world to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.² We maintain that the purpose of convening a world disarmament conference is to be truly conducive to nuclear disarmament and not to deceive the people with high-sounding words.

Particularly today when the United States Government is continuing its aggression against Viet-Nam and is giving continued support to the Israeli Zionists in their forcible occupation of the Arab territories, and when the Soviet Government is supporting Indian expansionists in their aggression against Pakistan, it is all the more impermissible to use an empty slogan for the convocation of a world disarmament conference to deceive the world's people.

Therefore, necessary prerequisites must be created for the convocation of such a conference—that is, the United States and the Soviet Union, which possess large quantities of nuclear weapons, should first issue statements, separately or jointly, to undertake openly the obligation: first not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and in any circumstances and not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries or against non-nuclear zones; second, to dismantle all nuclear bases set up in the territories of other countries and to withdraw all their nuclear armed forces and all nuclear weapons and means of delivery from abroad.

Why should all this be done? Because it is none other than these two super-Powers that are obdurately pushing the policies of nuclear monopoly, nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats. The world disarmament conference should in no way be convened under the nuclear threat of the super-Powers. In order to make such a conference fruitful the above prerequisites are therefore essential.

Basing itself on the above understanding, the Chinese delegation will vote in favour of the draft resolution put forward by Romania, Mexico and other countries.³ That is all I wanted to say.

¹ A/PV.2022 (prov.), pp. 41-42.

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, p. 272.

³ *Post*, pp. 909-910.

Statement by the Soviet Representative (Roshchin) to the General Assembly, December 16, 1971¹

The Soviet Union, in submitting for consideration by the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly the question of a world disarmament conference,² wanted, in order to step up the efforts of all States to curtail the arms race and bring about disarmament, an international forum to be convened for the discussion of disarmament problems in which all States of the world could take part without any discrimination.

We note with satisfaction that this Soviet initiative has met with the approval and support of the overwhelming majority of States Members of the United Nations, as may be seen from the broad discussion which took place on this question and also from the vote on the draft resolution which has just taken place.³

The proposal for a world disarmament conference became one of the central questions at this session of the General Assembly. In the course of the discussion many specific proposals were put forward as a practical means of preparing for and holding the conference.

The Soviet delegation, speaking in a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 26 November this year, declared that it was prepared to consider these proposals in the most practical spirit.⁴ A large group of States prepared and submitted for consideration by the Assembly a draft resolution approving the idea of holding a world disarmament conference and setting out practical measures for preparing for the conference.⁵ That draft is fully in accord with the purposes and aims by which our delegation was guided in submitting for the consideration of the twenty-sixth session of the General Assembly the question of a world disarmament conference. My delegation supported that draft as being in keeping with the aims of which I have spoken.

The Soviet delegation would like now to exercise its right of reply and to address itself to a number of disarmament questions in connexion with the statement made by the delegation of the People's Republic of China at the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 26 November this year, in which a number of questions were put directly to the Soviet delegation,⁶ and also in connexion with its statement at today's meeting.⁷

As regards the proposal of the People's Republic of China for calling a conference of the heads of all countries to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and complete destruction of

¹ A/PV.2022 (prov.), pp. 42-48.

² *Ante*, pp. 592-596.

³ *Infra*.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 771-778.

⁵ *Post*, pp. 909-910.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 779-781.

⁷ *Supra*.

nuclear weapons, we should like to recall that as far back as 1964 the Soviet Union expressed its agreement with that proposal and supported it. In a message from Mr. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, to Chou En-lai, Head of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, dated 28 December 1964, it was stated:

The Soviet Government is prepared to participate in an international conference of Heads of State to discuss the question of the complete prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons. Together with all socialist and other peace-loving States, the Soviet Union will do everything within its power to ensure that this conference takes place and culminates in positive results.⁸

The Soviet Union's proposal for calling a world disarmament conference is in no way contradictory to the proposal of the People's Republic of China for calling a conference of Heads of Government.⁹ Indeed, it goes further than that proposal and poses the question on a broader level. At the same time we propose that that conference should discuss, first and foremost, the question of the prohibition and the destruction of nuclear weapons.

On the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, which was raised by the delegation of the People's Republic of China on 26 November and in its statement today, we should like to note that the Soviet Union as long ago as 1967 put forward a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons.¹⁰ At the twenty-second session of the United Nations General Assembly a resolution was adopted calling on all States to study the draft convention and to hold negotiations concerning its conclusion.¹¹ We raise the question as to whether the People's Republic of China is prepared for the conclusion of such a convention.

As regards the question of the withdrawal of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery from abroad, we should like to indicate that the Soviet Union has repeatedly put forward proposals to that end. The USSR constantly struggles to bring about the liquidation of all foreign military bases, including those at which nuclear weapons are maintained. In addition, in a memorandum from the Soviet Government dated 1 July 1968, the question was raised of the prohibition of flights by bombers with nuclear weapons on board beyond the limits of national frontiers and limiting the movements of nuclear-missile submarines.¹²

We should like to note that the Government of the People's Republic of China in words is speaking for a solution of the problem of disarmament but in deeds is doing everything possible to prevent the attainment of that objective. It is not a party to a single one of the treaties in the field of disarmament. The result is,

⁸ *Documents on Disarmament, 1964*, pp. 532-533 (variant translation).

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 455.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 420-421.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 626-627.

¹² *Ibid.*, 1968, p. 468.

among others, that the People's Republic of China continues to conduct nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere which poses a grave threat of radioactive contamination—in the first instance, to the neighbours of the People's Republic of China. This is a vivid illustration of the fact that China, in words, speaks in favour of disarmament but in fact helps the imperialist States that for decades now have been thwarting the conclusion of agreements on serious disarmament and the complete liquidation by all States of all armed forces and armaments.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to express satisfaction at the fact that the Soviet Union's proposal for calling a world disarmament conference has received the approval and support of the General Assembly. The conference will undoubtedly help to spur further activity in regard to negotiations to curtail armaments and bring about disarmament with the participation of all the States of the world. It will undoubtedly make a contribution to progress towards general and complete disarmament, which would be in the interests of all peoples.

General Assembly Resolution 2833 (XXVI): World Disarmament Conference, December 16, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Conscious of the responsibility of the United Nations under the Charter for disarmament and the consolidation of peace,

Convinced that all peoples of the world have a vital interest in the success of disarmament negotiations,

Believing that it is imperative that all States exert further efforts for the adoption of effective measures of disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament,

Believing also that a world disarmament conference could promote and facilitate the realization of such aims,

1. *Expresses the conviction* that it is most desirable to take immediate steps in order that careful consideration be given to the convening, following adequate preparation, of a world disarmament conference open to all States;

2. *Invites* all States to communicate to the Secretary-General, before 31 August 1972, their views and suggestions on any relevant questions relating to a world disarmament conference, in particular the following:

- (a) Main objectives;
- (b) Provisional agenda;
- (c) Site favoured;
- (d) Date and contemplated duration;

¹ A/RES/2833 (XXVI), Jan. 18, 1972. The resolution was adopted by acclamation.

(e) Procedures to be adopted for carrying out the preparatory work;

(f) Relationship to the United Nations;

3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session a report containing the views and suggestions communicated to him;

4. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "World Disarmament Conference".

General Assembly Resolution 2852 (XXVI): Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, December 20, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its determination to continue all efforts to eliminate the threat or use of force in international relations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, and to bring about general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and reaffirming its desire to secure full observance of human rights applicable in all armed conflicts pending the earliest possible termination of such conflicts,

Reaffirming that, in order effectively to guarantee human rights, all States should devote their efforts to averting the unleashing of aggressive wars and armed conflicts that violate the Charter and the provisions of the Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,²

Recalling the successive resolutions that have been adopted by the United Nations relating to human rights in armed conflicts, in particular General Assembly resolutions 2652 (XXV) of 3 December 1970,³ 2674 (XXV)⁴ and 2678 (XXV)⁵ of 9 December 1970 and 2707 (XXV) of 14 December 1970,⁶ and taking into account relevant resolutions of international conferences of the Red Cross,

Deeply concerned over the terrible suffering that armed conflicts continue to inflict upon combatants and civilians, particularly through the use of cruel means and methods of warfare and through inadequate restraints in defining military objectives,

¹ A/RES/2852 (XXVI), Jan. 24, 1972. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 110 to 1, with 5 abstentions. The United States abstained.

² General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 121-124.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 90-91.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 97-99.

Desiring to ensure the effective application of all existing rules relating to human rights in armed conflicts, as well as the development of these rules, and aware that progress in this regard will depend upon the political readiness and willingness of Member States,

Conscious that, although negotiations are going on in the field of disarmament concerning general and complete disarmament and the limitation and elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, those deliberations do not deal with the question of prohibiting or restricting the use of other methods of warfare that are cruel, such as napalm, or that indiscriminately affect civilians and combatants,

Noting the comments by Governments⁷ on the reports of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts,⁸

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on the comprehensive discussions undertaken at the first session of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which was held at Geneva from 24 May to 12 June 1971 at the invitation of the International Committee of the Red Cross,⁹

Having taken cognizance of the report prepared by the International Committee of the Red Cross on the work of the Conference of Government Experts,¹⁰

Welcoming the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to convene in 1972 a second session of the Conference of Government Experts with broader participation to include all the States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949¹¹ and to circulate in advance of that session a series of draft protocols,

Stressing the importance of further close co-operation between the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross,

Determined to continue its efforts to achieve better application of existing rules relating to armed conflicts, as well as the reaffirmation and development of these rules,

1. *Calls again upon* all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899¹² and 1907,¹³ the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹⁴ the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed

⁷ A/8313 and Add. 1-3.

⁸ A/7720 and A/8502.

⁹ A/8370 and Add. 1.

¹⁰ International Committee of the Red Cross, Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, *Report on the Work of the Conference* (Geneva, 1971).

¹¹ 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 287.

¹² Charles L. Bevans, comp., *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. 1, pp. 247 ff.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 631 ff.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

conflicts, and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to those instruments;

2. *Reaffirms* that persons participating in resistance movements and freedom-fighters in southern Africa and in territories under colonial and alien domination and foreign occupation who are struggling for their liberation and self-determination should, in case of arrest, be treated as prisoners of war in accordance with the principles of the Hague Convention of 1907 and the Geneva Conventions of 1949;

3. *Invites* the International Committee of the Red Cross to continue the work that was begun with the assistance of government experts in 1971 and, taking into account all relevant United Nations resolutions on human rights in armed conflicts, to devote special attention, among the questions to be taken up, to the following:

(a) The need to ensure better application of existing rules relating to armed conflicts, particularly the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, including the need for strengthening the system of protecting Powers contained in such instruments;

(b) The need for a reaffirmation and development of relevant rules, as well as other measures to improve the protection of the civilian population during armed conflicts, including legal restraints and restrictions on certain methods of warfare and weapons that have proved particularly perilous to civilians, as well as arrangements for humanitarian relief;

(c) The need to evolve norms designed to increase the protection of persons struggling against colonial and alien domination, foreign occupation and racist regimes;

(d) The need for development of the rules concerning the status, protection and humane treatment of combatants in international and non-international armed conflicts and the question of guerrilla warfare;

(e) The need for additional rules regarding the protection of the wounded and sick;

4. *Expresses the hope* that the second session of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts will result in specific conclusions and recommendations for action at the government level;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General, in line with paragraph 126 of his report on respect for human rights in armed conflicts submitted to the General Assembly at its twenty-fifth session,¹⁵ to prepare as soon as possible, with the help of qualified governmental consultant experts, a report on napalm and other incendiary weapons and all aspects of their possible use;

¹⁵ A/8052.

6. *Further calls upon* all States to disseminate widely information and to provide instruction concerning human rights in armed conflicts and to take all the necessary measures to ensure full observance by their own armed forces of humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts;

7. *Requests* the Secretary-General to encourage the study and teaching of principles of respect for human rights applicable to armed conflicts by the means at his disposal;

8. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the results of the second session of the Conference of Government Experts and any other relevant developments;

9. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "Human rights in armed conflicts" and to consider it in all its aspects.

General Assembly Resolution 2853 (XXVI): Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflicts, December 20, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Recalling its resolutions 2674 (XXV),² 2675 (XXV),³ 2676 (XXV)⁴ and 2677 (XXV)⁵ of 9 December 1970,

Noting also that the twenty-first International Conference of the Red Cross, held at Istanbul in 1969, adopted resolution XIII concerning the reaffirmation and development of the laws and customs applicable in armed conflicts,⁶

Noting with appreciation the report of the Secretary-General on respect for human rights in armed conflicts,⁷ concerning in

¹ A/RES/2853 (XXVI), Jan. 24, 1972. The General Assembly adopted this resolution by a vote of 83 to 15, with 14 abstentions. The Third Committee had approved it on Dec. 7 by a vote of 54 to 18, with 26 abstentions:

In favor—Argentina, Australia, Austria, Barbados, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Singapore, Spain, Swaziland, Thailand, Turkey, U.K., U.S., Uruguay, Venezuela, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—Algeria, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Chile, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Guinea, Hungary, Iraq, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Poland, Romania, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian SSR, USSR.

Abstaining—Afghanistan, Burma, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Dahomey, Egypt, Iceland, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Republic, Mali, Mauritania, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Yemen, Yugoslavia.

² General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 75-76.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 76.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 76-77.

⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 77-78.

⁶ A/7720, annex I, sec. D.

⁷ A/8370 and Add. 1.

particular the results of the first session of the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, which was held at Geneva from 24 May to 12 June 1971, at the invitation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, as well as the report of the International Committee on the work of the Conference,⁸

Emphasizing that effective protection for human rights in situations of armed conflict depends primarily on universal respect for humanitarian rules,

Recognizing that existing humanitarian rules relating to armed conflicts do not in all respects meet the need of contemporary situations and that it is therefore necessary to strengthen the procedure for implementing these rules and to develop their substance,

Welcoming the decision of the International Committee of the Red Cross to convene a second session of the Conference of Government Experts with the task of reaching agreement on the wording of various texts to facilitate discussion at a future diplomatic conference, and noting that all States parties to the Geneva Conventions of 1949⁹ have been invited to participate,

Affirming that the successful development of humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts requires the negotiation of instruments which can be effectively implemented and which command the widest possible support,

Emphasizing the importance of continued close collaboration between the United Nations and the International Committee of the Red Cross,

1. *Reiterates* its call upon all parties to any armed conflict to observe the rules laid down in the Hague Conventions of 1899¹⁰ and 1907,¹¹ the Geneva Protocol of 1925,¹² the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and other humanitarian rules applicable in armed conflicts, and invites those States which have not yet done so to adhere to those instruments;

2. *Welcomes* the progress made by the Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, as shown in its report, with regard to the following questions:

(a) Protection of the wounded and the sick;

⁸ International Committee of the Red Cross. Conference of Government Experts on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts, *Report on the Work of the Conference* (Geneva, 1971).

⁹ 75 UNTS 31, 85, 135, 287.

¹⁰ Charles L. Bevans, comp., *Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America, 1776-1949*, vol. I, pp. 247 ff.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 631 ff.

¹² *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765.

- (b) Protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts;
- (c) Rules applicable in guerrilla warfare;
- (d) Protection of civilian population against dangers of hostilities;
- (e) Strengthening of the guarantees afforded by international humanitarian law for non-military civil defence organizations;
- (f) Rules relative to the behaviour of combatants;
- (g) Measures intended to reinforce the implementation, in armed conflicts, of existing international humanitarian law;

3. *Expresses the hope* that the second session of the Conference of Government Experts will make recommendations for the further development of international humanitarian law in this field, including, as appropriate, draft protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, for subsequent consideration at one or more plenipotentiary diplomatic conferences;

4. *Calls upon* States parties to the existing international instruments to review, as a matter of priority, any reservations they may have made to those instruments;

5. *Requests* the Secretary-General:

(a) To transmit his latest report,^{1 3} together with any further observations received from Governments as well as the records of relevant discussions and resolutions of the General Assembly, to the International Committee of the Red Cross for consideration, as appropriate, by the Conference of Government Experts at its second session;

(b) To report to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session on the progress made in the implementation of the present resolution;

6. *Decides* to consider this question again, in all its aspects, at its twenty-seventh session.

General Assembly Resolution 2880 (XXVI): Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security, December 21, 1971¹

The General Assembly,

Bearing in mind the Declaration on the Strengthening of

^{1 3} A/8730 and Add. 1.

¹ A/RES/2880 (XXVI), Jan. 18, 1972. The resolution was adopted by a vote of 96 to 1, with 16 abstentions:

In favor—Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Austria, Bahrain, Bhutan, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian SSR, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Khmer Republic, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama,

International Security contained in General Assembly resolution 2734 (XXV)² of December 1970,

Noting that some positive results conducive to the strengthening of international peace and security have been achieved through negotiations and co-operation among States,

Convinced that bilateral and regional efforts towards achieving international security should be strictly in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations,

Convinced further that such efforts should be complemented by collective measures adopted by the competent organs of the United Nations, in order to ensure the complete implementation of the Declaration,

Deeply concerned at the persistence of armed conflicts and other situations resulting therefrom which threaten international peace and security,

Convinced that the United Nations, as a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations, bears the responsibility for promoting, through all its principal and subsidiary organs, full respect for the Preamble and the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Emphasizing that the Declaration, which constitutes an organic whole, needs to be implemented in its entirety, through the full use of United Nations machinery and capabilities, including those provided for in Chapters VI and VII of the Charter and the dispatch of special missions by the Security Council,

Expressing its conviction that the lack of substantial progress in solving issues relating to international peace and security, economic development and independence, disarmament, colonialism, *apartheid* and racial discrimination, human rights and fundamental freedoms is a constant source of tension and a threat to the security of nations,

Convinced that a broad exchange of views on the question of the strengthening of international security, undertaken annually, will make it possible to review the changing international situation and to seek areas of negotiation and agreement, thereby helping to improve the prospects for peace and international security,

Believing that the achievement of universality in the United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, would increase the effectiveness of the Organization in the strengthening of international peace and security,

¹Continued

Paraguay, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, USSR, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia.

Against—South Africa.

Abstaining—Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Swaziland, U.K., U.S.

²General Assembly *Official Records: Twenty-fifth Session, Supplement No. 28* (A/8028), pp. 22-24.

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General³ and having considered the item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security",

1. *Solemnly reaffirms* all the principles and provisions contained in the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security and strongly appeals to all States to take effective measures to implement the Declaration in its entirety;

2. *Calls upon* all States to contribute towards resolving existing conflicts and situations likely to endanger international peace and security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the Declaration;

3. *Calls upon* all States to respect the national unity, political independence and territorial integrity of every State, to refrain from the threat or use of force and to observe fully the principle that the territory of a State shall not be the object of military occupation resulting from the use of force in violation of the Charter and the principle that the acquisition of territories by force is inadmissible;

4. *Declares* that the termination of coercive acts which deprive peoples of their inalienable rights to self-determination, freedom and independence, the implementation of relevant United Nations resolutions concerning colonialism, racialism and *apartheid*, and the elimination of serious and systematic violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, which should be respected by all States, are essential elements for the strengthening of international peace and security;

5. *Invites* the Security Council to consider all appropriate means and procedures for ensuring the strict and full implementation of its resolutions relating to international peace and security;

6. *Urges* the early undertaking of a broad review of all aspects of the concept of peace-keeping operations in order to determine, in accordance with the Charter, appropriate guidelines for its application and to establish appropriate and effective machinery capable of preserving and restoring peace;

7. *Calls* for an early agreement on the definition of aggression, which would assist the United Nations in its fundamental task of maintaining international peace and security;

8. *Declares* that, in view of the close connexion between the strengthening of international security, disarmament and development, the United Nations should evolve a concept of collective economic security designed to promote the sustained development and expansion of national economies and, moreover, affirms that a substantial portion of the savings derived from measures in the field of disarmament should be devoted to promoting economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries;

³ A/8431 and Add. 1-5.

9. *Declares* that any measure or pressure directed against any State while exercising its sovereign right freely to dispose of its natural resources constitutes a flagrant violation of the principles of self-determination of peoples and non-intervention, as set forth in the Charter, which, if pursued, could constitute a threat to international peace and security;

10. *Invites* all Member States, in particular the more developed countries, to adopt all appropriate measures to normalize the financial situation of the United Nations and to provide it with the means of effectively achieving its goals;

11. *Requests* the Secretary-General to submit to the General Assembly at its twenty-seventh session a report on measures adopted in pursuance of the Declaration, containing, *inter alia*:

(a) An introduction by the Secretary-General regarding events within the context of the implementation of the Declaration;

(b) Communications from Member States relating to the implementation of the Declaration;

(c) Relevant information on compliance with the provisions of the Declaration by United Nations organs and other international bodies;

12. *Decides* to include in the provisional agenda of its twenty-seventh session an item entitled "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

11th Annual Report of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, January 29, 1972¹

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

January 28, 1972

MR. PRESIDENT:

I submit for your transmittal to the Congress, as required by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act as amended,² the eleventh annual report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency,

This report covers the work of the Agency during calendar year 1971. The Government Printing Office will print the report as an Agency publication.

Respectfully,

GERARD SMITH

THE PRESIDENT,
The White House.

¹ *Arms Control Report: 11th Annual Report to the Congress* (ACDA pub. 61, 1972).

² *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, pp. 482-495; *ibid.*, 1963, pp. 622-623; *ibid.*, 1965, p. 206; *ibid.*, 1968, p. 396; *ibid.*, 1970, p. 213.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the Arms Control and Disarmament Act as amended (P.L. 87-297), I herewith transmit the Eleventh Annual Report of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. I am also pleased to report to the Congress that this document reflects appreciable progress in the disarmament field during calendar year 1971.

Our progress has been especially significant in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union. In May 1971, I was able to announce that a deadlock had been broken. We reached an understanding with the Soviet leadership to concentrate on working out an accord to limit the deployment of defensive antiballistic missile systems (ABMs), and to conclude it simultaneously with an agreement on certain measures limiting offensive strategic weapons.³ This joint understanding reinforces my firm commitment to reach an equitable agreement limiting both offensive and defensive strategic nuclear weapons.

Another highlight of 1971 occurred when the American and Soviet SALT Delegations reached two collateral agreements that were signed in Washington on September 30. The first dealt with measures to be taken by each country to reduce the risk of accidental nuclear war⁴ while the second provided for improvements in the reliability of the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link, or "Hot Line", by using satellite communications systems.⁵

In Geneva, at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the United States was also among the principal architects of a convention banning the development, production and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins.⁶ The presence of these weapons in the arsenals of any civilized nation is no longer justified.

As 1972 opens, I am determined to maintain American leadership in achieving arms control measures which will enhance both national and world security and contribute to a lasting peace.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
February 10, 1972

PERSPECTIVE

Over the past ten years the United States has been engaged in a process of negotiating multilateral and bilateral arms control agreements. In fulfilling its statutory obligations to develop, coordinate and recommend arms control policies to the President and the Secretary of State, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has taken a pragmatic approach, seeking step-by-step measures which are both practically attainable and consistent with our national security interests.

The year 1971 was productive.

³ *Ante*, p. 298.

⁴ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

⁵ *Ante*, pp. 635-639.

⁶ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union continued alternately in Vienna and Helsinki. Though these negotiations had made progress in identifying many key issues, in the spring of 1971 they remained deadlocked as to what weapons systems should be limited in an initial agreement.

This impasse was broken on May 20, when President Nixon and the Soviet Government announced jointly that an understanding had been reached to concentrate this year in SALT on working out an agreement to limit the deployment of antiballistic (defensive) missile systems. They also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they would agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons. President Nixon said:

If we succeed, this joint statement . . . may well be remembered as the beginning of a new era in which all nations will devote more of their energies and their resources not to the weapons of war, but to the works of peace.⁷

Intensive negotiations continued in SALT in an effort to translate the negotiating impetus of the May 20 understanding into concrete agreements.

The American and Soviet SALT Delegations, in addition to working on the principal SALT negotiations, concluded two agreements. One agreement provides for measures to avoid an accidental outbreak of nuclear war⁸; the other, which in part supplements the first, provides for modernization of the Washington-Moscow Direct Communications Link or "Hot Line," utilizing satellite communications systems.⁹ Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko signed these two agreements in Washington on September 30.

As the world's principal forum for negotiating *multilateral* arms control agreements, the Geneva-based Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, or CCD, was the focal point for continuing discussions on the control of chemical and biological weapons. In August, the United States and the Soviet Union submitted to the CCD identical draft texts of a convention prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins.¹⁰ This draft BW (biological weapons) convention was considered by the UN General Assembly, which in December, by a vote of 110 to 0, commended it for signature to the nations of the world.¹¹ The significance of this biological weapons convention lies particularly in the fact that in prohibiting a class of weapons, it became the first actual measure of disarmament negotiated since World War II. (In July, fulfilling an earlier policy directive of

⁷ *Ante*, p. 298.

⁸ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

⁹ *Ante*, pp. 635-639.

¹⁰ *Ante*, pp. 456-460.

¹¹ *Ante*, pp. 884-889.

President Nixon, the United States unilaterally began to destroy its biological weapons stockpile.)

Progress was also made during the year toward fulfillment and implementation of previously negotiated arms control treaties:

(1) The Seabed Arms Control Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow on February 11. This treaty prohibits the emplacement of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction on the seabeds beyond a 12-mile coastal "seabed zone," thus banning these weapons from nearly 70% of the earth's surface.¹² The treaty will come into effect when 22 nations (including the US, the UK, and the USSR) have ratified it. President Nixon has submitted the treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Eighty-five nations have now signed the treaty; 23 have ratified it. (See Appendix A.)¹³

(2) In May, the United States ratified, with a clarifying statement, Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.¹⁴ In becoming a party to this Protocol, the United States pledged to respect the nuclear-free zone established by this treaty. (See Appendix E.)¹⁵

(3) Considerable progress was made during 1971 in the implementation of Article III of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,¹⁶ providing for a system of effective safeguards to prevent diversion of nuclear materials from peaceful uses to weapons manufacture.

(4) The Antarctic Treaty, which preserves Antarctica for peaceful purposes and the pursuit of scientific knowledge, provides for free access to installations on the subcontinent by observers designated by the parties.¹⁷ In February and March a team of American observers, composed of members of ACDA and other Government Agencies, inspected Australian, French, and Soviet bases in the Antarctic.

During the year there was continued research and study of the issues involved in possible mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR) in Europe, the goal being to achieve a more stable military balance at lower force levels. Meeting in Lisbon in early June, the NATO Foreign Ministers welcomed the new Soviet interest in exploring the possibilities of MBFR.¹⁸ In October, at a Deputy Foreign Ministers' Conference, participating NATO countries appointed an "Explorer" with instructions to explain their positions on MBFR to the Soviet and other interested governments, obtain reactions, and report back. Regrettably the official

¹² *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

¹³ Not printed here.

¹⁴ *Documents on Disarmament, 1967*, p. 83.

¹⁵ Not printed here.

¹⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1968*, pp. 461-465.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, 1945-1959, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

¹⁸ *Ante*, pp. 307-311.

chosen, Manlio Brosio of Italy, formerly Secretary General of NATO, has not been received in Moscow.

On the following pages will be found details concerning specific activities of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1971.

STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION TALKS

At the Table

The United States and the Soviet Union have been engaged in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) since the autumn of 1969. The meetings take place alternately in Helsinki and Vienna. The fourth session was held in Vienna from March 15 to May 28, the fifth session in Helsinki from July 8 to September 24, and the sixth session began in Vienna on November 15 and continued into the new year. In an effort to facilitate progress, both sides have agreed on a policy of privacy with respect to the substance of these negotiations.

The goal of the United States at SALT is the limitation and eventual reduction of both offensive and defensive strategic arms. The belief that this goal can be achieved is based on the common interest which both sides share in reducing the likelihood of nuclear war and also in reducing the burden of the strategic arms competition. The prospects for arms control are enhanced by mutual awareness that neither the US nor the USSR has the capability to launch a nuclear attack on the other without receiving devastating and unacceptable retaliation.

Complicating the task of reaching an agreement which both sides could regard as equitable is the fact that the strategic forces of the two countries differ in deployment, composition and in other important respects.

The two sides, after extensive discussions, were unable to agree on the strategic systems which should be included in an initial agreement. In an effort to make some progress despite these differences, both governments addressed these problems at the highest levels. As a result, a significant breakthrough was announced jointly by President Nixon and the Soviet Government on May 20 as follows:

The Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, after reviewing the course of their talks on the limitation of strategic armaments, have agreed to concentrate this year on working out an agreement for the limitation of the deployment of antiballistic missile systems (ABMs). They have also agreed that, together with concluding an agreement to limit ABMs, they will agree on certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.

The two sides are taking this course in the conviction that it will create more favorable conditions for further negotiations to limit all strategic arms. These negotiations will be actively pursued.¹⁹

The May 20 announcement thus stressed the necessity of simultaneously limiting both offensive and defensive strategic arms. Limits on ABM systems are important because an extensive

¹⁹ *Ante*, p. 305.

deployment of defenses by one side would threaten the retaliatory capability of the other side, and provoke an offsetting expansion of its offensive forces. The net result would be a continuation of the arms competition with no increase in security for either country. Limits on offensive weapons also are necessary since they, too, can threaten the other's retaliatory capability and generate an offsetting escalatory response. The SALT negotiating teams—led by Ambassador Gerard Smith, Director of ACDA, and Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir S. Semenov—worked for the remainder of the year on translating this understanding into concrete agreements. Progress has been made and their efforts continue.

Accidents and "Hot Line" Agreements

In parallel with the main SALT negotiations, discussions were held on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of accidental nuclear war between the US and USSR. Preliminary exploration of this topic in earlier SALT sessions had been encouraging, and resulted in the establishment, in conjunction with the principal SALT negotiations, of two special technical groups which worked under the direction of the delegations. One group focused on arrangements for exchanging information to reduce ambiguities and prevent misunderstandings in the event of a nuclear incident. The second group addressed a related topic—ways to improve the Washington-Moscow direct communications link, or "Hot Line," with special attention devoted to ways to increase the reliability and survivability of this vital communications facility. During the spring of 1971, each group resolved the major substantive issues.

Development of these technical understandings into the texts of international agreements was accomplished at SALT V, and the two agreements were referred by the SALT delegations to their respective governments. These agreements were signed in Washington by Secretary of State Rogers and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 30, 1971.

One agreement pertains to measures to reduce the risk of the accidental outbreak of nuclear war between the US and the USSR. It expresses the intention of each party to maintain and improve, as it determines necessary, its existing organizational and technical arrangements to guard against accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons under its control, and provides for the rapid exchange of information and notification of nuclear incidents or planned missile launches which could create a risk of accidental outbreak of nuclear war.²⁰

The other agreement covers measures to improve the direct communications link. It provides for the establishment of two satellite communications circuits between the US and USSR and multiple terminals on each side. The American circuit is being

²⁰ *Ante*, pp. 633-635.

arranged through Intelsat, the Soviet circuit through the Molniya II system. These additions, when put into effect, will significantly upgrade the reliability of the "Hot Line" and provide greater assurance of its availability for use in time of emergency.²¹ These two supplemental agreements are important complements to the main SALT effort to limit strategic arms and serve to reduce further the risk of nuclear war.

Behind the Scene

Basic decisions on the US position at SALT are made by the President. These decisions are based on analyses made through the Verification Panel of the National Security Council, which is responsible for the overall evaluation of the many complex issues impinging on the negotiations. These include not only verification problems, but also options for limiting offensive and defensive forces and their impact on the strategic balance and US security. The Verification Panel consists of the Attorney General; the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Director of ACDA; the Under Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director of CIA; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

A Verification Panel Working Group has the delegated responsibility for preparing and coordinating detailed analyses of specific problem areas. ACDA is a major participant in these support activities, and studies related to SALT are given high priority in the allocation of the Agency's research resources. This research includes studies performed by the ACDA staff, as well as contract supported studies and field tests.

Day-to-day support for the SALT delegation is provided by the Backstopping Committee, established by the Under Secretaries Committee of the National Security Council, and chaired by Philip J. Farley, Deputy Director of ACDA and Alternate Chairman of the US SALT Delegation. This Committee enables timely, coordinated guidance to be provided to the SALT delegation during the negotiations.

Keeping the Congress informed fully on US negotiating positions and of developments in SALT is a matter of high priority. The Director and other top ACDA officials regularly brief members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the Senate Armed Services Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

SALT activities are also closely coordinated with America's allies. Our NATO and other allies are kept up-to-date by means of consultations during which special briefings and written reports are provided, and their views are solicited on all significant developments.

²¹ *Ante*, pp. 635-639.

MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS

The CCD

The principal forum for the negotiation of multilateral arms control measures has been the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. Organized as the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Conference (ENDC) in 1962, the Geneva disarmament conference was enlarged to 26 members in 1969 and was renamed the CCD. It has played a key or contributing role in the negotiation of such major arms control agreements as the Limited Test Ban Treaty,²² the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty,²³ the Seabed Arms Control Treaty,²⁴ and most recently, the draft convention banning biological and toxin weapons.²⁵

Since the inception of the CCD, the United States and the Soviet Union have served as permanent Co-Chairmen. The CCD membership is composed of a group of six states allied to the United States (Canada, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, and France—which has never occupied its seat); a group of six states allied to the Soviet Union (Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and Romania); and a “group of 12” nonaligned countries (Argentina, Brazil, Burma, Egypt, Ethiopia, India, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Sweden, and Yugoslavia).

The CCD meets annually for a total of about six months. Arms control agreements are negotiated by the presentation of national positions in formal plenary sessions, supplemented by smaller informal discussions. In this manner, the conference proceeds on a basis of consensus.

Although it is not formally a UN body, the CCD prepares an annual report which is submitted to the UN General Assembly. Drafts of treaties negotiated by the CCD are also submitted to the UNGA for its consideration.

Chemical and Biological Weapons Control

In recent decades the growing possibility of biological warfare spreading disease over large areas of the world has lent a powerful impetus to efforts to bring biological weapons under control. During the past year these efforts successfully culminated with the negotiation of a convention prohibiting biological and toxin weapons—the first true disarmament measure of the post-World War II era.

Shortly after his Administration took office, President Nixon ordered a review of US policy regarding chemical and biological warfare. On the basis of this study, the President made a statement on November 25, 1969, in which he renounced all biological

²² *Documents on Disarmament, 1963*, pp. 291-293.

²³ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 461-465.

²⁴ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

²⁵ *Ante*, pp. 568-573.

methods of warfare and stated that henceforth the US program would be confined to research on strictly defined measures of defense, such as immunization. The Defense Department was instructed to draw up a plan for the disposal of existing stocks of biological agents and weapons.²⁶

On February 14, 1970, the White House announced the extension of the ban on biological weapons to cover toxins.²⁷ (Toxins fall between biologicals and chemicals in that they act like chemicals but are ordinarily produced by biological or microbial processes.)

In his November 25, 1969, statement, the President announced US support for the principles of a draft convention on biological warfare which had been proposed to the CCD by the United Kingdom. The UK draft convention prohibited the development, production, stockpiling, and use of biological weapons.²⁸ At the suggestion of the United States,²⁹ this draft was amended in 1970 to include a prohibition on toxins.³⁰

Throughout 1970 the United States gave active support to the British draft convention at the CCD and at the UN. However, the Soviets, their allies, and a number of other countries continued to insist on a single agreement banning both chemical and biological weapons.

The United States and some of its allies pointed to the difficulty of adequately verifying a CW (chemical weapons) ban and said that negotiations should proceed on a BW ban where these problems did not arise. The US delegation at the CCD emphasized that unlike biological weapons, chemical weapons have been used in modern warfare. They are more predictable and controllable than biological weapons, and they form an important part of the arsenals of many states. Thus, only when countries can assure themselves that parties to an agreement are no longer developing, producing, or stockpiling chemical weapons will there be a sound basis for a reliable chemical warfare convention.

During the 1971 spring session of the CCD, the Soviets changed their approach and tabled a draft convention prohibiting the development, production, and stockpiling of biological weapons and toxins, but not chemical weapons.³¹

After this important Soviet move it became possible to work out an agreed US-USSR text during the summer session of the CCD. In the ensuing discussions a number of CCD members favored strengthening the commitment to further negotiations on CW as well as the verification provisions of the draft. After the text had been modified by the acceptance of some of these

²⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 592-593.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 5-6.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 1969, pp. 431-433.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 189-190.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 428-431.

³¹ *Ante*, pp. 190-194.

changes, a consensus was reached at the end of September, and a draft BW convention was submitted to the 26th UN General Assembly for its consideration.³² The draft treaty was carefully reviewed by the General Assembly, where it gained broad approval. In his statement to the First Committee, US Ambassador Bush called it a "solid achievement, . . . an achievement that can eliminate the threat of the use of disease as a method of warfare. It is an agreement that is in the interests of all governments; it is in the interest of all mankind."³³

The draft convention was commended by the General Assembly on December 16, 1971, by a vote of 110-0-1.³⁴ It is expected to be opened for signature early in 1972. It will go into effect when ratified by 22 countries, including the three depository states (US, UK and USSR).

Among its provisions, the convention contains an undertaking by the parties to continue negotiations in good faith with a view to reaching early agreement on effective measures for a chemical weapons ban. In this connection, work has continued at the CCD toward solving the complex problems involved in a prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. ACDA's research program in the field of chemical weapons has concentrated on solving the technical problems involved in verifying compliance with such a ban. This has included studies of the utility of economic controls in supporting the verification of a CW ban. In addition, ACDA personnel have conducted field studies concerned with transportation and storage of chemical agents and munitions and are continuing to monitor the US Army's destruction programs for chemical and biological weapons.

It is expected that measures to effect a ban on chemical weapons will continue to be a topic for discussions at the CCD in 1972. President Nixon resubmitted the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to the US Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on August 19, 1970. The Protocol prohibits the use in war of "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of bacteriological methods of warfare."³⁵

There are now 98 parties to the Protocol, including all of the NATO countries, Japan, the Warsaw Pact nations and the People's Republic of China. Although the United States is not yet a party, it has supported the principles and objectives of the Protocol.

Comprehensive Test Ban

In messages to the CCD, President Nixon has reaffirmed long-standing US support for a comprehensive test ban treaty which can be adequately verified.

³² *Ante*, pp. 456-460, 568-573.

³³ *Ante*, p. 711.

³⁴ *Ante*, pp. 884-889.

³⁵ The protocol appears in *Documents on Disarmament, 1969*, pp. 764-765. For President Nixon's message, see *ibid.*, 1970, pp. 445-446.

The Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT), which entered into force in 1963, prohibits the testing of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water. It also prohibits underground tests which cause radioactive debris to be present outside the territory of the testing state.³⁶ It was possible to agree to such a limited test ban because all parties felt capable of verifying compliance with the treaty relying solely on their own national means.

The United States and the Soviet Union have been unable to agree on the measures needed to adequately verify a comprehensive test ban which includes all underground tests. The United States maintains that verification capabilities by national means have not yet reached the point where adequate verification of a comprehensive test ban can be achieved without some on-site inspections as a supplemental measure.

The Soviets, however, maintain that national means of verification are sufficient.

The United States has conducted intensive research to improve and refine its means for detecting and identifying underground nuclear explosions. In the past several years the capability of various seismic techniques for detection and discrimination has improved significantly. International cooperation in sharing the results of seismic studies also has increased. ACDA studies are under way to analyze seismic signatures to provide improved discrimination between nuclear events and natural events and to explore the capability of unattended tamper-resistant instrumentation to provide information on the nature of seismic events. ACDA has also investigated the techniques and usefulness of on-site inspections in connection with an underground peaceful nuclear explosive experiment, "Rulison," conducted in Colorado.

The comprehensive test ban issue retains a high priority on the agenda of the CCD, where the US participated constructively in discussion of seismic verification techniques in June, 1971.

The last four Presidents have stated that it is an objective of US policy to achieve an adequately verified ban on all nuclear weapon tests. US verification capabilities and requirements are under continuing review. Both the Limited Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty³⁷ express the determination of the parties to seek a comprehensive test ban treaty. The United States views establishment of a comprehensive test ban as yet another means for restraining the nuclear arms race and inhibiting the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries.

Controlling Conventional Arms

Conventional arms account for four-fifths of world military expenditures. The cost and sophistication of conventional weaponry continue to increase. Vast quantities of conventional

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 1963, pp. 291-293.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, 1968, pp. 461-465.

arms are produced not only for use by the producing countries but also for export to other countries. International transfers of arms exceed \$5 billion annually.

The uncontrolled acquisition of conventional weaponry, either from indigenous production or by import, may fuel regional arms races and increase the risk of hostilities in many parts of the globe. One need only look at the Middle East or South Asia for examples of this danger. Furthermore, such acquisitions constitute a drain on resources which might otherwise be used to meet the increasing demands for economic and social betterment in the developing as well as in developed countries of the world.

The US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency continues to search for practical international arrangements to limit conventional arms. The Agency has intensified its examination of the contribution which conventional arms limitations might make to world peace and stability. To this end a series of studies was initiated in 1971 to assess the potential utility of various types of controls in particular areas. These studies have considered the feasibility of limitations on force and armament levels, indigenous arms production, and international transfers of arms. Consideration has been given to arrangements which might involve arms-producing states, arms-exporting states, and arms recipients. ACDA's participation in studies undertaken by the interdepartmental groups of the National Security Council also provides the Agency with an opportunity to suggest controls over conventional arms which might contribute to the achievement of US foreign policy objectives. At the request of ACDA, a major study of conventional arms control prospects was initiated during the year on an interagency basis.

In addition to examining possible multilateral arrangements to limit conventional arms, ACDA has continued to participate in the formulation and implementation of US arms export policy. In this process the Agency assesses whether a particular transfer may stimulate arms races, contribute to the outbreak or escalation of hostilities, inhibit the development of multilateral arms control arrangements, or hinder economic and social development.

ACDA makes known its views on arms supply issues through participation in the National Security Council and its subordinate bodies, and through membership on the interagency Security Assistance Program Review Committee established by the Department of State in August 1971.

There has been continuing interest in the conventional arms problem in the CCD and in other international forums, although it must be said that regrettably little progress has been made.

In his remarks of August 26, 1971, Ambassador James F. Leonard, the US Representative at the CCD, discussed the reluctance of many countries even to consider conventional arms control, in part because of fear that this might weaken their sovereignty or make them more dependent upon others for

survival. US efforts have been directed at stimulating discussion of various alternative approaches to conventional arms control that might prove feasible on a local, regional, or world-wide basis. Ambassador Leonard appealed to the CCD to "make clear that the members of this Committee, to which the United Nations looks for a lead in the disarmament field, are determined to come to grips with the vast question of conventional arms at the same time as we continue our pursuit of measures pertaining to weapons of mass destruction."³⁸

STATUS AND IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING TREATIES

Nonproliferation Treaty

The ultimate measure of a treaty is its effective implementation after it has entered into force. Thus the entry into force of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970 was simply an auspicious beginning; and efforts were needed to insure that the promise of that Treaty would be fulfilled. On the US side, ACDA has participated actively in these efforts.

The NPT is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to states which do not now possess them, thus reducing the likelihood of an outbreak of nuclear war. To this end, Article III of the treaty provides for safeguards to insure that fissionable materials are not diverted from peaceful uses to the production of nuclear weapons. It requires non-nuclear weapon states that are parties to the treaty or that receive nuclear fuel from treaty parties to negotiate concrete agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)—a UN-associated agency with headquarters in Vienna—implementing this article of the NPT.

The most important steps toward implementation of this article in 1971 were the completion of the work of the Safeguards Committee of the IAEA; the conclusion of the first safeguard agreements specifically designed to meet the requirements of the NPT; the commencement of negotiations between IAEA and EURATOM of an agreement designed to meet such requirements; and further progress in safeguards research and development.

The Safeguards Committee completed and reached a remarkable degree of consensus on a document (INF/CIRC/153) which sets forth detailed recommendations with respect to the structure and content of agreements with the IAEA designed to fulfill the requirements of Article III of the NPT, and treats such matters as the types of records and reports required and the nature, purpose, scope, and frequency of inspections by the IAEA, and the access to be given to inspectors.³⁹ The Safeguards Committee also reached a solution, approved by the General Conference of the IAEA on October 8, 1971, to the problem of financing safeguards. In essence, this solution provides that the cost of safeguards in

³⁸ *Ante*, p. 537.

³⁹ *Ante*, pp. 218-244.

member states of the IAEA will continue to be financed out of the regularly assessed budget of the IAEA but that such assessments will be adjusted so as to provide financial relief to members with relatively low per capita net national products.

Once these financing arrangements were settled and the recommendations had been approved by IAEA, definite negotiations got under way. The Board of Governors has already approved agreements between IAEA and the following states: Austria, Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Hungary, Poland, and Uruguay. Active negotiations were also commenced by many other NPT parties and signatories. Among the most significant are the negotiations between IAEA and EURATOM (covering nuclear activities in the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) and that between the IAEA and Japan. In addition, negotiations began on an agreement implementing the offer, initially made by the United States in 1967 and reaffirmed by President Nixon in 1969, to permit the IAEA to safeguard U.S. facilities. Negotiations also started on a similar offer made by the United Kingdom.

The work of the Safeguards Committee made clearer than ever before the need to maximize the cost-effectiveness of IAEA safeguards and to proceed with the research, development, and other efforts contemplated in the Preamble to the NPT "to further the application of the principle of safeguarding effectively the flow of source and special fissionable materials by use of instruments and other techniques at certain strategic points."⁴⁰ In this connection, ACDA has continued to make significant contributions that supplement the safeguards research programs of the IAEA.

In response to IAEA safeguards requirements, ACDA and the USAEC (US Atomic Energy Commission), in cooperation with IAEA, have undertaken the design, fabrication and installation of new types of tamper-resistant, unattended safeguards instrumentation. This equipment, to be installed in the GE chemical reprocessing plant at Morris, Illinois, will be jointly evaluated to determine its cost-effectiveness in NPT safeguards.

Another ACDA safeguards research effort has involved both theoretical and experimental work on the potential application of Minor Isotope Safeguards Techniques (MIST) to nuclear reactors, nuclear fuel reprocessing plants, and enrichment plants. These investigations, some undertaken in cooperation with the IAEA, EURATOM and the USAEC, suggest that these isotopic techniques could be of significant value to the IAEA. International recognition of the potential importance of MIST is indicated by the fact that the IAEA has scheduled an international symposium on the safeguards use of isotopic data for April 1972.

⁴⁰ *Documents on Disarmament*, 1968, p. 461.

The program to develop an unattended tamper-resistant instrumentation system for monitoring the flow of nuclear material in a continuously fueled reactor has progressed through designing and laboratory testing phases. The installation of equipment on the operating reactor at Rolphton, Ontario, will be completed by spring 1972. At that time system testing and determination of the limitations of the equipment will be conducted. The organizations involved in this test, in addition to ACDA, are the Atomic Energy Control Board of Canada, Limited; the US Atomic Energy Commission; the US National Bureau of Standards; the Sandia Corporation; and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

One item of equipment which has been developed under this program is the Reactor Power Monitor, which provides an independent history of the power level of the reactor. From this information an estimate of plutonium production can be made.

A second item is the Spent Fuel Chute Bundle Counter Assembly, whose purpose is to provide a record of the number of irradiated fuel items transferred to storage.

In response to an IAEA requirement for an inexpensive seal which has a high degree of protection against tampering, ACDA is developing sealing systems based on the use of fiber optic devices. These systems produce a record of the ends of a unique fiber optic bundle which unambiguously identifies the seal. A portable camera is used for this purpose. One system involves seals which are fabricated and identified by the manufacturer prior to use and then simply snapped shut when installed.

The other system is assembled and photographed in the field by the inspector using a portable kit. An important feature of the seal is that verification of its integrity can be made quickly and efficiently in the field without destroying the seal. The current design is being evaluated and will be modified, if necessary, on the basis of comments from the IAEA.

Latin American Nuclear-Free Zone Treaty

On May 12, 1971, the United States ratified Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.⁴¹ Earlier in the year, the Senate had given its advice and consent to this action by unanimous vote.

In ratifying this protocol, which was designed for adherence by nuclear weapon states, the United States undertook to respect fully the aims and provisions of the underlying treaty, not to contribute to its violation, and not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the Latin American countries who are parties to the treaty. The United Kingdom has also ratified this protocol, but it has not yet been signed by the Soviet Union, France, or the People's Republic of China.

This was the first time the United States had ever entered into a

⁴¹ For the Tlatelolco Treaty and protocols, see *ibid.*, 1967, pp. 69-83.

legal undertaking that restricted the use of nuclear weapons. This obligation applies only to those Latin American states that are bound by, and act compatibly with, the treaty. In our instrument of ratification we made it clear we would consider that an armed attack by any Latin American state party to the treaty, in which it was assisted by a nuclear weapon state, would be incompatible with its obligations under the treaty.

The treaty was opened for signature in 1967, and is now in force for 17 Latin American countries, with a combined area of over two and a half million square miles and a total population of well over 100 million. It has been signed by all states in the region except Guyana (whose eligibility to sign is in dispute) and Cuba. Thus it was clearly a major regional arms control initiative by our Latin American neighbors. It created the first nuclear-free zone in a populated region of the world. Moreover, as Assistant Secretary of State Charles Meyer testified, the treaty is in U.S. national security interest for at least the following two reasons:

First, it includes an undertaking by the Latin American parties to prevent the type of deployment of nuclear weapons in their territory that occurred in the Cuban missile crisis, and provides for verification of compliance with this undertaking not only by the parties themselves, but by the regional organization they have established and given the right to make special inspections. It is to our advantage to reduce the chances of such deployment, which could upset stability in this hemisphere and add to the number of locations and directions, and in some cases decrease the distance, from which nuclear attacks could be launched against us. And it is also to our advantage to have this additional means of verifying that such deployment has not occurred.

Second, it complements our efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons in several ways. For example, this treaty is already in force for [six] states which have not yet ratified the NPT . . . and it has been signed by three other states that have not yet signed the NPT. Moreover, the treaty requires IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials and facilities under [the] jurisdiction [of the parties].⁴²

Admiral Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, likewise testified in favor of our support of this treaty through ratification of additional Protocol II with the declarations and understandings incorporated in our instrument of ratification. When it was observed that no step had been taken to bring the Panama Canal Zone under the treaty, he noted previous indications that the United States would be agreeable to inclusion of that zone, adding that, "In the meantime, we are prepared to act consistent with the spirit of the treaty . . . We have not deployed nuclear weapons in the Canal Zone and have no intention of doing so. We would, of course, maintain well established transit rights for our naval ships in the Canal."⁴³

This treaty is regarded as an outstanding example of what can be achieved through regional initiatives in arms control, and US ratification of Additional Protocol II reflects the strong support of the United States for this achievement.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

The United States played a major role in the negotiation of the

⁴² *Ibid.*, 1970, pp. 518-519.

⁴³ *Ahte*, p. 19.

Seabed Arms Control Treaty which prohibits the emplacement of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction in an area comprising nearly 70% of the earth's surface. The treaty, negotiated at the CCD, reflects the overall effort of the United States to prohibit, through arms control agreements, the deployment of weapons of mass destruction in areas where they have not yet been introduced. Specifically, the treaty prohibits the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction on the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a 12-mile coastal "seabed zone."⁴⁴

After receiving overwhelming approval from the UN General Assembly,⁴⁵ the Seabed Arms Control Treaty was opened for signature in Washington, London, and Moscow on February 11, 1971. At the opening ceremonies in the three capitals more than 60 countries signed the treaty. By the end of 1971, a total of 85 countries had signed and 23 countries had ratified it.

President Nixon submitted the Seabed Arms Control Treaty to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification on July 21, 1971.⁴⁶ Senate hearings on the treaty are expected early in 1972. The treaty will enter into force when it has been ratified by 22 governments, including the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union.

Antarctic Treaty

1971 marked the tenth anniversary of the Antarctic Treaty⁴⁷ which preserves Antarctica for peaceful purposes and the pursuit of scientific knowledge. The treaty includes arms control provisions which prohibit all military activity and ban nuclear waste disposal and nuclear explosions on the continent. Since its inception, the treaty has been successful in fulfilling its objective of promoting scientific research on the continent despite the political problems which from time to time have affected relations among the 16 signatory nations.

Article VII of the treaty established an unlimited right of inspection of all stations, installations, and equipment on the continent. Any signatory nation may send observers to conduct inspections at any time. Argentina, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have exercised this right of inspection. The United States conducted inspections in 1964, 1967, and 1971.

As part of its responsibility for the operation of designated arms control verification systems, ACDA organizes, conducts and evaluates Antarctic inspections by the United States. This year an American team of six observers was sent to verify compliance with the terms of the Antarctic Treaty. Specifically, the team was to

⁴⁴ *Ante*, pp. 7-11.

⁴⁵ See *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 680-681.

⁴⁶ See *ante*, pp. 430-431.

⁴⁷ *Documents on Disarmament, 1945-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

observe scientific programs and equipment, logistic and support activities, and the conservation of living resources.

On February 12 the observers set out from the American Antarctic base at McMurdo aboard the Coast Guard icebreaker *Staten Island* to inspect such coastal stations as weather and ice conditions would permit. During the next four weeks they inspected the French station, Dumont d'Urville; the Australian station, Casey; the Soviet station; Mirnyy; and the Australian station, Mawson.

Although inspection plans called for a circumnavigation of the continent, damage sustained by the icebreaker near Mawson forced it to withdraw from Antarctic waters.

The observers were well received at each station. All facilities were opened to them and all programs freely described by station personnel. No military activities, armaments, or prohibited nuclear activities were observed and all scientific programs were in accord with previously published plans. The observed activities at each station were in compliance with the provisions and spirit of the Antarctic Treaty.

The final report of the 1971 Antarctic Inspection was published in July and, in accordance with the provisions of the treaty, transmitted to the governments of the signatory nations.

MUTUAL AND BALANCED FORCE REDUCTIONS

ACDA has continued during the past year to study, along with other US Government agencies, issues involved in possible mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe (MBFR). The aim of such reductions would be to achieve a more stable East-West military balance in Europe at lower force levels. Accordingly, ACDA chaired an interdepartmental working group that developed a number of hypothetical reduction goals or "options" that in turn were subjected to intensive military and political analysis. ACDA has also participated in studies of such related issues as our ability to verify particular types of reductions.

The US has shared the results of its studies with its NATO allies. In addition, the US continues to take an active part in NATO discussions and studies aimed at formulating specific MBFR principles and elements which could form the basis for initial discussions with the East.

The NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers' meeting in October took the first concrete Western step towards these discussions by designating Manlio Brosio of Italy as an "explorer" to conduct preliminary talks with the Soviets and other interested governments on behalf of the countries appointing him (not NATO as such).

The Soviet Government had earlier publicly signaled its interest in MBFR—following NATO's twice-repeated invitation in 1970 to explore the possibility of force reductions—in the form of two somewhat cryptic statements by the Secretary General of the

Soviet Communist Party, Leonid Brezhnev. In a report to the 24th Party Congress, Mr. Brezhnev stated that he favored dismantling foreign military bases and reducing armed forces and armaments in areas of military confrontation, especially Central Europe.⁴⁸ Two months later Brezhnev asserted without further elaboration the willingness of the Soviet Union to begin negotiations.⁴⁹

The NATO Ministers meeting in Brussels on December 9 and 10, expressed regret that the Soviet Government had so far failed to respond to the allied initiatives. Noting statements by Soviet leaders to the effect that they hoped East-West talks on force reductions in Europe would begin as soon as possible, the NATO Ministers expressed the hope that Brosio would soon be able to go to Moscow.⁵⁰

MILITARY EXPENDITURES AND ECONOMIC IMPACT

The Agency continues to be a leading source of statistical information on world military expenditures and the significance of this spending on the world economy.

World arms spending is estimated to exceed \$200 billion a year, or more than 6% of the world product; and there is no evidence as yet of a worldwide tendency to reduce or restrict military expenditures.

It is estimated that the number of Americans engaged in defense-related work and/or in the armed forces has been reduced by more than two million in the past three years. Total defense-related employment—that is, armed forces, Department of Defense civilian employment, and private defense contractor employment—in fiscal year 1971 is estimated at six million, slightly above the level in fiscal year 1965, preceding the Vietnam build-up.

While ACDA does not itself have operational authority in the economic conversion area, it has continued to be a source of information for US Government agencies and others directly concerned with the role of the defense industry in the US economy and with problems of readjustment arising out of cutbacks in defense spending. ACDA's research on questions relating to labor, industrial, and regional adjustment represents the largest single fund of information assembled on this subject. More than 25 research projects have been completed. An effort is now being made to summarize the policy conclusions in the completed research programs in order to make them more readily accessible to operating agencies.

ACDA's annual reports on World Military Expenditures, showing trends in defense expenditures in 120 countries compared with other economic indicators, provided much of the factual basis for

⁴⁸ *Ante*, p. 196.

⁴⁹ *Pravda*, June 12, 1971, pp. 1-2; *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIII, no. 24 (July 13, 1971), p. 20.

⁵⁰ *Ante*, p. 857.

a UN study in 1971 of the economic and social consequences of the arms race over the past decade.⁵¹

THE AGENCY AT WORK

The Mandate

The Arms Control and Disarmament Agency has the statutory responsibility of providing the President, the Secretary of State, and the Congress with recommendations concerning the scope and direction of American policy on arms control matters, and with assessing the effects of these arms control recommendations on our national security, on our foreign policy, and on our economy.

The Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is the principal adviser to the President and Secretary of State on arms control activities and has the primary responsibility within the Government for coordinating all arms control matters.

The Agency has four major areas of responsibility in the arms control field:

- (1) the conduct, support, and coordination of research leading to policy formulation;
- (2) the preparation and conduct of international negotiations;
- (3) the dissemination and coordination of public information; and
- (4) the preparation and operation of international control systems and inspections.

The Structure

ACDA has an annual budget of around \$9 million and a staff of about 240 people. Resources therefore have to be carefully allocated to obtain maximum results. About half of the Agency's total budget is devoted to salaries for a highly trained professional staff which, for the most part, is either recruited from the physical and social sciences, or borrowed on a reimbursable basis from other agencies, primarily the State and Defense Departments. The other half is roughly proportional—one-third to the conduct of international arms control negotiations (predominantly SALT) plus certain expenses of US participation in other negotiating forums such as the CCD and the UNGA: a third for research activities, most of which are designed to backstop negotiations; and the rest for support of public affairs, inspection, and administrative activities.

ACDA is made up of four Bureaus and three Offices.

The Bureaus are:

International Relations—which is primarily responsible for multilateral arms control negotiations at Geneva, in the United Nations, and in connection with MBFR;

Science and Technology—which has primary staff responsibility

⁵¹ *Ante*, pp. 644-686.

for SALT and other arms control matters relating to weapons of mass destruction, including verification aspects;

Weapons Evaluation and Control—which deals with military aspects of arms control matters, verification of compliance, inspections, and control; and

Economic Affairs—which deals with the economic and social aspects of military spending and arms control measures, handles matters relating to the control of conventional arms transfers, and prepares historical records of arms control negotiations.

The ACDA Offices are:

General Counsel—is responsible for matters of domestic and international law including the legal aspects of treaties and negotiations, and handles relations with the Congress.

Public Affairs Adviser—services domestic and foreign media, coordinates information policies with the White House, Departments of State and Defense, and the US Atomic Energy Commission, and prepares information reports for public distribution.

Executive—prepares and controls the budget, and handles general administration including personnel, contracting, and security matters.

Policy Formulation and Coordination

The Agency is responsible under the President and Secretary of State for the formulation and coordination of arms control policies within the Government.

International Negotiations

The Agency is responsible for planning, coordinating, conducting, funding, and administering the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union. The Director heads the US SALT Delegation. ACDA is also responsible for United States participation in the CCD as well as for US input into United Nations disarmament debates. The Agency's Assistant Director for International Relations currently heads the US Delegation to the CCD and advises the US United Nations Delegation on arms control matters.

Research

The coordination and conduct of research in support of arms control policy formulation and international negotiations is a basic function of ACDA. Research activities have built up a fund of theoretical and practical knowledge in such divergent fields as force posture evaluation, verification of arms control agreements by sensors and other means, the economic impact of defense cutbacks, and estimates of world-wide military expenditures. In addition to the research carried out by the ACDA staff, a significant portion is contracted out to universities, private research organizations, and to other Government Agencies.

ACDA also utilizes consultants from a wide variety of areas including the academic and scientific communities.

As an extension of its research activities, the Agency carries out a program of field tests in support of its major arms control activities. These tests assure that the techniques and equipment developed for arms control systems are effective and reliable under operational field conditions.

A research policy committee within the Agency, under the chairmanship of the Director, provides overall guidance for the Agency's research program. This committee reviews the adequacy of ACDA research policies, procedures, and programs in the light of US national security objectives.

ACDA is also represented on a new interagency group for research coordination, the Subcommittee on Foreign Affairs Research of the Under Secretaries Committee. Chaired by the Department of State, the Subcommittee is charged with coordinating government-sponsored research in the foreign affairs field. The ACDA representative is the Assistant Director for Economic Affairs.

Inspections

The Agency's statutory functions include the preparation and operation of US participation in control systems designed to verify compliance with the provisions of arms control agreements. Two existing agreements—the Antarctic Treaty⁵² and the Outer Space Treaty⁵³—now have provisions for inspections. In 1964, 1967, and 1971 the Agency conducted on-site inspections under the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. No inspections have been carried out under the Outer Space Treaty.

Congressional Relations

The office of the General Counsel has the day-to-day responsibility for maintaining liaison with Members of Congress with respect to developments in arms control policy and negotiations. The office supports the regular and special appearances of the Director and other top Agency officers before various Congressional committees. In addition, the office makes certain that the views of Senators and Representatives on arms control matters are brought to the Director's attention, and it makes pertinent arms control information available to Members of Congress, their staffs, and their constituents.

Public Affairs

The Public Affairs Adviser and his staff are responsible for the coordination and dissemination of public information on arms control developments. The Public Affairs office maintains regular contact with representatives of both domestic and foreign news media. The Public Affairs Adviser served as US Delegation

⁵² *Documents on Disarmament, 1954-1959*, vol. II, pp. 1550-1556.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, 1967, pp. 38-43.

spokesman at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and a senior Public Affairs officer was the US Delegation spokesman at the Geneva disarmament conference.

The office provides advice on public information aspects of arms control to the White House, the Secretary of State, the Director of ACDA, and the State Department press spokesman.

Last year ACDA officers addressed about 3,000 individuals—mostly students—at briefing sessions in the State Department. Briefings of this sort are arranged upon request for groups coming to Washington.

In addition, ACDA officers filled 100 speaking engagements before various types of audiences throughout the country. These are also arranged upon request, provided the host institution or organization pays travel expenses. Lecture fees and honoraria are not accepted.

In arranging these meetings the Agency seeks not only to provide information on the US Government's activities and policies in the field of arms control, but also to elicit opinions, suggestions and insights developed in the discussion which follow the presentations.

Among ACDA publications in 1971 were:

Tenth Annual Report (a survey of Agency operations in the preceding calendar year);

Arms Control Achievements, 1959-1971 (a thumbnail description of existing agreements and on-going arms control negotiations);

Arms Control and National Security (a basic guide outlining contemporary arms control concepts and issues);

World Military Expenditures, 1970 (a statistical summary);

Documents on Disarmament, 1970 (part of an annual series which collects and reprints selected statements, proposals, and documents of both US and foreign origin);

Arms Control and Disarmament, A Quarterly Bibliography (a summary of current articles and books in the arms control and national security field produced by the Library of Congress under an ACDA reimbursable agreement).

Most ACDA publications and unclassified research reports are available in ACDA depository libraries (Appendix G)^{5 4} throughout the country.

The emergence of arms control as a major factor on the diplomatic scene is also reflected in the educational curricula of schools and colleges. Courses in arms control are given in a wide variety of departments, including political science, physics, theology, ethics, psychology, national security studies, international relations, international law, and military science. In addition, arms control is given attention in special interdisciplinary seminars,

^{5 4}Not printed here.

conferences, and study programs. Intensified diplomatic activity in this field during the last decade is reflected in more detailed and more analytic approaches in most textbooks and encyclopedias.

The Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau has assisted the Army War College and the National War College in the development of courses in the arms control field. A syllabus entitled "The Strategy of Arms Control and Disarmament" was prepared this year as a supplemental aid to course work.

Members of the Agency staff have been available for consultation with teachers preparing curricula, authors and publishers, producers of teaching materials, and conference planners. In addition, Agency publications are used for classroom assignments.

Social Science Advisory Board

The Social Science Advisory Board (SSAB), established by the Director in March 1964, is a group of distinguished scholars from the various social science disciplines who advise the Agency on the social science aspect of Agency programs and on means whereby the social sciences can help the Agency attain its arms control and disarmament objectives. (The present members are listed in Appendix F.)⁵⁵

Board members are an important channel of communication between the Agency and the academic community. Through them the Agency learns about developments in the social sciences that are relevant to ACDA operations. It is also through the SSAB that the academic community and individual scholars increase their knowledge and understanding of the Agency's activities.

The Board met twice in 1971, on May 28 and November 19. During these meetings the members were briefed on recent Agency activities and on planned programs and projects. In turn, the SSAB members offered advice and guidance on these activities, particularly on those projects involving social science research, and brought Agency officers up to date on relevant work in their respective fields. Subjects on which the SSAB has recently been consulted include the worldwide arms trade, the impact of defense spending on economic development in the developing countries, problems of conversion from military to nonmilitary production, and utilization of the behavioral sciences.

Between sessions, individual SSAB members are called upon for advice and assistance on specific ACDA projects.

GENERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

The General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament was established by the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 "to advise the President, the Secretary of State, and the Disarmament Director respecting matters affecting arms control, disarmament, and world peace." The law provides that

⁵⁵ *Infra.*

the President appoint the Committee by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.⁵⁶

President Nixon reconstituted the Committee in 1969 with the reappointment of John J. McCloy as Chairman and the appointment of 14 new members. The President stated that he wished the Committee to be an independent advisory body.

On December 16, 1969, the President met with the Committee and placed several specific problems before it for study and advice in connection with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. On subsequent occasions during the last two years the President asked for the Committee's analytical judgment on a number of other policy issues related to SALT and other arms control matters which would supplement judgments he receives from within the Executive Branch.

The Committee has so far convened for 32 full-day sessions, 11 during the last calendar year, to hear expert testimony and to examine extensive classified and public documentation on the major political and strategic issues related to arms control. It has reviewed the key problems raised by SALT in the context of Soviet strategic and conventional capabilities, as well as questions relating to mutual and balanced force reductions, a Conference on European Security, and other aspects of European arms limitation policy. It has also studied strategic developments bearing on other areas, such as China, and kept abreast of major technical developments relating to the arms race.

During 1971 the Committee met with 57 recognized authorities both within and outside the government on the questions under study. These included the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Dr. Henry Kissinger; the Under Secretary of State, John Irwin; George Ball, former Under Secretary of State; Dr. Paul Frank, State Secretary of the German Foreign Office; former Deputy Secretary of Defense, David Packard, and Professor Marshall Shulman of Columbia University. The Committee met frequently with the Director of ACDA, Gerard C. Smith, and with his Deputy, Philip J. Farley.

Also included among those who met with the Committee during 1971 to discuss national security and arms control questions were the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Mr. Richard Helms; Professor Michel Oksenberg of Columbia University; Dr. John Newhouse, formerly of the Brookings Institution; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Moorer; Drs. Herbert York and Herbert Scoville, Jr., of the Federation of American Scientists; Under Secretary of the Treasury, Paul Volcker; Professor Robert Bowie of Harvard University; and Peter Peterson, the Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs.

⁵⁶ *Documents on Disarmament, 1961*, p. 485.

In fulfillment of its statutory responsibilities, the Committee, during the past year, furnished the President with specific recommendations on a number of major issues relating to SALT, MBFR, and related aspects of European policy. At the invitation of the President, the Chairman also met with the National Security Council on several occasions.

In order to assist the Committee in the performance of its work, the Chairman has a small staff located in the Committee's offices in the Department of State.

At the end of 1971, the members of the Committee appointed by President Nixon were:

John J. McCloy, lawyer, former adviser on disarmament to President Kennedy, retired Chairman of the Chase Manhattan Bank, former Chairman of the Ford Foundation, President of the World Bank, US High Commissioner for Germany, the Assistant Secretary of War during the Second World War.

I. W. Abel, President of the United Steel Workers of America.

Dr. Harold Brown, scientist, President of the California Institute of Technology, member of the SALT delegation, and former Secretary of the Air Force.

William C. Foster, former Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and former Deputy Secretary of Defense.

Kermit Gordon, economist, President of the Brookings Institution, former member of the Council of Economic Advisers, and Director of the Bureau of the Budget.

Dr. James R. Killian, former President and Chairman of the Corporation of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.

General Lauris Norstad, USAF (Ret.), Chairman of the Board and President of the Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corporation, and former Supreme Allied Commander in Europe.

Dr. Jack Ruina, scientist, Professor of Electrical Engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, former President, Institute for Defense Analyses, and Assistant Director for Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense.

Dean Rusk, Professor of International Law, University of Georgia, former Secretary of State.

Governor William Scranton, lawyer, former Governor of Pennsylvania, and former Member of Congress.

Dr. John Archibald Wheeler, scientist, Joseph Henry Professor of Physics at Princeton.

Three members appointed by President Nixon resigned during 1971. They are *Mr. William J. Casey*, who was named head of the Securities and Exchange Commission; *Mr. Peter Peterson*, who was appointed Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs; and *Mr. Cyrus Vance*, who resigned for business and personal reasons.

APPENDIX F

*Social Science Advisory Board**Chairman*

Abram Bergson, Department of Economics, Harvard University,
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Morris Janowitz, Department of Sociology, University of
Chicago, Chicago, Ill.

Saul H. Mendlovitz, School of Law, Rutgers University,
Newark, N.J.

APPENDIX H

Agency Officials

Director: Gerard C. Smith

Deputy Director: Philip J. Farley

Special Assistant to the Director and Executive Secretary:
Albert M. Christopher

Counselor:

Lawrence D. Weiler

Special Assistant for Plans to the Deputy Director:
Benjamin Huberman

Assistant Director, International Relations Bureau:

James F. Leonard

Deputy: Arthur R. Day

Assistant Director, Science and Technology Bureau:

Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr.

Deputy: Sidney N. Graybeal

Assistant Director, Weapons Evaluation and Control Bureau:

Vice Adm. John M. Lee, USN

Deputy: Ira B. Richards

Assistant Director, Economic Affairs Bureau:

Robert H.B. Wade

Deputy: Vacant

General Counsel: William W. Hancock

Deputy: Charles N. Van Doren

Public Affairs Adviser: Nedville E. Nordness

Deputy: Ralph Stuart Smith

Executive Director: Sanford Menter

Deputy: Emery J. Adams

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² Printed in *Documents on Disarmament, 1970*, pp. 702-733.

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⁷ Excerpts printed *ante*, pp. 44-75.

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